[JPRT 107-32]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



107th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
                         JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT                  
 1st Session                                                    107-32
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
                    COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
                           PRACTICES FOR 2000
                                VOLUME I

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                            SUBMITTED TO THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                              U.S. SENATE

                                AND THE

                  COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                 BY THE

                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

     IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN 
                   ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

                                     




                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-555v1                   WASHINGTON : 2001

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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr, Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland           JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota         BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California            LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Isdland
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey     GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
    Virginia
                     Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
            Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

                  COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                   HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         TOM LANTOS, California
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa                 HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska              GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 
DAN BURTON, Indiana                      Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California           DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina       SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California         CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
PETER T. KING, New York              BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York               JIM DAVIS, Florida
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana              GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado         BARBARA LEE, California
RON PAUL, Texas                      JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
NICK SMITH, Michigan                 JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania        EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
DARRELL E. ISSA, California          SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia                GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana              DIANE E. WATSON, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
         Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Staff Director/General Counsel
               Robert R. King, Democratic Staff Director
      Kristin Gilley, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel

                                  (ii)

  


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Foreword.........................................................   vii

Letter of Transmittal............................................    ix

Preface..........................................................    xi

Overview and Acknowledgments.....................................  xiii

Introduction.....................................................  xvii

                                Volume I

Africa:
    Angola.......................................................     1
    Benin........................................................    16
    Botswana.....................................................    25
    Burkina Faso.................................................    36
    Burundi......................................................    46
    Cameroon.....................................................    59
    Cape Verde...................................................    85
    Central African Republic.....................................    91
    Chad.........................................................   103
    Comoros......................................................   115
    Congo, Democratic Republic of................................   122
    Congo, Republic of...........................................   156
    Cote d'Ivoire................................................   166
    Djibouti.....................................................   193
    Equatorial Guinea............................................   204
    Eritrea......................................................   215
    Ethiopia.....................................................   228
    Gabon........................................................   253
    Gambia, The..................................................   262
    Ghana........................................................   272
    Guinea.......................................................   294
    Guinea-Bissau................................................   310
    Kenya........................................................   317
    Lesotho......................................................   345
    Liberia......................................................   353
    Madagascar...................................................   367
    Malawi.......................................................   374
    Mali.........................................................   382
    Mauritania...................................................   391
    Mauritius....................................................   407
    Mozambique...................................................   415
    Namibia......................................................   433
    Niger........................................................   446
    Nigeria......................................................   455
    Rwanda.......................................................   479
    Sao Tome and Principe........................................   493
    Senegal......................................................   496
    Seychelles...................................................   507
    Sierra Leone.................................................   513
    Somalia......................................................   524
    South Africa.................................................   537
    Sudan........................................................   557
    Swaziland....................................................   579
    Tanzania.....................................................   588
    Togo.........................................................   608
    Uganda.......................................................   622
    Zambia.......................................................   642
    Zimbabwe.....................................................   656

East Asia and the Pacific:
    Australia....................................................   683
    Brunei.......................................................   693
    Burma........................................................   700
    Cambodia.....................................................   723
    China (includes Hong Kong and Macau).........................   736
    China (Taiwan only)..........................................   824
    East Timor...................................................   836
    Fiji.........................................................   846
    Indonesia....................................................   858
    Japan........................................................   899
    Kiribati.....................................................   912
    Korea, Democratic People's Republic of.......................   914
    Korea, Republic of...........................................   927
    Laos.........................................................   938
    Malaysia.....................................................   950
    Marshall Islands.............................................   985
    Micronesia, Federated States of..............................   989
    Mongolia.....................................................   992
    Nauru........................................................   999
    New Zealand..................................................  1002
    Palau........................................................  1008
    Papua New Guinea.............................................  1012
    Philippines..................................................  1017
    Samoa........................................................  1036
    Singapore....................................................  1040
    Solomon Islands..............................................  1054
    Thailand.....................................................  1062
    Tonga........................................................  1076
    Tuvalu.......................................................  1079
    Vanuatu......................................................  1082
    Vietnam......................................................  1085

                               Volume II

Europe:
    Albania......................................................  1107
    Andorra......................................................  1118
    Armenia......................................................  1121
    Austria......................................................  1137
    Azerbaijan...................................................  1147
    Belarus......................................................  1164
    Belgium......................................................  1192
    Bosnia and Herzegovina.......................................  1200
    Bulgaria.....................................................  1223
    Croatia......................................................  1241
    Cyprus.......................................................  1260
    Czech Republic...............................................  1271
    Denmark......................................................  1290
    Estonia......................................................  1294
    Finland......................................................  1302
    France.......................................................  1306
    Georgia......................................................  1318
    Germany......................................................  1341
    Greece.......................................................  1355
    Hungary......................................................  1371
    Iceland......................................................  1383
    Ireland......................................................  1390
    Italy........................................................  1399
    Kazakhstan...................................................  1407
    Kyrgyzstan...................................................  1434
    Latvia.......................................................  1450
    Liechtenstein................................................  1457
    Lithuania....................................................  1462
    Luxembourg...................................................  1471
    Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of.......................  1474
    Malta........................................................  1485
    Moldova......................................................  1489
    Monaco.......................................................  1503
    Netherlands, The.............................................  1506
    Norway.......................................................  1513
    Poland.......................................................  1517
    Portugal.....................................................  1535
    Romania......................................................  1542
    Russia.......................................................  1555
    San Marino...................................................  1605
    Slovak Republic..............................................  1608
    Slovenia.....................................................  1621
    Spain........................................................  1626
    Sweden.......................................................  1637
    Switzerland..................................................  1645
    Tajikistan...................................................  1656
    Turkey.......................................................  1670
    Turkmenistan.................................................  1707
    Ukraine......................................................  1718
    United Kingdom...............................................  1742
    Uzbekistan...................................................  1760
    Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of..............................  1780

Near East and North Africa:
    Algeria......................................................  1823
    Bahrain......................................................  1836
    Egypt........................................................  1848
    Iran.........................................................  1869
    Iraq.........................................................  1890
    Israel and the occupied territories..........................  1908
    Jordan.......................................................  1950
    Kuwait.......................................................  1968
    Lebanon......................................................  1983
    Libya........................................................  1998
    Morocco......................................................  2007
    The Western Sahara...........................................  2050
    Oman.........................................................  2055
    Qatar........................................................  2064
    Saudi Arabia.................................................  2071
    Syria........................................................  2087
    Tunisia......................................................  2100
    United Arab Emirates.........................................  2120
    Yemen........................................................  2131

South Asia:
    Afghanistan..................................................  2157
    Bangladesh...................................................  2175
    Bhutan.......................................................  2201
    India........................................................  2212
    Maldives.....................................................  2263
    Nepal........................................................  2271
    Pakistan.....................................................  2286
    Sri Lanka....................................................  2325

Western Hemisphere
    Antigua and Barbuda..........................................  2351
    Argentina....................................................  2356
    Bahamas......................................................  2371
    Barbados.....................................................  2377
    Belize.......................................................  2383
    Bolivia......................................................  2390
    Brazil.......................................................  2403
    Canada.......................................................  2431
    Chile........................................................  2440
    Colombia.....................................................  2453
    Costa Rica...................................................  2498
    Cuba.........................................................  2506
    Dominica.....................................................  2526
    Dominican Republic...........................................  2530
    Ecuador......................................................  2551
    El Salvador..................................................  2563
    Grenada......................................................  2577
    Guatemala....................................................  2581
    Guyana.......................................................  2615
    Haiti........................................................  2625
    Honduras.....................................................  2642
    Jamaica......................................................  2662
    Mexico.......................................................  2671
    Nicaragua....................................................  2701
    Panama.......................................................  2719
    Paraguay.....................................................  2734
    Peru.........................................................  2745
    St. Kitts and Nevis..........................................  2776
    Saint Lucia..................................................  2779
    St. Vincent and the Grenadines...............................  2784
    Suriname.....................................................  2789
    Trinidad and Tobago..........................................  2796
    Uruguay......................................................  2802
    Venezuela....................................................  2809

Appendixes:
    A. Notes on preparation of the reports.......................  2829
    B. Reporting on worker rights................................  2831
    C. Selected international human rights conventions...........  2833
    D. Explanation of chart in Appendix C........................  2836
    E. FY 2000 U.S. economic and military assistance--actual 
      obligations................................................  2837
    F. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting 
      record.....................................................  2849
    G. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting 
      table......................................................  2851
    H. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights......  2854




                                FOREWORD

                              ----------                              

    The country reports on human rights practices contained 
herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance 
with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative 
requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.
    The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations 
that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not. 
They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the 
consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance 
legislation.

                                       Jesse Helms,
                          Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

                                      Henry J. Hyde
                    Chairman, Committee on International Relations.

                                 (vii)

                                     




                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                       Department of State,
                                 Washington, DC, February 25, 2001.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I 
am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2000, prepared in compliance with sections 
116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.
    We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we 
can provide any further information.
            Sincerely,
                                    Barbara Larkin,
                          Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
    Enclosure.

                                  (ix)

                                     
                                PREFACE

                              ----------                              


                      HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

    I am pleased to transmit to the United States Congress this 
25th edition of the Department of State's Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices.
    For the past quarter of a century, these reports have grown 
in breadth and stature every year. As such they reflect our 
country's deep and abiding commitment to universal human rights 
and the unprecedented growth in democracy, freedom, and human 
rights throughout the world.
    The year 2000 saw many improvements in human rights--from 
the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana to the 
defeat of an entrenched dictator in Serbia and the election of 
a new president in Mexico. At the same time, the continued 
deterioration of conditions in China and Cuba and the abusive 
policies pursued by the regimes in Iraq and Sudan and a number 
of other countries offer proof that the battle to promote 
universal human rights is far from finished. We who believe in 
human freedom and the rule of law must not lose sight of the 
challenges that lie before us.
    This year's report covers 195 countries. No country, our 
own included, can claim a perfect human rights record; nor 
should any seek exemption from international scrutiny. Each 
nation must be accountable for the way it treats its citizens. 
The purpose of these reports, therefore, is to provide to the 
best of our ability a comprehensive and accurate report on the 
human rights conditions in every country.
    The interest in these annual Country Reports can be seen in 
the hundreds of thousands of hits our web site at www.state.gov 
will receive from every part of the world over the next few 
days, and in the countless discussions, both public and 
private, that will follow. The Report for the year 2000 thus 
takes its place within the context of a new and revolutionary 
era of global human discourse. It is my deepest hope, 
therefore, that these reports can stimulate new dialogue and 
provide new encouragement for all countries to strengthen their 
commitments to universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.
    I would like to thank all those who had a hand in preparing 
this year's Country Reports--whether overseas or in the 
Department of State. Without their dedication and hard work, a 
report of this quality and scope would simply be impossible.
                                           Colin L. Powell,
                                                Secretary of State.

                      OVERVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

                              ----------                              


                      HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

Why The Reports Are Prepared
    This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department 
of State in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and section 
504 of the Trade Assistance Act of 1974, as amended. The law 
provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate, by February 25 ``a full and 
complete report regarding the status of internationally 
recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A) 
in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B) 
in all other foreign countries which are members of the United 
Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human 
rights report under this Act.'' We have also included reports 
on several countries that do not fall into the categories 
established by these statutes and that thus are not covered by 
the congressional requirement.
    The responsibility of the United States to speak out on 
behalf of international human rights standards was formalized 
in the early 1970's. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation 
creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of 
State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In 
1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for 
Women's Rights. Congress has also written into law formal 
requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into 
account countries' human rights and worker rights performance 
and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an 
annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only 
countries receiving U.S. aid, numbering 82; this year 195 
reports are submitted.
How The Reports are Prepared
    In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen 
further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections 
in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to 
corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts 
were made to link mission programming to the advancement of 
human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, reflecting both a 
broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking 
issues of human rights, worker rights, and democracy. The 2000 
human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by 
hundreds of State Department, Foreign Service, and other U.S. 
Government employees.
    Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the 
reports, gathered information throughout the year from a 
variety of sources across the political spectrum, including 
government officials, jurists, military sources, journalists, 
human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This 
information-gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign 
Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying 
and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of 
human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of 
individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human 
rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their 
governments.
    After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were 
sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in cooperation with other 
State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate, 
analyze, and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on 
their own sources of information. These included reports 
provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign 
government officials, representatives from the United Nations 
and other international and regional organizations and 
institutions, and experts from academia and the media. Officers 
also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee 
issues, military and police matters, women's issues, and legal 
matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant 
information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly 
as possible.
    The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for 
shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance, 
training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve 
as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private 
groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized 
human rights.
    The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover 
internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and 
worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. There rights include freedom from torture or 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 
from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or 
clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of 
the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.
    Universal human rights aim to incorporate respect for human 
dignity into the processes of government and law. All persons 
have the inalienable right to change their government by 
peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of 
expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion, 
without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a 
necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the 
reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights, 
including the right of association; the right to organize and 
bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory 
labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age 
for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.
    Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
the editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of: 
Editor in Chief--William E. Dilday; Editor in Chief Ex 
Officio--Marc J. Susser; Senior Advisor--Leslie A. Gerson; 
Managing Editor--Jeannette P. Dubrow; Technical Editor--Larry 
Arthur; Senior Editors--Frank B. Crump, Susan F. Kovalik, 
Gregory P. Moody, Diana D. Perry-Elby, Rachel D. Settlage; 
Editors--Sara M. Allinder, Stefanie R. Altman, Liana Brooks, 
Cynthia R. Bunton, Michelle Eyrich Day, Claire Ehmann, Imogen 
Fua, Stanley Ifshin, David T. Jones, Lisa N. Kaplan, Amy E. 
McKee, Martine K. Miller, Donald E. Parker, Jennifer M. 
Pekkinen, Yvette Saint-Andre, John J. Sheerin, Jolynn M. 
Shoemaker, James C. Todd, William J. Tomlyanovich, Stephen W. 
Worrel; Assistant Editors--Eric M. Barboriak, Melanne A. Civic, 
George T. Constantine, Douglas B. Dearborn, Thomas F. Farr, 
Carol G. Finerty, Stephen M. Epstein, Nancy Hewett, Peter 
Higgins, Alden H. Irons, Herman Keizer, Susan E. Keogh, Richard 
Marshall, Janet L. Mayland, Edmund McWilliams, Susan 
O'Sullivan, Maria B. Pica, Tamara J. Resler, Daniel J. Schuman, 
Christopher Sibilla, Wendy B. Silverman, Danika Walters, James 
D. Wulff; Editorial Assistants--Phillip L. Antweiler, Timothy 
Brittingham, Paige E. Chabora, Andrew Chen, Lewis K. Elbinger, 
Charles W. Evans, Dr. Sudha Haley, Rashid U. Haq, Kristy L. 
Hofkens, Adrienne Lauson, David G. Leyden, Coleman Mehta, 
Philip A. Mirrer-Singer, Mark N. Templeton, Steven A. 
Wagenseil, Melissa A. Waters, Gerri L. Williams, Anne Zollner; 
Technical Support--Mitchell R. Brown.

 INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR THE 
                               YEAR 2000

                              ----------                              


               I. The 25th Edition of the Country Reports

    For the past quarter of a century, the Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices have chronicled the ebb and flow of 
human rights, bearing witness to the conditions that affect 
people's lives in every nation of the world. Yet despite all 
the suffering--or perhaps because of it--the cause of human 
rights is stronger now than ever.
    The expansion of democracy and human freedom that the world 
has experienced over the past 25 years has many causes. This 
expansion rests on the fundamental belief that there are rights 
and freedoms to which every human is entitled no matter where 
he or she resides. This idea is so powerful and so universal 
that it gains strength with every passing year.
    The primary focus of the Country Reports always has been 
events in the countries that the reports cover. If newspapers 
are the first drafts of history, the reports are surely the 
second drafts, carefully researched cross-sections of the good 
and bad that transpire around the world every year. But the 
reports are not just history. They are documents backed by the 
full weight of the U.S. people and Government. They speak for 
those who have no voice, bearing witness for those who have not 
had access to free trials, nor have enjoyed other fundamental 
human rights and protections. As the reports have done since 
their first appearance in March 1977, they represent the 
nation's commitment to respect for universal human rights and 
its interest in promoting these rights in every country of the 
world. The reports are a tangible manifestation of the 
Department of State's intense focus on human rights issues.

                         II. The Year in Review

    The year saw a number of advances in human rights, 
democracy, and fundamental freedoms. The Yugoslav people voted 
Slobodan Milosevic out of office in September, ending more than 
a decade of authoritarian rule and offering hope for a new, 
more tolerant and democratic era in Yugoslavia. Nigeria 
continued to make progress in its transition to democracy, 
while a peaceful transfer of authority took place in Ghana 
following generally free and fair elections. Ethiopia and 
Eritrea signed a peace accord in December, ending a conflict 
that created at least a million internally displaced civilians 
in both countries. The election of Vicente Fox marked the first 
time in modern Mexican history that a member of an opposition 
party was elected President. Peru's decision to renew its 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights appeared to represent a renewed 
commitment to the rule of law. And South Korean President Kim 
Dae Jung's engagement policy led to some easing of tensions 
with North Korea.
    U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan reiterated the United 
Nation's support for the promotion of human rights and 
instructed its agencies to place emphasis on both reporting and 
programming initiatives that strengthened respect for human 
rights. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia continued to try alleged war criminals, including a 
war crimes trial based on charges of rape and other sexual 
violence. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda also 
continued to try persons for genocide-related crimes. At the 
regional level, a number of institutions continued to work to 
strengthen democratic norms and practices. The Organization of 
African Unity denied a seat at its summit to Cote d'Ivoire due 
to its 1999 coup. The Organization of American States (OAS) 
sent a mission to Peru in the wake of elections that 
international and domestic observers deemed to be seriously 
flawed. The Government subsequently announced new elections 
that are scheduled to take place in April 2001. The OAS mission 
also sponsored a dialog among government, opposition 
politicians, and civil society representatives aimed at 
reforming the country's beleaguered democratic institutions. 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe engaged 
in active and public human rights reporting in Kosovo and 
monitored elections in a number of countries. A number of 
member states of the Council of Europe began to publish reports 
of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
    At the international level, the global spread of democracy 
was affirmed in both governmental and nongovernmental arenas. 
The Governments of over 100 countries that have chosen a 
democratic path and that represent every region of the world, 
level of development, and various historical experiences, 
convened a June ministerial meeting in Warsaw, Poland, under 
the rubric of a Community of Democracies. Participants endorsed 
the Warsaw Declaration, which committed their Governments to 
uphold democratic principles and practices. The Community of 
Democracies meeting sought to enhance cooperation among 
participating Governments through several avenues, including an 
informal caucus at the U.N. General Assembly to share 
information and support democracy-related issues and 
resolutions within the U.N. system.
    At the same time these positive trends took place, China's 
poor human rights record worsened during the year, as the 
authorities intensified their harsh measures against 
underground Christian groups and Tibetan Buddhists, destroyed 
many houses of worship, and stepped up their campaign against 
the Falun Gong movement. China also sharply suppressed 
organized dissent. In Burma the military continued its severe 
repression, holding Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for 
much of the year, detaining her supporters, imprisoning many 
religious believers, and coercing numerous persons, including 
children, into forced labor. North Korea's situation remained 
among the worst in the world: The Government stifled all 
dissent and widely curtailed freedom of religion, political 
prisoners were held in forced labor camps, and malnutrition 
remained widespread. In Afghanistan the Taliban continued to be 
a major violator of human rights, severely restricting women's 
and girls' access to education, medical facilities, and 
employment. Iraq remained under the complete domination of one 
of the world's most repressive regimes, as security forces 
routinely executed, tortured, beat, raped, or otherwise 
intimidated and abused any perceived political opponents. 
Cuba's overall human rights record remained poor, as the 
Government retained tight surveillance over anyone considered a 
potential opponent. The human rights situation in Belarus 
worsened in a number of areas, as the Lukashenko regime took 
severe measures to neutralize political opponents and repressed 
all calls for democracy. Turkmenistan remained one of the most 
totalitarian countries in the world, as the Committee on 
National Security maintained tight control over the country, 
and a personality cult centered around President Saparmurat 
Niyazov continued. In Israel and the occupied territories, 
following the outbreak of violence in September, Israeli 
security forces sometimes used excessive force in contravention 
of their own rules of engagement, killing approximately 300 
Palestinians and injuring thousands in response to violent 
demonstrations and other clashes in Israel, the West Bank, and 
Gaza. Palestinian security forces and members of Fatah's Tanzim 
killed numerous Israeli soldiers and civilians in the cycle of 
violence.
    Continuing internal conflict marred the human rights 
situation in a number of countries. In Colombia both 
paramilitary and guerrilla groups continued to commit acts of 
violence and other serious abuses in many parts of the country, 
with numerous massacres of civilians and the murder, kidnaping, 
and intimidation of human rights defenders, trade unionists, 
journalists, and other targeted groups. War, exacerbated by 
external intervention, continued to wrack the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, enabling perpetrators of human rights 
violations to enjoy virtual impunity in large portions of the 
country. The Government of Sudan continued its bombing of 
civilian population centers, support for slave taking, and 
forced religious conversions, while preventing international 
humanitarian assistance from reaching large portions of the 
country. Numerous credible reports of human rights abuses by 
Russian forces in Chechnya, which included extrajudicial 
killings, torture, and rape, provoked widespread condemnation 
and calls for accountability; the Chechens committed numerous 
abuses as well, such as the execution of prisoners. In 
Indonesia security forces were responsible for numerous 
instances of indiscriminate shootings of civilians, torture, 
beatings, and other abuses in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and elsewhere, 
and the Government was ineffective in deterring social, 
interethnic, and interreligious violence in the Moluccas and 
Sulawesi.

        III. Developments in Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor

    Global Democratic Trends: The year witnessed new strides 
towards the globalization of democracy. Many, if not most, 
governments, civil society leaders, and multilateral 
institutions now pursue and promote open economies and freer 
societies. A majority of people in the world now live in 
democratic countries or countries that have begun to implement 
some democratic and political reforms. The overall trend 
remains one of positive, incremental change, despite some 
reversals.
    Elections bolstered democratic transitions in Croatia, 
Ghana, Mexico, Suriname, and Yugoslavia during the year. An 
active civil society and increasingly independent media helped 
to ensure the success and transparency of these elections. 
Setbacks included continuing conflict in the Middle East and 
Africa, a coup in Fiji, and a breakdown of the Government and 
law and order in the Solomon Islands. In China, despite 
widespread Government abuses, important aspects of civil 
society continued to develop. Seriously flawed elections took 
place in other countries, most notably in Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Haiti.
    On the nongovernmental side, increased global networking 
among organizations and private citizens mirrored the growth of 
active civil societies at the national level. The World Forum 
on Democracy, held jointly with the Warsaw Community of 
Democracies Ministerial in June, brought together an 
unprecedented international gathering of scholars, civic, 
religious, labor, and business leaders to assess the challenges 
to democracy. The Forum provided to the ministerial assembly 
recommendations that included convening the informal caucus of 
democracies that was launched at the United Nations in the 
fall. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) 
from over 80 countries also met in Sao Paulo during November to 
consider how to meet the challenges to democracy. They 
developed a list of practical steps NGO's could take in their 
own countries to support the democratic process.
    Integrity of the Person: In Algeria reports of abuses such 
as torture and arbitrary detention continued to decrease during 
the year; however, extrajudicial killings by security forces 
and terrorist groups claimed the lives of many hundreds of 
persons. The torture of political opponents is widespread in 
Uzbekistan. Cameroon's security forces reportedly killed many 
dozens of persons over a 6-month period in the city of Douala, 
and the abuse of detainees throughout the country remained 
endemic. The brutality associated with the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone abated somewhat; however, there 
continued to be reports of serious abuses, such as 
extrajudicial killings, rapes, and beatings in the 60 percent 
of the country that the Government does not control. The RUF 
also committed human rights abuses in Guinea. The Libyan 
government resorted to intimidation to control the political 
opposition, as security forces arbitrarily arrested and 
detained individuals who frequently were held incommunicado or 
tortured.
    Press Freedom: Freedom of the press remains nonexistent in 
such countries as Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and Turkmenistan. There 
were severe restrictions on the press in Sudan, Uzbekistan, and 
China, except in Hong Kong. The disappearance of Ukrainian 
Georhiy Gongadze, whose alleged remains were found late in the 
year, raised serious concern about press freedom in Ukraine. In 
Russia Kremlin efforts to gain control over a major independent 
television network posed a threat to hard-won press freedom as 
well. In Iran dozens of newspaper offices were closed, and a 
number of Iran's most prominent journalists and editors were 
arrested or harassed as hard-line elements within the 
Government sought to silence their critics. However, there was 
some easing of press restrictions in Syria, and the press in a 
number of countries in North Africa continued to demonstrate 
more freedom.
    Religious Freedom: The year saw the continuation of 
religious repression and discrimination in every region of the 
world. Based on the Department's Annual Report on International 
Religious Freedom 2000 (issued in September and covering the 
period July 1999 through June 2000), all five countries 
designated as ``countries of particular concern'' by the 
Secretary of State in 1999--Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and 
Sudan--were redesignated. This designation reflects the 
particularly severe violations of religious freedom by the 
Governments of those countries. In each the situation remained 
serious; in some--notably China--religious repression 
increased.
    In Uzbekistan, despite the release of some religious 
prisoners, the Government continued to incarcerate and abuse 
others because of their religious beliefs and practices. In 
particular some Muslims were vulnerable to mistreatment because 
of their alleged association with terrorists. The Government of 
Turkmenistan failed to allow non-Sunni Muslims and non-Russian 
Orthodox Christian believers to register, despite earlier 
promises to do so, and continued its crackdown on Protestant 
worshipers and its suppression of practitioners of other faiths 
for not being registered. In Russia there were concerns about 
the uniform implementation by local officials of federal 
regulations requiring the reregistration of religious groups 
and organizations. In Georgia there was increased 
discrimination against some religious minorities, including 
Jehovah's Witnesses. In Laos some religious prisoners were 
released, but the practice by certain local officials of 
forcing Christians to sign renunciations of their faith 
continued, as did the harsh treatment of Christians in prison.
    In Saudi Arabia non-Muslim public worship is prohibited, 
and the Government detained and subsequently deported several 
persons whom it considered to have violated the prohibition. 
The Government supports the Sunni Muslim majority, and 
discrimination against members of the Shi'a minority persists. 
Pakistan's blasphemy law continued to be abused and directed 
against the country's religious minorities, in particular the 
Ahmadiya and Christian communities. In Europe some states have 
adopted or are considering discriminatory legislation or 
policies that tend to stigmatize expressions of religious faith 
by certain groups by wrongfully associating them with dangerous 
``sects'' or ``cults.''
    On a more positive note, religious life in a number of 
countries of the New Independent States continued to progress 
during the year, as some governments tried with varying degrees 
of success to bring local and regional officials into line with 
national policy. In Azerbaijan the treatment of religious 
groups continued to improve, as it has since President Aliyev's 
public commitment to religious liberty in 1999.
    Women: The year saw women's human rights attract more 
international attention than in the past, but actual gains 
worldwide were limited. In Egypt women were granted the right 
to divorce on grounds of incompatibility. In Rwanda a law was 
passed that improves women's rights in inheritance, family 
matters, and credit. Despite some progress made in these and 
other areas, serious problems remain. In many parts of Africa, 
female genital mutilation continued to damage the physical and 
psychological health of women and girls. Societal 
discrimination prevented women in many countries from taking 
advantage of economic opportunities. In Afghanistan the 
Taliban's restrictions on education and work continued to 
confine women to the home. Traditional patriarchal societies 
continued to devalue women and girls. In China coercive family 
planning practices continued to harm women and female children, 
despite some government experimentation with noncoercive 
practices. In a number of countries in the Middle East and 
South Asia, so-called honor killings and dowry deaths continued 
to be major problems.
    Violence against women remained a pervasive problem, 
cutting across social and economic lines. Domestic and sexual 
violence against women is found on every continent. While 
governments publicly condemned violence against women, too few 
took concrete steps to address it.
    Children: Children are among the most vulnerable of any 
group in society and face particular threats to their human 
rights. Around the world, children face dangerous and unhealthy 
conditions, working in factories, fields, and sweatshops, as 
domestic servants, or, in some cases, as prostitutes. The 
trafficking of children for forced labor, prostitution, and 
pornography is a growing and lucrative business for criminals. 
In many cities large numbers of street children lack shelter, 
food, education, and support and are vulnerable to many forms 
of abuse, despite the best efforts of governments and NGO's. In 
countries such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and 
Uganda, armed rebels force children to serve as soldiers or 
recruit them with promises or threats. In many countries, 
children are denied access to education--in some cases because 
they cannot afford the fees for books and uniforms, in others 
because they must work to support their families--thereby 
severely reducing their chances for a better life. Many 
governments deny girls the opportunity to attend school or 
complete their schooling.
    Some improvements in the lives of children took place 
during the year, as some governments took steps to aid children 
and strengthen protection of their rights. For example, in 
Venezuela some 500,000 children attended school for the first 
time when the Government prohibited registration fees. The 
Government of Tunisia sponsors an immunization program that 
targets preschool age children and reports that over 95 percent 
of children are vaccinated. At the end of the year, the 
Moroccan UNICEF chapter and the National Observatory of 
Children's Rights began a human rights awareness campaign 
regarding the plight of child maids that received widespread 
media exposure. The Minister of Justice in Benin established a 
National Commission for Children's Rights, which held its 
initial session in July; the Benin Government also has made 
serious efforts to combat child abuse and trafficking in 
children. In March several government agencies in the 
Philippines signed a memorandum of agreement on the handling 
and treatment of children involved in armed conflict, which 
treats child insurgents as victims to be rescued and 
rehabilitated, rather than as enemies to be neutralized and 
prosecuted. The United Nations opened two important documents 
for signature during the year: the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child Concerning Children in 
Armed Conflict and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child Concerning the Sale of the Child. NGO's 
also are extremely active in the field of children's rights 
throughout the world, advocating legal reform and providing 
services.
    Worker Rights: During the year, there were countervailing 
negative and positive trends affecting worker rights. Among the 
positive developments, over 50 countries ratified the 
International Labor Organization's (ILO) Convention on the 
Worst Forms of Child Labor (Convention 182), the most rapid 
international approval for any convention in the organization's 
81-year history. The U.S. Trade and Development Act of 2000 
encouraged international community ratification of the 
convention by linking ratification to continued eligibility for 
Generalized System of Preferences status. The act also 
incorporated worker rights criteria into trade preference 
eligibility for African and Caribbean Basin programs.
    For the first time, the ILO adopted a resolution that 
called for measures to secure compliance with fundamental 
worker rights. In November the ILO's Governing Body judged that 
the Government of Burma had not taken effective action to deal 
with the ``widespread and systematic'' use of forced labor. It 
called on all ILO member states to take appropriate measures to 
ensure that Burma does not perpetuate or extend its system of 
forced or compulsory labor.
    Among negative trends during the year was the impunity with 
which a dramatically increasing number of trade unionists were 
killed, tortured, and intimidated in Colombia. Elsewhere a 
growing trend toward the negotiation of individual contracts 
between companies and workers and the resort to the formation 
of ``cooperatives'' in place of trade unions deprived workers 
of the protection afforded by union representation and of 
protection under national labor legislation.
    Trafficking in Persons: Trafficking in persons poses a 
serious challenge to human rights. This rapidly growing global 
problem affects countries and families on every continent. 
Traffickers prey upon women, children, and men from all walks 
of life, and of every age, religion, and culture. Traffickers 
particularly exploit women and children who suffer from poverty 
and are marginalized within their own societies--the most 
vulnerable segments of the population. Trafficking has grown 
significantly in recent years and serves as one of the leading 
sources of revenue for international criminal organizations--in 
part because it is low-risk and high-profit. In some countries, 
local police and immigration and customs officials are involved 
or complicit in trafficking. Traffickers deprive their victims 
of their basic human dignity, subject them to inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and treat them as chattel that can be 
bought and sold into forced and bonded labor across 
international and within national borders. Victims often find 
themselves in a strange country, unable to speak the language, 
and without identification or documentation. Many are subject 
to violent and brutal treatment by their captors. Some come 
from countries in which the police and other authorities are a 
source of repression rather than a source of help, and they are 
reluctant to seek assistance. Many are threatened with 
retribution against themselves or their families should they 
try to escape. Many victims face additional risks from 
dangerous working conditions, including the threat of harm from 
exposure to dangerous pesticides or sexually transmitted 
diseases.
    The underground nature of trafficking makes it difficult to 
quantify. Reliable estimates range from 700,000 to 2 million 
persons trafficked globally each year. Victims are trafficked 
into sweatshop labor, prostitution, domestic servitude, unsafe 
agricultural labor, construction work, restaurant work, and 
various forms of modern-day slavery. Governments around the 
world have taken steps to combat these heinous practices, 
enacting legislation to criminalize trafficking and strengthen 
penalties against it, and taking steps to aid victims. In 
December 81 countries signed the Trafficking in Persons 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the U.N. 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. More 
countries are expected to sign the Trafficking Protocol in the 
coming months. NGO's are especially active in the 
antitrafficking field; their efforts globally include awareness 
campaigns, the provision of medical and psychological support 
and shelter for victims, as well as job training.
    Corporate Responsibility: In recent years, partnerships 
among governments, businesses, and civil society to promote 
human rights, support civil society, and address corporate 
responsibility needs have expanded. Two of the best-known 
examples are the Sullivan Principles and the U.N. Global 
Compact, which encourage corporations, on a voluntary basis, to 
recognize international human rights, labor, and environmental 
standards. During the year, a group of major oil, mining, and 
energy companies; human rights and corporate responsibility 
organizations; and an international trade union federation 
worked with the U.S. and British Governments to forge a set of 
voluntary principles on security and human rights. The 
principles provide a mechanism for a continuing dialog on 
important security and human rights issues.

                IV. History of the Human Rights Reports

    The first edition of the Country Reports was a product of 
its times. While the United States had been at the forefront of 
the international human rights movement since the end of World 
War II and the creation of the United Nations, the Cold War and 
the gradual ending of colonialism dominated the first decades 
of that movement. However, the early 1970s gave rise in the 
Congress and throughout the country to new concepts and 
measures of accountability. An important force behind this 
changing environment was an ever-growing community of NGO's 
whose global outlook, commitment to human rights, and access to 
the media helped shape public opinion and government 
decisionmaking.
    In 1973 Representative Donald Fraser held hearings on human 
rights in the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
International Organizations. That same year, a sense of 
Congress resolution was passed urging the Nixon Administration 
to link U.S. foreign assistance programs to respect for human 
rights within those recipient countries. The Congress amended 
the Foreign Assistance Act 3 years later to require the 
Secretary of State to transmit to Congress ``a full and 
complete report'' every year concerning ``respect for 
internationally recognized human rights in each country 
proposed as a recipient of security assistance.''
    Thus in March 1977, the first volume of Country Reports was 
submitted to Congress. The report covered 82 countries. Because 
it focused on nations with whom the United States had formal 
security assistance programs, most of them were longstanding 
allies and friends. The initial report was brief--only 143 
pages--and at the end of each entry was a rating, taken from 
Freedom House, judging whether the country was free, partly 
free, or not free.
    Like any innovation, the new report had its critics. To 
some the very existence of such a document harmed relations 
with the very nations with which the United States had 
established the best ties. To others the report fell short of 
full disclosure. Such criticism has helped improve the reports 
ever since. They now cover virtually every country of the world 
and include a level of detail that would have stunned earlier 
readers.
    For the 1978 report, 33 additional countries that received 
U.S. economic assistance were added to the original 82. The 
next year, the Foreign Assistance Act was amended again to 
require an entry on each member of the United Nations. The 1979 
report thus expanded to 854 pages and covered 154 countries, 
including for the first time discussions of Cuba, the Soviet 
Union, and the People's Republic of China.
    By then the basic format of the report had been 
established, although it would undergo many modifications over 
time. The first section was Respect for the Integrity of the 
Person, and it included, as it still does, subsections on 
torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial; 
and invasion of the home. The second section was entitled 
Government Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of such Vital 
Needs as Food, Shelter, and Health Care. Third was Respect for 
Civil and Political Liberties. This section included separate 
subsections on freedom of speech, press, religion, and 
assembly; freedom of movement within the country for travel and 
immigration; and freedom to participate in the political 
process. Fourth was Government Attitude and Record Regarding 
International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged 
Violations of Human Rights.
    In 1980 a subsection was added on disappearances. The 
following year's report saw a recasting of the section on 
fulfillment of vital needs as Economic and Social 
Circumstances. The 1982 report added subsections on political 
and extrajudicial killing and disappearances and expanded the 
discussions on freedom of speech and the press, peaceful 
assembly, religion, movement, and the political process. The 
following year, the right of citizens to change their 
government was added. In 1986 a new section entitled 
Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or 
Social Status was introduced, along with another section on the 
Status of Labor.
    In 1989 a subsection was added on the use of excessive 
force and violations of human rights in internal conflicts. The 
labor section was revised to include specific discussions of 
the right of association, the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, minimum age for employment of children, and 
acceptable conditions of labor. The 1993 report saw an 
expansion of the discrimination section to include specific 
discussions of the rights of women, children, the indigenous, 
people with disabilities, and national, racial, and ethnic 
minorities. In 1993 the reports appeared on the Department of 
State's web site for the first time, an event that dramatically 
increased the number of individuals who had immediate access to 
them. Additional coverage on refugees and asylum was added 3 
years later. In 1997 the subsection on forced and bonded child 
labor was upgraded substantially. In 1998 the report was 
published for the first time in two volumes.
    Later in 1998, Congress passed the International Religious 
Freedom Act, which mandated annual reports on the state of 
international religious freedom in every country. The first of 
these reports appeared in September 1999, the same year that 
Congress requested that a new section be added to the reports 
on trafficking in persons. The reports that year also included 
a new focus on access to political prisoners and genocide.
                                 Michael E. Parmly,
                       Acting Assistant Secretary of State,
                      Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.


                                 AFRICA

                              ----------                              


                                 ANGOLA

    The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has ruled 
the country since its independence from Portugal in 1975. The country's 
competing independence movements began a civil war immediately after 
independence, which lasted until the signing of the Bicesse Accords in 
1991. Under the Bicesse Accords, one-party rule ended with the passage 
of a new Constitution that legalized opposition parties and called for 
U.N.-monitored elections which were held in 1992. President Jose 
Eduardo Dos Santos of the MPLA won a plurality of the votes cast in an 
election that U.N. observers considered free and fair. The National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), under the 
leadership of Jonas Savimbi, rejected the results of the vote and 
resumed the civil war. In 1994 in an effort to end the civil war, the 
Government and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol, which called for the 
demilitarization of UNITA, the creation of a national army, the seating 
of a government of national unity and reconciliation, and the extension 
of state administration to areas formerly under UNITA control. The 
Government generally complied with its obligations under the protocol, 
although the conduct of the police and, to a lesser extent, military 
units in former UNITA areas drew widespread criticism. UNITA failed to 
comply with several fundamental aspects of the protocol. It maintained 
a significant military capability, and it refused to surrender to state 
administration the territory it held. At the end of 1998, fighting 
resumed between the Government and Jonas Savimbi's armed faction of 
UNITA. A splinter group of UNITA called UNITA-Renovada and another 
larger peaceful faction of UNITA both rejected war; during the year, 
the two groups continued to pursue their goals through peaceful 
political activity, including as members of the National Assembly. In 
late 1999, a massive offensive by the Angolan armed forces (FAA) 
destroyed the conventional military capacity of UNITA, and by January 
drove the rebels from their heartland on the central plateau into the 
country's far east and into scattered pockets elsewhere. By March the 
FAA had consolidated its military control of most of the nation's 
territory; however, UNITA reorganized itself as a guerrilla force and 
carried out ambushes or attacks on lightly defended targets. In June 
1999, the National Assembly voted to postpone new elections 
indefinitely due to the renewal of conflict; during the year, the 
Government stated its intention to hold elections in 2001, but later 
postponed them until 2002. The judiciary, where it functions, is 
subject to the influence of the President and the MPLA in practice.
    The Ministry of Interior is responsible for internal security, a 
function that it exercises through the Angolan National Police (ANP), 
the Rapid Intervention Police (PIR), which was created in 1992 as an 
elite paramilitary force, and other organs of state security. The Armed 
Forces of Angola (FAA) are responsible for protecting the State against 
external threats and have intervened in regional conflicts every year 
since 1996. The FAA claimed that it had integrated more than 10,000 
UNITA soldiers since the 1999 fall offensive. With the resumption of 
localized hostilities within the country, the FAA became involved in 
counterinsurgency operations against UNITA. The FAA also is involved in 
similar operations, although on a smaller scale, against the Front for 
the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-
FAC). The Government's security forces remain firmly under civilian 
leadership. Security forces committed numerous, serious human rights 
abuses.
    The security factors that inhibited the country's transition to 
full multiparty democracy had a similar effect on the country's 
transition from a directed, state-dominated economic system to one 
based on market principles. Forty percent of the budget remains 
dedicated to defense (or 22 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)). 
The economy was in disarray and despite abundant natural resources, 
output per capita is extremely low. Angola produces more than 750,000 
barrels of oil per day, a total that is expected to rise to over 1 
million by the end of 2002. Due to its control of oil revenues, the 
parastatal oil company Sonangol plays a dominant role in both the 
economy and government. The country produced an estimated $600 million 
worth of diamonds in the areas controlled by the Government. There also 
are lucrative untapped mineral, agricultural, and hydroelectric 
resources in the country; however, corruption and mismanagement are 
pervasive in the public sector and widespread in the private sector. 
The Government has begun to liberalize its import regimes and reform 
its regulatory agencies to better allow the importation of the goods 
and services on which the economy depends. Annual per capita GDP was 
approximately $450. The country's wealth continued to be concentrated 
in the hands of a small elite who often used government positions for 
massive personal enrichment, and corruption continued to be a common 
practice at all levels. The average monthly salary of urban wage 
earners (approximately 20 percent of the labor force) was far below 
what is required for basic subsistence, and rural wages are even lower 
because the majority of the rural economy is dependent on subsistence 
agriculture and is highly vulnerable to political unrest.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. 
Citizens have no effective means to change their government. Members of 
the security forces committed extrajudicial killings, were responsible 
for disappearances, and tortured, beat, raped and otherwise abused 
persons. The Government often failed to pay the salaries of the 
majority of its security service personnel. The poor discipline and 
poor working conditions of the police force made it the worst offender; 
military units generally have better discipline and a more effective 
chain of command. Other than those personnel assigned to elite units, 
the Government gives tacit permission for security personnel to 
supplement their income--through the extortion of the civilian 
population. Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening. The 
Government routinely used arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy 
pretrial detention is a problem. Although the Government made some 
efforts to discipline members of the security services for abuses, the 
Government often did not punish those in the security services who were 
responsible for abuses. The judiciary is subject to executive 
influence, only functions in certain parts of the country, and does not 
ensure due process. The legal code and rules of procedure remain 
outdated. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and 
forcibly recruited military-age males. The Government at times 
restricted freedom of speech and of the press, and intimidated 
journalists into practicing self-censorship. A Government crackdown on 
the independent media continued until March and resulted in the 
harassment, arrest, detention, and trials of journalists; however, by 
April the Government expanded the limits of public expression in most 
areas of the country. The Government restricted freedom of assembly. 
The Government restricted association and movement; however, it allowed 
some peaceful public protest. The Government continued to limit 
independent investigations of human rights abuses, although it allowed 
international human rights organizations, including Amnesty 
International, to conduct research in the country. Violence and 
discrimination against women were common; adult and child prostitution 
are problems; and children and the disabled continued to suffer as a 
result of the ongoing conflict and poor economic conditions. The 
Government continues to dominate the labor movement and restricts 
workers' rights, although there were improvements in the independent 
labor sector. Forced labor, including forced child labor, is a problem.
    The armed faction of UNITA under Savimbi was responsible for 
numerous, serious abuses during the year; the other two factions of 
UNITA were not responsible for abuses. The armed UNITA forces, under 
the control of Jonas Savimbi, were responsible for killings, 
disappearances, torture, rape, and other abuses. UNITA military units 
reportedly pillaged rural areas, depopulated parts of the country, 
killed traditional leaders, and eliminated all opposition, real or 
potential. UNITA prevented freedom of speech, the press, assembly, 
association, and movement. UNITA refused all attempts to conduct 
investigations in areas under its control. UNITA continued forced 
military recruitment, including of underage males, and used forced 
labor for a large part of its local-level logistical support. The 
sexual abuse of women conscripted to work as porters was common in 
UNITA areas.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
committed extrajudicial killings. Police participated in shakedowns, 
muggings, and carjackings. There were reports that army units engaged 
in a scorched earth policy during the year, burning villages and 
killing civilians in Cuando Cubango and Lunda Sul provinces. There were 
also reports that soldiers summarily executed civilians.
    There were reports that Government soldiers killed civilians in 
Namibia. After Namibia decided in December 1999 to allow FAA to launch 
anti-UNITA attacks from Namibian territory, there was extensive cross-
border fighting which resulted in civilian deaths and injuries. FAA 
soldiers killed a number of Namibian civilians during the year. On 
January 22, an FAA member killed Thadeus Mubili in Mushangara in 
western Caprivi. No further information was available on the case at 
year's end. On May 27, an FAA member killed Thaddeus Vili at Bagani 
near the Kavango and Caprivi regions. An FAA member was arrested by 
police in Namibia; there was no further information available on the 
case at year's end. In July the army executed two Namibian civilians 
and injured another.
    Some individual members of the FAA reportedly also committed 
summary executions in the Republic of the Congo.
    Prison conditions are life threatening due to inadequate food, 
medicine, and sanitation, and many prisoners died in official custody 
(see Section 1.c.).
    In December 1999, there was an unconfirmed report that the FAA 
killed 47 civilians during operations in the Lunda Sul province. There 
was no investigation into the incident nor was any action taken by 
year's end. In February 1999, government forces reportedly killed 
several civilians after retaking the town of Mbanza Congo from UNITA. 
There was no investigation into the incident nor action taken by year's 
end.
    There were no investigations into, nor was any action taken against 
those responsible for the extrajudicial killings of more than 40 
persons during 1998, including the UNITA provincial secretary in Xa-
Cessau, the UNITA communal secretary of Quibaxe, and the local UNITA 
secretary of Cangundu.
    Numerous localities changed hands during the year, a process that 
often involved the extrajudicial killing of government or UNITA 
administrators and persons accused of collaboration. Internally 
displaced persons and refugees risked their lives to flee to 
government-held areas or neighboring countries. Undocumented Congolese 
workers in diamond fields were targeted by government or UNITA forces 
seeking to take control of alluvial diamond mining operations. An 
unknown number of civilians died in the course of engagements between 
the security services and insurgents, particularly in the Central 
Highlands and in the northwest. Strong anecdotal information suggested 
that both sides summarily executed prisoners of war (POW's).
    On January 12, over 100 persons reportedly were killed in Bie 
province. Although there were unconfirmed reports that UNITA killed 150 
persons while passing through the area, other observers claimed that 
these persons were killed by the Government for being too sympathetic 
to UNITA. There were reports that at least one mass grave was 
discovered in the area, which the Government attributed to UNITA.
    During the year, there was a conviction in the case of the 1996 
killing of state-television reporter Antonio Casimiro (see Section 
2.a.).
    UNITA used landmines in Namibia, which resulted in dozens of deaths 
and numerous injuries of civilians and security force officers. At the 
end of September, the Government reported that more than 130 persons 
had been killed or injured by landmines in Namibia. Landmine explosions 
killed at least 10 civilians and injured 36 others in the Kavango 
region of the country by the end of June.
    Both Government and UNITA forces continued to use antipersonnel 
landmines (see Section 1.g.). According to the National Institute for 
the Removal of Explosive Obstacles and Devices, a government agency, 
100 persons were killed and 327 were injured by landmine explosions 
during the first half of the year; most of the incidents occurred in 
areas that had been mined by UNITA. There was an unconfirmed report 
that on February 17, 10 persons were killed and 18 were injured when a 
truck hit an antitank mine. In April 33 persons were killed and 17 
injured, including two young children, in two landmine attacks in the 
province of Uige. The Government blamed UNITA rebels for the deaths.
    UNITA military units reportedly pillaged rural areas, depopulated 
parts of the country, killed traditional leaders, and eliminated all 
opposition, real or potential. UNITA troops committed numerous 
extrajudicial killings during attacks on villages. Interviews with many 
refugees indicated that UNITA committed abuses, including public 
extrajudicial killings, as a deliberate policy. On February 6, UNITA 
shelled and attacked Santa Clara in Cunene province; at least 26 
civilians were killed and more than 40 were injured. There was an 
unconfirmed report that on March 21, UNITA rebels stoned and crucified 
six children for allegedly giving information to the Government. On May 
20 and 21 in Bie province, UNITA attacked and looted a hospital in 
Camacupa. On June 7, the government press reported the discovery of 17 
mass graves in the Bie province, each containing more than 100 bodies; 
however, the report was not confirmed by independent sources by year's 
end. On July 8, an orphanage in Huambo province was attacked and 
looted, reportedly by 100 UNITA bandits; a teenager was killed, 4 were 
injured, and 25 were kidnaped. On August 8, UNITA rebels killed four 
civilians during an attack on the town of Catete.
    UNITA killed numerous civilians during attacks on civilian traffic 
on roads in the interior of the country; such attacks were designed to 
halt transportation, disrupt commerce, isolate populations, and 
maintain a climate of insecurity. Many such attacks occurred on the 
Malanje-Luanda road during the year.
    UNITA forces reportedly killed 80 Christians during the year for 
providing information to the Government (see Section 2.c.).
    During raids in the Kavango and Caprivi regions of Namibia, UNITA 
forces killed civilians. On January 9, suspected UNITA forces shot and 
killed two civilians outside of Rundu. In February UNITA forces killed 
three civilians and burned nine houses in Shinyungwe village.
    There were reports that UNITA continued to use forced conscription 
and killed persons who attempted to desert (see Sections 1.b. and 
1.f.).
    On October 2, the body of journalist Antonio Paciencia was 
discovered in Zambia. The results of an investigation determined that 
he had been killed, but did not attribute responsibility for the 
killing; however, the Government and some journalists blamed UNITA for 
the killing.
    UNITA never has accounted for the deaths of numerous senior party 
officials. A number of high-ranking UNITA officials who have defected 
revealed the extent of extrajudicial killings in UNITA-held areas. Two 
former UNITA secretaries general, a former head of UNITA intelligence, 
and others reported that Savimbi personally ordered extrajudicial 
killings of opponents and, in some cases, personally carried out the 
executions. UNITA does not allow the U.N. to investigate claims of 
human rights abuses in the limited areas (less than 5 percent of the 
country's territory) that it controls.
    There were no further developments into the September 1999 case in 
which National Assembly Deputy Joao Ngolongombe Jacob, who was a member 
the non-Savimbi faction of UNITA, was killed by unknown persons. In 
January 1999, a U.N. chartered aircraft was shot down; there was no 
further information available on the case at year's end. In January 
1999, Father Albino Saluaco and two catechists were killed by armed men 
in Huambo (see Section 2.c.); although no group claimed responsibility 
for the killings, there were credible reports that it was UNITA.
    UNITA and the separatist group FLEC-FAC killed foreign nationals. 
For example, on April 27, FLEC-FAC killed a foreign national during an 
ambush north of Dingo.
    FLEC-FAC forces tortured and killed civilians in the Cabinda region 
(see Section 1.a.). In May FLEC-FLAC forces kidnaped three foreign and 
one local employee of a construction company.
    On June 2, 12 persons were killed and 52 were injured when a group 
of children brought a discarded missile into a refugee camp near 
Malanje, and it exploded.
    On June 10, polio vaccination workers passing through the Huambo 
area discovered an ambushed truck with 7 dead persons inside.
    On July 9, approximately 100 members of UNITA attacked a 
residential school and training center in Huambo Province; the UNITA 
members kidnaped 21 children, killed 1 boy, and injured at least 4 
others.
    On October 20, there were reports that dozens of persons were 
killed during an attack by unknown gunmen on two buses and a car. 
Reportedly a bus was set on fire with the passengers still inside; the 
gunmen also burned the other two vehicles.
    b. Disappearance.--Persons taken into police custody often 
disappeared without a trace, particularly in rural areas. Suspects 
accused of illegal weapons ownership or collaboration with UNITA 
disappeared.
    Civilians abducted by UNITA generally either were recruited 
forcibly as soldiers or support personnel, or were considered 
government collaborators. The frequent discovery of bodies in the 
aftermath of attacks suggested that suspected collaborators were 
executed summarily. Those who escaped UNITA custody and were able to 
return to government-held areas reported that they were subjected to 
torture, beatings, and sexual abuse (see Section 1.c.). There was an 
unconfirmed report that on January 29, six armed men abducted two 
teenage girls from a village near the border. UNITA rebels were 
suspected in the incident; however, no further information was 
available on the incident by year's end. On July 9, approximately 100 
members of UNITA attacked a residential school and training center in 
Huambo Province; the UNITA members kidnaped 21 children, killed 1 boy, 
and injured at least 4 others. On July 18, UNITA kidnaped two priests, 
eight nuns, and five students during an armed attack on a Roman 
Catholic mission in Benguela Province. The kidnaped persons were 
released on July 26.
    There were also reports that members of the FLEC-FAC separatist 
group kidnaped civilians. On May 25, members of FLEC-FAC kidnaped three 
foreign and one local employee of a Portuguese company in Cabinda; 
FLEC-FAC claimed that they still were holding them at year's end.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and the Penal Code explicitly prohibit 
all forms of mistreatment of suspects, detainees, or prisoners; 
however, security forces tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise abused 
persons. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the U.N., 
and human rights organizations reported that there was widespread 
government abuse of suspects.
    Security service personnel frequently employed torture and other 
forms of cruel and degrading treatment, including rape. Police used 
torture and coerced confessions frequently during investigations and 
rarely, if ever, were punished for such abuses. Those suspected of ties 
to UNITA regularly are detained under inhuman conditions and are 
subjected to primitive and brutal forms of interrogation. Nonpolitical 
criminal suspects also are subjected to detention and abuse, although 
to a much lesser extent. There have been no cases in which an army or 
police official has been disciplined for the use of excessive force 
against an UNITA suspect. Police often beat and released suspects in 
lieu of trials (see Section 1.d.). Police frequently participate in 
shakedowns, muggings, carjackings, and killings. Police also extorted 
money from travelers at checkpoints, and routinely harassed refugees 
(see Section 2.d.).
    Reports that government forces raped women in the central highlands 
increased during the year; government forces reportedly attacked women 
in their homes, while they were working in the fields, near military 
camps, and during searches of homes (see Section 1.f.). Rapes by 
government forces were reported most commonly in the Bie, Huambo and 
Uige provinces.
    Police officers and soldiers reportedly harassed internally 
displaced persons (IDP's) and denied them humanitarian assistance due 
to misappropriation of supplies (see Section 2.d.).
    There were reports that police beat protesters during 
demonstrations in February (see Section 2.b.).
    There were numerous reports of abuses of Namibian citizens by the 
FAA in the border areas. A Namibian human rights organization reported 
that in July the army executed two Namibian civilians and wounded 
another (see Section 1.a.).
    Some individual members of the FAA reportedly committed acts of 
rape and looting in the Republic of the Congo (see Section 1.a.).
    Landmines laid by both sides during the conflict resulted in an 
increasing number of fatalities and injuries, including maiming (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
    The U.N. and human rights organizations report that abuse of 
suspects is universal in areas remaining under UNITA control. 
Interviews with persons who have fled UNITA-held areas revealed that 
UNITA uses cruel and inhuman practices, including public torture, to 
punish dissent and deter further acts of disloyalty. Torture is used at 
all levels of the UNITA forces. There have been repeated credible 
allegations that UNITA president Jonas Savimbi has ordered suspects 
tortured and executed in his presence. There were reports that UNITA 
engaged in reprisal attacks on civilians during the year. UNITA 
reportedly cut off the ears and hands of civilians in order to extract 
information and to discourage civilians from providing the Government 
with information on UNITA or from fleeing to government-controlled 
areas. On July 9, approximately 100 members of UNITA attacked a 
residential school and training center in Huambo Province; the UNITA 
members kidnaped 21 children, killed 1 boy, and injured at least 4 
others.
    There were numerous reports that UNITA forces abused Namibian 
citizens in the border areas.
    FLEC-FAC forces tortured and killed civilians in the Cabinda region 
(see Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Cells are 
overcrowded and lack basic sanitary facilities. The prison system holds 
approximately five times the number of prisoners that it was built to 
hold. Many prisons, lacking financial support from the Government, were 
unable to supply prisoners with adequate food and health care. There 
were credible reports that many prisoners died of malnutrition and 
disease. For example, at the Viana Prison malnutrition and disease are 
pervasive problems. In November the Government and the National 
Assembly Committee on Human Rights acknowledged that conditions are 
inhuman and announced modest appropriations for improvements in the Sao 
Paulo Prison hospital in Luanda and Viana prison outside the capital. 
Members of the Committee visited both institutions and donated 
mattresses and other supplies to the inmates.
    Prison officials routinely beat detainees. Prisoners depend on 
families, friends, or international relief organizations for basic 
support, including food; prisons often do not provide any food to 
prisoners. Prison officials, who are chronically unpaid, support 
themselves by stealing from their prisoners and extorting money from 
family members. Juveniles, often incarcerated for petty theft, are 
housed with adults and suffer abuse by guards and inmates. Female 
prisoners are held separately from male prisoners. There were reports 
that prison guards sexually abused female prisoners. Detained 
journalists were also housed with other prisoners.
    The Government permitted foreign diplomatic personnel and local and 
international human rights monitors to visit prisons during the year, 
and unlike in the previous year, they were permitted to visit 
individual prisoners. A local NGO was launched to document prison 
conditions in Luanda (see Section 4).
    The conditions of UNITA's prisons were not known; however, 
extensive testimony from defectors described harsh conditions of 
confinement and summary executions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are serious ongoing problems. Security forces used arbitrary 
arrest and detention during the year. Under the law, a person caught in 
the act of committing a crime may be arrested and detained immediately. 
Otherwise, the law requires that a judge or a provincial magistrate 
issue an arrest warrant. Arrest warrants also may be signed by members 
of the judicial police and confirmed within 5 days by a magistrate. The 
Constitution provides for the right to prompt judicial determination of 
the legality of the detention. Under the law, the prosecution and 
defense have 90 days before a trial to prepare their case, although 
both sides generally have the right to request an extension of this 
deadline under extenuating circumstances. The Constitution also 
provides prisoners with the right to receive visits by family members. 
Such rights are frequently ignored in practice; however, the Government 
paid increased attention to the rights of prisoners during the year; 
however, there was no substantial change in practice by year's end. 
There is a scarcity of personnel and resources and a lack of official 
determination to ensure these rights. Although the Ministry of Justice 
is nominally in charge of the prison system, the Ministry of the 
Interior continued to arrest and detain persons systematically, 
arbitrarily, and secretly for all categories of crimes and for 
indefinite periods, often with no apparent intent to bring the 
detainees to trial.
    Under the criminal law a person may not be held for over 135 days 
without trial. The National Security Law provides for a maximum of 180 
days of preventive detention. In practice, laws regarding preventative 
detention frequently are ignored. Over 90 percent of inmates in Luanda 
still are awaiting trial, and it is believed that the national average 
is over 50 percent. Inmates who have been awaiting trial for 2 or 3 
years are common. In many cases, police beat and then released 
detainees rather than make any effort to prepare a formal court case.
    In February police disrupted several demonstrations; they arrested 
and detained protestors (see Section 2.b.).
    On October 27, the Independent Union of Maritime and Association 
Workers of Angola (SIMA) engaged in a strike. Management threatened to 
fire the striking workers in retaliation, but all of the striking 
workers retained their jobs. Police arrested six strikers, but they 
were released on October 30 and acquitted of charges of disturbing the 
peace.
    In December 1999, a journalist, Andre Domingos Mussamo, was 
arrested and held in preventive detention for 3 months on charges of 
defamation before being released on bail in March (see Section 2.a.). 
Although the Press Law only allows a maximum of 15 days in detention, 
and other laws allow for a maximum detention of 45 days, the provincial 
Attorney General extended Mussamo's detention to 90 days; in April 
Mussamo was released without a trial, and in May all criminal charges 
against him were dropped.
    The Government holds an unknown number of suspected UNITA officials 
and supporters in areas where government control was regained. In past 
years, the Government invariably accused these persons of illegal 
weapons possession or collaboration with UNITA, although formal charges 
rarely were filed. However, the Government improved its compliance with 
the law, and there were no documented cases of further detentions of 
suspected UNITA officials and supporters during the year.
    UNITA continued to kidnap and detain persons primarily from rural 
areas against their will. The number of such persons is unknown.
    The Lusaka Protocol provides for the release, under International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) auspices, of persons detained for 
war-related reasons. Neither the Government nor UNITA regularly 
notified the ICRC or any other institution that it had POW's in 
custody. Between 10,000 and 15,000 UNITA soldiers have surrendered or 
been captured; most of them either entered the FAA or were released by 
the Government and placed in IDP camps.
    The Government did not use forced exile as a form of punishment. 
Some UNITA members claimed that they went into self-imposed exile 
because the Government threatened their lives.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary, where it functions, is 
not independent of the President and the MPLA, and political pressure 
from the presidency affected the outcome of cases. In practice the 
court system lacked the means, experience, training, and political 
backing to assert its independence from the President and the ruling 
MPLA party. The President has strong appointive powers, including the 
power to appoint Supreme Court justices without confirmation by the 
National Assembly. The judicial system largely was destroyed during the 
civil war and did not function in large areas of the country. In many 
cases, police beat and then released detainees rather than make any 
effort to prepare a formal court case.
    The court system consists of the Supreme Court at the appellate 
level plus municipal and provincial courts of original jurisdiction 
under the nominal authority of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
serves as the appellate division for questions of law and fact. A 
Constitutional Court provided in the 1991 Constitution had not been 
established by year's end; the Constitution provides for judicial 
review of constitutional issues by the Supreme Court until the 
Constitutional Court is established. There are long delays for trials 
at the Supreme Court level.
    Trials for political and security crimes are supposed to be handled 
exclusively by the Supreme Court; however, there were no known cases of 
such trials. During the trial of Rafael Marques and Aguiar Dos Santos, 
the judge closed proceedings to the general public (except for members 
of the Bar Association), although visitors were allowed to observe the 
closing statements and the announcements of the final ruling (see 
Section 2.a.).
    The Constitution provides defendants with the presumption of 
innocence, the right to a defense, and the right to appeal. Legal 
reform in 1991 established the right to public trials, a system of 
bail, and recognized the accused's right to counsel; however, the 
Government does not respect these rights in practice. Trials are open 
to the public; however, each court has the discretion to close 
proceedings arbitrarily. Defendants do not have the right to confront 
their accusers. Judges are usually lay persons, not licensed lawyers. 
The judge and two lay persons elected by the full court act as the 
jury.
    On November 24, the MPLA introduced a general amnesty bill to the 
National Assembly, which was approved on November 29. Although the non-
Savimbi faction of UNITA introduced its own version, it later withdrew 
the proposal. The bill requires a voluntary request for amnesty by any 
individual and covers national security crimes, honesty (defamation), 
military crimes and common crimes. The bill also includes a 90-day 
period during which an individual is allowed to request amnesty. The 
bill was not implemented formally by year's end; however, many 
prisoners were released under its provisions during the year.
    In the past, UNITA established a nominal military and civilian 
court system in territories under its control and claimed that its 
Civil Code is equivalent to the Portuguese Civil Code used by the 
Government; however, there was no indication that UNITA maintained this 
system during the year. The areas under UNITA's control diminished to 
isolated pockets that composed about 5 percent of the country, and 
reports during the year indicated that strict martial law applies in 
those areas.
    There were reports that the Government holds political prisoners; 
however, the number is unknown. The Government denied that it holds 
political prisoners and insisted that persons considered by some of 
civil society to be political prisoners are criminals.
    There are numerous confirmed reports that UNITA holds political 
detainees. It is not known if persons detained by UNITA were convicted 
by UNITA judicial procedure; decisions made by UNITA courts have no 
standing under the country's legal system, and persons were denied due 
process protections.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. 
The Government maintained a sophisticated security apparatus dedicated 
to the surveillance, monitoring, and wiretapping of certain groups, 
including opposition party leaders, journalists, members of the 
National Assembly and foreign diplomats. Legal requirements for search 
warrants routinely are disregarded.
    There were reports that army units engaged in a scorched earth 
policy during the year, burning villages and killing civilians (see 
Section 1.a.). Government forces reportedly attacked women in their 
homes, while they were working in the fields, near military camps, and 
during searches of homes (see Section 1.c.).
    On June 20, armed individuals dressed as security forces visited 
the Voice of America (VOA) offices and demanded the addresses of the 
homes of several independent media correspondents; the addresses were 
not given to them. The Government did not acknowledge nor attribute 
responsibility for the incident.
    The Government threatened to evict from his home a journalist who 
had been charged with defamation (see Section 2.a.).
    To enforce laws on mandatory military service, the armed forces and 
police conducted forced conscription drives in many of the areas under 
the control of the Government, including Luanda, in which some minors 
may have been recruited. Under the law, military service is obligatory, 
but the pattern of the forced recruitment targeted poor communities and 
unemployed young men. Persons who could prove that they had jobs 
usually were released, and those with financial means could purchase an 
exemption from the armed forces. The Government denied that forced 
recruiting was taking place. Church groups, civil society institutions, 
and foreign embassies protested the manner of conscription.
    UNITA reportedly looted and destroyed property while replenishing 
their supplies of food and medicine.
    UNITA continued to conscript civilians, including children 
forcibly, for military duty (see Section 1.g.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Military operations by both the Government and 
UNITA continued to result in numerous human rights violations. The 
Government and UNITA continue to use antipersonnel landmines to 
strengthen defensive positions and, in the case of UNITA, to prevent 
residents within its own areas from fleeing to government-held areas 
(see Section 2.d.). Large areas have been remined since the resumption 
of fighting in 1999, mostly by UNITA. Military attacks have resulted in 
indiscriminate and summary killings, torture, abductions, destruction 
of property, and theft (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.). The 
provinces most affected were Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malange, Bie, and 
Moxico, although UNITA also has mounted raids on or near the coast. 
There were several attacks on Congolese miners during the year. The 
Government's failure to pay, feed, and equip many of its army and 
police personnel resulted in frequent extortion and theft. Government 
personnel frequently confiscated food, including donated relief 
supplies, livestock, and personal property; however, respect for 
humanitarian workers and property by security forces improved during 
the year as the result of an order from the Armed Forces Chief of Staff 
and better liaison between the Government and the U.N. on such 
problems.
    There were reports that army units engaged in a scorched earth 
policy, burning villages and killing civilians (see Section 1.a.).
    The Government continued to use forced conscription (see Section 
1.f.).
    In July the local government in Kwanza Norte evicted journalist 
Isidoro Natalicio from his home on the grounds that his work for 
independent and international radio stations violated his lease (see 
Section 2.a.).
    In May the U.N. estimated that as many as 7 million landmines have 
been laid in the country, and new mines were laid during the year. 
There were numerous injuries and deaths resulting from landmines (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Various NGO's participated in landmine 
clearance operations during the year, and the Government implemented a 
Mine Action Plan.
    UNITA forces routinely violated citizen's rights in pursuit of 
military objectives. UNITA attacks against civilian populations as a 
guerrilla strategy resulted in hundreds of casualties. There were 
continued reports of deaths resulting from UNITA attacks on villages 
throughout the country and executions of suspected government 
supporters by UNITA forces (see Section 1.a.). The Government 
attributed the discovery of mass graves to UNITA actions (see Section 
1.a.).
    The number of IDP's continued to increase (see Section 2.d.).
    UNITA carried out forced recruiting, including of children, 
throughout all of the country's disputed territory. Recruits were taken 
to isolated military camps and subjected to psychological stress and 
extreme hardships; those who attempted to desert were executed. Women, 
many as young as 13 years of age, were recruited forcibly to serve as 
porters and camp followers, and reports of sexual assault were 
widespread and credible.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression and of the press and specifically provides that 
the media cannot be subject to ideological, political, or artistic 
censorship; however, the Government does not always respect this right 
in practice. Although the Government's respect for freedom of the press 
improved marginally beginning in March, the Government continued to 
intimidate and threaten journalists into practicing self-censorship. 
There were reports that the Government pays journalists to publish 
progovernment stories. The Government detained for up to several months 
or placed under investigation journalists who reported on sensitive 
issues, including military operations, government corruption, and 
UNITA, especially Jonas Savimbi. However, there was increasing private 
media attention to corruption, economic mismanagement, and opposition 
politics; journalists acknowledge that they exercise self-censorship 
when reporting on the military situation, internal security, or other 
highly sensitive matters.
    The news ban on war coverage that was instituted in 1999 remained 
effective; however, the strong discouragement of negative news coverage 
by the Government that occurred in 1999 lessened during the year.
    Defamation against the President or his representatives is a 
criminal offense, punishable with imprisonment or fines. There is no 
truth defense to defamation charges; the only allowable defense is to 
show that the accused did not produce the actual writing alleged to 
have caused harm. In June journalist Gustavo Costa, the editor of a 
Portuguese newspaper, was convicted of defamation against the Governor 
of Kwanza North, Manuel Pacavira. In June the director of the 
independent weekly Agora, Aguiar Dos Santos, and a columnist for Folha 
8, Rafael Marques, were found guilty of defamation. On October 27, the 
Supreme Court upheld the convictions of Marques, Aguiar Dos Santos, and 
Costa. Aguiar Dos Santos was sentenced to 2 months in prison, a fine, 
and travel restrictions; their sentences were suspended for 3 years. 
Costa was sentenced to 8 months for defamation, which also was 
suspended for 3 years, and travel restrictions were imposed on him. On 
December 11, the Supreme Court ordered the police to lift the travel 
restrictions that had been imposed on Marques, Dos Santos, and another 
journalist, Antonio Freitas; however, on December 12, government 
officials prevented Marques from leaving the country and temporarily 
confiscated his passport. Travel restrictions subsequently were lifted 
for the three journalists.
    In January Rafael Marques, a columnist for the independent weekly, 
Folha 8 who was arrested and detained for a July 1999 article critical 
of President Dos Santos, was released on bail after 45 days of 
preventive detention (see Section 1.d.). His trial for defamation of 
the President in March was closed to the public (although members of 
the Bar Association could observe); the judge refused to allow 
Marques's lawyer to present evidence regarding the truth of what 
Marques wrote. Marques was convicted and given a suspended sentence of 
6 months, the maximum under the law, as well as a large fine. On April 
27, police again interrogated Rafael Marques after he wrote an article 
that criticized the Government for the reinstitution of the military 
draft.
    In November 1999, Isidoro Natalicio was convicted of defamation, 
and his appeal was pending at year's end. During the year, the local 
government threatened to evict Natalicio from his home, and filed 
another defamation charge against him. In July the local government in 
Kwanza Norte evicted him from his home on the grounds that his work for 
independent and international radio stations violated his lease.
    In August 1999 the Government banned Isaias Soares, a VOA and Radio 
Ecclesia journalist, from covering official events or reporting on 
military issues in Malange. In July and August, the Government 
continued to harass Soares, and the provincial government seized his 
motorcycle, which was his only means of transport.
    In 1999 the Government harassed, arrested, and detained more than 
20 journalists on charges of slander, defamation, and crimes against 
the security of the State; however, such incidents decreased during the 
year. In July individuals claiming they represented government 
authorities kidnaped Catholic Radio Ecclesia director Paulo and forced 
him to drive at gunpoint to the outskirts of Luanda, where he managed 
to escape unhurt. The Government later disclaimed responsibility for 
the assault. In December 1999, police arrested and detained in Kwanza 
Norte province Andre Mussamo, correspondent for Angolan National Radio 
and contributor to Folha 8, for ``violation of a state secret.'' On May 
31, the charges were dropped when it was shown that Mussamo had not 
published any material from a secret document; however, the person who 
provided Mussamo with the document was convicted. Mussamo reportedly 
still is under investigation, and he has been barred from leaving the 
country or from practicing journalism. The Union of Angolan Journalists 
criticized the Government's actions in the Mussamo case.
    The majority of the media is state-run and carries very little 
criticism of the Government; however, the Government has tolerated 
progressively more criticism of its policies and actions in the 
independent media. There are five private weekly publications with 
circulations in the low thousands. There are also five commercial radio 
stations including the Catholic Radio Ecclesia, and Radio Lac Luanda, 
which openly criticized aspects of government policies and highlighted 
poor socioeconomic conditions. A committee composed of the Minister of 
Social Communication, the spokesman of the presidency, and the 
directors of state-run media organizations controls policy and 
censorship authority. The MPLA's secretary general also influences the 
content and tone of state-run media reporting. The Government used its 
control of the media to engage in a hostile propaganda campaign against 
UNITA, including unconfirmed allegations of UNITA massacres, as a means 
of influencing local and international public opinion.
    There were some attempts by the Government to improve relations 
with the media, including visits to independent radio and newspapers by 
the Vice-Minister of Social Communication. Media harassment diminished 
in most areas in the latter half of the year, with the exception of 
Kwanza Norte and Malange, where the Government continued to target 
journalists.
    As a result of the Marques trial, the Government decided to revise 
the press law. In August a committee appointed by the President 
released a draft law for public comment. Despite wide criticism of the 
new text, the Government encouraged a series of public seminars, and 
radio and television programming on the topic. In September the 
Government extended the original 6-week review period by 3 weeks to 
accommodate public feedback. The draft was criticized widely for not 
allowing the expansion of political dialog and discussion and for 
increasing the criminal penalties for defamation. The Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ) recommended the withdrawal of the draft law. 
In October the Government suspended the drafting process, withdrew its 
draft, and announced its intention to appoint a committee consisting of 
both government and nongovernment representatives to reconsider the 
drafting process; however, the process had not begun by year's end.
    The Government generally did not restrict the activities of foreign 
media, including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and VOA; 
however, it continued to refuse to allow direct retransmission of their 
broadcasts. Foreign journalists must obtain authorization from the 
Ministry of the Interior in order to obtain access to government 
officials or to travel within the country. Media requests to travel to 
areas that were not controlled by the Government were routinely denied. 
The Government placed no abnormal visa restrictions on foreign 
journalists and allowed them freedom to report on all aspects of 
society.
    During the year, there was a conviction in the case of the 1996 
killing of state-television reporter Antonio Casimiro (see Section 
1.a.).
    UNITA does not permit freedom of expression in the areas under its 
control.
    Academic life has been circumscribed severely by the civil war; 
however, there is academic freedom, and academics do not practice self-
censorship.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government strictly 
controls this right in practice, although official tolerance for public 
protest increased. The law requires a minimum of 3 days' prior notice 
before public or private assemblies are held, and makes participants 
liable for ``offenses against the honor and consideration due to 
persons and to organs of sovereignty.'' Applications for progovernment 
assemblies are granted routinely without delay; however, applications 
for protest assemblies rarely are granted.
    On February 18, 25 members of the Party for the Support of 
Democracy and Progress in Angola (PADPA) members demonstrated in front 
of the Carmo Church in downtown Luanda in a highly publicized hunger 
strike against an increase in fuel prices. Police dispersed the 
demonstration on the grounds that the police had not received the 
required 3-day notification prior to the demonstration, and police 
detained 12 protesters. There also were allegations of police assault 
against protestors. On February 23, police dispersed a demonstration 
outside the Luanda Provincial Government and reportedly beat some 
demonstrators. On February 24, police with rifles dispersed a 
demonstration, arrested 10 protestors, including the leaders of 2 
opposition parties, and reportedly beat some of the protestors. On 
February 25, the police issued an apology for the arbitrary arrests.
    The Government became more tolerant of public protest during the 
latter half of the year. On March 11, officials permitted an opposition 
march by 100 members of opposition parties against high fuel prices; 
this was the first authorized opposition demonstration since 1992.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association; however, 
the Government restricts this right in practice. Legislation allows the 
Government to deny registration to private associations on security 
grounds; however, in practice the Government accepts virtually all 
applications, including those for political parties. However, there are 
informal government constraints on the operation of associations. The 
Government arbitrarily limits organized activities deemed adverse to 
its interests, by refusing to grant licenses and through other means.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    The Government does not require religious groups to register. 
Colonial era statutes banned all non-Christian religious groups from 
the country; while those statutes still exist, they are no longer 
enforced.
    Members of the clergy in government-held areas regularly use their 
pulpits to criticize government policies.
    While in general UNITA permits freedom of religion, interviews with 
persons who left UNITA-controlled areas reveal that the clergy does not 
enjoy the right to criticize UNITA policies.
    In January 1999, unknown gunmen killed Father Albino Saluaco, a 
Catholic parish priest, and two catechists in a town in the province of 
Huambo that was under UNITA military occupation. No group had claimed 
responsibility for the incident by year's end (see Section 1.a.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement and residence, and freedom of exit from and entry into the 
country; however, the Government does not respect these rights in 
practice. A network of government security checkpoints throughout the 
country interfered with the right to travel. Such checkpoints serve 
also as the principal source of income for many of the country's 
security service personnel. Extortion at checkpoints is routine in the 
center of Luanda and pervasive on major commercial routes. Police 
routinely harassed refugees at checkpoints (see Section 1.c.). The 
Government routinely cuts off access to areas of the country that are 
deemed insecure or beyond the administrative authority of the State. 
Insecurity prevented persons from transporting goods during the year. 
The Government did not place restrictions on emigration and 
repatriation; however, there were reports that immigration officials 
harassed and extorted money from foreign businessmen.
    Journalists who were convicted of defamation were temporarily 
prohibited by the Government from traveling outside of the country (see 
Section 2.a.).
    Landmines are a major impediment to the freedom of movement. UNITA 
used landmines primarily on roads and trails to disrupt transportation, 
and to control village populations. Government mining generally was 
confined to strategic positions around towns for defensive purposes. 
Estimates of the total number of landmines deployed throughout the 
country range into the millions. Fear of injury and death from 
landmines effectively imprisoned and impoverished entire communities. 
There were at least 100 fatalities due to landmine explosions during 
the year, and there are over 80,000 survivors of landmine explosions 
(see Section 1.g.).
    In April the Angolan Ministry of Assistance and Social Re-Insertion 
(MINARS) estimated that there were 3,800,000 IDP's in the country. In 
the same month, the U.N. reported 1,480,942 confirmed IDP's and a total 
of 2,299,314 reported IDP's in the country. There are 120 IDP camps in 
the country, 35 of which were inaccessible due to their distance from 
urban centers, and there is a lack of adequate water supply in these 
areas. Many IDP's are former returnees from neighboring countries who 
were reintegrated into the country from 1994 to 1998. There were 
instances in which IDP's were harassed by police officers and soldiers, 
and denied humanitarian assistance due to misappropriation by the 
authorities. IDP's were conscripted forcibly in both Government and 
UNITA controlled areas (see Section 1.f.). Provincial governments in 
the country at times relocated IDP's to areas with security problems. 
On June 2, 9 persons were killed and 50 were injured when a discarded 
missile exploded in an IDP camp (see Section 1.a.). There have also 
been reports of male IDP's being forced by authorities to leave IDP 
camps and return to their places of origin. However, the IDP's overall 
situation improved during the year. Many IDP's were moved from transit 
camps and urban warehouses with poor conditions to rural, safe security 
areas, and provided with homes, small land parcels, medical care, and 
education by the Government and UNHCR. In November the UNHCR began new 
IDP assistance programs and now provides protection and assistance in 
three provinces.
    Approximately 170,000 citizens sought refuge in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a result of the conflict. In November 
the UNHCR reported that between 15,000 and 18,000 citizens gathered 
near the border with DRC; they remained near the border at year's end. 
Thousands of citizens reportedly crossed into Namibia during the year.
    The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees. The Government provides first asylum to 
refugees. An eligibility committee to evaluate asylum claims meets 
regularly to evaluate asylum requests. According to UNHCR, the country 
has approximately 12,000 refugees, 90 percent of whom are from the DRC.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with valid 
claims to refugee status.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides all adult citizens with the right to vote 
by secret ballot in direct multiparty elections to choose the President 
of the Republic and deputies in the 220-seat National Assembly; 
however, in practice citizens have no effective means to change their 
government. The Lusaka Protocol establishes the mechanism for returning 
the country to an electoral calendar. The Constitutional Committee of 
the National Assembly continued to work on a new constitution and a new 
electoral law; however, the process was not completed by year's end. 
During the year, the Government announced that elections were scheduled 
for 2001, but later postponed them until 2002. Opposition parties 
complained of harassment and intimidation by the Government.
    The President is elected by absolute majority. If no candidate wins 
such a majority, a runoff must take place between the two candidates 
with the most votes. Of the 220 deputies in the National Assembly, 130 
are elected on a national ballot, and 90 are elected to represent the 
provinces. The Electoral Law also calls for the election of three 
additional deputies to represent citizens living abroad; however, those 
positions were not filled in the 1992 elections.
    Ruling power is concentrated in the President and other members of 
the Council of Ministers, through which the President exercises 
executive power. The Council can enact decree-laws, decrees, and 
resolutions, thereby controlling most functions normally associated 
with the legislative branch. Although the Constitution establishes the 
position of Prime Minister, the President dismissed the Prime Minister 
during the MPLA Party Congress at the end of 1998, assumed the position 
himself by decree, and continued to hold the position at year's end. 
The National Assembly has, since its inception, served as a rubber 
stamp for the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, with opposition 
deputies holding about 43 percent of National Assembly seats, 
substantive debates sometimes took place on issues ranging from the 
peace process to the Government's budgeting priorities and 
accountability. In August the parliamentary opposition held a 3-day 
conference in a National Assembly annex with the specific objective of 
organizing an electoral coalition; the conference included 300 
activists from seven opposition parties.
    The 1992 elections were the first multiparty democratic elections 
in the country's history; they were conducted with U.N. supervision and 
financial support. MPLA president Jose Edardo Dos Santos won a 
plurality of votes cast in the presidential election (49 percent), and 
UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi finished second (40 percent). Although local 
and international observers declared the election to be generally free 
and fair and called on UNITA to accept the results, UNITA claimed that 
the elections were fraudulent, rejected the results, and returned the 
country to civil war. The runoff election between Dos Santos and 
Savimbi was never held. The Lusaka Protocol stated that it would take 
place following a U.N. determination that requisite conditions exist. 
The National Assembly voted in June 1999 to cancel the runoff election, 
pending a determination that conditions are appropriate for a new 
election.
    In 1997 UNITA and 10 smaller opposition parties joined the ruling 
MPLA in a government of national unity and reconciliation. In 1998 
UNITA officials assumed 4 ministerial and 7 vice-ministerial positions, 
and 70 UNITA deputies took their seats. UNITA governors, vice 
governors, and local administrators were nominated, but remaining 
positions were filled by members of a splinter UNITA group, UNITA-
Renovada, which is recognized and assisted by the Government. The 
National Assembly promulgated a special status for Savimbi, declaring 
him to be the leader of the largest opposition party and providing him 
with 5 official residences and a bodyguard contingent of 400 personnel. 
The National Assembly revoked Savimbi's status in 1998 for abrogating 
his duties under the Lusaka Protocol. In 1999 the Government declared 
Savimbi a war criminal and issued a warrant for his arrest; the warrant 
remained outstanding at year's end.
    There are no legal barriers to the participation of women in the 
political process; however, women are under represented in government 
and politics. Women occupy 10 of 83 cabinet positions, 35 of 220 seats 
in the National Assembly, and none of the 9 places on the Supreme 
Court.

Section 4. Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not prohibit independent investigations of its 
human rights abuses; however, it fails to cooperate and often uses 
security conditions as a false justification to deny access to affected 
areas.
    There were more than 120 registered NGO's operating in the country; 
approximately 45 were domestic NGO's. Local NGO's actively promoted 
human rights during the year. In October a local NGO, Maos Livres, was 
launched to document and expose prison conditions in Luanda. During the 
year, Maos Livres also provided free legal counsel to detained strikers 
from an independent longshoremen's union (see Section 6.a.).
    Several international organizations have a permanent presence in 
the country including the ICRC and the human rights division of the 
U.N. Human Rights Watch visited the country three times during the 
year.
    The Constitution provides for the creation of an Office of the 
Provider of Justice, or Ombudsman, designated by the National Assembly 
for a 4-year-term, to defend citizens' rights and liberties. However, 
this office had not been established at year's end.
    During the year, U.N. activities in the country resumed with a 
limited mandate and staff.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Under the Constitution, all citizens are equal before the law and 
enjoy the same rights and responsibilities regardless of color, race, 
ethnicity, sex, place of birth, religion, ideology, degree of 
education, or economic or social condition. The Government does not 
have the ability to enforce these provisions effectively.
    Women.--Violence against women was widespread. Credible evidence 
indicated that a significant proportion of homicides was perpetrated 
against women, usually by spouses. In 1997 the Ministry of Women and 
Family was created to deal in part with violence against women. The 
Government continued its project to reduce violence against women and 
improve the status of women, and efforts during the year included 
public education campaign. Allegations of rape by Government forces in 
the central highlands increased during the year (see Section 1.c.). 
There were some unconfirmed reports of rape by UNITA forces.
    The Constitution and Family Code provide for equal rights without 
regard to gender; however, societal discrimination against women 
remained a problem, particularly in rural areas. In addition a portion 
of the Civil Code dates to colonial times and includes discriminatory 
provisions against women in the areas of inheritance, property sales, 
and participation in commercial activities. There are no effective 
mechanisms to enforce child support laws, and women carry the majority 
of responsibilities for raising children. Due to poor economic 
conditions, an increasing number of women engaged in prostitution. The 
law provides for equal pay for equal work; however, in practice, women 
rarely are compensated equally. Some women hold senior positions in the 
armed forces (primarily in the medical field) and civil service, but 
women mostly are relegated to low-level positions in state-run 
industries and in the small private sector. In much of the country, 
women constituted a growing percentage of the disabled, as they were 
most likely to become victims of landmines while foraging for food and 
firewood in agricultural areas. Under the law, adult women may open 
bank accounts, accept employment, and own property without interference 
from their spouses. Upon the death of a male head of household, the 
widow automatically is entitled to 50 percent of the estate with the 
remainder divided equally among legitimate children.
    A series of national conferences on women's rights, partially 
funded by foreign donors, continued to produce calls for the Government 
to amend the Civil Code to end women's legal inequality, create a 
social welfare program, and strengthen enforcement mechanisms for 
existing legislation.
    Children.--Approximately 50 percent of the population is believed 
to be under the age of 15; however, the Government gave little 
attention to children's rights and welfare. The Ministry of Education 
barely functioned due to a lack of resources and corrupt 
administration. Private religious, community, or corporate groups have 
been unable to fill this vacuum. Although primary and secondary 
education was free, students often have to pay significant additional 
expenses. Although primary education was compulsory, there were not 
enough schools and many children had to work to support their families. 
Teachers were chronically unpaid and often demanded unofficial payment 
or bribes from students. Teachers engaged in strikes in provinces 
throughout the country during the year (see Section 6.a.). The net 
enrollment rate of school-age children is 40 percent; however, while 50 
percent of children 5 to 14 years of age are in school, only 30 percent 
of children remain in school after grade 5. There was an 18 percent 
enrollment rate gap favoring boys over girls. Almost 1 million children 
are estimated to be out of school, with no prospect of integrating them 
into the education system. Most of the educational infrastructure was 
either partially or totally damaged and lacks basic equipment and 
teaching materials. Only 42 percent of the population was literate, and 
the illiteracy rate for women is almost twice that of men.
    UNITA and the Government allowed 8,000 child soldiers to be 
demobilized in 1996-97. The Government has not brought any significant 
numbers of children back into the armed forces, although some children 
have been caught up in forced recruitment campaigns (see Section 1.f.). 
There were credible reports that UNITA often forcibly recruits children 
as young as 10 years of age into its armed forces.
    Children often were victims in the civil war. Government and UNITA 
forces killed, kidnaped, and injured children during attacks throughout 
the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.). Children were killed and 
injured by landmine explosions in increasing numbers (see Section 
1.a.).
    The U.N. Children's Fund in 1998 estimated that there were 
approximately 5,000 street children in Luanda; some were orphans or 
abandoned while others ran away from their families or government 
facilities that were unable to support them. Living conditions in 
government youth hostels are so poor that the majority of homeless 
children preferred to sleep on city streets. Street children shine 
shoes, wash cars, and carry water, but many resort to petty crime, 
begging, and prostitution in order to survive (see Section 6.d.). An 
international NGO that works with street children estimated that there 
are 500 to 1,000 underage prostitutes in Luanda. There are no laws that 
specifically prohibit child prostitution; however, child prostitution 
is prohibited by a general criminal statute. The age of sexual consent 
is 12 years, and any sexual relations with a child under 12 years of 
age is considered rape. Sexual relations with a child between the ages 
of 12 and 17 can be considered sexual abuse. There are no laws 
specifically against child pornography; however, pornography is 
prohibited statutorily. The Ministry of Family and Women's Affairs 
enforces and oversees special family courts, and the National Institute 
for Assistance to Children has daily responsibility for children's 
affairs.
    The government-sponsored National Institute for Children was 
established in the late 1980's to enforce child protection, but it 
lacks the capacity to work adequately with international NGO's to 
assist dispossessed youth. The Government publicized the problems of 
street and homeless children during the year. There are no active 
private children's rights advocacy groups.
    People with Disabilities.--The number of the physically disabled 
persons includes an estimated 80,000 disabled landmine survivors. While 
there was no institutional discrimination against the disabled, the 
Government did little to improve their physical, financial, or social 
conditions. There is no legislation mandating accessibility for the 
disabled in public or private facilities, and, in view of the 
degradation of the country's infrastructure and high unemployment rate, 
it was difficult for the disabled to find employment or participate in 
the education system.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Years of war and internal 
dislocation have produced substantial integration of ethnic and 
linguistic groups, particularly in the coastal areas, where as much as 
half of the population resides. The largest ethno-linguistic group, 
about 40 percent of the country's population, is Ovimbundu, whose 
traditional region includes much of the south-central part of the 
country. Although they form the base for UNITA, there is little 
evidence of systematic discrimination against them by the Government or 
other groups. Other important ethno-linguistic groups include the 
Bakongo in the north; Kimbundu in the north-central area; and Chokwe in 
the far east. The coastal population centered in Luanda and, to a 
lesser extent, Benguela-Lobito, predominantly speaks Portuguese as a 
first language. The Portuguese-speaking group includes a large minority 
of ``Mesticos'' of mixed European and African ancestry and a small, 
white, predominantly Portuguese-descended population. In addition about 
30,000 Portuguese citizens live in the country, forming the bulk of the 
nonrefugee expatriate community.
    The population also includes 1 to 2 percent of Khoisan and other 
linguistically distinct hunter-gatherer tribes scattered through the 
provinces of Namibe, Cunene, and Cuando Cubango. There is no evidence 
that they suffer from official discrimination or harassment, but they 
do not participate actively in the political or economic life of the 
country, and they have no ability to influence government decisions 
concerning their interests.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to form and join trade unions, engage in union activities, and 
strike; however, the Government does not respect these rights 
consistently in practice. The Government dominates the National Union 
of Angolan Workers (UNTA), which is the labor movement affiliated with 
the ruling MPLA party; however, there are two independent unions, the 
General Center of Independent and Free Labor Unions of Angola (CGSILA) 
and the small Independent Union of Maritime and Related Workers (SIMA). 
The CGSILA has a membership of approximately 50,000 members, and UNTA 
claims to have over 400,000 members. There are tensions between the two 
organizations. The law requires that labor unions be recognized by the 
Government. Restrictions on civil liberties potentially prevent any 
labor activities not approved by the Government; however, the major 
impediment to labor's ability to advocate on behalf of workers is the 
60 percent formal sector unemployment rate.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Legislation 
passed in 1991 provides the legal framework for, and strictly 
regulates, that right. The law prohibits lockouts and worker occupation 
of places of employment and provides protection for nonstriking 
workers. It prohibits strikes by armed forces and police personnel, 
prison workers, and fire fighters. The law does not prohibit employer 
retribution against strikers effectively.
    There were several strikes during the year by teachers. On August 
7, teachers in four provinces engaged in strikes to protest lack of 
training and low wages (see Section 5).
    In September the Angolan Teachers Union organized a protest to 
demand a salary increase and back pay. Although teachers were paid 
arrears in Benguela, Lobito, and Kwanza South, other provinces claimed 
they were unable to make payments, and teachers returned to work by 
year's end. On October 27, the Independent Union of Maritime and 
Association Workers of Angola (SIMA) engaged in a strike. Management 
threatened to fire the striking workers in retaliation, but all of the 
striking workers retained their jobs. Police arrested six strikers, but 
they were released on October 30 and acquitted of charges of disturbing 
the peace. On December 12, UNTA organized a 3-day strike for an 
increase in the minimum wage. The CGSILA refused to cooperate and 
openly criticized UNTA for coopting CGSILA's long-standing support for 
a minimum wage increase, but demanding half of the amount that the 
CGSILA had advocated. The minimum wage had not been increased by year's 
end. In 1999 the National Union of Teachers, affiliated with CGSILA, 
twice called for a national strike to demand better and regular pay in 
order to correct the Government's chronic failure to pay teachers on 
schedule. On the first occasion, the Government negotiated with the 
union, but on the second occasion some members of the union were 
arrested and tried for acts against the State, although none were 
convicted or imprisoned as a result.
    Unions have the right to affiliate internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for the right to organize and for collective 
bargaining; however, the Government generally does not respect those 
rights in practice. The Government dominates the economy through state-
run enterprises. The Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and 
Social Security sets wages and benefits on an annual basis. Legislation 
prohibits discrimination against union members and calls for worker 
complaints to be adjudicated in regular civil courts. Under the law, 
employers found guilty of anti-union discrimination are required to 
reinstate workers who have been fired for union activities. In practice 
neither the Labor Code nor the judicial system are capable of defending 
these rights.
    On November 5, several railroad workers were ordered home after 
they reportedly attempted to change their union affiliation from UNTA 
to CGSILA; none of the workers were fired, and they continued to belong 
to UNTA at year's end.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law permits the 
Government to force workers back to work for breaches of worker 
discipline and participation in strikes, and has been cited by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) as an example of forced labor in 
violation of ILO conventions. There were reports that the army forcibly 
conscripted persons (see Section 1.f.). The law prohibits forced or 
bonded child labor, and there are no reports that such labor occurs in 
government-held areas; however, the Government does not have the 
capacity to enforce this legislation in nongovernment-held areas.
    UNITA forces regularly abducted children for military service and 
other forms of forced labor (see Sections 1.b., 1.f., and 5). UNITA 
depended on forced labor for much of its logistical support. Refugees 
and internally displaced persons reported that rural women frequently 
were forced to work as porters for UNITA military units and kept in 
life-threatening conditions of servitude. There continued to be some 
reports of sexual assault of abductees during the year.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 14 years. Children 
between the ages of 14 and 18 may not work at night, in dangerous 
conditions, or in occupations requiring great physical effort, and 
children under 16 years of age are prohibited from factory work; 
however, these provisions generally are not enforced. The Inspector 
General of the Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and 
Social Security is responsible for enforcing labor laws. Although child 
labor law enforcement is under the jurisdiction of the courts, in 
practice, the court system does not provide adequate protection for 
children. Child labor violations were punishable with fines and 
restitution. There is no formal procedure for inspections and 
investigations into child labor abuses outside of the family law 
system, although private persons can file claims for violations of 
child labor laws. The ministry maintains employment centers where 
prospective employees register, and the center screens out applicants 
under the age of 14; however, many younger children work on family 
farms, as domestic servants, and in the informal sector as street 
vendors. Family-based child labor in subsistence agriculture is common. 
Children under 12 years of age work for no reimbursement for their 
families and in apprenticeships. Poverty and social upheavals have 
brought large numbers of orphaned and abandoned children, as well as 
runaways, into unregulated urban employment in the informal sector. The 
Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of 
child labor; however, there are no reports that such child labor exists 
in the country.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded child labor; however, the 
Government is unable to enforce these provisions, and children were 
regularly abducted by UNITA forces for forced labor (see Section 6.c. 
and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage set by the 
Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and Social Security was 
approximately $30 (600 kwanzas) per month during the year; however, the 
Government does not enforce this standard. The majority of urban 
workers earn less than $10 (200 kwanzas) per month. Most workers hold 
second jobs, engage in subsistence agriculture, rely on aid from 
relatives, or engage in corruption to supplement their incomes. Neither 
the minimum wage nor the average monthly salary, which are estimated at 
$20 (400 kwanzas) to $200 (4,000 kwanzas) per month, are sufficient to 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. As a 
result, most wage earners depend on the informal sector, subsistence 
agriculture, corruption, or support from abroad to augment their 
incomes. The Government took no measures to rectify the national system 
of setting the minimum wage during the year. Employees receiving less 
then the legal minimum wage have the right to seek legal recourse; 
however, it is uncommon for workers to do so.
    A 1994 government decree established a 37-hour work week; however, 
the Ministry of Public Administration was unable to enforce this 
standard, just as it was unable to enforce existing occupational safety 
and health standards. Workers cannot remove themselves from dangerous 
work situations without jeopardizing their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits trafficking 
in persons; however, there continued to be allegations that UNITA 
abducted persons, including children, for forced labor, and abducted 
women for use as sex slaves. There were reports that the Government 
forcibly recruited persons (see Section 1.f.). There were credible 
reports that UNITA forcibly recruited children into its military (see 
Section 5).
                               __________

                                 BENIN

    The Republic of Benin is a constitutional democracy headed by 
President Mathieu Kerekou, who was inaugurated on April 4, 1996, after 
elections that observers generally viewed as free and fair. President 
Kerekou, who ruled Benin as a Socialist military dictator from 1972 to 
1989, succeeded his democratically elected predecessor and continued 
the civilian, democratic rule begun in the 1990-91 constitutional 
process that ended his previous reign. The next presidential election 
is scheduled for March 2001. There are 19 political parties represented 
in the unicameral, 83-member National Assembly. The March 1999 
parliamentary elections, which were free, fair, and transparent, 
resulted in significant gains by the opposition, notably the party of 
former President Nicephore Soglo, which gained 27 seats in Parliament. 
Although a loose alliance of progovernment deputies holds a 42 to 41 
seat majority, some progovernment deputies side with the opposition, 
depending on the issue. Consequently, legislative power is shared 
between opposition and progovernment forces. For example, the President 
of the National Assembly belongs to an opposition party. The Government 
respects the constitutional provision for an independent judiciary; 
however, the executive has important powers in regard to the judiciary, 
and the judiciary is inefficient and susceptible to corruption at all 
levels.
    The civilian-controlled security forces consist of the armed 
forces, headed by the Minister Delegate for Defense Matters in the 
Office of the President, and the police force under the Interior 
Minister. The Ministry of Defense supervises the gendarmerie, which 
exercises police functions in rural areas while the Ministry of 
Interior supervises other police forces. The armed forces continued to 
play an apolitical role in government affairs despite concerns about 
lack of morale within its ranks and an ethnic imbalance within the 
forces. Members of the police committed some human rights abuses.
    Benin is an extremely poor country with average yearly per capita 
income below $400. The economy is based largely on subsistence 
agriculture, cotton production, regional trade (including transshipment 
of goods to neighboring countries), and small-scale offshore oil 
production. The port of Cotonou serves as a major conduit for goods 
entering neighboring Nigeria legally and illegally. The Kerekou 
administration maintained the austerity program begun by its 
predecessor; privatized state-owned enterprises; reduced fiscal 
expenditures; and deregulated trade. In spite of an inefficient 
bureaucracy and widespread unemployment, the country's economic 
recovery continued under liberal economic policies instituted since the 
return to democracy. Although the economy expanded, real growth was 
lower than in the previous year. The Government estimated the growth 
rate at 5 percent for the year; however, approximately 2 percent of 
this growth can be credited to major infrastructure projects, such as 
road construction, that were funded by foreign aid. Inflation was 4 
percent at year's end, prompted by price hikes for imported oil and 
derivative products. In July the Minister of Finance took the newly 
privatized state-owned oil company, Sonacop, to court over improper 
financial operations in the acquisition of the company by tycoon, Sefou 
Fagbohoun, a close associate of the President. Also the Government 
announced delays in the privatization of the port of Cotonou and the 
cotton parastatal, Sonapra.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in several areas. There were 
credible reports that police sometimes beat suspects, and at times the 
authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The most 
prominent human rights problems continued to be the failure of police 
forces to curtail acts of vigilantism and mob justice; harsh and 
unhealthy prison conditions; serious administrative delays in 
processing ordinary criminal cases with attendant denial of timely, 
fair trials; judicial corruption; violence and societal discrimination 
against women; and trafficking in and abuse of children. The practice 
of female genital mutilation (FGM) and, to a lesser extent, infanticide 
also remain problems. Child labor continues to be a problem. The 
Constitutional Court has demonstrated independence.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by 
government officials.
    In September Amnesty International-Benin reported that police had 
conducted a regular investigation in the 1998 deaths of Florent Adoko 
and Alexandre Adjakieje (the date of the investigation was not 
available). They allegedly died as a result of abusive force used by 
the police, but the Government did not follow up the investigation nor 
were the results of the investigation released publicly by year's end.
    On May 4, a riot in the Lokossa prison (Mono Department) resulted 
in the death of three prisoners and severe injury to a magistrate who 
attempted to mediate the dispute; prisoners rioted over lengthy 
pretrial detention.
    As in the previous year, incidents of mob justice were reported by 
the media and other sources. Most often these were cases of mobs 
killing or severely injuring suspected criminals, particularly thieves 
caught in the act. Although a number of these incidents occurred in 
urban areas and were publicized in the press, the Government apparently 
made no concerted attempt to investigate or prosecute anyone involved. 
In 1999 a rural popular leader, the self-styled Colonel Devi, incited 
mobs to lynch more than 100 suspected criminals in the southwestern 
part of the country. Most of the victims were burned alive, many after 
being abducted, beaten, and tortured by Devi's followers. Although the 
number of such killings decreased during the year, reliable reports 
indicate that incidents of mob justice by Devi's followers persisted, 
despite a promise Devi made in 1999 to order his followers to cease 
lynching suspected wrongdoers and instead turn them over to the 
authorities. Individual incidents of mob justice continued to occur 
nationwide, and police most often ignored vigilante attacks. On March 
18, a mob took a convicted thief, ``DeGaulle,'' from the automobile of 
the director of the Lokossa prison and burned him death.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there 
were credible reports that police sometimes beat criminal suspects. For 
example, in June the police shot a man twice in the pelvis, handcuffed 
him, and left him for several hours without medical attention. The 
press reported the incident; however, the Government took no action 
against the police. The Government continued to make payments to 
victims of torture under the military regime that ruled from 1972 to 
1989.
    An investigation was completed in the case of the March 1999 
beating of Deputy Sacca Fikara. The incident reportedly occurred in 
daytime when the police stopped Fikara's car for an alleged traffic 
infraction but did not recognize him. The Attorney General did not 
render a decision regarding this incident by year's end.
    Mob justice resulted in serious injuries to a number of persons 
(also see Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh. Extensive 
overcrowding and lack of proper sanitation and medical facilities posed 
a risk to prisoners' health. The prison diet is seriously inadequate; 
malnutrition and disease are common. Family members are expected to 
provide food for inmates to supplement prison rations. Prisoners are 
allowed to meet with visitors such as family members, lawyers, and 
others.
    Some progress was made in 1998 with the opening of three modern 
facilities in the departments (provinces) of Borgou, Mono, and Atacora 
through foreign funding. The prisons provided, for the first time, 
separate units for men, women, and minors. However, by April two out of 
three of the new prisons already were overcrowded. These, like other 
prisons, at times were filled to more than three times their capacity. 
The prison in Natitingou (in Atacora province) was the only one of 
eight prisons nationwide below full capacity.
    Efforts to complete a facility in Misserete (in Oueme) for 1,000 
prisoners were delayed because of funding problems. On July 31, the 
night before the country's 40th Independence Day, President Kerekou 
announced that some prisoners who were convicted of minor crimes, such 
as petty theft, between August 2, 1998, and August 1, 1999, could have 
their prison sentences reduced. The presidential pledge had to be 
approved by the Council of Ministers and other government bodies; 
however, by year's end, the majority of the prisoners were released.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. In 
February a delegation headed by the president of the Commission 
Beninoise des Droits de L'Homme toured prison facilities in Cotonou. In 
April the president of the Beninese chapter of Amnesty International 
also visited several prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits the arbitrary arrest and detention; however, at times the 
authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The Constitution 
prohibits detention for more than 48 hours without a hearing by a 
magistrate whose order is required for continued detention. However, 
there were credible reports that authorities exceeded this 48-hour 
limit in many cases, sometimes by as much as a week, using the common 
practice of holding a person indefinitely ``at the disposition of'' the 
public prosecutor's office before presenting their case to a 
magistrate. Approximately 75 percent of persons in prison are pretrial 
detainees.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile of citizens, and it is not 
practiced. Many citizens who went into exile prior to the establishment 
of democratic rule have returned.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this 
provision in practice; however, the executive has important powers in 
regard to the judiciary, and the judiciary remains inefficient in some 
respects and is susceptible to corruption at all levels.
    The President appoints career magistrates as judges in civil 
courts, and the Constitution gives the Ministry of Justice 
administrative authority over judges, including the power to transfer 
them. Inadequate facilities, poorly trained staff, and overcrowded 
dockets result in a slow administration of justice. The low salaries of 
magistrates and clerks have a demoralizing effect on their commitment 
to efficient and timely justice and make them susceptible to 
corruption.
    A civilian court system operates on the national and provincial 
levels. There is only one court of appeals. The Supreme Court is the 
court of last resort in all administrative and judicial matters. The 
Constitutional Court is charged with deciding on the constitutionality 
of laws and on disputes between the President and the National Assembly 
and with resolving disputes regarding presidential and National 
Assembly elections. Its rulings in past years against both the 
executive and legislative branches, which were respected by both 
branches, demonstrated its independence from both these branches of 
government. The Constitution also provides for a High Court of Justice 
to convene in the event of crimes committed by the President or 
government ministers against the State. Under the Constitution, the 
High Court is to consist of members of the Constitutional Court (except 
for its president), six deputies elected by the National Assembly and 
the Supreme Court, and the Chairman of the Supreme Court. Implementing 
legislation to create the High Court of Justice was passed in 1996. On 
August 11, after several years of legislative delays, the National 
Assembly elected six deputies by an absolute majority to serve on the 
first High Court of Justice. Only a new Chairman of the Supreme Court, 
currently awaiting appointment, must be chosen by the President. 
However, at year's end, the law had not been promulgated. Inefficiency 
and corruption particularly affect the judiciary at the trial court and 
investigating magistrate levels. Military disciplinary councils deal 
with minor offenses by members of the military services, but they have 
no jurisdiction over civilians.
    The legal system is based on French civil law and local customary 
law. The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial. A 
defendant enjoys the presumption of innocence and has the right to be 
present at trial and to representation by an attorney, at public 
expense if necessary. In practice the court provides indigent 
defendants with court-appointed counsel upon request. A defendant also 
has the right to confront witnesses and to have access to government-
held evidence. Trials are open to the public, but in exceptional 
circumstances the president of the court may decide to restrict access 
to preserve public order or to protect the parties.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and 
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions in 
practice. The Government denied charges of wiretapping involving former 
President Soglo, and the National Assembly investigation into the case 
was hampered by Soglo's absence from the country for much of the year. 
Police are required to obtain a judicial warrant before entering a 
private home, and they usually observed this requirement in practice.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. The government entity with oversight responsibility 
for media operations is the High Authority for Audio-Visual Media and 
Communications (HAAC), which requires broadcasters to submit weekly 
lists of planned programs and requires publishers to deposit copies of 
all publications with it. However, this requirement is not observed by 
the media in practice.
    The law provides for sentences of imprisonment involving compulsory 
labor for certain acts or activities related to the exercise of the 
right of free expression (see Section 6.c.).
    There is a large and active privately owned press consisting of 
more than a dozen daily newspapers. These publications criticize the 
Government freely and often, but their effect on public opinion is 
limited because of their urban concentration. The majority of citizens 
are illiterate and live in rural areas; they largely receive their news 
via radio. A nongovernmental media ethics commission (ODEM) was 
established in May 1999 and censured a number of journalists in 1999 
and during the year for unethical conduct, as well as commending some 
journalists for adherence to the standards of their profession.
    In 1999 a trial court sentenced five journalists to various jail 
terms not exceeding 1 year and fines for criminal libel in several 
cases that did not involve criticism of the Government. For example, 
Vincent Foly, a reporter for Le Point au Quotidien, was arrested in 
January 1999 following a tough editorial and sentenced to 1 year in 
prison in August 1999. At year's end, none of these 1999 sentences had 
been executed and appeals remained pending. Foly was arrested again on 
January 27, following his publication of an editorial critical of a 
court's decision to dismiss narcotics trafficking charges against a 
senior government official, and released approximately February 1. No 
charges were brought against Foly in this incident.
    Journalists sought during the year to eliminate jail sentences as a 
penalty for violating the libel law, but the Government has not 
responded. In December at the opening of the U.N.-sponsored Fourth 
International Conference on New and Reestablished Democracies, the 
President admonished the press for its lack of professional standards 
and indicated that journalism should be improved.
    New privately owned radio and television stations began 
broadcasting in 1997. Throughout the year, they broadcast programs that 
criticized the Government without interference. It is unclear what 
effect the private electronic media have on public opinion; however, an 
increase in the number of ``call-in'' and panel shows during the year 
contributed to significantly increased public involvement in political 
affairs and a heightened awareness of important national problems.
    The Government continued to own and operate the media that were 
most influential in reaching the public because of its broadcast range 
and infrastructure. Radio is probably the most important information 
medium, given that half of the population is illiterate. Until 1997, it 
owned the only radio stations that transmitted locally. The Benin 
Office of Radio and Television (ORTB) transmits on the FM and AM bands 
and by short wave, in French and local languages. Radio France 
International (RFI) also transmits on a local FM band under an 
agreement with the Government. In 1999 the British Broadcasting 
Corporation began French and English language broadcasting in Cotonou. 
Five rural radio stations governed by local committees broadcast 
several hours a day exclusively in local languages. These stations 
receive support from the ORTB.
    A similar arrangement exists for television transmissions: the ORTB 
broadcasts 5 hours per day on a signal that is easily received in urban 
areas. Approximately 80 percent of the ORTB's television programming is 
in French. TV5, a commercial venture with investments by television 
broadcasting organizations in France, Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland, 
broadcasts locally 24 hours per day entirely in French under an 
agreement with the Government. A new privately owned television 
station, LC-2, began broadcasting in Cotonou in 1997. LC-2 is owned 
entirely by a local businessman and features light entertainment and 
news, although news coverage requires payment in many circumstances. 
Although neither television station broadcasts partisan programs in 
support of, or unduly critical of, the Government, the vast majority of 
news programming centers on government officials' activities, 
government--sponsored conferences, and international stories provided 
by French television or other foreign sources.
    The Government does not censor works by foreign journalists, 
authors, or artists.
    HAAC regulations govern satellite reception equipment and movie and 
video clubs. There is little enforcement of these regulations.
    Internet service is available in major cities; there are no 
restrictions on its use.
    In general academic freedom is respected. University professors are 
permitted to lecture freely, conduct research, and publish their work.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice. The Government requires permits for use of 
public places for demonstrations and generally grants such permits; 
however, during the year, the mayor of Cotonou denied permits to 
protesters angry over rising gasoline prices, and in at least two 
instances, citing the visit of a foreign head of state (see Section 
6.a.). In other instances, gasoline price protest permits were granted.
    In June police dispersed a march to protest the rising gas prices 
(see Section 6.a.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government 
requires associations to register and routinely grants registrations. 
In August the Government published a list of 167 schools that it 
claimed were operating as nonregistered organizations; it suspended 
these institutions until they registered. The Government closed a few 
of the schools; however, most continued to operate despite being listed 
as nonregistered. Others reopened after completing the fairly 
complicated registration process. By year's end, schools were operating 
normally.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Persons 
who wish to form a religious group must register with the Ministry of 
Interior. Registration requirements are identical for all religious 
groups. There were no reports that any group has been refused 
permission to register or has been subjected to untoward delays or 
obstacles in the registration process. Religious groups are free from 
taxation.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice; 
however, the presence of police, gendarmes, and illegal roadblocks 
impedes domestic movement. Although ostensibly meant to enforce 
automotive safety and customs regulations, many of these checkpoints 
serve as a means for officials to exact bribes from travelers. The 
Government maintained previously implemented measures to combat such 
petty corruption at roadblocks.
    The Government's policy toward the seasonal movement of livestock 
allows migratory Fulani herdsmen from other countries to enter freely; 
it does not enforce designated entry points. Disputes have arisen 
between the herdsmen and local landowners over grazing rights.
    The Government does not restrict international travel for political 
reasons, and those who travel abroad may return without hindrance.
    The law contains provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Historically, the Government 
has cooperated closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees, 
including those in need of first asylum. The Government provided first 
asylum to up to 200,000 citizens of Togo during the 1993 political 
violence in that country. While most have returned to Togo, in December 
there were 991 refugees at the Kpomasse camp and a total of 1,519 
Togolese in the country. Despite severe economic pressures that limit 
its ability to provide education for children, the Government has 
allowed these Togolese to enroll their children in local schools and to 
participate in some economic activities. During the year, the 
Government welcomed about 731 at-risk refugees from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo destined for eventual resettlement in another 
country.
    In contrast the UNHCR estimates that 250 Ogoni refugees from 
Nigeria, disadvantaged because they do not speak French, cannot work, 
nor can their children attend schools. UNHCR officials have directed 
them to remain within the confines of the Kpomasse refugee camp to 
avoid potential confrontations with local inhabitants and to maintain 
administrative control over their activities.
    In addition there are lesser numbers of other refugees from 
Nigeria, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, 
Chad, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Niger, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Sierra Leone. The UNHRC 
estimated that, as of November, there were 5,628 refugees of different 
nationalities in the country and that approximately 2,800 persons 
resident in the country were requesting asylum.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons having a 
valid claim to refugee status.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully. Citizens exercised this right in legislative 
elections in 1991, 1995, and in presidential elections in 1991 and 
1996, all of which were considered free and fair. The Constitution 
provides for a 5-year term of office for the President (who is limited 
to two terms) and 4-year terms for National Assembly members (who may 
serve an unlimited number of terms). The next presidential election, 
which will take place in two rounds, is scheduled for March 2001.
    Women participate actively in the political parties but are under 
represented in government and politics. Following a Cabinet reshuffle 
in June 1999, there are 2 women in the 19-member Cabinet, 1 less than 
in the previous 18-member Cabinet. There are 5 female deputies in the 
83-member, unicameral National Assembly, including the leader of the 
largest opposition party. The previous legislature consisted of 82 
deputies with 6 female members. The President of the Constitutional 
Court and the Solicitor General (which is not a cabinet position) are 
women.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups, both domestic and international, 
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing 
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are 
generally cooperative and responsive to their views.
    The Beninese branch of Amnesty International and other 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued to report without 
government interference on the alleged discovery of hundreds of bodies 
of victims of Togolese security forces washed up on Beninese beaches in 
1998. Investigation by a joint U.N.-Organization of African Unity 
commission into this case continued. A three-person team visited the 
country in November and held several interviews with regard to the 
problem, despite continued reluctance by witnesses to come forward.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, and 
religion, but societal discrimination against women continued.
    Women.--While no statistics are available, violence against women, 
including wife beating, occurred. At times the press reports incidents 
of abuse of women, but judges and police are reluctant to intervene in 
domestic disputes, considering such disputes a family matter.
    Although the Constitution provides for equality for women in the 
political, economic, and social spheres, women experience extensive 
societal discrimination, especially in rural areas where they occupy a 
subordinate role and are responsible for much of the hard labor on 
subsistence farms. In urban areas, women dominate the trading sector in 
the open-air markets. By law women have equal inheritance and property 
rights, but local custom in some areas prevents them from inheriting 
real property. Women do not enjoy the same educational opportunities as 
men, and female literacy is about 18 percent (compared with 50 percent 
for males). However, elementary school pass rates in recent years 
highlighted significant progress by girls in literacy and scholastic 
achievement.
    There are active women's rights groups that have been effective in 
drafting a family code that would improve the status of women and 
children under the law. The draft code has yet to be adopted by the 
National Assembly, although it has been on the legislature's agenda for 
6 years and has been considered by parliamentary committees. Many 
observers believe that consideration of the draft was postponed because 
of provisions that would threaten male prerogatives, which is a highly 
volatile political issue. Action on the draft code is not anticipated 
until after a president is elected in March 2001 and the next regular 
session of the legislature convenes in April 2001.
    Children.--The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible 
for the protection of children's rights, primarily in the areas of 
education and health. The National Commission for Children's Rights and 
the Ministry of Family and Social Protection have oversight roles in 
the promotion of human rights issues with regard to children and their 
welfare. In April the Minister of Justice established a National 
Commission for Children's Rights, which held its initial session in 
July.
    Education is neither free (although the charge is nominal) nor 
compulsory. In particular the Government is trying to boost primary 
school enrollment, which is approximately 78 percent for males and only 
approximately 46 percent for females nationwide. In some parts of the 
country, girls receive no formal education.
    Some traditional practices inflict hardship and violence on 
children, including most prominently the custom of ``vidomegon,'' 
whereby poor, often rural, families place a child, primarily a 
daughter, in the home of a more wealthy family to avoid the burden the 
child represents to the parental family. The children work, but the 
arrangement is voluntary between the two families. There is 
considerable, but an unquantified amount of abuse in the practice, and 
there are instances of sexual exploitation. Ninety to 95 percent of the 
children in vidomegon are young girls. Children are sent from poorer 
families to Cotonou and then some of the children are sent to Gabon, 
the Cote d'Ivoire, and the Central African Republic to help in markets 
and around the home. The child receives living accommodation, while 
income generated from the child's activities is split between the 
child's parents remaining in the rural area and the urban family that 
raises the child. In July 1999, the Ministry of Justice launched a 
nationwide publicity campaign to alert parents to the risks of placing 
their children in vidomegon and to inform adults with vidomegon 
children of their responsibilities and of the children's rights. In 
August in conjunction with UNICEF, the Ministry of Family and Social 
Protection sponsored a 4-day workshop on educating vidomegon children 
about their rights.
    During the year, the parents of a young female house servant to the 
daughter-in-law of President Kerekou filed a formal complaint regarding 
the abuse of their daughter by Kerekou's daughter-in-law. The parents 
of the child reportedly requested a preliminary inquiry, and reportedly 
the case was closed without further action.
    In the 1996 case of an official detained for beating a 12-year-old 
maid to death that year, a criminal court found the defendant, Mrs. 
Christine Tchitchi, ex-wife of a former Minister of Culture, guilty in 
1996. The former Minister of Culture was not detained. The court 
sentenced her to 5 years imprisonment. Already confined in pretrial 
detention, she was given credit for time served, completed her 
sentence, and was released.
    Other traditional practices include the killing of deformed babies, 
breech babies, and one of two newborn twins (all of whom are thought to 
be sorcerers in some rural areas). There is also a tradition in which a 
groom abducts and rapes his prospective child bride (under 14 years of 
age). Criminal courts mete out stiff sentences to criminals convicted 
of crimes against children, but many such crimes never reach the courts 
due to lack of education and access to the courts or fear of police 
involvement in the problem.
    Forced child labor and the trafficking in Beninese children for 
purposes of forced labor or prostitution in other countries remains 
problems (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    The Government, in concert with NGO's, made serious efforts to 
combat child abuse and trafficking in children, including media 
campaigns, programs to assist street children, greater border 
surveillance, and a conference on trafficking (see Section 6.f.). 
Despite such efforts, the abuse of children remained a serious human 
rights problem.
    The Government has been less successful in combating female genital 
mutilation, which is not illegal. FGM is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health. FGM is practiced on females ranging from infancy 
through 30 years of age and generally takes the form of excision. 
Surveys, including one conducted by the World Health Organization in 
1999, reliably placed the estimate of the number of women who had 
undergone FGM at approximately 50 percent. A prominent NGO, the Benin 
chapter of the Inter-African Committee, has made progress in raising 
awareness of the dangers of the practice; the Government has cooperated 
with its efforts. According to recent research, there is a strong 
profit motive in the continued practice of FGM by those who perform the 
procedure, usually older women. The Government, in cooperation with 
NGO's, held workshops during 1999 aimed at eradicating the practice, 
and several NGO's continued the effort during the year. One 
international NGO (Intact) paid those who perform the procedure to 
abandon their profession. Another local NGO also was active. In January 
Dignite Feminine collected 60 excision knives from practitioners of FGM 
in the northern section of the country who renounced the practice 
voluntarily. In April the Social Affairs Minister attended a ceremony 
in which 17 women turned in their cutting tools in exchange for small 
grants (worth approximately $176 (123,200 CFA).
    Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--Although the Constitution provides that 
the State should care for people with disabilities, the Government does 
not mandate accessibility for them. It operated a number of social 
centers for disabled persons to assist their social integration. 
Nonetheless, many are unable to find employment and must resort to 
begging to support themselves.
    The 1998 Labor Code includes provisions to protect the rights of 
disabled workers. The code was enforced with moderate effectiveness 
during the year.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is a long history of 
regional rivalries. Although southerners are preeminent in the 
Government's senior ranks, many prominent military officers come from 
the north. During the year, the imbalance was reduced by new 
appointments. The south has enjoyed more advanced economic development, 
a larger population, and has traditionally held politically favored 
status. In the 1996 elections, a northerner was elected President.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides workers 
with the freedom to organize, join unions, meet, and strike, and the 
Government usually respects these rights in practice. A new Labor Code 
went into effect in January 1999. The code was approved after long 
discussions between the Government, labor unions, and the National 
Assembly. The labor force of approximately 2 million is engaged 
primarily in subsistence agriculture and other primary sector 
activities, with less than 2 percent of the population engaged in the 
modern (wage) sector.
    Although approximately 75 percent of the wage earners belong to 
labor unions, a much smaller percentage of workers in the private 
sector are union members. There are several union confederations, and 
unions generally are independent of government and political parties. 
The Economic and Social Council, a constitutionally mandated body 
established in 1994, includes four union representatives.
    Strikes are permitted; however, the authorities can declare strikes 
illegal for stated causes, for example, threatening to disrupt social 
peace and order, and require strikers to maintain minimum services. The 
Government declared two strike-related marches illegal during the year, 
but it did not declare the strikes illegal.
    During the year, there were several major peaceful strikes over 
increases in the price of gasoline, which significantly reduced 
workers' purchasing power. For example, in June a strike at the port of 
Cotonou succeeded in reversing a government decision to privatize the 
port. During strikes unions generally called for higher wages, lower 
fuel prices, and the dismissal of the mayor of Cotonou, who refused to 
issue permits to march during a visit by the Libyan head of state in 
June (see Section 2.b.). One such march began before police dispersed 
it without violence. During an authorized march in July, President 
Kerekou addressed the workers and rebuked the unions for failing to 
recognize their relative well-being in relation to that of neighboring 
countries. Labor unions continued to oppose the Government's merit-
based promotion scheme. Unions also opposed a 1969 decree (which is 
still in effect) permitting the Government to dock the wages of 
striking public sector employees.
    There were no known instances of efforts by the Government to 
retaliate against union activity; however, the ICFTU alleged that 
hostility to trade unions persisted and that union members were 
intimidated. A company may withhold part of a worker's pay following a 
strike. Laws prohibit employer retaliation against strikers, and the 
Government enforces them effectively.
    Unions may form freely or join federations or confederations and 
affiliate with international bodies. The two major labor confederations 
are known to be affiliated with the Brussels-based Confederation 
Internationale de Syndicats Libres.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
provides for collective bargaining, and workers freely exercised these 
rights. Wages in the private sector are set in negotiations between 
unions and employers.
    The new Labor Code permits unions to become affiliated with 
international organizations. It also includes a section on the rights 
of disabled workers. The Government sets wages in the public sector by 
law and regulation.
    The Labor Code prohibits employers from taking union membership or 
activity into account regarding hiring, work distribution, professional 
or vocational training, or dismissal. The Government levies substantial 
penalties against employers who refuse to rehire workers dismissed for 
lawful union activities.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor and specifically prohibits forced 
and bonded labor by children; however, forced child labor and 
trafficking in children are problems (see Section 6.f.). Some 
financially desperate parents indenture their children to ``agents'' 
recruiting farm hands or domestic workers, often on the understanding 
that money paid to the children would be sent to the parents. According 
to press reports, in some cases, these agents take the children to 
neighboring countries for labor (see Section 6.f.). The Government has 
taken steps to educate parents and to prevent such kidnapings of 
children. Also, many rural children are sent to cities to live with 
relatives or family friends, often on the understanding that in return 
for performing domestic chores, they would receive an education. Host 
families do not always honor their part of the bargain, and the abuse 
of child domestic servants occurs. The Government has taken some steps 
to curb abuses, including media campaigns, regional workshops, and 
public pronouncements on child labor problems.
    The law provides for sentences of imprisonment involving compulsory 
labor for certain acts or activities related to the exercise of the 
right of free expression (see Section 2.a.); however, no such sentences 
were imposed during the year.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment or apprenticeship 
of children under 14 years of age in any enterprise; however, child 
labor remains a problem. The Ministry of Labor enforces the Labor Code 
in only a limited manner (and then only in the modern sector), due to 
the lack of inspectors. To help support their families, children of 
both sexes--including those as young as 17 years old--continue to work 
on rural family farms, in small businesses, on construction sites in 
urban areas, in public markets, and as domestic servants under the 
practice of vidomegon. In February one report estimated that 75 percent 
of apprentices working as seamstresses, hairdressers, carpenters, and 
mechanics were younger than 15 years of age. Most of these apprentices 
are also under the legal age of 14 for apprenticeship. Children also 
commonly work as street vendors.
    The Government did not ratify ILO Convention 182 on eliminating the 
worst forms of child labor; however, it was before the National 
Assembly at year's end.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; but the 
Government is unable to enforce these prohibitions except in the modern 
sector, and there are reports of forced child labor (see Sections 6.c. 
and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government administratively 
sets minimum wage scales for a number of occupations. In July the 
Government raised the minimum wage to approximately $35 (CFA francs 
25,000 per month) increased from CFA francs 21,924 in April 1997. The 
decision was made in consultation with trade unions. However, this 
increase is not adequate to cover the costs for food and housing even 
of a single worker. Many workers must supplement their wages by 
subsistence farming or informal sector trade. Most workers in the wage 
sector earn more than the minimum wage, although many domestics and 
other laborers in the informal sector earn less.
    The Labor Code establishes a work week of from 40 to 46 hours, 
depending on the type of work, and provides for at least one 24-hour 
rest period per week. Domestic and agricultural workers frequently work 
70 hours or more per week. The authorities generally enforce legal 
limits on work weeks in the modern sector. The code establishes health 
and safety standards, but the Ministry of Labor does not enforce them 
effectively. The code does not provide workers with the right to remove 
themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued 
employment. The Ministry of Labor has the authority to require 
employers to remedy dangerous work conditions but does not do so 
effectively.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons; however, trafficking in children is a problem. Article 15 of 
the Constitution provides for fundamental civil rights, and long-
standing provisions of the criminal code prohibit kidnaping. Laws 
dating to 1905 but still in force prohibit trafficking in persons in 
general and in underage females in particular. Trafficking in children, 
which remained a problem, continued to be the subject of considerable 
media coverage. Most victims are abducted or leave home with 
traffickers who promise educational opportunities or other incentives. 
They are taken to places in foreign countries (according to the press, 
principally located in Nigeria, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon) and 
sold into servitude in agriculture, as domestics, or as prostitutes. In 
addition hundreds of children are taken across the border to Togo and 
Cote d'Ivoire to work in plantations.
    According to a survey of child labor conducted by the Government in 
1999, the World Bank, and INSAE (a nutritionally focused NGO), 49,000 
rural children, constituting 8 percent of the rural child population 
between the ages of 6 and 16, work abroad, primarily as agricultural 
workers on plantations in the Cote d'Ivoire and as domestic workers in 
Gabon. Only children who had been trafficked explicitly for labor 
purposes were counted among the 49,000 children that were estimated to 
be victims of trafficking. However, the children who left ``for other 
reasons'' may conceal an additional number of trafficked children and 
bring the number close to 80,000. Of the trafficked children, 61 
percent were boys and 39 percent were girls. Certain villages have been 
particularly victimized by organized child traffickers, and there were 
villages where up to 51 percent of children were trafficked.
    The Minor Protection Brigade, under the jurisdiction of the 
Interior Ministry, combats crimes against children. The media reported 
that during the year, the brigade, in addition to gendarmes and police, 
intercepted and arrested a number of traffickers trying to smuggle 
children into and out of the country.
    On January 14, according to press reports, authorities arrested an 
adult male citizen attempting to smuggle six children, all younger than 
10 years old, out of the country reportedly to work on farms in 
Nigeria. The press also reported the arrest of 13 adults on April 25 as 
they were attempting to smuggle 26 children into Togo for work as 
domestics and farm hands. At year's end, there were no reports on 
subsequent legal action against the traffickers.
    In 1998 the Justice Minister stated that in 3 years a total of 
1,363 children had been intercepted and returned to their parents. 
There was no further information during the year on additional 
interceptions by the Government. The Government worked with NGO's to 
combat trafficking in children, including media campaigns and greater 
border surveillance (see Section 5); however, police complained that 
they lacked equipment to monitor trafficking adequately.
    In July a 4-day subregional workshop, sponsored by the 
International Labor Organization and the International Program on the 
Elimination of Child Labor, on child trafficking in West and Central 
Africa was held in Cotonou and featured speeches by Justice Minister 
Joseph Gnonlonfoun, Labor Minister Ousmane Batoko, and foreign 
representatives.
                               __________

                                BOTSWANA

    Botswana is a longstanding, multiparty democracy. Constitutional 
power is shared between the President and a popularly elected National 
Assembly. The House of Chiefs, representing all of the country's major 
tribes and some smaller ones, has no legislative power but may offer 
its views to both the President and National Assembly on legislation. 
Festus Mogae, who, as Vice President, became President upon former 
president Sir Katumile Masire's retirement in 1998, continued to lead 
the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has held a majority of seats 
in the National Assembly continuously since independence. In October 
1999 elections generally regarded as largely free and fair, despite 
initial restrictions on opposition access to radio and press reports of 
ruling party campaign finance improprieties, the BDP increased its 
majority in the National Assembly and elected President Mogae to a 
second term. The Government respects the constitutional provisions for 
an independent judiciary.
    The civilian Government exercises effective control over the 
security forces. The military, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), is 
responsible for external security only, unlike in past years when the 
BDF at times performed internal security functions. The Botswana 
National Police (BNP) are responsible for internal security. Members of 
the security forces, in particular, the police, occasionally committed 
human rights abuses.
    The economy is market oriented with strong encouragement for 
private enterprise, and has achieved rapid sustained real per capita 
economic growth since independence. Per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) is slightly more than $2,681 (14,495 pula). Diamond exportation 
provided over two-thirds of the country's export income and much of the 
revenue of the Government, which owned half of a company engaged in the 
production of diamonds from existing mines. Nearly 50 percent of the 
population is employed in the informal sector, largely subsistence 
farming and animal husbandry. Rural poverty remains a serious problem, 
as does a widely skewed income distribution.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, problems continued in several areas. There were 
credible reports that the police sometimes beat or otherwise mistreated 
criminal suspects in order to obtain evidence or coerce confessions. 
The authorities took action in some cases against officials responsible 
for such abuses. Prison conditions were poor; however, unlike in the 
previous year, there were no reports of torture and deaths under 
suspicious circumstances in prisons. In many instances, the judicial 
system did not provide timely fair trials due to a serious backlog of 
cases. The Government continued to dominate domestic radio 
broadcasting, although to a lesser extent than in the previous year. At 
times the Government held newly arrived refugees from neighboring 
countries in local jails or special areas in prisons until they could 
be interviewed by refugee officials. Violence against women remained a 
serious problem, and women continued to face legal and societal 
discrimination. Some citizens, including groups not numbered among the 
eight ``principal tribes'' of the Tswana nation, the majority ethnic 
group, still did not enjoy full access to social services and, in 
practice, remained marginalized in the political process. Trade unions 
continued to face some legal restrictions, and the Government did not 
always ensure that labor laws were observed in practice.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    Unlike in previous years, there were no instances of suspicious 
deaths in prisons.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution explicitly forbids torture, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment or punishment, and the authorities generally 
respect this prohibition in practice; however, instances of abuse 
occur. In some cases, the authorities have taken disciplinary or 
judicial action against persons responsible for abuses. While coerced 
confessions are inadmissible in court, evidence gathered through 
coercion or abuse may be used in prosecution. There were credible 
reports that police sometimes beat persons and used intimidation 
techniques in order to obtain evidence or elicit confessions. In 
general, however, beatings and other forms of extreme physical abuse 
remained rare.
    There were reports that BDF soldiers at the Dukwe refugee camp beat 
and abused Dukwe residents. One refugee applicant claimed that BDF 
soldiers beat him on December 1 for allegedly stealing a bag of sugar. 
The refugee applicant received medical treatment for his injuries. The 
Acting Station Commander at Dukwe has stated that his office is 
investigating the case (see Section 2.d.).
    Some international NGO's reported that government game wardens 
abused the Basarwa (Bushmen) in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve 
(CKGR) (see Section 4).
    Customary courts continued to impose corporal punishment sentences 
in the form of lashings on the buttocks, generally against young 
offenders in villages for crimes such as vandalism, theft, and 
hooliganism. The Government in 1999 refused to adopt a motion submitted 
by the House of Chiefs to reinstate flogging across the back rather 
than the buttocks.
    Prison conditions were poor; however, unlike the previous year, 
there were no reports of torture and deaths under suspicious 
circumstances. A December 1999 report by the Gaborone Prison Visiting 
Committee cited ``appalling'' conditions in prisons, and these 
conditions did not change during the year. With the country's high 
incidence of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, prison overcrowding constitutes 
a serious health threat. The 21 prisons across the country have a 
capacity of 3,198 but held 7,000 at year's end. To alleviate 
overcrowding, the Government began constructing 2 new prisons that are 
scheduled to be completed in 2001; these would bring prison capacity to 
over 4,000. Construction of a third prison for male juvenile offenders 
was delayed due to lack of funds, but is scheduled to begin in 2001. In 
July Parliament passed a bill that would give the Prison Commissioner 
authority to release terminally ill prisoners and prisoners in the last 
12 months of their sentences (under current law, the Commissioner only 
can grant an early release to prisoners in the last 6 months of their 
sentences). The bill also would grant the Commissioner authority to 
allow prisoners with sentences of 12 months or less to perform 
``extramural'' labor. The President signed the bill into law during the 
year. The Government estimated that as many as 1,492 prisoners could be 
released under the program.
    The Commissioner of Prisons ordered full investigations into the 
management and conditions of prisons covered in the GPVC report. A 
report was completed and submitted to the Commissioner during the year 
which reportedly cleared the Government of responsibility for the 
conditions; however, the report was not publicly released by year's 
end. The December 1999 report by the Gaborone Prison Visiting Committee 
cited the suspicious deaths in prison of two inmates during 1999. The 
Commissioner of Prisons stated that a post-mortem examination conducted 
by medical authorities in 1999 supported prison officials' statements 
that Boitumelo Nthoiwa died of pneumonia and Andrew Molefe died after 
taking an illegal substance smuggled in by another inmate. Human rights 
organizations in the country have not challenged either case.
    The Prisons Act, which covers both prison officials and prisoners, 
makes it illegal for prison officials to mistreat prisoners. In 
September the Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public 
Administration stated that stiff penalties would be imposed upon prison 
officials who treat inmates improperly. When there is an allegation or 
suspicion of mishandling of prisoners by prison officials, the 
Department of Prisons is required to forward the case to the police for 
investigation. Three prison officials appeared before a magistrate in 
early December for alleged abuse of prisoners in previous years. In 
December the magistrate discharged one of the officials, and the other 
two officials were scheduled to appear before the magistrate again in 
March 2001.
    The Prisons Act provides for a governmental visiting committee for 
each prison, the members of which are appointed by the Minister of 
Labor and Home Affairs. Members of these committees serve 1-year terms 
and must visit their prison four times within their first term and 
issue a report both to the Commissioner of Prisons and the Minister of 
Labor and Home Affairs. These reports normally are not released to the 
public. During the year, the committees visited each prison every 3 
months and last issued their last report in December.
    While the Prisons Act grants relatives, lawyers, magistrates, and 
church organizations the right to visit prisoners for ``rehabilitative 
purposes,'' the Commissioner of Prisons has the authority to decide 
whether domestic and international human rights organizations may 
visit. In practice the Commissioner does not generally allow such 
visitations; however, some local human rights organizations have been 
granted access to visit specific prisoners. In 1999 the Botswana Center 
for Human Rights was permitted to make prison visitations. There were 
no visitation requests from human rights organizations during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Under the Constitution, 
``every person in Botswana'' is entitled to due process, the 
presumption of innocence, and freedom from arbitrary arrest; and the 
authorities respected these provisions in practice. Suspects must be 
informed of their legal rights upon arrest, including the right to 
remain silent, to be allowed to contact a person of their choice, and 
generally to be charged before a magistrate within 48 hours. A 
magistrate may order a suspect held for 14 days through a writ of 
detention, which may be renewed every 14 days. Most citizens charged 
with noncapital offenses are released on their own recognizance; some 
are released with minimal bail. Detention without bail is highly 
unusual, except in murder cases, where it is mandated.
    Detainees have the right to hire attorneys of their choice, but in 
practice most are unable to afford legal counsel. However, poor police 
training and poor communications in rural villages make it difficult 
for detainees to obtain legal assistance, and authorities do not always 
follow judicial safeguards. The Government does not provide counsel for 
the indigent, except in capital cases. One NGO, the Botswana Center for 
Human Rights, provides free legal services, but its capacity is 
limited. Another NGO, the University of Botswana Legal Assistance 
Center, provides free legal services in civil, but not criminal, 
matters. Constitutional protections are not applied to illegal 
immigrants, although the constitutionality of denying them due process 
has not been tested in court.
    Pretrial detention has been prolonged in a large number of cases. 
In Gaborone Central Prison, the average wait in prison before trial was 
1 year. The Government is attempting to alleviate the backlog of cases 
by temporarily hiring more judges.
    The Government sometimes held newly arrived refugees and asylum 
seekers in local jails until they could be interviewed by the Botswana 
Council for Refugees (BCR) or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). Once persons were granted refugee status, the Government 
transferred them to the Dukwe Refugee Camp. An illegal immigrant 
internment center, which is to house foreigners awaiting repatriation, 
is currently under construction and is scheduled to open by February 
2001. However, even with this new facility, refugees would continue to 
be housed first in local jails and then in Dukwe. Approximately 60 
refugees from Namibia's Caprivi Strip who had left the Dukwe Camp or 
were involved in disturbances and were being held in Mahalapye Prison 
were released back to Dukwe. At year's end, six detainees were being 
held in protective custody at Mahalapye Prison; they were transferred 
from Dukwe after they committed criminal offenses while at the camp. 
Five of the detainees were released by year's end, and one detainee 
continued to serve a sentence for a narcotics conviction. A Namibian 
asylum seeker in extradition proceedings has accused the Government of 
unfair detention and violations of human rights. He successfully 
challenged his detention in court and was released in June (see Section 
2.d.).
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The judiciary consists of both a civil court (including 
magistrates' courts, a High Court, and a Court of Appeal) and a 
customary (traditional) court system.
    The law provides for the right to a fair trial. However, the civil 
courts remained unable to provide for timely, fair trials in many cases 
due to severe staffing shortages and a backlog of pending cases. Most 
trials in the regular courts are public, although trials under the 
National Security Act (NSA) may be held in secret. Those charged with 
noncapital crimes are tried without legal representation if they cannot 
afford an attorney. As a result, many defendants may not be informed of 
their rights in pretrial or trial proceedings. In October 1999, a High 
Court judge declared a mistrial in the case of two Basarwa (Bushmen) 
men who had been convicted in 1995 of a murder that occurred the same 
year, and were awaiting execution. A human rights group claimed that 
the two did not understand the language used at the trial and that 
translations were poor. It also questioned whether the accused 
understood their rights or the charges against them, and noted that 
attempts by the men to change their court-appointed lawyers had been 
disregarded. Ruling that the two had been deprived of their 
constitutional rights, the judge ordered a new trial. A date had not 
yet been set for the new trial by year's end (see Section 5).
    Most citizens encounter the legal system through the customary 
courts, under the authority of a traditional leader. These courts 
handle minor offenses involving land, marital, and property disputes. 
In customary courts, the defendant does not have legal counsel and 
there are no precise rules of evidence. Tribal judges, appointed by the 
tribal leader or elected by the community, determine sentences, which 
may be appealed through the civil court system. The quality of 
decisions reached in the traditional courts varies considerably. In 
communities where chiefs and their decisions are respected, plaintiffs 
tend to take their cases to the customary court; otherwise, persons 
seek justice in the civil courts.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice; however, the State continues to 
dominate domestic radio broadcasting, although to a lesser extent than 
in the previous year.
    The independent press is small but growing, and has a long 
tradition of vigorous, candid, and unimpeded discourse. It actively 
covers the political arena and is frequently critical of the Government 
and the President. The circulation of privately owned print media 
continues to be limited mostly to the main cities and towns. At year's 
end, six privately owned weekly newspapers were published in Gaborone 
and distributed to the country's main cities and towns. One privately-
owned weekly newspaper was published in Francistown, the country's 
second-largest city. Nine privately-owned magazines were published 
monthly. These publications reported and editorialized without fear of 
closure or censorship.
    Government officials sometimes complain of bias in the private 
press. However, government officials and other public figures have 
recourse to the courts if they believe that they have been libeled. 
Libel is a civil law matter; there are no criminal libel laws.
    The Government's Botswana Press Agency (BOPA) provides most of the 
information found in the media owned and operated by the Government - 
the free Daily News newspaper, Radio Botswana, which broadcasts 
nationally to almost all of the country, and the new Botswana 
Television. News coverage in the state-owned media focuses on the 
activities of government officials and supports government policies and 
actions. The Daily News also publishes general coverage of current 
events and issues, and includes a second front page in Setswana, the 
most commonly spoken tribal language.
    Radio remained the most important medium of public communication; 
the circulation of privately owned print media continued to be limited 
mostly to the main cities and towns. In past years, the state 
monopolized domestic radio broadcasting; however, in 1999 the 
Government granted licenses to two private radio stations, Yarona FM 
and Gabz FM, and they began broadcasting in June and November 1999, 
respectively. Both broadcast in a 56-mile radius of Gaborone, an area 
that includes 5 of the country's 10 largest cities; state-owned radio 
continued to be the only domestic radio service broadcasting to the 
rest of the country. Both private radio stations have a news component 
to their programming, with no discernible policy of supporting a 
particular political party. A 1998 broadcast law provides for issuance 
of broadcast licenses to private companies and provides copyright 
protection of broadcast material. The law also mandates the 
establishment of a National Broadcast Board, which grants broadcast 
licenses. On November 30, the Board held its first meeting at BTA 
offices in Gaborne.
    On July 31, the Government opened its new national television 
station, Botswana Television (BTV), amid skepticism from the public and 
some parliamentarians over delays and overspending. BTV began 
broadcasting with technical and programming assistance from the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and an emphasis on the Setswana 
language service. Transmission extends south from Gaborone to Lobatse, 
north to Serowe and Francistown, and is scheduled to be available 
across the country within the next few years.
    The debut of BTV generated considerable discussion among members of 
the public, parliamentarians, and government officials about whether 
its status as a government-owned station would interfere with its 
ability to function independently, especially with respect to reporting 
the news. During the opening ceremony, the Acting Minister for 
Presidential Affairs and Public Administration stated that editorial 
policies of the station would not be subject to government influence; 
however, according to newspaper reports in August, BTV management was 
criticized by the Government for reporting on the eviction of squatters 
by the Ministry of Lands and Housing. A Permanent Secretary in the 
Office of the President responded by convening a press conference on 
August 30 on the private Yarona FM radio station and stating that it 
was important for BTV to broadcast news that promoted government 
policies and not reports that ``encourage trouble and criticize the 
government.''
    Responding to calls for the privatization of BTV after it began 
operations on July 31, the Government announced that it was considering 
turning the Department of Information and Broadcasting into a 
parastatal. However, on December 1, the Minister of Presidential 
Affairs and Public Administration, Thebe Mogami, stated that BTV would 
remain under government control. This proposal would affect BTV, Radio 
Botswana, the Daily News and BOPA. The opposition Botswana Congress 
Party has criticized government control over media and has urged that 
they be privatized or turned into parastatals.
    The privately-owned Gaborone Broadcasting Company (GBC), which has 
operated since 1987, broadcasts mostly foreign-made programming and is 
the only other television station operating in the country. GBC 
broadcasts reach viewers only in the capital area.
    Independent radio and television from neighboring South Africa are 
received easily. An analogue television service from South Africa, 
which had been available free to viewers, was discontinued on October 
1, when the signal was scrambled and viewers were required to pay to 
receive the service. Satellite television from a South African-based 
company is readily available, although its cost prevents many persons 
from subscribing to the service.
    Internet access is spreading quickly. The Government does not 
restrict e-mail or Internet usage. Four Internet service providers are 
available to the domestic market: three of them are private companies, 
and one, Botsnet, is the commercial arm of the parastatal Botswana 
Telecommunications Corporation.
    During the 1999 election campaign, opposition candidates initially 
had limited access to state-owned media, including state-owned radio, 
which was the only domestic radio service and the sole domestic source 
of news for most of the rural population. During the first part of the 
campaign season, the state-owned media gave opposition candidates less 
news coverage than ruling party candidates. When opposition politicians 
complained about this, the Government initially countered that the 
activities of ministers and other government figures were inherently 
more newsworthy and therefore deserving of more coverage. However, the 
Government subsequently changed its policy, and during the latter part 
of the election campaign season the state-owned media gave balanced 
news coverage to the main opposition parties and included stories about 
the smaller political parties as well. Opposition leaders expressed the 
view that government media practices seriously disadvantaged opposition 
parties relative to the ruling party during the election campaign.
    On occasion the Government has taken steps, under loosely defined 
provisions of the National Security Act, to limit publication of 
information that in its view impinged on national security; however, 
there were no such incidents during the year.
    Academic freedom is not restricted.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
The Constitution provides for the suspension of religious freedom in 
the interests of national defense, public safety, public order, public 
morality, or public health. However, any suspension of religious 
freedom by the Government must be deemed ``reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society.''
    All religious organizations must register with the Government. To 
register a group submits its constitution to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. After a generally simple bureaucratic process, the 
organization is registered. There are no legal benefits for registered 
organizations. Unregistered groups are potentially liable to penalties 
including fines up to $192 (1,000 Pula), up to 7 years in jail, or 
both. Except for the case of the Unification Church, there is no 
indication that any religious organization has ever been denied 
registration.
    The Unification Church was denied registration (but not suspended) 
in 1984 by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the public order grounds 
stipulated in the Constitution. The Government also perceived the 
Unification Church as anti-Semitic and denied registration because of 
another constitutional provision, which protects the rights and 
freedoms of individuals to practice their religion without 
intervention. In the intervening 16 years, although it has petitioned 
unsuccessfully the offices of the President and Vice President, the 
Unification Church has made no move to challenge the Ministry's 
decision in the courts.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There are no 
formal barriers to domestic and international travel or emigration.
    Some human rights organizations continued to assert that the 
Government has pressured several Basarwa (Bushmen) communities within 
the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) into relocating to partially 
built settlements outside of the Reserve. Government officials 
maintained that the ``voluntary'' resettlement was necessary in order 
to provide the Basarwa with better public services and to avoid 
conflicts between wildlife and humans within the CKGR. When the Basarwa 
arrived at the new settlements, beginning in 1995, services and 
facilities were substandard or nonexistent. Although conditions later 
improved, they remain very basic. The Government permits relocated 
Basarwa to return to the CKGR, but does not provide services within the 
reserve. Some international NGO's reported that government game wardens 
abused the Basarwa in the CKGR; however, no further information was 
available by year's end.
    The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the 
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The 
Government has maintained a policy of considering asylum requests only 
from refugees from bordering countries; although in practice, the 
Government often considers refugee applications from Angolans. Although 
the Government sometimes held newly arrived refugees and asylum seekers 
in local jails until they could be interviewed by BCR or UNHCR 
officials, it transferred persons granted refugee status to the Dukwe 
Refugee Camp, pending resettlement or voluntary repatriation (see 
Section 1.d.). There were 3,409 refugees at Dukwe by year's end; they 
were primarily from Namibia, Angola, and Somalia. A small number of 
refugees were being held in ``protective custody'' in Mahalapye Prison. 
At year's end, there were six refugees from Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Somalia, and Burundi being held in Mahalapye Prison. The Government 
strictly applies a policy of first asylum. Refugee applicants who are 
unsuccessful in obtaining asylum are allowed to remain at Dukwe until 
the Government refers their cases to the UNHCR for resettlement.
    There were reports that BDF soldiers at Dukwe beat and abused Dukwe 
residents. One refugee applicant claimed that BDF soldiers beat him on 
December 1 for allegedly stealing a bag of sugar. The refugee applicant 
received medical treatment for his injuries. The Acting Station 
Commander at Dukwe has stated that his office is investigating the case 
(see Section 1.c.).
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
    More than 2,500 refugees from the Caprivi Strip in neighboring 
Namibia have fled to the country since late 1998. Many were armed and 
linked to the ethnically based opposition groups based in the Caprivi 
Strip of Namibia. Male refugees linked to such groups requested asylum 
based on their claim that they were being forced into the Namibian army 
to fight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government 
provided first asylum to all such persons. In consultation with the 
UNHCR in 1999, the Government began negotiations with the Government of 
Namibia to facilitate the voluntary return of Nambian refugees. During 
the year, five persons were returned voluntarily to Namibia. UNHCR 
experienced problems obtaining permission from Namibia to return other 
such persons. In August 1999, the Government detained members of a 
Caprivi separatist group who had fled into the country after a military 
offensive in Katima Mulilo in Namibia. The group's leader, Meshake 
Muyongo, was resettled in a third country. Eight of Muyongo's group of 
15 Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) leaders and their families who 
feared for their safety in Namibia were awaiting adjudication of their 
resettlement applications by year's end.
    During the year, the Government's Refugee Advisory Committee, which 
includes a UNHCR representative, found that 19 Namibian asylum seekers 
failed to qualify for asylum. In September the Government filed for the 
extradition of 15 of these individuals, 13 of whom appeared in court 
(one was ill, and another fled). One of the 15 accused the Government 
of unfair detention and violations of human rights and successfully 
challenged his detention in court (see Section 1.d.). The extradition 
process was continuing at year's end; three of the cases were returned 
to Namibia for further documentation, and one other application was 
dismissed. The 19 failed asylum seekers were being detained in various 
local jails at year's end. Their trial began in December and was 
ongoing at year's end.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, generally free and fair elections held on the basis 
of universal adult (18 years of age) suffrage. The President is elected 
by the National Assembly and is limited to two 5-year terms in office. 
Members of the BDP have held a majority of seats in the National 
Assembly, and as a result also the presidency, continuously since 
independence.
    Elections for the National Assembly were held in October 1999 and 
generally were regarded as largely free and fair by domestic and 
international observers, despite preferential access for BDP candidates 
during much of the campaign to state-owned media including state-owned 
radio, the sole domestic source of news for most of the rural 
population, and despite press reports of large anonymous campaign 
contributions to the ruling party, purportedly by international diamond 
interests (see Section 2.a.). The BDP increased its majority in the 
National Assembly from 31 to 37 of 44 seats, thereby ensuring the 
election of its presidential candidate, incumbent President Mogae. In 
1998 Mogae, then Vice President, had succeeded Sir Ketumile Masire as 
President upon the latter's retirement. Of the 7 seats won by 
opposition parties in October, the Botswana National Front (BNF) won 6 
and the Botswana congress Party (BCP) won 1 seat.
    The House of Chiefs, an advisory body with limited powers, is 
restricted constitutionally to the eight ``principal tribes'' of the 
majority Tswana ethnic group and four elected chiefs representing 
smaller tribes, including the Bakalanga, Lozi, Humbukush, and 
Bakgalagadi. Consequently, other groups, for example, the Basarwa, 
Herero, Baloi, or Bayei are not represented there. Given the limited 
authority of the House of Chiefs, the impact of excluding other groups 
of citizens is largely symbolic, but some non-Tswana view it as 
important in principle (see Section 5). Members of the National 
Assembly are required to speak English.
    The State is highly centralized. There are 406 district governments 
with elected councilors, but they have no fiscal autonomy and must rely 
on the central Government for revenue.
    In practice women are underrepresented in the political process. 
However, the 1999 elections doubled the number of women serving in the 
National Assembly, from 4 to 8 of 44 members. The number of women 
serving in the cabinet also increased from 3 to 4 of 15 members. Of the 
13 High Court justices, 1 was a woman.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic and international human rights groups operate without 
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 
human rights cases. Ditshwanelo, the Botswana Center for Human Rights, 
actively promotes human rights and investigated alleged abuses. The 
Metlhaetsile Women's Information Center, Emang Basadi, and Women 
Against Rape are active on issues concerning women's rights, 
particularly rape and domestic violence. Government officials are 
generally cooperative and responsive to these groups. The Government 
does not have a human rights office.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution forbids State discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, race, nationality, creed, sex, or social status, and these 
provisions are implemented in practice by government authorities. 
However, neither the Constitution nor any known law prohibits 
discrimination by private persons or entities.
    Women.--Violence against women remains a serious problem. Domestic 
abuse is one area of concern. Under customary law and in common rural 
practice, men have the right to ``chastise'' their wives. Police rarely 
are called to intervene in cases of domestic violence. Reports of 
sexual exploitation, abuse, and criminal sexual assault are increasing, 
and public awareness of the problem generally is growing. The national 
police force has begun training officers in handling domestic violence 
problems to make them more responsive in such cases. Rape is another 
grave national problem, and the Government acknowledged in 1999 that, 
given the high incidence of HIV/AIDS, sexual assault has become an even 
more serious offense. In 1998 Parliament enacted legislation that 
increased all penalties for rape, incest, and other forms of sexual 
assault by imposing minimum sentencing requirements where none existed 
previously. The minimum sentence for rape is now 10 years, with the 
minimum increasing to 15 years with corporal punishment if the offender 
is HIV positive and to 20 years with corporal punishment if the 
offender knew of his or her HIV status. In 1999 a High Court ruled 
unconstitutional a provision in the new law that allowed the detention 
of rape suspects without bail. The law does not address the issue of 
marital rape. A recent study of rape by the police service urges police 
to develop improved methods of rape investigation, including the use of 
DNA tests in all rape cases. The police force purchased new equipment 
and an officer was trained to use it during the year.
    Although the Government has become far tougher in dealing with 
criminal sexual assault, societal attitudes toward other forms of 
domestic violence remain lax. Half the murders of women were linked to 
histories of domestic violence. Human rights activists estimate that 6 
women in 10 are victims of domestic violence at some time in their 
lives.
    Sexual exploitation and harassment continue to be problems as well, 
with men in positions of authority, including teachers, supervisors, 
and older male relatives, pressuring women to provide sexual favors. 
Greater public awareness and improved legal protection have led more 
victims of domestic violence and sexual assault to report incidents to 
the authorities. In March 1999, the Women's Affairs Department 
submitted the Report on the Study of Socio-Economic Implications of 
Violence Against Women in Botswana to the Attorney General's office, 
which is working with all of the ministries to further investigate 
these problems.
    Women legally enjoy the same civil rights as men; however, in 
practice discrimination persists. A number of traditional laws enforced 
by tribal structures and customary courts restrict women's property 
rights and economic opportunities. A woman married under traditional 
law or in ``common property'' is held to be a legal minor, requiring 
her husband's consent to buy or sell property, apply for credit, and 
enter into legally binding contracts. Under a law enacted in 1996, 
women married under an intermediate system, referred to as ``in 
community of property,--are permitted to own immovable property in 
their own names; however, their husbands still retain considerable 
control over jointly-held assets of the marriage. The law was a step 
toward equalizing a husband's and a wife's legal control over property 
held in community of property. Moreover, the 1998 Deeds Registry Act 
stipulates that neither spouse can dispose of joint property without 
the written consent of the other party.
    Women have, and increasingly are exercising, the right to marriage 
``out of common property,'' in which case they retain their full legal 
rights as adults. Polygyny is still legal under traditional law with 
the consent of the first wife, but it rarely is practiced. In September 
1998, consultants submitted to the Labor Ministry a report identifying 
provisions of existing law that potentially discriminate against women.
    Well-trained urban women enjoy growing entry level access to the 
white-collar job market, but the number of opportunities decreases 
sharply as they rise in seniority. Discrimination against women is most 
acute in rural areas where women engaged primarily in subsistence 
agriculture have weak property rights.
    Young women do not have access to military or national service 
training. Military service is voluntary for men only, and available to 
very few young women who serve as clerical workers. The Government 
abolished its national service program in April, a program that 
previously allowed male and female high school graduates to serve in 
government departments, mostly in rural areas. Government officials 
recently announced that there are no plans to recruit women into the 
Botswana Defense Force, due to infrastructure concerns such as lack of 
adequate living quarters and training facilities that made integration 
impracticable; the statement prompted women's rights activists to claim 
a denial of equal opportunity.
    The Government and interested NGO's meet regularly to implement the 
long-term plan of action described in the National Policy on Women 
adopted in 1996. The plan identifies six critical areas of concern, 
prioritized as follows:(1) women and poverty, (2) women and 
powersharing and decisionmaking, (3) education and training of women, 
(4) women and health, (5) the girl child, and (6) violence against 
women. The Women's Affairs Department of the Ministry of Labor and Home 
Affairs, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Program, 
developed the Program Support Document (PSD) in 1997, which provides a 
framework for implementation of the national policy on women through 
2002. Its five target areas include: (1) institutional strengthening at 
the national level, (2) advocacy and social mobilization, (3) 
institutional strengthening of NGO's, (4) research and information 
sharing, and (5) economic empowerment.
    A number of women's organizations have emerged to promote the 
status of women. The Government has entered into a dialog with many of 
these groups. While some women's rights groups reportedly felt that the 
Government has been slow to respond concretely to their concerns, 
women's NGO's state that they are encouraged by the direction of change 
and by the increasingly collaborative relationship with government 
authorities. Major women's NGO's include the Emang Basadi Women's 
Association, which promotes the social, economic and legal status of 
women; the Metlhaetsile Women's Information Centre, which provides 
legal assistance to poor women; and the Botswana Council of Women.
    Children.--The Government provides 7 years of free primary 
education for children, although attendance is not compulsory. 
Government estimates of the proportion of children who never attend 
school have ranged from 10 to 17 percent, and fewer than 20 percent of 
children complete secondary school; school attendance and completion 
rates are highest in urban areas, and lowest in remote rural areas, 
especially those inhabited chiefly by Basarwa (San or Bushmen). The 
national literacy rate is 69 percent: 70 percent for females and 67 
percent for males. However, in some cases, girls are denied schooling 
because of religious or customary beliefs. The Government continued to 
allocate the largest portion of its operating expenditures to the 
Ministry of Education, and the second-largest portion to the Ministry 
of Local Government, Lands, and Housing, which administered primary 
education. It also continued to allocate a large part of its investment 
expenditures to construct primary and secondary schools, so that 
children have ready access to education.
    It was estimated during the year that 35.8 percent of adults are 
infected with HIV/AIDS, and due largely to deaths from HIV/AIDS, 60,000 
orphans were registered by the Ministry of Health countrywide. 
Increasing numbers of children, mostly believed to be orphans, were 
observed begging or engaging in prostitution in urban areas. Orphans 
infected with HIV/AIDS also were denied inheritance rights by their 
relatives.
    The rights of children are addressed in the Constitution and the 
1981 Children's Act. Under the act, The country has a court system and 
social service apparatus designed solely for juveniles. The Government 
launched a 10-year program of action for children in 1997, 
incorporating the seven major global goals identified at the 1990 U.N. 
World Summit for Children. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor and Home 
Affairs transferred responsibility for children to the Social Welfare 
Department in the Ministry of Local Government, Lands, and Housing. 
Laws pertaining to children continued to be under review to align them 
with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Adoption Act 
also continued to be reviewed to ensure that adopted children are 
provided for and not exploited as cheap labor.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children, although 
incest and other forms of child abuse have received increased attention 
from the media and from local human rights groups.
    The problem of sexual harassment of students by teachers is a 
national concern. Reports of rape and sexual assault of young women, 
and cases of incest and ``defilement'' of young girls appear with 
greater frequency in the news. The age of sexual consent is 16. Child 
prostitution and pornography are criminal offenses, and 1998 amendments 
increased penalties for ``defilement'' of persons under 16.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate on 
the basis of physical or mental disability, although employment 
opportunities for the disabled remain limited. The Government does not 
require accessibility to public buildings and public conveyances for 
persons with disabilities, and the NGO community only recently has 
begun to address the needs of the disabled. In 1997 Parliament adopted 
a national policy that provides for integrating the needs of disabled 
persons into all aspects of government policymaking. The Government 
funded NGO's that provide rehabilitation services and supported small-
scale work projects by disabled workers.
    Indigenous People.--The Basarwa (also known as San), who now 
inhabit chiefly the Kalihari Desert, are the earliest known inhabitants 
of the country, and were the only inhabitants until Bantu groups 
arrived during the 16th century. They are physically, linguistically, 
and culturally distinct from the rest of the population. They remain 
economically and politically marginalized; they have lost access to 
their traditional land in fertile regions of the country and are 
vulnerable to exploitation by their non-Basarwa neighbors. Their 
isolation, ignorance of civil rights, and lack of political 
representation have stymied their progress. The estimated 52-55,000 
Basarwa persons represent about 3 percent of the country's total 
population. Although the Baswara traditionally were hunter-gatherers, 
most Basarwa now are employed as agricultural workers on farms or at 
cattle posts belonging to other ethnic groups. The formation of the 
20,000 square mile Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) by the colonial 
government in 1961 on traditional Basarwa lands set the stage for 
conflict between the Basarwa's pursuit of their traditional way of life 
and wildlife conservation. The Government in the past followed a policy 
of prohibiting human habitation in the CKGR with the goal of wildlife 
preservation, but has made accommodation for the estimated 1,000 to 
3,000 Basarwa who still pursue hunting and gathering there. The 
Government has provided very limited social services within the CKGR, 
and has encouraged those living there to leave the reserve for 
permanent settlements; there were some reports that the Government 
sometimes forced Baswara to leave the reserve. However, the Government 
has made little real progress since international attention in 1996 
focused on the intractable problem of resettling Basarwa living in the 
CKGR. Both the Basarwa and the Government are seeking out concerned 
NGO's to assist with the resettlement process and to address the larger 
issue of improving the Basarwa's standard of living without sacrificing 
what remains of their traditional way of life.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Well over half of the country's 
1.5 million inhabitants belong to the Tswana ethnic group, of which the 
Constitution recognizes eight principal tribes, and which has a 
tradition of peacefully coexisting with non-Tswana groups. Some non-
Tswana ethnic groups are more numerous than the Tswana in some rural 
areas of the country: the Kalanga and Lozi in areas of the north; the 
Bayei and Herero in the Okavango Delta region; and the Baswara in the 
arid west. There are also communities of persons of Asian and European 
descent.
    Apart from the lack of schooling in their own languages and their 
present lack of representation in the House of Chiefs (see Section 3), 
the country's non-Tswana communities are not subject to discrimination 
by the State. Societal discrimination also is limited. Intermarriage 
between Tswana and non-Tswana ethnic groups is common. Urban 
neighborhoods are not ethnically segregated. There generally is little 
correlation between income and ethnicity among persons of African 
descent, although many persons of Asian and European descent are 
prominent in the commercial sector.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of association. In practice all workers are free to join or 
organize unions of their own choosing. The country ratified ILO 
Convention 151 during the year, which permits government employees to 
organize their own unions. The industrial or wage economy is small, and 
unions are concentrated largely in mineral extraction and to a lesser 
extent in the railway and banking sectors. There is only one major 
confederation, the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU), but 
there are no obstacles to the formation of other labor federations.
    Unions are independent of the Government and are not closely allied 
with any political party or movement. Unions may employ full-time 
administrative staff, but the law requires elected union officials to 
work full time in the industry that the union represents. This rule 
severely limits union leaders' professionalism and effectiveness, and 
has been criticized by the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU).
    The law also severely restricts the right to strike. Legal strikes 
are theoretically possible after an exhaustive arbitration process, but 
in practice none of the country's strikes has been legal. Sympathy 
strikes are prohibited.
    Unions may join international organizations, and the BFTU is 
affiliated with the ICFTU. The Minister of Labor must approve any 
affiliation with an outside labor movement, but unions may appeal to 
the courts if an application for affiliation is refused.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for collective bargaining for unions that have 
enrolled 25 percent of a labor force. In reality only the mineworker 
unions have the organizational strength to engage in collective 
bargaining. Elected labor union officials are required by law to work 
full time in whatever industry they represent; consequently, there are 
no full-time elected labor leaders in the country. However, unions may 
employ full-time staff.
    Workers may not be fired for union-related activities. Dismissals 
may be appealed to labor officers or civil courts, but labor offices 
rarely do more than order 2 months' severance pay.
    The country has only one export processing zone, located in the 
town of Selebi-Phikwe, and it is subject to the same labor laws as the 
rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The constitutional 
provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens, 
although there are no laws that specifically prohibit forced or bonded 
labor by children; there were no reports of forced or bonded labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment 
of Children.--Although education is not compulsory, the Government 
provides 7 years of free primary education to every child, and most 
children take advantage of this opportunity. Only an immediate family 
member may employ a child age 13 or younger, and no juvenile under age 
15 may be employed in any industry. Only persons over age 16 may be 
hired to perform night work, and no person under age 16 is allowed to 
perform hazardous labor, including mining. District and municipal 
councils have child welfare divisions, which are responsible for 
enforcing child labor laws. Two laws focus on the protection of orphans 
and adopted children from exploitative labor. The Adoption Act ensures 
that adopted children are not exploited as cheap labor, and the 
Employment Act protects orphans from exploitation as cheap labor or 
coercion into prostitution. Because research on the issue of child 
labor is limited, it is difficult to state whether child labor laws are 
enforced effectively. However, there is general agreement among the 
Labor Commissioner, officials of the Ministry of Local Government, 
Lands, and Housing, and UNICEF that the child labor problem is limited 
to young children in remote areas who work as cattle tenders, maids, or 
babysitters.
    The Government ratified ILO Convention No. 182 on the worst forms 
of child labor on January 3, and is in the process of bringing its 
national laws into compliance with international treaty obligations. 
The Government launched a 10-year program of action for children in 
1997; however, implementation has proceeded slowly.
    The constitutional provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor 
applies to all citizens, although there are no laws that specifically 
prohibit forced or bonded labor by children (see Section 6.c.); there 
were no reports of forced or bonded labor by children.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum daily wage for most 
full time labor in the private sector was $3.15 (17 Botswana pula), 
which remained less than 50 percent of what the Government calculates 
is necessary to meet the basic needs of a family of five. Wage policy 
is determined by the Cabinet, which decides on recommendations made by 
the National Economic, Manpower and Incomes Committee (NEMIC), which 
consists of government, BFTU, and private sector representatives. The 
Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage, and 
each of the country's districts has at least one labor inspector. Civil 
service disputes are referred to an ombudsman for resolution. Private 
labor disputes are mediated by labor commissioners, but insufficient 
numbers have resulted in 1 to 2 year backlogs. In 1999 the Ministry of 
Labor received over 9,000 labor disputes and referred a small but 
undisclosed number of them to the Industrial Court for its review, 
which currently has a 9-18 month backlog.
    Formal sector jobs almost always pay well above minimum wage 
levels. Informal sector employment, particularly in the agricultural 
and domestic service sectors, where housing and food are included, 
frequently pay below the minimum wage. There is no mandatory minimum 
wage for domestic workers, and the Ministry of Labor no longer 
recommends a minimum wage for them. Illegal immigrants from poorer 
neighboring countries, primarily Zambians and Zimbabweans, are 
exploited easily in labor matters, as they would be subject to 
deportation if they filed grievances against their employers.
    The law permits a maximum 48-hour workweek, exclusive of overtime, 
which is payable at time and a half for each additional hour. Most 
modern private and public sector jobs are on the 40-hour workweek.
    The law provides that workers who complain about hazardous 
conditions may not be fired. However, the Government's institutional 
ability to enforce its workplace safety legislation remains limited by 
inadequate staffing and unclear jurisdictions between different 
ministries. Nevertheless, employers generally provide for worker 
safety, with the occasionally notable exception of the construction 
industry.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, although penal code provisions cover such related offenses 
as abduction and kidnaping, slave trafficking, compulsory labor, and 
procuring women and girls for the purpose of prostitution. There were 
no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through 
the country.
                               __________

                              BURKINA FASO

    President Blaise Compaore continued to dominate the Government of 
the Fourth Republic, assisted by members of his party, the Congress for 
Democracy and Progress (CDP), despite increasing challenges from a 
number of fronts within society. In spite of the existence of dozens of 
political parties, there is little viable opposition to the President 
and his Government. The Government includes a strong presidency, a 
Prime Minister, a Council of Ministers presided over by the President, 
a two-chamber National Assembly, and the judiciary. In November 1998, 
President Compaore was reelected to a second 7-year term with 88 
percent of the vote; 56 percent of the electorate voted. Both national 
and international observers described the presidential election as 
substantially free and fair and an improvement over the 1997 
legislative elections, particularly with regard to the logistical 
organization of the balloting and the functioning of the polling 
stations; however, there were a limited number of voting 
irregularities. The national observers identified a number of systemic 
weaknesses in the electoral code that precluded the serious assurance 
of a perfectly regular and transparent vote, and a coalition 
representing a number of opposition parties boycotted the election. The 
CDP now controls 102 of 111 seats in Parliament. International 
observers considered the 1997 legislative elections to be substantially 
free and fair, although a collective of 14 local nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) cited generalized and systematic corruption and 
voter list irregularities. In November President Compaore and 
representatives from the opposition parties that agreed to participate 
in the Government signed a protocol that, among other items, ceded one-
third of the cabinet posts to the opposition. The judiciary is subject 
to executive influence.
    The security apparatus consists of the armed forces and the 
gendarmerie, both of which are controlled by the Ministry of Defense; 
the national police, controlled by the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration; and the municipal police, controlled by municipalities. 
Some members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
    Over 80 percent of the population of approximately 11.4 million 
persons engages in subsistence agriculture. Frequent drought, and 
limited communication and transportation infrastructures, in addition 
to a 77 percent illiteracy rate, are longstanding problems. The 50 
percent devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 made imports more 
expensive for salaried workers and civil servants, but improved the 
competitiveness of livestock and cotton exports. Since 1991 the 
Government has adopted a series of structural adjustment programs 
designed to open the economy to market forces and to reduce government 
deficits, while shifting resources to the education and health sectors. 
In recent years, the country has registered strong gains in life 
expectancy, literacy, and school attendance rates, although it remains 
a very poor country with annual per capita income of about $240.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor in a number of 
areas; although there were improvements in a few areas, serious 
problems remain. The continued dominance of President Compaore and his 
ruling party limited citizens' right to change their government, 
although the 1998 presidential election represented a further step 
toward democratic government. The security forces were responsible for 
at least one extrajudicial killing and continued to mistreat detainees. 
Prison conditions remained harsh. Arbitrary arrest and detention are 
problems, and authorities do not ensure detainees due process. Although 
the Government continued attempts to improve its respect for human 
rights, a general climate of impunity for members of the security 
forces and members of the President's family, along with a lack of 
progress in identifying or punishing those responsible for abuses 
committed, continued to tarnish its record. Courts are subject to 
executive influence, and authorities do not ensure fair trials. At 
times authorities restricted media activity, and the media practices 
self-censorship. The death of internationally respected journalist 
Norbert Zongo, his brother, and two other men in a suspicious car fire 
in December 1998 remained a focus of public concern during the year. 
The Government restricted freedom of assembly. Violence and 
discrimination against women persisted. Violence against children, 
particularly female genital mutilation (FGM), remained a problem. The 
Government took steps to educate citizens about the dangers of FGM. 
Child labor is a problem and there were occasional reports of 
trafficking of women and children. Killings of criminal suspects by 
vigilante mobs remained a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, there was one extrajudicial 
killing. On December 6, gendarmes shot and killed Flavien Nebie, a 12-
year-old student, while forcibly dispersing a student demonstration in 
the town of Bousse (see Section 2.b.). The Government characterized the 
killing as accidental and, at year's end, promised an investigation.
    In August 1999, police officers shot and killed mechanic Mamadou 
Kone when he was in their custody in Banfora, a village in the province 
of Comoe. Kone had been arrested as a result of an investigation 
involving stolen car engines; while he was being booked, Kone struck at 
two police officers in an attempt to escape. He then was shot by a 
third police officer. The policeman accused of assaulting and killing 
Kone was indicted for involuntary homicide in September 1999 and held 
in custody until he was released on bail in March. At year's end, a 
trial date had not been set.
    The January 1998 extrajudicial killing of David Ouedraogo, the 
chauffeur of President Compaore's brother Francois, was resolved in 
August. Ouedraogo, along with two other domestic employees of Francois 
Compaore, had been taken to the Presidential Guard barracks in December 
1997 after being accused of stealing money from the home of the 
President's brother. Francois Compaore's refusal to cooperate with 
judicial authorities impeded the official investigation, and he was 
never arrested. In March 1999, the civil court handling the case 
declared itself incompetent to rule on the matter since Ouedraogo died 
at the hands of members of the Presidential Guard within their 
barracks. As a result, the case was sent to a military tribunal.
    Six members of the Presidential Guard were implicated in the 
Ouedraogo killing. One died in a road accident before criminal charges 
could be filed against him; five were arrested in 1999. On August 19, 
the military tribunal found three of the defendants guilty of 
assaulting and killing Ouedraogo; two of the convicted defendants 
received 20-year prison sentences, and the other received a 10-year 
sentence. The military tribunal acquitted the final two defendants, the 
lowest ranking of the accused Presidential Guards, on the basis of 
insufficient evidence. Warrant Officer Abdoulaye Siemde, who admitted 
falsifying a police report in the David Ouedraogo case, died on May 26 
in the mental ward of Ouagadougou's main hospital under unknown 
circumstances.
    The Independent Investigatory Commission examining the deaths of 
journalist Norbert Zongo, his brother, and two other men in a 
suspicious car fire in December 1998 released its report in May 1999. 
The report determined that the four died for ``purely political 
motives'' and postulated that the probable reason for Zongo's murder 
was to stop the articles that he was writing on the January 1998 
killing of David Ouedraogo. The Commission stated that the six members 
of the Presidential Guard implicated in the Ouedraogo case also were 
``serious suspects'' in the Zongo murder. The Commission also noted 
that official documents from the Presidential Guard and the army that 
might have shed light on the whereabouts of the six Presidential Guard 
members on the day of the murders could not be found and probably were 
destroyed intentionally. During the year, the Zongo case remained a 
highly divisive issue. Despite the convictions of three of the five 
accused Presidential Guard members for the apparently related killing 
of David Ouedraogo and despite strong public sentiment favoring a trial 
of Zongo's alleged killers, by year's end, no one was charged in the 
Zongo case.
    In its report on the Zongo case, the Independent Investigatory 
Commission also recommended that the separation of functions between 
the police and the military be enforced; that the Presidential Guard 
limit its duties to the protection of the Chief of State; that 
unresolved cases of disappearances and killings in the recent past be 
settled; and that the National Assembly pass a law to eliminate any 
time limit for resolving the Zongo case. At year's end, the separation 
of functions between the police and military was being enforced; 
however, the Presidential Guard had not limited officially its duties 
to protecting the President nor had it been reorganized, no unresolved 
cases of disappearances and killings in the recent past were settled, 
and the National Assembly had not passed a law to eliminate any time 
limit for resolving the Zongo case.
    In May 1999, in response to the Independent Investigatory 
Commission's report, the President announced the creation of a Council 
of Wisemen to review the political crimes that have taken place since 
the country's independence, and to make recommendations for restoring 
social peace in the wake of the Zongo killings. In August 1999, the 
Council of Wisemen issued its final report which recommended reform of 
the judicial system; creation of a temporary, consensual commission to 
review certain articles of the Constitution; formation of a government 
of national unity; creation of a truth and justice commission to direct 
the nation's reconciliation process; and dissolution of the National 
Assembly. By year's end, only the recommendation to restructure the 
government had been accepted (see Section 3).
    No progress was made in punishing those responsible for abuses 
reported in previous years. The major problem with law enforcement 
remains a general climate of impunity for human rights abusers and 
members of the President's family, fostered by the failure of 
government investigations to result in guilty findings and appropriate 
sanctions. Inquiries tend to continue until they are overshadowed by 
subsequent incidents or quietly shelved. Appeals by human rights 
organizations generally go unanswered.
    On December 21, the trial of a gendarme accused of fatally shooting 
two unarmed high school demonstrators in the city of Garango in 1995 
was delayed indefinitely to permit a new government investigation; the 
original investigation was seriously flawed.
    In June militiamen who claimed allegiance to Naba Tigre, the 
traditional chief of the city of Tenkodogo, killed trader Mamadou Kere, 
reportedly for showing disrespect to Naba Tigre. The victim actually 
had criticized Naba Tigre's son, a parliamentarian who supported the 
CDP. Although Naba Tigre was temporarily held in police custody from 
July 7 to 19, he was released, and at year's end, no one had been 
charged in Kere's killing.
    Killings by vigilante mobs and self-styled militias remained a 
problem nationwide. The vast majority of such killings targeted 
suspected thieves and other alleged criminals, who typically were 
burned or beaten to death. On several occasions during the year, 
vigilantes destroyed the property of persons accused of sorcery and 
expelled them from their communities.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits the mistreatment of detainees; however, 
members of the security forces continued to mistreat persons and 
suspects are often subject to beatings, rough handling, and threats, 
frequently to extract confessions. There are credible reports that 
officials at Maco prison continued to employ degrading treatment 
subjecting prisoners to overcrowded, unsanitary conditions and 
providing inadequate food. The Government is not known to have taken 
any disciplinary action against those responsible, and the climate of 
impunity created by the Government's failure to prosecute abusers 
remains the largest obstacle to ending abuses.
    On April 8, police used tear gas and batons to disperse a march, 
injuring 20 persons (see Section 2.b.). On April 10, while dispersing 
continued violent protests, security forces arrested several marchers 
and shaved their heads while they were in custody (see Section 2.b.).
    On April 12 to 13, police arrested 20 demonstrators and shaved the 
heads of several demonstrators while they were in detention (see 
Section 2.b.).
    On August 30, police used tear gas to disperse refugees peacefully 
demonstrating for improved living conditions and transfer to other 
countries (see Section 2.d.).
    On November 30, gendarmes detained approximately 15 students, 
reportedly beat them, stripped them to their undergarments, and 
subsequently left them in a park near the outskirts of the city (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
    On December 6, police used tear gas and fired upon a student 
demonstration in Bousse, killing a boy (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
    Prison conditions are harsh, overcrowded, and can be life 
threatening. The federal prison in Bobo-Dioulasso, built in 1947, 
houses approximately 1,000 prisoners, although it was designed to hold 
less than half that number. The prison diet is poor, and inmates often 
must rely on supplemental food from relatives. There are separate 
facilities for men, women, and children.
    According to human rights monitors, prison visits are granted at 
the discretion of prison authorities. Permission is granted routinely, 
and advance permission is not required.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention were problems, and authorities did not ensure due process. 
The Constitution provides for the right to expeditious arraignment and 
access to legal counsel. The law limits detention for investigative 
purposes without charge to a maximum of 72 hours, renewable for a 
single 48-hour period; however, in practice police rarely observe these 
provisions. The average time of detention without charge is 1 week, and 
the law allows judges to impose an unlimited number of 6-month 
preventive detention periods. It is not unusual for defendants without 
access to legal counsel to be imprisoned for weeks or months before 
appearing before a magistrate. In some cases, prisoners were held 
without charge or trial for a longer period than the maximum sentence 
that they would have received if convicted of the alleged offense.
    On November 30, gendarmes detained approximately 15 students during 
a peaceful demonstration in Ouagadougou. After forcibly removing the 
students from a church, gendarmes reportedly beat the students, 
stripped them to their undergarments, and subsequently left them in a 
park near the outskirts of the city (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    In November 1998, eight armed policemen temporarily detained 
opposition Party for Democracy and Progress (PDP) deputy Gerard 
Karambiri and a PDP supporter. Police awakened both men in their 
respective homes in the early hours of the morning. The officers lacked 
the required warrants and entered their homes at times other than the 6 
a.m. to 9 p.m. ``legal hours.'' Police took them to headquarters, 
interrogated them for about 2 hours, and then released them. 
Parliamentarians believed that the detention of Deputy Karambiri 
violated the parliamentary immunity granted to all deputies under the 
Constitution. Several days later, after demanding that the detentions 
be investigated fully, PDP deputies walked out of the National Assembly 
in protest. The governing CDP parliamentary group expressed support for 
the PDP, and National Assembly President Melegue Traore addressed a 
letter to the Prime Minister asking that the incident be investigated. 
At year's end, the Government has not responded.
    While dispersing violent protesters on April 10, security forces 
arrested several marchers and shaved their heads while in custody (see 
Section 1.c.). On April 12 to 13, the police arrested 6 prominent 
leaders and approximately 12 members of the Collective of Mass 
Democratic Organizations and Political Parties following a 
demonstration.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is subject to 
executive influence. The President has extensive appointment and other 
judicial powers. The Constitution stipulates that the Head of State is 
also the President of the Superior Council of the Magistrature, which 
can nominate and remove some high-ranked magistrates and can examine 
the performance of individual magistrates.
    The Zongo killing (see Section 1.a.) and its aftermath have focused 
attention on the severe weaknesses in the justice system, including 
removability of judges, outdated legal codes, an insufficient number of 
courts, a lack of financial and human resources, and excessive legal 
costs.
    The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is the highest 
court in the country. Beneath the Supreme Court are 2 Courts of Appeal 
and 10 provincial courts (``de grande instance''). There is also a High 
Court of Justice, with jurisdiction to try the president and senior 
government officials for treason and other serious crimes. In 1995 the 
National Assembly passed legislation reforming the military court 
system, making military courts less susceptible in principle to 
executive manipulation; however, their independence has not yet been 
demonstrated.
    In addition to the formal judiciary, customary or traditional 
courts, presided over by village chiefs, handle many neighborhood and 
village problems, such as divorce and inheritance disputes. The 
population generally respects these decisions, but citizens also may 
take a case to a formal court.
    The Constitution provides for the right to public trial, access to 
counsel, and has provisions for bail and appeal. While these rights 
generally are respected, the ability of citizens to obtain a fair trial 
remains circumscribed by their ignorance of the law--78 percent of the 
population is illiterate--and by a continuing shortage of magistrates. 
Amendments to the Penal Code to make it more relevant to modern 
requirements, such as the revision making FGM a crime, were adopted by 
Parliament in 1996 and entered into effect in 1997.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for these rights, and in 
practice the authorities generally do not interfere in the daily lives 
of ordinary citizens. However, in national security cases a law permits 
surveillance, searches, and monitoring of telephones and private 
correspondence without a warrant. By law and under normal 
circumstances, homes may be searched only with the authority of a 
warrant issued by the Attorney General.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1991 Constitution and the 1990 
Information Code provide for freedom of speech and of the press; 
however, in practice these freedoms still remain circumscribed both by 
government action and by a certain degree of self-censorship. The 
President and his Government remain sensitive to criticism. Provisions 
in the code granting the Government strong legal powers to intimidate 
the press through a broad interpretation of defamation were removed in 
1993. As a result, journalists charged with libel may defend themselves 
in court by presenting evidence in support of their allegations. The 
independent press, particularly the written press, continued to 
exercise greater freedom of expression. However, the suspicious death 
of internationally respected journalist and newspaper editor Norbert 
Zongo in December 1998 raised serious questions on the limits to the 
exercise of this freedom (see Section 1.a.). Zongo was well known for 
his investigative reports on government scandals.
    All media are under the administrative and technical supervision of 
the Ministry of Communication and Culture. The audiovisual media are 
regulated further by the Superior Council of Information (CSI).
    The official media, including the daily newspaper Sidwaya, and the 
national radio and television displayed progovernment bias. The 
independent press includes five daily and approximately a dozen weekly 
newspapers; some newspapers appear only occasionally. There are more 
than 50 independent radio stations and a religious television station. 
The only private commercial television station ceased to broadcast in 
1999, due to financial difficulties. These media outlets included 
stations that are critical of the Government.
    In 1998 the CSI released new regulations for private and 
independent radio and television; which entered into effect in 1999. 
The regulations allowed reinstatement of call-in shows, which were 
suspended in 1997. However, radio stations are held responsible if 
their call-in programs threaten the public order or the rights of any 
third party. On April 14, the Government permanently suspended call-in 
programs, which allowed criticism of the Government, on two private FM 
stations. The Government also temporarily closed one of the stations, 
Radio Horizon, from April 16 to June 17. In May 1999, employees from 
two radio stations were questioned by the police after broadcasting a 
call-in show on the Zongo killings that featured the secretary general 
of Reporters Without Borders, Robert Menard. After being threatened 
with formal expulsion, Menard involuntarily left the country. In 
September 1999, he was denied entry into the country.
    National and international observers reported that the CSI 
effectively fulfilled its responsibilities under the Electoral Code to 
assure equal media treatment of the candidates during the period prior 
to the November 1998 presidential election. The collective of 
independent election observers stated after the election that the press 
generally was open to the different candidates. Press reporting on 
candidates' campaigns, with the exception of the national television 
and state-owned newspaper, which initially gave the President more 
attention than that provided to the other two candidates, became more 
balanced after a complaint presented to the CSI early in the campaign 
by Green Party candidate Ram Ouedraogo.
    Academic freedom is respected. In April the Government closed the 
University of Ouagadougou and primary and secondary schools in 
Ouagadougou and several other cities in response to political 
demonstrations by students. The primary and secondary schools reopened 
in approximately a week, and the University reopened several weeks 
later. In October the Government again closed the University in 
response to a series of strikes, walkouts, and violent confrontations 
between riot police and student groups. After instituting a series of 
reforms and conceding to the concerns of teachers and student groups, 
University registration began in late December. The University was 
scheduled to reopen early in 2001.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, at times the Government 
restricted this right in practice. Police forcibly dispersed several 
demonstrations, and in December the Government banned all public 
demonstrations or gatherings except for weddings, funerals, and 
religious ceremonies. At year's end, the ban remained in effect.
    Previously, political parties and labor unions were allowed to hold 
meetings and rallies without requesting Government permission. However, 
the law requires that authorities be notified in advance of planned 
demonstrations and gives the executive the right to invoke the need to 
preserve public order to forbid demonstrations. Penalties for 
violations include 2 to 5 years imprisonment. Permits must be obtained 
from municipal authorities for political marches. Applicants must 
indicate the date, time, duration, and itinerary of the march or rally, 
and authorities may alter or deny requests on grounds of public safety. 
Denials or modifications may be appealed before the courts.
    On April 8, security forces dispersed a march protesting the 
impunity from prosecution of members of the President's family and 
entourage. The police used tear gas and batons to disperse the 
demonstrators, injuring 20 persons.
    Protests continued on April 10 for progress on the Zongo case and 
expanded political freedom and a more effective justice system.
    While dispersing violent street demonstrations, police arrested 
several persons and shaved their heads while they were in custody. From 
April 12 to 13, the Collective of Mass Democratic Organizations and 
Political Parties led largely peaceful demonstrations to demand 
truthful information in both the Zongo and David Ouedraogo cases (see 
Section 2.b.). The police arrested approximately 12 members and 6 
prominent leaders of the collective, including human rights leader 
Halidou Ouedraogo; lawyer Benewende Sankara; union leader Tole Sagnon; 
and Sankarist party leader Norbert Tiendrebeogo. The police detained 
them (without charge) for 3 days and shaved their heads while they were 
in custody.
    On August 30, police used tear gas to disperse refugees 
demonstrating for improved living conditions (see Section 2.d.).
    In October civil servants widely observed a peaceful general strike 
called by opposition parties to demand truth in the Zongo case, 
although it was ignored generally by the private sector (see Section 
6.a.).
    On November 30, gendarmes detained approximately 15 students during 
a peaceful demonstration in Ouagadougou, reportedly beat them, stripped 
them to their undergarments, and left them in a park near the outskirts 
of the city (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On December 6, students from Ouagadougou University demonstrated in 
the town of Bousse against proposed government reforms at the 
university. Gendarmes used tear gas to disperse the demonstration and 
fired upon the demonstrators, killing a boy. The Government 
subsequently banned all public demonstrations until further notice.
    Despite the ban on demonstrations, a small group of protesters 
marked the second anniversary of Zongo's death on December 13; security 
forces dispersed them with tear gas.
    Journalists and human rights activists were not permitted to hold 
public meetings during the International Press Freedom Festival in 
Ouagadougou on December 12 to 16. The Government also refused to permit 
a number of foreign journalists and human rights activists to enter the 
country to attend the festival.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this in practice. Since early 1990, 
political parties and labor unions usually have been permitted to 
organize without seeking government permission.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    The Government requires that religious groups register with the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration. Registration establishes a 
group's legal presence in the country but entails no specific controls 
or benefits. There are no penalties for failure to register.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement, and authorities generally respect this right in practice. 
Gendarmes routinely stop travelers for identity and customs checks and 
the levying of road taxes at police and military checkpoints; some 
foreign journalists were not permitted to enter the country. There is 
no restriction on foreign travel.
    Following the Government's December ban on demonstrations (see 
Section 2.b.), progovernment vigilantes intimidated human rights 
activists and forced some to flee from cities such as Koudougou (see 
Section 4).
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status 
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Refugees are accepted 
freely. The Government provides first asylum. The Government cooperated 
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. Most refugees 
departed voluntarily for neighboring countries; however, a few hundred 
refugees from the Great Lakes region remained in the country at year's 
end. The majority of these refugees come from the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Congo Brazzaville, and Chad; they live singly or in small 
groups in Ouagadougou.
    During the year, 30 of the 600 refugees from several Francophone 
Africa countries who were resettled in the country in 1998 by the UNHCR 
held a sustained protest regarding their harsh living conditions. They 
accused the Foreign Ministry's National Committee for Refugees of 
misappropriating large sums of money intended for the refugees. On 
August 30, police used tear gas to disperse demonstrating refugees.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution. There were no reports of the forced 
expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee status.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government 
through multiparty elections; however, although the November 1998 
presidential election represented a further step toward democratic 
government, in practice citizens are unable to exercise this right 
fully due to the continued dominance of the President and his ruling 
party. President Compoare won 88 percent of the vote; 56 percent of the 
eligible voters went to the polls. The irregularities cited by 
observers in the actual voting process were limited in number and scope 
and did not appear to affect the ultimate outcome of the election. 
However, the national observers identified a number of systemic 
weaknesses in the electoral code that precluded a perfectly regular and 
transparent vote, and a coalition representing a number of opposition 
parties boycotted the election. Nevertheless, neither of the two 
candidates opposing President Compaore contested the results.
    In October 1999, President Compaore instructed the Prime Minister 
to reshuffle and broaden the Government. The new cabinet included four 
members from small opposition parties; however, the major opposition 
bloc, the Group of 14 February (G-14), refused to participate. In 
October 1999, the Council of Ministers passed decrees creating a 
Commission for Political Party Consultations and a Commission of 
National Reconciliation. The Commission issued a final report in 
December 1999. The President announced in his traditional 1999 New 
Year's Eve address that he would accept all of the report's 
recommendations, including designating a formal leader of the 
opposition in Parliament and reintroducing presidential term limits 
beginning in 2005. He said that he would call new parliamentary 
elections ``if necessary.'' At year's end, he had taken none of the 
recommended steps.
    In November President Compaore and representatives from the 
opposition parties that agreed to participate in the Government signed 
a protocol that ceded one-third of the cabinet posts to the opposition. 
Ernest Yonli was designated Prime Minister. The protocol also set out a 
commitment to strengthen dialog with opposition parties, civil society, 
associations, and trade unions, and to strengthen ethics in political 
life. Members of the opposition held 12 of 36 posts, but members of the 
largest opposition party, the Party for Democracy and Progress (PDP) as 
well as the other parties belonging to the G-14 bloc, refused to 
participate in the Government.
    The 1997 legislative elections gave the ruling CDP 101 out of 111 
parliamentary seats. (The CDP now controls 102 seats because of a 
defection to the ruling party by an opposition deputy.) The victory 
reflected both general support for policies of the governing party and 
a lack of viable opposition alternatives. While international observers 
described the elections as substantially free and fair, a collective of 
14 local NGO's cited generalized and systematic corruption and voter 
list irregularities. The Supreme Court annulled the results in four 
constituencies because of these irregularities.
    In May 1998, the National Assembly approved the establishment of an 
independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), funded by the 
Government. Although developing electoral lists remains the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and 
Security, the CENI is responsible for creating a census bureau, 
installing voting stations, training poll workers, organizing election 
observation, ensuring election security, and distributing election 
material. During the 1998 presidential election, the CENI was unable to 
carry out its functions in some areas due to inadequate staffing. On 
May 17, the Government promulgated a new electoral code that gave the 
CENI more independence. Under the revised code, the CENI has full 
responsibility for managing its budget and is the only organization 
responsible for monitoring elections and referendums. However, during 
the September 24 municipal elections, the CENI appeared to defer to the 
Government on important questions such as postponing the elections and 
candidate eligibility.
    The CDP won over 70 percent of the seats in nationwide municipal 
elections held on September 24, but lost its majority in Koudougou, the 
third largest city. The CDP won the majority of seats, and thus the 
mayor's office, in 42 of the country's 49 communes. Despite some 
allegations of fraud, the vote was held without disruption and the CENI 
generally had adequate staff and personnel to perform its duties. 
Nationwide turnout was approximately 60 percent of registered voters, 
but less than half of eligible voters were registered. Seventeen 
parties participated in the elections; however, 8 opposition parties 
actively boycotted them.
    The Compaore Government includes a strong presidency, a Prime 
Minister, a Council of Ministers presided over by the President, a two-
chamber National Assembly, and the judiciary. The legislature is 
independent, but it remains susceptible to external influence from the 
executive branch.
    In November 1999, a presidential decree established a Commission on 
Political Reforms. Pursuant to the Commission's recommendation in 
December 1999, Article 37 of the Constitution was amended in April to 
provide that the presidential term of office be 5 years, renewable 
once, starting in 2005; the provision is not retroactive. Previously 
the Constitution allowed the President to run for an unlimited number 
of terms.
    There are no restrictions in law or practice on the participation 
of women or minority group members in politics; however, women are 
underrepresented in government and politics. Only 4 of the 36 ministers 
and 8 of the 111 National Assembly deputies are women. The President of 
the Social and Economic Council is a woman. In part because of the 
important role that women played in reelecting President Compaore in 
1998, the Congress for Democracy and Progress voted at its first 
ordinary Congress held in July 1999 to increase the number of women on 
its National Executive Council from two to six.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    In general the Government did not interfere with the activities of 
local human rights organizations during the year. A number of such 
groups operated during the year according to monitors, including the 
Burkinabe Movement for Human Rights (MBDHP), GERDES, and the 
Association of Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT).
    In March 1999, the Council of Ministers terminated the agreement 
that had existed between the Government and the InterAfrican Human 
Rights Union (UIDH) since 1995. The Council stated in 1999 that UIDH 
head Halidou Ouedraogo, who also served as president of the Burkinabe 
Movement for Human Rights (MBDHP) and as president of the collective, 
had mixed politics with human rights and thus acted in ways 
incompatible with the agreement. The Council also considered illegal 
the UIDH's participation on a parallel inquiry commission that was set 
up in January 1999 by the Collective to investigate the Zongo killings. 
Under the 1995 agreement, the UIDH benefited from tax exemptions, a 
government subsidy that paid $500 (300,000 CFA) a month to rent 
temporary offices for the organization; Ouedraogo, a Burkinabe 
national, had enjoyed diplomatic immunity as head of an international 
organization. In May the President promised to reinstate the agreement 
providing a tax exemption and subsidy to the UIDH; however, these 
actions had not taken place by year's end.
    The Government again failed to answer inquiries from international 
human rights organizations concerning past abuses.
    Amnesty International (AI) still is awaiting the results of the 
Government inquiry into the 1995 killings in Garango, but the 
Government has not responded to AI's request for information.
    Following the Government's December ban on demonstrations (see 
Section 2.b.), progovernment vigilantes intimidated human rights 
activists and forced some to flee from cities such as Koudougou.
    The Government permitted international human rights groups to visit 
and operate in the country. The MBDHP is affiliated with the 
InterAfrican Human Rights Union (UIDH) and representatives of other 
human rights groups visited the country during the year.
    In 1994 the Government announced the creation of the Office of 
Ombudsman, called ``Mediateur du Faso.'' Retired General Marc Garango 
was appointed to the position, which is responsible for mediating 
disputes between the state and its citizens. In June 1998, the 
Ombudsman's Office issued its first activity report, which indicated 
that half the cases brought before it dealt with career problems of 
civil servants and the other half with a variety of issues, including 
land questions and bureaucratic inaction. On July 20, Garango issued 
another report and retired effectively on November 10. The report 
attempted to resolve approximately 300 outstanding citizen complaints 
against the Government and urged the Government to pay compensation in 
a number of cases.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, or ethnic origin. Minority ethnic groups, like the majority 
Mossi, are represented in the inner circles of the Government, and 
government decisions do not favor one group over another.
    Women.--Violence against women, especially wife beating, occurs 
frequently. Cases of wife beating usually are handled through customary 
law and practice. There are no statistics on rape, although it is 
recognized as a crime. Spousal rape is not discussed. There are 
organizations that counsel rape victims, including Catholic and 
Protestant missions, the Association of Women Jurists in Burkina, the 
Burkinabe Movement for Human Rights, the Association of Women, and 
Promofemmes, a regional network that works to combat violence against 
women. The Government is attempting to change attitudes toward women, 
using education through the media. The Penal Code explicitly prohibits 
sexual harassment, but it has no special laws protecting women against 
violence other than general laws dealing with violence.
    Forced marriage is prohibited by law with specific penalties under 
the Penal Code for violators. Polygyny is permitted, but both parties 
must agree to it prior to a marriage, and the woman maintains the power 
to oppose further marriages by her husband if she can provide evidence 
that he abandoned her and her children. Either spouse can petition for 
divorce; custody of children is granted to either parent on the basis 
of the children's best interests.
    Although the law provides equal property rights to women and some 
inheritance benefits depending on other family relationships, in 
practice customary law prohibits women from the right to own property, 
particularly real estate. In rural areas, land belongs to the family of 
the man whom a woman marries. Customary law does not recognize 
inheritance rights for women and regards the woman as property that can 
be inherited upon her husband's death.
    There are no specific constitutional provisions or laws protecting 
women, who face extensive discrimination. In general women continue to 
occupy a subordinate position and experience discrimination in such 
areas as education, jobs, property, and family rights. Overall, women 
represent 45 percent of the work force; however, in the modern sector 
women make up one-fourth of the government work force, although they 
usually are found in lower paying positions. Women still do much of the 
subsistence farming work. After the May 1997 parliamentary elections, 
the Government created a Ministry of Women's Affairs and appointed a 
woman as minister; the minister actively promoted women's rights during 
the year.
    There were occasional reports of trafficking in women (see Section 
6.f.).
    Children.--The Constitution nominally protects children's rights. 
The Government has demonstrated its commitment to improving the 
condition of children by continuing a national policy to revitalize 
primary health care through the privatization of hospitals, which 
provided greater autonomy in hospital management. The Government has 
stated its commitment to improve access to primary education and as of 
1996 had raised the literacy rate to 22 percent. Although the law 
provides for free compulsory primary education, the Government lacks 
the means to provide universal, free primary instruction; many 
children, especially girls, do not attend school. A 1995 estimate 
indicated that about 30 percent of males and 9 percent of females were 
literate. The Government devoted approximately 21 percent of its budget 
to education and provided free primary school education to all 
children. If a child qualifies on the basis of grades and social 
condition (that is, the family is ``poor''), free education can 
continue through junior high and high school. In practice the family 
condition requirement often is ignored, giving many children a free 
education through high school.
    Females constitute approximately one-third of the total student 
population in the primary school system and are represented in the 
secondary and higher educational systems, although the percentage 
decreases significantly beyond the primary level. Schools in rural 
areas have disproportionately fewer female students than schools in 
urban areas. The Government has set up a scholarship program for female 
secondary students to encourage them to stay in school.
    Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, still is practiced widely, especially in many 
rural areas, and usually is performed at an early age. The percentage 
of females who have undergone this procedure may be as high as 70 
percent. The Government has made a strong commitment to eradicate FGM 
through educational efforts, and The National Committee for the Fight 
Against Excision campaigns against the practice. The Penal Code was 
revised in 1996 to make FGM a crime, with stricter punishments for 
those involved in its practice. Perpetrators are subject to 6-months to 
3-years imprisonment and a significant fine. The Government continued 
its sensitization campaign regarding the deleterious effects of this 
practice. According to press reports in 1999 and during the year, some 
persons who have practiced FGM and the victims' parents were arrested, 
and some FGM practitioners were prosecuted and received prison 
sentences under the 1996 law forbidding FGM. Another form of 
mutilation, scarification of the faces of both boys and girls of 
certain ethnic groups, gradually is disappearing.
    There were occasional reports of trafficking in children (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--While there are modest government 
subsidies for workshops for the disabled, there is no government 
mandate or legislation concerning accessibility for the disabled. There 
is no legislation to protect persons with disabilities from 
discrimination. Programs to aid the disabled are limited, but human 
rights groups are not aware of any discrimination against the disabled.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1962 Labor Code has been amended 
several times during the past decade. During the year, the Government 
repealed provisions requiring public servants to respect the 
revolutionary order under penalty of disciplinary sanctions. Under this 
legislation, workers, including civil servants, traditionally have 
enjoyed a legal right of association, which is recognized under the 
Constitution. There are 4 major labor confederations and 12 autonomous 
trade unions linked by a national confederal committee. They represent 
a wide ideological spectrum; the largest and most vocal member espouses 
socialist doctrine. Approximately 85 percent of the workforce is 
engaged in subsistence agriculture. Of the remainder, approximately 50 
percent of private sector employees and 60 percent of public sector 
employees are union members. Essential workers, such as police, may not 
join unions.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and workers use 
strike actions to achieve labor goals. Many strikes were called 
throughout the year both by labor organizations to advance workers' 
objectives, and by the Collective of Mass Organizations and Political 
Parties to press for justice in the aftermath of the Zongo killings. 
The Government allowed peaceful strikes on a number of occasions, 
including in the health and banking sectors. University and medical 
students also struck on several occasions, including strikes in 
February and May protesting for improved study and working conditions, 
better food, and subsidized transportation. In October civil servants 
widely observed a peaceful general strike called by opposition parties 
to demand truth in the Zongo case (see Section 1.a.), although it was 
ignored generally by the private sector (see Section 2.b.).
    Labor unions may affiliate freely with international trade unions. 
The National Confederation of Burkinabe Workers is affiliated with the 
Brussels-based World Confederation of Labor.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the 
right to bargain for wages and other benefits, both directly with 
employers and with industry associations. These negotiations are 
governed by minimums on wages and other benefits contained in the 
Interprofessional Collective Convention and the Commercial Sector 
Collective Convention, which are established with government 
participation. If no agreement is reached, employees may exercise their 
right to strike. Either labor or management may refer an impasse in 
negotiations to labor tribunals. Appeals may be pursued through the 
Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, whose decision is binding on both 
parties. Collective bargaining is extensive in the modern wage sector, 
but it encompasses only a small percentage of workers.
    The Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination. The Labor 
Ministry handles complaints about such discrimination, which the 
plaintiff may appeal to a labor tribunal. If the tribunal sustains the 
appeal, the employer must reinstate the worker. Union officials believe 
that this system functions adequately.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor; however, there were occasional reports of 
trafficking in women for forced prostitution or domestic service (see 
Section 6.f.).
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; 
however, there were occasional reports of trafficking in children for 
forced prostitution or domestic service (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age for employment at 14 
years, the average age for completion of basic primary school. However, 
the Ministry of Employment, Labor, and Social Security, which oversees 
labor standards, lacks the means to enforce this provision adequately, 
even in the small wage sector. Children commonly work with their 
parents in rural areas or in family-owned small businesses in villages 
and cities. Most children actually begin work at an earlier age on 
small, family subsistence farms, in the traditional apprenticeship 
system, and in the informal sector. There are no reports of children 
under the age of 14 employed in either state or large private 
companies. The Government prohibits forced or bonded child labor; 
however, there were reports of trafficking in children (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    In December the National Assembly unanimously ratified ILO 
Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor, but at year's end, 
the President had not yet signed the bill into law. The Ministry of 
Labor is expected to be responsible for its enforcement.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code mandates a 
minimum monthly wage, a standard workweek of 40 hours with at least one 
24-hour rest period for nondomestic workers and a 60 hour workweek for 
household workers, and establishes safety and health provisions. The 
minimum monthly wage in the formal sector, about $41 (28,911 CFA), does 
not apply to subsistence agriculture, which employs about 85 percent of 
the population. The Government last set a minimum wage in 1996. It is 
not adequate for an urban worker to support a family. Wage earners 
usually supplement their income through reliance on the extended 
family, subsistence agriculture, or trading in the informal sector.
    A system of government inspections under the Ministry of 
Employment, Labor, and Social Security and the labor tribunals is 
responsible for overseeing health and safety standards in the small 
industrial and commercial sectors, but these standards do not apply in 
the subsistence agricultural sector. However, the Government's Labor 
Inspector Corps does not have sufficient resources to fulfill its 
duties adequately. Every company is required to have a work safety 
committee. If a workplace has been declared unsafe by the Government's 
Labor Inspection Office for any reason, workers have the right to 
remove themselves from dangerous work without jeopardy to continued 
employment. In practice there are indications that this right is 
respected, but such declarations are relatively rare.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons; however, there were occasional reports of trafficking in women 
and children for the purposes of forced prostitution or domestic 
service. The country is an occasional source country for women who 
travel to Europe, believing they are going to work as domestics, but 
who, upon their arrival, are forced to work as prostitutes.
    The country is a source and transit point for trafficking, most 
frequently of children destined for agricultural labor, usually in Cote 
d'Ivoire. In many instances, children voluntarily travel to Cote 
d'Ivoire to work as agricultural laborers to escape poverty at home; 
however, in other cases, children are lured to plantation work in Cote 
d'Ivoire by false promises of generous remuneration, only to be forced 
to work under very harsh conditions for little or no payment. Some 
children are forced to work long hours without pay, allegedly to repay 
costs of their transport to Cote d'Ivoire and the costs of food and 
housing on the plantation.
    The Government only has limited resources to combat trafficking in 
women or children. During the year, a number of children destined for 
plantations in Cote d'Ivoire were intercepted by the authorities, and 
the traffickers were arrested; however, none were prosecuted during the 
year. The Government provided initial shelter to the children and 
helped return them to their homes. Some children asserted that they 
were going voluntarily to Cote d'Ivoire in search of work.
                               __________

                                BURUNDI

    Burundi is ruled by an authoritarian military regime led by self-
proclaimed interim President Pierre Buyoya, who was brought to power in 
a bloodless coup by the largely ethnic Tutsi armed forces in 1996 and 
who abrogated the Constitution. Buyoya holds power in conjunction with 
a political power structure dominated by members of the Tutsi ethnic 
group. In 1998 the Buyoya regime reached a political agreement with the 
opposition-dominated National Assembly, which adopted a Transitional 
Constitutional Act and a transitional political platform. The agreement 
brought the predominantly ethnic Hutu opposition party FRODEBU into the 
Cabinet. Political parties operate under significant restraints. Since 
1993 the civil war has caused thousands of civilian deaths and mass 
internal displacement. In June 1998, the Government and opposition 
parties began peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. On August 28, the 
Buyoya regime and other groups present at the peace talks signed a 
peace agreement, which was ratified by the National Assembly on 
November 30. The agreement proposes extensive reforms of the security 
forces, the judiciary, and the country's political institutions. 
Several of the parties signed with reservations parts of the agreement, 
including the key issues of leadership of the transitional government, 
integration of the army, and the electoral system. Negotiations were 
ongoing at year's end. The two major armed rebel groups declined to 
join the peace process. The judiciary is controlled by the ethnic Tutsi 
minority and is not impartial.
    The security forces are controlled by the Tutsi minority and 
consist of the army and the gendarmerie under the Ministry of Defense, 
the judicial police under the Ministry of Justice, and the intelligence 
service under the presidency. Members of the security forces continued 
to commit numerous serious human rights abuses.
    The country is poor and densely populated, with 92 percent of the 
population dependent on subsistence agriculture. Many internally 
displaced citizens have been unable to grow food and depend largely on 
international humanitarian assistance. Per capita income fell from $200 
in the early 1980's to $121 in 1999, according to the Ministry of 
Development and Reconstruction. The civil war has caused severe 
economic disruption, especially to the small modern sector of the 
economy, which is based mainly on the export of coffee, tea, and 
cotton. The Government has announced plans to privatize publicly owned 
enterprises, but made little progress during the year.
    The Government's human rights record was poor. Citizens do not have 
the right to change their government. Security forces continued to 
commit numerous extrajudicial killings. The armed forces killed armed 
rebels and unarmed civilians, including women, children, and the 
elderly. Rebel attacks on the military often were followed by army 
reprisals against civilians suspected of cooperating with the 
insurgents. Despite Buyoya's stated commitment to end abuses by the 
military, numerous abuses were committed and perpetrators were not 
punished. Impunity for those who commit serious human rights 
violations, and the continuing lack of accountability for those who 
committed past abuses, remained key factors in the country's continuing 
instability. There were credible reports of disappearances, and the 
security forces continued to torture and otherwise abuse persons. 
Soldiers raped women. Despite some improvements, prison conditions 
remained life threatening. Arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy 
pretrial detention were problems, and there were reports of 
incommunicado detention. The court system suffers from a lengthy case 
backlog; however, the Government took steps to diminish the backlog. 
The dysfunctional justice system was unable to resolve pressing issues 
of detention and impunity because of its lack of independence, 
inefficiency, a lack of resources, systemic corruption, administrative 
disruption due to the war, and the partiality of Tutsi officials. 
Authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government 
controlled the media and restricted freedom of speech and of the press. 
It restricted freedom of assembly and did not permit political 
demonstrations by government opponents. The Government restricted 
freedom of association and freedom of movement. Since 1993 the civil 
war has caused thousands of civilian deaths and mass internal 
population displacement. During the first half of the year, the army 
continued its forced regroupment policy, requiring an estimated 330,000 
persons (mostly Hutus) to live in forced regroupment camps to prevent 
rebel attacks on the nearby capital, Bujumbura; however, by August the 
Government had closed all regroupment camps. The armed forces sometimes 
limited access to certain areas by human rights observers, citing 
dangerous security conditions. Violence and discrimination against 
women continued. The Government was unable to protect the rights of 
children, and child prostitution is a problem. Discrimination against 
the disabled also is a problem. The indigenous Twa (Pygmy) people 
remain marginalized economically, socially, and politically. Incidents 
of ethnically motivated property destruction and killing occurred 
throughout the country. State discrimination against Hutus was 
widespread. Soldiers required persons who were regrouped forcibly, 
including children, who were mostly Hutus, to perform forced labor. 
Child labor was a problem.
    Hutu rebels also continued to commit numerous serious abuses 
against civilians, including killings, rapes, theft, and forced labor.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
committed numerous extrajudicial killings. On February 15, a police 
officer allegedly tortured to death a domestic servant who insulted the 
officer's wife (see Section 1.c.). The officer was arrested later that 
day, but released on March 15. The U.N. protested his release.
    On April 1, a soldier killed a local Bujumbura government official 
and four members of the official's family, allegedly in retaliation for 
four soldiers killed by rebels. The soldier was arrested for the 
murders and he remained in detention pending trial at year's end.
    In early May, members of the security forces tortured and 
decapitated a man who had thrown stones at them while they looted 
houses in the forced regroupment camp Kavumu, in Bujumbura Rural 
province (see Sections 1.c., 1.f., and 2.d.). The Government began an 
investigation into this incident, but did not complete it by year's 
end.
    On June 24-25, soldiers killed 69 persons in Taba commune, Gitega 
province, on the suspicion that the residents were cooperating with 
rebels.
    On July 22-23, soldiers killed 53 persons in Butaganzwa commune, 
Ruyigi province. Observers believe that the killings were in response 
to intense pressure from the Government to combat rebels and their 
supporters in the province.
    On August 19, in Nyambuye zone, Bujumbura Rural province, soldiers 
killed 35 civilians who had sought refuge in Bujumbura on August 17 
after 2 days of confrontations between the army and rebels. Apparently 
the civilians were trying to go home when they encountered the rebels 
on August 19. Soldiers shot the civilians as they fled, ostensibly 
having mistaken them for rebels.
    On October 3, soldiers shot and killed Antonio Bargiggia, a 
Catholic brother from Italy, who ran a hospital in Mutoyi (see Section 
2.c.). On October 19, two soldiers, including Napoleon Manirakiza, who 
was convicted of killing Bargiggia, were executed for murder without 
having had legal representation during their trial or a chance to 
appeal their convictions (see Section 1.e.). The other soldier, Rene 
Rukemanganisi, was convicted of killing Caritas Nahimana, the director 
of the Gitega medical school, and her two sons. These were the first 
executions since July 1999.
    Fighting between security forces and rebels resulted in a number of 
deaths. On February 14, there were reports that three rebel attacks on 
a regroupment camp in Kavumu commune, near Bujumbura, resulted in the 
deaths of at least six civilians (see Section 2.d.). It is unclear 
whether they were killed during fighting between security forces and 
rebels or as a result of security forces firing into the camp. On 
September 15, at least 11 persons reportedly were killed in Bujumbura's 
northern neighborhoods of Kamenge, Ngagara, and Gikizi, during fighting 
between security forces and rebels. It is unknown who initiated the 
fighting, although some reports place the blame on rebels. On November 
16, there were reports that several civilians were killed during 
fighting between security forces and rebels after security forces 
forced approximately 100 men to remove foliage from near the 
battleground (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.).
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that soldiers 
shot and killed some persons who tried to leave regroupment sites to 
which Hutus were relocated forcibly starting in September 1999 (see 
Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
    Deaths in prisons continued due to disease and malnutrition (see 
Section 1.c.); however, the number of such deaths decreased during the 
year.
    Comprehensive and accurate information about landmines was hard to 
obtain; however, the armed forces apparently used landmines to prevent 
rebels from accessing government territory. There were reports that the 
security forces mined the border with Tanzania in order to prevent 
rebels from crossing the border. An international organization received 
reports of 9 antipersonnel landmine incidents in the first 7 months of 
the year, a decrease from the 47 incidents reported during the previous 
12 months. The decline in reported incidents may be due in part to 
self-imposed limitations on the movement of U.N. personnel during the 
year. Other sources reported that in midApril a landmine that exploded 
on a footpath on the northeastern edge of the capital killed two women 
and three children.
    There were no developments in the October 1999 case of the soldier 
who killed six persons at the Ruyaga regroupment site. The Government 
did not conclude its investigation into reports that government 
soldiers killed 50 persons in August 1999, in Kanyosha on the outskirts 
of Bujumbura, or its investigation into reports that in December 1999 
soldiers shot and killed an unarmed FRODEBU Hutu parliamentarian. By 
year's end, the Government had not released the findings of an 
investigation into a January 1999 case in which soldiers killed more 
than 55 civilians in Mubone, Kabezi commune, Bujumbura Rural province, 
nor was any action taken against those responsible. There was no 
investigation nor action taken in a May 1999 case in which soldiers 
killed 11 Hutu civilians, including women and children, most of whom 
lived in the household of a man suspected of participating in the 1993 
killing of Tutsis. There was no investigation nor action taken in a 
July 1999 case in which soldiers killed 30 civilians in Kanyosha 
commune, Bujumbura Rural province.
    In September the U.N. formally protested the release of a 
lieutenant accused in the November 1998 killing of up to 200 persons in 
Mutambu commune, Bujumbura Rural province.
    In May 1999, the media reported a judgment in the trial of the 1993 
assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye. The Supreme Court 
sentenced 5 members of the army to death and 23 others to prison. 
Another 38 persons were acquitted, 10 cases were sent back to the court 
for further review, and 5 cases were dropped because the suspects had 
died. No high-ranking army officers were convicted, although charges 
originally were brought against many past and present senior army 
members. The new Attorney General, who is a Hutu, announced in June 
1999 that the case would be reopened; new trials are scheduled for 
January 2001.
    There was no investigation nor action taken in a January 1999 case 
in which 178 civilians were killed either by rebels or because they 
were caught in a crossfire between rebels and the army.
    Media and NGO reports indicate that about 200,000 persons, mostly 
civilians, have been killed in ethnic violence between October 1993 and 
the end of the year; however, the source of this figure is unclear. No 
credible countrywide casualty figures were available. The Government 
and security forces frequently have prevented journalists and human 
rights observers from going to areas where casualties occurred, making 
it difficult to gather information about the perpetrators and the 
victims. Much of the extrajudicial killing and property destruction 
during the year was concentrated in the province around the capital and 
in the southern and eastern provinces of Bururi, Makamba, Rutana, and 
Ruyigi.
    There were urban bombings during the year. For example, on August 
23, at least two persons were killed and several others were injured 
when a hand grenade exploded in the Buyenzi market, a suburb of 
Bujumbura. No suspect had been identified by year's end; however, in 
August the twin brother of a labor organizer was arrested for 
involvement in the attack (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
    In October there were reports that unidentified attackers killed an 
Italian nun in Gitega (see Section 2.c.). No suspect had been 
identified by year's end.
    Rebels killed persons near regroupment camps, sometimes during 
battles with government troops. Hutu rebels also killed Hutu and Tutsi 
civilians; Hutu rebels sometimes deliberately targeted and killed 
Tutsis. There are no definitive statistics available on how many 
persons were killed by Hutu rebels; the Government stated that rebels 
were responsible for the majority of civilian casualties. Rebels 
reportedly often kill persons for suspected collaboration with the 
regime and for their refusal to pay ``taxes'' to rebels. There were 
numerous reports throughout the year that Hutu rebels ambushed 
minibuses carrying persons on national highways, and robbed and killed 
the occupants. U.N. security forces reported 146 ambushes in the first 
7 months of the year; however, this figure probably does not represent 
all incidents.
    On March 5, rebels killed six persons in an ambush in the southern 
province of Makamba, on National Highway 3 between Mabanda and Nyanza 
Lac communes. On March 25, rebels killed seven Tutsi women and children 
in Bukeye commune, Muramvya province. Over the weekend of April 22 to 
23, rebels reportedly killed 3 persons in Bubanza province, 7 persons 
on National Route 1 in Bujumbura Rural province, and 16 persons in a 
camp for internally displaced Tutsis in Makamba province (see Section 
2.d.).
    On December 24 and 25, there were reports that hundreds of 
suspected rebels attacked the town of Bukemba, Rutana province, killed 
15 civilians, and injured 6 persons.
    On December 28, rebels shot and killed 20 persons and injured 20 
others on a road north of Bujumbura when they ambushed a civilian bus 
traveling from Kigali, Rwanda, to Bujumbura. By year's end, no one had 
claimed responsibility for the attack, nor had any perpetrator been 
identified.
    There were unconfirmed reports that rebels took landmines planted 
by government forces and later used them against the army.
    Government authorities blamed rebels for the October 1999 killings 
of two U.N. foreign staff members and seven others in Rutana province, 
and stated that the rebels had fled to Tanzania after the attack. No 
arrests were made in the case. Rebels accused the armed forces of 
committing the killings.
    b. Disappearance.--Human rights groups reported that abductions and 
disappearances occurred during the year, but no credible overall 
figures were available. There were no developments in the disappearance 
of three men in September 1999. Rebels were responsible for many of the 
disappearances, although credible reports suggest that such abductions 
were infrequent; rebels kidnaped and raped women (see Section 1.c.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Transitional Constitution Act prohibits these abuses; 
however, members of the security forces continued to torture and 
otherwise abuse persons. On February 15, a police officer allegedly 
tortured to death a domestic servant who insulted the officer's wife 
(see Section 1.a.). The officer was arrested later that day, but 
released on March 15. The U.N. protested his release. On February 26, 
police officers reportedly beat several persons while forcibly 
dispersing a demonstration against the peace talks; a number of persons 
were arrested (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). In early May, members of 
the security forces tortured and decapitated a man who threw stones at 
them because they were looting houses in the forced regroupment camp 
Kavumu, in Bujumbura Rural province (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). On 
November 16, there were reports that several civilians were injured 
during fighting between security forces and rebels after security 
forces forced approximately 100 men to remove foliage near the 
battleground (see Sections 1.a. and 6.c.). According to press reports, 
in December six university students were injured when security forces 
used tear gas to forcibly disperse a group of students demonstrating 
against exam schedules (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Government 
soldiers raped women in regroupment camps (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). 
There were no known prosecutions of members of the security forces for 
these abuses.
    Government troops used excessive force in areas where there were 
civilians and often fired on Hutu civilians, stating that it was 
difficult to distinguish them from rebels.
    Landmine explosions resulted in some casualties (see Section 1.a.). 
For example, the domestic human rights organization, Iteka, reported 
that four persons from a forced regroupment camp in Bujumbura Rural 
province surrounding the capital were injured in a landmine explosion 
while working in their fields during the year (see Section 2.d.). It is 
unknown if the landmine was laid by government forces or by rebels.
    There also were reports that soldiers used children for forced 
labor (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.).
    At the end of the year, signs emerged of renewed government support 
for policing of the capital and countryside by armed civilians, which 
raised fears of the return of the militias created in 1995 to 
destabilize the then Hutu-led government. There have been unconfirmed 
reports that the Government armed civilians in Ruyigi, Rutana, and 
Bururi provinces.
    Rebels killed, beat, and stole from civilians, and kidnaped and 
raped women (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 5). Rebels used civilians, 
including children, for forced labor (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.). 
On December 24 and 25, hundreds of rebels attacked the town of Bukemba, 
Rutana province, injured 6 persons and killed approximately 15 others 
(see Section 1.a.). On December 28, rebels injured 20 persons, and 
killed 20 persons, when they ambushed a civilian bus traveling from 
Kigali, Rwanda, to Bujumbura (see Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions remained life threatening. Conditions in state-
run prisons improved, largely due to efforts by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to improve sanitation, hygiene, 
medical care, food, and water. However, severe overcrowding continued, 
prisoners still relied on family members to provide an adequate diet, 
and according to government officials, prisoners suffered from 
digestive illnesses, dysentery, and malaria. Harsh prison conditions 
contributed to the deaths of prisoners from disease and malnutrition. 
Approximately 10,000 inmates were housed in facilities built to 
accommodate a maximum of 3,650 persons, according to Iteka. With the 
return of the ICRC, the death rate in the prisons containing 80 percent 
of all inmates dropped from 2.3 deaths per 10,000 per day to 0.4 deaths 
per 10,000.
    International and local human rights monitors were permitted to 
visit prisons and speak with inmates (see Section 4).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--On January 1, a new 
criminal code that prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile 
took effect; however, the code was not respected and security forces 
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Limits on the length of 
pretrial detention were not respected. The law requires arrest 
warrants, and presiding magistrates are authorized to issue arrest 
warrants. Police and gendarmes can make arrests without a warrant, but 
are required to submit a written report to a magistrate within 48 
hours. The law requires that suspects appear in court within 7 days. A 
magistrate can order the release of suspects or confirm charges and 
continue detention, initially for 15 days, then subsequently for 
periods of 30 days, as necessary to prepare the case for trial. The 
police are required to follow the same procedures as magistrates; 
however, the police have detained suspects for extended periods without 
announcing charges, certifying the cases, or forwarding them to the 
Ministry of Justice as required. Bail was permitted in some cases. 
Human rights organizations reported that incommunicado detention 
exists, although law prohibits it.
    There were numerous instances of arbitrary arrest. In March police 
arrested 20 teenage girls at a club for prostitution (see Sections 5 
and 6.d.). In May security forces arrested seven residents of the 
Kavumu regroupment camp in Bujumbura Rural province while conducting a 
search of residences (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.); one of the seven 
later was found decapitated (see Section 1.a.). In August police 
arrested the twin brother of a labor organizer who called for a general 
strike and accused the twin brother of involvement in a grenade attack 
on the Buyenzi market (see Sections 1.c. and 6.a.)
    There were numerous instances of the arbitrary arrest of persons 
demonstrating against the peace process (see Section 2.b.). On February 
7, authorities in Bujumbura arrested and detained for 1 week at least 
eight persons who were demonstrating against the Arusha peace talks 
(see Section 2.b.). On February 26, police arrested and detained for 1 
week 11 participants during another demonstration against the peace 
talks (see Section 2.b.). On March 25 security forces dispersed, 
arrested, and detained briefly several persons demonstrating against 
the peace process (see Section 2.b.). On April 19, authorities 
reportedly arrested and fined 15 persons also protesting the peace 
process. On August 18, authorities arrested and detained several 
protesters during a rally against the peace process, including the 
president of a labor union (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). On August 20, 
police arrested Diomede Rutamucero, president of a self-described 
mainly Tutsi self-defense group PA-Amasekanya, for holding a non-
violent demonstration against aspects of the peace process on August 19 
(see Section 2.b.). Rutamucero was detained for longer than a week 
before he appeared before a judge and was fined.
    The disruption of the political process and the generally poor 
security conditions severely impeded the judicial process.
    The ICRC estimates that the prison population is approximately 
8,700 persons and that 70 percent of those are pretrial detainees. 
According to the local human rights organization, Iteka, an estimated 
3,255 pretrial detainees constituted 54 percent of the total prison 
population at year's end, down from 78 percent the previous year. The 
decline was due to government efforts to release prisoners while 
pending trial, to the release of prisoners charged with minor crimes, 
or those released because there was not enough evidence to support an 
indictment. By year's end, the Government had released approximately 
1,000 prisoners without files.
    The Government does not used forced exile as a means of political 
control; however, many persons remained in voluntary exile in Belgium, 
Kenya, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and 
elsewhere. Some senior authorities maintain members of their families 
outside the country. A number of officials of the Government of deposed 
president Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, who fled the country in 1996, have 
not yet returned.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Transitional Constitutional 
Act provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice the 
judiciary is not independent of the executive and is dominated by 
ethnic Tutsis. Reform of the judicial system is a priority of the peace 
accord, which has not yet been implemented. An international human 
rights organization estimated that ethnic Hutus account for only 10 
percent of the country's lawyers and 5 percent of High Court judges; in 
lower courts, 10 percent of the judges are Hutu, although Hutus 
constitute an estimated 85 percent of the population. This discrepancy 
is due in part to unequal access to education, and in part to the 
conflict in which a number of Hutu judges and lawyers were killed or 
fled the country. Most citizens assume that the courts promote the 
interests of the dominant Tutsi minority; members of the Hutu majority 
believe that the judicial system is biased against them.
    The judicial system is divided into civil and criminal courts with 
the Supreme Court at the apex. The armed forces have a separate 
judicial system, and there is a labor court.
    Citizens generally did not have regular access to civilian and 
military court proceedings. Defendants in theory are presumed innocent 
and have the right to appeal; however, in practice some lawyers say 
that the structure of the court system inappropriately limits the 
possibility of appeals for defendants accused of the most serious 
crimes. While defendants have a right to counsel and to defend 
themselves, in practice few have legal representation. The civil court 
system functions, but the lack of a well-trained and adequately funded 
judiciary constrains expeditious proceedings. Many citizens have lost 
confidence in the system's ability to provide even basic protection. 
The majority of persons arrested on criminal charges since October 1993 
remain in pretrial custody.
    On January 1, a new criminal code took effect that provides for 
suspects' rights to a lawyer before official charges are filed and 
during pretrial investigations; however, not all aspects of the new 
code were respected, particularly the section that requires that 
detainees be charged and appear in court within 7 days of their arrest. 
Authorities sometimes are unable to carry out their investigations or 
transport suspects and witnesses to the appropriate court due to 
resource constraints and poor security conditions.
    On October 19, two soldiers, including one convicted of killing 
Antonio Bargiggia, were executed for murder without having had legal 
representation during their trial or the chance to appeal their 
convictions (see Section 1.a.). These were the first executions since 
July 1999. According to the law, the prisoners had a right to appeal to 
the military's court of appeal, then to the Supreme Court, and then to 
the President for clemency; however, this process did not occur.
    The Government holds political prisoners. An international 
organization estimated that up to 2,000 of all convicted inmates were 
being held for political crimes; however, no reliable figures are 
available. Charges against defendants convicted for nonpolitical crimes 
sometimes are politically motivated. The peace agreement, which has not 
been implemented, calls for the creation, within 30 days of the 
installation of the transitional government, of a commission to 
investigate and make recommendations on the existence and release of 
any political prisoners.
    According to the ICRC, an agreement is in place between the ICRC 
and the Ministries of Justice and Defense regarding access to prisoners 
and detained persons, including persons detained for ``reasons relating 
to the conflict.'' The Ministries cooperate with the ICRC; however, the 
ICRC did not have a formal agreement with the Ministry of the Interior 
at year's end.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Transitional Constitutional Act provides for the 
right to privacy; however, the authorities do not respect the law 
requiring search warrants. Security forces widely are believed to 
monitor telephones regularly.
    In 1999 the Government forcibly relocated approximately 330,000 
mainly Hutu inhabitants of Bujumbura Rural province in regroupment 
camps where security forces could more readily monitor and control 
their movements (see Section 2.d.). The sites were opened in September 
1999, and had inadequate sanitation and insufficient access to water, 
food, shelter, and medicine. The Government's stated rationale for 
these forced relocations was to protect the regrouped population from 
rebel attacks. In May security forces conducted a search of residences 
at the Kavumu regroupment camp in Bujumbura Rural. Residents protested 
that soldiers stole their belongings and some of the residents threw 
rocks at the soldiers. Seven residents were arrested (see Section 
1.d.); one of the seven later was found decapitated (see Section 1.a.). 
A National Assembly committee on human rights launched an investigation 
in May; however, no findings were made public by year's end. All of the 
regroupment sites were closed by August. Many of the residents of the 
regroupment camps returned home to find their fields ravaged, their 
homes looted or destroyed, and their livestock gone. Observers believe 
that members of both the military and the rebels were responsible for 
the damage.
    International humanitarian aid agencies could not reach some of the 
Government's forced regroupment camps in remote sections of Bujumbura 
Rural province due to lack of infrastructure or because they were 
prevented from doing so by security forces (see Sections 2.d. and 4). 
These camps, composed of mainly Hutu residents, reportedly had 
insufficient water, food, sanitation, medicine, and shelter.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Transitional Constitutional 
Act does not impose restrictions on the media; however, the Government 
restricts freedom of speech and of the press. A press law requires that 
newspaper articles undergo review by a government censor 4 days before 
publication, and the Government controls the media and harasses and 
detains journalists.
    The regime controlled much of the news, since it owns the only 
regularly published newspaper and the major radio and television 
stations. The government-owned Le Renouveau was published 3 times a 
week. Other newspapers, including at least one opposition newspaper, 
appeared irregularly. Political tracts circulated, and two private 
faxed newsheets were published almost daily. These represented mainly 
Tutsi political viewpoints. The National Communications Council 
prevented the publication of one edition of the FRODEBU opposition 
political party's newspaper, La Lumiere, in July (see Section 3). 
Journalists practice self-censorship.
    The Government and its security forces harass journalists, 
questioning or detaining them or having their property searched and 
seized. In September the editor and a journalist of a private faxed 
newsheet were detained for 1 week and interrogated about their sources 
in a criminal investigation against the twin brother of a labor leader 
(see Sections 1.d. and 6.b.).
    The government-owned radio broadcasts in the Kirundi language, 
French, and Swahili, and offers limited English programming. The 
private radio station, Umwizero, is financed by international donors 
and broadcasts in French and Kirundi. Listeners also can receive 
transmissions of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Voice 
of America, and Radio France Internationale. On March 21, the National 
Communications Council and the BBC signed an agreement allowing the BBC 
to begin broadcasting from within the country; the BBC began 
broadcasting later in the spring.
    No laws or regulations limit academic freedom, and no persons at 
the University of Burundi were persecuted for what they published or 
said. However, the population at the state university remains primarily 
ethnic Tutsi. Tensions have flared occasionally between Hutu and Tutsi 
students on campus, where politically and ethnically motivated killings 
occurred in 1995 and 1996. According to press reports, in December 
security forces forcibly dispersed university students demonstrating 
against exam schedules, which resulted in several injuries (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In December 1999, the staff of the University 
of Burundi held a series of strikes, which ended in the spring (see 
Section 6.a.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
restricts freedom of assembly. It banned several meetings by mainly 
Tutsi groups critical of government policy and the peace process (see 
Section 3). On June 24, police prevented a meeting organized by the 
Tutsi group, PA-Amasekanya, by locking the doors of the assembly hall.
    The Transitional Constitutional Act permits political 
demonstrations, but in practice the Government has allowed none. During 
the year, police arrested protesters taking part in a series of non-
violent protests against the peace process. On February 7, authorities 
in Bujumbura arrested at least eight persons who were demonstrating 
against the Arusha peace talks (see Section 1.d.). On February 26, 
police forcibly dispersed 1,000 unauthorized persons demonstrating 
against the peace talks; 11 persons were arrested (see Section 1.d.). 
There were reports that police beat some of the protesters (see Section 
1.c.). On February 27, police and gendarmes prohibited members of 
organized clubs from going on weekly runs or runs with members of clubs 
in which political ideas are discussed. On March 25 and April 19, 
security forces dispersed and arrested several persons demonstrating 
against the peace process (see Section 1.d.). On August 18 and 19, 
protesters demonstrated against the peace process. On August 18, 
protesters attempted to implement a ``ville morte'' or dead city strike 
by shutting down road traffic on one of the national routes; university 
students then threw rocks and tree limbs onto the street near the 
university campus; however, security forces intervened and reopened the 
road. On August 19, police dispersed approximately 100 persons marching 
in Bujumbura to protest the peace talks and on August 20, arrested 
Diomede Rutamucero, president of PAAmasekanya, which organized the 
march (see Section 1.d.). Authorities arrested and detained several 
protesters during the August 18 rally (see Section 1.d.), including 
PierreClaver Hajayandi, President of the Confederation of Burundi 
Unions (COSYBU), which organized the rally (see Section 6.a.). 
According to press reports, in December security forces used tear gas 
to forcibly disperse university students demonstrating against exam 
schedules, which resulted in injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
    The Government restricts freedom of association and has arrested 
members of organizations and political parties. The Transitional 
Constitutional Act permits political parties to operate; however, the 
regime places restrictions on groups critical of its policies.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Transitional Constitutional Act 
provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice.
    The Government requires religious groups to register with the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which keeps track of their leadership and 
activities. The Government requires that religious groups have a 
headquarters in the country. Once registered, religious organizations 
enjoy taxfree status, and clergy theoretically do not have to pay duty 
on purchased goods. However, one religious group reported that it was 
required to pay duty on all imported goods, except books and other 
publications.
    On October 3, soldiers shot and killed Antonio Bargiggia, a 
Catholic brother from Italy, who ran a hospital in Mutoyi (see Section 
1.a.). In October there were reports that unidentified attackers killed 
an Italian nun in Gitega (see Section 1.a.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Immigration, and Repatriation.--The Transitional Constitutional Act 
provides for these rights; however, the Government restricts these 
rights in practice. There was a government-imposed curfew in parts of 
the country; in Bujumbura the curfew begins at 11 p.m. and ends at 5 
a.m. During the first half of the year, the Government continued its 
forced regroupment policy that required approximately 330,000 Hutus 
from Bujumbura Rural province to live in governmentcontrolled camps 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.). Residents of parts of Bujumbura Rural 
more heavily populated by Tutsis were not subject to relocation. The 
relocated population at times lacked access to food, safe drinking 
water, shelter, basic sanitation, and health care. Some regroupment 
camps were difficult to access (see Sections 1.f. and 4). Authorities 
stated that they were relocating the population to protect it from 
rebels, but the displacements also were used to separate rebels from 
the relocated population and to impede civilian assistance to rebels. 
Inhabitants of these sites raised some of their own food with the 
permission of the armed forces; however, residents were not given full 
access to their fields. Unlike in the previous year, there were no 
reports that persons who tried to leave the sites were shot by 
soldiers.
    On February 14, there were reports that three rebel attacks on a 
regroupment camp in Kavumu commune, near Bujumbura, resulted in the 
deaths of at least six civilians (see Section 1.a.).
    In early May, members of the security forces tortured and 
decapitated a man who had thrown stones at them while they looted 
houses in the forced regroupment camp Kavumu, in Bujumbura Rural 
province (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.).
    According to the U.N., there were 324,100 internally displaced 
persons (IDP's) living in 212 sites at year's end, which represents 
about 5 percent of the total population. Many were Tutsis who fled to 
other parts of the country starting in 1993 because of ethnic violence 
and never returned home. Soldiers did not restrict the movement of 
residents of IDP camps. Soldiers guarding these camps provide a measure 
of protection to camp inhabitants; however, they sometimes committed 
human rights abuses against them (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.). Camp 
inhabitants often were required to perform labor for the soldiers 
without compensation (see Section 6.c.).
    Persons who remain outside the sites reportedly were killed by Hutu 
rebels for allegedly collaborating with authorities and by the armed 
forces on suspicion of collaborating with the rebels (see Section 
1.a.). Over the weekend of April 22 to 23, rebels reportedly killed 16 
persons in a camp for internally displaced Tutsis in Makamba province 
(see Section 1.a.).
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the 
authorities restricted foreign travel for political reasons. The 
majority of citizens could travel legally in and out of the country. 
Travel within the country was possible but could be hazardous in areas 
of rebel activity, particularly in parts of Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, 
Rutana, Ruyigi, and Makamba provinces.
    Real and claimed insecurity in rural areas was cited by the 
Government in denying access to some areas of the country to human 
rights observers (see Section 4).
    The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention on 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, there is a 
special ad hoc administrative body in the Government that coordinates 
refugees, and the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). The Government has granted first asylum in recent 
years. Approximately 23,600 citizens of the DRC live in Burundi, many 
of whom claim asylum. Of these, about 1,400 are ethnic Tutsi known as 
Banyamulenge. Rwandan refugees who fled the 1994 ethnic massacres in 
Rwanda departed the country by 1997. Another 200,000 Rwandans who came 
in earlier waves of refugees, some as early as 1959, are not registered 
officially with the UNHCR and are integrated into Burundian society.
    The UNHCR reported that as of the end of September, about 10,000 
Burundian refugees had returned during the year from Rwanda, Tanzania, 
the DRC, and other countries. During the same period, an estimated 
47,528 persons fled to Tanzania, according to the UNHCR. Approximately 
563,700 refugees, most of them Hutu, remained in Tanzania. About 200,00 
of these persons fled as early as 1972, and many fled following the 
assassination of former president Ndadaye in October 1993. Another 
23,408 refugees, most of them Hutu, are in Angola, Cameroon, the DRC, 
the Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, and Zambia.
    There were unconfirmed reports that the Government had hired 
mercenaries to invade refugee camps in Tanzania; however, the 
Government strongly denied these reports.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The 
Transitional Constitutional Act makes no provision for elections. The 
1992 Constitution and 1994 Convention of Government were suspended by 
the Buyoya military regime that assumed power on July 25, 1996, in a 
bloodless coup. On that date, the regime dissolved the National 
Assembly and banned political parties. About 3 weeks later, Buyoya 
announced the restoration of the National Assembly and political 
parties with certain restrictions. The opposition party, FRODEBU, which 
is mostly ethnic Hutu, holds just over half of the National Assembly 
seats.
    In April 1998, multiparty peace talks began in Arusha, Tanzania, 
and the Government subsequently launched an internal peace process. On 
June 4, 1998, Buyoya's regime and the National Assembly entered into a 
partnership agreement. The National Assembly adopted the Transitional 
Constitutional Act and a Transitional Political Platform. The act 
changed the structure of government by eliminating the post of prime 
minister, creating two vice presidents, removing the National Assembly 
Speaker from the line of presidential succession, and enlarging the 
National Assembly. The act placed no time limits on the President's or 
the National Assembly's term of office. On August 28, the Buyoya regime 
and other groups present at the peace talks signed a peace agreement, 
which was ratified by the National Assembly on November 30. The August 
28 peace agreement instructs the country's next transitional government 
to hold local, national, and presidential elections within a 3-year 
period, and to oversee elections for a newly formed Senate; however, 
this agreement was not implemented by year's end. Representation of 
both Hutus and Tutsis in institutions, including the army, the National 
Assembly, and a proposed Senate, is a key component of the agreement.
    The Transitional Political Platform endorses in general terms the 
restoration of democracy and correction of the ethnic imbalance within 
the army and the judicial system. It calls for the creation of an 
international tribunal to try crimes of genocide. Although the peace 
accord also provides for such a tribunal as well as a National Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission to investigate other crimes, the 
agreement had not been implemented and no tribunal had been created by 
year's end.
    On June 12, 1998, a new Government was announced in which the First 
Vice President and 10 of the 22 cabinet ministers are members of 
FRODEBU. The Cabinet includes 12 Hutus, including the Minister of 
External Relations. Progovernment ethnic Tutsi members hold the key 
Ministries of Defense, Interior, Justice, and Finance.
    Under the 1992 Constitution, deposed President Ntibantunganya would 
have remained in office until 1998. The last elections to fill the 
Assembly took place in June 1993. The Transitional Constitutional Act 
stipulates that the National Assembly shall consist of 121 
parliamentarians: Those elected in 1993 who sat in the previous 
National Assembly, plus 40 new members28 members of civil society 
appointed by the President and one representative each (selected by 
their respective parties) from all 12 officially recognized political 
parties not previously represented. Not all of those elected in 1993 
are alive or in the country, and the vacant seats were filled by 
substitutes from the same political party as the original 
parliamentarian. Tutsi supporters of the Government filled 22 of the 40 
new seats.
    Political parties operate under significant constraints. The 
National Communications Council prevented the publication of one 
edition of the FRODEBU opposition political party's newspaper, La 
Lumiere, in July (see Section 2.a.). The Government banned several 
meetings by mainly Tutsi groups critical of government policy and the 
peace process. On June 24, police prevented a meeting organized by the 
Tutsi group, PA-Amasekanya, by locking the doors of the assembly hall 
(see Section 2.b.).
    Police often disrupted political demonstrations and beat and 
arrested demonstrators (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
    The National Assembly has nominal budgetary oversight, but the 
Council of Ministers legally can enact a budget if the National 
Assembly fails to do so. The Transitional Constitutional Act gives the 
President the authority to declare a state of emergency by decree after 
consulting with the National Assembly Speaker, the Constitutional 
Court, and the National Security Council, which has not been convened 
since 1996.
    No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women; however, 
women are underrepresented in government and politics. Of the 22 
cabinet seats, 1 is filled by a woman, who serves as the Minister of 
Women, Welfare, and Social Affairs. In 1993 women were elected to 9 of 
81 seats in the National Assembly. The expansion of the National 
Assembly and the filling of vacant seats have brought the total number 
of female parliamentarians to 17. Two of the nine members of the 
Supreme Court are women, as are three of the seven Constitutional Court 
members, including its president.
    No legal restrictions hinder the participation of indigenous 
people; however, the ethnic Twa (Pygmies) are underrepresented in 
government and politics. About 1 percent of the population is Twa, but 
there are no Twa in the Cabinet. One Twa is an appointed member of the 
National Assembly (see Section 5). Under the peace accord, up to three 
Twa could be appointed to sit in the Senate.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic human rights groups received varying degrees of 
cooperation from government ministries. The local human rights group, 
Iteka, continued to operate and publish a newsletter. Human Rights 
Watch maintained an office in the country. Amnesty International 
representatives visited the country several times during the year, and 
the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights visited once during the 
year. The office of the UNHCR maintained a three-person observer team, 
down from nine observers in 1999. The observer reductions resulted from 
security restrictions following an October 1999 attack on a U.N. 
humanitarian mission.
    Real and claimed insecurity in rural areas was cited by the 
Government in denying access to journalists, international relief 
workers, and human rights observers to some areas of the country, 
including to regroupment camps (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). Army 
elements in the field frequently denied access to human rights 
observers where the army was accused of human rights violations. Human 
rights NGO's frequently were unable to investigate reports of killings 
due to these restrictions. In the spring, the U.N. resumed normal field 
operations in much of the country following the deaths of two workers 
in 1999 (see Section 1.a.); however, many areas of the country, 
particularly near Bujumbura, near the border with the DRC, and near the 
border with Tanzania, remain off limits for normal operations.
    On May 21 and 22, rebels attacked the city of Makamba; no injuries 
were reported. There were reports that the target of the attack was 
Doctors Without Borders, an international NGO.
    On November 25, on the road between Bujumbura and Gitega, a group 
of men, some allegedly dressed in military uniform, robbed at gunpoint 
a truck belonging to World Vision, an international NGO.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, 
        or Social Status
    The Transitional Constitutional Act provides equal status and 
protection for all citizens, without distinction based on sex, origin, 
ethnicity, religion, or opinion; however, the Government failed to 
implement effectively the act's provisions and discrimination persists. 
Hutus continued to perceive, correctly, that the Tutsi-dominated 
Government and army discriminate against them. The question of 
exclusion was a central question during the peace talks.
    Women.--Violence against women occurred, but its extent is 
undocumented. Wives have the right to charge their husbands with 
physical abuse, but they rarely do so. Police normally do not intervene 
in domestic disputes, and the media rarely report incidents of violence 
against women. No known court cases dealt with the abuse of women.
    Women face legal and societal discrimination. Explicitly 
discriminatory inheritance laws and credit practices continued. By law 
women must receive the same pay as men for the same work, but in 
practice they do not. Women are far less likely to hold mid-level or 
high-level positions. In rural areas, women traditionally perform hard 
farm work, marry and have children at an early age, and have fewer 
opportunities for education than men.
    Rebels kidnaped and raped women, although credible reports suggest 
that such incidents were infrequent (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
    Children.--The law provides for children's health and welfare, but 
the Government cannot adequately satisfy the needs of children and, in 
particular, of the large population of orphans resulting from the 
violence since 1993 and HIV/AIDS. Many of the victims in the civil war 
are children, and many children have lost family members and witnessed 
violence.
    More than a quarter of the primary schools have been destroyed in 
the war, and many teachers have been killed. Teacher training has been 
interrupted, and it is difficult to find qualified teachers to work in 
the provinces most affected by fighting. The Government provides 
elementary education at nominal cost through grade six; however, 
inequitable distribution of educational resources favors those children 
in southern and central areas of the country, according to 
International Alert, an international NGO. The Government estimates 
that approximately 45 percent of children are enrolled in primary 
school and approximately 44 percent of children are enrolled in 
secondary school.
    Teenage prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.d.). During the 
year, the Government began a campaign to curb underage prostitution in 
Bujumbura. In March police arrested, detained for several days, and 
fined 20 teenage girls at a club for prostitution.
    There were reports that soldiers used children for forced labor 
(see Section 6.c.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Government has not enacted 
legislation or otherwise mandated access to buildings or government 
services for persons with disabilities. Discrimination against the 
disabled is a problem. There are few job opportunities for the 
physically disabled in the country, where most jobs involve significant 
manual labor.
    Indigenous People.--The Twa (Pygmies), who are believed to be the 
country's earliest inhabitants, now make up about 1 percent of the 
population, and generally remain marginalized economically, socially, 
and politically. Most Twa live in isolation, without formal education, 
and without access to government services, including health care.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The principal national problems 
continued to be ethnic conflict between the majority Hutus and the 
minority Tutsis, and regional inequities between southern Bururi 
province and much of the rest of the country. Almost 4 decades of 
violence and systematic discrimination have exacerbated the genocide 
and exclusion fears of both Tutsis and Hutus. Tutsis claim to have been 
the targets of genocide carried out in 1993 by Hutus angered by the 
assassination of democratically elected Hutu president Ndadaye. The 
Tutsis, particularly southern Tutsis, historically have held power, and 
they dominate educated society and control the security forces. In 1996 
Major Pierre Buyoya, a southern Tutsi, deposed President 
Ntibantunganya, a central Hutu, in a coup.
    The Transitional Constitutional Act provides equal status and 
protection for all citizens, without distinction based on sex, origin, 
ethnicity, religion, or opinion; however, the Government failed to 
implement effectively the act's provisions. The Tutsi-dominated 
Government and army discriminate against Hutus. Northern and eastern 
Tutsis also have a more difficult time acceding to positions of power. 
State discrimination against Hutus, who constitute an estimated 85 
percent of the population, affects every facet of society, but most 
strikingly higher education and certain branches of the Government such 
as the armed services and the judicial system. The President and the 
Tutsi-dominated army retain their dominance in decision-making and do 
not share power equally with Hutu members of the Government.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code protects the rights of 
workers to form unions; however, the army, gendarmerie, and foreigners 
working in the public sector are prohibited from union participation. 
Most union workers are urban civil servants.
    According to the Confederation of Free Unions of Burundi (CSB), an 
umbrella trade union, 60 percent of the 80,000 formal private sector 
employees are unionized. All employees in the public sector, except 
those prohibited by law, are unionized.
    Since gaining independence from the Government in 1992, the CSB has 
been dependent financially on a system of checkoffs, or voluntary 
contributions, as are local unions. In 1995 a rival trade union, the 
Confederation of Burundi Unions (COSYBU), was founded. Both COSYBU and 
the CSB represented labor in collective bargaining negotiations in 
cooperation with individual labor unions during the year.
    Tutsis dominate the formal sector of the economy and the unions.
    The Labor Code permits the formation of additional unions or 
confederations outside the CSB. When settling disputes in which more 
than one labor union is represented, the law stipulates that the 
Minister of Labor must choose the union representing the greatest 
number of workers to participate in the negotiations.
    The Labor Code provides workers with a restricted right to strike. 
The restrictions on the right to strike and to lock out include: All 
other peaceful means of resolution must be exhausted prior to the 
strike action; negotiations must continue during the action, mediated 
by a mutually agreed upon party or by the Government; and 6 days' 
notice must be given. The law prohibits retribution against workers 
participating in a legal strike; however, this provision was not 
respected.
    In December 1999, the staff of the University of Burundi held a 
series of strikes, which ended in the spring (see Section 2.a.). In 
January civil servants held several strikes to protest price and tax 
hikes; however, the strikes were not observed widely due to government 
intimidation. All striking employees returned to work on January 19. 
The Government initially had agreed to negotiate with COSYBU, but later 
refused. The vice president of the union was arrested twice, but 
released.
    On August 18, authorities arrested and detained several protesters 
during a rally against the peace process (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.), 
including Pierre-Claver Hajayandi, President of the COSYBU, which 
organized the rally. In September police arrested a labor organizer who 
called for a general strike against government policies. The 
organizer's twin brother, whom they accused of involvement in a grenade 
attack on a popular market (see Section 1.c.), also was arrested (see 
Section 1.d.).
    Unions are able to affiliate with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
recognizes the right to collective bargaining, formerly acknowledged 
only by ordinance. Since most workers are civil servants, government 
entities are involved in almost every phase of labor negotiations.
    Public sector wages are set in fixed scales in individual contracts 
and are not affected by collective bargaining. In the private sector, 
wage scales also exist, but individual contract negotiation is 
possible.
    The Labor Code gives the Labor Court jurisdiction over all labor 
dispute cases, including those involving public employees. Negotiations 
are conducted largely under the supervision of the tripartite National 
Labor Council, the Government's highest consultative authority on labor 
issues. The Council represents government, labor, and management and is 
presided over and regulated by the Minister of Labor.
    The Labor Code prohibits employers from firing or otherwise 
discriminating against a worker because of union affiliation or 
activity. This right is upheld in practice.
    There are no functioning export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
the performance of forced or compulsory labor; however, soldiers 
guarding internally displaced persons sites and soldiers at military 
posts often require persons to cook, fetch water, chop wood, work in 
the fields of military leaders, and perform other chores without 
compensation (see Section 2.d.). The military also require persons to 
perform regular night watches.
    The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children; however, 
there were reports that soldiers forced children to perform occasional 
tasks, such as carrying supplies.
    On November 16, there were reports that security forces forced 
approximately 100 men from the northern neighborhoods of Bujumbura to 
remove foliage near Tenga, a densely wooded area where security forces 
were fighting with rebels. Several civilians were killed or injured 
during the fighting (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    Rebel groups also require the rural population to perform 
uncompensated labor, including the transport of rebel supplies and 
weapons. Rebels also recruit and use children for labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code states that children under the age of 16 
cannot be employed by ``an enterprise'' even as apprentices, although 
it also states that they may undertake occasional work that does not 
damage their health or interfere with their schooling. In practice 
children under the age of 16 in rural areas do heavy manual labor in 
the daytime during the school year.
    The minimum age for military service is 18, but observers believe 
that there are some children below that age in the military.
    Children are prohibited legally from working at night, although 
many do so in the informal sector. Most of the population lives by 
subsistence agriculture, and children are obliged by custom and 
economic necessity to participate in subsistence agriculture, family-
based enterprises, and the informal sector.
    Teenage prostitution is a problem (see Section 5).
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, 
there were reports that it occurred (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The formal minimum wage for 
unskilled workers is $0.21 (160 francs) per day in the cities Bujumbura 
and Gitega and $0.14 (105 francs) in the rest of the country, with a 
graduated scale for greater skill levels. This amount does not allow a 
worker and family to maintain a decent standard of living, and most 
families rely on second incomes and subsistence agriculture to 
supplement their earnings.
    Unionized employees, particularly in urban areas, generally earn 
significantly more than the minimum wage. Public sector wages are set 
by agreement between the Government and either the CSB or COSYBU. The 
government wage scale has remained unchanged since 1992, but 
allowances, such as the one for housing, have risen.
    The Labor Code stipulates an 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek, 
except in cases where workers are involved in activities related to 
national security. Supplements must be paid for overtime. Foreign 
workers are protected by law and are not subject to discrimination.
    The Labor Code establishes health and safety standards that require 
an employer to provide a safe workplace and assigns enforcement 
responsibility to the Minister of Labor. However, the Ministry does not 
enforce the code effectively. Health and safety articles in the Labor 
Code do not address directly workers' rights to remove themselves from 
dangerous tasks.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                CAMEROON

    Cameroon is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. Since 
independence a single party, now called the Cameroon People's 
Democratic Movement (CPDM), has remained in power and limited political 
choice. In October 1997, CPDM leader Paul Biya won reelection as 
President in an election boycotted by the three main opposition 
parties, marred by a wide range of procedural flaws, and generally 
considered by observers not to be free and fair. Although the 
Government legalized opposition parties in 1990 after widespread 
protests, most subsequent elections, including the May 1997 legislative 
elections, which were dominated by the CPDM, were flawed by numerous 
irregularities. International and local observers generally consider 
the election process, which is controlled by the Government's Ministry 
of Territorial Administration, as not free and fair. No President has 
ever left office in consequence of an election. The President retains 
the power to control legislation or to rule by decree. In the National 
Assembly, government bills take precedence over other bills, and no 
bills other than government bills have been enacted since 1991, 
although the Assembly sometimes has not enacted legislation proposed by 
the Government. The President repeatedly has used his control of the 
legislature to change the Constitution. The 1996 Constitution 
lengthened the President's term of office to 7 years, while continuing 
to allow Biya to run for a fourth consecutive term in 1997 and making 
him eligible to run for one more 7-year term in 2004. In July the 
Government began discussions on an action plan to create the 
decentralized institutions envisioned in the 1996 constitution, such as 
a partially elected senate, elected regional councils, and a more 
independent judiciary. Government timetables for establishing these 
bodies extend until 2004. Although the country's first local government 
elections were held in 1996, President Biya limited their scope in many 
pro-opposition cities by expanding the number of municipal governments 
led by presidentially appointed delegates rather than headed by mayors 
chosen by the directly-elected municipal councils. The Government 
remained highly centralized and is dominated by the presidency. The 
judiciary is subject to political influence and suffers from corruption 
and inefficiency.
    Internal security responsibilities are shared by the national 
police (DGSN), the National Intelligence Service (DGRE), the 
gendarmerie, the Ministry of Territorial Administration, military 
intelligence, the army, and to a lesser extent, the Presidential Guard. 
On February 20, the Government created a military Operational Command 
to fight crime in Douala and the Littoral Province. The police and the 
gendarmerie have dominant roles in enforcing internal security laws. 
The security forces, including the military forces, remain under the 
effective control of the President, the civilian Minister of Defense, 
and the civilian head of police. The security forces continued to 
commit numerous serious human rights abuses.
    The country's population of approximately 15 million had a recorded 
mean per capita Gross National Product (GNP) of approximately $607. 
Economic growth has continued over the past 4 years, despite decreases 
in world prices for the country's major primary product exports. Over 
the past 3 years, GNP growth has averaged 4 to 5 percent annually; 
however, economic recovery continues to be inhibited by a large 
inefficient parastatal sector, excessive public sector employment, and 
the Government's inability to deregulate the economy to attract more 
investment. Widespread corruption in government and business also 
impedes growth. Members of the Beti and Bulu ethnic groups dominate the 
civil service and the management of state-owned businesses. The 
majority of the population is rural, and agriculture accounts for 25 
percent of GNP. Principal exports include timber, coffee, cocoa, 
cotton, bananas, and rubber. The Government also continued to receive 
substantial assistance from international financial institutions.
    The Government's human rights record continued to be generally 
poor, and government officials continued to commit numerous serious 
abuses. Citizens' ability to change their government remained limited. 
Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings; were 
responsible for disappearances, some of which may have been motivated 
politically; and tortured, often beat, and otherwise abused detainees 
and prisoners, generally with impunity. However, the Government 
prosecuted a few of the most egregious offenders, including some who 
were convicted and sentenced to prison terms and others who remain in 
prison awaiting trial. Conditions remained harsh and life threatening 
in almost all prisons, although the Government granted international 
humanitarian organizations access to prisoners. Security forces 
continued to arrest and detain arbitrarily various opposition 
politicians, local human rights monitors, and other citizens, often 
holding them for prolonged periods, often without charges or a chance 
for trial and, at times, incommunicado. The judiciary remained corrupt, 
inefficient, and subject to political influence. At times military 
tribunals exercise criminal jurisdiction over civilians, which in the 
past denied some civilians fair trials. Security forces conducted 
illegal searches and harassed citizens. The Government infringed on 
citizens' privacy and monitored and harassed some opposition activists. 
The Government continued to impose limits on press freedom. Although 
private newspapers enjoyed considerable latitude to publish their 
views, journalists continued to be subject to official and, on 
occasion, serious harassment. There were no reports that the Government 
seized newspaper editions; however, the Government continued its 
prosecutions of pro-opposition journalists under criminal libel laws. 
The Government continued to obtain convictions against journalists 
under these laws. In July the Government implemented a 1990 law 
designed to end its virtual monopoly of domestic broadcast media. Five 
radio stations subsequently applied for licenses to operate and 
continued to broadcast pending final authorization. The Government 
restricted freedom of assembly and association. At times the Government 
used its security forces to inhibit political parties from holding 
public meetings. Government security forces limited freedom of 
movement. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious 
problems. The abuse of children was a problem and female genital 
mutilation (FGM) persisted in some areas. Discrimination against 
indigenous Pygmies continued. Societal discrimination based on religion 
persisted in some areas. Discrimination against ethnic minorities 
remained widespread. The Government continued to infringe on workers' 
rights, and restricted the activities of independent labor 
organizations. Child labor remained a serious problem. Slavery 
reportedly persisted in northern parts of the country. Forced labor, 
including forced child labor, was a problem. There were reports of 
trafficking in persons, primarily children, for purposes of forced 
labor. Mob violence continued to result in some deaths.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political killings; however, the security forces 
continued to use excessive, lethal force against private citizens and 
committed numerous extrajudicial killings.
    In mid-January Atangana, a gendarme serving at the Douala port, 
shot and killed Alhadji Bapetel, a customs officer also serving at the 
port. The shooting followed a quarrel over authority issues. The 
Government arrested the gendarme, who was awaiting trial on charges of 
``assault occasioning death'' at year's end.
    On March 2, an unidentified Douala soldier, who reportedly was 
drunk, shot and killed Pascal Kalo, a young Nigerian businessman. The 
death occurred after the soldier shot wildly at a group of customers 
who left the bar without paying their bill, but instead hit Kalo, who 
was eating dinner in a nearby restaurant. Reportedly there was no 
investigation nor action taken in this case by year's end.
    On April 6, police officers beat to death Emmanuel Ebanda, a porter 
at the Douala International Airport (see Section 1.c.). The police 
claim that Ebanda died because he beat his own head against the wall; 
however, a jailed witness contests these charges, claiming that he 
called repeatedly for medical assistance for Ebanda, but that the 
police ignored his pleas. The police investigated the case and on 
August 21, three police officers were arrested; they remained in 
detention pending trial at year's end.
    On May 7, a police officer by the name of Bahiga shot and killed 
Laurent Abbe in Yaounde, allegedly during an illegal search of Abbe's 
friend's residence (see Section 1.f.). The Government arrested Bahiga, 
who was in detention pending trial at year's end.
    On May 11 in Yaounde, a mixed patrol of police officers, gendarmes, 
and soldiers attempted to seize a vehicle illegally for non-emergency 
purposes. The driver loudly disputed the seizure, and attracted a crowd 
that began to laugh at the security forces. One of the officers, 
angered by the laughter, shot indiscriminately at the crowd, killing 
two women. Reportedly there was no investigation nor action taken in 
this case by year's end.
    On May 29, police officers from the Yaounde special operation 
grouping (GSO) detained, tortured, and killed Edouard Leuwat, a Yaounde 
taxicab driver (see Section 1.c.). One GSO policeman, with assistance 
from other officers, had arrested Leuwat without warrant on May 28, 
believing Leuwat to be the driver of a taxicab in which the policeman 
had left his handgun on May 27. Leuwat denied the charge, and the 
policeman tortured Leuwat to extract a confession. The Government 
arrested eight police officers involved in the case and charged them 
with ``torture having resulted in death.'' On June 20, the Government 
transferred the eight to the Yaounde-based Kondengui Central Prison, 
where they were awaiting trial at year's end.
    On June 21, security officers shot two alleged bandits in Yaounde's 
Nlongkak Circle, killing one. A neighborhood resident walked up to the 
remaining, incapacitated bandit and slit his throat with a machete. 
Reportedly there was no investigation nor action taken in this case by 
year's end.
    On September 14, Mathew Titiahonjo, who gendarmes at the NDOP 
brigade in the Northwest Province had arrested and detained on May 23, 
died in prison reportedly from torture (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On October 28, Operational Command Sergeant Jean Claude Mbita 
allegedly shot and killed Luc-Benoit Bassilekin, a technician, while 
attempting to arrest him; Bassilekin's brother was arrested. In 
November the Government announced that it had arrested Mbita on charges 
of intentional homicide; he remained in detention pending trial at 
year's end.
    On October 30, Operational Command officers reportedly shot and 
killed Paul Petchueke, a taxicab driver, because Petchueke had 
attempted to make a U-turn in front of a command roadblock. On November 
13, the Government announced that it had arrested Paul Essoh, a soldier 
at the Douala Airbase, on charges of unintentional homicide for 
Petchueke's killing; he remained in detention at Douala New Bell prison 
pending trial at year's end.
    There were reports that the Douala Operational Command committed 
numerous summary executions, which totaled at least several dozens. 
There were reports that some persons were tortured before they were 
killed (see Section 1.c.). This special military unit, created to fight 
crime in Douala, operates above the authority of other security forces 
currently in the city. This command killed some suspects in shoot-outs 
and high-speed car chases during the year. It also reportedly used a 
network of informants, including a large number of convicted criminals 
and prison officials, to obtain the names of suspected bandits who they 
then arrested and summarily executed. The Operational Command also used 
neighborhood sweeps to search for criminals, occasionally executing 
suspects for minor offenses such as smoking marijuana. Press and other 
reports allege that the Operational Command has several mass graves, 
including in the ``Forest of Monkeys'' (Bois des Singes) and off the 
``Old Road'' between Douala and Edea, where bodies were abandoned in 
pits or buried. Cardinal Tumi, the Archbishop of Douala, estimated the 
total number of extrajudicial killings committed by the Operational 
Command to be as high as 500.
    Credible reports by the press and the Maroua-based Movement for the 
Defense of Human Rights and Liberties (MDHRL), one of the few operating 
human rights organizations in the Far North Province, describe a large 
but undetermined number of extrajudicial killings perpetrated by a 
special antigang gendarmerie unit tasked with combating highwaymen. 
This unit was created under the direct authority of the Minister of 
Defense and operates outside the normal chain of command for law-and-
order units. While some armed suspects were killed in firefights with 
security forces, there were credible reports that others caught in 
dragnet operations were executed summarily. Families of the deceased 
and human rights NGO's have accused the head of this unit, Colonel Pom, 
of extrajudicial killings of local civilians. The MDHRL estimated that 
up to 1000 persons have been killed since the beginning of 1998. The 
Government's National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF) 
corroborated this information, although it was unable to determine the 
exact number of persons killed, since many of the victims' families are 
too frightened to speak with human rights groups. At least one private 
newspaper, the Yaoundebased triweekly Mutations, also reported in 1998 
that security forces summarily executed hundreds of alleged highway 
robbers in northern areas of the country during recent years.
    Numerous prisoners died in custody due to abuse inflicted by 
members of the security forces or harsh prison conditions and 
inadequate medical treatment (see Section 1.c.).
    In November 1999, the U.N. released a report by the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, Nigel Rodley, regarding his visit to the country 
in May 1999. In this report, Rodley noted that torture and long-term 
detention is widespread. He also commented on deaths resulting from 
torture and extrajudicial killings, primarily in the Far North Province 
(see Sections 1.c. and 4), but he did not provide any specific examples 
of such deaths.
    In November the Government announced plans to investigate alleged 
killings by the Douala Operational Command. In the fall, the National 
Human Rights Commission, under the Prime Minister, sent teams to Douala 
to investigate. Although two reports were produced for the President 
and the Prime Minister, there are no plans to release the reports 
publicly.
    There were no known developments in the following 1999 cases: The 
January 1999 killing of Yves Atiback by a gendarme captain; the 
February 1999, killing of three Fulani shepherds by villagers acting on 
the orders of the Fon of Bali; the March 1999 killing of Denis Nzidchen 
by prison guards; the September 1999 beating death of Theopole Mbasi 
Ombe by three members of the presidential guard; the October 1999 
beating death of Frederic Djomeli by police in the Haut-Nkam division.
    On April 12, the Yaounde higher court sentenced police officer 
Francois Bilongo to seven years in jail and $10,000 in damages for the 
1998 killing of Leonard Fouda. In May Police Constable Kuete Pierre was 
convicted and sentenced to 14 years in prison for the June 1998 police 
shooting of truck driver Jean-Marie Penga at a roadblock in Douala.
    There were no known developments in three open 1998 cases: The 
reported January 1998 police killing of Serge Francois Massoma; the 
June 1998 police killing of a 17-year-old male during racial violence 
against whites in Yaounde. Two gendarmes reportedly facing manslaughter 
charges in connection with the 1998 killing of an Anglophone barkeeper 
who died while in detention, reportedly as a result of torture, 
remained in detention at year's end.
    There continued to be no developments in the 1997 security force 
killing of Faustin Fetsogo and the killing of five persons in 1997 
during opposition politician Koulagne Nana's election campaign 
following a skirmish with the forces of a traditional ruler loyal to 
the ruling party.
    While ethnic conflicts caused deaths in previous years (see 
Sections 1.c. and 5), there were no reports of such deaths during the 
year.
    Mob violence and summary justice directed against suspected thieves 
and those suspected of practicing witchcraft and other crimes 
reportedly continued to result in a number of deaths and serious 
injuries. Although the number of reported cases of mob killings had 
diminished in past years, increased crime in the major cities of Douala 
and Yaounde caused a rise in such incidents during the year. On April 
5, a thief was stripped naked, beaten unconscious, and burned alive by 
a mob. On March 9, a mob reportedly killed two suspected thieves by 
burning tires around their necks. On April 14, a crowd of citizens in 
Buea, Southwest Province, beat to death Jean-Paul Kamdem and Alfred 
Mbakwa Fowa, alleged members of a gang that stole electronic items from 
a businessman's home (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were reports of disappearances of persons 
in the custody of security forces. Some disappearances may be 
attributed to summary executions by security forces in Douala or the 
northern regions (see Section 1.a.); in these instances, bodies rarely 
are found, although the suspects are presumed dead.
    On May 9, plain clothes security officials in Mamfe, Manyu 
Division, Southwest Province, searched the homes of John Enow, Joseph 
Tafong, Chief Assam, Mathias Takunchung, and several others, without 
search warrants. The victims' families have neither seen nor heard from 
the victims since that time, and believe that the security forces 
summarily executed them. In a letter written on May 12 and sent to the 
National Human Rights Commission, the families claim that more than 30 
people have disappeared in Mamfe under similar circumstances. According 
to the commission, four persons still were missing at year's end.
    In August 10 of the 13 refugees from Equatorial Guinea detained at 
a military base since 1998 left for refugee resettlement in another 
country (see Section 1.d.). Three refugees disappeared before they 
could depart; however, they were believed to have returned voluntarily 
to Equatorial Guinea or to have established unofficial residence in the 
country.
    The Government did not initiate any public investigation into any 
of these disappearances by year's end, nor did the Government 
investigate the 1998 disappearances of Chadian refugees Jim Temba and 
El Hadj Bakeye, Chadian herders, or the truck driver Mahamat Oumar.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Penal Code proscribes torture, renders inadmissible in 
court evidence obtained thereby, and prohibits public servants from 
using undue force against any person; however, although President Biya 
also promulgated a law in 1997 that bans torture by government 
officials, there were numerous credible reports that security forces, 
including the Operational Command, continued to torture, beat, and 
otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees. There were reports that 
security forces, including the Operational Command, detained persons at 
specific sites where they tortured and beat detainees (see Section 
1.d.). The Operational Command reportedly tortured some persons before 
summarily executing them (see Section 1.a.). The U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, Nigel Rodley, in his report on the country 
released in November 1999, stated that torture was widespread and used 
indiscriminately against persons under arrest or detained. Security 
forces also reportedly subjected women, children, and elderly people to 
ill-treatment. Most cases apparently were not reported to the relevant 
authorities because of ignorance, lack of confidence, or fear of 
reprisals on the part of the victims and their families. In New Bell 
and other nonmaximum-security penal detention centers, beatings are 
common and prisoners reportedly are chained or flogged at times in 
their cells. However, the authorities often administer beatings not in 
prison facilities, but in temporary detention areas in a police or 
gendarme facility. Two forms of physical abuse commonly reported to be 
inflicted on detainees include the ``bastinade,'' in which the victim 
is beaten on the soles of the feet, and the ``balancoire,'' in which 
the victim, with his hands tied behind his back, is hung from a rod and 
beaten, often on the genitals. Nonviolent political activists often 
have been subjected to such punitive physical abuse during brief 
detentions following roundups of participants in antigovernment 
demonstrations or opposition party political rallies.
    Security forces subjected prisoners and detainees to degrading 
treatment that includes stripping, confinement in severely overcrowded 
cells, and denial of access to toilets or other sanitation facilities. 
Police and gendarmes often beat detainees to extract confessions and 
the names and whereabouts of alleged criminals. In his report, U.N. 
Special Rapporteur Rodley noted that the Government increasingly was 
moving toward punishing offenders, but that ``some of those 
incriminated act out of ignorance and others out of pure habit, for 
they have regularly acted that way for a long time without fear of any 
consequences.'' Pretrial detainees sometimes were required, under 
threat of abuse, to pay so-called ``cell fees'' (essentially a bribe to 
the prison guards to prevent further abuse).
    On January 27, security forces intervened in a student strike at 
the University of Douala (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). The police used 
water cannons and nightsticks on the students, which resulted in eight 
injuries; police also beat several students severely.
    On January 28, four gendarmes reportedly arrested and tortured 
customs inspector Vincent Nkengfua, who they suspected of kidnaping a 
child. The gendarmes also arrested, detained, and tortured all the 
workers at Nkengfua's plantation in Mbanga, including a child (see 
Section 1.d.). In September Nkengfua filed a lawsuit against the 
gendarmes with the Mbanga High Court for abuse of power, arbitrary 
arrest and seizure of property, false evidence, calumny, and torture. 
The status of the lawsuit was unknown at year's end.
    On March 27, a crowd dragged Jean-Paul Kentsa to the Tsinga 
gendarmerie station in Yaounde after a woman claimed that he had tried 
to kidnap her 7-year-old son. After listening to the woman's statement, 
a gendarme began beating Kentsa, without allowing Kentsa to tell his 
side of the story. According to a witness, the gendarme tied his arms 
and legs and subjected him to ``balancoire'' torture for over half an 
hour. When a crowd formed to watch the beating, the gendarme beat two 
of the onlookers without cause using a machete.
    On April 6, police officers beat to death Emmanuel Ebanda, a porter 
at the Douala International Airport (see Section 1.a.). The police are 
investigating the case, though no charges have been filed against the 
officers.
    On April 20, government security forces reportedly attacked the 
parish of Notre Dame de Sept Douleurs in Douala during a Mass. Security 
forces reportedly arrested some parishioners and beat others (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    On April 27, a gendarme officer serving at the mobile gendarmerie 
unit, Abessolo-Abessolo, assaulted, beat, and seriously injured Nico 
Ajong in Ajong's tailoring store in the Yaounde neighborhood of Ngoa-
Ekelle. The gendarme entered Ajong's workshop, demanded the identity 
cards of Ajong and a customer, and pocketed Ajong's identity card. When 
Ajong asked why the gendarme had taken his identity card, Abessolo-
Abessolo began beating Ajong on the face and body. A medical report 
indicated that the resulting injuries incapacitated Ajong for 21 days.
    On April 27, Bessala, a soldier on patrol in the Yaounde 
neighborhood of Coron, shot Cecile Ngono. Ngono was a passenger in a 
taxicab that did not stop at a police checkpoint, and when Bessala shot 
at the car, he hit and wounded Ngono.
    In April a gendarme in Limbe, Southwest Province, beat and tortured 
a foreign volunteer teaching at the government bilingual high school. 
The gendarme interrogated the volunteer about his connections with the 
Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), an organization which calls 
for secession of the two English-speaking Anglophone provinces.
    On May 1, Dieudonne Dibong, a police officer, shot at a Yaounde cab 
after the cab ignored his traffic directions, seriously wounding the 
driver and the occupants of the vehicle. The General Delegate for 
National Security (DGSN) ordered disciplinary sanctions, and the 
Government arrested Dibong, whose trial was pending at year's end.
    On May 23, police and gendarmes forcibly dispersed a demonstration 
by students of the University of Yaounde, in which students protested 
the poor road conditions that killed 14 persons in a May 17 bus 
accident (see Section 2.b.). Police arrested approximately 50 students 
and severely beat several of them (see Section 1.d.).
    On May 23, gendarmes at the NDOP brigade in the Northwest Province 
arrested and detained Mathew Titiahonjo, Nathaniel Ntam, John Nivame, 
and several others (see Section 1.d.), and beat and tortured Titiahonjo 
and Nivame. One of the gendarmes claimed he suspected the men of 
belonging to a group of bandits who reportedly accosted him on May 19, 
seized his gun, pulled off his shoes, and tied him to a palm tree. 
According to the victims, Nivame caught the gendarme asleep with 
Nivame's girlfriend and stole the gendarme's shoes and gun in 
retaliation. On September 14, Titiahonjo died in prison reportedly from 
torture (see Section 1.a.); the Prime Minister released the remaining 
nine on October 31.
    On May 25, officers of the GSO police unit arrested Madeleine Ngo 
Songane, the sister of an alleged bandit. They took her to their 
headquarters and beat her violently in an effort to extract information 
on the whereabouts of her brother.
    On May 28, the same GSO police officers in Yaounde who tortured 
Edouard Leuwat to death (see Section 1.a.), arrested and tortured 
Achille Tchoumba Heubo, also in an effort to extract a confession 
concerning the officer's lost gun.
    On May 29, Edouard Leuwat, a Yaounde taxicab driver, died in 
custody as a result of torture by police officers from the Yaounde 
special operation grouping (GSO) (see Section 1.a.). The Government 
arrested eight police officers involved in the case and charged them 
with ``torture having resulted in death.'' On June 20, the Government 
transferred the eight to the Yaoundebased Kondengui Central Prison, 
where they were awaiting trial at year's end.
    In June in Ndop, Northwest Province, a gendarme who had lost his 
gun enlisted the support of his brigade to search for the weapon 
without a warrant. Press reports indicated the gendarmes ransacked 
homes and business, assaulting citizens in the process (see Section 
1.f.).
    On the night of June 7, a police patrol from the Yaounde 8 police 
district arrested and beat Beatrice Elouga for failing to carry her 
national identity card (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
    In early June, a gendarme officer identified as Okala, alias 
Tohmugwah, threw a hand grenade into a bar at Belo, Northwest Province, 
wounding several people. Okala apparently was angry with Amina 
Nyonghabi, the bartender, who wanted the gendarme to pay the bill for 
the drinks he had consumed. The previous day, the same gendarme slapped 
Nyonghabi in the face twice when she requested that he pay his bar 
bill.
    In early June, soldiers at a military garrison near the intendance 
roundabout in Yaounde brutalized and stripped naked Amelie, a young 
female soccer player with ``Canon-filles,'' a Yaounde-based soccer 
team. Amelie was returning home with her boyfriend when the soldiers 
demanded her identification. The gendarmes accused her of holding a 
fake national identity card with a female name, and, after beating 
Amelie, the soldiers decided to strip her naked publicly to verify her 
gender, only to realize that she had spoken the truth and her identity 
card was authentic.
    On July 27, Police Commissioner Theophile Tocko arrested Magloire 
Evouta, a businessman, at a Yaounde hotel. Evouta, who suffered from a 
chronic illness, was denied medical treatment and died at the Yaounde 
judicial police station on August 2. On August 28, the President 
dismissed Tocko from his position; Tocko was arrested and in detention 
pending trial at year's end.
    On September 12, members of the Operational Command unit of the 
Mboppi Brigade allegedly raped two young girls. The girls reportedly 
were detained because their identification papers were damaged 
partially by water.
    On November 13, security forces forcibly dispersed a march by 
opposition SDF parliamentarians in Yaounde (see Sections 2.b. and 3). 
Security forces arrested several marchers, seized journalists' cameras, 
and beat one journalist (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    Security forces harassed and threatened journalists (see Section 
2.a.). For example, on April 15 and 16, a gendarme patrol detained Alex 
Lembe, a journalist with Afrik Netpress, and demanded his identity card 
(see Section 2.a.). When the patrol commander realized he was a 
journalist, he insulted Lembe, beat him, and held him overnight.
    Security forces frequently used roadblocks to exact bribes or 
thwart opposition political activities (see Section 2.d.).
    In the vast majority of cases of torture or abuse, the Government 
rarely investigated or punished any of the security officials involved.
    Seke Columban, the police commissioner in Guider, North Province, 
beat Madi Baddai while arresting him in a nightclub in September 1999, 
and during a subsequent 4-day detention, causing serious injuries. 
Although Madi Baddai filed charges against the commissioner, no action 
had been taken by year's end.
    At year's end, the Buea military tribunal was preparing to try the 
commander of the 11th Navy Battalion and two noncommissioned officers 
in connection with looting and alleged beatings and rapes of civilians 
by naval cadets in the Anglophone Southwest Province port of Limbe in 
November 1998. There were no developments in other 1998 cases of 
nonlethal violence by security forces.
    On June 16, the Yaounde Court of First Instance sentenced Leon 
Ongolo, a Yaounde police commissioner, to 6 months imprisonment, a $70 
(50,000 CFA) fine, and $450 (300,000 CFA) in victim damages, for 
brutalizing his neighbors over a dispute concerning electrical wiring 
in 1996.
    Mob violence directed against suspected thieves reportedly 
continued to result in a number of deaths, some because of beatings or 
torture (see Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Prisons are 
seriously overcrowded, unsanitary, and inadequate, especially outside 
major urban areas. Serious deficiencies in food, health care, and 
sanitation due to a lack of funds are common in almost all prisons, 
including in ``private prisons'' in the north operated by traditional 
rulers. U.N. Special Rapporteur Rodley described prison conditions in 
the country as ``universally appalling.'' Rodley also reported that: 
``overcrowding, unhygienic sanitation, lack of health care, and 
shortage of food, reportedly are the main failings in the Cameroonian 
prison system. These conditions cannot be blamed only on lack of 
financial or material resources, but also result from deliberate 
policies or serious neglect on the part of the relevant officials.'' 
Rodley wrote that these conditions are ``endangering the health and 
even the lives of the detainees.'' Prisoners are kept in dilapidated 
colonial-era prisons, where the number of detainees is four to five 
times the original capacity. Authorities confirmed to Rodley that one 
cell measuring 6 square meters housed 16 people; one prisoner stated 
that the cell sometimes held up to 23 people. Health and medical care 
almost are nonexistent, and prisoners' families are expected to provide 
food for their relatives in prison. Prison officials torture, beat, and 
otherwise abuse prisoners (see Section 1.c.). Rodley reported that the 
vast majority of those in detention had been tortured or abused. Rodley 
specified cases of machete beatings, toenails being ripped out, and 
victims shot by police who had received no medical attention. Prisoners 
routinely die due to harsh prison conditions and inadequate medical 
treatment. In Douala's New Bell Prison, there were only 7 water taps 
for a reported 3,500 prisoners; this contributed to poor hygiene, 
illness, and deaths. In New Bell and other nonmaximum-security penal 
detention centers, families are permitted to provide food and medicine 
to inmates; however, beatings are common. Prisoners reportedly are 
chained or flogged at times in their cells and often are denied 
adequate medical care. In April the new Minister of Territorial 
Administration and the new Secretary of State for Territorial 
Administration in charge of penitentiary administration visited Douala 
and Yaounde prisons. The Yaounde prison was so dirty that the Minister 
ordered the immediate release of funds for repainting. In Douala the 
Minister said that the prison would be improved with funding from a 
foreign government; however, the project had not been implemented fully 
by year's end.
    Credible press reports indicate that Douala's New Bell prison, 
originally built for 600 inmates, held more than 3,500 during the year, 
of which 2,000 were pre-trial detainees. A 1997 report on prison 
conditions indicated that Bertoua Prison, which was built to hold 50 
inmates, housed over 700 persons. The Kondengui Central Prison in 
Yaounde, constructed in 1967 to hold 1,500 inmates and equipped with 
only 16 toilets or showers and 400 beds, held approximately 3,300 
inmates, including 700 women during the year. In 1999 the government 
official in charge of prisons said that the Central Prison of 
Bafoussam, built for 320 inmates, held 3,140 persons. Press reports 
indicate that the Bamenda Central Prison, built for 300 inmates, 
currently holds 900 persons, approximately 750 of whom are pre-trial 
detainees. Overcrowding is exacerbated by the large number of long 
pretrial detentions and the practice of ``Friday arrests'' (see Section 
1.d.). According to credible press reports, more than 1,400 of the 
inmates of the Douala prison were pretrial detainees, whereas only 900 
were convicted prisoners.
    Juveniles and nonviolent prisoners often are incarcerated with 
adults, although not usually in the same cells. There are credible 
reports of sexual abuse of juvenile prisoners by adult inmates. 
Corruption among prison personnel is widespread. Persons awaiting trial 
routinely are held in cells with hardened criminals. There are few 
detention centers for women; women routinely are held in prison 
complexes with men, occasionally in the same cells. Mothers often are 
incarcerated with their children or babies. The U.N. Special Rapporteur 
on Torture reported that he saw at least one 14-year-old child being 
kept with adult offenders, one woman being held in the same cell as 
male prisoners, and one woman incarcerated with her 9-month-old child. 
Some high-profile prisoners are able to avoid some of the abuse that 
security forces routinely inflict on many common criminals. They are 
kept in elite wings of certain prisons, where they enjoy relatively 
lenient treatment.
    On March 14, a group of detainees in the Douala Central Prison 
addressed a letter to the governor of the Littoral Province, 
complaining about the conditions of their detention. They charged that 
many prisoners must sleep on the ground and without shelter from rain 
due to lack of floor space within the crowded prison.
    Numerous NGO's, diplomatic missions, and the NCHRF all have 
criticized publicly the conditions of the group of Anglophone detainees 
arrested in 1997. One reliable report described 28 detainees sharing a 
cell measuring 14 square meters (about 140-square feet). At least eight 
of the original detainees reportedly have died from abuse or lack of 
medical care: Emmanuel Konseh, Samuel Tita, Mathias Gwei, Neba Ambe, 
Mado Nde, Richard Fomusoh Ngwa, Patrick Jimbou, and Lawrence Fai.
    In the north, the Government permits traditional Lamibe (chiefs) to 
detain persons outside the government penitentiary system, in effect in 
``private prisons.'' The places of detention in the palaces of the 
traditional chiefs of Rey Bouba, Gashiga, Bibemi, and Tcheboa have the 
reputation of seriously mistreating their inmates. Members of the 
National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) party, which was an 
opposition party until late 1997, have alleged that other UNDP members 
have been detained in these private jails and that some have died from 
mistreatment.
    Both the Cameroonian Red Cross and the NCHRF visited prisons only 
infrequently during the year. However, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) began to visit prisons in March 1999, pursuant to 
a December 1998 agreement with the Government under which the ICRC was 
to have free access to all detention centers and prisons, have private 
discussions with the inmates, and make repeated or unscheduled visits 
(see Section 4). Although the ICRC does not release its findings 
publicly, the Government generally complied with its agreement with the 
ICRC, which had not conducted prison visits in the country during the 
previous 7 years due to dissatisfaction with the limited access allowed 
by the Government. However, despite government assurances to the 
contrary, officials denied U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights 
Rodley access in May 1999 to holding cells operated by the Government's 
special antigang unit (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Penal Code requires 
an arrest warrant for any arrest, except when the criminal is caught in 
the act; however, security forces continued to arrest and detain 
citizens arbitrarily. The Penal Code also stipulates that detainees 
must be brought promptly before a magistrate; however, arbitrary, 
prolonged detention remained a serious problem, as security forces 
often failed to bring detainees promptly before a magistrate and 
sometimes held them incommunicado for months or even years.
    Police legally may detain a person in custody in connection with a 
common crime for up to 24 hours, renewable three times, before bringing 
charges. However, the law provides for the right to a judicial review 
of the legality of detention only in the two Anglophone provinces. 
Elsewhere, the French legal tradition applies, precluding judicial 
authorities from acting on a case until the administrative authority 
that ordered the detention turns the case over to the prosecutor. After 
a magistrate has issued a warrant to bring the case to trial, he may 
hold the detainee in administrative or ``pretrial detention'' 
indefinitely, pending court action. Such detention often is prolonged, 
due to the understaffed and mismanaged court system. According to U.N. 
Special Rapporteur Rodley, 80 percent of the prison population consists 
of untried prisoners. Rodley wrote that the length of pre-trial 
detention, often stretching as long as 7 years, makes it ``inhuman in 
itself.'' In addition Rodley claimed that ``pretrial detention is used 
not to attain its primary goal of upholding order and security and 
facilitating investigation, but rather, in the perception both of the 
public and of the forces of law and order, as a sanction.'' 
Furthermore, a 1990 law permits detention without charge by 
administrative authorities for renewable periods of 15 days, ostensibly 
in order to combat banditry and maintain public order. Persons taken 
into detention frequently are denied access to both legal counsel and 
family members. The law permits release on bail only in the Anglophone 
provinces, where the legal system includes features of British common 
law; however, bail is granted infrequently in those provinces.
    There were reports that security forces, including the Operational 
Command, detained persons at specific sites where they tortured and 
beat detainees (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    Government officials and security forces continued to use arbitrary 
arrest to harass and intimidate members of opposition parties and other 
critics of the Government.
    On January 7, gendarmes in Limbe arrested and briefly detained 23 
people who were looking at a flag hoisted by SCNC secessionists without 
pulling it down. Gendarmes retained the identity cards of 19, telling 
them to come back on January 10 to retrieve them. When they did so, the 
gendarmes photographed the individuals before releasing them with their 
identity cards.
    On January 8 and 9, in Limbe, Southwest Province, the Government 
arrested a group of demonstrating members of the SCNC (see Section 
2.b.). The Government released all of the detainees except Justice 
Frederick Ebong, Chief Ayumba, and James Sam Sabum, three of the 
group's leaders. The Government did not charge them with any crime, but 
it transferred them from Limbe to Buea and then to the underground 
Yaounde prison cells of the Secretariat of State for Defense, where 
they were awaiting trial on unspecified charges by the state security 
court at year's end. On May 9, the Buea High Court ruled against a 
motion for bail for the three SCNC leaders, stating the court lacked 
jurisdiction over the case.
    On January 9, gendarmes of the Nkongsamba (Littoral Province) 
brigade arrested Sylvestre Tchakoutio, a political activist and member 
of the opposition Union of Cameroon Democratic Forces (UFDC), on 
unspecific charges. On January 12, three gendarmes searched his 
residence without a search warrant (see Section 1.f.). On January 18, 
during questioning by the brigade commander, Tchakoutio learned that an 
anonymous false report to the Government's senior divisional officer of 
Mungo Division claimed that Tchakoutio was hiring people to engage in 
operations to destabilize the Government. The gendarmes released 
Tchakoutio on January 30 when they found no evidence to support the 
accusations.
    On January 27, security forces intervened in a student strike at 
the University of Douala (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Several 
students, including one of the strike's leaders, Guy Simon Ngakam, were 
arrested and detained for 2 days.
    The Government continued to harass and arrest a high-profile Douala 
political activist, Mboua Massok. On January 27, Douala police arrested 
Mboua Massok near the Douala University campus for his apparent support 
of the January 18 student strike (see Section 2.b.). The gendarmes 
released him without charge or trial on March 16. On April 11, members 
of the Douala gendarmerie again detained Massok for several hours 
regarding a human rights essay he published (see Section 2.a.).
    On January 28, four gendarmes reportedly arrested and tortured 
customs inspector Vincent Nkengfua, who they suspected of kidnaping a 
child, and all the workers at Nkengfua's plantation in Mbanga, 
including a child (see Section 1.c.). In September Nkengfua filed a 
lawsuit against the gendarmes with the Mbanga High Court for abuse of 
power, arbitrary arrest and seizure of property, false evidence, 
calumny, and torture.
    In March the Prefet (Senior Divisional Officer) of Bangangte, Nd 
Division, West Province, ordered the arrest of Catherine Yami and Roger 
Tankeu, respectively the SDF president for the Basssamba electoral 
district, and the SDF West provincial coordinator (see Section 2.b.). 
The two leaders had tried to prevent gendarmes from dispersing a 
meeting in the district.
    On March 20, security forces raided the palace of Fon Omer Tawun, 
the traditional ruler of Chup, in Nkambe, Northwest Province, under the 
suspicion that he was storing illegal weapons (see Section 1.f.). 
Although security forces found no weapons or ammunitions, they arrested 
Fon Tawun, Moses Khan (treasurer of division), and Francis Adamu 
(second deputy town mayor). Security forces detained the three for 2 
days in the town jail, then transferred them to the gendarmerie legion 
in Bamenda, where they questioned and released them.
    On April 20, government security forces reportedly attacked the 
parish of Notre Dame de Sept Douleurs in Douala during a Mass. Security 
forces reportedly arrested some parishioners and beat others (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.c.).
    On April 21 and 22, security forces arrested and detained briefly 
hundreds of SCNC supporters and sympathizers in the towns of Kumba and 
Muyuka, Southwest Province. The arrests, ordered by the Southwest 
Province governor, were based on allegations that the SCNC was 
considering overthrowing the Province's officials.
    On May 10, plainclothes policeman in Mamfe, Manyu Division, 
Southwest Province, arrested without warrants Mathias Takunchung Ebai, 
Daniel Akwo, John Enow, Tambong, and four other members of the SDF. The 
police transferred them to the gendarmerie legion in Buea, where 
gendarmes questioned them for 3 days concerning their support for the 
SCNC before releasing them on May 13.
    On May 23, gendarmes at the NDOP brigade in the Northwest Province 
arrested and detained Mathew Titiahonjo, Nathaniel Ntam, John Nivame, 
and several others, and beat and tortured Titiahonjo and Nivame (see 
Section 1.c.). On September 14, Titiahonjo died in prison reportedly 
from torture; the Prime Minister released the remaining nine on October 
31.
    On May 23, police and gendarmes forcibly dispersed a demonstration 
by students of the University of Yaounde, in which students protested 
the poor road conditions that killed 14 persons in a May 17 bus 
accident (see Section 2.b.). Police arrested approximately 50 students 
and severely beat several of them (see Section 1.c.). The students were 
released on May 25.
    On the night of June 7, a police patrol from the Yaounde 8 police 
district arrested and beat Beatrice Elouga for failing to carry her 
national identity card (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
    On August 24, gendarmes released Bassy Okon Edet, a Nigerian 
fisherman, after a 7-day incarceration. Edet apparently was fishing in 
the Atlantic Ocean near the disputed Bakassi Peninsula when gendarmes 
in the region picked him up, permanently seizing his fishing boat, 
fishing nets, and clothes. Edet claims that the gendarmes blindfolded 
him, did not feed him, and forced him to do labor during his 
incarceration (see Section 6.c.); the fisherman claims that other 
Nigerians remain in the same detention camp.
    In November the Prefet of Dschang arrested two union leaders 
allegedly because of an unsigned labor agreement (see Section 6.a.); 
ten others also were questioned. All 12 were released the next day.
    On November 13, security forces forcibly dispersed a march by 
opposition SDF parliamentarians in Yaounde (see Sections 2.b. and 3). 
Security forces arrested several marchers, seized journalists' cameras 
(see Section 2.a.), and beat one journalist (see Section 1.c.).
    Security forces harassed and occasionally detained journalists and 
beat demonstrators and members of human rights NGO's (see Sections 2.a. 
and 2.b.). For example, in late June, police commissioner Jean-Joel 
Ondo, from the central provincial judicial police, detained for 2 hours 
two journalists of the Douala-based French-language tri-weekly 
newspaper, La Nouvelle Expression. According to the journalists, the 
commissioner arrested them for chatting with two young women who were 
close to the commissioner. The commissioner also ordered the two women 
brought to the police station, where police beat one of them severely 
(see Section 1.c.).
    Many of the public officials arrested in 1999 in the Government's 
high-profile but short-lived corruption crack-down still were awaiting 
trial at year's end. In September and October 1999, the Government 
arrested these officials, including former Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications Monchipou Seidou, Ministry Budget Director Guillaume 
Yetna Hiobi, and Ministry Director of Production Philip Tarkang, on 
charges of corruption or embezzlement.
    On March 3, political activist Sanda Oumarou was released from 
jail; he had been held without formal charges or judicial proceedings 
since July 1999.
    In 1997 government security forces detained 13 former senior 
military officers of Equatorial Guinea who had been granted refugee 
status by the UNHCR and had lived in the country for 4 years. In 1998 
these 13 officers, who were affiliated with an Equato-Guinean 
opposition party and included Alfonso Mba Nsogo, former head of the 
Equato-Guinean military, contested the Government's assertion that it 
had arrested them for their own protection. In August 10 of the 13 
refugees from Equatorial Guinea detained at a military base since 1998 
left for refugee resettlement in another country. Three refugees 
disappeared before they could depart (see Section 1.b.); however, they 
were believed to have returned voluntarily to Equatorial Guinea or to 
have established unofficial residence in the country.
    Nana Koulagne, a former member of the National Assembly and UNDP 
activist, has remained in prison in Garoua since May 1997, when members 
of the security forces attacked and arrested him and other activists of 
the then-opposition UNDP while he was campaigning for election in the 
North Province. On July 17, after more than 3 years in detention, the 
Garoua Military Tribunal formally charged Koulagne with complicity in 
assassination, group looting, arson, and desecrating cadavers. On 
August 31, the Garoua Military Tribunal sentenced Koulange to 3 years 
in prison, counted as time served in detention. He was released on 
August 31. No members of the Lamido's traditional guard, who also were 
involved in the incident, were charged with a crime.
    The Government continues to incarcerate illegally Nda Yinzi 
Ousmanou, Pierre Mbock, Jules Zoa, Ambadiang Adebada, and Michel Kamga. 
The Government arrested the five on April 30, 1996, on charges of 
aggravated theft, illegal possession of firearms, and forgery. Despite 
an October 1997 Douala court ruling of innocence and a court order to 
release the men, the Government refuses to let them out of prison. Nda 
Yinzi Ousmanou died on November 21, 1998, and the other four remain 
incarcerated.
    Four Anglophones, Abel Achah Apong, Crispus Kennebie, John Kudi, 
and Zacque Njenta, have been detained in the Yaounde Central Prison 
since 1995, and a fifth, Etchu Wilson Arrey, since 1997. Each was 
incarcerated after signing or displaying a petition for a referendum on 
independence for the Anglophone provinces. At year's end, none of these 
detainees had been brought before a judge or charged with a crime.
    Police and gendarmes often arrest persons on spurious charges on 
Fridays at mid-day or in the afternoon (see Section 1.c.). While the 
law provides for a judicial review of an arrest within 24 hours, the 
courts do not convene sessions on the weekend, so the detainee remains 
in prison at least until Monday. Police and gendarmes commonly accept 
bribes to make such ``Friday arrests'' from persons who have private 
grievances against the person arrested. There are no known cases of any 
policemen or gendarmes being sanctioned or punished for this practice.
    Government intimidation extends beyond the police stations and 
holding cells. In efforts to combat highwaymen (``coupeurs de route''), 
Colonel Pom and his special antigang gendarmerie unit (see Section 
1.a.) use informants to identify and accuse persons of taking part in 
highway robbery. Standards of proof for such accusations are 
nonexistent. Accusations occasionally have been used to pursue private 
grievances, and informants repeatedly have extorted money from innocent 
persons by threatening to accuse them of being bandits. The Douala 
Operational Command reportedly uses informants in a similar fashion. 
These informants often are former criminals or prison guards, and are 
used to target criminals who are then summarily executed (see Section 
1.a.).
    The Government does not use forced exile; however, some human 
rights monitors or political opponents who considered themselves 
threatened by the Government have left the country voluntarily and 
declared themselves to be in political exile.
    On April 11, the traditional rulers of Ekondo-Titi, Southwest 
Province, acting under the authority of the Balondo Development 
Association (BACUDA), ordered the expulsion of Iyassa Anou, Joseph 
Regeant, Johnson Mambo Naseri, Mathew Ajong Awor, Christian Buma, 
Francisca Nyando, and James Okenye, for allegedly bewitching to death a 
resident of the town of Lobe; however, the order to expel the seven was 
not implemented by year's end. BACUDA was investigating the charges of 
alleged witchcraft at year's end.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary remains highly subject to 
political influence and corruption. The court system remains 
technically part of the executive branch, subordinate to the Ministry 
of Justice. The Constitution specifies that the President is the 
guarantor of the legal system's independence. He also appoints judges 
with the advice of the Supreme Council of the Magistrature. However, 
during the 1990's, elements of the judiciary began to show some modest 
signs of growing independence. Since 1997 the courts repeatedly have 
used powers given them under the 1996 press law to order the Ministry 
of Territorial Administration to desist from seizing print runs of 
newspapers critical of the Government. In 1999 an appeals court 
overturned a criminal libel conviction of journalists on the grounds 
that it violated 1990 legislation providing for freedom of the press 
(see Section 2.a.); however, some politically sensitive cases never are 
heard.
    The court system includes the Supreme Court, a court of appeals in 
each of the 10 provinces, and courts of first instance in each of the 
country's 58 divisions.
    Military tribunals may exercise jurisdiction over civilians not 
only when the President declares martial law, but also in cases 
involving civil unrest or organized armed violence. A law on the 
organization of the judiciary promulgated in 1998 also transferred to 
military tribunals jurisdiction over gang crimes, grand banditry, and 
highway robbery. The Government apparently interprets these guidelines 
quite broadly and sometimes uses military courts to try matters 
concerning dissident groups and political opponents.
    The legal system includes both national law and customary law, and 
many cases can be tried using either. Customary law is based upon the 
traditions of the ethnic group predominant in the region and is 
adjudicated by traditional authorities of that group. Accordingly, 
particular points of customary law differ depending upon the region and 
the ethnic group where a case is being tried. In some areas, 
traditional courts reportedly have tried persons accused of some 
offenses, such as practicing witchcraft, by subjecting them to an 
ordeal, such as drinking poison (see Section 2.c.); however, there were 
no known incidents during the year. Customary courts may exercise 
jurisdiction only with the consent of both parties to a case; either 
party has the right to have any case heard by a national rather than a 
customary court, and customary law is supposed to be valid only when it 
is not ``repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience.'' 
However, many citizens in rural areas remain unaware of their rights 
under civil law and have been taught since birth that customary laws 
form the rules by which they must abide. Consequently, traditional 
courts remain important in rural areas and serve as an alternative for 
settling disputes. Their authority varies by region and ethnic group, 
but they often are the arbiters of property and domestic disputes and 
may serve a probate function as well. Most traditional courts permit 
appeal of their decisions to traditional authorities of higher rank.
    Corruption and inefficiency in the courts remain serious problems. 
Justice frequently is delayed or denied before reaching the trial stage 
(see Section 1.d.). Political bias often brings trials to a halt or 
results in an extremely long process, punctuated by extended court 
recesses. Powerful political or business interests appear to enjoy 
virtual immunity from prosecution; some politically sensitive cases are 
settled with a payoff and thus never are heard. Private journalists, 
political opponents, and critics of the Government often are charged or 
held and sometimes jailed under libel statutes considered by observers 
as unduly restrictive of press freedom (see Section 2.a.). Prisoners 
may be detained indefinitely during pretrial proceedings.
    The legal structure is influenced strongly by the French legal 
system, although in the Anglophone provinces certain aspects of the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition apply. The Constitution provides for a fair 
public hearing in which the defendant is presumed innocent. Because 
appointed attorneys receive little compensation, the quality of legal 
representation for indigent persons is often poor. The Bar Association 
and some voluntary organizations, such as the Cameroonian Association 
of Female Jurists, offer free assistance in some cases. Trials are 
normally public, except in cases with political overtones judged 
disruptive of social peace.
    The Government holds a number of political prisoners; however, as 
in previous years, there were no reliable estimates of the number of 
political prisoners held at the end of the year.
    In April 1999, the Government began the trial of the 65 surviving 
Anglophones who had been detained, some for more than 2 years, on 
suspicion of participating in armed attacks against government 
installations in the Northwest Province in March 1997. This judicial 
process did not follow either international or national legal norms. In 
October 1999, the military tribunal convicted 37 of the accused, 
sentencing 3 to life imprisonment and 34 to terms ranging from 1 to 20 
years in prison. The tribunal acquitted 28 defendants, some of whom had 
been detained for 30 months, during which at least 8 of the persons 
originally arrested in this case died in custody, some of them as a 
result of torture inflicted on many of these detainees (see Section 
1.c.). At year's end, 19 of the Anglophones convicted remained in 
prison in Yaounde; the other 18 were released following the completion 
of their sentences. On November 6, the Government released four 
Anglophones, Abel Achah Apong, Crispus Kennebie, John Kudi, and Zacque 
Njenta, who had been in the Yaounde Central Prison since 1995, and a 
fifth, Etchu Wilson Arrey, since 1997. Each was incarcerated after 
signing or displaying a petition for a referendum on independence for 
the Anglophone provinces. The tribunal declared itself incompetent to 
rule on two accused illegal Ghanaian immigrants, who remain 
incarcerated. International human rights NGO's, including Amnesty 
International, criticized the trial as unfair and protested the 
sentences.
    Titus Edzoa, former Minister of Health and longtime presidential 
aide, who had declared himself a candidate to oppose incumbent 
President Biya in the 1997 election, remains incarcerated, together 
with Michel Atangana, his campaign manager. They were sentenced in 1997 
to 15 years' imprisonment on embezzlement and corruption charges, for 
which Edzoa was arrested shortly after declaring his presidential 
candidacy (see Section 3). In 1999 the Yaounde Court of Appeals 
confirmed their convictions and their 15-year prison terms. At year's 
end, Edzoa reportedly still was held in confinement at the maximum 
security gendarmerie headquarters, in cramped quarters with very 
limited access to visitors.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The preamble of the Constitution provides for the 
inviolability of the home, for protection against search except by 
virtue of law, and for the privacy of all correspondence; however, 
these rights are subject to the ``higher interests of the State,'' and 
there were a number of credible reports that police and gendarmes 
harassed citizens, conducted searches without warrants, and opened or 
seized mail. The Government continued to keep some opposition activists 
and dissidents under surveillance.
    The law permits a police officer to enter a private home during 
daylight hours without a warrant if he is pursuing an inquiry and has 
reason to suspect that a crime has been committed. The officer must 
have a warrant to make such a search after dark. However, a police 
officer may enter a private home at any time in pursuit of a criminal 
observed committing a crime.
    An administrative authority may authorize police to conduct 
neighborhood sweeps in search of suspected criminals or stolen or 
illegal goods without individual warrants. Such sweeps are conducted 
frequently. During the year, as in 1999, sweeps involving forced entry 
into homes occurred in Yaounde, Douala, Ekondo Titi, Maroua, and 
Kousser. An increase in crime during the year led to a dramatic 
increase in the number of such sweeps, called ``kali-kali'' or 
``raffles,'' in Douala and Yaounde. Government security forces also 
conducted neighborhood sweeps in Buea and Limbe. Typically, security 
forces seal off a neighborhood, systematically search homes, arrest 
persons arbitrarily, and seize suspicious or illegal articles. There 
were credible reports that security forces used these sweeps as a 
pretext to loot homes and arbitrarily arrest persons for minor 
offenses, such as not possessing identity cards (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.d.). In a June letter to government officials, the Catholic 
Archbishop of Douala stated that security forces arrested some parents 
during these operations, forcing them to leave babies or sick children 
alone at home.
    In the past, Government administrative officials have used the 
armed forces to conduct tax raids on civilian communities; however, the 
Government reportedly did not conduct any such raids this year. In the 
past, the Government publicly has blamed opposition parties for its 
inability to collect internal revenues, but it did not repeat such 
accusations this year.
    On January 12, three gendarmes of the Nkongsamba (Littoral 
Province) brigade searched the residence of Sylvestre Tchakoutio, a 
political activist, for guns without a search warrant. Tchakoutio had 
been arrested on January 9 (see Section 1.d.).
    On March 20, security forces, under instructions from the senior 
divisional officer, raided the palace of Fon Omer Tawun, the 
traditional ruler of Chup, in Nkambe, Northwest Province, under the 
suspicion that he was storing illegal weapons. Eyewitness accounts 
reported that security forces violated sacred places in the palace 
during the search, including the ``kwifon,'' which houses the 
traditional secret society of the village. Though security forces found 
no weapons or ammunitions, they arrested Fon Tawun, Moses Khan 
(treasurer of division), and Francis Adamu (second deputy town mayor) 
(see Section 1.d.).
    On May 7, a police officer by the name of Bahiga shot and killed 
Laurent Abbe in Yaounde during an allegedly illegal search of Abbe's 
friend's residence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
    In June in Ndop, Northwest Province, a gendarme who had lost his 
gun enlisted the support of his brigade to search for the weapon 
without a warrant. Press reports indicated the gendarmes ransacked 
homes and business, assaulting citizens in the process (see Section 
1.c.).
    Following the November 1999 destruction of the Kobba-Bonaberi 
neighborhood in Douala, some residents returned to the neighborhood in 
May and began to rebuild their homes. In June the authorities warned 
the returning residents to leave, or the Government would destroy their 
homes again. A few residents continue to maintain that they have valid 
permits to build homes.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression and of the press; however, the Government 
continued to impose limits on these rights. The Penal Code's libel laws 
specify that defamation, abuse, contempt and dissemination of false 
news are offenses punishable by prison terms and heavy fines. These 
statutes sometimes are invoked by the Government to silence criticism 
of the Government and government officials.
    While approximately 60 private newspapers were published, only 
about 20 were published on a regular basis. Most continued to be highly 
critical of President Biya, and his Government, and reported on 
controversial issues, including corruption, human rights abuses, and 
economic policies. Since the Government's 1994-95 crackdown on the 
private press, most private journalists have begun to practice a higher 
degree of fact checking and thus have increased journalistic accuracy. 
Journalists continue to be critical of the Government; however, some 
journalists practiced self-censorship.
    In 1996 the Government repealed the law that had authorized the 
Government both to censor private publications and extrajudicially to 
seize publications ``dangerous to public order,'' or suspend 
newspapers' publication licenses. Previously, the Government often had 
taken these extrajudicial actions to inflict economic damage on 
newspapers critical of the Government and had done so often during 
election years.
    Formal censorship ceased in 1997. Since 1998, the Government 
largely has ceased to interfere with private newspaper distribution or 
seize print runs of private newspapers; however, on May 10, the Prefet 
(Senior Divisional Officer) of Kumba, Meme Division, Southwest 
Province, signed an order to ban one issue of the Bamenda-based 
English-language publication Today in his district. The Prefet took the 
measure following an increase in the secessionist activities in the 
region, and increased reporting of such activities.
    Security forces continued frequently to restrict press freedom by 
harassing or abusing private print media journalists.
    The Government continued to harass and arrest the high-profile 
Douala political activist, Mboua Massok (see Section 2.b.). On April 
11, members of the Douala gendarmerie detained Massok for several hours 
regarding a human rights essay he published (see Section 1.d.).
    On April 15 and 16, a gendarme patrol detained Alex Lembe, a 
journalist with Afrik Netpress and formerly with Aurore Plus, a Douala-
based, French-language weekly newspaper. The patrol had stopped Lembe 
and demanded his identity card. When the patrol commander realized he 
was a journalist, he insulted Lembe, beat him, and held him overnight 
(see Section 1.c.).
    In late June, police commissioner Jean-Joel Ondo, from the central 
provincial judicial police, detained for 2 hours two journalists of the 
Douala-based French-language tri-weekly newspaper, La Nouvelle 
Expression (see Section 1.d.). According to the journalists, the 
commissioner arrested them for chatting with two young women who were 
close to the commissioner.
    On September 15, members of the Operational Command unit arrested 
three employees of Le Messager in Douala and detained them at the 
Mboppi gendarmerie camp (see Section 1.d.). They were released the 
following day without charges.
    On November 13, security forces forcibly dispersed a march by 
opposition SDF parliamentarians in Yaounde (see Sections 2.b. and 3). 
Security forces arrested several, seized journalists' cameras, and beat 
one journalist (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    From March through May, the Government harassed some newspapers 
through fiscal means. On April 30, the Center Provincial Taxes 
Department sealed the office of the Yaounde-based French-language 
newspaper, L'Anecdote, demanding that the paper pay tax arrears of 
$280,000 (200 million CFA). According to one newspaper, the move was 
prompted by an article the paper had published in September 1999, 
accusing the wife of a senior official of the Ministry of Finance of 
involvement in the embezzlement scandal at the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications, for which the Government later arrested her. On May 
19, the Government sealed the offices of the Douala-based French-
language publication Le Front Independent for one day due to non-
payment of taxes estimated at $21,000 (15 million CFA) by the Littoral 
Province Office of Taxation. In early June, the Government again sealed 
the paper's offices, claiming that arrears had jumped to $57,000 (40 
million CFA). The newspaper and the taxation office reportedly were 
negotiating a deal at year's end.
    Since 1996 the Government frequently has prosecuted its critics in 
the print media under the criminal libel laws. These laws authorized 
the Government, at its discretion and at the request of the plaintiff, 
to criminalize a civil libel suit, or to initiate a criminal libel suit 
in cases of alleged libel against the President and other high 
government officials. There continued to be allegations that government 
ministers and other high officials offered to drop criminal libel suits 
in exchange for cash payments from newspapers or journalists. During 
the year, the Government arrested, prosecuted, or convicted four 
members of the press on criminal libel charges. However, this practice 
declined in frequency and severity from previous years, apparently due 
in part to greater fact checking on the part of journalists.
    On April 3, the Bafoussam High Sentence Court sentenced Michel 
Eclador Pekoua, publisher of the Bafoussam-based French-language weekly 
newspaper Ouest Echoes to 6 months in jail and damages of $1150 
(800,000 CFA) for libel in a suit brought by Blanche Penda Ekoka, an 
employee of the national hydrocarbon company (SNH). On July 14, 1999, 
Ouest Echoes published a leaflet on behalf of a group of SNH employees, 
denouncing unjust working conditions and blaming the SNH General 
Manager and Penda Ekoka, said to be his girlfriend. In August 1999, 
Penda Ekoka's lawyer and the instructing magistrate demanded that 
Pekoua disclose the names of those who had written the leaflet. Pekoua 
refused, and the Government charged and convicted Pekoua with 
defamation, abuse (insulting expressions), and false reporting. On May 
2, after 30 days of detention in the Bafoussam Penitentiary, the judge 
granted provisional release to Pekoua, pending an appeal.
    On April 12, security forces arrested Severin Tchounkeu, publisher 
of the Douala-based French-language tri-weekly La Nouvelle Expression, 
and newspaper journalists Edmond Kamguia and Alain Bengono, and 
detained them in the cells of the Secretariat of State for Defense for 
3 days. The Government had filed a complaint against the paper for its 
March 31 ``April Fool's'' article that said that bandits attacked the 
gendarmerie station in Yaounde, seizing arms, and holding the gendarmes 
hostage. On April 14, the Government charged Tchounkeu and Bengono with 
``dissemination of false news'' and released them pending trial. The 
Government did not file charges against Edmond Kamguia.
    On July 19, a Douala court sentenced Daniel Atangana and Thierry 
Mbouza, two journalists of the Douala-based French-language biweekly 
Dikalo, to 6 months in prison. The publisher, Celestin Biake Difana, 
received a suspended 6-month prison term. The Douala court had 
convicted the journalists of defamation, false reporting, and the 
dissemination of false news charges, based upon Dikalo's 1998 
publication of a memorandum written by members of the National Union of 
Road Transporters (SNTR), denouncing the poor management of SNTR 
President Pierre Sime. Sime responded with a libel suit. The case was 
suspended and Dikalo was appealing previous judgments against the 
newspaper at year's end.
    No new developments were reported in the following 1999 criminal 
libel cases: The February 1999 criminal libel conviction of SDF Party 
Chairman Fru Ndi and journalists Severin Tchounkeu and Henriette Ekwe; 
the June 1999 sentencing of Severin Tchounkeu and Souley Onohiolo for 
libel and dissemination of false news; and the June 1999 sentencing of 
Anselme Mballa for criminal libel.
    The Government publishes an official newspaper, The Cameroon 
Tribune. This paper occasionally implies criticism of the Government; 
however, its reporters do not report extensively on activities or 
political parties critical of the Government, overtly criticize the 
ruling party, or portray government programs in an unfavorable light.
    Despite the large number of newspapers in the country, the 
influence of the print media on the average person is minimal. 
Circulation is low, distribution is problematic outside of Yaounde and 
Douala, and prices are high. Print media reaches only a tiny percentage 
of the population, most notably the urban elite. The Cameroon Tribune 
has a print run of only about 5,000; the four most important opposition 
papers Dikalo, Le Messager, Mutations, and Nouvelle Expression, have 
print runs of between 5,000 and 10,000 each.
    Radio remains the most important medium for reaching most citizens. 
There are approximately 2 million radios in the country. Television is 
less pervasive but is still more influential than the print media. 
There are an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 television sets in the 
country, and viewership is high, since many persons watch television in 
extended family groups or together in commercial establishments.
    On April 3, the Government issued a decree that implements the 1990 
law liberalizing the broadcast media and sets out the conditions and 
procedures for establishing independent radio and television stations. 
Rural radio stations must submit an application to broadcast but are 
exempt from fees. Potential commercial radio and television 
broadcasters must submit a licensing application and pay a fee when the 
application is approved. The annual licensing fees stipulated in the 
decree potentially are prohibitive: $15,600 (10 million CFA) for radio 
broadcasters, $73,000 (50 million CFA) for local television stations, 
and $146,000 (100 million CFA) for national television stations. 
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Communication received more than a hundred 
applications from potential broadcasters.
    Five Yaounde-based private radio stations that previously had been 
broadcasting illegally submitted applications and paid an interim fee 
of $727 (500,000 CFA). The Government authorized them to continue 
broadcasting, pending final approval of their application and 
subsequent payment of the full licensing fee. Of these stations, two 
are religious: The Pentecostal ``Radio Bonne Nouvelle'' and ``Radio 
Reine,'' which is managed by a Catholic priest, though not officially 
sponsored by the Catholic Church. Two others are affiliated with 
private non-accredited academic institutions: NDI Samba University's 
``Radio Lumiere'' and the Siantou University's ``Radio Siantou.'' The 
fifth station is ``Radio Venus,'' which plays only music. A small 
number of radio stations that had been broadcasting illegally including 
``Radio Soleil,'' which broadcasts from the Muslim quarter of Yaounde, 
did not apply for licenses, claiming the fees are too high. The 
Government has not yet acted against these operators.
    The state-owned Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) broadcasts on 
both television and radio and is currently the only officially-
recognized and fully-licensed broadcaster in the country. The 
Government levies taxes on all registered taxpayers to finance CRTV 
programming, giving it a distinct advantage over newly-competing 
independent broadcasters.
    There are several low-power, rural community radio stations mostly 
funded by foreign countries, with extremely limited range, which 
broadcast educational programs to small audiences but are not allowed 
to discuss politics. In addition this year's decree allows for 
broadcasting of foreign news services but requires them to form a 
partnership with a national station. Radio France International and the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) have announced their intention 
to work with CRTV and hope to begin broadcasting in 2001.
    During the year, the Government continued to allow the reception of 
international cable and satellite television broadcasts (see Section 
1.f.).
    Like the Cameroon Tribune, CRTV provides broad reporting of CPDM 
functions, while giving relatively little attention to the political 
opposition. CRTV management, which in the past repeatedly has 
instructed CRTV staff to ensure the Government views prevail at all 
times in CRTV broadcasts, continued during the year to punish CRTV 
journalists who criticized government policy. In late May, CRTV 
censored a program concerning the Douala Operational Command, the 
security unit instituted to fight Douala city crime. CRTV had started 
broadcasting the program, including portions that reported public 
allegations of arbitrary arrests, torture, and extortion. The 
Government censored the second part of the program before it was 
broadcast, allegedly because the first part had caused some 
embarrassment to the military hierarchy and the Government. In November 
CRTV suspended two journalists for broadcasting a program that 
criticized members of the ruling party for their lifestyles.
    CRTV television and radio programming include a weekly program, 
Expression Directe, which ostensibly fulfills the Government's legal 
obligation to provide an opportunity for all political parties 
represented in the National Assembly to present their views. However, 
CRTV continued to restrict the opposition SDF party's freedom of 
expression through that program, occasionally censoring and 
significantly shortening proposed SDF programming. For example, on 
March 9 and 22, the General Manager of CRTV censored SDF submissions, 
arguing that the content of the programs violated provisions of the 
law. Both CRTV and the SDF appealed to the National Council on 
Communication, the regulatory organ for communication, for support. 
There was no report of a ruling or decision by the National Council on 
Communication by year's end.
    High-tech communications, including the Internet, e-mail, and 
satellite phones, are not available or utilized widely; however, a few 
cybercafes provide occasional Internet or e-mail access in some urban 
areas. There are at least six domestic Internet service providers, one 
of which has been in operation for 3 years. Some are privately owned. 
The Government has not attempted to restrict or monitor these forms of 
communications.
    Although there are no legal restrictions on academic freedom, state 
security informants operate on university campuses. Many professors 
believe that adherence to opposition political parties can affect 
adversely their professional opportunities and advancement. Free 
political discussion at the University of Yaounde is dampened by the 
presence of armed government security forces. Security forces subjected 
Dr. Charley Mejame Ejede, a professor of philosophy at the University 
of Douala who is also national secretary of the Liberal Democratic 
Alliance political party, to prolonged harassment, presumably due to 
his political activism in previous years; however, there were no 
reports of such harassment during the year. Security forces forcibly 
dispersed some student protests during the year (see Section 2.b.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts this right 
in practice. The law requires organizers of public meetings, 
demonstrations, or processions to notify government officials in 
advance; it does not require prior government approval of public 
assemblies, and does not authorize the Government to suppress public 
assemblies that it has not approved in advance. However, for many years 
government officials routinely have asserted that this provision of the 
Penal Code implicitly authorizes the Government to grant or deny 
permission to public assemblies, often have not granted permits to 
assemblies organized by persons or groups critical of the Government, 
and repeatedly have used force to suppress public assemblies whose 
organizers submitted advance notice as required by law but for which 
government authorities did not issue permits. The Government continued 
to allow opposition political parties greater freedom of assembly.
    In early January, two administrative orders banned all political 
activities in Buea and Limbe, Fako Division, Southwest Province, 
following a series of secessionist activities in December 1999. On 
January 8 and 9, in Limbe, Southwest Province, the Government arrested 
several demonstrating members of the SCNC, including the rally's leader 
Justice Frederick Ebong and two of his associates (see Section 1.d.). 
Approximately 25 SCNC members marched and raised the flag of the 
``Federal Republic of the Southern Cameroons.'' The march followed the 
December 1999 announcement by the SCNC that proclaimed the independence 
of two southern provinces.
    On January 27, security forces intervened in a student strike at 
the University of Douala. The students went on strike on January 18 to 
demand changes at the university. The police used water cannons and 
nightsticks on the students, and beat several students severely (see 
Section 1.c.). Police also arrested several students and detained them 
for 2 days (see Section 1.d.). Political activist Mboua Massok also was 
arrested near the campus for his apparent support of the strike (see 
Section 1.d.).
    In early March, the Prefet (Senior Divisional Officer) of 
Bangangte, Nd Division, West Province, ordered the arrest of Catherine 
Yami and Roger Tankeu, respectively the SDF president for the Basssamba 
electoral district, and the SDF West provincial coordinator (see 
Section 1.d.). The two leaders had tried to prevent gendarmes from 
dispersing a duly declared meeting in the district.
    On March 30, Pierre Minlo, the Delegate General for National 
Security (DGSN) in Yaounde, banned three peaceful marches by the Union 
of Cameroon Democratic Forces (UFDC), an opposition party. The UFDC 
wanted to protest against growing crime in Yaounde and had declared to 
the sub-divisional officers (sous-prefets) in the three affected 
neighborhoods their intent to march. In his communique, the DGSN stated 
that the UFDC had no right to march because it was not represented at 
the National Assembly, a requirement which does not exist in any of the 
laws regulating public meetings and processions.
    On March 30, the Government banned a press conference by five SDF 
mayors in Douala suburbs, and police officers from the Douala First 
Police District barred entry to journalists and participants. According 
to the commissioner leading the squad, authorities banned the 
conference because they feared it might disturb public order; the 
commissioner made this deduction because the mayors allegedly refused 
to disclose what they planned to say at the press conference.
    On May 23, police and gendarmes forcibly dispersed a demonstration 
by students of the University of Yaounde, in which students protested 
the poor road conditions that killed 14 persons in a May 17 bus 
accident. Police arrested approximately 50 students and severely beat 
several of them (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On November 13, security forces forcibly dispersed a march by 
opposition SDF parliamentarians in Yaounde. The Governor of the Center 
Province had banned the march on November 7. The parliamentarians 
marched to highlight the need for an independent electoral commission 
(see Section 3). Security forces arrested several marchers, seized 
journalists' cameras and beat one journalist (see Sections 1.c. and 
2.a.). On November 24 in Yaounde, security forces dispersed a similar 
protest by several dozen SDF parliamentarians; the SDF did not seek 
Government approval for the march as required under the law. No arrests 
were made.
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government 
generally respected this right in practice during the year, although 
there were some exceptions. The conditions for government recognition 
of a political party, a prerequisite for many political activities, 
were not onerous. Over 150 political parties operated legally, together 
with a large and growing number of civic associations. However, in past 
years, the Government has been suspected widely of fomenting splits in 
the main opposition party, the SDF. Some members of the SCNC claim that 
the Government encourages splits within the organization as a way of 
undercutting the group's secessionist message.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    Relations between the State and religious groups are governed 
chiefly by the Law on Religious Congregations. Religious groups must be 
approved and registered with the Ministry of Territorial Administration 
in order to function legally; there were no reports that the Government 
refused to register any group. It is illegal for a religious group to 
operate without official recognition, but the law prescribes no 
specific penalties for doing so. Although official recognition confers 
no general tax benefits, it allows religious groups to receive real 
estate as gifts and legacies for the conduct of their activities. In 
order to register, a religious denomination must fulfill the legal 
requirement to qualify as a religious congregation. This definition 
includes ``any group of natural persons or corporate bodies whose 
vocation is divine worship'' or ``any group of persons living in 
community in accordance with a religious doctrine.'' The denomination 
then submits a file to the Minister of Territorial Administration. The 
file must include a request for authorization, a copy of the charter of 
the group that describes planned activities, and the names and 
respective functions of the officials of the group. The Minister 
studies the file and sends it to the presidency with a recommendation 
for a positive or negative decision. The President generally follows 
the recommendation of the Minister, and authorization is granted by a 
presidential decree. The approval process usually takes several years, 
due primarily to administrative slowness. The only religious groups 
known to be registered are Christian and Muslim groups and the Baha'i 
Faith, but other groups may be registered. The Ministry has not 
disclosed the number of registered denominations, but the number of 
registered religious groups is estimated to be in the dozens. The 
Government does not register traditional religious groups, on the 
grounds that the practice of traditional religions is not public but 
rather private to members of a particular ethnic or kinship group, or 
to the residents of a particular locality.
    The sites and personnel of religious institutions were not exempt 
from the widespread human rights abuses committed by government 
security forces. On April 20, government security forces reportedly 
attacked the parish of Notre Dame de Sept Douleurs in Douala during a 
Mass. Security forces reportedly arrested some parishioners and beat 
others (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). On April 24, the Ministry of 
National Education announced the suspension of two teachers of the 
Bertoua technical high school. The two teachers were accused of having 
``enticed'' some of their students into their religious group.
    In January 1998, an undisclosed number of personnel of the 21st 
Navy Battalion, allegedly broke into a church in Douala, beat and 
stabbed the priest and several youths, raped young women, and stole 
funds. On February 22, the Douala Military Tribunal convicted the 
personnel of breach of orders causing bodily harm and destruction. The 
tribunal sentenced them to 1-year imprisonment with no possibility of 
remission.
    Disputes within registered religious groups about control of places 
of worship, schools, real estate, or financial assets are resolved in 
the first instance by the executive branch rather than by the 
judiciary.
    Government officials criticized and questioned criticisms of the 
Government by religious institutions and leaders, but there were no 
reports that Government officials used force to suppress such 
criticism.
    The practice of witchcraft is a criminal offense under the national 
penal code; however, persons generally are prosecuted for this offense 
only in conjunction with some other offense, such as murder. Witchcraft 
traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases of which the 
causes were unknown.
    There was a media report that in September 1999 traditional 
authorities in Lobe, in Ndian Division of the Southwest Province, 
banished from the locality six persons, including one blind man, 
accused of having killed a woman by practicing witchcraft. According to 
the report, a traditional court tried the accused by requiring them to 
drink poison that traditionally is believed to kill only those who lie 
to the court, convicted the accused when they refused to drink, ordered 
them to pay inkind, bloodprice damages, and expelled them from the 
locality when they refused to pay. The accused reportedly filed a 
protest with the divisional officer of the central Government; however, 
initial investigations could not confirm this report.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law does not restrict freedom of 
movement within the country; however, in practice government security 
forces routinely impede domestic travel. Police frequently stop 
travelers to check identification documents, vehicle registrations, and 
tax receipts as security and immigration control measures. Police 
commonly demand bribes from citizens whom they stop at roadblocks or at 
other points.
    Roadblocks and checkpoints manned by security forces have 
proliferated in cities and most highways and make road travel both 
time-consuming and costly, since extortion of small bribes is 
commonplace at these checkpoints. In past years, violent and sometimes 
fatal confrontations have occurred repeatedly at such checkpoints when 
travelers would not or could not pay the bribes demanded by the 
security forces.
    There were credible reports that police arrested and beat 
individuals who failed to carry their identification cards (see 
Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.).
    The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The country has long 
been a safe haven for displaced persons and refugees from nearby 
countries. The Government provides first asylum to persons who arrive 
at the border without documentation but who can show a valid claim to 
refugee status. The UNHCR estimated that there were about 47,000 
refugees in the country for whom Cameroon was a country of first 
asylum. However, some NGO's claim that the number is as high as 60,000. 
The majority of these persons are Chadians, whose total number was 
estimated to be more than 41,000. In May 1999, the UNHCR began a 
repatriation program for Chadian refugees. The remaining refugees 
principally were from Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, with small numbers from Liberia, Sudan, and Ethiopia. The 
Government accepts for resettlement refugees who are granted refugee 
status by the UNHCR.
    In 1997 government security forces detained 13 former senior 
military officers of Equatorial Guinea who had been granted refugee 
status by the UNHCR and had lived in the country for 4 years (see 
Section 1.d.). In August 10 of the 13 refugees from Equatorial Guinea 
detained at a military base since 1998 left for refugee resettlement in 
another country. Three refugees disappeared before they could depart 
(see Section 1.b.); however, they were believed to have returned 
voluntarily to Equatorial Guinea or to have established unofficial 
residence in the country.
    Some illegal immigrants have been subjected to harsh treatment and 
imprisonment. In August Bassy Okon Edet, a Nigerian fisherman released 
after 7 days of incarceration by gendarmes (see Section 1.d.), claimed 
that security forces continue to hold other Nigerians for fishing in 
waters close to the disputed Bakassi Peninsula. Communities of 
Nigerians and Chadians often have been the targets of police and 
gendarme harassment. During raids, members of the security forces often 
extort money from those who do not have regular residence permits or 
those who do not have valid receipts for store merchandise (see Section 
5).
    There were no confirmed reports of the forced return of persons to 
a country where they feared persecution. Although the Government 
occasionally returns illegal immigrants, there were no reports of 
forced repatriation of recognized refugees.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides that citizens have the right to change 
their government, but dominance of the political process by the 
President and his party limits the ability of citizens to exercise this 
right. President Paul Biya has controlled the Government since 1982 and 
the ruling party since 1985. The 1992 and 1997 presidential elections 
and the 1997 legislative contests were criticized widely and viewed as 
fraudulent by international and domestic observers. In these elections, 
which were administered by the Ministry of Territorial Administration, 
members of largely pro-opposition ethnic groups and inhabitants of 
largely pro-opposition localities effectively were prevented from 
registering or voting, registration and vote counting procedures were 
not transparent, a public announcement of results was delayed, and the 
number of votes cast in some progovernment areas exceeded the adult 
population.
    Elections are held by balloting that officially is described as 
secret but may permit voters to leave the polling place with evidence 
of how they voted. At polling places on election day, registered 
citizens receive a package containing one card for each candidate. 
While alone inside a closed booth, citizens choose a ballot and seal it 
into an envelope. Citizens then exit the booth and vote by depositing 
the sealed envelope into a ballot box. Polling officials are supposed 
to provide a method by which voters can dispose of the unused ballots 
privately before exiting the closed booth, but this rarely was done in 
the 1996 or 1997 elections.
    Following the flawed 1997 legislative elections, international 
observers endorsed a series of reform measures, including the creation 
of a permanent and autonomous electoral commission to replace the 
present system of elections run by the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration. The Government's control of the electoral process leads 
to a variety of abuses including preelection manipulation of voter 
registration lists.
    President Biya's October 1997 reelection was marred by serious 
procedural flaws as well as by a boycott by the three major opposition 
parties. While the boycott made the outcome a foregone conclusion, most 
observers nonetheless considered the contest to be neither free nor 
fair. Election irregularities especially were egregious in opposition 
strongholds, where boycotting opposition activists chose not to be 
present to monitor the voting count.
    In December 1997, after the Supreme Court announced the official 
election results declaring President Biya the winner with 92.57 percent 
of the vote, the UNDP, which previously had been an opposition party, 
joined the CPDM in a coalition government. The new ruling coalition 
also included a faction of the UPC party, which was not the same 
faction that had participated in previous CPDM-dominated coalition 
governments under President Biya.
    In 1998 talks between the ruling CPDM party and the leading 
opposition party, the SDF, broke down over the issue of creating an 
independent electoral commission, as recommended by most international 
observers of the 1992 and 1997 Presidential elections. The SDF demanded 
such a commission but the CPDM initially refused to grant this demand; 
however, on December 13, the National Assembly passed legislation to 
create a National Election Observatory (NEO) to monitor all stages of 
the electoral process; however, the legislation was not implemented by 
year's end.
    The Biya administration has proven particularly intolerant of 
opposition from within its Beti/Bulu ethnic-regional base in the Center 
Province. Following the unexpectedly strong showing of opposition 
parties in the region in the 1996 municipal elections, Titus Edzoa, a 
ruling CPDM member from the southern part of the country, a former 
Minister of Health, and a longtime presidential aide, declared himself 
a candidate to oppose incumbent President Biya in the October 1997 
election. Edzoa and his campaign manager were arrested shortly after he 
declared his candidacy and before the election was held. They were 
sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on embezzlement and corruption 
charges and remained incarcerated at year's end (see Section 1.e.).
    The President's control over the country's administrative apparatus 
is extensive. The President appoints all Ministers, including the Prime 
Minister, who serve at the President's pleasure. The President also 
directly appoints the governors of each of the 10 provinces. The 
governors wield considerable power in the electoral process, 
interpreting the laws and determining how these should be implemented. 
The President also has the power to appoint important lower level 
members of the 58 provincial administrative structures, including the 
senior divisional officers, the divisional officers, and the district 
chiefs. The governors and senior divisional officers wield considerable 
authority within the areas under their jurisdiction, including, 
significantly, the authority to ban political meetings that they deem 
likely to threaten public order. They also may detain persons for 
renewable periods of 15 days to combat banditry and other security 
threats.
    The 1996 amendments to the 1972 Constitution retained a strongly 
centralized system of power, based on presidential authority. However, 
the amendments imposed a limit of two 7-year (in place of unlimited 5-
year) terms on the President. They provided for the creation of a 
partially elected (70 percent) and partially appointed (30 percent) 
senate, along with the creation of a similarly constituted set of 
provincial assemblies with limited power over local affairs. Although 
promulgated by the President in January 1996, the senate and regional 
council amendments have not yet been implemented.
    Citizens' right to choose their local governments remained 
circumscribed. In 1996 the Government held local government elections 
that were unprecedented in the Francophone region and the first such 
elections since the 1960's in the Anglophone region. These elections 
were for mayors or deputy mayors and council members in Douala, 
Yaounde, provincial capitals, and some division capitals. President 
Biya first promised such elections in 1992, but postponed them twice. 
In the meantime, the Government greatly increased the number of 
municipalities run by presidentially-appointed delegates, who have 
authority over elected mayors. Delegate-run cities, of which there were 
only four in 1992, by 1996 included most of the provincial capitals and 
some division capitals in pro-opposition provinces, but not in the 
southern provinces that had tended to support the CPDM. In 1998 a 
60member Committee on Good Governance, created by the Government, 
publicly recommended that the Government eliminate the position of 
delegate in order to allow elected local officials to manage municipal 
governments more freely. Even in municipalities with elected mayors, 
local autonomy is limited, since elected local governments must rely on 
the central Government for most of their revenues and their 
administrative personnel.
    Like the 1992 National Assembly elections, the 1996 municipal 
elections were less flawed than other elections held since 1990. 
Foreign observers considered the elections largely free and fair, 
having detected few instances of malfeasance during or after the 
voting; however, opposition parties credibly alleged systematic 
preelection government manipulation of the registration lists and 
arbitrary government disqualification of their candidates, especially 
in the south. Government election authorities acknowledged that 
opposition candidates won 104 of the 336 offices at stake. Ninety-six 
contests in which the Government declared the ruling party candidate 
the winner were appealed to the Supreme Court, which declared itself 
unqualified to adjudicate many of these complaints, but nullified the 
results of 18 elections, which it ordered the Government to hold again. 
As of year's end, the Government had not complied with any of these 
Supreme Court orders.
    There were no new developments in the 1999 criminalized civil libel 
case against SDF Party Chairman John Fru Ndi by a disgruntled former 
SDF official. Fru Ndi's February 1999 felony conviction still is 
pending an appeal in the Yaounde High Court. Some observers believe 
that Fru Ndi's conviction might enable the Government in the future to 
disqualify him for any public office for which he may seek to run.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no 
laws that specifically prohibit women or members of minorities from 
participating in government, in the political process, or in other 
areas of public life. Women hold 4 of 50 cabinet posts, 10 of 180 seats 
in the National Assembly, and few of the higher offices of major 
political parties, including the CPDM.
    Many of the key members of the Government are drawn from the 
President's own Bulu/Beti ethnic group, as are disproportionately large 
numbers of military officers and CPDM officials. Members of some of the 
other 200 ethnic groups hold 30 cabinet seats, compared with 18 cabinet 
positions held by members of the President's ethnic group.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic and international human rights monitoring groups generally 
have considerable latitude to operate. A large number of independent 
human rights monitoring groups exist, although the activities of 
virtually all are limited by a shortage of funds and trained personnel. 
The Government did not formally prevent human rights monitors from 
operating. In the past, the Government used its authority to approve or 
withhold official recognition of NGO's, but there have been no recent 
cases in which such recognition was withheld. However, Government 
officials repeatedly impeded the effectiveness of human rights NGO's by 
limiting access to prisoners, by refusing to share information, and 
increasingly by threatening and using violence against personnel of 
human rights NGO's (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    Domestic human rights NGO's include the National League for Human 
Rights, the Organization for Human Rights and Freedoms, the Association 
of Women Against Violence, the Cameroonian Association of Female 
Jurists, the Cameroonian Association for Children's Rights, Conscience 
Africaine, the Movement for the Defense of Human Rights and Liberties 
(MDHRL), the Human Rights Defense Group, the National Association of 
Nontribalists and Nonracists, the Committee of Action for Women's and 
Children's Rights (CADEF), the Human Rights Clinic and Education 
Center, the Association of Women against Violence, the Cameroon 
National Association for Family Welfare (CAMNAFAW), Tribes Without 
Frontiers (TSF), the Association for the Promotion of Communal 
Initiatives, and the League for Rights and Freedoms (LDL). A number of 
these groups issued press releases or reports detailing specific human 
rights violations. Many held seminars and workshops on various aspects 
of human rights.
    In 1999 the Government generally cooperated with the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights on a visit to the Far North Province, but 
Colonel Pom's special antigang gendarmerie unit denied him access to 
its holding cells (see Section 1.c.). In 1999 the Government allowed 
the ICRC, for the first time in 7 years, to generally have unrestricted 
access to all prisons and detention places and to hold private 
discussions with inmates.
    The governmental NCHRF, although hampered by a shortage of funds, 
conducted a number of investigations into human rights abuses, visited 
prisons, and organized several human rights seminars aimed at judicial 
officials, security personnel, and other government officers. Although 
the Commission infrequently condemned the Government's human rights 
abuses publicly, its staff intervened with government officials in 
specific cases of human rights harassment by security forces, attempted 
to stop Friday arrests (see Section 1.d.), and attempted to obtain 
medical attention for jailed suspects in specific cases. The law 
prohibits the NCHRF from publishing information on specific human 
rights cases. However, it may and does submit reports on specific 
alleged abuses to the government authorities directly involved, along 
with recommendations for improving conditions or punishing violators. 
During the year, the NCHRF sent teams to Douala to investigative 
allegations of extrajudicial killings by the Operational Command (see 
Section 1.a.). Although the Commissioner sent two reports to the 
President and the Prime Minister, there are no plans to release the 
reports publicly.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution does not explicitly forbid discrimination based on 
race, language, or social status. The Constitution prohibits 
discrimination based on sex and mandates that ``everyone has equal 
rights and obligations,'' but the Government does not enforce these 
constitutional provisions effectively.
    Women.--Violence against women remains high. Women's rights 
advocates report that the law does not impose effective penalties 
against men who commit acts of domestic violence. There are no 
genderspecific assault laws, despite the fact that women are the 
predominant victims of domestic violence. Spousal abuse is not a legal 
ground for divorce. In cases of sexual assault, a victim's family or 
village often imposes direct, summary punishment on the suspected 
perpetrator through extralegal means ranging from destruction of 
property to beating. While there are no reliable statistics on violence 
against women, the large number of newspaper reports, which observers 
believer are a fraction of actual incidents indicates that it is 
widespread.
    Despite constitutional provisions recognizing women's rights, women 
do not, in fact, enjoy the same rights and privileges as men. Civil law 
theoretically provides equal status and rights for men and women; 
however, no legal definition of discrimination exists, and some points 
of civil law are prejudicial to women. The 1981 Civil Code allows a 
husband to oppose his wife's right to work in a separate profession if 
the protest is made in the interest of the household and the family. 
While the law gives a woman the freedom to organize her own business, 
the Commercial Code allows a husband to end his wife's commercial 
activity by notifying the clerk of the commerce tribunal of his 
opposition based upon the family's interest. Partly for this reason, 
some employers require a husband's permission before they hire a woman. 
Polygyny is permitted by law and tradition, but polyandry is not. In 
cases of divorce, the husband's wishes determine the custody of 
children over the age of 6. While a man may be convicted of adultery 
only if the sexual act takes place in his home, a female may be 
convicted without respect to venue.
    Civil law offers a more equal standard than customary law, which is 
far more discriminatory against women, since in many regions a woman 
customarily is regarded as the property of her husband. Because of the 
importance attached to customs and traditions, laws protecting women 
often are not respected. Despite the law that fixes a minimum age of 15 
years for a bride, many girls are married off by their families by the 
age of 12. In the customary law of some ethnic groups, husbands not 
only maintain complete control over family property, but also can 
divorce their wives in a traditional court without being required to 
provide either verifiable justification or alimony. Traditional law 
normally governs the extent to which a woman may inherit from her 
husband in the absence of a will, and customs vary from group to group. 
In many traditional societies, custom grants greater authority and 
benefits to male than to female heirs. Another problem facing women is 
forced marriage; in some regions, girls' parents can and do give them 
away in marriage without their consent. Often, the husband, who is 
sometimes many years older than the girl, pays a bride's parents a 
``bride price.'' Since a price has been paid, the girl is considered 
the property of the husband. When a married man dies, his widow often 
is unable to collect any inheritance, since she herself is considered 
part of the man's property. Often the widow is forced to marry one of 
the deceased's brothers. Refusal means that she must repay the bride 
price in full (she usually has no source of funds) and leave the family 
property. In the northern provinces, some Lamibe (traditional rulers) 
reportedly prevent their wives and concubines from leaving their 
palaces. The lack of a national legal code covering the family leaves 
women defenseless against male-oriented customs.
    Children.--The Constitution provides for a child's right to 
education, and schooling is mandatory through the age of 14. After 
almost a decade of budget cuts for education, the Government took 
measures during the year to improve access to schools. In February 
President Biya announced the elimination of tuition fees for public 
elementary schools. In June the National Assembly passed a budget bill 
that increased spending on national education by 49 percent. 
Nonetheless, education spending during the 1999/2000 fiscal year was 
only approximately 2 percent of GDP. Since parents must pay uniform and 
book fees for primary school, and because tuition and other fees for 
secondary education remain even more costly, education remains 
unaffordable for many children. According to 1998 Government 
statistics, approximately 3.5 million children, about 81 percent of all 
children, were enrolled in school. In practice although not in law, 
girls suffer from discrimination in access to education. The gap in 
school attendance rates between boys and girls is 9 percent nationally 
and 14 percent in the three northern provinces. This problem, which is 
especially acute in rural areas, results in higher levels of illiteracy 
among women than among men. According to a 1995 study by a U.N. agency, 
the adult literacy rate was 75 percent for men but only 52 percent for 
women. In addition fewer girls are found at higher levels of education; 
according to a 1992 study by the Ministry of Women's Affairs, women 
made up only 23 percent of postsecondary students.
    While the Government has closed unlicensed primary and secondary 
schools in the past, there were no reports of such closings this year.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which has been condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is not practiced widely, but it is traditional 
and continues to be practiced in some areas of Far North and Southwest 
Provinces. It includes the most severe form of the abuse, infibulation, 
and usually is practiced on preadolescent girls. The Government has 
criticized the practice; however, no law prohibits FGM.
    The degree of familial child abuse is not known but is one of 
several targeted problems of children's rights organizations. During a 
crime wave in the country's largest cities of Yaounde and Douala, 
newspaper reports often cited children as victims of kidnapping, 
mutilation, and even infanticide. There were several credible stories 
of mothers (usually young, unemployed, and unmarried) abandoning 
newborns in streets, garbage cans, and pit toilets. The Yaounde-based 
Center for Helpless Children, created by the Minister of Social Affairs 
in 1997, currently harbors 24 abandoned or abused children, only a 
fraction of the suspected cases of abuse, abandonment, or neglect.
    Reports also indicate an alarming trend in the country's prisons of 
incarcerating juvenile offenders with adult prisoners, occasionally in 
the same cells or wards (see Section 1.c.). There are credible reports 
of sexual abuse of juvenile prisoners by adult inmates. The law 
specifies that children should not be detained without trial beyond 3 
months after an investigation, but the Government detains children for 
longer periods of time. In June press sources indicated that between 34 
and 38 children are detained in the Douala New Bell Prison. Some 
children (particularly infants) are jailed with their detained mothers.
    There were reports of forced child labor, child prostitution, and 
trafficking in children during the year (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 
6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--A 1983 law and subsequent implementing 
legislation provide certain rights for persons with disabilities. These 
include access to public institutions, medical treatment, and 
education. The Government is obliged to bear part of a disabled 
person's educational expenses, to employ disabled persons where 
possible, and, as necessary, to provide them with public assistance. 
However, these rights in fact rarely are respected. There are few 
facilities for disabled persons and little public assistance of any 
kind. Lack of facilities and care for the mentally disabled is 
particularly acute. In recent years, the Government reportedly has 
reduced the share of its expenditures that benefit disabled persons and 
has terminated subsidies to NGO's that help disabled persons. Society 
tends to treat the disabled as tainted, leaving churches or foreign 
NGO's responsible for providing assistance. However, there is no 
widespread societal discrimination against the disabled. The law does 
not mandate special access provisions to buildings and facilities for 
the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--A population of perhaps 50,000 to 100,000 Baka 
(Pygmies), a term that encompasses several different ethnic groups, 
primarily reside in the forested areas of the South and East provinces, 
of which Pygmies were the earliest known inhabitants. While no legal 
discrimination exists, other groups often treat Pygmies as inferior and 
sometimes subject them to unfair and exploitative labor practices. 
There have been credible reports of Pygmies being forced out of their 
homes by logging companies and security forces. There continued to be 
reports that Pygmies complain that the forests they inhabit are being 
logged without fair recompense for the negative consequences suffered 
by the Pygmies of the region. Some observers believe that sustained 
logging is destroying the Pygmies' unique, forest-oriented belief 
system, forcing them to adapt their traditional social and economic 
systems into a more rigid modern society similar to their Bantu 
neighbors. Some local activists also criticized possible effects from 
the Chad-Cameroon pipeline on nearby pygmy settlements.
    Religious Minorities.--Approximately 40 percent of the population 
are at least nominally Christian, about 20 percent are at least 
nominally Muslim, and about 40 percent practice traditional indigenous 
religions or no religion. Of Christians, approximately half are 
Catholics, and about half are affiliated with Protestant denominations. 
Christians are concentrated chiefly in the southern and western 
provinces; the two Anglophone provinces of the western region largely 
are Protestant; and the Francophone provinces of the southern and 
western regions largely are Catholic. Muslims are concentrated mainly 
in the northern provinces, where the locally dominant Fulani (or Peuhl) 
ethnic group is overwhelmingly Muslim, and other ethnic groups, known 
collectively as the Kirdi, generally are partly Islamicized. The Bamoun 
ethnic group of the western provinces is also largely Muslim. 
Traditional indigenous religions are practiced in rural areas 
throughout the country but rarely are practiced publicly in cities, in 
part because many such religions are intrinsically local in character.
    Relations among different religious groups generally are amicable; 
however, some religious groups face societal pressures within their 
regions. In the northern provinces, especially in rural areas, societal 
discrimination by Muslims against persons who practice traditional 
indigenous religions is strong and widespread. Some Christians in rural 
areas of the north complain of discrimination by Muslims, but this 
reported discrimination may reflect ethnic as much as religious 
differences. The northern region suffers from ethnic tensions between 
the Fulani, a Muslim group that conquered most of the region 200 years 
ago, and the Kirdi, the descendents of groups that practiced 
traditional indigenous religions and whom the Fulani conquered or 
displaced, justifying their conquest on religious grounds. Although 
some Kirdi subsequently have adopted Islam, the Kirdi remain socially, 
educationally, and economically disadvantaged relative to the Fulani in 
the three northern provinces. The slavery still practiced in parts of 
the north is reported to be largely enslavement of Kirdi by Fulani (see 
Section 6.c.).
    In the past, there have been occasional reports of isolated 
conflict between Christians and practitioners of traditional indigenous 
religions; however, no specific incidents or violence stemming from 
religious discrimination were reported this year.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is divided into 
more than 200 ethnic groups, among which there are frequent and 
credible allegations of discrimination. Members of virtually all ethnic 
groups commonly provide preferential treatment to fellow members when 
they are able to do so. Ethnic-regional differences continue to pose 
obstacles to political and economic liberalization.
    Members of President Biya's Bulu ethnic group and of closely 
related Beti groups of southern parts of the country are represented 
disproportionately and hold key positions in government, the civil 
service, state-owned businesses, the security forces, the military, and 
the ruling CPDM party. The large size and centralized character of the 
public sector has long been perceived widely to favor these groups. 
Prospective economic and political liberalization is widely perceived 
as being likely to harm these groups, and to favor other groups, such 
as the large Bamileke and Anglophone ethnic-cultural groups of the 
west, whose members tend to be more active in private commerce and 
industry and have tended to support the SDF since the legalization of 
opposition parties. Since 1990 natives of the two Anglophone provinces, 
the Northwest and Southwest Provinces, have suffered disproportionately 
from human rights violations committed by the Government and its 
security forces (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.); have been 
underrepresented in the public sector; and generally believe that they 
have not received their fair share of public sector goods and services. 
Since the flawed 1992 presidential election (see Section 3), many 
residents of the Anglophone region have sought to achieve greater 
freedom, greater equality of opportunity, and better government, at 
least partly by regaining regional autonomy rather than through 
nationwide political reform. They have formed several quasipolitical 
organizations to pursue that goal.
    At least one Anglophone group, the SCNC, advocates secession from 
the country. Subsequent to SCNC secessionist incidents in 1999, such 
activity calmed considerably during the year; however, the Government 
continued to hold some SCNC activists or suspected SCNC supporters in 
jail without trial (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.). The opposition 
SDF party (whose base of support rests in the Anglophone provinces) 
reiterated its commitment to pursuing nonviolent political struggle to 
restore a federal republic.
    Northern areas of the country suffer from ethnic tensions between 
the Fulani (or Peuhl), a Muslim group that conquered most of the region 
200 years ago, and the ``Kirdi,'' the descendants of diverse groups who 
then practiced traditional indigenous religions and whom the Fulani 
conquered or displaced, justifying their conquest on religious grounds. 
Although some Kirdi subsequently have adopted Islam, the Kirdi remain 
socially, educationally, and economically disadvantaged relative to the 
Fulani in the three northern provinces. Traditional Fulani rulers 
(Lamibe) continue to wield great power over their subjects, often 
including Kirdi, sometimes subjecting them to tithing and forced labor 
(see Section 6.c.). The slavery still practiced in northern parts of 
the country is reported to be largely enslavement of Kirdi by Fulani. 
Although the UNDP party is based largely in the Fulani community, the 
ruling CPDM party has long been perceived widely to represent Fulani as 
well as Beti-Bulu interests.
    During the 1990's, local-language broadcasts by 
governmentcontrolled regional radio stations in southern areas of the 
country, as well as private French-language newspapers with close ties 
to leading government and CPDM figures, broadcast or printed anti-
Bamileke and anti-Anglophone commentaries; however, there were no 
reports of these types of commentaries during the year.
    Members of the country's large community of Nigerian immigrants 
often complain of illegal discrimination and even persecution by 
elements of the Government (see Section 2.d.). Government officials 
repeatedly have announced crackdowns on undocumented Nigerian 
immigrants.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Code allows workers to 
form and join trade unions of their choosing. The Labor Code requires 
that unions register with the Government; it permits groups of at least 
20 workers to organize a union by submitting a constitution, internal 
regulations, and non-conviction certifications for each of the 20 
founding members. For unions in the private sector, the Government 
requires registration with the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and 
Social Insurance. Unions for public sector workers must register with 
the Ministry of Territorial Administration. The law does not permit the 
creation of a union that includes both public and private sector 
workers. The Government indicated that it remits certification within 1 
month of union application; however, in practice, independent union 
especially in the public sector, have found it difficult to obtain 
registration. In addition the requirement for union registration 
apparently contradicts ILO Convention 87, to which the country signed 
and agreed in 1960, and which states that unions have the right to 
exist through declaration, not through Government recognition or 
registration. Registered unions are subject to Government interference. 
The Government chooses the unions with which it will bargain; some 
independent unions have accused the Government of creating small, non-
representative unions amenable to the Government position and with 
which it can negotiate. Some sections of the Labor Code have never 
taken effect because the presidency has not issued implementing 
decrees.
    There are two trade union confederations. Until 1995 the sole labor 
confederation was the Confederation of Cameroonian Trade Unions (CCTU), 
formerly affiliated with the ruling CPDM party under another name (the 
Organization of Cameroonian Trade Unions). In 1995 the Government 
encouraged the creation of a new labor confederation, the Union of Free 
Trade Unions of Cameroon (USLC), with which it maintains close ties. 
This move was seen as an effort by the Government to create a rival 
trade union confederation more firmly under its control. In 1997 the 
CCTU, government control of which had been eroding since large public 
sector salary cuts in 1993, split into two rival factions, and the 
Government banned a conference by the CCTU's reformist faction, led by 
Benoit Essiga. A CCTU Congress held in April 1999, which was attended 
by international observers and held under the auspices of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), elected the reform faction 
slate of candidates to the CCTU leadership positions. However, the 
losing faction did not accept the results and continues to claim that 
it is the real CCTU. The Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social 
Insurance has stated that it will not recognize the new CCTU leadership 
as long as another CCTU faction uses the same name. In September 1998, 
the new CCTU leadership took their case to court and won; however, the 
Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Insurance continues to 
withhold official status. Other ministries within the Government 
informally recognize the new CCTU leadership and include them in 
appropriate seminars and invitations. In a February press conference 
and an August ``unity'' conference, the Ministry of Labor, Employment, 
and Social Insurance appeared to back publicly the losing CCTU faction 
at the expense of the reformist faction. However, a court declared the 
August unity conference, attended by 400 people, illegal, stating that 
only the reformist faction of the CCTU had the power to convoke such a 
conference.
    The Labor Code explicitly recognizes workers' right to strike, but 
only after mandatory arbitration. Arbitration proceedings are not 
enforceable legally and can be overturned or simply ignored by the 
Government. The Labor Code provides for the protection of workers 
engaged in legal strikes and prohibits retribution against them. 
However, these provisions of the Labor Code do not apply to civil 
servants, employees of the penitentiary system, or workers responsible 
for national security. Instead of strikes, civil servants are required 
to negotiate grievances directly with the minister of the concerned 
department and with the Minister of Labor.
    During the year, labor unrest continued. There were strikes by 
workers in the privatized railroad company Camrail, the sugar producing 
company of Camsuco, the cotton producing company of Cicam, as well as 
strikes by some elementary and secondary school teachers and employees 
of the Douala Municipal Council. The National Autonomous Union of 
Telecommunications Workers (SYNATTEL) also discussed and negotiated 
salary and benefit issues, despite the Government's argument that it 
had not obtained full legal recognition.
    The CCTU is a member of the Organization of African Trade Unions 
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The USLC is a 
member of the Organization of African Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
provides for collective bargaining between workers and management in 
workplaces, as well as between labor federations and business 
associations in each sector of the economy; however, no formal 
collective bargaining negotiations have taken place since 1996. When 
labor disputes arise, the Government chooses which labor union to 
invite into the negotiations, selectively excluding some labor 
representatives. Once agreements are negotiated, there is no mechanism 
to enforce implementation; some agreements between the Government and 
labor unions have been shelved or ignored by the Government after being 
negotiated. The Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination, and 
employers guilty of such discrimination are subject to fines of up to 
an amount equivalent to approximately $1,600 (1 million CFA). However, 
employers found guilty are not required to compensate the workers 
against whom they discriminated, or to reinstate fired workers. The 
Ministry of Labor has reported no complaints of such discrimination 
during recent years; however, one organizer of the Union for 
Telecommunications Workers claims that his state-owned company demoted 
him due to his union activism.
    In November the Prefet of Dschang arrested two union 
leadersuniversity professors trying to organize the University of 
Dschangallegedly because of an unsigned labor agreement (see Section 
1.d.); ten others also were questioned. They were released the next 
day. There is an industrial free trade zone regime, but the Government 
did not grant approval to any firms to operate under it during the 
year. Free trade zone employers are exempt from some provisions of the 
Labor Code but must respect all internationally recognized worker 
rights.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the Labor Code prohibit forced or compulsory labor; however, it occurs 
in practice. The authorities continued to allow prison inmates to be 
contracted out to private employers or used as communal labor for 
municipal public works. Forced or bonded labor by children is not 
prohibited specifically, and there were reports that it occurs in 
practice (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    On August 24, gendarmes released Bassy Okon Edet, a Nigerian 
fisherman, after a 7-day incarceration (see Section 1.d.). Edet claims 
that the gendarmes forced him to do labor during his incarceration.
    There were credible reports that slavery continued to be practiced 
in northern parts of the country, including in the Lamidat of Rey 
Bouba, a traditional kingdom in the North Province (see Section 5). In 
the South and East Provinces, some Baka (Pygmies), including children, 
continued to be subjected to unfair and exploitative labor practices by 
landowners, such as working on the landowners' farms during harvest 
seasons without payment (see Section 5). There were reports of 
trafficking in children (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--A 1969 Ministry of Labor order and the 1992 Labor Code 
provide the legal framework for the protection of children in the field 
of labor and education, and specify penalties ranging from fines to 
imprisonment for infringement of the law. In April 1998, the National 
Assembly authorized President Biya to ratify ILO Convention 138 
regarding to employment of children; however, the President has not 
signed the bill. Article 86 of the Labor Code and the Ministerial Order 
both set the minimum age for the employment of children at 14. The 
Ministerial Order also bans night work and enumerates tasks that cannot 
be performed legally by children between the ages of 14 and 18. These 
tasks include moving heavy weights, dangerous and unhealthy tasks, 
working in confined areas, or tasks that could hurt a child's morality. 
The order also states that a child's workday cannot exceed 8 hours. In 
order to improve knowledge and education of children between the ages 
of 14 and 18, employers are required to train them. To this end, work 
contracts must contain a training provision for these minors. The law 
prohibits children from working before 6 a.m. or after midnight, though 
enforcement of this law is inefficient.
    According to an ILO study conducted during the year in conjunction 
with local NGO's and the Ministry of Labor, child labor remains a 
serious problem, although the Government has made some progress to 
address it. The ILO estimates there are 602,000 child laborers. In the 
nation's major cities of Yaounde, Douala, and Bamenda, from March to 
April, the ILO estimated that 40 percent of employed children were 
female, 7 percent were less than 12 years of age, and 60 percent had 
dropped out of primary schools. Primary education is compulsory through 
the age of 14, but the relatively high cost for school precludes many 
children from attending.
    The Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Labor are 
responsible for enforcing existing child labor laws through site 
inspections of registered businesses; however, lack of resources 
inhibits an effective inspection program. Moreover, the legal 
prohibitions do not include family chores, which in many instances are 
beyond a child's capacity to do. According to the ILO study, child 
labor in cities exists mainly in the informal sector such as street 
vending and car washing or other non-qualified jobs. An increasing 
number of children work as household help, and some children are 
involved in prostitution. In the north of the country, there are 
credible reports that children from needy homes are placed with other 
families to do household work for money.
    In rural areas, many children begin work at an early age on family 
farms. Often, relatives employ rural youth, especially girls, as 
domestic helpers, while many urban street vendors are less than 14 
years of age.
    The Government is a signatory to ILO Convention 182; however, the 
National Assembly had not ratified the convention by year's end.
    Forced or bonded labor by children is not prohibited specifically, 
and there were reports that it occurs in practice (see Section 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Under the Labor Code, the 
Ministry of Labor is responsible for setting a single minimum wage 
applicable nationwide in all sectors. The minimum wage is approximately 
$40 (23,514 CFA) per month. It does not provide a decent standard of 
living for an average worker and family.
    The Labor Code establishes a standard workweek of 40 hours in 
public and private nonagricultural firms, and 48 hours in agricultural 
and related activities. The code makes compulsory at least 24 
consecutive hours of weekly rest.
    The Government sets health and safety standards, and Ministry of 
Labor inspectors and occupational health doctors are responsible for 
monitoring these standards; however, they lack the resources for a 
comprehensive inspection program. There is no specific legislation 
permitting workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations 
without jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code provides that any person 
who engages in any trafficking in persons shall be punished with 
imprisonment of from 10 to 20 years and that the court may also impose 
a forfeiture penalty. Trafficking is a problem, and an ILO report 
during the year pinpointed trafficking in children as especially 
serious.
    An ILO study conducted in March and April in Yaounde, Douala, and 
Bamenda revealed that trafficking accounted for 84 percent (or 
approximately 530,000) of an estimated 610,000 child laborers (see 
Sections 5 and 6.c.). In most cases, intermediaries presented 
themselves as businessmen, approaching parents with large families or 
custodians of orphans and promising to assist the child with education 
or training. The intermediary paid parents an average of $8 (6,000 CFA) 
before taking the child, transporting the child to the city where the 
intermediary would subject the child to forced work for remumeration 
which was far below the minimum wage level. In 4 out of 10 cases, the 
child was a foreigner transported to the country for labor. The report 
also indicated that the country is a transit country for regional 
traffickers as well, transporting children between Nigeria, Benin, 
Niger, Chad, Togo, the Republic of the Congo, and the Central African 
Republic.
    While there has been no study on trafficking in persons besides 
children, anecdotal evidence from the NCHRF indicates that there may 
also be some trafficking in adults, primarily women, as well. No NGO's 
were known to be working to reduce trafficking in persons.
    The Government has condemned the practice of trafficking in 
persons, and the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Insurance is 
responsible for fighting trafficking. However, that ministry is 
severely under-funded, and there are no known cases of prosecution of 
traffickers or protection of victims.
                               __________

                               CAPE VERDE

    Cape Verde is a multiparty parliamentary democracy in which 
constitutional powers are shared between the elected Head of State, 
President Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro, an independent; the Head of 
Government, Prime Minister Carlos Wahnon Veiga; and Veiga's party, the 
Movement for Democracy (MPD). The MPD has an absolute majority in the 
National Assembly, although a disagreement within the top levels of the 
MPP during the year resulted in a split within the party and the 
formation of a new party. The principal opposition party, the African 
Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), held power in a one-
party state from independence in 1975 until 1991. National elections 
are scheduled for January and February 2001. The judiciary is 
independent; however, there were accusations of politicized and biased 
judicial decisions.
    The Government controls the police, which has primary 
responsibility for maintenance of law and order. Some members of the 
police and prison guards committed human rights abuses.
    Cape Verde has a market-based economy but little industry and few 
exploitable natural resources. Based on 1998 data, the per capita 
income is $1,312. The country has a long history of economically driven 
emigration, primarily to Western Europe and the United States, and 
remittances from citizens abroad remained an important source of 
income. Even in years of optimum rainfall, the country can produce food 
for only 25 percent of the population of approximately 435,000 persons, 
which resulted in heavy reliance on international food aid.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. There were a 
number of credible reports of police abuse, including beatings, of 
citizens detained on suspicion of criminal activity. While in principle 
the law and the judiciary provide means to deal with isolated instances 
of abuse, in practice the Government has not held accountable police 
officers who were credibly accused of human rights abuses. There were 
reports that immigration authorities harassed Nigerian citizens. Prison 
conditions are poor. The judicial system is overburdened, lengthy 
delays in trials are common, and there continued to be accusations of 
politicized and biased judicial decisions. There were some limitations 
on press freedom, and there continued to be allegations of media self-
censorship. Revisions of the Constitution in 1999 created an 
independent ombudsman. Violence and discrimination against women and 
mistreatment of children continued to be serious problems. Although the 
Government supported legislation to ameliorate these problems, it 
failed to adopt, implement, and enforce policies designed to address 
the most critical challenges. There were reports of trafficking in 
persons.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, but there was 
one credible report that police beat a detainee on Sal Island in 
August; at year's end, no action had been taken against the police. 
While mechanisms for investigating citizen complaints of police 
brutality exist in theory, in practice these mechanisms neither ensure 
the punishment of all of those responsible nor effectively prevent 
future violations. In addition in some instances of violence against 
women, the police did not protect the victims effectively (see Section 
5). There were reports that immigration authorities harassed Nigerian 
citizens (see Section 2.d.).
    Prison conditions are poor, and they are severely overcrowded; 
however, there were no reports of prison deaths. The President's 
amnesty did not reduce the overcrowding. Sanitation and medical 
assistance is poor; a doctor and a nurse were available and prisoners 
were taken to the public hospitals for serious problems. Psychological 
problems were common. Although women and men are held separately, 
juveniles are not held separately from adults.
    According to a study by the Ze Moniz Association (AZM), there were 
reports that guards abused female prisoners.
    The Government permits both formal visits by human rights monitors 
to prisons and routine visits to individual prisoners; however, other 
than the AZM study there were no visits by human rights groups.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The laws provide for 
protection from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities 
generally observe these laws in practice. The law stipulates that a 
suspect must be charged before a judge within 48 hours of arrest. 
Police may not make arrests without a court order unless a person is 
caught in the act of committing a felony. In 1999 the Government 
revoked a provision that allowed authorities to detain a person for up 
to 5 days in exceptional cases.
    The courts have jurisdiction over state security cases. There is a 
functioning system of bail.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a 
judiciary independent of the executive branch, and the Government 
respects this provision in practice; however, there continued to be 
accusations of politicized and biased judicial decisions. In July 1999, 
a prosecutor dismissed a case against four persons associated with the 
main opposition party who had been arrested for church desecration in 
1996. In 1998 a judge ordered their release from detention because of 
lack of evidence. The Attorney General refused to confirm the 
prosecutor's decision and declared that the case should await better 
proof that the persons were not culpable (see Section 5). At year's 
end, the case remained pending.
    The judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court and the 
regional courts. Of the five Supreme Court judges, one is appointed by 
the President, one by the National Assembly, and three by the Superior 
Judiciary Council. This council, created by the 1999 revision of the 
Constitution, consists of the President of the Supreme Court, the 
Attorney General, eight private citizens, two judges, two prosecutors, 
the senior legal inspector of the Attorney General's office, and a 
representative of the Ministry of Justice. Judges are independent and 
may not belong to a political party.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial. Defendants 
are presumed to be innocent; they have the right to a public, nonjury 
trial; to counsel; to present witnesses; and to appeal verdicts. Free 
counsel is provided for the indigent. Regional courts adjudicate minor 
disputes on the local level in rural areas. The Ministry of Justice 
does not have judicial powers; such powers lie with the courts. 
Defendants may appeal regional court decisions to the Supreme Court.
    The judiciary generally provides due process rights; however, the 
right to an expeditious trial is constrained by a seriously 
overburdened and understaffed judicial system. A backlog of cases 
routinely leads to trial delays of 6 months and more.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the 
freedom to express ideas by words, images, or any other means, and for 
freedom of the press without censorship; however, although the 
Government generally respected these rights in practice, there were 
some restrictions on press freedom. There is a substantial and growing 
independent press. Nevertheless, there was continued criticism by 
independent political figures of the performance of the state-
controlled television, radio, and print media for their failure to 
exercise vigorously their monitoring role in a multiparty system. In 
several instances, persons in the media (and other sectors) whose views 
did not coincide with those of the Government and the ruling party were 
transferred, fired, or subjected to other disciplinary actions; the 
Government does not acknowledge that the divergence of views was the 
reason for such actions. There continued to be reports of media self-
censorship.
    The constitutional provision of freedom of expression was amended 
in 1999, to exclude using this freedom as a defense in cases involving 
defamation or offense to personal honor. This wording was criticized 
strongly by opposition politicians and some journalists as potentially 
limiting the freedom of expression; however, at year's end, no legal 
challenge had been made to the provision.
    There are three independent newspapers and one state-owned 
newspaper. There are six independent radio stations and one state-owned 
radio station. One television station is state-owned and two others are 
foreign-owned. Foreign broadcasts are permitted. Journalists are 
independent of government control and are not required to reveal their 
sources; however, there are credible reports that journalists within 
the government-controlled media still practice self-censorship. In 
November opposition party members demonstrated in Praia against what 
they considered to be MPD control of the public media.
    Government authorization is not needed to publish newspapers or 
other printed material. Despite the broadly interpreted criminal libel 
laws, no independent media outlets reported direct pressure in their 
daily operations or business activities. The national radio station 
provided live broadcasts of National Assembly sessions.
    The law requires a formal licensing mechanism for mass media, 
including government authorization to broadcast; however, there were no 
reports that licenses were denied or revoked or that the Government 
refused to authorize broadcasts.
    The Government did not restrict Internet access. There was a 
single, private sector Internet service provider. There were technical 
limitations on Internet use related to bandwidth and the unavailability 
of electricity and telephone lines in isolated parts of the country.
    The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and this right is 
respected in practice.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respected 
this right in practice. Throughout the year, labor organizations, 
opposition political parties, civic action groups, and numerous others 
exercised this right without government interference or objection.
    In July students demonstrated in front of government offices in 
Praia to protest the requirement that they pass an achievement 
examination before receiving government scholarships. The 
demonstrations initially were peaceful, but they became violent when 
students blocked off main roads with burning tires; police fired into 
the air to disperse the demonstrators. There were no reported injuries.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respected this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in 
practice.
    The overwhelming majority (more than 90 percent) of citizens are at 
least nominally Roman Catholic. It generally is recognized that the 
Catholic majority enjoys a privileged status in national life; for 
example, the Government provides it with free television broadcast time 
for religious services and observes its holy days as official holidays.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides citizens with the right 
to travel and establish residence without government restrictions.
    The Constitution provides for repatriation, and the Government 
respected this right in practice.
    The Constitution provides for the right of asylum by refugees, and 
no violations were reported. The law provides for the granting of 
refugee and asylum status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. According to 
the U.N. Human Rights Commission, credible media reports, and 
government officials, Nigerian citizens have been subjected to 
harassment and prejudice by immigration authorities. The Government has 
not reviewed charges of misconduct by immigration officials. Nigerians 
alleged that they have been subjected to discriminatory treatment by 
Government officials; however, some Nigerians were illegally present in 
the country or convicted of crimes. Other observers reported no 
evidence of a government policy of discrimination against Nigerians. 
Three or four Basque separatist asylees remained in the country; there 
are no refugees.
    The Government has not formulated specific policies regarding 
refugees or first asylum, and the issue of first asylum has never 
arisen.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government. Power was 
transferred peacefully by the PAICV to the MPD following free and fair 
elections in 1991; a second general election in 1995 and municipal and 
presidential elections in 1996 also were judged free and fair by 
international observers. National elections are scheduled to be held on 
January 14 and February 11, 200l.
    The Constitution provides for the separation of powers. Cabinet 
ministers are not required to be members of the National Assembly, but 
they are individually subject to confirmation by the President. 
Collectively, they must retain the support of a parliamentary majority. 
The President may dismiss the Government with the approval of the 
political parties represented in the National Assembly and the Council 
of the Republic. This council consists of the President of the National 
Assembly, the Prime Minister, the President of the Constitutional 
Court, the Attorney General, the Ombudsman, the President of the 
Economic and Social Council, the former presidents, and five private 
citizens appointed by the President.
    In November 1999, a disagreement within the top levels of the MPD 
ended cooperation between the party's factions, and the group that 
controlled the party bureaucracy dismissed a number of dissident 
ministers and senior officials from the Government. Those who were 
dismissed claimed that they could not get a fair hearing for their 
views and formed a new political party, the Partido da Renovacao 
Democratica (PRD), which was legalized on October 25.
    There are no restrictions in law or practice regarding the rights 
of women or members of minorities to vote or to participate in the 
political process; however, women are underrepresented in government 
and politics. Women constitute 11 percent of the deputies elected to 
the 72-member National Assembly. There are 2 female cabinet ministers 
and 3 female secretaries of state (junior ministers) in a cabinet 
consisting of 14 ministers and 6 secretaries of state.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are two private human rights groups, the National Commission 
of the Rights of Man and the Ze Moniz Association. During 1999 a 
foreign government financed a professional study of prison conditions 
by the Ze Moniz Association, which was released to the Government and 
the public in September. The Government cooperated with the researchers 
who prepared the report and, upon its publication, expressed interest 
in using the report to help formulate new laws and regulations; 
however, no action had been taken by year's end.
    The post of an independent Ombudsman, to be elected by the National 
Assembly, was created by the 1999 revision of the Constitution. The 
Ombudsman's powers remained undefined at year's end, and no Ombudsman 
has been elected.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, disability, language, or social status. However, despite the 
Government's increasing efforts to enforce all relevant constitutional 
provisions, it still does not do so effectively, and not all elements 
of society, particularly women and children, enjoy full protection 
against discrimination.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women, including wife beating, 
remains common. The Government and civil society encourage women to 
report criminal offenses such as rape and spousal abuse to the police; 
however, longstanding social and cultural values inhibit victims from 
doing so, and according to the media, such reports remain rare. 
Nevertheless, reporting of such crimes to police slightly increased 
during the year, and the media continued to report their occurrence. 
Women's organizations continued to seek legislation to establish a 
special family court to address crimes of domestic violence and abuse; 
however, they made no progress in achieving the required legislation.
    Violence against women has been the subject of extensive public 
service media coverage in both government--and opposition--controlled 
media. In 1998 the Parliament revised the Penal Code, widening the 
scope of sexual abuse and strengthening penalties against abusers.
    Despite constitutional prohibitions against sex discrimination and 
provisions for full equality, including equal pay for equal work, 
discrimination against women continued. Although they often are paid 
less than men for comparable work, women are making modest inroads in 
various professions especially in the private sector. However, some 
employers continued to claim that they prefer to hire men.
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women in 
inheritance, family, and custody matters; however, largely because of 
illiteracy, most women are unaware of their rights. Women often are 
reluctant to seek redress of domestic disputes in the courts. The 
Organization of Cape Verdean Women alleged that there is disparate 
treatment in inheritance matters, despite laws that call for equal 
rights. For example, some women are pressured to sign judicial 
agreements detrimental to their statutory inheritance rights.
    In July a group of female attorneys formed the Assoiagao 
Caboverdiana das Mulheres Juristas, an association whose purpose is to 
provide free legal assistance to women throughout the country suffering 
from social abuse (both violence and discrimination) and spousal abuse.
    Children.--The Government updated its studies of social policy 
priorities and legal rights for children and adolescents and, during 
the year, it restructured the Cape Verdean Institute for Children in 
accordance with norms established in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. The Government provides free mandatory education for 6 years 
of primary school for all children. Normally this benefit covers 
children from age 6 to 12. Education is compulsory until age 16; 
however, secondary education is free only for children whose families 
have an annual income below approximately $1,700 (160,000 escudos). 
According to 1998 UNICEF statistics, primary school attendance is 
approximately 97 percent for children. Attendance rates by boys and 
girls differ by less than 1 percent. The Government also seeks to 
reduce infant mortality and disease, combat drug and alcohol abuse, and 
discourage teenage pregnancy; however, progress continued to be slow.
    Child abuse and mistreatment, sexual violence against children, and 
juvenile prostitution are continuing but isolated problems, exacerbated 
by chronic poverty, large unplanned families, and traditionally high 
levels of emigration of adult men. The media reported cases of sexual 
abuse against children and adolescents. The inefficiencies of the 
judicial system made it difficult for government institutions to 
address the problem.
    People with Disabilities.--Although the Constitution mandates 
``special protection'' for the aged and disabled, the Government does 
not require access to public buildings or services for the disabled. 
There are no official schools or trained teachers for the disabled, 
although several nongovernmental groups, including an association for 
the blind, are active.
    Religious Minorities.--More than 20 cases involving the desecration 
of Catholic churches have been reported to the police over the years. 
While some cases date from 1975, after 1990 the rate of incidence 
increased; however, in contrast to previous years, there were no 
incidents during the year. The persons responsible for the desecrations 
never were identified, and the topic has remained a controversial 
electoral issue since the MPD accused supporters of the main opposition 
party PAICV of involvement in the crimes; however, the courts have 
dismissed every formal accusation that has been brought against PAICV 
members, usually for lack of evidence. In August 1999, the Attorney 
General rejected a local prosecutor's dismissal of the case against the 
four individuals of the ``S. Domingos Group,'' who were accused of 
desecrating a Catholic church in 1996 (see Section 1.e.), and no 
further action was taken during the year.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that 
workers are legally free to form and join unions without government 
authorization or restriction. There are two umbrella union 
associations: The Council of Free Labor Unions, composed of 11 unions 
with about 14,000 members; and the National Union of Cape Verde 
Workers, formed by the former ruling party but operating independently, 
composed of 14 unions with about 16,000 members. The Government does 
not interfere with the activities of these organizations, but the 
National Union of Cape Verde Workers claims that it received less than 
its share of funds for unions. Both unions suffer from a shortage of 
funds.
    The Constitution provides union members with the right to strike, 
and the Government generally respects this right. However, in July and 
August 1999, the workers of the shipping company Arca Verde made two 
attempts to strike. The Government invoked a ``civil request,'' under 
which it has the power, in an emergency or if a strike threatens 
coverage of basic needs, to name a list of minimum services that a 
union must continue to provide during any strike. Because of the 
Government's ``civil request,'' the crew and workers of four of the 
five ships in the fleet were required to continue working. According to 
the National Union of Cape Verde Workers, the Government's decision 
violated the law, since there was no emergency. The union claimed that, 
under such circumstances, the ``minimum services list'' that it 
presented to the Government would have ensured the continuation of 
essential services of public interest. The union presented the case to 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which in August 
1999 filed a complaint against the Government with the International 
Labor Organization (ILO). At year's end, the complaint remained 
unresolved.
    In its November report, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 
(CFA) noted that the Government amended legislation in April 1999 so 
that organizations of workers may enjoy the right to peaceful 
demonstration without unreasonable restrictions, in particular with 
regard to time. The CFA also reported that the Government began to take 
measures to amend its legislation so that in the event of disagreement 
between the parties on the minimum services to be respected during 
strikes, this difference of opinion is resolved by an independent body. 
However, at year's end, the Government had not created an independent 
body to resolve such differences.
    The law requires an employer either to reinstate a worker fired 
unjustly or to provide financial compensation. This law is enforced in 
practice.
    There were a number of strikes during the year, including a 3-day 
strike by firemen in Praia in February demanding wages equivalent to 
those of the police and a 2 day strike by teachers in November to 
protest delays in the payment of their salaries. There also were 
strikes by undergraduate students in November and meteorology workers 
in December; however, neither of the strikes resulted in concessions to 
the strikers.
    In 1999 the ILO invited the Government to contest a case presented 
by the labor union UNTO-CS regarding the arrest of two of its activists 
in connection with a demonstration in 1998. The Government contested 
the case in July, and the ILO requested that the Government revise its 
legislation to permit an independent agency to resolve disputes 
concerning the provision of minimum services during a strike. During 
the year, the Government took no action to revise its legislation; 
however, it did not prosecute persons who struck without providing 
``minimal services'' such as the strike by firemen in February.
    Unions are free to affiliate internationally and have ties with 
African and international trade union organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for the right to organize, to operate without 
hindrance, and to sign collective work contracts. Workers and 
management in the small private sector, as well as in the public 
sector, reach agreement through collective bargaining. Although there 
are no collective labor contracts, workers succeeded in collectively 
negotiating important issues such as salary increases. However, as the 
country's largest employer, the Government continued to play the 
dominant role in setting wages. It does not fix wages for the private 
sector, but salary levels for civil servants provide the basis for wage 
negotiations in the private sector. There are no collective bargaining 
agreements.
    A 1991 legislative decree bans antiunion discrimination by 
employers with fines for offenders. No cases were brought to court 
during the year.
    Praia has a 30-acre export processing zone, which houses two 
Portuguese companies and a Cape Verdean-Sengalese joint venture. There 
are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws for such 
zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids 
forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 14 years. The law 
prohibits children under the age of 16 from working at night, more than 
7 hours per day, or in establishments where toxic products are 
produced; but the Government rarely enforces the law. In practice the 
Ministry of Justice and Labor enforces minimum age laws with limited 
success, and then only in the urban, formal sectors of the economy.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces 
this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    The Government has taken no action on ILO Convention 182 on the 
worst forms of child labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no established minimum 
wage rates in the private sector. Large urban private employers link 
their minimum wages to those paid to civil servants. For an entry-level 
worker, this wage is approximately $120 (11,193 escudos) per month. The 
majority of jobs pay wages insufficient to provide a worker and family 
with a decent standard of living; most workers also rely on second 
jobs, extended family help, and subsistence agriculture.
    The maximum legal workweek for adults is 44 hours. While large 
employers generally respect these regulations, many domestic servants 
and agricultural laborers work longer hours.
    The Director General of Labor conducts periodic inspections to 
enforce proper labor practices and imposes fines on private enterprises 
that are not in conformity with the law. However, the Government does 
not enforce labor laws systematically, and much of the labor force does 
not enjoy their protection. Few industries employ heavy or dangerous 
equipment, and work-related accidents are rare.
    There is no legal provision for workers to remove themselves from 
unsafe working conditions without jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no law addressing trafficking 
in persons. Illegal trafficking in emigrants to various points in 
Europe is believed to be a thriving business, with the country as a 
transit point; it has become a concern for local authorities. Several 
notices in the press report that the police have arrested some persons, 
traffickers as well as victims. During the year, cases involved fewer 
than 30 persons. The Government is cooperating with European 
authorities, neighboring governments, and embassies to counter the 
problem.
                               __________

                        CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

    The Central African Republic is a constitutional democracy with a 
multiparty legislature. Ange Felix Patasse, leader of the Movement for 
the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC), who first was 
elected president in 1993, was reelected with a narrow majority in 
1999. The 1999 presidential election, like National Assembly elections 
held in late 1998, generally was free but was controlled by the 
Government and was marred by irregularities that tended to favor the 
ruling party candidate. Although the Constitution provides for 
separation of powers, the legislature is vulnerable to manipulation by 
the President, who dominates the Government. The president can veto 
legislation, although two-thirds of the unicameral legislature can 
override his veto, and he can rule by decree under special conditions. 
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, it is 
subject to executive interference.
    The National Police under the direction of the Ministry of Interior 
and Public Security, and the military forces and the national 
gendarmerie under the Ministry of Defense, are responsible for 
presidential security and share responsibility for internal security. 
On January 26, President Patasse issued a decree which dissolved the 
Special Forces for the Defense of the Democratic Institutions 
(FORSDIR), the body responsible for internal security, and replaced 
them with the Special Presidential Unit (USP). The decree also 
decreased the number of presidential security forces from approximately 
1,200 to approximately 400, and placed them under the full control of 
the Ministry of Defense. The integration of USP/FORSDIR into the 
military was completed by March; however, some remaining components of 
the decree were not implemented fully by year's end. The military, much 
of which mutinied in 1996-97, is widely perceived to be of doubtful 
loyalty to the Patasse Government, and implementation of government 
plans to reduce its size have been delayed by lack of funds for 
severance pay and pensions. MINURCA, a 1,350-person peacekeeping force, 
was deployed by the United Nations Security Council in 1998, with a 
mandate to assist national security forces in maintaining law and 
order, to strengthen the national reconciliation process, to maintain a 
climate of security and stability during the legislative and 
presidential elections, and to facilitate the disarmament process. In 
December 1999, MINURCA began to withdraw its forces over a 3-month 
period; the withdrawal was completed by February. The domestic security 
forces, and the USP in particular, continued to commit serious human 
rights abuses.
    The country is landlocked and sparsely populated. The majority of 
the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Principal exports 
are coffee, cotton, timber, tobacco, and diamonds. Annual per capita 
gross domestic product decreased from an estimated $330 in 1999 to an 
estimated $273 (CFA 206,388). Foreign assistance is an important source 
of national income. Salary arrears continued during the year for 
civilian employees and the military. The arrears continued to impair 
the functioning of the Government and the authority of the state to 
enforce the rule of law. The misappropriation of public funds and 
corruption in the Government diminished in comparison to previous 
years, but remained widespread; the decrease contributed to an increase 
in the country's revenue. The country suffered a major fuel shortage 
from May to July, which initially was provoked by the unauthorized use 
of the country's fuel reserves that were stored in neighboring 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The civil war in the DRC also 
impeded the safe passage of fuel by river into the country, which 
negatively impaired the economy.
    The Government's overall human rights record remained poor, with 
serious problems in many areas and deterioration in others. Citizens 
generally were able to choose their national government; however, the 
Government controls the electoral process. Security forces continued to 
commit extrajudicial killings, including government-approved executions 
of suspected bandits and killings reportedly committed for political 
reasons by members of the presidential guard. There also were credible 
reports of deaths of prisoners due to police abuse. Police continued to 
torture, beat, and otherwise abuse suspects and prisoners. Other human 
rights abuses included harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and 
detention; prolonged detention without trial; limits on judicial 
independence; and infringements on citizens' right to privacy. The 
Government restricted freedom of the press and freedom of assembly and 
association. There were some limits on freedom of religion and some 
limits on freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against 
women; female genital mutilation (FGM); child prostitution; 
discrimination against indigenous people (Pygmies); and child labor, 
including instances of forced child labor, continued to be problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
    Freedom From
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
continued to commit extrajudicial killings, including government-
approved executions of suspected bandits and killings reportedly 
committed for political reasons by members of the presidential guard. 
There also were credible reports of deaths of prisoners due to police 
abuse.
    A special police Squad for the Repression of Banditry (OCRB), 
formed in response to the spread of armed robbery throughout Bangui 
following the military mutinies of 1996 and 1997, continued to operate. 
The police commissioner continued repeatedly to publicize on radio and 
television the crimes of criminals apprehended by this squad; the OCRB 
executed these criminals the following day without a trial. 
Extrajudicial killings by the OCRB reportedly declined from over 100 in 
1998 to fewer than 6 during the year, according to BONUCA, the U.N. 
peace-building office in Bangui. Joseph Bindoumi, the country's chief 
prosecutor, indicated that he has no records regarding the activities 
or detainees of this police squad. Medical staff have confirmed that 
the OCRB often takes the bodies of persons it has executed to the 
hospital and leaves them for the family to pick up. The OCRB's use of 
extrajudicial killing has both official Government and popular support, 
and is seen as an effective means of reducing crime and increasing 
public security. The Government tacitly approved the actions taken by 
the police squad to reduce armed robbery; it never has prosecuted 
members of the security forces for these extrajudicial killings. 
Officials justify the unit's actions as a consequence of nonexistent 
prison facilities in Bangui.
    Some detainees died as a result of torture (see Section 1.c.). The 
Government tacitly approved the actions taken by the police squad to 
reduce armed robbery; it never has prosecuted members of the security 
forces for these extrajudicial killings. Police and security forces are 
immune from prosecution for extrajudicial killings.
    In November 1999, armed men, reportedly members of FORSDIR, killed 
former army lieutenant Antoine Gbodo, in his home in Kembe, and four 
others. In December 1999, the Government dispatched a team of gendarmes 
to Kembe to investigate the incident, accompanied by a group of 
National Assembly members from the largely pro-opposition region; 
however, no representative of the Government's Office of Human Rights 
was permitted to accompany the team. According to Kembe deputy Desire 
Kolingba, the Government submitted a report based on its independent 
investigation into the Kembe killing to the National Assembly. The 
Assembly did not discuss the report during its October session and it 
had not been released publicly by year's end. According to the Ministry 
of Defense, the general prosecutor concluded his investigation, but the 
results of that investigation also were not released by year's end.
    On February 5, armed bandits attacked a vehicle transporting 
religious personnel, killing one nun and wounding another (see Sections 
1.c, 2.d., and 5). The Government conducted a full investigation into 
the incident; however, it did not result in any arrests or indictments 
by year's end.
    On August 29, armed bandits shot the Libyan Ambassador, Al Sanoussi 
Awad Abdallah, in a carjacking attempt as he was leaving a restaurant 
in Bangui; he died 3 days later. In September authorities arrested 
three persons and charged them with the murder; the three remained in 
detention pending trial at year's end. A French suspect was released 
shortly after being arrested on September 5; he left the country. 
Although political motives were suspected, an investigation by the 
police concluded that the killing was the result of an attempted 
carjacking.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no deaths during the year 
due to mob violence, nor any mob killings of persons suspected of 
practicing witchcraft. There was no progress in the trial of those 
alleged to be involved in the February 1999 mob killing of three men 
suspected of witchcraft.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Although the Penal Code prohibits torture and specifies 
sanctions for those found guilty of physical abuse, police continued to 
torture, beat, and otherwise abuse criminal suspects and prisoners. As 
in previous years, family members and human rights groups, including 
the Human Rights League (HRL) Executive Committee, continued to file 
court complaints with the prosecutor, Joseph Bindoumi, based on the 
deaths of several prisoners due to police abuse. Approximately 15 to 20 
complaints were filed during the year; however, the authorities 
continued to take no action (see Section 1.a.).
    On January 23, several members of the Karako militia marched on 
President Patasse's residence demanding to be enlisted in the regular 
army (see Section 2.b.). The Special Anti-Riot Police Squad (FECU) used 
automatic weapons and teargas grenades to disperse the protesters, and 
arrested five persons (see Section 1.d.). One man was taken to the 
hospital with serious injuries as a result of being beaten by police. 
On February 4, police and ex-presidential guardsmen fired shots into 
the air to disperse a similar protest (see Section 2.b.).
    On November 14, riot police used tear gas and rubber bullets to 
disperse approximately 3,000 civil servants who marched in Bangui to 
protest salary arrears (see Section 6.a.). Witnesses said that police 
also beat several demonstrators.
    On December 19, USP and riot police used tear gas to violently 
disperse a demonstration at Bangui's Bonga-Bonga stadium (see Sections 
1.d. and 2.b.); police reportedly also beat several persons. 
Approximately 20 persons were injured during a stampede caused by the 
tear gas.
    Legislation adopted in November 1999 to restructure the military 
placed the Presidential Security Unit (USP), formerly the FORSDIR, 
under the civilian control of the Minister of Defense. The President 
signed the restructuring implementing decree on January 26, and the 
Presidential Security Unit was reduced in size and placed under the 
command of the Army Chief of Staff. The USP, like the FORSDIR, is a 
well-equipped force parallel to the military that frequently used 
excessive force in its operations; it reportedly also was responsible 
for other serious human rights abuses.
    The Government has not taken legal action against members of the 
presidential guard who tortured and beat trade union leader Sonny Cole 
in 1999.
    Travelers and religious groups, particularly Catholic priests and 
nuns, were victims of organized highway bandits near Grimari, 180 miles 
northeast of Bangui (see Section 2.d.). On February 5, armed bandits 
attacked a vehicle transporting religious personnel, killing one nun 
and wounding another. A week later, the funeral procession for the nun 
was attacked near the same place (see Section 5); no injuries were 
reported. The Government conducted a full investigation into the 
incidents; however, it did not result in any arrests by year's end.
    There were no developments in the case of the six armed men, 
alleged to be DRC soldiers, who in 1999 allegedly raped three foreign 
nuns at their residence in Bangassou, near the border with the DRC, and 
beat a local priest.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no cross-border conflicts 
or foreign troop movements by armed foreigners.
    Prison conditions are harsh. Ngaragba, Bangui's main prison, was 
ransacked during the 1996 mutinies. Approximately 255 detainees, half 
of whom are awaiting trial, still were being kept in 10 police stations 
around Bangui; however, President Patasse officially pardoned and 
released most of them during the year and the number remaining in 
detention at year's end was unknown. Police station cells in Bangui and 
prisons elsewhere are overcrowded, and basic necessities, including 
food, clothing, and medicine, are in short supply and often are 
confiscated by prison officials for their personal use. Prisoners 
frequently are forced to perform uncompensated labor at the residences 
of government officials and magistrates (see Section 6.c.). Male and 
female prisoners are confined in separate facilities in Bangui but 
housed together elsewhere. There are no separate detention facilities 
for juvenile offenders and minors in Bangui; elsewhere juvenile 
offenders routinely are housed with adults and are subjected to 
physical abuse. Although the Government has solicited funds to rebuild 
Bangui prison, construction had not started by year's end.
    The Government permits prison visits by international and local 
human rights monitors. The national Red Cross and international and 
local religious groups routinely provide supplies, food, and clothes to 
prisoners. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
unrestricted access to prisoners. On June 19, a representative of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights responsible for 
monitoring prison conditions in Africa visited prisons and detention 
facilities throughout the country, including those located in Bangui 
(see Section 4). He concluded that general prison conditions in the 
country did not meet international standards.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides 
protection against arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the 
security forces often ignored these provisions. The law stipulates that 
persons detained in cases other than those involving national security 
must be brought before a magistrate within 96 hours. In practice 
authorities often do not respect this deadline, in part due to 
inefficient judicial procedures. Judicial warrants are not required for 
arrest. By law, national security detainees are defined as ``those held 
for crimes against the security of the State'' and may be held without 
charge for up to 2 months.
    Prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem; approximately 
one-half of the male prison population is made up of pretrial 
detainees. President Patasse officially pardoned and released most of 
them during the year, and the number remaining in detention at year's 
end was unknown.
    On January 23, police arrested five protesters during 
demonstrations by members of the Karako militia; however, they 
subsequently were released without charges (see Sections 1.c. and 
2.b.).
    On December 19, police arrested 73 persons, including 4 members of 
the National Assembly, following a demonstration at Bangui's Bonga-
Bonga stadium (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). All 73 persons subsequently 
were released. On December 20, police issued an arrest warrant for 
attorney Assingambi Zarambaud, an open critic of the Government, in 
connection with the December 19 rally. Zarambaud went into hiding after 
the rally; his whereabouts were unknown at year's end.
    The law does not permit the use of exile, and the Government does 
not employ it in practice. The Government has stated repeatedly that 
any person in self-imposed exile for strictly political, rather than 
criminal, reasons may return without fear of persecution.
    e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, it is subject to executive 
interference.
    The judiciary consists of regular and military courts. New courts 
of justice were created in 1997 in both urban and rural areas. A 
juvenile court was created in 1998. However, these courts are not 
functioning due to inefficient administration, shortage of trained 
personnel, growing salary arrears, and a lack of material resources. 
The Criminal Court did not meet in session during the year.
    In criminal cases, the accused are presumed innocent and have the 
right to legal counsel, to public trial, to be present at their trials, 
and to confront witnesses. The Government generally respects these 
safeguards in practice in many cases; however, a number of persons were 
subjected to prolonged detention without trial or were summarily and 
extrajudicially killed by the OCRB (see Section 1.a. and 1.d.).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits invasion of homes without a warrant 
in civil and criminal cases. On occasions police used provisions of the 
Penal Code governing certain political and security cases that allowed 
them to search private property without a warrant. Security forces 
continued to carry out warrantless searches for guns and ammunition in 
private homes, a practice initiated in 1997 as part of a disarmament 
process following the 199697 military mutinies. The increase of 
banditry in Bangui has become a pretext for police to carry out 
warrantless house searches. The Government continued to monitor the 
telephones of some opposition figures and to engage in wiretapping 
without judicial authority.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government at times 
restricted the freedom of the print media to criticize the Government. 
Legislation enacted in 1998 rescinded the Government's authority to 
censor the press, defined the rights and responsibilities of private 
media, and created a High Broadcast Council to regulate the media; 
however, the Government continued to dominate domestic broadcast media. 
In August President Patasse issued a decree dissolving the High 
Broadcast Council without further explanation. Many observers believe 
that the President took such action because the Government cannot 
control the local private press. Libel cases are addressed in civil 
rather than criminal courts.
    Citizens continued to speak freely and publicly, criticizing the 
Government and political parties. Opposition leaders in particular used 
press statements, manifestos, and copies of open correspondence to the 
Government to circulate their views. The Government made no apparent 
effort to censor, seize, or halt the printing and circulation of these 
materials.
    The Government owns and controls two newspapers, the Agence 
Centrafricaine de Presse (ACAP) bulletin, which appears sporadically, 
and Be Africa Sango, which was not published during the year due to 
lack of finances. Echo de CentrAfrique, a private daily newspaper 
created at the beginning of 1999, is close to the ruling party. More 
than a dozen private newspapers were published over varying intervals; 
eight were published on a regular basis during the year. These 
newspapers often were outspoken in their criticism of the President, 
the Government's economic policies, and official corruption. In January 
both the President and Prime Minister threatened local journalists with 
sanctions if any newspaper transgressed the media code and went beyond 
journalistic propriety.
    On August 4, the editor of the private daily ``Le Citoyen'' was 
arrested and detained at the gendarmerie in Bangui. A presidential 
spokesman accused Maka Gbassokoto, the editor, of defamation following 
the newspaper's publication of an official letter sent by the spokesman 
to all businessmen requiring them to buy pictures of President Patasse 
and to deposit the payments in a special account opened for this 
purpose by the President's communication advisor. These instructions 
violated restrictions imposed by the IMF and the World Bank; only the 
public treasury is authorized to collect and manage government funds. 
Gbassokoto was released on August 5, immediately rearrested on 
presidential orders, and finally released on August 8, pending an 
August 21 trial. However, on August 20, the spokesman withdrew his 
complaint, which was seen by the private press as a victory over 
government harassment; all charges were dropped and the judge cancelled 
the trial.
    Radio is the most important medium of mass communication, since 
literacy is not universal and newspapers and television are relatively 
expensive and rarely are found outside urban areas. The Government owns 
and operates a radio station and a television station. Programming 
continued to be dominated by reporting on the activities of the 
President and senior government officials. It is a common complaint 
among political observers that ruling majority parties received more 
coverage of their activities or meetings than opposition parties. The 
presidency, especially the President's communications advisor, 
reportedly controls the radio programs and broadcasts. In 1999 some 
programs, such as a popular call-in show, whose listeners often 
expressed opinions critical of the Government, were taken off the air.
    Government television and radio broadcasts included weekly programs 
that provided an opportunity for political parties to present their 
views and discuss their programs during the 1999 presidential 
elections. Although the opposition originally welcomed this promised 
access to the public media, in practice such access did not 
materialize. During the 1998 legislative and 1999 presidential 
elections, political parties had access to the public media according 
to a schedule established by the High Council of Communication; 
opposition candidates received equal coverage and had equal access to 
state-owned media.
    Since the mid-1990's, the Government has relaxed partially its 
monopoly of domestic radio broadcasting. A private radio station, 
Africa Number One, part of a French-owned network based in Libreville, 
Gabon, has been broadcasting in Bangui since 1995. Its programming 
includes national news coverage by a correspondent based in the 
country. Radio Notre Dame, which is affiliated with the Catholic 
Church, also began operations in 1995. Its programming includes 
national news, debates, legal counseling, and human rights education. 
Radio France International (RFI) has been broadcasting domestically 
since 1997. Its programming includes some national news coverage by a 
correspondent based in the country. Radio MINURCA, the U.N. 
peacekeeping forces' radio that began broadcasting in 1998, ceased its 
operations on February 15. On June 3, a new private radio, N'deke Luka 
(Sangho for ``bird of luck''), started broadcasting from Bangui on FM 
and shortwave frequencies with assistance from foreign governments and 
development organizations. One of N'deke Luka's objectives is to 
promote peace and development by publicizing programs of international 
and local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) working in the region. 
There are no broadcast media entities either privately owned or 
operated by citizens of the country, as distinct from transnational 
French networks or Catholic networks. There are no privately owned 
stations that broadcast domestically produced national news or 
political commentary.
    The Government continued to monopolize domestic television 
broadcasting. Private television broadcasting is allowed by law; the 
High Council of Communication is responsible for authorizing private 
television as well as radio stations. No applications to establish a 
private television station have been received. The Government does not 
restrict domestic receipt or distribution of satellite or cable 
television, but few citizens can afford it, and it is not widespread 
even in the capital. A private telecommunications company, which was 
established pursuant to a 1996 law that liberalized telecommunications, 
operates a domestic Internet and e-mail service provider as well as 
cybercafes. Few citizens can afford home access to the Internet, but 
many urban residents rent brief access at cybercafes.
    Unlike in the previous year, the Government did not impede foreign 
journalists in their work.
    The Government respects academic freedom. University faculty and 
students belong to many political parties and generally express their 
views without fear of reprisal.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government restricted 
this right in practice on at least one occasion. In addition some legal 
restrictions on freedom of assembly remain. A 1992 decree requires 
organizers of demonstrations and public meetings to register with the 
Government 48 hours in advance and also prohibits political meetings in 
schools or churches. Unlike in the previous year, the Government did 
not ban public demonstrations and mass meetings nationwide; however, it 
rarely granted approval for public demonstrations. Prior to 1999, the 
Ministry of Interior generally had not prohibited demonstrations or 
public meetings if notified in advance. There were several incidents of 
Government interference with opposition meetings during the year. In 
1999 the Government banned the Union des Forces Acquises a la Paix 
(UFAP), a coalition of political parties, labor unions, and NGO's, from 
holding public meetings on the grounds that it was not a registered 
organization. The organization dissolved following the presidential 
election; on November 15, opposition parties formed The Coalition of 
Opposition Political Parties, replacing the UFAP.
    On January 23 and February 4, police forcibly dispersed 
demonstrations by members of the Karako militia (see Section 1.c.). The 
Karako militia, which come from President Patasse's district in the 
northwestern part of the country, was formed initially to protect the 
presidential regime during the 1996 and 1997 mutinies. The Ministry of 
Defense has enlisted several hundred of the 1000 Karako militiamen as 
it promised to do when recruiting the militiamen during the mutiny.
    On November 14, riot police forcibly dispersed approximately 3,000 
civil servants who marched in Bangui to protest salary arrears (see 
Section 6.a.). On November 24, over 10,000 civil servants and their 
union representatives marched through Bangui to protest salary arrears. 
Although the Government did not authorize the march, it did not take 
action to disperse it (see Section 6.a.).
    On December 19, at Bangui's Bonga-Bonga stadium, USP and riot 
police violently dispersed approximately 4,000 demonstrators. The 
rally, which had been banned by the Government, was organized by 
opposition leaders to protest salary arrears and call for the 
President's resignation; several persons were injured and numerous 
persons were arrested (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricted this right in practice. All associations 
including political parties must register with the Ministry of Interior 
in order to enjoy legal status. The Government usually grants 
registration expeditiously.
    There are more than 35 registered political parties and a variety 
of nonpolitical associations. The Government normally allows them to 
hold congresses, elect officials, and publicly debate policy issues 
without interference except when they advocated sectarianism or 
tribalism. Unlike the previous year, there were no incidents reported 
of Government restrictions on NGO activities during the year.
    The law prohibiting nonpolitical organizations from coalescing for 
political purposes remains in place; no significant reports of 
enforcement of this law were reported during the year, although 
government officials complained publicly about labor unions 
coordination with opposition political parties in year-end 
demonstrations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, but establishes fixed legal conditions and prohibits what the 
Government considers religious fundamentalism or intolerance. The 
constitutional provision prohibiting religious fundamentalism is widely 
understood to be aimed at Muslims. There is no state religion. In 
practice the Government permits adherents of all religions to worship 
without interference. Religious organizations and missionary groups are 
free to proselytize, worship, and construct places of worship.
    Religious groups (except for traditional indigenous religious 
groups) are required by law to register with the Ministry of Interior. 
This registration is free and confers official recognition and certain 
limited benefits, such as customs duty exemption for the importation of 
vehicles or equipment, but does not confer a general tax exemption. The 
Ministry's administrative police keep track of groups that have failed 
to register, but have not attempted to impose any penalty on such 
groups. The Ministry of Interior has registered more than 100 religious 
and nonreligious groups since 1993. However, any religious or non-
religious group that the Government considers subversive is subject to 
sanctions. The Ministry may decline to register, suspend the operations 
of, or ban any organization that it deems offensive to public morals or 
likely to disturb the peace. The Government has banned the Unification 
Church since the mid-1980's as a subversive organization likely to 
disturb the peace, specifically in connection with alleged paramilitary 
training of young church members. However, the Government imposed no 
new sanctions on any religious group during the year. The Ministry also 
may intervene to resolve internal conflicts about property, finances, 
or leadership within religious groups.
    Muslims, particularly Mbororo (also known as Peulh or Fulani) 
herders, claim to be singled out for harassment by authorities, 
including extortion by police, due to popular resentment of their 
presumed affluence.
    The practice of witchcraft is a criminal offense under the Penal 
Code; however, persons generally are prosecuted for this offense only 
in conjunction with some other offense, such as murder.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Persons are free to move about within 
the country, but the police, security forces, and other officials 
harass travelers unwilling or unable to pay bribes at checkpoints along 
major intercity roads and at major intersections in Bangui. However, 
under pressure from the National Assembly, the Ministry of Interior 
continued to remove some security forces checkpoints on the main roads 
outside the capital during the year.
    USP forces continued to be stationed at the airport to control 
travelers. The Government generally allows opposition leaders to travel 
outside or inside the country without restrictions. Although in the 
previous year, some citizens were prevented from leaving the country 
because their names were on unspecified official lists, there were no 
reports of such incidents during the year.
    Attacks by bandits on major routes to the north and east sometimes 
occurred, even though most travelers moved in convoys with military 
escorts. Travelers and religious groups, particularly Catholic priests 
and nuns, were victims of organized highway bandits near Grimari, 180 
miles northeast of Bangui. On February 5, armed bandits attacked a 
vehicle transporting religious personnel, killing one nun and wounding 
another. A week later, the funeral procession for the nun was attacked 
near the same place (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5); no injuries were 
reported. Archbishop Joachim Ndayen protested assaults against Catholic 
clergy by accusing the Government of indifference and of not stopping 
highway banditry or prosecuting the perpetrators. The Government also 
established military bases in East Zemio, Bambari, Bria, Kaga-Bandoro, 
and Bossangoa in an effort to curb highway banditry.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government respects 
these provisions in practice. The Government continued to work with the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in hosting Chadian, 
Sudanese, Rwandan, and Congolese refugees. Almost all refugees were 
registered with the National Commission for Refugees. However, there is 
concern that the Government and the UNHCR may not be prepared to handle 
a mass influx of Congolese refugees from the war in the DRC. The 
Government and the UNHCR established refugee camps in Boubou, Kaga-
Bandoro, and Mongoumba during the year.
    During the week of January 24, the Government moved Rwandan 
refugees from the Bouca camp, near Boubou, due to pressure from local 
residents. The refugees were relocated to Bangui, where they remained 
at year's end.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no cross-border conflicts 
or foreign troop movements by armed foreigners.
    Applicants for asylum generally are treated well and often are 
accepted. There were no reports of the forced return of persons 
considered to be refugees under international standards to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government. This right first was exercised in free and fair elections 
in 1993 that were the culmination of a successful democratization 
movement led by Ange Felix Patasse. Patasse's MLPC won both the 
presidency and a majority of seats in the unicameral national 
legislature. Citizens again exercised their constitutional right to 
change their government by democratic means through National Assembly 
and presidential elections in 1998 and 1999, respectively. 
International observers deemed both elections generally free and fair; 
however, the presidential elections were marred by irregularities in 
voter registration and distribution of electoral materials. Some of the 
registration irregularities tended to favor the ruling party.
    In the 1998 National Assembly elections, opposition parties won 55 
seats, while the ruling MLPC party of President Patasse and its allies 
won 54 seats. However, the defection of one opposition National 
Assembly member in December 1998 gave the ruling party and its 
coalition a one-seat majority. The opposition parties and the UFAP 
strongly protested this defection and boycotted the inauguration of the 
new session of the legislature.
    President Patasse's first term of office expired in 1999, but he 
was eligible constitutionally to seek a second consecutive term. In 
June 1999, the Government established an Independent Electoral 
Commission (CEMI) to supervise the presidential election. Although the 
CEMI included representatives from many political parties on its board, 
persons loyal to the President controlled it. The Government explicitly 
rejected suggestions by elements of the international community, which 
provided material and financial support for the election, that the 
executive branch of the Government not involve itself in the management 
of the electoral process. In August 1999, President Patasse promulgated 
a decree that subordinated CEMI to the state Organ of Control (OCASPA), 
a state organization that he had created by decree in May 1999 to 
oversee the election process. Before the presidential election, there 
were credible reports of attempts to inflate sharply the number of 
registered voters in pro-MLPC northern areas, although this was 
corrected before the polling. The Government postponed the first round 
of the presidential election, first from August 29 to September 12, and 
then to September 19, after serious problems in ballot distribution 
became evident; however, the Government denied requests from opposition 
leaders for further delays to permit more complete resolution of the 
problems with the electoral process. Some provisions of the electoral 
code, requiring publication of voter lists at least 15 days before the 
election and distribution of voter identification cards at least 8 days 
before the election, were not respected. On election day, a shortage of 
ballots was reported in some largely pro-opposition districts. 
Opposition party poll-watchers reported the use of some falsified voter 
identification documents by voters, and there were several reports of 
ballot boxes being delivered to the CEMI without certified tally 
sheets, or from unofficial polling places.
    Two weeks after the voting, the Constitutional Court announced the 
official results of the election and declared President Patasse 
reelected with 51.6 percent of the votes cast. Nine other candidates 
certified by the Constitutional Court had competed in the election. The 
Constitution required a secondround runoff election if no candidate 
received 50 percent of votes cast in the first round election. However, 
only one of the unsuccessful candidates filed a complaint with the 
Constitutional Court.
    There was occasional violence during the presidential election 
campaign, including fighting in Bangui between supporters of President 
Patasse and former president Kolingba, and attacks by some opposition 
supporters on foreign diplomats whose governments' were perceived to 
have supported Patasse.
    The Constitution provides for multiple political parties. The state 
is highly centralized. The central Government appoints all subnational 
government officials, and subnational government entities have no 
significant fiscal autonomy. The Government has not held 
constitutionally required local elections in recent years, ostensibly 
due to budgetary restrictions. The Government has appointed four 
successive mayors, including the current mayor of Bangui, the capital, 
a southern city well outside the ruling party's main political base in 
the north (see Section 5).
    On April 14, the opposition groups in Parliament filed a motion of 
censure against Prime Minister Anicet-Georges Dologuele and his cabinet 
in response to a series of political and financial scandals in the 
early part of the year, including allegations of connections of public 
officials with organized crime, the illegal transfer of laundered money 
through the Central Bank, the duty-free purchase and subsequent sale of 
oil in the country by a company close to the presidency, and the 
renting of government cars to visitors attending an official conference 
organized by the Government. The latter scandal led to the resignation 
of two ministers and a partial reshuffle of government officials. The 
motion won 43 of the 50 opposition votes, but the Prime Minister 
survived this vote of noconfidence with 58 votes (out of 109).
    On July 8, following the month-long fuel crisis, 6 opposition 
parties holding 5 of the 109 seats in the National Assembly called on 
President Patasse to resign. In meetings with and statements to private 
newspapers, opposition leaders attributed the fuel crisis to the 
President's irresponsibility, incompetence, corruption, predation, and 
his ambiguous relationship with both DRC President Laurent Desiree 
Kabila and rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba. In reaction, political 
parties and personalities close to Patasse expressed their support for 
the President through a communique read on local radio and television, 
and accused the opposition of a brainwashing campaign.
    There are no laws that restrict the participation of women or 
minorities in the political process; however, women are 
underrepresented in government and politics. Before and during the 
legislative and presidential elections in 1998 and 1999, the 
Government's Department of Social Affairs and women's NGO's implemented 
programs and launched an extensive public awareness campaign to 
encourage women to register to vote and to compete for public office; 
however, the effect has been nominal as there are very few women in 
prominent government positions. Only 8 members of the National Assembly 
are women, and only 3 of the 25 cabinet members are women. In 1999 the 
President, for the first time, appointed five women as prefects.
    There are no laws that restrict the participation of minorities, in 
the political process; however, minorities are underrepresented in 
government and politics.
    President Patasse is a member of the Sara-Kaba ethnic group. 
Members of northern ethnic groups, including the Sara and Baya, 
continued to predominate among the President's advisors, in the 
leadership of the ruling party, and among ruling party members of the 
National Assembly. Both Prime Minister Dologuele and National Assembly 
President Luc Dondon Konambaye are distant relatives of Patasse. In 
November 1999, President Patasse appointed a more ethnically diverse 
Government, which now includes more than 12 different ethnic groups, 
such as the Gbaya, Banda, Kaba, Dagba, Manjda, Ngbaka, Azande, Youlou, 
Rounga, Yakoma, and Banziri groups. At year's end, there was one Muslim 
in the Prime Minister's cabinet, and there were at least five Muslims 
in the National Assembly.
    Pygmies (Ba'aka), the indigenous inhabitants of the southern part 
of the country, who represent 1 to 2 percent of the population, are not 
represented in the Government and have little political power or 
influence.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Central African Human Rights League (LCDH) publicizes human 
rights violations and pleads individual cases of human rights abuses 
before the courts. The LCDH continued to distribute to prisons, police 
stations, courts, schools, and other NGO's pamphlets describing human 
rights and information on judicial access. In August the LCDH issued a 
press release protesting the arbitrary arrest and detention of Maka 
Gbassokoto, editor of the daily newspaper ``Le Citoyen,'' (see Section 
2.a). Unlike in the previous year, security forces did not harass the 
president of the LDCH.
    The Association of Central African Women Lawyers advises women of 
their legal rights (see Section 5). Several other NGO's, including the 
Movement for the Defense of Human Rights and Humanitarian Action and 
some religious groups actively monitor human rights problems. Although 
the Government supported the role that some of these NGO's played in 
mediating its negotiations with military mutineers in 1996 and 1997, it 
did not welcome their criticism that some officials close to MLPC 
involved in alleged corruption scandals were neither arrested nor tried 
(see Section 3).
    International NGO's are permitted in general to visit and monitor 
human rights problems; however, no organizations other than the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHRR) visited the country 
during the year. On June 19, a representative of the ACHRR visited 
prisons and detention facilities throughout the country (see Section 
1.c.).

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution stipulates that all persons are equal before the 
law without regard to wealth, race, sex, or religion, but the 
Government does not enforce these provisions effectively, and 
significant discrimination exists.
    Women.--Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs 
although inadequate data make it impossible to quantify the extent. 
Victims seldom report incidents. The courts try very few cases of 
spousal abuse, although litigants cite these abuses during divorce 
trials and civil suits. Some women reportedly tolerate abuse in order 
to retain a measure of financial security for themselves and their 
children. The Government did not address this problem during the year.
    In practice women are treated as inferior to men both economically 
and socially. Single, divorced, or widowed women, even with children, 
are not considered by society to be heads of households. Only men are 
entitled to family subsidies. Women in rural areas generally suffer 
more discrimination than do women in urban areas. Approximately 60 to 
70 percent of urban women have attended primary school, whereas only 10 
to 20 percent of their rural counterparts have done so. At the primary 
level, women and men enjoy equal access to education, but the majority 
of young women drop out at age 14 or 15 due to social pressure to marry 
and bear children. Only 20 percent of the students at the University of 
Bangui are female. There are no accurate statistics on the percentage 
of female wage earners. Women's access to educational opportunities and 
to jobs, particularly at upper levels in the professions or in the 
government service, traditionally has been limited. Several active 
women's groups organized workshops and seminars to promote women's and 
children's rights and to fully participate in the political process. In 
February in Bossangoa, UNESCO funded a workshop to educate women on the 
principles of peace and democracy. On December 6, BONUCA organized a 
seminar with different NGO's, including many women's groups, on 
promoting human rights. In October a delegation of women attended the 
Women's International Symposium on Health and World March of Women.
    Polygyny is legal, although this practice faces growing resistance 
among educated women. The law authorizes a man to take up to four 
wives, but a prospective husband must indicate at the time of the first 
marriage contract whether he intends to take additional wives. In 
practice many couples never marry formally because men cannot afford 
the traditional bride payment. Women who are educated and financially 
independent tend to seek monogamous marriages. Divorce is legal and may 
be initiated by either partner. The law does not discriminate against 
women in inheritance and property rights, but a number of conflicting 
customary laws often prevail. A family code designed to strengthen 
women's rights was enacted in May 1998; it has had a positive effect in 
strengthening women's rights, particularly in the courts. The 
Association of Central African Women Lawyers advises women of their 
legal rights, and publishes pamphlets in conjunction with the Ministry 
of Social Affairs on the dangers of female genital mutilation (FGM).
    Children.--Although there is no official discrimination against 
children, the Government spends little money on programs for children. 
Churches and NGO's have relatively few programs for youths. The failure 
of the education system, caused by a meager budget and salary arrears, 
has resulted in a shortage of teachers and an increase in the number of 
street children. Public education is free and education is compulsory 
from ages 6 to 14; however, parents rarely are prosecuted for their 
children's nonattendance. Moreover, in practice, the age that a child 
starts school often varies by 2 to 3 years in rural areas. Many 
children survive by begging and stealing. Several charitable 
organizations work to assist children. In some rural areas, teachers or 
principals use their pupils as farm laborers (see Section 6.c.). The 
teachers' strike that lasted throughout 1999 and further reduced 
education opportunities for children ended in August; however, the 
strike resumed in October and was ongoing at year's end.
    Juvenile prisoners routinely are housed with adults and often are 
subject to physical abuse (see Section 1.c.).
    Some girls enter prostitution to earn money for their families (see 
Section 6.c.). Until late 1999, child prostitution increased in the 
capital due to the presence of international peacekeeping forces; 
however, the number of teenage prostitutes in the country decreased 
during the year as international peacekeeping forces withdrew from the 
country. The Government did not address this problem during the year.
    The Penal Code forbids parental abuse of children under the age of 
15 years. The Family Code was designed to strengthen children's rights. 
Illegitimate children now have the same rights as those born in 
wedlock. A juvenile court was set up in 1998 but has not begun 
operations due to lack of resources (see Section 1.c.).
    A 1996 ordinance banned female genital mutilation (FGM), which is 
widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both 
physical and psychological health; however, girls continued to be 
subjected to this traditional practice in certain rural areas, and to a 
lesser degree in Bangui. Approximately 45 to 50 percent of adult 
females have undergone FGM. In August the International Committee of 
African Women for Development (CIFAD), a central Africanbased women's 
rights organization, began a national campaign against FGM with 
financial assistance from a foreign donor. During the year, a 
Government-NGO campaign continued to reduce incidence of FGM in rural 
areas.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no codified or cultural 
discrimination against the disabled. There are several government-
initiated programs designed to assist the disabled, including 
handicraft training for the blind and the distribution of wheelchairs 
and carts by the Ministry of Social Services. There are no legislated 
or mandated accessibility provisions for the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--Despite constitutional protection, there is 
societal discrimination against Pygmies (Ba'aka), the earliest known 
inhabitants of the rain forest in the southern part of the country, who 
make up approximately 1 to 2 percent of the country's population. In 
general Pygmies have little input in decisions affecting their lands, 
culture, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources. 
Indigenous forest-dwelling Pygmies, in particular, are subject to 
social and economic discrimination and exploitation, which the 
Government has done little to correct. Pygmies often work for villagers 
at wages lower than those paid to members of other groups.
    Religious Minorities.--Although religious tolerance among members 
of different religious faiths is the norm, there have been occasional 
reports that some villagers who were believed to be witches were 
harassed, beaten, or sometimes killed by neighbors. Witchcraft 
traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases for which the 
causes were unknown. The practice of witchcraft is widely understood to 
encompass attempts to harm others not only by magic, but also by covert 
means of established efficacy such as poisons. Courts have tried, 
convicted, and sentenced some persons for crimes of violence against 
suspected witches. Unlike in the previous year, there were no mob 
killings of persons suspected of practicing witchcraft during the year.
    Muslims (who constitute about 15 percent of the population), 
particularly Mbororo (also known as Peulh or Fulani) herders, continued 
to claim that they were singled out for harassment by authorities, 
including extortion by police, due to popular resentment of their 
presumed affluence. Muslims play a preponderant role in the economy.
    Generally, amicable relations exist among members of different 
religious faiths. When serious social or political conflicts have 
arisen between the various religious communities, simultaneous prayer 
ceremonies have been held in churches, temples, and mosques to ask for 
divine assistance. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace often 
conducts developmental and educational programs and seminars throughout 
the country. The members work closely with other church groups and 
social organizations on social issues. On April 15, the commission 
organized a large, nationally televised rally at the national stadium 
to promote dialogue on peace and tolerance, with President Ange-Felix 
Patasse and other government officials in attendance.
    Religious groups, particularly Catholic priests and nuns, were 
victims of organized armed highway bandits northeast of Bangui (see 
Sections 1.a. and 2.d.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of about 3.5 
million includes approximately 90 ethnic groups; many of these groups 
speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated regionally 
outside urban areas. The largest ethnic groups are the Baya (more than 
30 percent), the Banda (more than 25 percent), the Mandja (more than 20 
percent), and the Sara (about 10 percent). The Mbororo make up about 5 
percent of the population but play a preponderant role in the economy. 
They are involved in mining development and remain the most important 
cattle breeders in the country.
    Until 1993 members of Kolingba's ethnic group, the Yakoma subgroup 
of the Ngbandi, held a disproportionate number of senior positions in 
government, the armed forces, and stateowned firms. As a result of 
President Patasse's 1993 election, Yakomas no longer hold a 
disproportionate number of positions in the civil service, but the 
armed forces still are being restructured to achieve greater ethnic 
balance. At year's end Yakomas still constituted the majority of the 
army. Approximately 80 percent of USP, former FORSDIR, members are 
native to the President's northern region; many belong to the 
President's Kaba ethnic group or closely related groups.
    Major political parties tend to have readily identifiable ethnic or 
ethnic-regional bases. The results of the 1998 legislative elections 
and the 1999 presidential election confirmed that the MLPC Party of 
President Patasse has strong support in the north, especially among the 
Sara and Baya ethnic groups, but also has strengthened its support in 
the capital. The Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) party of 
former President Dacko is strong in the southwestern part of the 
country and the Central African Democratic Rally (RDC) Party of 
Kolingba, is popular in the southeast, in the Oubangui River basin, 
especially among the Yakoma.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Under the Labor Code, all workers are 
free to form or join unions without prior authorization. A relatively 
small part of the workforce has exercised this right, chiefly wage 
earners such as civil servants. There are five recognized labor 
federations. The two most important are the Organization of Free Public 
Sector Unions and the Labor Union of Central African Workers (USTC), 
which are independent of the Government.
    Unions have the right to strike in both the public and private 
sectors. To be legal, strikes must be preceded by the union's 
presentation of demands, the employer's response to these demands, a 
conciliation meeting between labor and management, and a finding by an 
arbitration council that union and employer failed to reach agreement 
on valid demands. The union also must provide 8 days' advance written 
notification of a planned strike. The Labor Code states that if 
employers initiate a lockout that is not in accordance with the code, 
the employer is required to pay workers for all days of the lockout. 
Other than this, the code contains no other provisions regarding 
sanctions on employers for acting against strikers. No employer actions 
against strikers are known to have occurred during the year. The 
teacher's strike that lasted throughout 1999 and further reduced 
education opportunities for children ended in August; however, the 
strike resumed in October and was ongoing at year's end. Health workers 
went on strike several times during the year to protest unpaid salaries 
and poor working conditions. The last such strike began in August and 
was ongoing at year's end.
    Since October the major labor federations have mobilized all 
striking civil servants to demand that the Government pay at least 12 
months worth of salary arrears. On November 14, approximately 3,000 
civil servants marched through Bangui to protest 30 months of unpaid 
salary. The Government had agreed to pay 3 months of arrears; however, 
it only paid 2 months worth to some civil servants. The march was 
dispersed by riot police who released tear gas, shot rubber bullets at 
the protesters, and reportedly beat several demonstrators (see Section 
1.c.). On November 24, labor federations representing civil servants 
marched through Bangui again to protest salary arrears. The Government 
did not authorize the strike by over 10,000 civil servants and their 
union representatives; however, unlike in the previous march, the riot 
police did not disperse the protestors. Following the march, the 
Government agreed to pay 1 month of arrears; however, only some police, 
military officials, gendarmes, Justice Department officials, and health 
and education workers were able to collect their salaries. On December 
11, all unions organized a ``ville morte'' or dead city strike to 
protest salary arrears. The strike closed offices, shops, and markets 
in Bangui from 5 a.m. to 4 p.m. On December 13, students from the 
University of Bangui marched to protest arrears, and on December 14, 
women's organizations marched for the same reason.
    Labor federations are free to affiliate internationally. The USTC 
is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade 
unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
grants trade unions full legal status, including the right to sue in 
court. It requires that union officials be full-time wage-earning 
employees in their occupation, but they are allowed to conduct union 
business during working hours. The code does not provide specifically 
that unions may bargain collectively. While collective bargaining has 
taken place in the past, there was no collective bargaining during the 
year.
    The Ministry of Labor and Civil Service sets wage scales. Salary 
arrears continued during the year at the same rate as the previous year 
for both civilian (12 months) and military (9 months) personnel; 
arrears continued to be a major complaint of the unions.
    The law expressly forbids discrimination against employees on the 
basis of union membership or union activity. Employees can have their 
cases heard in the labor court. The Labor Code does not state whether 
employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to 
reinstate workers fired for union activities; however, employers 
legally are required to pay damages, including back pay and lost wages.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is 
specifically prohibited by the Labor Code; however, prisoners were 
forced to work without compensation for government officials or 
magistrates (see Section 1.c.). The Labor Code also applies to 
children, although it does not specifically prohibit forced labor by 
children; however, the Government does not have sufficient resources to 
enforce the prohibition effectively and some parents force their 
daughters into prostitution to help support the family (see Sections 5 
and 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code forbids the employment of children less 
than 14 years of age; however, the Ministry of Labor and Civil Service 
enforces the provision only loosely. In practice child labor is common 
in many sectors of the economy, especially in rural areas. In some 
rural areas, teachers or principals use school children as labor on 
farms some rural schools have farms where teachers ostensibly teach 
school children how to work the land, because many students do not 
further their education beyond secondary school and return to their 
villages to work. The schools use the proceeds from the sale of the 
farm produce to purchase school supplies and equipment and to fund 
school-related activities. The Labor Code generally covers all labor 
sectors, although specific regulations cover specific sectors. In some 
cases, the Labor Code provides that the minimum age for employment 
could be reduced to 12 years of age for some types of light work in 
traditional agricultural activities or home services. The Government 
has adopted laws and regulations proscribing the worst forms of child 
labor, which the Labor Code defines as ``dangerous work or work 
involving serious risk for the children's health, security or 
morality.'' In addition to the minimum age for basic employment, the 
code also defines age 14 as the maximum age at which children are 
required to be enrolled in school.
    The Labor Code prohibits forced and bonded labor in general 
although it does not specifically prohibit forced labor by children; 
however, the Government does not enforce its provisions effectively and 
there were reports of forced prostitution by children (see Sections 5 
and 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code states that the 
Minister of Labor must set minimum wages by decree. The minimum wage 
varies by sector and by kind of work. For example, the monthly minimum 
wage is equivalent to approximately $12 (CFA 7,800) for agricultural 
workers but approximately $28 (CFA 18,000) for office workers. The 
minimum wage does not enable a worker and family to maintain a decent 
standard of living. Most labor is performed outside the wage and social 
security system, especially by farmers in the large subsistence 
agricultural sector. The Government owes at least 12 months worth of 
salary arrears to civil servants (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.b., and 
6.a.).
    The law sets a standard workweek of 40 hours for government 
employees and most private sector employees. Household employees may 
work up to 55 hours per week. The law also requires a minimum rest 
period of 48 hours a week.
    There also are general laws on health and safety standards in the 
workplace, but the Ministry of Labor and Civil Service neither 
precisely defines nor actively enforces them, a matter about which the 
International Labor Organization has expressed concern to the 
Government for many years. The Labor Code states that a labor inspector 
may force an employer to correct unsafe or unhealthy work conditions, 
but it does not provide the right for workers to remove themselves from 
such conditions without risk of loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law was known specifically to 
prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that 
persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                  CHAD

    Chad is a centralized republic dominated by a strong presidency. 
President Idriss Deby, leader of the Patriotic Salvation Movement 
(MPS), has ruled since taking power in a 1990 rebellion. The Sovereign 
National Conference (CNS) confirmed Deby in 1993 as Chief of State, and 
he was elected President in 1996 under a Constitution adopted in a 
referendum earlier that year. According to credible reports, fraud, 
widespread vote-rigging, and local irregularities marred both the 1996 
presidential election and the 1997 legislative elections in which 
members of the MPS won 65 of 125 seats in the National Assembly. The 
Government remained unable to exert effective control over the 
northwestern region of the country where former Defense Minister 
Youssouf Togoimi began a rebellion in October 1998. The Supreme Court 
began full operations in October. In May the National Assembly enacted 
a law calling for the election of 15 members of the High Court of 
Justice as required by the Constitution; they were elected on May 24. 
Despite these steps in fulfilling the 1996 Constitution's requirement 
for the establishment of an independent judiciary, the courts remained 
ineffective, overburdened, and subject to outside interference, 
including by the executive branch.
    The army, Gendarmerie (State Police Force), police, National and 
Nomadic Guard (NNG), and intelligence services are responsible for 
internal security. Officers from President Deby's ethnic group dominate 
the Rapid Intervention Force (FIR), and the National Security Agency 
(ANS), a counterintelligence organization that has acted as an internal 
political police force. The National Army, Gendarmerie, the NNG, and 
the Republican Guard (the Presidential Security Force) were deployed to 
fight the rebels. The security forces continued to commit serious human 
rights abuses.
    The economy is based on subsistence agriculture, herding, and 
fishing. Annual per capita income is estimated at $239. The country has 
little industry; its chief export is cotton. Among the impediments to 
sustainable economic growth are corruption, numerous state-owned 
monopolies, a bloated civil service, and a thriving informal sector 
outside government taxation policies. The Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline 
project officially started in October, and the construction of 
infrastructure for the project began during the year. The Government 
remains heavily dependent on assistance from external donors and 
international financial institutions.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and serious 
problems continued. The Government limited citizens' right to change 
their government. State security forces committed extrajudicial 
killings, disappearances, and tortured, beat, abused, and raped 
persons. Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. 
Security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. 
Although the Government detained and convicted some members of the its 
security forces implicated or accused of criminal acts, it rarely 
prosecuted or sanctioned members of the security forces who commit 
human rights abuses. The Government also did not prosecute or punish 
security force personnel accused in previous years of killings, rape, 
torture, arbitrary arrest and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention 
remained a problem. The judiciary remains subject to executive 
interference and is unable to provide citizens with prompt trials. The 
Government holds political detainees. Security forces used illegal 
searches and wiretaps and monitored the contents of private mail. The 
Government at times infringed on freedom of speech and of the press. 
The Government continued to threaten judicial action against 
independent newspapers for publishing material, which it deemed 
prejudicial to the Government, on the rebellion in the north and 
actions of senior officials. The Government limited freedom of 
assembly. At times the Government limited freedom of religion and 
movement. Violence and societal discrimination against women remained 
common. Female genital mutilation (FGM) remained widespread. Both 
official and societal ethnic and regional discrimination remained 
widespread; northerners, in particular members of President Deby's 
Zaghawa ethnic minority, continued to dominate key positions in the 
public sector. There also were reports of forced labor, including 
forced child labor. Child labor is a problem. Serious armed conflict 
between the Government and rebels in the Tibesti continued.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Officially 
sanctioned extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals by police, 
customs officers, and gendarmes continued, although some members of the 
security forces, who committed such acts, were taken into custody for 
judicial adjudication. Units of the armed forces were responsible for 
the extrajudicial killings of suspected members of the northwestern 
rebellion in the Tibesti.
    In January a relative of an advisor to rebel leader Togoimi 
reported that police killed 25 Tabou men, including a relative of 
Togoimi, after arresting them (see Section 1.d.).
    According to human rights groups, in May the armed forces arrested 
and killed four persons, Sougui Mahamat Taher, Chaha Bougar, Ali Bakai 
Boursa, and Sougou Allatchi Tollymi in Zouar (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti). 
They were suspected of being supporters of the MDJT. At year's end, 
there had been no government investigation of the incident and no 
action taken against the personnel involved.
    In May Le Temps newspaper reported that 8 armed Republican Guards 
kidnaped 10 persons, including 7 soccer players, from a public park in 
N'Djamena. The Republican Guards killed a 20-year-old man by breaking 
his neck. The others of those kidnaped received serious injuries; they 
were beaten by the Republican Guards. There were no reports of legal 
action against the Republican Guards involved.
    On October 5, security officials reportedly beat and abused a 
Zaghawa tribesman, who died at his home 3 days after his release from 
custody (see Section 1.c.).
    Armed bandits operated on many roads, assaulting, robbing, and 
killing travelers; some bandits were identified as active duty soldiers 
or deserters (see Section 2.d.).
    There was no action taken in several 1999 extrajudicial killings. 
For example, no action was taken against officials in Bol who beat to 
death three men in February 1999 or against police in Tan'djile after 
two businessmen died while in their custody in January 1999. No action 
was taken against the security forces who killed seven presumed thieves 
in the Mayo Kebbi and Bongor areas in January 1999. Likewise, no action 
was taken against Hemchi Dogori, a gendarme who in July 1999 fired on a 
group of villagers in Gourma and wounded nine persons and killed 
another.
    During the year, approximately 10,000 government armed forces 
engaged in sporadic battles with 1,000 to 2,000 insurgents in the 
Tebesti region in the northwest part of the country. Both government 
and insurgent forces suffered heavy casualties, including members of 
the leadership. On July 17, the Government suffered heavy casualties 
when the insurgents seized a major base. At year's end, the fighting 
intensified, and there were heavy casualties on both sides.
    Throughout the year, members of the Tibesti rebellion reported that 
members of the army committed human rights abuses and killed suspected 
collaborators among the civilian population.
    Landmines laid by government, foreign, and rebel forces in previous 
years caused several deaths and injuries during the year.
    b. Disappearances.--In May soldiers in Tibesti followed and opened 
fire on businessman Souleyman Toke and a friend who were returning from 
Libya by car. Souleyman's friend was injured seriously and evacuated to 
Faya hospital. Toke was accused of supporting the Togoimi rebellion and 
sent to N'Djamena. He has not been seen since that time.
    Cases of disappearances from 1998 remained unsolved. Political 
detainees either eventually are released or they disappear. In February 
1998, security forces arrested Kibel Justin in Sarh for suspicion of 
aiding rebel leader Dr. Nahor Ngawara Mamouth. Although most of the 
detainees who were held for complicity in Dr. Nahor's 1998 kidnaping of 
four Frenchmen were released in July 1998, Kibel Justin cannot be 
accounted for nor has he been located in other prisons.
    c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and 
degrading or humiliating treatment; however, members of the security 
forces tortured, beat, abused, and raped citizens. During the year, 
three members of the security forces were prosecuted; however, they 
escaped from prison.
    In March a group of policemen led by the deputy police chief of 
Pala beat Tigalou Mbaiky, a local secondary school teacher. They 
subjected him to various forms of torture including ``arbatachar'' 
(where the victim's arms and legs are tied behind his back cutting off 
circulation and sometimes resulting in paralysis). The police then 
dragged Mbaiky to the jail, which was approximately 45 yards away, 
where he was detained without charge or trial; however, by year's end, 
he was released.
    In March according to human rights groups, uniformed soldiers 
threatened and harassed the wife and minor children of rebel leader 
Youssouf Togoimi. In March the Government refused to issue them 
passports. In another attack upon Mrs. Togoimi, according to Le Temps, 
security forces were prevented from entering her home by relatives; 
however, on March 17, they beat her as she left her home. In April 
members of the armed forces illegally evicted the Togoimi family from 
their home in N'Djamena. At year's end, they were staying with a 
relative in N'Djamena with their movements closely observed by 
government security agents. No charges were filed against Mrs. Togoimi.
    In May eight armed Republican Guards reportedly kidnaped 10 persons 
from a public park in N'Djamena, killing 1 and seriously injuring the 
others (see Section 1.a.).
    In May 12 customs agents beat Armel Ramadji, a high school student, 
and fractured his skull. The newspaper Le Temps reported that Ramadji 
was returning home about 5:00 p.m. when he was stopped by several 
customs agents. The agents reportedly believed he was a smuggler, 
ordered him to open his briefcase, and then began beating him. Also in 
May, members of the N'Djamena police severely beat a civilian, 
Abdoulaye Absakine. The police chief reportedly ordered one of his 
agents to shoot Absakine, but the agent refused to do so.
    In June the army badly beat and tortured inhabitants of several 
villages in the south--Bessokoyan, Bekolo, Bembaitada, and Bamadja--
whom they accused of supporting the rebel chief Kette Nodji Moise. 
Soldiers beat the Bessokoyan village chief, Gaston Gangnon, and 
tortured the chief of Bekolo, paralyzing his left arm. Soldiers also 
raped women in the villages and stole possessions.
    On August 15, five soldiers attacked and stoned a defendant at a 
session of N'Djamena's criminal court. The soldiers were friends of the 
person the defendant was accused of murdering. Later that day, the 
Minister of Justice publicly criticized the attack and said that the 
soldiers should protect the courts, not abuse them. On August 17, the 
Minister of Defense delivered the five soldiers to the Minister of 
Justice. Four of the five were convicted and sentenced to 4 years in 
prison without parole and fined $100 (75,000 CFA); one of the accused 
was acquitted.
    On October 5, two security officials reportedly beat and abused a 
Zaghawa tribesman by the name of Hissein who was acting erratically 
near a Western embassy. He died at his home 3 days after his release 
from the National Security prison on October 11. At year's end, no 
action had been taken against the officials.
    After obtaining authorization from President Deby, victims filed a 
class action suit against torturers in the Habre regime on January 25; 
however, at year's end, the action had not been adjudicated.
    In September 1999, members of police and military forces tortured a 
businesswoman. Although President Deby dismissed the Minister of 
Justice and other senior officials as a result of the negative 
publicity generated by the incident, there was no legal action against 
the police or military officials. No action was taken against the 
military officers and ANS agents who tortured Dr. Djibrine Ibrahim from 
February 1998 to June 1999. The Government did not permit Dr. Ibrahim 
legal counsel nor did it bring him before a judge on formal charges. No 
action was taken against police who dispersed demonstrations in 
February 1999 and injured two students. No action was taken against 
members of the N'Djamena gendarmerie who severely beat a member of the 
National Sugar Society for allegedly embezzling funds, nor against two 
members of the Ati gendarmerie who broke the arm of a student in 
January 1999.
    The Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Unit (RAID), a specialized 
police unit under the Ministry of Interior's authority, which committed 
numerous human rights abuses in previous years, was disbanded in 1999. 
During the year, a new chief of the Police Rapid Action Company (CARP) 
dismissed corrupt members of the unit.
    Impunity for those who commit human rights abuses remained 
widespread. Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening. Prisons 
were characterized by serious overcrowding; poor sanitation; inadequate 
food, shelter, and medical facilities. The Government reported that 
there were 2,385 prisoners in 46 operational prisons throughout the 
country with one-third in N'Djamena's Central Prison. The prison, 
reportedly scheduled to be completed in June, did not open during the 
year. Juvenile males were held with adult male prisoners. Female 
prisoners usually were separated from males. The law provides that a 
doctor must visit each prison three times a week; however, there were 
credible reports that this was not done. The law authorizes forced 
labor in prison.
    In 1999 human rights organizations called on the Government to 
investigate numerous accusations by citizens in the Kenga canton of the 
Guera prefecture who claimed that the canton chief was operating a 
private prison in which some prisoners were tortured and whipped. 
During the year, observers reported that the canton chief had closed 
the prison and that no prisoners were being held.
    The Government permitted the International Commission of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) to visit all prisons including some military prisons, 
although the Government insisted on advance notice; the ICRC conducted 
25 prison visits during the year. Domestic nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's), including human rights groups, may visit a 
prison only with authorization from a court or from the Director of 
Prisons. These groups reportedly were not allowed access to military 
prisons, and their access to civilian prisons depended greatly on the 
personal inclinations of judges and prison administrators.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the 
Penal Code prohibit arbitrary arrest; however, security forces continue 
to use arbitrary arrest and detention. A judicial official must sign 
arrest warrants; however, the Government often does not respect this 
requirement.
    In January the director general of SONASUT (sugar parastatal), Ali 
Abderamane Haggar, submitted his resignation, and President Deby jailed 
him and ordered an investigation of SONASUT's finances to determine if 
there had been corruption. After an exhaustive investigation and being 
charged with misappropriation of public funds, Haggar was declared 
innocent and released from jail 8 months later. In March the police 
chief of Pala arrested and tortured a schoolteacher, Tigalou Mbaiky 
(see Section 1.c.). He was detained without charge or trial, and a 
human rights organization reported that he was released by year's end. 
In May the Sultan of Kanem arrested a large number of adherents of an 
Islamic group, Faydal Djaria (see Section 2.c.).
    A relative of an advisor to the rebel Togoimi reported that the 
police arrested him and 25 other Toubou men in April. The person is now 
free, but he reported credibly to a human rights group that the other 
25 men were killed.
    Members of a special police unit (CARP) under the Ministry of 
Interior's authority were responsible for numerous cases of arbitrary 
arrest and detention; they beat, tortured, and raped detainees, without 
sanction by government authorities. Subsequently the CARP chief was 
replaced, and one officer was fired for abuses; however, legal 
authorities took no action against him.
    In January the Association of Chadian Jurists (AJT) protested the 
detention of Ali Abderaman Haggar and Malloum Maina, who were detained 
illegally for 5 and 24 days respectively in 1999 before being 
officially charged; they were never tried or convicted, but were 
imprisoned for 8 and 9 months respectively before being released in 
January. In a January press release, the Chadian League for Human 
Rights denounced the political nature of their arrest.
    Persons accused of crimes may endure up to several years of 
incarceration before being charged or tried, especially those arrested 
for felonies in the provinces, who must await remand to the overcrowded 
house of detention in N'Djamena.
    Human rights organizations cited the cases of over 100 detainees 
held from as early as 1996 by the canton chief in Kenga, Guera, who was 
accused of operating a private prison and abusing his authority in 
numerous cases; however, the prison was closed during the year, and no 
prisoners were being held at year's end.
    The Government continued to hold political detainees. Detainees 
implicated in Dr. Nahor's rebellion in 1998 remained in jail without 
charges and without trial at year's end. Despite the arrests of 
individuals on suspicion of subversive activities against the 
Government, no one has been tried for such crimes since Deby came to 
power. Political detainees either eventually are released or they 
disappear (see Section 1.b.). In June 1999, the army returned from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo with a group of Congolese prisoners of 
war, many of whom were ordinary civilians. Although the Government 
claimed that they were Ugandan and Rwandan soldiers, the group 
consisted entirely of Congolese nationals who were housed initially at 
a military facility in N'Djamena but were exchanged for Chadian 
detainees in 1999.
    The Government does not practice forced exile; however, some family 
members of persons who have joined the northern rebellion choose to 
leave Chad for security reasons.
    e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution mandates an 
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was ineffective, 
underfunded, overburdened, and subject to executive interference. In 
practice government officials and other influential persons often 
enjoyed immunity from judicial sanction. During the year, the President 
intervened in a number of legal cases for political reasons. Ali 
Abderamane Haggar and Malloum Maina were accused of misappropriation of 
funds and imprisoned for 8 and 9 months respectively (see Section 
1.d.); they were never tried or convicted but were released in January. 
President Deby supported the prolonged incarceration of these two 
former administrators despite a lack of evidence. In April the Chief 
Justice demoted two Supreme Court justices, Maki Adam and Ruth Romba, 
reportedly because they made a decision adversely affecting the 
interests of the Chief Justice.
    On August 15, five soldiers attacked and stoned a defendant at a 
session of N'Djamena's criminal court. The soldiers were friends of the 
person that the defendant was accused of murdering. Later that day, the 
Minister of Justice publicly criticized the attack and said that the 
soldiers should protect the courts, not abuse them (see Section 1.c.).
    On April 28, 1999 President Deby swore in 16 members of the Supreme 
Court as well as 9 members of the Constitutional Court. In May the 
National Assembly enacted legislation calling for the election of 15 
members of the High Court of Justice; however, they were appointed by 
President Deby and the president of the National Assembly. The court 
began formal operations on May 24 after the justices were appointed. 
The establishment of these bodies fulfills the Constitution's mandate 
for an independent judicial branch; however, due to inadequate funding, 
the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court did not begin operations 
until October.
    The Constitution mandates a Superior Council of Magistrates to act 
as a guarantor of judicial independence; however, at year's end, it had 
not been established. The national judicial system operates with courts 
located in provincial capitals. The N'Djamena court of appeals is 
supposed to conduct regular sessions in the provinces, but funding 
limitations do not permit the court to make periodic circuit visits.
    Applicable law can be confusing, as courts often tend to blend the 
formal French-derived legal code with traditional practices. Residents 
of rural areas often lack effective access to formal judicial 
institutions. In most civil cases, they rely on traditional courts 
presided over by village chiefs, canton chiefs, or sultans. Decisions 
may be appealed to a formal court.
    Official inaction and executive interference continue to plague the 
judiciary. Long delays in trials result in lengthy pretrial detention 
(see Section 1.d.). The 48-hour temporary police custody period after 
which a prisoner can be released if not brought before a judge is not 
respected. Prisoners are not released but remain in jail due to lack of 
evidence, witnesses, or poor preparation of their cases.
    The salaries of judicial officials often are low. Although the 
Government has stated that the strengthening and reform of the 
judiciary are top priorities, it made little progress in these areas.
    The Government has not enforced the Military Code of Justice since 
the 1979-80 civil war, and courts-martial instituted early in the Deby 
regime to try security personnel for crimes against civilians no longer 
operate.
    There were no reliable figures concerning the number of political 
prisoners. During the year, the Government reported that there were no 
political prisoners. In June detainees implicated in Kette Moise's 
rebellion, Charles Mbairem, Padja Ortingar, Mbairassem Elysee, 
Djikossem Nidja, Todjimbaye, and Michel Mbailemel received public 
trials. However, other individuals arrested for suspicion of subversive 
activities against the Government in the Tibesti region simply were 
released, or they disappeared (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of 
home, correspondence, and other communications, as well as freedom from 
arbitrary search; however, authorities infringed on those rights. The 
Penal Code requires authorities to conduct searches of homes only 
during daylight hours and with a legal warrant; however, in practice 
security forces ignored these provisions and conducted extrajudicial 
searches at any time.
    The Government engages in wiretapping without judicial authority, 
monitors the contents of private mail through the postal service, and 
monitors private e-mail through the main post office server. The 
president of the political party Mouvement pour la Democratie au Chad 
reported to human rights groups that his telephone line continued to be 
tapped. According to a local newspaper, the N'Djamena Hebdo of March 
16, the telephone lines of two embassies and opposition supporters also 
were tapped.
    The Government illegally and forcibly conscripted young men from 
eastern Chad and Sudan into the army where they were trained for 
fighting against rebel forces in northern Chad.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government at times 
infringed on this right in practice. The Government continued to 
threaten journalists with legal retaliation for publishing material on 
the rebellion in the northern part of the country or about senior 
government officials accused of corruption or responsibility for 
attacks on Chadians in Libya. However, although the Minister of 
Communications labeled such material as seditious and urged the press 
not to publish it, the Government did not retaliate legally against 
journalists or other media for such coverage during the year. Several 
opposition newspapers strongly criticized government actions, and the 
Government did not prosecute private print journalists for libel.
    The Government controls the newspapers Info Tchad and Victoire and 
influences Le Progres; however, it does not dominate the press. A 
number of private newspapers are published in the capital; most were 
extremely critical of government policies and leaders.
    The Government reacted strongly to the Le Temps and L'Observateur 
editions of March 5 and 10. L'Observateur published a picture of rebel 
leader Togoimi in a vehicle with heavy weapons; Le Temps accused the 
President's party (MPS) of being Fascist. Both newspapers received 
unspecified threats from government officials. On March 10, the Le 
Temps editor Nadjikimo Benoudjita reported that both he and 
L'Observateur editor Sy Koumbo Gali had heard rumors of possible 
reprisals at their offices by state security forces; however, no 
official action was taken.
    Due to widespread illiteracy and the relatively high cost of 
newspapers and television, radio is the most important medium of mass 
communication and information. La Voix du Paysan, which is owned by the 
Catholic Church, began operating in 1997. Located in Doba, it 
broadcasts locally produced programming including news coverage and 
political commentary in French and indigenous languages over a 140-mile 
range. The High Council on Communications (HCC), an independent 
institution, has set the licensing fee for a commercial radio station 
at a prohibitively high level: approximately $9,000 (5 million CFA) per 
year, 10 times the fee for radio stations owned by nonprofit NGO's like 
La Voix du Paysan. A community radio station in N'Djamena, DJA-FM99 
received a license in 1999 from the HCC; DJA-FM99 began operations in 
May 1999 and programming in October 1999, but it only broadcast music. 
Station FM Liberte, owned by a group of human rights organizations, 
also received a license in 1999, but it did not start operations and 
programming until August.
    The Government owns and operates the only domestic television 
station. There have been no requests to establish a private television 
station as the economic preconditions, such as a sizeable audience with 
purchasing power, do not exist. There is one privately owned cable 
television station service that distributes foreign-sourced programming 
in French and Arabic, but relatively few citizens can afford to 
subscribe to the service. A South African cable station also sells 
subscriptions.
    The sole Internet access server is provided by the government-owned 
telecommunications monopoly. The Government does not restrict access to 
the Internet; however, the state-owned firm reportedly set prices and 
provided a quality of service that has discouraged the establishment of 
private domestic Internet service providers.
    The official media, consisting of a national radio network, a press 
agency, and N'Djamena's only national television station, are subject 
to both official and informal censorship; however, at times they were 
critical of the Government. The official media also gave top priority 
to government officials and events, while providing less attention to 
the opposition. The HCC acts as an arbiter whose main function is to 
promote free access to the media; however, it has no powers of 
enforcement.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government limited this 
right in practice. The law requires organizers of public demonstrations 
to notify local authorities 5 days in advance of the demonstration. 
Authorities banned demonstrations critical of the Government despite 
being notified in advance as required by law. In September the Ministry 
of Interior refused permission to Njarlejy Yorongar, leader of the 
Federation-Action-Republic political party, to hold a meeting. Les 
Forces Vives, an association of political parties, also was waiting for 
permission from the Interior Ministry to hold a march; they were denied 
permission, and at year's end, they had not been authorized to hold a 
march. By contrast peaceful demonstrations in support of the Government 
and its policies are condoned.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respected this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, at times it limited this right. The Constitution also provides 
that the country shall be a secular state; however, despite the secular 
nature of the state, a large proportion of senior government officials, 
including President Deby, are Muslims, and some policies favor Islam in 
practice. For example, the Government sponsored annual Hajj trips to 
Mecca for certain government officials.
    The Government requires religious groups, including both foreign 
missionary groups and domestic religious groups, to register with the 
Ministry of Interior's Department for Religious Affairs. Registration 
confers official recognition but not any tax preferences or other 
benefits. There are no specific legal penalties for failure to 
register, and there were no reports that any group had failed to apply 
for registration or that the registration process is unduly burdensome. 
The Government reportedly has denied official recognition to some 
groups of Arab Muslims in Ati, near the eastern border with Sudan, on 
the grounds that they have incorporated elements of traditional African 
religion, such as dancing and singing, into their worship. Non-Islamic 
religious leaders claim that Islamic officials and organizations 
receive greater tax exemptions and unofficial financial support from 
the Government. State lands reportedly are accorded to Islamic leaders 
for the purpose of building mosques, while other religious 
denominations must purchase land at market rates to build churches.
    On May 31, the Supreme Court rejected a request from one branch of 
a Christian evangelical church to deny government recognition to its 
independent sister branch. In 1998 the Eglise Evangelique des Freres 
(EEF) split into moderate and fundamentalist groups. The moderate 
branch of the EEF retained the legal registration for the Church, but 
on April 7, 1999, the Ministry of Interior awarded recognition to the 
fundamentalist branch under a new name, Eglise des Freres Independentes 
au Tchad (EFIT). Since 1999 the EEF branch has sought to bar the EFIT 
church legally from practice, and ultimately the case went before the 
Supreme Court, which upheld the rights of the EFIT to continue its 
religious work and its right to function.
    The Government has imprisoned and sanctioned fundamentalist Islamic 
imams believed to be promoting conflict among Muslims.
    A fundamentalist imam in N'Djdamena, Sheikh Faki Suzuki was 
restricted from preaching Islam for 6 months, from October 1998 to 
March 1999, and the authorities also placed him under house arrest 
during the same period. Although no longer under house arrest, Suzuki 
has experienced problems since the beginning of the year with the 
Islamic Committee in N'Djamena for painting their name and logo on his 
car. He was warned twice to not represent the committee, and he 
responded by removing the committee name from his car. In January 1999, 
the Government arbitrarily arrested and detained Imam Sheikh Mahamat 
Marouf, the fundamentalist Islamic leader of the northeastern town of 
Abeche, and refused to allow his followers to meet and pray openly in 
their mosque. Sheikh Marouf was released from prison in November 1999 
after nearly 1 year in jail. Sheikh Marouf may pray but is not 
permitted to lead prayers. His followers are allowed to pray in their 
mosques, but they are forbidden from debating religious beliefs in any 
way that might be considered proselytizing; however, the Tidjani 
followers throughout the country are allowed to proselytize.
    In both instances, the Government claimed that the imams were 
responsible for inciting religious violence; their followers rejected 
the Government's claim and cited religious differences with the 
Government.
    On May 25, the Sultan of Kanem arrested a large number of adherents 
of an Islamic group, Faydal Djaria. The group arrived in the country 
from Nigeria and Senegal and incorporates singing and dancing into its 
religious ceremonies and activities. The group is found from the Kanem 
region around Lake Chad into neighboring Chari Baguirmi. The Chadian 
Superior Council of Islamic Affairs considered that the Faydal Djaria 
group does not conform to Islamic tenets, and it requested the Ministry 
of Interior to arrest the group's spiritual leader, Ahmat Abdallah. In 
January 1998, the Minister of Interior banned the group; however, from 
the beginning of the year, the group was increasingly active, resulting 
in the arrests in the Kanem. The new Director of Religious Affairs at 
the Ministry of Interior requested that the Superior Council of Islamic 
Affairs provide the specific sections of the Koran that support the ban 
of the group. There was an undetermined number of Faydal Djaria 
prisoners in Kanem at year's end.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights; however, there are some limits on them in practice. The 
Government did not require special permission for travel in areas that 
it effectively controls; however, elements of the security forces, 
rebels, and bandits continued to maintain many roadblocks throughout 
the country, extorting money from travelers. The Government did not 
officially condone such behavior on the part of members of security 
forces, but it did not discourage it effectively. In addition armed 
bandits operated on many roads, assaulting, robbing, and killing 
travelers; some bandits were identified as active duty soldiers or 
deserters (see Section 1.a.).
    In March the Government refused to issue passports to the wife and 
children of rebel leader Togoimi. At year's end, Togoimi's family 
limited their movements in response to government surveillance; they 
did not pursue their request for passports, despite the Ministry of 
Interior's statements indicating that the Government was disposed to 
reconsider favorably the Togoimi family's earlier request (see Section 
1.c.).
    Some family members of persons who have joined the northern 
rebellion choose to leave Chad for security reasons.
    The Government adheres to the principles of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; 
however, these principles are not incorporated into the law. An 
official national structure, the National Committee for Welcoming and 
Reinsertion, is in place to deal with domestic and foreign refugee 
affairs. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations assisting 
refugees. Since 1993 the Government has registered refugees in 
N'Djamena and sent their applications for refugee status to UNHCR 
Central African headquarters in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, or other regional UNHCR offices in Africa. A person whose 
application is accepted is eligible to enroll in a 6-month care 
maintenance program that includes a monthly subsistence allowance, 
medical care, and assistance in finding work. This program is funded by 
a local NGO. The Government provides first asylum for refugees and has 
done so in past years. The Government has granted refugee and asylee 
status informally to persons from Sudan and the Republic of the Congo 
and has allowed them to remain for resettlement. The World Refugee 
Survey stated that the country hosted 20,000 Sudanese refugees.
    Chadian refugees are legally free to repatriate. In May the 
Cameroonian Government repatriated 300 Chadian refugees to Lere, with 
the assistance of the UNHCR. This group is the first of 2,400 Chadian 
refugees who fled the country during the civil war in 1980. In October 
about 350 families were repatriated from Libya after clashes between 
Libyans and Subsaharan Africans, which were described in the press as 
xenophobic. Most Chadian refugees reside in the Central African 
Republic, Niger, Libya, Sudan, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The World Refugee 
Survey stated that approximately 15,000 Chadians were refugees (5,000 
in the Central African Republic, 5,000 in Sudan, 3,000 in Cameroon, and 
1,000 in Nigeria).
    A group of foreign individuals, mostly Sudanese, claiming to be 
refugees, continue to charge that foreign officials often monitor 
refugees applying at the UNHCR branch office in N'Djamena and have 
stated that this surveillance intimidates some refugees. There were no 
confirmed reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim 
to refugee status, but refugees continue to complain about threats to 
their safety while waiting for their cases to be adjudicated.
    There were no known instances of persons being returned to a 
country where they feared persecution. Persons forcibly repatriated by 
Sudan and initially under movement restrictions were free to leave the 
country during the year.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully; however, the Government continued to limit this 
right in practice. The 1996 presidential election and the 1997 National 
Assembly elections, in which President Deby's MPS party won 65 of a 
total of 125 seats in the National Assembly, were the first multiparty 
elections in many years; however, both elections were compromised by 
widely reported fraud, including vote rigging and other irregularities 
committed by election officers, government officials, members of the 
ruling party, and others.
    The Government is headed by a prime minister who is nominated by 
the President and confirmed by the National Assembly. In December 1999, 
President Deby replaced former Prime Minister Nassour Ouaidou 
Guelengdouksia with Nagoum Yamassoum.
    The State remains highly centralized. The national government 
appoints all subnational government officials, who must also rely on 
the central government for most of their revenues and their 
administrative personnel. Using its parliamentary majority, the 
Government passed twin legislative bills in 1999 outlining the 
country's proposed decentralization structure for local government 
elections as required by the Constitution. Local elections have been 
delayed since the conclusion of the 1997 parliamentary elections and 
had not taken place by year's end. In September 1999, the 
Constitutional Court returned both legislative bills to the Parliament 
after finding that they violated the Constitution. On January 4, the 
Constitutional Court rejected a decree redrawing provincial borders and 
separately rejected the bill on decentralization.
    Many political parties objected to the Government's proposed 
decentralization plan and presidentially decreed internal territorial 
divisions, which appeared to be an attempt at gerrymandering. 
Opposition political leaders accused the Government of coopting their 
most popular local politicians to run as MPS members in upcoming local 
elections and also alleged intimidation by the military against those 
party members who refused.
    The National Assembly created an Independent Elections Commission 
(CENI) in September to prepare for the presidential and National 
Assembly elections. The President's political party dominates the CENI.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics; few women 
hold senior leadership positions. There is 1 woman of cabinet rank, and 
there are 3 women who are members of the 125-seat National Assembly.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights organizations generally operate with few overt 
restrictions, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases; however, the Government obstructed the work of human 
rights organizations during the year through arrest, detention, and 
intimidation. Government officials often are accessible to human rights 
advocates; however, they generally are unresponsive or hostile to their 
findings. Incidents between state security forces and human rights 
activists occurred in Kelo, Bessao, and Bedaralal.
    Human rights groups are outspoken, and often partisan, in 
publicizing the abuses through reports, press releases, and the print 
media, but only occasionally are they able to intervene successfully 
with authorities. They often send statements to diplomatic missions and 
international NGO's. Many human rights groups are composed of opponents 
of the Government, which impairs their credibility with the Government 
and also with international organizations.
    NGO's have gained recognition under the Deby regime and play a role 
in political events. Human rights groups have assisted the Government 
in meditation efforts to reconcile the ancient conflict between herders 
and farmers over land and water rights.
    At the turn of the year, the Collective of Human Rights 
Associations, consisting of five human rights organizations, issued a 
declaration urging the Government to respect human rights; at year's 
end, there was no government response.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, 
regardless of origin, race, religion, political opinion, or social 
status. In practice cultural traditions maintain women in a status 
subordinate to men, and the Government favors its ethnic supporters and 
allies.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women is believed to be common, 
although no statistics were available. By tradition wives are subject 
to the authority of their husbands, and they have only limited legal 
recourse against abuse. Family or traditional authorities may act in 
such cases; however, police rarely intervene.
    Discrimination against women remains widespread. In practice women 
do not have equal opportunities for education and training, making it 
difficult for them to compete for the few formal sector jobs. Property 
and inheritance laws do not discriminate against women, but traditional 
practice favors men. The exploitation of women is especially pervasive 
in rural areas, where women do most of the agricultural labor and are 
discouraged from formal schooling. Illiteracy was estimated at 65 
percent for women, but only 38 percent for men. Under the law, polygyny 
is the norm; however, spouses may opt for monogamy. If a monogamous 
relationship is violated, the marriage may be dissolved at the wife's 
request alone; however, she must repay the dowry and other expenses 
related to the marriage.
    During the year, the Government promoted increased awareness of 
women's rights by sponsoring a national women's march in N'Djamena on 
October 17. In August 1999, the Government held meetings with 
representatives of religious groups and civil society to update the 
Family Code. In the absence of a comprehensive law governing women's 
rights, the Family Code sets the parameters of women's rights under the 
law. In a subsequent meeting with the national women's group during the 
year, the group called upon the Government and the rebels to cease the 
fighting in the Tibesti.
    Children.--The Government took several actions to improve 
children's rights and welfare, but it devoted few resources and little 
attention to implementing its proposals. Although the Government 
continued to increase modestly its assistance to the education sector, 
it has not committed adequate funding to public education and medical 
care. Government education policy for children and youth is focused on 
increasing classroom facilities and infrastructure.
    The Government does not enforce compulsory education. The 
Constitution provides for free education; however, parents complained 
that they must pay tuition to public schools. Educational opportunities 
for girls are limited, mainly because of tradition. About as many girls 
as boys are enrolled in primary school, but the percentage of girls 
enrolled in secondary school is extremely low, primarily because of 
early marriage. Although the law prohibits sexual relations with a girl 
under the age of 14, even if married, this law is rarely enforced, and 
families arrange marriages for girls as young as the age of 12 or 13; 
the minimum age for engagements is 11 to 12. There are some forced 
marriages, for the financial gain of a dowry (see Section 6.c.). Many 
young wives are then forced to work long hours of physical labor for 
their husbands in fields or homes. Children also work in agriculture 
and herding (see Section 6.d.).
    The law considers any citizen under the age of 18 years as a minor. 
Sexual relations, even with consent, before the age of 13 years are 
considered to be rape and the prescribed sentence is for hard labor in 
perpetuity; the age of consent is 14. Rape of children and child abuse 
are problems.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is widespread and deeply rooted in tradition. A 
U.N. study in 1995 estimated that approximately 60 percent of all 
females have undergone FGM; the practice is especially prevalent among 
ethnic groups in the east and south, where it was introduced from 
Sudan. All three types of FGM are practiced; the least common but most 
dangerous and severe form of FGM, infibrulation, is confined largely to 
the region on the eastern border with Sudan. FGM usually is performed 
prior to puberty as a rite of passage and an occasion during which many 
families profit from gifts from their communities.
    Opposition to the elimination of FGM is strong. Both the Government 
and the NGO community in recent years have conducted active and 
sustained public education campaigns against this practice. The 
Ministry of Social Action and the Family is responsible for 
coordinating activities to combat FGM. The law makes FGM theoretically 
a prosecutable offense as a form of assault, and charges can be brought 
against the parents of FGM victims, medical practitioners, or others 
involved in the action; however, no suits have been brought under the 
law. A law to criminalize the practice of FGM was passed by the Council 
of Ministers; however, by year's end, no action had been taken by the 
National Assembly.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no official discrimination 
against disabled persons; however, the Government operates only a few 
therapy, education, or employment programs for persons with 
disabilities, and no laws mandate access to buildings for the disabled. 
Several local NGO's provide skills training to the deaf and blind.
    Religious Minorities.--Although the different religious communities 
generally coexist without problems, there were reports of increasing 
tension between Christians and Muslims due to the proselytizing by 
evangelical Christians. In addition tensions and conflicts between 
government supporters from the politically dominant northern region and 
rebels from the politically subordinate southern region occasionally 
have religious overtones.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are approximately 200 
ethnic groups, many of which are concentrated regionally and speak 
distinct primary languages. Most ethnic groups are affiliated with one 
of two regional and cultural traditions: Arab and Saharan/Sahelian zone 
Muslims in the north, center, and east; and Sudanian zone Christian or 
animist groups in the south.
    Societal discrimination continued to be practiced routinely by 
members of virtually all ethnic groups and was evident in patterns of 
buying and employment, in patterns of de facto segregation in urban 
neighborhoods, and in the paucity of interethnic marriages, especially 
across the north-south divide. Although the law prohibits state 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, in practice ethnicity 
continued to influence government appointments and political alliances. 
Northerners, in particular members of President Deby's Zaghawa ethnic 
group, continued to dominate the public sector and were overrepresented 
in key institutions of state power, including the military officer 
corps, elite military units, and the presidential staff. Political 
parties and groups generally continued to have readily identifiable 
regional or ethnic bases.
    In the army's struggle against the Tibesti rebels, hundreds of 
soldiers were killed or injured by landmines in 1998 and 1999; deaths 
and injuries from landmines continued during the year. In 1999 the 
Government exhibited a pattern of discrimination in selectively 
separating wounded northerners, especially Zaghawa, from southerners 
for treatment, with the Zaghawa given preferential medical treatment, 
including evacuation abroad. Human rights groups in Faya Largeau 
charged that many untreated wounded southerners were left to die as a 
result of the selective access to medical treatment based solely on 
ethnicity; however, there were no similar reports during the year.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes freedom 
of association and union membership, as well as the right to strike, 
and the Government generally respected the right to organize and strike 
in practice. All employees, except members of the armed forces, are 
free to join or form unions. However, few workers belong to unions, 
since most workers are unpaid subsistence cultivators or herders. The 
main labor organization is the Federation of Chadian Unions (UST). Its 
former major constituent union, the Teacher's Union of Chad, broke off 
from UST and became independent in 1998. Neither union has a tie to the 
Government. A number of minor federations and unions, including the 
Free Confederation of Chadian Workers, also operated, some with ties to 
government officials.
    Ordinances of the law permitted forced labor imprisonment for 
participation in strikes; however, there was no such punishment during 
the year.
    The 1996 Labor Code ended long-standing legal restrictions on trade 
union rights; however, there were reports that a 1962 ordinance 
requiring prior authorization from the Ministry of the Interior before 
an association can be formed is still in force. The ordinance also 
allowed for the immediate administrative dissolution of an association 
and permitted the authorities to oversee associations' funds. Although 
the Government allegedly has applied this law to unions on several 
occasions despite assurances that only the Labor Code would govern the 
unions, there were no reports of such action during the year.
    A strike by butchers from January to March was provoked by the new 
value added tax and caused a shortage in the meat supply for several 
weeks and a consequent price increase for meat.
    Labor unions have the right to affiliate internationally. The Union 
des Syndicates du Tchad (UST) affiliates with the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution contains only general provisions for the rights of the 
Government to set minimum wage standards and to permit unions to 
bargain collectively. The Labor Code has specific provisions on 
collective bargaining and workers' rights. The Labor Code empowers the 
Government to intervene in the bargaining process under certain 
circumstances.
    The Labor Code protects unions against antiunion discrimination, 
but there is no formal mechanism for resolving such complaints.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the Labor Code prohibit slavery and forced or compulsory labor by 
adults and children; however, there were reports of forced labor 
practices in the formal economy, and isolated instances of forced labor 
by both children and adults in the rural sector by local authorities as 
well as in military installations in the north. During the year, a 
local newspaper reported that workers in SONOSUT, the sugar parastatel, 
were forced to work but were not paid. Some young girls were forced 
into marriages by their families; these girls then were forced to work 
in their husbands' fields or homes (see Section 5). There were reports 
that Zaghawas were conscripted forcibly into the armed forces 
throughout the year. In December security forces in N'Djamena 
reportedly rounded up army deserters and other individuals described as 
bandits, sent them to the northern military front, and forced them to 
fight alongside government troops. Ordinances of the law permitted 
forced labor imprisonment for participation in strikes.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code stipulates that the minimum age for 
employment in the formal sector is 14 years; however, the Government 
does not enforce the law in practice. Children are rarely employed 
except in agriculture and herding due to the high unemployment rate; 
however, in agriculture and herding, nearly all children work. Children 
rarely are employed in the commercial sector; however, some children 
work on contract with herders.
    Abusive and exploitative child labor exists and affects an 
estimated 19 percent of children between the ages of 6 and 18 years of 
age. For example, Ngaryade Togyambaye, a 12-year-old student in the 
third grade, and Nanguerimbaya Masrabaye, a 16-year-old student in the 
sixth grade, were taken from school and delivered by their father, 
Ngaryade Victor, to Ahmat Izergue, a herder, for $13 (6,600 CFA). Such 
practices are a consequence of parental resignation, dislocation of the 
family unit, endemic poverty, lack of appropriate legal protection, 
demographic and population explosion, and civil war. The instability 
resulting from civil wars contributed to the Government's limited 
ability to improve living conditions of children. Despite the 
ratification of international conventions on child labor, no government 
policies protecting child labor existed before the National Assembly 
ratified the Convention on Children's Rights on August 4.
    There were reports that in the southern part of the country, 
families contract out their children to Arab nomadic herders to help 
care for their animals, and the children often are abused and return 
with little financial compensation for their work. Some children work 
as domestic servants in the households of relatives for little 
compensation.
    The Government does not support the use of minors in the military, 
and observers believe that most minors were demobilized in 1997; 
however, there were credible reports that minors continue to serve in 
the military. President Deby reportedly conscripted teenage Zaghawa to 
fight in the Tibesti.
    During the year, the Government sponsored a number of workshops, 
seminars, and radio broadcasts to raise awareness of the abuses of 
child labor and to advocate elimination of the worst forms of child 
abuse. The Council of Ministers adopted ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor in October 1999, and the National Assembly 
ratified the convention in August. The labor law states anyone under 
the age of 18 is a minor, and, in accordance with ILO Convention 182, 
it prohibits children from undertaking ``any work which, by its nature 
or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the 
health, safety or morals of children.''
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; 
however, it does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code applies to both 
foreign and domestic workers and requires the Government to set minimum 
wages. The minimum wage at year's end was $50 (25,480 CFA) per month. 
Most wages, including the minimum wage, were insufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Nearly all private 
sector and state-owned firms paid at least the minimum wage, but the 
lowest public sector wages remained below the minimum wage. The 
Government increased civil servant's salaries by 5 percent in January 
1999, but salaries were not increased subsequently. In 1999 the 
Government reduced wages paid to the armed forces, which were already 
well below the minimum wage.
    The State, which owns businesses that dominate many sectors of the 
formal economy, remained the largest employer. The Government reduced 
significantly the large salary arrears owed to civil servants and 
military personnel, although some arrears remain. Nevertheless, wages 
remained low and many state employees continued to hold second jobs, 
raise their own food crops, or rely on family members for support.
    The law limits most agricultural work to 39 hours per week, with 
overtime paid for supplementary hours. Agricultural work is limited to 
2,400 hours per year. All workers are entitled to an unbroken period of 
48 hours of rest per week, although in practice these rights rarely are 
enforced.
    The Labor Code mandates occupational health and safety standards 
and inspectors with the authority to enforce them; however, these 
standards rarely are respected in practice in the private sector and 
nonexistent in the civil service. The UST has alleged before the ILO 
that the labor inspection service is not allocated the resources 
necessary to perform its duties. In principle workers can remove 
themselves from dangerous working conditions; however, in practice they 
cannot leave without jeopardizing their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country.
    The Penal Code makes trafficking in persons a crime punishable by 5 
to 20 years in prison; however, no governmental organization focused on 
the potential problem, and no economic or financial aid would be 
available unless a victim seeks damages in court. The Government has 
sponsored educational campaigns through the media to advise parents to 
instruct children about the danger of trusting strangers.
                               __________

                                COMOROS

    The Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros is ruled by Colonel 
Azali Assoumani, who took power in a coup in April 1999. The country 
consists of three islands (Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli) and 
claims a fourth, Mayotte, which is governed by France. Comoros has been 
prone to coups and political insurrection since independence in 1975. 
In April 1999, army commander Colonel Azali staged a bloodless coup and 
overthrew President Tadjiddine Ben Said Massounde, the Interim 
President who had held office since the death of democratically elected 
President Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim in November 1998. In December 1999, 
in response to international criticism, Azali appointed a civilian 
prime minister, Bianrifi Tarmidi; however, Azali remains the Head of 
State and army Commander in Chief. When he took power, Azali said that 
he would step down on April 14 and relinguish power to a democratically 
elected president, but by year's end, he had not done so. In May 1999, 
Azali decreed a Constitution that gave him both executive and 
legislative powers. In August Azali organized a national congress in 
response to pressure from his political supporters to restore civilian 
rule. Opposition parties boycotted the National Congress, but pro-Azali 
parties participated. The Congress agreed on a new constitution in 
which Azali would remain Head of State, but daily government 
administration would be handled by the civilian Prime Minister and the 
Council of State, which would act as both a legislature and constituent 
assembly. In November a Tripartite Commission, composed of 
representatives from Grande Comore, Moheli and Anjouan, was inaugurated 
and charged with developing a new constitution based on the Fomboni 
Declaration--an agreement between the Government and Anjouan--and the 
constitution that was articulated by the National Congress in August. 
In December Azali named a new civilian Prime Minister, Hamada Madi, and 
formed a new civilian Cabinet. The opposition parties initially refused 
to participate in the Tripartite Commission, but in December met with 
the Azali Government. At year's end, the Organization for African Unity 
(OAU) was mediating negotiations between the Government and the 
opposition on the provisions of the new constitution and a timetable 
for elections in 2001; however, it remained unclear whether the 
representatives from Anjouan would participate in or accept any 
agreement resulting from the negotiations. Although the OAU initially 
had maintained the position that the Antananarivo Accord was the only 
viable option to reunify the islands, in December the OAU stated its 
intention to accept an agreement that maintained the territorial 
integrity the country and that provided for a democratic constitutional 
government. The August constitution provided for the continuation of an 
independent judiciary; however, it was not implemented by year's end. 
In the past, both the executive and other elites influenced the outcome 
of cases, and the executive intervened in at least two cases during the 
year.
    The Anjouan secession crisis subsided after the August 26 signing 
of the ``Fomboni Declaration of National Unity'' by Azali and 
separatist leader Lieutenant Colonel Said Abeid. The Fomboni 
Declaration provides for a loose confederation between the islands, 
giving each island the ability to maintain an army and conduct its own 
foreign relations. On Anjouan the signing of the Fomboni Declaration 
resulted in 4 days of violent clashes between opponents and supporters 
of Abeid's separatist faction.
    The Comorian Defense Force (FCD), and the gendarmerie are 
responsible for internal security and are under Azali's direct control. 
Security forces committed some human rights abuses.
    The economy of this extremely poor country is dominated by 
agriculture. Revenues from the main crops--vanilla, essence of ylang-
ylang, and cloves--continued to fall while the population of 547,600 
has been growing at a rate of 2.7 percent annually. Per capita income 
was approximately $400 per year in 1997--the national accounts have not 
been updated since 1998. The country depends heavily on foreign 
assistance from the European Union and Arab countries, including 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
    The Government's human rights situation remained poor, and it 
continued to commit abuses. Citizens do not have the right to change 
their government. Security forces reportedly continued to threaten 
Christians. Separatist authorities on Anjouan tortured, beat, and raped 
opponents of the separatist Government. Prison conditions remain poor. 
Security forces and the separatist authorities on Anjouan used 
arbitrary arrest and detention. In at least two instances, the 
executive intervened with the judiciary. Authorities restricted 
citizens' privacy rights. There were infringements on freedom of the 
press and assembly and movement. The military Government limits freedom 
of religion. Societal discrimination against women and Christians 
continued to be serious problems. There were some instances of forced 
child labor.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by security forces 
on Grande Comore or Moheli.
    Between May 11 and 13, 1998, police clashed with protestors on 
Grand Comore over the May 6, 1998, government closure of the opposition 
party's Radio Tropique. Police seriously injured several persons, but 
the only death reportedly was due to a traffic accident caused by the 
fighting. By year's end, no police officers were held responsible for 
their actions during the protests.
    In addition to the police and the military, there are many groups 
throughout Anjouan that are armed, including paramilitary forces, 
militias, and civilians. In 1999 battles between rival militias 
resulted in approximately 12 deaths; however, there were no such deaths 
reported during the year.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution does not prohibit torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment specifically; however, 
while there were no reports of security force brutality, police 
reportedly continued to threaten Christians on Grande Comore (see 
Section 2.c.).
    On October 13, police used tear gas to disburse forcibly 
demonstrators protesting against rising fuel prices and protestors who 
were marching to the OAU offices in Moroni (see Section 2.b.). Police 
reportedly also threw tear gas canisters into private homes (see 
Section 1.f.). Two policemen and several protestors reportedly were 
injured, and some protestors reportedly were arrested.
    Separatist security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused 
persons on Anjouan. There were reports that separatist security forces 
on Anjouan intimidated, arrested, and beat persons during the 
referendum at the end of January (see Section 3). In August separatist 
authorities on Anjouan arrested approximately 100 opponents of the 
Fomboni Declaration, following demonstrations against the agreement 
(see Section 1.d.). There were unconfirmed reports that as many as 28 
of those arrested, who primarily were members of the Comoros Red 
Crescent Society and the opposition party GIRMA (Group for the Recovery 
Initiative for the Anjouan Movement), were tortured, and, in one case, 
raped. By November the Government had freed all of those arrested; 
there were no reports of government action against those persons 
responsible for the abuses.
    In April 1999, quasi-police authorities known as embargoes 
arrested, beat, and detained three local Christians; there was no 
further information on the incident at year's end. Prison conditions 
continued to be poor. A lack of proper sanitation, overcrowding, 
inadequate medical facilities, and poor diet are common problems. The 
military Government has not taken action to remedy these problems. 
Although there were reports of deaths as a result of disease in prisons 
in previous years, there were no reports of such deaths during the 
year. Female prisoners are held separately from male prisoners. 
Juveniles are not imprisoned; they are returned to the custody of their 
parents.
    The military Government permits prison visits by independent 
monitors; however, no such visits occurred during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution does 
not prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention specifically, and there 
were instances in which authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained 
citizens. The new constitution, approved in August, prohibits arbitrary 
arrest and detention; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
    Two Azali opponents who reportedly led a coup attempt in March were 
detained in a military prison. In November one of the opponents escaped 
from prison; the other opponent remained in detention at year's end 
(see Section 3).
    On August 15, authorities arrested four opposition politicians, 
including Cheik Ali Bacar Kassim, former Member of Parliament (M.P.) 
and owner of the opposition radio station Radio Tropique, for allegedly 
plotting to overthrow Colonel Azali. The four were detained in a 
military prison, despite a judge's order to transfer them to the 
civilian prison in the capital of Moroni. Cheik Ali reportedly was 
denied access to defense counsel until he launched a hunger strike in 
protest (see Section 1.e.).
    After the August demonstrations against the Fomboni Declaration, 
separatist authorities on Anjouan arrested and beat numerous opposition 
supporters (see section 1.c.). At the end of September, 3 of the 
approximately 100 persons arrested were freed by a tribunal in 
Anjouan's capital, Mutsamudu. At the end of November, authorities 
reportedly freed Kassim on the condition that he leave the country; 
when he refused to leave, he reportedly was returned to prison. No 
trial date had been scheduled by year's end.
    On Anjouan local authorities continued to attempt to suppress or 
convert the Christian minority.
    On October 13, police arrested approximately 20 persons while 
dispersing a demonstration in Moroni; police broke into houses and one 
mosque to make arrests (see Section 1.c., 1.f., 2.b., and 2.c.). The 
protestors were released within 24 hours, and no charges were filed 
against them.
    One Anjouanais Christian estimated that approximately 50 
Christians, both men and women, were detained in Anjouan by embargoes 
during the past 18 months.
    In September 1999, secessionist authorities on Anjouan exiled a 
group of opponents to Mayotte, then imprisoned several of the group's 
leaders when they were sent back to Anjouan by French authorities. The 
opponents were released from prison in early October, and no charges 
were filed against them.
    The Constitution does not prohibit forced exile, but the military 
Government did not use it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in the past, the executive and other 
elites have exercised influence over court cases, and the executive 
intervened in at least two cases during the year. The Head of State 
names magistrates by decree. In August despite regulations that prevent 
the removal of judges, Colonel Azali transferred to other duties nine 
judges who had initiated a strike calling for judicial reform and 
regular payment of salaries. In October Colonel Azali issued a 
presidential decree which reduced the number of Supreme Court justices 
from nine to five and transferred judges to other courts. Although the 
official reason for the action was a lack of resources, opposition 
critics accused Azali of punishing certain judges for questioning 
government policies and participating in a strike by judges and court 
personnel. In the case of detained opposition politician Cheik Ali 
Bacar Kassim and three others, the trial judge resigned in protest when 
authorities failed to obey his order to transfer the opposition leaders 
from a military prison to a civilian prison in Moroni. Authorities 
stated that the poor condition of the Moroni Prison prohibited the 
transfer.
    The High Council, made up of four members appointed by the 
President, three members elected by the Federal Assembly, and a member 
of each island council, also serves as the High Court of the Republic 
and rules on cases of constitutional law. The August Constitution, 
which was not implemented during the year, provides for equality before 
the law of all citizens and provides for the right of accused to mount 
a defense. Trials are open to the public except for limited exceptions 
defined by law. The legal system incorporates Islamic law as well as 
French legal codes. After he was arrested in August (see Section 1.d.), 
opposition leader Cheik Ali was denied access to defense counsel for 
almost 1 month, but authorities allowed Cheik Ali's lawyer to visit him 
after he began a hunger strike. There are very few lawyers in the 
country, making it difficult to obtain legal representation. The 
military Government does not provide legal counsel to the accused. Most 
disputes are presented to village elders for possible resolution before 
being taken to court.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--There were no known cases of arbitrary interference 
with correspondence; however, police interfered with the privacy of the 
home. On October 13, during protests in Moroni, police reportedly 
raided houses by breaking down doors and throwing canisters of tear gas 
through windows; police arrested approximately 20 persons during the 
raids, and there were reports that some protestors and police were 
injured (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Police also arrested worshipers 
in a mosque (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    Bans on alcohol and immodest dress are enforced sporadically, 
usually during religious months, such as Ramadan. Alcohol can be 
imported and sold with a permit from the Government.
    In October several hundred Comorian illegal immigrants were evicted 
from their homes and places of employment after the local Government in 
Mayotte announced new penalties against persons who housed or employed 
illegal immigrants (see Section 2.d.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution does not provide 
specifically for freedom of the press, and on at least one occasion 
authorities infringed on this right. In August former M.P. Cheik Ali 
Bacar Kassim, who also owns the independent radio station Radio 
Tropique and is a well-known opposition figure, was arrested for 
allegedly plotting to overthrow the Azali Government (see Sections 1.d. 
and 1.e.). The new constitution approved in August, provides for 
freedom of the press; however, it was not implemented during the year.
    There are two independent newspapers that publish regularly. These 
newspapers exist side-by-side with the semiofficial weekly Al-Watwan. 
Some of the independent newspapers criticized the Government freely.
    The government-controlled radio station, Radio Comoros, was the 
only national radio station until the opposition radio station Radio 
Tropique resumed operations in June 1999. In August Radio Tropique 
stopped broadcasting news for a week to protest the arrest of its 
owner, Cheik Ali Bacar Kassim. In addition there are at least 10 
regional and local stations, some of which are openly critical of the 
Government. Residents also receive broadcasts from Mayotte Radio, as 
well as from French television, without government interference. A 
national television station is under construction with assistance from 
the Government of the People's Republic of China. There are several 
private local television stations, and satellite antennas are popular. 
Amateur radio licenses have been issued without hindrance in the past.
    Foreign newspapers are available, as are books from abroad. 
Internet service was introduced in 1998.
    In August 1999, an independent radio station on Anjouan, Radio 
Ushababi, which was opposed to the independence movement, reportedly 
was forced to cease broadcasting after being harassed by police and 
threatened on several occasions by a group of separatist militiamen. In 
November the station resumed broadcasting.
    The Government respects academic freedom. There is no university, 
but secondary students and teachers spoke freely and criticized the 
Government openly. Strikes by teachers and students resulted in 
periodic school closures.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
does not provide specifically for freedom of assembly and association, 
and on at least one occasion the Government restricted this right in 
practice. The new constitution, approved in August, provides for 
freedom of assembly; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
    On October 13, a general strike was held in the capital of Moroni 
to protest the rising cost of fuel. Police and protestors violently 
clashed after the demonstrators reportedly blocked roads with stones 
and burning tires. The protest began after an earlier demonstration by 
women in Mtsangani district was held to protest the military 
Government. There were reports that police raided numerous homes, 
disrupted persons in a mosque during prayers, and arrested persons 
during the incident (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.c.). Two policemen 
and several protestors reportedly were injured, and some protestors 
reportedly were arrested. There were also reports that security forces 
used tear gas to disperse protesters who were marching to the OAU 
offices. Police briefly detained some of the protestors who were 
marching to the OAU offices. There were reports that some protestors 
and police officers were injured.
    Between August 28 and 31 on Anjouan, separatist authorities clashed 
violently with opposition protesters who were demonstrating against the 
Fomboni Declaration of National Unity. Separatist authorities arrested 
as many as 100 of the protesters, some of whom reportedly were tortured 
and raped while in custody. (see sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    The Constitution does not provide specifically for freedom of 
association; however, the Government generally respects this right in 
practice. The new constitution, approved in August, provides for 
freedom of association; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution does not prohibit 
discrimination based on religion or religious belief specifically, and 
authorities infringed on freedom of religion. An overwhelming majority 
of the population is Sunni Muslim, and authorities restricted the right 
of Christians to practice their faith. Police regularly threatened and 
sometimes detained practicing Christians. In previous years, the 
authorities held those detained for a few days and often attempted to 
convert them to Islam forcibly; however, there were no reports of such 
actions during the year. In October 1999, two citizens were arrested, 
tried, and convicted of ``anti-Islamic activity'' in part because they 
possessed Christian books and audiovisual material. One of the citizens 
was sentenced to 18 months in prison, while the other was sentenced to 
4 months. Although in previous years, local government officials 
attempted to force Christians to attend services at mosques against 
their will, there were no reports of such incidents during the year. 
The Fombani Declaration that was signed by Azali and the Anjouan 
separatist leader in August included an agreement to make Islam the 
national religion. The constitution, approved in August, provides for 
equality of citizens under the law regardless of religion, belief, or 
ideology; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
    During protests in Moroni on October 13, there were reports that 
police arrested persons inside a mosque while they were praying (see 
Section 1.f. and 2.b.).
    There are two Roman Catholic churches and one Protestant church. 
However, prior to the April 1999 coup, the former military Government 
restricted the use of these three churches to noncitizens. There was no 
information available as to whether the new military Government 
continued this practice. Many Christians practice their faith in 
private residences. The Government permited Christian missionaries to 
work in local hospitals and schools, but did not permit them to 
proselytize.
    An Anjouanais Christian estimated that approximately 50 Christians, 
both men and women, have been detained by the embargoes during the last 
18 months. In April 1999, embargoes on Anjouan arrested, beat, and 
detained three local Christians for a day. Some community authorities 
on Anjouan banned Christians from attending any community events and 
banned Christian burials in a local cemetery.
    Bans on alcohol and immodest dress are enforced sporadically, 
usually during religious months, such as Ramadan. Alcohol can be 
imported and sold with a permit from the Government.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution does not specifically 
provide for these rights and the military Government restricts these 
rights in practice. The new constitution, approved in August, provides 
for these rights; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
    In February in response to a call by the OAU, the Azali Government 
imposed partial sanctions on Anjouan for its failure to sign the 
Antananarivo Accords by the February 1 deadline. These sanctions 
included travel and financial restrictions on Anjouan's leaders. In 
March broader sanctions were imposed on Anjouan, including restrictions 
on all telecommunications, air, and sea links, on oil and petroleum 
products, and on the non-recognition of travel documents and passports. 
Following the signing of the Fomboni Declaration in August, the Azali 
Government lifted the embargo unilaterally, permitting travel between 
Grande Comore and Anjouan. However, the embargo continued to be 
enforced by other nations.
    There were reports during the year that persons fled Grand Comore 
and Anjouan for Mayotte; many of these persons reportedly drowned when 
they attempted to reach Mayotte on rafts or by swimming.
    Comorian illegal immigrants in Mayotte are sometimes harassed by 
citizens of Mayotte. For example, in October several hundred Comorian 
illegal immigrants were evicted from their homes and places of 
employment after the local government in Mayotte announced new 
penalties against persons who housed or employed illegal immigrants.
    The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees, 
asylees, or first asylum. During the 1990's, refugees from central 
Africa fled to the country. Some have received asylum in other 
countries; approximately 10 of these refugees remained in the country, 
and they were awaiting placement by the UNHCR in other countries at 
year's end.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    The Constitution does not provide for the right of citizens to 
change their government specifically, and in practice citizens do not 
have this right. The Constitution states that national sovereignty 
belongs to the nation's citizens who may exercise it through 
referendums; however, the Government had not scheduled a referendum by 
year's end.
    According to the Constitution, the Head of State is appointed by 
the national army and has legislative power, which he then delegates to 
the Prime Minister and the Council of State. All laws proposed by the 
Council must be approved by the Head of State. In December 1999, in 
response to international criticism, Azali appointed a civilian Prime 
Minister, Bianrifi Tarmidi; however, Azali remains the Head of State 
and army Commander in Chief.
    In March dissident political and army elements attempted a coup 
against Azali. This coup was suppressed, and the leaders of the coup 
were detained. In November one of the detained leaders escaped from 
prison, and the other leader remained in detention at year's end. The 
Government had not filed charges against the coup leaders by year's 
end.
    In August Azali organized a national congress in response to 
pressure from his political supporters to restore civilian rule. 
Opposition parties boycotted the National Congress, but pro-Azali 
parties participated. The Congress agreed on a constitution in which 
Azali would remain Head of State, but daily government administration 
would be handled by the civilian Prime Minister and the Council of 
State, which would act as both a legislature and constituent assembly. 
The constitution was approved the National Congress in August, but it 
was not implemented by year's end.
    On August 26, the Fomboni Declaration was signed by Azali and 
separatist leader Abeid. The declaration was an agreement to create a 
``new Comorian entity,'' in which the islands would share a common 
policy on religion, nationality, currency, foreign relations, and 
defense. In November a Tripartite Commission, composed of 
representatives from Grande Comore, Moheli, and Anjouan, was 
inaugurated and charged with developing a new constitution based on the 
Fomboni Declaration--an agreement between the Government and Anjouan--
and the constitution that was articulated by the National Congress in 
August. The opposition parties initially refused to participate in the 
Tripartite Commission, but in December they met with the Azali 
Government. By year's end, the OAU was mediating negotiations between 
the Government and the on the provisions of the new constitution and a 
timetable for elections in 2001; however, it remained unclear whether 
the representatives from Anjouan would participate in or accept any 
agreement resulting from the negotiations. Although the OAU had 
initially maintained the position that the OAU-brokered Antananarivo 
Accord was the only viable option to reunify the islands, in December 
the OAU stated that it would accept an agreement that maintained the 
territorial integrity of the country and that provided for a democratic 
constitutional government. On December 12, Azali named a new civilian 
Prime Minister, Hamada Madi, and formed a new civilian Cabinet, which 
is composed of Azali supporters.
    There were no bans in effect on political parties, which continued 
openly to criticize the Government without penalty. There are 21 
political parties in the country; 5 parties represent the Azali 
Government and 16 parties represent the opposition.
    Village chiefs and Muslim religious leaders tend to dominate local 
politics. Traditional social, religious, and economic institutions also 
affect the country's political life in important ways.
    Although women have the right to vote and to run for office,
    they are underrepresented severely in national politics and 
government. At least three women hold senior government positions; one 
is the Minister for National Education; one is the President of the 
Tribunal of First Instance, and the third is the General Secretary of 
the State Council, which advises the Cabinet.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The military Government did not prevent the operation of human 
rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), and a number of NGO's 
operated in the country. However, the Comoros Human Rights Association, 
established in 1990, was on the verge of disintegration due to a lack 
of funds, and it was inactive during the year.
    The military Government cooperated with international NGO's, and a 
few international NGO's operated in the country.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution does not prohibit discrimination based on these 
factors specifically, but only states that the judiciary is the 
guardian of individual liberties. There is discrimination against 
women, and local communities discriminate against and harass 
Christians. The new constitution, approved in August, provides for 
equality under the law to all citizens regardless of sex, origin, race, 
religion, belief, or ideology; however, it was not implemented by 
year's end.
    Women.--Violence against women occurs, but medical authorities, the 
police, and women's groups believed that it was rare. In theory a woman 
could seek protection through the courts in the case of violence, but 
the problem is addressed most often within the extended family or at 
the village level.
    Men have the dominant role in society. A matriarchal African 
tradition affords women some rights, especially in terms of 
landholding. Societal discrimination against women is most apparent in 
rural areas where women have onerous farming and childrearing duties, 
with fewer opportunities for education and wage employment. In contrast 
an improvement in the status of women was most evident in the major 
towns, where growing numbers of women are in the labor force and 
generally earn wages comparable to those of men engaged in similar 
work; however, few women hold positions of responsibility in business. 
While legal discrimination exists in some areas, in general inheritance 
and property rights do not disfavor women. For example, the house that 
the father of the bride traditionally provides to the couple at the 
time of their marriage remains her property in the event of divorce.
    Children.--The Government has not taken any specific action to 
protect or promote children's welfare. Education is compulsory until 
the age of 10; however, attendance is not enforced. An estimated 60 
percent of children attended primary school, while only 34 percent 
attending secondary school. Fifty-five percent of boys attended school, 
and 45 percent of girls attended school. Population pressure and 
poverty forced some families to place their children in the homes of 
others. These children, often as young as 7 years of age, typically 
worked long hours as domestic servants in exchange for food and shelter 
(see Section 6.c.). Legal provisions that address the rights and 
welfare of children were not enforced because of a lack of inspectors.
    Child prostitution and child pornography are criminalized under the 
law. Unmarried children under the age of 13 are considered minors, and 
they are legally protected from sexual exploitation, prostitution, and 
pornography.
    Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, generally is not practiced. Child abuse appears 
to be rare.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence of widespread 
discrimination against the disabled in the provision of education or 
other services. There are no laws concerning accessibility to public 
buildings or services for persons with disabilities.
    Religious Minorities.--There is widespread societal discrimination 
against Christians in all sectors of life. Attempts have been made to 
isolate Christians from village life. In September and October 1999, on 
Anjouan, a religious leader started an unofficial campaign against 
Christians. Committees were formed in many villages to harass 
Christians, and lists of names of suspected Christians were circulated. 
Anti-Christian rhetoric was broadcast on the radio. This campaign 
resulted in threats, but there were no reports of violence. Christians 
faced insults and threats of violence from members of their 
communities. Christians have been harassed by mobs in front of mosques 
and called in for questioning by religious authorities. In some 
instances, families forced Christian members out of their homes or 
threatened them with a loss of financial support. Some Christians have 
had their Bibles taken by family members. Local government officials, 
religious authorities, and family members have attempted to force 
Christians to attend services at mosques against their will.
    Islamic fundamentalism is growing in popularity as more students 
return to the country after studying Islamic subjects in foreign 
countries.
    In 1999 community members and authorities in Lingoni, Anjouan, 
banned Christians from attending any community events, and in Mremeni, 
Anjouan, they banned Christian burials in the local cemetery.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution does not provide for 
the right to unionize; however, the Government has not prevented 
industries from unionizing. Farming on small land holdings, subsistence 
fishing, and petty commerce make up the daily activity of most of the 
population. The wage labor force is small, and numbers less than 7,000 
including government employees, and less than 2,000 excluding them. 
Teachers, civil servants, and dockworkers are unionized. Unions are 
independent of the Government. The Constitution does not provide for 
the right to strike; however, the right to strike has been exercised 
freely by public sector workers. The new constitution, approved in 
August, provides for the right to strike; however, it was not 
implemented by year's end.
    Government workers and teachers held strikes intermittently during 
the year. Teachers and hospital workers strike intermittently, mostly 
because they often are not paid for months at a time (see Sections 1.e. 
and 2.a.). In August, despite regulations that prevent the removal of 
judges, Colonel Azali transferred to other duties nine judges who had 
initiated a strike from mid-June to early August that called for 
judicial reform and regular payment of salaries. There are no laws 
protecting strikers from retribution, but there were no known instances 
of retribution.
    There are no restrictions on unions joining federations or 
affiliating with international bodies; however, none are known to do 
so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the 
right to bargain collectively, and strikes are legal. Wages are set by 
employers in the small private sector and by the Government, especially 
the Ministries of Finance and Labor, in the larger public sector. The 
Labor Code, which is rarely enforced, does not include a system for 
resolving labor disputes, and it does not prohibit antiunion 
discrimination by employers.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
does not prohibit forced or bonded labor, but it generally is not 
practiced; however, some families place their children in the homes of 
others where they work long hours in exchange for food or shelter (see 
Section 5).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code defines the minimum age for employment as 
15 years of age. The Ministry of Labor has few resources to enforce 
this provision; however, except for domestic work, child labor is not a 
problem due to the general lack of wage employment opportunities. 
Children generally help with the work of their families in the 
subsistence farming and fishing sectors (see Section 5).
    The law does not prohibit forced or bonded labor, and there were 
some instances of forced or bonded labor by children (see Section 5 and 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage. The 
Government often pays workers late or fails to pay them at all; during 
the year, government workers received wages through August.
    The Labor Code specifies 1 day off per week plus 1 month of paid 
vacation per year, but the Government has not set a standard workweek.
    There are no safety or health standards for the minuscule 
manufacturing sector.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

    Much of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) 
continued to be ruled by President Laurent Desire Kabila, whose 
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) 
overthrew the authoritarian regime of Mobutu Sese Seko by armed force 
in 1997. Kabila continued to rule by decree, despite creating and 
personally selecting members of a Constituent and Legislative Assembly, 
and the Government continued to operate without a constitution. The 
State continued to be highly centralized formally, although in practice 
the country's dilapidated transportation and communications 
infrastructure impaired central government control. The Government 
recognized two progovernment political parties and a splinter group of 
a prominent opposition party; however, it banned all other opposition 
parties. The ``People's Power Committees'' (CPP's) continued to monitor 
the activities of citizens in neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces. 
War broke out in 1998 between the Government and rebel forces. The 
Lusaka Accords, which were signed on July 10, 1999, provided for a 
political dialog among the Government, rebel factions, the unarmed 
opposition, and elements of civil society; however, the Government 
repeatedly frustrated attempts to begin initial talks during the year. 
The judiciary continued to be subject to executive influence and 
corruption.
    As the war grew into an increasing stalemate, government forces 
controlled less than half of the country. Several rebel groups, the 
Congolese Rally for Democracy based in Goma (RCD/Goma), the Movement 
for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), and the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy based in Bunia (RCD/ML) controlled the remaining territory, 
with the active military support of the Rwandan and Ugandan 
Governments. The RCD/Goma remained dominated by members of the Tutsi 
ethnic minority and continued to be supported by the Government of 
Rwanda; the RCD/ML commanded fewer troops and, like the largely non-
Tutsi MLC, was supported by the Government of Uganda. War broke out in 
August 1998, when Kabila tried to expel Rwandan military forces that 
had helped him overthrow Mobutu. Congolese Tutsis as well as the 
Governments of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda all relied on the Rwandan 
military presence for protection against hostile armed groups operating 
from the eastern part of the country. These groups included: The 
Interahamwe militia of Hutus, mostly from Rwanda, which took part in 
the 1994 genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda and who fought the Tutsi-
dominated Government of Rwanda; Hutu members of the former Rwandan 
armed forces, which also took part in the 1994 genocide of Tutsis in 
Rwanda, and which also fought the Government of Rwanda; the Mai Mai, a 
loose association of traditional Congolese local defense forces, which 
fought the influx of perceived Rwandan immigrants; the Alliance of 
Democratic Forces (ADF), made up of Ugandan expatriates and supported 
by the Government of Sudan, which fought the Government of Uganda; and 
several groups of Hutus from Burundi fighting the Tutsi-dominated 
Government of Burundi. In the ensuing war, elements of the armed forces 
of Rwanda and Uganda operated inside the country in support of the RCD 
or the MLC; elements of the armed forces of Angola, Namibia, and 
Zimbabwe operated inside the country in support of the Government; and 
the Mai Mai and Hutu armed groups operated inside the country on the 
side of the Government, often as guerrillas operating inside territory 
held by antigovernment forces. Elements of the armed forces of Burundi 
operated inside the country against armed groups of Hutus from Burundi 
who used the country as a base. Libya was among those countries 
supplying arms and logistical support to the Kabila Government, but did 
not conduct combat operations in the country. North Korea had advisers 
in the country who trained government troops. The front that separated 
government from antigovernment forces generally was stable, except in 
the province of Equateur, where government and rebel MLC troops fought 
running engagements along the Ubangi River. The cease-fire agreement, 
negotiated as part of the Lusaka Accords, was violated by all parties, 
especially in the north and east where the Government launched a major 
military offensive along the Ubangi River. In October the Congolese 
Armed Forces (FAC) launched an offensive on the rebel-occupied 
territories in northern Katanga Province; however, the offensive was 
pushed back by Rwandan and RCD forces, who captured the town of Pweto.
    The Government's security forces consist of a national police force 
under the Ministry of Interior, the National Security Council (CNS), 
the National Intelligence Agency (ANR), and the FAC, which includes an 
Office for the Military Detection of Subversive Activities (DEMIAP). 
The Presidential Guard was integrated into forces of the 7th Military 
District to form the Forces d'Intervention Rapide (FIC) during the 
year. The immigration service, Direction General de Migration (DGM), 
the Autodefense Forces (FAP), and CPP's also functioned as security 
forces. In 1999 Kabila gave Mai Mai leaders commissions in the FAC and 
coordinated operations with the Mai Mai and Hutu militias. The People's 
Defense Committees (CPD's), which are armed elements of the CPP's and 
operated outside the formal structure of the State, had not yet been 
armed in some areas by year's end. The police force, reorganized in 
1997, handles basic criminal cases. The CNS shares responsibility for 
internal and external security with the ANR, including border security 
matters. The FAC retains some residual police functions. Military 
police have jurisdiction over armed forces personnel. The security 
forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
    Most sectors of the economy continued to decline. Production and 
incomes continued to fall, and the modern sector virtually has 
disappeared. Physical infrastructure was in serious disrepair, 
financial institutions have collapsed, and public education and health 
have deteriorated. Annual per capita national income remained at less 
than $100. Subsistence activities, a large informal sector, and 
widespread barter characterized much of the economy; the insolvent 
public sector could not provide even basic public services. External 
economic assistance remained limited, and the State's revenues from 
diamond exports, its leading source of foreign exchange, declined. 
Public sector employees, including most soldiers, routinely went months 
without pay, which caused widespread hardship and contributed to 
tensions within the armed forces; however, unlike in 1999, there were 
no strikes. Rebel-held areas increasingly were integrated financially 
and administratively with the economies of Rwanda and Uganda. The 
Governments of Rwanda and Uganda established commercial agreements, 
maintained cadres in key income-collecting agencies, levied and 
collected taxes and customs duties, and systematically extracted hard 
currency from the regions they controlled.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it 
continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the 
right to change their government peacefully. Security forces were 
responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings, disappearances, 
torture, beatings, rape, and other abuses. In general security forces 
committed these abuses with impunity, although a special military 
tribunal tried and executed some security force members for various 
human rights abuses. Prison conditions remained harsh and life 
threatening. Security forces increasingly used arbitrary arrest and 
detention throughout the year. Prolonged pretrial detention remained a 
problem, and citizens often were denied fair public trials. The special 
military tribunal tried civilians for political offenses, frequently 
with total disregard for due process protections, and sentenced 
civilians to death; however, no civilians were executed during the 
year. The judiciary remained subject to executive influence and 
continued to suffer from a lack of resources, inefficiency, and 
corruption. It largely was ineffective as either a deterrent to human 
rights abuses or a corrective force. Security forces violated citizens' 
rights to privacy. Forcible conscription of adults and children 
continued, although children were conscripted to a lesser extent than 
in the previous year. Government security forces continued to use 
excessive force and committed violations of international law in the 
war. Government aircraft routinely bombed civilian populated areas in 
rebel-held territory. Although a large number of private newspapers 
often published criticism of the Government, the Government continued 
to restrict freedom of speech and of the press by harassing, arresting, 
detaining, and torturing newspaper editors and journalists and seizing 
individual issues of publications, as well as by increasing its 
restrictions on private radio broadcasting. Harassment of journalists, 
human rights activists, and opposition politicians increased during the 
year. The Government severely restricted freedom of assembly and 
association. Government forces committed some abuses against religious 
entities. The Government continued to restrict freedom of movement and 
continued to require exit visas. The war resulted in a massive increase 
in internally displaced persons (IDP's). The Government continued to 
ban political party activity and used security services to stop 
political demonstrations, resulting in numerous arrests and detentions. 
It also harassed, imprisoned, and tortured members of opposition 
parties and harassed human rights nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's). Violence against women was a problem and rarely was punished. 
Discrimination against women was widespread and common. Female genital 
mutilation (FGM) persisted among isolated populations in the north. 
Child prostitution was a problem. Discrimination against indigenous 
Pygmies and ethnic minorities was a problem. Serious governmental and 
societal violence and discrimination against members of the Tutsi 
ethnic minority continued; however, the Government protected many 
Tutsis who were at risk and facilitated the departure of approximately 
3,000 to neighboring countries. On occasion tension between the Hema 
and Lendu flared into violence that resulted in hundreds of deaths. The 
Government restricted worker rights. The Government arrested labor 
leaders during public sector strikes and allowed private employers to 
refuse to recognize unions. There were reports of forced conscription, 
including of children, and there were reports of forced child labor. 
Child labor, including use of child soldiers, remained a problem. Mob 
violence resulted in killings and injuries.
    There were numerous credible reports that Mai Mai groups fighting 
on the side of the Government committed serious abuses, including many 
killings, torture, and the arbitrary arrest and detention of civilians.
    During the year, antigovernment forces committed serious abuses 
against civilians living in territories under their control, including 
deliberate, large-scale killings, disappearances, torture, rape, 
extortion, robbery, dismemberment, arbitrary arrests and detention, 
harassment of human rights workers and journalists, and forcible 
recruitment of child soldiers. In particular RCD/Goma and Rwandan units 
committed mass killings generally in reprisal for Mai Mai attacks 
against RCD or Rwandan forces. There also were numerous and widespread 
unconfirmed reports that armed bands of Rwandan Hutus posing as 
Interahamwe fighters committed abuses. The Rwandan army allegedly 
recruited these groups in order ostensibly to demonstrate the need for 
a continued Rwandan military presence in the areas they controlled. 
Rebel organizations severely restricted freedom of speech, assembly, 
association, and religion in areas they held. There were reports of 
attacks against local and international NGO's in rebel-held areas. 
There also were many deaths due to interethnic mob violence in areas 
held by antigovernment forces.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the 
security forces committed extrajudicial killings, and the Government 
misused the judicial system to try, sentence, and execute numerous 
persons without due process. The Government also materially supported 
Mai Mai and Hutu armed groups, which, according to credible reports, 
repeatedly killed unarmed as well as armed persons in areas held by 
antigovernment forces. An international humanitarian NGO estimated that 
as many as 1.7 million persons have died during the war because of 
killings, malnutrition, or starvation (see Section 1.g.).
    On January 5, FAC soldiers shot and killed William Mbulu in the 
Lingwala district of Kinshasa for no apparent reason. On January 14, in 
the Limete district of Kinshasa near Kuaka, a soldier in the 
Presidential Guard known by the name of Pipiyu killed a policeman who 
intervened on behalf of a civilian being harassed by the soldier. On 
the morning of January 28, in the Masina district of Kinshasa near 
Mizola, a FAC soldier shot and killed Addy Lisasi in a building near 
the railroad tracks. On May 21, in the village of Kimpaka, near 
Kinshasa, soldiers killed ``Ya Rolly'' Ngimbi after he refused to give 
them money. The soldiers then raped and killed his wife, and stole 
money and valuables from the household before leaving. On May 25, near 
the village of Kimbiolongo, there were unconfirmed reports that FAC 
soldiers killed Nsiala Nkia Mbiyavanga for unknown reasons. The 
soldiers then beat his parents severely, raped his 13yearold sister 
Mirielle, and stole numerous items from their home (see Section 1.c.). 
On May 25, there were unconfirmed reports that Mukoko died from 
injuries inflicted during a severe beating by FAC soldiers. The 
soldiers later allegedly tortured his family members when they sought 
justice from village authorities (see Section 1.c.). On May 31, Mpadi 
Mamikamona Moko, a veterinarian at the MULENDA MBO farm outside of 
Kinshasa and a resident of the Masina district of Kinshasa, was beaten 
to death and thrown into the Ndjili river by men dressed in military 
uniforms. On the evening of July 22, in the MontNgafula district of 
Kinshasa, two armed men believed to be soldiers broke into the home of 
Irenge Kako, an employee of the Central Bank of the Congo. The men 
stole money from Kako and then shot him twice in the head, killing him. 
On September 8, government soldiers shot and killed 47 men and 4 women 
in a house in Dongo; 2 persons survived by jumping out of a window. The 
soldiers reportedly killed the persons while retreating from a rebel 
attack.
    On October 31, security forces rearrested Commandant Anselme Masasu 
Nindaga, a political prisoner arrested in 1998 but released on March 24 
(see Sections 1.b., 1.d., and 1.e.). On November 24, there were reports 
that government officials executed Masasu and 35 suspected 
collaborators at a FAC military court near Pweto, allegedly for 
plotting a coup against President Kabila during the year. There also 
were widespread rumors that the Government executed hundreds of 
suspected Masasu collaborators with Kivusian origins in Kinshasa.
    On December 7, a group of armed police attacked the car of 
JeanClaude Masangu as he was returning home. The police shot and killed 
Masangu's bodyguard; Masangu and his chauffeur escaped without harm. 
The local press declared that the police were attempting to kill 
Masangu; however, at year's end, the intent of the attack remained 
unknown. On December 11, a military court tried, convicted of 
manslaughter, sentenced to death, and executed two of the policemen.
    Throughout the year, government military tribunals continued to 
sentence to death many civilians after military trials that were often 
perfunctory, and many of these civilians were executed (see Section 
1.e.). Members of the security forces repeatedly killed civilians, 
particularly in areas that they were preparing to abandon to advancing 
antigovernment forces. The military justice system, which was revised 
in 1997, prosecuted FAC members for individual incidents ranging from 
armed robbery to rape to murder, and sentenced to death and executed at 
least 17 FAC members during the year (see Section 1.e.).
    Harsh prison conditions and abuse led to an undetermined number of 
deaths in prisons. Many prisoners died of illness or starvation (see 
Section 1.c.). It was reported that, since Kabila took power in 1997, 
both extrajudicial killings and deaths due to torture and neglect have 
become common at a secret detention center known as ``Alfa,'' which was 
run directly by the Office of the President. On January 21, in Inongo, 
Bandundu Province, Iyela Mokolo died in detention from injuries he 
sustained while being tortured (see Section 1.c.).
    No action is known to have been taken against the members of the 
security forces responsible for the following 1999 killings: University 
student Remy Lushima Nyamangombe in January 1999; a person in the 
Sebastian bar in Kinshasa in February 1999; public transportation 
driver Kalle in April 1999; a minibus driver in April 1999; Colonel 
Ndoma Moteke who was tortured in May 1999; a 12-year-old boy in July 
1999; Charles Bokeleale in July 1999; student Kamba Kanyinda in 
November 1999; and Simon Makoko in November 1999.
    The Government did not prosecute any state officials or other 
persons in connection with the mass extrajudicial killings of Tutsis in 
1998.
    There were reports that landmines continued to be used, 
particularly in the eastern half of the country, despite agreements not 
to do so in the Lusaka Accords. Government forces, rebel groups, and 
the armed forces of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Chad allegedly used 
landmines; however, it is impossible to know which groups laid 
landmines.
    In July a Belgian judge issued an arrest warrant against Congolese 
Foreign Minister Yerodia Abdoulaye after a number of Tutsis in Belgium 
claimed that Yerodia's radio broadcasts in August 1998 incited the 
populace to murder Tutsis randomly. A similar case was filed against 
Kabila in September.
    There were widespread reports throughout the year of killings and 
other human rights abuses by both progovernment and antigovernment 
forces. Verification of these reports was extremely difficult, 
particularly those emanating from remote areas and those areas affected 
by active combat, primarily in the eastern areas of the country. 
Independent observers often found access difficult due to hazardous 
security conditions as well as frequent impediments imposed by 
authorities (see Section 4). Both progovernment and antigovernment 
forces extensively used propaganda disseminated via local media, 
including charges leveled at opposing forces, further complicating 
efforts to obtain accurate information (see Section 2.a.).
    Progovernment Mai Mai guerilla units killed many civilians, 
sometimes after torturing them, in areas where they operated. In August 
there were reports that Mai Mai killed dozens of civilians fleeing from 
Shabunda. Hutu militia units fighting on the side of the Government, 
and reportedly supported materially by the Government, also killed many 
noncombatants. Information about killings by Mai Mai, Interahamwe, and 
Hutu militia units remained very incomplete, and many such killings may 
not have been reported.
    Mob violence resulted in killings, but the Government did not 
incite directly lethal mob violence during the year. However, following 
the October death of Archbishop Emmanuel Kataliko of Bukavu due to a 
heart attack, the Kabila Government claimed that Tutsis had poisoned 
the Archbishop, a charge the Catholic Church denied (see Section 2.c.). 
The government statement contributed to demonstrations in the occupied 
territories that were suppressed by RCD/Goma rebel authorities (see 
Section 2.b.). At least one child was killed by gunfire during the 
incident.
    Throughout the year in the Ituri district in Orientale Province, an 
area dominated by Ugandan and Ugandan-supported forces, fighting 
continued between members of the Lendu and Hema tribes, which 
reportedly killed thousands of persons and displaced tens of thousands 
of others (see Section 5). This fighting reportedly arose from a 
dispute about land use and also reportedly was manipulated by Ugandan 
troops who charged the tribes fees in order to provide protection to 
their members. Specific incidences of violence were difficult to verify 
due to the general unrest in the region. There were reports during the 
year that intertribal fighting between December 28 and 31, 1999, in the 
area of Blukwa in the Walendu Pitsi collective, left 300 persons dead, 
the majority Hema, according to credible sources. There were unverified 
reports of up to 40 Lendu killed at Lita, near Katoto, in late August, 
and between 20 to 25 Lendu killed at Nyangaray. According to credible 
sources, clashes occurred in August and September in Linga, Ngongo, 
Kobu, and Bunia.
    In July a group believed to be Interahamwe attacked an internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camp in North Kivu Province (see Section 2.d.). 
Approximately 50 persons were killed, including some who were burned 
alive inside their homes. On September 5, Interahamwe reportedly 
attacked settlements near Goma; six persons were killed and nine were 
wounded. On September 6, Interahamwe reportedly attacked a team of 
civilian conservationists in the Gahuzu-Biega National Park near 
Bukavu; 10 persons were killed, including a journalist and 2 park 
guides, and a number of others were injured. Progovernment forces 
routinely bombed civilian populations in air raids against towns held 
by antigovernment forces, which resulted in heavy civilian casualties 
(see Section 1.g.).
    On two occasions during the year in May and June, Rwandan and 
Ugandan forces fought in Kisangani, resulting in hundreds of civilian 
deaths, thousands of wounded, and 60,000 displaced persons (see Section 
2.d.). The most severe of these clashes occurred from June 5 to 11, 
during which time both forces shelled the city with artillery and 
mortar fire, destroying homes and much of the city's infrastructure. 
Credible sources claim that Rwandan and Ugandan troops raped many women 
and shot persons during extensive fighting in the city. Humanitarian 
organizations report that approximately 700 Congolese civilians were 
killed during the fighting; many died as a result of lack of medical 
attention since transportation to hospitals during the fighting often 
was unavailable. Many displaced persons remained for several months at 
a camp outside of the city because they feared to return (see Section 
2.d.). There were reports that both Ugandan and Rwandan forces used 
landmines during the fighting in Kisangani.
    During the year, antigovernment forces committed repeated mass 
killings. In particular RCD/Goma and Rwandan units committed mass 
killings generally in reprisal for Mai Mai attacks against RCD or 
Rwandan forces. Some of the many reports of such killings were 
credible, particularly attacks, murders, and looting committed against 
members and facilities of the Catholic Church (see Section 2.c.). 
Investigations of many reported killings often were difficult, and 
details of reported abuses sometimes emerged long after the events 
occurred. There have been no known serious attempts by any of the 
combatants in the conflict to investigate incidences in which their 
troops allegedly committed numerous murders, rapes, lootings, and other 
abuses in areas under their control.
    During the year, there were numerous credible reports that RCD 
forces, participating with or supported by the Rwandan Patriotic Army 
(RPA), beat, tortured, and then buried alive 15 women at Mwenga in 
December 1999. However, the Rwandan Government denied these charges and 
claims that 3 women, not 15, only were beaten severely by civilians who 
accused the women of witchcraft. According to the Rwandan Government, 
the women were rescued from mob justice by RCD troops but later died 
from their injuries. In December 1999, the RCD/RPA arrested Frank 
Kasereke, the RCD commander, but he escaped from jail on February 5 
along with 32 other detainees.
    On January 29, in Bunia, a Rwandan soldier reportedly summarily 
executed a Congolese rebel soldier based on the suspicion that the 
Congolese soldier was passing information to an opposing rebel group 
(see Section 1.e.).
    On February 5, RCD and RPA soldiers reportedly attacked the village 
of Kilambo, North Kivu Province. The rebels allegedly tied up men, 
raped their wives in front of them (see Section 1.c.), and then killed 
30 persons.
    On February 12, RCD/Goma rebels killed Kitoko, chief of the 
Lulonge-Fizi, and Tchalanga, chief of the Ziralo, in Kalele, South Kivu 
Province.
    On February 16, a Banyamulenge militia attacked a Catholic mission 
in the Kilibu area of South Kivu Province (see Section 2.c.). Two 
priests fled, but militiamen captured a third priest, Father Pepin 
Beta; the militiamen forced the priest to kneel, and then shot and 
killed him.
    From March 6 to 8, RPA forces reportedly made repeated attacks on 
the village of Kilambo in Masisi, North Kivu Province, and allegedly 
executed numerous persons suspected of collaborating with the 
Interahamwe. Among others, the RPA reportedly killed two men known as 
Kapalata and Mamboleo, Samuel Kanyomo, a woman named Suzana, and her 
three children.
    On March 10, RCD soldiers killed Lwina Samuel, the chief of the 
Office of Environmental Protection in Rutshuru, North Kivu Province, 
for refusing to allow soldiers to steal his belongings. RCD soldiers 
later killed Lwina Bwangi, Samuel's 17-year-old son, after he 
identified his father's killers.
    On March 24, RCD soldiers shot and killed Thomas Kumbuka in the 
village of Kishondja in Masisi, North Kivu Province, after they 
allegedly mistook him for an Interahamwe militiaman.
    On April 10, Muulwa, a farmer from the village of Habula in 
Walikale territory, North Kivu Province, was killed by RCD soldiers who 
had entered the village to investigate whether the residents were 
harboring Interahamwe soldiers. On April 16, following a Mai Mai attack 
on the RCD/Goma camp at Mulume Munene in South Kivu Province, RCD 
soldiers attacked the village of Izege. Soldiers reportedly warned 
villagers to leave their homes, then set the homes on fire, and killed 
four persons; soldiers burned hundreds of homes and animals.
    On May 14 and 15, in response to the apparent Mai Mai slaying of 
RCD commander Ruzagura during an ambush on his motorcade, RCD/Goma 
forces killed hundreds of civilians in and around the town of Katogota 
in South Kivu Province. According to some reports, RCD soldiers killed 
as many as 300 villagers by slitting their throats.
    On June 23, in Walikale, RPA Captain Alexis Rugira and other RPA 
soldiers killed Baligizi Mufungizi, stole his bicycle, and robbed him. 
Captain Rugira, Lieutenant Gapfunsi, S/Major Rutabana, and two privates 
were arrested and were in pretrial detention awaiting prosecution by 
the military tribunal at year's end.
    Between August 18 and 24, following a period of intense fighting 
between Mai Mai and RCD forces in the Shabunda region of South Kivu 
Province, the RCD carried out a punitive campaign against the villages 
between the towns of Lulingu and Nzovu. Soldiers sent by RCD Commandant 
Macumu burned the villages; more than 300 villagers were burned alive 
and 3,000 homes were destroyed.
    On August 29, Bukavu students demonstrated to protest the arrest of 
four civil society members (see Sections 1.d and 2.b.). In their effort 
to disperse the demonstrations, RCD soldiers fired into the air and 
reportedly shot and killed one student.
    On August 30, RCD/Goma vice military police commandant Tshisekedi 
ordered subordinates to arrest his younger brother, Mbuyi Tshibwabwa, 
and Nyamulinduka Ndelo Zagabe, whom he suspected of stealing his sewing 
machine. Military police repeatedly beat the two men with hammers, 
shovels, and clubs until they eventually died (see Section 1.c.). There 
was no known action taken against Tshisekedi by year's end.
    On September 1, RPA Captain Peter Kabanda and other RPA soldiers 
allegedly killed 67 unarmed civilians in Masisi, North Kivu Province. 
The captain and the other RPA soldiers were arrested for acting 
contrary to operational orders and for failing to differentiate between 
the enemy and unarmed civilians. The soldiers were in detention 
awaiting prosecution for murder before the military tribunal at year's 
end.
    On November 1, a group of suspected Interahamwe soldiers armed with 
guns, machetes, and clubs attacked the village of Kehero, near Goma, 
North Kivu Province, allegedly in revenge for an October 10 killing by 
RCD forces of their leader known as Rwenderi. The alleged Interahamwe 
killed nine persons on suspicion that they had collaborated with the 
RCD forces.
    On November 8, Ugandan soldiers allegedly shot and killed nine 
persons at a wedding party in the village of Kikere, near Butembo, 
North Kivu Province; the soldiers believed the village to be 
sympathetic to the Mai Mai. The attack reportedly followed violent 
clashes between Ugandan and Mai Mai forces in the surrounding area. The 
soldiers also allegedly set fire to houses in the village; 11 persons 
burned to death in the houses.
    There also were reports of killings by Banyamulenge militias and 
Burundian military forces. On July 19, in the Fizi district of South 
Kivu Province, Banyamulenge and Burundian soldiers killed an estimated 
150 persons in the town of Lubamba by slitting their throats. The local 
population sought refuge in the nearby town of Dine.
    Although unconfirmed, there were widespread and numerous reports 
throughout the occupied territories of a Rwanda-supported Hutu militia 
posing as Interahamwe and operating as an instrument of terror against 
civilians. Rwandan authorities reportedly coordinated attacks by this 
group on civilian and church targets and then blamed the attacks on the 
Interahamwe. Rwandan authorities allegedly used the insecurity brought 
on by this Hutu militia to further justify its military presence in the 
country.
    By year's end, it was more difficult to identify the armed groups 
responsible for attacks. On June 19, approximately 50 unidentified 
soldiers attacked and pillaged a Catholic church and convent, a 
hospital, and homes in the town of Kabare, South Kivu Province (see 
Section 2.c.); 3 civilians were killed. The RCD blamed the attack on 
the Interahamwe, but local humanitarian groups disputed this claim 
because of the number of RPA soldiers in the area.
    During the night of July 9 and 10, an unidentified militia attacked 
an encampment of displaced persons at Sake, in the Masisi territory of 
North Kivu Province (see Section 2.d.). Official estimates indicated 
that the assailants killed as many as 40 persons and wounded a number 
of others; 20 were treated at Goma General Hospital. In addition 48 
homes were burned and 2 pharmacies were looted.
    There were numerous reported killings along the road from Uvira to 
Bukavu in South Kivu Province; many were aimed at looting and theft. 
Observers believe that Mai Mai, Interahamwe, FDD, Banyamulenge, or RPA 
combatants could have been responsible for the attacks, with or without 
the knowledge or consent of their commanders. The climate of insecurity 
in the occupied territories and particularly in the Kivu Provinces 
forced many local residents to abandon their homes and created food 
shortages as armed bands kept farmers from working in their fields.
    b. Disappearance.--There were many reported cases of disappearance, 
most as a result of the war. Government forces reportedly were 
responsible for the disappearance of many persons. Throughout the year, 
government security forces regularly held alleged suspects in detention 
for varying periods of time before acknowledging that they were in 
custody. Typical accounts described unidentified assailants who 
abducted, threatened, and often beat their victims before releasing 
them. Journalists and opposition members claimed that they were targets 
of such actions.
    On October 31, security forces rearrested Commandant Anselme Masasu 
Nindaga, a political prisoner who had been arrested in 1998 but 
released on March 24 (see Sections 1.a, 1.d., and 1.e.). Masasu 
reportedly was detained in undisclosed locations in Kinshasa for at 
least 3 weeks. On November 24, there were reports that government 
officials executed Masasu and 35 suspected collaborators. The 
Government has denied these reports. The persons reportedly executed 
remained unaccounted for at year's end.
    In the 1999 disappearance cases of Commandant Jean Nkumu Wangala, 
Bernard Ntandou, Jean Mpalabouna, Justin Djuambe Tegi, Michel Gbetoro, 
and Belmonde Ma Gloire Coffi, human rights NGO La Voix des Sans Voix 
(VSV) reported that Belmonde Ma Gloire Coffi had been executed and that 
Jean Nkumu Wangala fled the country. VSV believed that the others also 
had fled, but did not have evidence to prove this belief.
    There have been no developments in the December 1998 case of Donnat 
N'Kola Shamuyi, an investigator for the human rights NGO Collectif pour 
le Development des Droits de l'Homme, who disappeared while working in 
Tshikapa in Western Kasai Province.
    The bodies of many persons killed in the war were burned, dumped in 
rivers, or buried in mass graves that remain unopened. Neither side is 
known to have kept or released records of the identities of the persons 
whom its forces killed.
    Antigovernment and rebel forces reportedly were responsible for the 
disappearance of many persons. There were reports that antigovernment 
forces repeatedly failed to acknowledge detaining persons.
    On April 2, RCD security forces arrested Christian Ngongo Kasumba 
at the border post of Bunagana. Kasumba was returning from a business 
trip to Nairobi, Kenya, via Kampala, Uganda; he has not been seen since 
his arrest. Efforts to locate him have been unsuccessful; an RCD 
commandant named Karim reportedly was responsible for Kasumba's arrest 
and detention.
    On May 15, Rwandan soldiers reportedly arrested Ainakafota, the 
director of the Bolongo-Bas office of Friends of Nelson Mandela for 
Human Rights (ANMDH) in Orientale Province, and two other staff members 
of the human rights NGO, on suspicions of spying (see Section 4). The 
ANMDH and family members have not been able to locate Ainakafota or the 
staff members since their arrests; inquiries to Rwandan officials 
concerning their whereabouts have produced no results.
    Reportedly persons whom rebel, Rwandan, or Ugandan forces allegedly 
detained sometimes were transferred to Rwanda or Uganda. Persons 
reported missing in 1998, including 22 Franciscan friars from Sola in 
Katanga Province and 3 university professors from Bukavu in South Kivu 
Province, still were unaccounted for at year's end.
    Ugandan and Rwandan troops, in addition to RCD rebels, reportedly 
abducted many young women from the villages they raided. These night 
raids on villages became so frequent that in many parts of the Kivu 
Provinces peasants slept in their fields.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law forbids torture; however, security forces and 
prison officials used torture, and often beat prisoners in the process 
of arresting or interrogating them. The Government has not responded to 
charges of inmate abuse and repeated beatings by its security force and 
prison officials. Members of the security forces also raped, robbed, 
and extorted money from civilians; some abusers were prosecuted. 
Incidents of physical abuse by security forces occurred during the 
arrest or detention of political opponents, journalists, businessmen, 
and others (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    On January 1, Albert Angbana Mate, a Mobutu government official, 
was arrested in Mbandaka by the ANR for predicting that rebels soon 
would capture the government-held town of Bikoro (see Section 1.d.). 
Agbana was transferred to the ANR facility in Kinshasa (Lemera), where 
security agents reportedly subjected him to severe torture.
    On January 9, 7th Military District soldiers forcibly entered the 
home of Christophe Kalonji Ntambwe in Kinshasa's Barumbu commune, 
ransacked the home, and arrested Kalonji. The soldiers reportedly were 
working as agents of Joseph Mbuyi Lusambo, who wished to expropriate 
land owned by Kalonji. On January 13, the soldiers returned to 
Kalonji's home, searched his files, and destroyed furniture. When 
Kalonji's wife, Muawuka Kena Bantu, visited him at the 7th Military 
District holding facility, she was detained from January 13 to 15, and 
stripped. During their detention, soldiers commanded by Major Jose 
Mopia Agaga beat both Kalonji and his wife, who was 5 months pregnant. 
Kalonji was released on February 8.
    On January 13, security forces arrested, detained, and tortured for 
5 days Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) activist Crispin 
Ipondo Banda, reportedly for distributing brochures on the Lusaka 
Accords published by the NGO LINELIT. Police held Banda at the 
Inspection Provinciale de la Police de Kinshasa before transferring him 
to another ANR facility. He was accused of committing offenses against 
President Kabila but all charges subsequently were dropped, and he was 
freed on February 2. On February 29, rapid intervention police arrested 
seven members of the UDPS in Kinshasa, near the home of UDPS president 
Etienne Tshisekedi, and detained them at a jail in the Kasavubu 
district of Kinshasa where security agents reportedly lashed the 
detainees with whips until their release the following morning (see 
Section 1.d.).
    On January 21, in Inongo, Bandundu Province, Iyela Mokolo died in 
detention from injuries he had sustained while being tortured (see 
Section 1.a.). He had been detained in December 1999 on accusations of 
illegal possession of weapons and poaching.
    There were many recorded instances of torture, harassment, and 
theft committed against the residents of villages that surround Dingi-
Dingi, the location of a FAC airfield that was under construction 
during the year. On February 19, FAC soldiers beat Makengo Mbila Mbua, 
a resident of the village of Kinsala, and stole his money, chickens, 
and sacks of corn. On February 20, FAC soldiers lashed Godet Hiemba, a 
resident of Ingidi village, 50 times with a whip and confiscated his 
belongings because he did not respond properly to the Commandant of the 
Presidential Protection Unit (PPU) at the airfield. The same day, 
soldiers lashed Mawete Mbiyavanga 10 times with a whip and confiscated 
all of the food and money that she had in her possession. Also on 
February 20, FAC soldiers beat Manianga after he prevented the 
Commandant of the PPU from sexually exploiting Manianga's daughter. The 
soldiers also confiscated his belongings and money.
    On the night of March 10, security forces reportedly abducted and 
detained five Congolese refugees from Angola's enclave of Cabinda. The 
refugees were registered with U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in Angola and reportedly were associated with an Angolan 
independence movement. Security officials released three of the 
detainees; however, two remained in detention at a Conseil de Securite 
d'Etat facility in Kinshasa at year's end. Security forces reportedly 
beat and tortured the two who remained in detention, Macario Romao 
Lembe and Vosso Fuila. One of the detainees reportedly is in poor 
health as a result of torture.
    In March a police commandant severely beat the president of the 
Front for the Survival of Democracy (FSD) after he inquired at the 
police station about the arrests of FSD supporters who gathered for a 
FSD demonstration on March 16 (see Section 2.b.).
    On March 20, police officers publicly raped a young girl in the 
town of Pusuku, Bandundu Province, after villagers intervened on behalf 
of a young man named Kituku who had an altercation with another officer 
(see Section 1.d.). There was no known action taken against the 
officers.
    On April 7, government security forces under the command of Faustin 
Numbi arrested and tortured Freddy Lomboto wa Lomboto, the second vice 
president of the opposition party FONUS (Forces Novatrices pour l'Union 
et la Solidarity or New Forces for Unity and Social Progress). 
Lomboto's interrogators smashed his fingers with metal bars and beat 
him until he lost control of his bodily functions in order to extract 
information regarding the party and its president, Joseph Olenghankoy. 
The Government released him after 4 days of questioning and further 
abuse; however, on June 9, Commandant Numbi's soldiers returned to 
Lomboto's house and interrogated his wife when they could not find him; 
she later fled.
    On April 30, members of the Special Presidential Security Group 
allegedly beat Koyagialo Ahonzima Wasana for ignoring government 
restrictions on movement within the vicinity of the Marble Palace, 
President Kabila's residence (see Section 2.d.).
    On May 25, near the village of Kimbiolongo, FAC soldiers killed 
Nsiala Nkia Mbiyavanga for unknown reasons (see Section 1.a.). The 
soldiers then beat his parents severely, raped his 13yearold sister 
Mirielle, and stole numerous items from their home.
    On May 25, there were unconfirmed reports that a man known as 
Mukoko died from injuries inflicted during a severe beating by FAC 
soldiers (see Section 1.a.). The soldiers later allegedly tortured his 
family members when they sought justice from village authorities.
    On October 11, security agents abducted seven UDPS members from a 
street corner in Kinshasa (see Section 1.d.). They reportedly continued 
to be detained at Camp Kokolo at year's end and were subjected to daily 
beatings by security agents.
    On October 18, national police arrested military court officials 
Ambroise Kusa and Ndaba (see Section 1.d.). Kusa and Ndaba reportedly 
were detained at Makala prison and were beaten and tortured. They were 
released on October 25.
    On November 16, police reportedly beat 10 students who intervened 
on behalf of two students arrested while carrying their lunches on the 
campus of the Institut Pedagogique National (IPN) in Kinshasa, because 
the police wanted the food. Several students were arrested (see Section 
1.d.). On November 17, approximately 800 students demonstrated to 
protest the incident; allegedly FAC forces briefly detained a 
journalist covering the protest and confiscated her recordings (see 
Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). The commander of the police detachment 
reportedly was arrested following the incident.
    On November 26, a group of armed government soldiers assaulted and 
shot in the leg Athanese Matenda Kyelu, the manager of the Chamber of 
Commerce, at his house in the Ngaliema district of Kinshasa. The 
soldiers searched and robbed the house (see Section 1.f.). Matenda 
received treatment at Ngaliema Hospital.
    On at least two occasions, members of the security forces beat 
taxicab and minibus passengers who were unable to pay bribes at 
roadblocks (see Section 2.d.).
    Security forces harassed, beat, and tortured journalists, including 
foreign journalists, during the year (see Section 2.a.). For example, 
on January 3, security forces arrested Freddy Loseke Lisumbu, editor of 
the newspaper Le Libre Afrique (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a). Security 
agents allegedly subjected Loseke to torture; he reportedly was in ill 
health at year's end but was denied medical attention. In May a 
military court sentenced Loseke to 3 years in prison (see Section 1.e).
    On February 26, police arrested, detained, and severely beat Zuzi 
Phukuta Dieudonne, a reporter for the newspaper Palme d'Or and 
president of the human rights NGO Justice Sans Frontiere (see Sections 
1.d. and 2.a.). Phukuta reportedly was riding in a public van with a 
number of students who shouted anti-Kabila remarks; Phukuta was accused 
of having insulted the President. Security force agents reportedly 
tortured Phukuta, and the beatings left permanent scars. Police 
released Phukuta shortly after his arrest but have continued to 
threaten his life.
    There was no known action taken against members of the security 
forces responsible for torturing, beating, or abusing the persons in 
the following 1999 cases: The January case of human rights activists 
Christophe Bintu and Bienvenu Kasole; the January case of newspaper 
publisher Thierry Kyalumba; the February case of Toussaint Muhavu 
Shankulu; the February case of Luyinumu Lelo Koko and Jonas Ndoko; the 
February case of Professor Tshibangu Kalala; the March case of two 
female money changers; the March case of a journalist; the April case 
of Lambert Edimba; the May case of eight members of the opposition 
Parti Lumumbist Unifie (PALU) party; the May case of Christian 
Badibangi, president of the opposition party Union Socialist 
Congolaise; the May case of Colonel Ndoma Moteke; the June case of 
journalists for the daily newspaper Tempete des Tropiques; the June 
case of the owner of a dugout canoe known as Motinga; the July case of 
Jean Marie Kashils of the Agence Congolaise de Presse and Bienvenu 
Tshiela of Kasai Horizon Radio Television; the July case of Professor 
Kambaj Wa Kambaji; the September case of human rights NGO activist 
Wetemwani Katembo Merikas; the September case of Francois Mpoyi 
Mukandu, the legal advisor of the governor of Eastern Kasai Province, 
Marcel Mpuanga Mindu, who also was an attorney, and Ditutu bin Bwebwe, 
a court clerk; and the October case of Pascal Kusehuka, secretary 
general of the PALU opposition party for Bandundu Province.
    Street children in Kinshasa were subject to severe harassment and 
exploitation, particularly by soldiers and police (see Section 5). 
There were credible reports that the FAC sexually exploited homeless 
girls.
    There were numerous reports that nongovernmental armed groups 
fighting on the side of the Government, and reportedly materially 
supported by the Government, tortured, raped, and otherwise physically 
abused many persons during the year. Mai Mai guerillas reportedly 
killed persons by torture, including by mutilation and crucifixion (see 
Section 1.a.).
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that mobs beat 
persons.
    There were reports that Interahamwe militia in South Kivu Province 
often raped women.
    There also were numerous reports of torture by antigovernment 
forces in the occupied territories.
    During the year, there were numerous credible reports that RCD 
forces, participating with or supported by the RPA, beat, tortured, and 
then buried alive 15 women at Mwenga in December 1999 (see Section 
1.a.). However, the Rwandan Government denied these charges and claims 
that 3 women, not 15, only were beaten severely by civilians who 
accused the women of witchcraft.
    There were reports that Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers allegedly 
raped women during extensive fighting in Kisangani in May and June (see 
Section 1.a.). Rwandan troops and RCD rebels also reportedly engaged in 
the rape of women in public and often in the presence of their families 
and in-laws. A woman raped in this manner generally is forced out of 
the village, leaving her husband and children behind (see Section 5). 
In June an RCD/Goma soldier, described only as a Munyamulenge, stopped 
a young girl, Fitina, on the road between Baraka and Mboko and raped 
her. After he raped her, the soldier discharged his weapon into her 
vagina. According to a number of credible human rights organizations, 
marauding bands of armed men in the occupied territories often put 
victims of rape through further painful humiliations by inserting 
rocks, sharp sticks, and hot peppers into their vaginas.
    On February 5, RCD and RPA soldiers reportedly attacked the village 
of Kilambo, North Kivu Province. The rebels allegedly tied up men, 
raped their wives in front of them, and then killed 30 persons (see 
Section 1.a.).
    On March 25, security agents for the rebel group RCD/ML arrested 
Kule Thatha, coordinator for the human rights NGO Fondation Yira pour 
les Droits de l'Homme in North Kivu Province. He was detained in the 
town of Beni, where security forces tortured him for having criticized 
the RCD/Goma. He was released on June 15.
    On July 12, the Goma provincial police detachment, which is a part 
of the RCD/Goma rebel government, arrested and tortured Jules Saruti 
for stealing. Police Commandant Charles LumbuLumbu and officer Emmanuel 
Sikuli burned Saruti's tongue with a cigarette, tied him to a pole, 
stuffed his mouth with toilet rags, and beat him. Saruti was 
hospitalized for his injuries following his August release.
    On July 29, RCD/ML security forces detained two of their senior 
officials, Deputy Director of Mining Michel Rudatenguha and Brigade 
Commander Mukalayi, on suspicion of conspiring to overthrow the leader 
of the RCD/ML rebel movement, Professor Wamba dia Wamba (see Section 
1.d.). The officials were allies of the deputy leader of the RCD/ML 
movement, Tibasima Mbogemu Ateenyi, who was then in conflict with 
Wamba. RCD/ML forces loyal to Wamba at the military training camp at 
Rwampara tortured the men while they were detained. It was not known 
whether the men had been released by year's end. Other RCD/ML soldiers 
who were suspected of disloyalty also were tortured.
    On August 30, RCD/Goma vice military police commandant Tshisekedi 
ordered subordinates to arrest his younger brother, Mbuyi Tshibwabwa, 
and Nyamulinduka Ndelo Zagabe, whom he suspected of stealing his sewing 
machine. Military police repeatedly beat the two men with hammers, 
shovels, and clubs until they eventually died (see Section 1.a.). There 
was no known action taken against Tshisekedi.
    On October 9, RCD rebels reportedly publicly arrested, detained, 
and beat 13 human rights activists who attended a meeting of a human 
rights umbrella group in Bukavu (see Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 4).
    There were reports that both Ugandan and Rwandan forces used 
landmines during the fighting in Kisangani (see Section 1.a.).
    There were numerous reports of killings and torture of prisoners by 
some antigovernment forces. A number of prisoners reportedly died of 
suffocation after guards detained them in overcrowded shipping 
containers. Guards reportedly sealed the prisoners inside overcrowded 
containers without ventilation, then denied them all food and water, 
causing death by dehydration, suffocation, and exhaustion. This 
treatment reportedly was reserved for suspected Interahamwe or Mai Mai 
collaborators.
    The Kabila Government operated 220 known prisons and other places 
of detention, and in all such facilities, conditions remained harsh and 
life threatening; there reportedly were many other secret or informal 
detention centers (see Section 1.d.). During the year, the Government 
continued to make limited efforts to improve conditions at Kinshasa's 
main prison, the Makala National Penitentiary and Reeducation Center. 
The Government provided food at some prisons, but not in sufficient 
quantities to ensure adequate nutrition for all inmates. Prison 
conditions remained a threat to prisoners' lives. Living conditions 
were harsh and unsanitary, and prisoners were treated poorly. The penal 
system suffered from severe shortages of funds, medical facilities, 
food, and trained personnel.
    Overcrowding and corruption in the prisons were widespread. 
Prisoners reportedly were beaten to death, tortured, deprived of food 
and water, or starved to death (see Section 1.a.). Prisoners are wholly 
dependent on the personal resources of family or friends for their 
survival. Guards have been known to steal food brought to prisoners. 
Inmates at Makala prison in Kinshasa sleep on the floor without bedding 
and have no access to sanitation, potable water, or adequate health 
care. There were reports of guards forcing 55 or 60 prisoners into a 
small cell with room only to stand. No water or food is given to these 
prisoners. There are no toilets, forcing prisoners to urinate and 
defecate on the floor. Tuberculosis, red diarrhea, and other infectious 
diseases are common and widespread.
    According to credible reports, prison guards demand bribes to allow 
family members to bring food to prisoners. Prisoners also pay bribes to 
receive better treatment. On February 29, three NGO activists who were 
arrested in Bukavu had to pay bribes in order to be moved from a closet 
where they had spent the first night in detention. Guards have shown 
reluctance to release prisoners due to fear of losing part of their 
incomes.
    Although authorities do not target women for abuse, prison guards 
rape female inmates. In general women and juveniles are detained 
separately from men.
    The Government exacerbated the overcrowding of civilian prisons by 
incarcerating many soldiers who declined to fight for the Kabila 
Government in the war. In July President Kabila pardoned and ordered 
the release of approximately 500 former Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) 
troops held at Makala prison; however, there were reports that these 
soldiers immediately were reenlisted in Kabila's military and sent to 
fight against the rebels. At year's end, it was unknown how many 
soldiers, if any, continued to be detained in civilian prisons.
    In June the Government released 93 Rwandan prisoners of war (POW's) 
in accordance with the Lusaka Accords (see Section 1.g.).
    The Government allowed some international humanitarian 
organizations to visit political prisoners on a regular basis, but only 
when the detainees were held in an official prison (see Section 1.e.); 
however, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was denied 
access to some regular detention facilities. The Government did not 
allow these organizations to visit the numerous unpublicized and 
unofficial detention sites scattered throughout the country where most 
newly arrested detainees are held, questioned, and sometimes subjected 
to abuse. The ICRC was denied access to these sites; however, the ICRC 
visited facilities where the Government holds Tutsis for their own 
protection. The ICRC is the only international NGO allowed to visit 
POW's.
    In the previous year, it was reported that RCD/Goma forces 
frequently used the private residences of Rwandan or rebel military 
commanders for incarcerations; it was not known whether such detentions 
occurred during the year. Reports from former detainees indicate a 
systematic pattern of beatings, undernourishment, and deliberate 
killings in these houses.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Despite legal provisions 
governing arrest and detention procedures, the security forces were 
responsible for numerous cases of arbitrary arrest and detention.
    Under the law, serious offenses (those punishable by more than 6 
months' imprisonment) do not require a warrant for a suspect's arrest. 
Only a law enforcement officer with ``judicial police officer'' status 
is empowered to authorize arrest. This status also is vested in senior 
officers of the security services. The law requires security forces to 
bring detainees to the police within 24 hours. The law also requires 
that detainees be charged within 24 hours and be brought within 48 
hours before a magistrate, who may authorize provisional detention for 
varying periods.
    In practice these provisions were violated systematically. Security 
forces, especially those carrying out the orders of any official who 
could claim authority, used arbitrary arrest to intimidate outspoken 
opponents and journalists. Charges rarely were filed, and the political 
motivation for such detentions often was obscure. When the authorities 
did press charges, the claims that they filed sometimes were contrived 
or recitations of archaic colonial regulations.
    Detention without charge has been a frequent problem under the 
Kabila administration. During the year, a number of human rights and 
religious organization leaders continued to indicate that it 
increasingly was difficult to monitor arrests and detentions or 
investigate reports of arbitrary arrest and detention due to increases 
in the number of arrests and detentions, in the number of security 
agencies involved, and in the number of detention facilities. There 
were many secret or unofficial detention centers in Kinshasa, some of 
which reportedly were run by the Office of the President (see Section 
1.a.); there were several reports of secret jails on the premises of 
the presidential palace.
    The Government no longer followed a policy of arresting and 
detaining members of the Tutsi ethnic group without charge and merely 
on the basis of their ethnicity. Approximately 1,516 Congolese Tutsis 
arrested in 1998 after the start of the war were allowed to depart 
between August 1999 and February for refugee camps in Cameroon and 
Benin and eventual resettlement abroad. On May 26, 156 Rwandans were 
repatriated by the ICRC from Lubumbashi to Rwanda. In June 1999, the 
ICRC repatriated detained Tutsis whom the Government regarded as 
Rwandan, Ugandan, or Burundian nationals, and who were willing to 
depart the country; however, approximately 300 Tutsis chose to remain 
in detention due to difficulties in repatriating them to neighboring 
countries, notably Uganda and Burundi. Terms of detention became 
increasingly liberal during the year and included substantial freedom 
of movement by year's end. Government detention of Tutsis became 
protective rather than punitive. Many Tutsis increasingly felt safer in 
government custody than elsewhere in the government-controlled part of 
the country (see Sections 1.c., 1.f., and 5). In July Human Rights 
Minister She Okitundu opened the Institut National de Securite Sociale 
(INSS) protection facility to the foreign diplomatic corps, media, and 
international organizations.
    On January 1, Albert Angbana Mate, a Mobutu government official, 
was arrested in Mbandaka by the ANR for predicting that rebels would 
soon capture the government-held town of Bikoro. Agbana was transferred 
to the ANR facility in Kinshasa (Lemera), where security agents 
reportedly subjected him to severe torture (see Section 1.c.).
    On the morning of January 2, security officials arrested Jose 
Malika, advisor to the Economics Minister, at his home in the Binza 
district of Kinshasa. The security officials questioned Malika at Camp 
Kokolo without revealing the charges for his detention; his personal 
property, including his car, were confiscated.
    On the evening of January 6, four police officials arrested 
Professor Balanda Mikueni, former president of the Supreme Court, at 
his home in the Kintambo district of Kinshasa. The police entered the 
house without an arrest warrant and reportedly threatened to beat 
Balanda's son. Balanda was detained at a holding prison at Kin Maziere 
and then moved to an unknown location before being released on January 
20. Security officials confiscated his house; it was returned by year's 
end.
    On January 13, police arrested and tortured Crispin Ipondo Banda, a 
member of the opposition party UDPS, for talking about the Lusaka peace 
accords with a group of friends (see Section 1.c.). The police 
initially detained him at their facilities in the Kalamu district of 
Kinshasa, but subsequently transferred him to the Provincial Inspection 
Center of Kinshasa.
    On January 14, ANR agents arrested Kayembe Kasuku, a member of the 
human rights NGO Lawyers Without Borders. Kayembe was the defense 
counsel for two Lebanese citizens who were tried by the military courts 
on charges of smuggling money. He also was responsible for the seizure 
of a vessel in the port of Matadi that reportedly was carrying goods 
destined for a Kinshasa merchant. Security agents detained Kayembe at 
the ANR holding facility at Ma Campagne. He reportedly was stripped and 
beaten for several hours for having insulted the President; jailers 
threw water mixed with cement and sand on him during the beating. On 
January 16, he was released and flown to South Africa for medical 
treatment for multiple injuries. It was unknown whether any charges 
were filed against Kayembe, and there was no known action taken against 
the security agents.
    On January 24, ANR agents arrested four missionaries, Jean Denis 
Lokulo, Jean Robert Bompanda, Henri Bofala, and Jean Andiswa, from 
Equateur Province, and detained them at the Lemera holding facility on 
the suspicion that they were rebel informants (see Section 2.c.). The 
missionaries were released on February 22.
    On February 5, security agents at Ndjili airport arrested Belgian 
development workers Pieter Vermaerke and Jesse Cnudde as they were 
about to board a flight to Brussels following a 1-week visit to 
Kinshasa. They were arrested when inspectors found reports on local 
prison conditions and development policies in their bags. Police 
detained them at an interrogation facility in the Ngaliema section of 
Kinshasa; they were released on February 19.
    On February 7, police arrested Time Missine and Betshi Pitchal in 
Matadi, Bas Congo Province, for possessing literature distributed by a 
human rights NGO. The women were sent to Kinshasa and released on 
February 15. It was unknown whether any charges were filed against 
Missine or Pitchal.
    On February 17, ANR agents arrested four members of the PALU 
opposition political party for engaging in political activities (see 
Section 3). They were released on February 25.
    On February 26, police arrested, detained, and severely beat Zuzi 
Phukuta Dieudonne, a reporter for the newspaper Palme d'Or and 
president of the human rights NGO Justice Sans Frontiere. Phukuta 
reportedly was riding in a public van with a number of students who 
shouted anti-Kabila remarks; Phukuta was accused of having insulted the 
President. Security force agents reportedly tortured Phukuta, and the 
beatings left permanent scars. Police released Phukuta shortly after 
his arrest but have continued to threaten his life (see Sections 1.c. 
and 2.a.).
    On February 29, rapid intervention police arrested seven members of 
the political party UDPS in Kinshasa, near the home of UDPS president 
Etienne Tshisekedi, and detained them at a jail in the Kasavubu 
district of Kinshasa where security agents reportedly lashed the 
detainees with whips until their release the following morning (see 
Section 1.c.). Police provided no explanation for their arrest. On 
October 11, security agents abducted seven other UDPS members from a 
street corner in Kinshasa. They reportedly continued to be detained at 
Camp Kokolo at year's end and were subjected to daily beatings (see 
Section 1.c.).
    On March 8, security agents from the DGM detained Joseph 
Olenghankoy, president of the opposition party FONUS, as he was 
departing Kinshasa for Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo. The security 
agents confiscated his documents and prevented him from leaving the 
country (see Section 2.d.).
    On March 16, security agents prevented a planned demonstration by 
the FSD in the Ndjili district of Kinshasa (see Section 2.b.). 
Immediately prior to the event, police arrested some FSD members who 
gathered for the demonstration; all were released the same evening or 
the following morning. The police commandant severely beat the 
president of the FSD, Eugene Diomi, when he arrived at the precinct in 
Ndjili to inquire about the arrests. Police also arrested a woman whom 
they wrongly thought to be Diomi's wife; she later was released. On 
November 15, security forces arrested Diomi after he questioned whether 
the aggression against the country began in 1998 when Rwanda invaded or 
in 1996 when the AFDL took over the country with the help of Rwanda. He 
was released from Makala prison on December 7.
    On March 20, in the town of Pusuku, Bandundu Province, an 
altercation between a police officer named Masango and a young man 
named Kituku escalated after villagers intervened to assist Kituku. The 
police officer initially fled; however, federal police from the 
Mungindu station returned to the town the same evening and destroyed 
Kituku's home. The police arrested any persons who approached the house 
and forced them to pay bribes to secure their release.
    On April 22, police arrested Francois Lumumba, President of MNC-L, 
during a party meeting at his home (see Section 2.b.). He was detained 
without formal charges at the Palais du Peuple in Kinshasa until May 3.
    On May 1, security forces arrested Raphael Ghenda, the Secretary 
General of the CPP's. The Government released Ghenda several days 
later, but provided no explanation for his arrest or detention.
    On May 5, police arrested four tax authority employees, Blaise 
Banzwa Kabo, Albano Mopipi, Andre Yoba Mbesi, and Kakale Makala, and 
detained them for 10 days for ``endangering state security'' (see 
Section 6.a.).
    On May 25, security forces arrested Kinshasa University students 
Placide Nkoso and Jean-Pierre Mofila Mboma for involvement in a student 
demonstration on May 17 (see Section 2.b.). Both were detained on the 
charge of suspected collaboration with MLC rebel leader Jean-Pierre 
Bemba. Both Mofila and Nkoso remained in detention at Makala prison at 
year's end (see Section 2.a. and 2.b.). It was unknown at year's end 
whether the students had been charged. On July 18, security force 
agents arrested a Kinshasa University student known only as Kosso, in 
connection with a student demonstration on July 17 (see Section 2.b.). 
Kosso remained in jail at year's end.
    On May 29, the National Intelligence Agency (ANR) arrested Felicien 
Malanda and Georges Nazimbika, leaders of the National Council of 
Development NGO's (CHONGD), and detained them until June 27 without 
formal charges.
    On June 3, ANR agents arrested Felicien Malanda Nsumba, executive 
secretary of CNONGD, and detained him at the BinzaMacampagne facility 
in Kinshasa. He was released later in June but received no explanation 
for his arrest.
    On June 3, police arrested Jeannot Bemba Saolona, Minister of 
Economy and Industry and father of MLC rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, 
Badimanyi Mulumba, Minister of State for Planning, and Frederic 
Kibassa-Maliba, Minister of Mines; President Kabila released the three 
on July 5. On June 10, government authorities arrested Victor Mpoyo, 
Minister of State for Petroleum Affairs. Bemba was accused of 
misappropriating hard currency; however, no specific charges were given 
for the other arrests.
    On the night of June 10, in the Masina district of Kinshasa, there 
were unconfirmed reports that soldiers forcibly entered the home of 
Reverend Placide Tshisumpa Tshiakatumba, president of the International 
Society for Human Rights (ISHR). Under the pretense of searching for 
``suspicious'' documents, the soldiers allegedly systematically 
searched Tshisumpa's belongings and stole jewelry, money, and a camera. 
The soldiers reportedly then blindfolded and bound Tshisumpa, abducted 
him in their jeep, and drove him around Kinshasa until 3 a.m. (see 
Section 1.f.).
    On June 23, security police arrested Jonas Mukamba Nzemba, former 
governor of Eastern Kasai Province and head of an Mbuji Mayi diamond 
company, and 33 guests at his home. Mukamba was released on December 7; 
the others were released in small groups prior to Mukamba's release.
    On July 7, security forces arrested Transportation Minister Odette 
Babandoa on charges that she took bribes and favored her husband's 
business interests (see Section 2.a.). She was released on July 8. On 
July 13, Babandoa was arrested again but was released on July 21.
    On July 22, security forces arrested and detained for 4 days Eddy 
Kapend, Aide de Camp to President Kabila, for embarrassing the 
President.
    On July 22, security agents arrested Catherine Nzuzi, leader of the 
major faction of the MPR. She was charged with treason after she 
complained in a radio broadcast of harassment by Kabila's security 
organizations (see Section 2.a.). On September 18, Nzuzi was allowed to 
return home, but she remained under house arrest and faced possible 
trial before a military court. In November authorities again detained 
Nzuzi in Makala prison; however, she was released on December 7. In 
1999 she was arrested and detained for 5 hours on charges of violating 
a decree prohibiting political activity.
    On July 27, army troops arrested Faustin Kamala, Deogratias 
Bihaira, and Thomas Kataala at their home. They reportedly were being 
held incommunicado by the ANR in the Ngaliema section of Kinshasa at 
year's end.
    On October 18 and 19, national police arrested military court 
officials Mwakobila Itonge, Ambroise Kusa, and Ndaba allegedly for 
possessing information regarding government abuses. Mwakobila 
reportedly was detained at the Kin-Masiere Prison. Kusa and Ndaba 
reportedly were detained at Makala prison and were beaten and tortured 
(see Section 1.c.). All three were released on October 25.
    On October 31, security forces rearrested Commandant Anselme Masasu 
Nindaga, a political prisoner who was released on March 24 (see Section 
1.e.). Masasu reportedly was detained in undisclosed locations in 
Kinshasa for at least 3 weeks. On November 24, there were reports, 
including from human rights NGO Association Africaine de Defense des 
Droits de l'Homme (ASADHO), that government officials had tried at a 
FAC military court near Pweto, sentenced to death, and executed Masasu 
and 35 suspected collaborators, allegedly for plotting a coup against 
President Kabila during the year (see Section 1.a.).
    On November 16, police arrested two students who were carrying 
their lunches on the campus of the Institut Pedagogique National (IPN) 
in Kinshasa, because the police wanted the food. Police reportedly 
arrested several students and beat 10 students who intervened on the 
behalf of the arrested students (see Section 1.c.). On November 17, 
approximately 800 students demonstrated to protest the incident; 
allegedly FAC forces briefly detained a journalist covering the protest 
and confiscated her recordings (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). The 
commander of the police detachment reportedly was arrested following 
the incident.
    On December 5, intelligence officers arrested Steve Mbikay, 
Secretary General of the Solidarity Union, as he left a union meeting; 
he was suspected of instigating popular discontent at the Customs 
Authority (see Section 6.a.). He continued to be detained without 
charges by the ANR in Gombe at year's end.
    During the year, government security forces arrested and detained 
more than 10 journalists compared to 80 in 1999; few of them were 
tried. The decrease in arrests and detentions during the year was 
attributed to efforts by Leonard She Okitundu, former Minister of Human 
Rights and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission. At least five journalists remained incarcerated at 
year's end. The Government also detained foreign journalists (see 
Section 2.a.).
    On January 5, a human rights NGO announced that Laurent Kantu 
Lumpungu, president of L'Association des Cadres Penitentiaires du 
Congo, was released from prison on December 29, 1999. He had been 
arrested in May 1999 after making critical remarks about prison 
conditions.
    In October 1999, ANR security forces arrested Charles M. Mfwamba 
Mukendi, the director of Centre d'Etude et de Formation Populaire 
Kasayi (CEFOP), for reportedly publishing a report that outlined 
government human rights abuses in the province. He was released on 
January 6; it was unknown if the charges against him were dropped. 
Personal items confiscated during his arrest reportedly were not 
returned.
    In November 1999, security forces arrested Cleophas Kamitatu, 
president of a newly formed opposition group, Community of the 
Pluralist Democratic Opposition (CODEP), after he criticized the 
Government in a foreign radio broadcast. However, he was charged with 
malfeasance in connection with prior service as ambassador to Japan. 
Kamitatu reportedly signed over the deed of a provincial house in 
return for a promise of release. On June 12, Kamitatu was sentenced to 
4 years of ``forced labor'' for misappropriating state funds; he 
remained in detention at year's end (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
    At year's end, two human rights workers had been arrested by the 
Kabila Government. They were Laurent Kantu Lupungu, president of the 
Association des Cadres Penitentiaires du Congo (ACPC); and Denis 
Ilounga Kabeya, member of Friends of Nelson Mandela (ANMDH), who was 
jailed in Mbuji Mayi.
    There were no developments in the 1999 arrests and detentions of 
Tabu Kalaia, president of the Katangan provincial branch of the 
opposition UDPS party; Professor Kambaj wa Kambaji; Wetemwani Katembo 
Merikas, an activist with the youth-oriented human rights NGO Cojeski; 
Innocent Kyuma; and the seven UDPS activists, all of whom remained in 
detention at year's end.
    On November 27, the Government released 509 prisoners from Makala 
prison in honor of the President's birthday (see Section 1.e.).
    Pretrial detention often was prolonged. In October it was reported 
credibly that the total number of prisoners at Makala prison was over 
2,400, almost 90 percent of whom were awaiting trial. In February a 
presidential decree offered amnesty to those arrested and imprisoned 
for endangering the security of the State and related charges. During 
the year, over 800 prisoners were freed; however, most were soldiers 
whom the Government reenlisted and sent to the front to fight the rebel 
forces.
    The Government also held prisoners of war (POW's). In June the 
Government released 93 Rwandan POW's in accordance with the Lusaka 
Accords, and in return the Government of Rwanda released 35 Zimbabwean 
and 11 Namibian prisoners. The Government claimed that it no longer 
detained any POW's at year's end.
    There were many reported arbitrary arrests by antigovernment forces 
in the occupied territories, and antigovernment forces reportedly 
detained persons repeatedly (see Section 1.b.). Many of those whom 
antigovernment forces detained reportedly were Hutus. In March rebel 
security agents harassed a number of religious and civil society 
leaders who traveled to Kinshasa to take part in the National 
Consultations. Over 40 delegates from the occupied territories, many of 
them associated with human rights NGO's, were subjected to harassment, 
delays, and detention (see Sections 3 and 4).
    On April 22, security forces arrested civil society activist Bruno 
Bahati as he returned from the National Consultations and reportedly 
kept him in detention in both Rwanda and the Kivu Provinces until 
August (see Section 2.d.). Rwandan authorities released Bahati 
following international pressure.
    On May 15, RCD/ML forces arrested Sylvain Mudimbi Masudi, external 
relations director of the human rights NGO Friends of Nelson Mandela 
(ANMDH), in Beni, North Kivu Province. Masudi was returning from the 
56th session of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. RCD officials 
imprisoned Mudimbi in a crowded cell with Mai Mai combatants for 2 
days; on May 17, he was expelled from the country along the Ugandan 
border (see Section 4).
    On July 29, RCD/ML security forces detained two of their senior 
officials, Deputy Director of Mining Michel Rudatenguha and Brigade 
Commander Mukalayi, on suspicion of conspiring to overthrow the leader 
of the RCD/ML rebel movement, Professor Wamba dia Wamba (see Section 
1.c.).
    On August 29, RCD/Goma security forces arrested 4 civil society 
members, Paulin Bapolisi Bahuga, Gervais Chiralwirhwa Nkunzimwami, 
Aloys Muzalia Wakyebwa, and Regine Mutijima in Bukavu ostensibly in 
connection with a grenade attack on an outdoor festival that killed 8 
persons and wounded approximately 100 (see Section 1.a.). The four 
reportedly had blamed Rwandan soldiers for the bombing. They were all 
active members of South Kivu Province civil society and the first three 
were employed at the teacher training school in Bukavu. President 
Kabila recently had nominated three of the four, without their 
knowledge or consent, to the National Constituent Assembly, as part of 
the delegation representing the occupied territories. The four were 
taken to Kisangani for questioning. Despite international calls to 
release the civil society workers, the four were detained until 
September 30.
    On October 9, RCD rebels reportedly publicly beat, arrested, and 
detained 13 human rights activists who attended a meeting of a human 
rights umbrella group in Bukavu, at Camp Saio (see Sections 1.c. and 
2.b.).
    On October 29, RCD forces reportedly arrested Jean-Paul Ramazani 
Kulimushi, director of the Congolese National Radio-Television (RTNC), 
in Goma (see Section 2.a.). He was detained in solitary confinement in 
the ``Mean Dog'' cellblock at year's end.
    In April 1999, members of the Presidential Guard attacked, severely 
beat, and abducted Ralph Biteo because he had the facial features of a 
Tutsi (see Section 5). Biteo told the guardsmen that he was visiting 
the hospital to see the burned child of a cousin, Mirimo Mulongo. 
Members of the Presidential Guard then arrested Mulongo, and both Biteo 
and Mulongo were taken to the GLM detention facility in the Gombe area 
of Kinshasa. Both were denied visitors and still were believed to be in 
detention at year's end.
    Government soldiers captured by antigovernment forces reportedly 
were held by the RCD/Goma or MLC, which reportedly did not permit the 
ICRC to visit them.
    The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not use it 
in practice; however, the Government did release approximately 3,000 
Congolese Tutsis from detention on the condition that they leave the 
country through internationally sponsored relocation programs. These 
Tutsis freely chose to leave the country rather than remain in 
government detention; however, another 300 Congolese Tutsis, Rwandans, 
Burundians, and Ugandans remained in the country due to difficulties in 
arranging their repatriation to neighboring countries, particularly 
Uganda and Burundi. These persons chose to remain under government 
protection rather than face possible reprisals abroad.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Transitional Act of the Mobutu 
regime and Kabila's Decree Law No. 3 provide for the independence of 
the judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary was not independent 
of the executive branch, which manipulated it during the year. The 
Kabila administration continued to refuse to establish mechanisms to 
ensure the independence of the judiciary; a judicial reform decree, 
reportedly awaiting presidential approval since 1997, still had not 
been promulgated. The judiciary also was ineffective and suffered from 
corruption. For example, on October 18 and 19, national police arrested 
military court officials Mwakobila Itonge, Ambroise Kusa, and Ndaba 
allegedly for possessing information regarding government abuses (see 
Section 1.d.). All three were released on October 25.
    The civil judiciary, including lower courts, appellate courts, the 
Supreme Court, and the Court of State Security, largely was 
dysfunctional; during the year, military tribunals that have been 
organized since August 1997 tried nearly all cases and sentenced 
civilians as well as military personnel to death after summary trials. 
Defendants before these tribunals had no automatic right to appeal to a 
higher court, and many apparently lacked counsel.
    Death sentences and executions resulting from summary military 
trials became increasingly frequent as the year progressed. 
Approximately 200 individuals have been executed by military courts as 
of year's end, including at least several dozen soldiers executed 
during the year in relation to a coup plot against the President (see 
Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.d.); however, during the year, no civilians 
were known to have been executed following a death sentence handed down 
by the military court. Government military tribunals repeatedly 
sentenced civilians to death for nonviolent offenses, including 
mismanagement of public funds and violations of government restrictions 
on private economic activity, such as private distribution of state-
monopolized and state-rationed gasoline. During her visit to the 
country in October, Kabila assured U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Mary Robinson that the military no longer would try civilian 
cases; however, similar promises have been made previously. Military 
tribunals also convicted and ordered the execution of military persons 
charged with armed robbery, murder, inciting mutiny, espionage, and 
looting while in a state of mutiny. Persons convicted by military 
tribunals sometimes were executed publicly in ceremonies held in 
stadiums and presided over by senior government officials, such as 
provincial governors; however, it was unknown whether any public 
executions occurred during the year.
    Civil and criminal codes are based on Belgian and customary law. 
The legal code provides for the right to a speedy public trial, the 
presumption of innocence, and legal counsel at all stages of 
proceedings; however, the Government did not respect these rights in 
practice. Defendants have the right to appeal in all cases except those 
involving national security, armed robbery, and smuggling, all of which 
are adjudicated in theory by the Court of State Security, and except 
those cases adjudicated by the special military tribunals, whose 
jurisdiction appears ill defined. The law provides for court-appointed 
counsel at state expense in capital cases, in all proceedings before 
the Supreme Court, and in other cases when requested by the court. The 
Kabila administration still had not stated a position on providing 
counsel by year's end, and had provided it only at its discretion.
    Corruption remained pervasive, particularly among magistrates, who 
were paid very poorly and only intermittently, and who also were 
trained poorly. The system remained hobbled by major shortages of 
personnel, supplies, and infrastructure.
    On January 15, security agents arrested Oscar Mudiayi Wa Mudiayi 
and Bernard Tshishimbi, both former employees of the Petroleum 
Ministry, and brought them before a military court for allegedly 
selling petroleum illegally. They were detained in Makala prison, where 
they remained until March 10.
    On January 28, eight soldiers were executed after a military court 
found them guilty of attempting to incite a mutiny in a battalion 
attached to the Special Rapid Intervention Brigade.
    On February 2, nine soldiers were executed, including four from the 
Presidential Guard, on accusations of murder and armed robbery.
    In May a military court sentenced Freddy Loseke Lisumbu, editor of 
the newspaper Le Libre Afrique, to 3 years in prison (see Section 
2.a.).
    On June 12, Cleophas Kamitatu was sentenced to 4 years of ``forced 
labor'' for misappropriating state funds; he remained in detention at 
year's end (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In November 1999, security 
forces had arrested Kamitatu, president of CODEP, after he criticized 
the Government in a foreign radio broadcast (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.a.).
    On February 19, President Kabila decreed a general amnesty for all 
prisoners detained for crimes against the security of the State. 
Although several hundred prisoners reportedly were freed as a result of 
the decree, hundreds more reportedly remain in detention (see Section 
1.c.).
    On March 10, the Government released 55 political prisoners, and on 
March 24, released 89 political prisoners, including AFDL cofounder 
Anselme Masasu (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.) and former Bas Congo 
Province governor Fuka Unzola and five associates, all of whom were 
convicted and sentenced to long prison terms in 1998. The majority of 
those released in March were soldiers who were retrained and sent to 
the front.
    The Government continued to hold some political prisoners. 
Observers believe that there were nine political prisoners at year's 
end, including Kambale Mututulo, former Minster of Parastatals; Luis 
Hamuli, former employee of the Information Ministry; and Mubake Mumeme, 
former Deputy Chief of Staff for the President. The precise number of 
political prisoners could not be ascertained due to restrictions on 
access to prisons by independent monitors (see Section 1.c.). Persons 
whom the Government incarcerated during the year for political 
offenses, including violations of Kabila's ban on political activity, 
mostly were detained without being tried (see Section 1.d.). The 
Government allowed some international humanitarian organizations to 
visit political prisoners on a regular basis, but only when the 
detainees were held in an official prison. The Government does not 
allow these organizations to visit the numerous other detention 
facilities scattered throughout the country. It is in these facilities 
where most recently arrested detainees are held, questioned, and 
sometimes subjected to abuse.
    In the territories occupied by the various rebel factions, 
particularly the RCD/Goma, the system of justice remained essentially 
nonfunctional. Judges seldom were paid their salaries. There were 
credible reports of judges accepting bribes in return for favorable 
decisions. RCD/Goma officials and others with influence reportedly used 
the judicial system to arrest individuals on false charges to extract 
money and property from these individuals. Credible sources claim that 
higher RCD/Goma authorities reprimanded judges who refused to 
participate in such schemes. There also were documented cases of 
indiscriminate military justice in which individuals suspected of 
treason were executed without a trial. For example, on January 29, in 
Bunia, a Rwandan soldier reportedly summarily executed a Congolese 
rebel soldier based on the suspicion that the Congolese soldier was 
passing information to an opposing rebel group (see Section 1.a.).
    Officially, the RCD/Goma established measures to investigate and 
punish rebel soldiers guilty of committing atrocities against civilian 
populations. However, the initiative remains largely ignored and 
ineffective, and there were no reports that RCD/Goma tried, convicted, 
or punished any of its troops for committing atrocities.
    Persons reportedly incarcerated by antigovernment forces for 
political reasons generally were reported to be detained without being 
formally tried (see Section 1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Security forces routinely ignored legal provisions for 
the inviolability of the home, the family, and private correspondence. 
Security force officials often harassed and robbed persons. Government 
security forces routinely kept under surveillance the headquarters of 
opposition parties and the movements of leading opposition political 
figures (see Section 2.b.).
    The security forces repeatedly raided private businesses, including 
newspapers, banks, and law firms, seized documents and other property, 
and arrested and detained employees whom they accused of collaborating 
with antigovernment forces (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). Security 
forces routinely ignored requirements for search warrants, entering and 
searching at will.
    When unable to locate a specific individual, authorities routinely 
arrested or beat the closest family member (see Sections 1.c. and 
1.d.). For example, in July 1999, military personnel held hostage the 
wife and sister of Innocent Kyuma until Kyuma appeared. He was arrested 
on July 9, 1999, without a warrant and for no apparent reason; his 
release still had not been reported by year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    Security agents forced their way into private homes without search 
or arrest warrants, often beating the inhabitants and stealing money 
and goods. There were reports that security forces raped women during 
these raids. The police often raided opposition party leaders' 
residences, made arrests, and seized files (see Sections 1.c. and 
1.d.). For example, on November 26, a group of armed government 
soldiers searched and robbed the house of Athanese Matenda Kyelu, the 
manager of the Chamber of Commerce, in the Ngaliema district of 
Kinshasa (see Section 1.c.).
    On January 9, 7th Military District soldiers forcibly entered the 
home of Christophe Kalonji Ntambwe in Kinshasa's Barumbu commune, 
ransacked the home, and arrested Kalonji (see Section 1.d.). The 
soldiers reportedly were working as agents of Joseph Mbuyi Lusambo, who 
wished to expropriate land owned by Kalonji. On January 13, the 
soldiers returned to Kalonji's home, searched his files, and destroyed 
furniture.
    On January 29, a group of soldiers ransacked the home of Christophe 
Gbenye, president of the political party Congolese National Movement/
Lumumba (MNC/L), for 2 hours while Gbenye was absent. The soldiers were 
searching for weapons; however, the soldiers confiscated much of 
Gbenye's personal property before leaving.
    On May 2, a group of soldiers ransacked the home of Somwe a Somwe, 
situated in the Selembao district of Kinshasa.
    On the night of June 10, in the Masina district of Kinshasa, there 
were unconfirmed reports that soldiers forcibly entered the home of 
Reverend Placide Tshisumpa Tshiakatumba, the president of the 
International Society for Human Rights (ISHR). Under the pretense of 
searching for ``suspicious'' documents, the soldiers searched 
Tshisumpa's belongings and stole jewelry, money, and a camera. The 
soldiers blindfolded and bound Tshisumpa, threw him in their jeep, and 
drove him around for several hours.
    ANR security agents monitored mail passing through private express 
delivery companies as well as through the largely dysfunctional state 
mail service. The Government widely was believed to monitor telephone 
communications.
    There were credible reports that government forces used forced 
conscription, and that many of those forced to enlist were children 
(see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.). On June 9, President Kabila issued a 
decree to reduce the Government's use of child soldiers and curtail 
forcible conscription of children during the year; however, the decree 
was not implemented by year's end. There was no general demobilization 
of child soldiers during the year, and many children already in the 
armed forces continued to serve in them. In addition government 
military commanders allegedly used child soldiers to inflate the ranks 
of troops under their command in order to acquire additional food and 
pay, which the commanders would confiscate. Commanders reportedly often 
concealed child soldiers during visits by human rights NGO's and other 
monitoring groups (see Section 5). There were credible reports that the 
FAC forcibly conscripted homeless boys.
    Some Mai Mai and Hutu militia units fighting on the side of the 
Government routinely seized private property and looted homes to supply 
themselves. Mai Mai and other progovernment groups also regularly 
recruited children from the areas in which they operated.
    Antigovernment forces subjected civilians to arbitrary interference 
with privacy, family, home, and correspondence of civilians in the 
areas that their forces dominated (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    In the provinces of North and South Kivu, RCD rebels and other 
antigovernment groups regularly recruited children from the areas in 
which they operated. In 1999 rebel forces stated that they would reduce 
their use of child soldiers, and the problem reportedly continued to 
diminish during the year; however, there were no reports that they 
generally demobilized child soldiers, and many child soldiers 
reportedly continued to serve in rebel armed forces.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Throughout the year, war continued with external 
intervention on both sides. The war began in August 1998, when Kabila 
tried to expel from the country Rwandan military forces that had helped 
him overthrow Mobutu. Congolese Tutsis and the Governments of Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Burundi relied on these Rwandan forces for protection from 
hostile nongovernmental armed groups operating out of the eastern part 
of the country. These groups included: The Interahamwe militia of 
ethnic Hutus, mostly from Rwanda, which fought the Tutsi-dominated 
Government of Rwanda, and Hutu members of the former Rwandan armed 
forces, two groups whose members are believed to be responsible for the 
1994 genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda; the Mai Mai, a loose association of 
traditional Congolese local defense forces that is growing in both 
popularity and numbers; the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), 
consisting of Ugandan expatriates and supported by the Government of 
Sudan; and several groups of Hutus from Burundi fighting the Tutsi-
dominated Government in Bujumbura. Kabila's attempt to expel the 
Rwandan armed forces was frustrated by the outbreak in August 1998 of a 
rebellion, led by the RCD. The RCD/Goma was dominated by members of the 
Tutsi ethnic minority, but from the outset depended heavily on troops, 
material, and direction from the Government of Rwanda, and, to a lesser 
extent, the Government of Uganda. Military intervention by Angola, 
Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe resulted in the defeat of an RCD drive on 
Kinshasa in August 1998, but antigovernment forces advanced elsewhere. 
In 1999 the rebels split into three factions: A Rwandan-supported 
faction of the RCD based in Goma; a Ugandan-supported faction of the 
RCD based in Bunia; and the Ugandan-supported Movement for the 
Liberation of the Congo, which unlike the original RCD was not 
dominated by ethnic Tutsis. Nevertheless, antigovernment forces 
advanced and controlled most of the country's territory, including its 
eastern and northern regions; however, during the year, the military 
situation largely stabilized except in Equateur Province. Elements of 
the armed forces of Rwanda and Uganda continued to operate inside the 
country in support of rebels, and elements of the armed forces of 
Burundi operated inside the country against armed groups of Hutus from 
Burundi. Elements of the armed forces of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe 
continued to operate inside the country in support of the Government 
throughout the year, but Chadian forces withdrew from the country in 
May 1999. Nongovernmental armed groups such as the Interahamwe, former 
Rwandan Hutu military, and Mai Mai continued to operate inside the 
country on the side of the Government, often as guerrillas inside 
territory held by antigovernment forces. Cease-fire accords signed in 
July and August 1999 between progovernment and antigovernment forces 
only briefly reduced the intensity of the war. During the year, all 
sides violated the cease-fire, although the level of fighting generally 
was limited. All sides repeatedly used excessive force and committed 
numerous abuses. An international humanitarian NGO estimated that as 
many as 1.7 million persons have died during the war because of 
killings, malnutrition, or starvation (see Section 1.a.).
    Government and progovernment forces routinely used excessive force 
by bombing civilian populations in air raids against towns held by 
antigovernment forces. The crude bombs used, their manner of delivery 
(rolled out of an aircraft through an open hatch), and the fact that 
the raids were carried out at night over populated areas, nearly always 
resulted in heavy civilian casualties and little or no damage to 
antigovernment forces; however, it is uncertain how many civilians were 
killed in these attacks. According to a report by the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, not only the Government's armed forces but also elements 
of the armed forces of other countries, including Zimbabwe, conducted 
such bombings.
    Government security forces continued to use child soldiers but 
reduced their overall forcible recruitment of child soldiers during the 
year (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
    There were reports that Mai Mai and Hutu guerrillas fighting on the 
side of the Government killed and tortured noncombatants (see Sections 
1.a. and 1.c.).
    There were many reports, at least some of them credible, that 
elements of the Rwandan armed forces and the Goma faction of the RCD 
repeatedly committed mass killings of noncombatants, usually in 
reprisal for attacks in the same area on RCD forces by Mai Mai or Hutu 
groups (see Section 1.a). In addition Rwandan soldiers and RCD rebels 
reportedly engaged in dismembering their victims with machete blows 
while they still were alive. Rwandan troops and RCD rebels also 
reportedly engaged in the raping of women in public and often in the 
presence of their families and in-laws (see Section 1.c.). Rebel forces 
reportedly continued to use child soldiers (see Sections 1.f. and 
6.c.).
    On two occasions during the year, Rwandan and Ugandan forces fought 
open battles in the streets of Kisangani, resulting in hundreds of 
civilian deaths, as well as thousands of wounded and displaced persons 
(see Sections 1.a. and 2.d.).
    The Government also held POW's. An exchange of POW's was called for 
in the Lusaka Accords. In June the Government released 93 Rwandan 
POW's, and in return the Government of Rwanda released 35 Zimbabwean 
and 11 Namibian POW's.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Statutes provide for freedom of 
speech and of the press, and remain in effect; however, the Government 
increasingly restricted these rights in practice.
    The CPP's that Kabila formed in 1999 monitored persons' speech, 
association, and movement, in residential areas, workplaces, and 
schools, and reported speeches critical of the Government to security 
forces. Although the CPP's were not part of the formal structure of the 
State, they clearly acted as agencies of the Government.
    Incidents of harassment, intimidation, and detention of journalists 
continued to occur, and violations of press freedom were more common, 
particularly in the last few months of the year. During the year, 
government security forces arrested and detained more than 10 
journalists compared to 80 in 1999; few of them were tried. The 
decrease in arrests and detentions during the year was attributed to 
efforts by Leonard She Okitundu, former Minister of Human Rights and 
current Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission. At least five journalists remained incarcerated at year's 
end. Other journalists were subjected to harassment, beatings, and 
torture. Police seized radio stations, shut down newspapers, and set 
fire to publishing houses. The Government shut down radio and 
television stations and disrupted the operations of newspapers. State 
authorities arrested, questioned, harassed, and expelled foreign 
journalists and banned the transmission of some international radio 
broadcasts.
    Almost 400 newspapers were licensed to publish, and a number of 
them appeared regularly in Kinshasa. There also was an active private 
press in Lubumbashi, and some private newspapers were published in 
other provincial cities. Of the Kinshasa-based newspapers, eight were 
dailies; the rest of the newspapers that appeared regularly were 
published between one and three times a week. Most private news 
publications relied on external financing, often from political parties 
and individual politicians. News publications tended to emphasize 
editorial commentary and analysis rather than factual descriptions of 
events; many were highly critical of the Government. There were no 
overtly government-controlled newspapers; however, at least two 
newspapers, L'Avenir and L'Observateur, were supported respectively by 
the Office of the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Le 
Forum and Le Palmares have close ties to the security services. Of 
these, only Le Palmares and l'Avenir were published daily.
    A 1996 press law regulates the newspaper industry. Publishers must 
continue to deposit copies of their publications with the Information 
Ministry; however, there is no longer a formal censorship regime. 
Criminal libel laws exist but were not used against journalists. In 
most cases where journalists were charged formally, state authorities 
charged them with ``endangering the State'' through the publication or 
broadcast of political news, or news of the war. Charges often were 
brought under the 1996 press law; however, the Government had not 
published the law in 4 years, and many of the judges, as well as the 
journalists on trial, are unfamiliar with it. Government officials 
criticized or implicated in fraudulent practices by the press at times 
encouraged police to arrest the journalists responsible for such 
stories.
    In November 1999, security forces arrested Cleophas Kamitatu, 
president of CODEP, after he criticized the Government in a foreign 
radio broadcast (see Section 1.d.). On June 12, Kamitatu was sentenced 
to 4 years of ``forced labor'' for misappropriating state funds; 
however, he remained in detention at year's end (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.b.).
    On January 3, security forces arrested and tortured Freddy Loseke 
Lisumbu, editor of the newspaper Le Libre Afrique, after he reportedly 
wrote two articles that claimed that elements in Kinshasa were planning 
a coup against President Kabila (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d). Security 
forces reportedly kept Loseke incommunicado at Makala prison; family 
members were not allowed to visit him, and guards reportedly stole and 
ate the food that family members brought for him. Security agents 
allegedly subjected Loseke to torture (see Section 1.c.); he reportedly 
was in ill health at year's end but was denied medical attention. In 
May a military court sentenced Loseke to 3 years in prison for 
publishing an article about a general who allegedly was plotting to 
assassinate President Kabila (see Section 1.e.).
    On January 8, presidential guards arrested Mossi Mwassi, a 
journalist, allegedly for speaking English. He was charged with libel 
and infringing on public security, but was released on January 11.
    On January 10, ANR agents summoned to an unknown location Father 
Fabien Kenta, director of the private Catholic radio station Radio 
Elikya. Security agents said that the radio station had broadcast anti-
Kabila messages under the guise of human rights information and ordered 
Kenta not to broadcast anti-Kabila messages.
    On February 26, police arrested and severely beat Zuzi Phukuta 
Dieudonne, a reporter for the newspaper Palme d'Or and president of the 
human rights NGO Justice Sans Frontiere. Phukuta reportedly was riding 
in a public van with a number of students who shouted anti-Kabila 
remarks. The students fled when police surrounded the vehicle after it 
stopped in traffic; however, the police found Phukuta inside the 
vehicle and severely beat him before placing him under detention (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Police accused Phukuta of having insulted the 
President; security forces reportedly tortured Phukuta and left 
permanent physical scars. Police reportedly continue to threaten his 
life, although he was released shortly after his arrest (see Section 
4).
    On March 13, police arrested journalist Nyembo Kimunyi because of 
an article he wrote in the weekly newspaper La Tribune that claimed 
Kabila's deceased brother had engaged in human rights abuses as head of 
the ANR in Lubumbashi. The article reportedly stated that the ANR in 
Lubumbashi is known for ``terror, extortion, and retaliation.'' The ANR 
released Kimunyi in July; it was unknown whether any charges were filed 
against him.
    On April 24, police arrested two journalists, Jean Bruno Kadima and 
Jose Ntumba Moukanda, the director of publications and a reporter for 
the weekly newspaper Umoja respectively (see Section 1.d.). Security 
forces gave no reason for the arrest, nor were any charges made against 
the pair. They were released on May 3.
    On June 12, security forces arrested Aime Kakese of the newspaper 
La Carousel after he refused to provide police with the address of a 
journalist that they were seeking. A military court sentenced Kakese to 
2 years in prison; however, he was released in December.
    On June 12, security forces arrested Richard Nsamba, editor of Le 
Messager African, for publishing articles unfavorable to Charles Okoto, 
the former governor of Eastern Kasai Province and current head of the 
parastatal MIBA. He was convicted by a military court, but he was 
released in September after serving a brief sentence.
    Also in June, security forces arrested Jean-Pierre Ekanga of the 
newspaper La Tribune de la Nation for allegedly providing inaccurate 
information on the newspaper's relationship with Nicolas Katako, 
husband of Transportation Minister Odette Babandoa. Katako was jailed 
for collaborating with journalists; Ekanga was sentenced to 2 years in 
prison but was released in December.
    On July 22, security agents arrested Catherine Nzuzi, leader of the 
major faction of the MPR (see Section 1.d.). She was charged with 
treason after she complained in a radio broadcast of harassment by 
Kabila's security organizations.
    On September 1, police arrested journalist Frank Baku of the daily 
newspaper La Reference Plus after Baku criticized the country's 
judicial system. Baku was released in October.
    On November 8, ANR agents arrested and detained Kinyongo Saleh, 
editor of the newspaper La Vision, at a facility in Kinshasa. Family 
members were not permitted to visit Kinyongo, and he remained in 
detention at year's end.
    On November 12, security forces arrested Feu d'or Bosange Ifonge, a 
music reporter for the newspaper L'Alarme, for selling copies of the 
newspaper with an article that claimed that the city of Mbandaka in 
Equateur Province was burning.
    On November 17, FAC forces allegedly briefly detained a journalist 
covering the student protest at the Institut Pedagogique National (IPN) 
in Kinshasa and confiscated her recordings (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 
and 2.b.).
    In November 1999, security forces arrested and detained Honsek 
Hokwoy, the editor of the newspaper La Solidarite, after Honsek claimed 
in print that Finance Minister Mawampanga Mwana Nanga had been 
arrested. He was released on February 4.
    In November 1999, security forces arrested and detained for 66 days 
without trial Kazadi Djodjo Mbayo, director of the publication La Palme 
d'Or; he was released on January 15. Kazadi reportedly was arrested for 
``having committed an outrage against the Chief of State and inciting 
revolt.'' As a condition of his release, Kazadi reportedly promised 
never to write another article about the President that could be deemed 
derogatory; he also promised to inform the ANR of any other derogatory 
information.
    In December 1999, security forces arrested and detained a newspaper 
street vendor, Gaspard Baila, after the front page of the Pot-Pourri 
satirical newspaper he was selling criticized fraud and embezzlement 
within the Government. Security forces reportedly subjected Baila to 
physical abuse. He was released on January 12.
    Security forces continued to detain Albert Bosange Yema, a 
journalist employed by L'Alarme, who was arrested in 1999 after he 
reportedly wrote an erroneous article on the capture of Lake Mukamba by 
the rebels. However, he had escaped from prison and was living in exile 
at year's end.
    The Government also harassed foreign journalists and academics by 
searching their luggage for professional notes, preventing their 
departure from the country, and detaining them for questioning. On 
September 15, immigration authorities arrested foreign journalist 
Francois Grignon after searching his luggage at the airport and 
uncovering interview notes. Grignon had been researching a report for 
the International Crisis Group (ICG). On September 22, security agents 
arrested foreign journalist Nicholas Long on suspicion that he was 
working with Grignon. Long was released within a few hours; Grignon 
spent 1 week in detention before authorities allowed him to leave the 
country. On September 27, immigration police detained foreign 
journalists Richard Dowden and Koert Lindyer after searching their 
luggage and uncovering notes, which were believed to have contained 
information on interviews with government officials and foreign 
diplomats. Both were released within a few days and departed the 
country.
    Government security forces sometimes seized individual issues of 
various newspapers or printing equipment. During the year, security 
forces continued occasionally to seize newspapers from street vendors 
to prevent circulation of articles deemed damaging to the Government.
    On November 30, the ANR warned independent newspapers in Kinshasa 
not to publish stories about the army or the security services.
    Due to limited literacy and the higher costs of newspapers and 
television, radio remained the most important medium of public 
information. At year's end, six radio stations operated in Kinshasa. 
During the year, the Government nationalized one radio and television 
station, RTKM, which was owned by Ngongo Ngongo Lowowo, a former 
Information Minister under Mobutu. In 1997 the Government lifted the 
Mobutu regime's ban on news programming on private radio; however, two 
radio stations continued to be state-owned and government-controlled. 
Opposition parties were unable to gain access to state-owned radio, and 
private radio was markedly less critical of the Government than private 
newspapers. During the year, the Government closed down private radio 
stations because they broadcast news unfavorable to the Government or 
commentary critical of the Government.
    Eight television stations broadcast in the Kinshasa area, two of 
which are state-controlled and two of which are religious. The status 
of these stations remains unclear after the Ministry of Communication 
announced in September that it would nationalize three broadcast 
corporations, including RTKM and two television stations owned by Jean-
Pierre Bemba: ``Antenne A'' and ``Canal Kin.'' The Ministry also 
ordered seven privately owned radio stations and three privately owned 
television stations to cease broadcasts. Communication Minister 
Dominique Sakombi invoked a 1996 broadcast law to legitimize the 
closings. Credible sources claim that the move also had financial 
motivations, as Sakombi ordered each of the stations that were shut 
down to pay the Communication Ministry a tax equivalent to 18 percent 
of each station's advertising revenue; the Ministry of Finance normally 
collects such taxes. However, by October most broadcast stations that 
the Government closed had resumed broadcasting. The Government motive 
for the shutdowns and reopenings remained unclear. Opposition parties 
remained unable to gain access to state-controlled television. Other 
methods of silencing the broadcast media have included burning down 
radio stations and expelling journalists from their homes; however, no 
such incidents occurred during the year.
    The Government continued to restrict severely foreign broadcasts 
during the year. In 1999 then Information Minister Didier Mumengi 
ordered privately owned radio and television stations to cease 
transmitting foreign broadcasts. The order was aimed at Elikya, a 
Catholic radio station that transmits Radio Vatican, and Raga FM, which 
broadcasts the Voice of America (VOA), the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) world service, and Deutsche Welle. However, Kinshasa 
still receives Radio France Internationale, which is transmitted from 
nearby Brazzaville.
    At year's end, there were two domestic Internet service providers. 
Because of technical difficulties and high costs, the Internet is not 
used widely.
    Some antigovernment forces, including the RCD/Goma, reportedly 
restricted freedom of speech and of the press; at year's end, there 
reportedly were no independent media in areas controlled by the RCD/
Goma.
    Antigovernment forces reportedly arrested journalists. For example 
on October 29, RCD forces allegedly arrested Jean-Paul Ramazani 
Kulimushi, director of the RTNC, in Goma. Ramazani Kulimushi reportedly 
broadcast a commentary critical of the conduct of certain RCD soldiers. 
He was detained in solitary confinement in the ``Mean Dog'' cellblock 
at year's end.
    In 1999 RCD/Goma security forces in Bukavu in South Kivu Province 
seized the radio transmitter and other equipment from the private radio 
station Radio Maendeleo, effectively taking it off the air. Despite 
wide appeals, RCD authorities refused to return the confiscated 
equipment.
    Academic freedom continued to be endangered as professors exercised 
self-censorship or modified their lectures to suit the views of their 
patrons in the Government. Faculty members complained that members of 
the Government took a strong interest in activities at their 
universities. The regime monitored university classrooms through 
student and teacher members of the CPP's (see Section 2.b.). During the 
year, the CPP's remained active on university campuses in Kinshasa and 
Lubumbashi, employing a cadre of both students and faculty. Several 
students were arrested after CPP members reported them for questioning 
the Government. Some students went into hiding after security forces 
suspected that they were in contact with foreigners. Security officials 
arrested several students for organizing strikes at Kinshasa University 
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In July 1999, security forces in 
Lubumbashi arrested Professor Kambaj wa Kambaji because of the 
professor's critical analysis of the use of ethnic hate radio in 
Congolese politics. Professor Kambaji and two colleagues, Richard 
Tshivuadi and Tabu Kalala, were released from an ANR facility in 
Kinshasa on April 6.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There is no legal 
protection for freedom of assembly, and the Government continued to 
restrict this right severely. The Government considers the rights to 
assemble and associate subordinate to the maintenance of ``public 
order.'' The Government requires all organizers to apply for permits, 
which are granted or rejected at the Government's discretion. Public 
activities generally are dispersed by government security services. 
However, the Government sanctioned pro-Kabila demonstrations, including 
demonstrations against foreign embassies and the offices of the U.N., 
which included rock throwing and threats.
    On January 7, military security officials arrested seven members of 
the opposition political party PALU when they attempted to hold a 
meeting in the commune of Lemba. Authorities filed no formal charges, 
and the matter never was presented to a civil court for arbitration. 
The seven were released on January 11.
    On March 16, security agents prevented a planned demonstration by 
the FSD in the Ndjili district of Kinshasa. Immediately prior to the 
event, police arrested some FSD members who had gathered for the 
demonstration (see Section 1.d.); all were released that evening or the 
following morning. The police commandant severely beat the president of 
the FSD, Eugene Diomi, when he arrived at the precinct in Ndjili to 
inquire about the arrests.
    On May 17, police dispersed a demonstration by Kinshasa University 
students to demand that the University repair restrooms that had not 
functioned properly for almost a year. On May 25, security agents 
arrested student Placide Nkoso, allegedly for organizing the 
demonstration (see Section 1.d.). Police also arrested another student, 
Jean-Pierre Mofila Mboma, and detained both students for collaborating 
with MLC rebels (see Section 1.d.). On July 18, there were unconfirmed 
reports that security force agents arrested a Kinshasa University 
student known only as Kosso, in connection with a student demonstration 
on July 17 (see Section 1.d.); the protest also was directed against 
poor sanitation. Kosso remained in detention at year's end.
    On July 19, security forces arrested 10 members of the UDPS 
opposition party who had gathered at the home of a party member. They 
remained in detention pending trial at year's end; two members 
reportedly are in poor health.
    On November 17, approximately 800 students at the Institut 
Pedagogique National (IPN) in Kinshasa reportedly demonstrated to 
protest the arrest and beating of 10 classmates the previous night. The 
incident reportedly started on November 16 when police arrested two 
students carrying their lunches on campus, because the police wanted 
the food. Police beat 10 students who intervened on the others' behalf, 
and several students were arrested. Allegedly FAC forces briefly 
detained a journalist covering the protest and confiscated her 
recordings (see Section 2.a.). The commander of the police detachment 
reportedly was arrested following the incident.
    On April 6, two UDPS party members, who were arrested for attending 
an ``illegal'' political meeting in May 1999, were released from 
detention. The two activists, Professor Alidor Muamba Ntita and Raymond 
Kabala, were detained without charges.
    Freedom of assembly sometimes was respected in rebel-held areas in 
the country. On January 31 in Bukavu, and on February 7 in Goma, 
citywide strikes (``villes mortes'') were held to protest the 
occupation of the cities by rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan forces. The 
Bukavu strike was enforced strictly by organizers who threatened those 
who tried to go to work.
    On July 19, approximately 4,000 Banyamulenge reportedly 
demonstrated in Bukavu and Uvira against the presence of RCD/Goma and 
Rwandan troops in the Kivu Provinces (see Section 1.g.).
    On August 29, RCD/Goma soldiers arrested and detained for a month 
four South Kivu Province civil society members in connection with the 
bombing of an outdoor festival in Bukavu, after the four reportedly 
blamed Rwandan and RCD soldiers for the bombing (see Section 1.d.). On 
August 29, Bukavu students demonstrated to protest their arrest. In 
their effort to disperse the demonstrations, RCD soldiers fired into 
the air and reportedly shot and killed one student (see Section 1.a.). 
RCD forces arrested several students but released them the following 
day (see Section 1.d.).
    The law provides no protection for freedom of association, and the 
Government severely restricted this right. Upon assuming power in 1997, 
the Government suspended political party activities but not political 
parties themselves. In 1999 President Kabila issued a decree that 
partially lifted the ban on political party activities; however, the 
decree allows the Interior Minister to ban parties arbitrarily, and 
requires that legally recognized parties have members from all 
provinces, a requirement that could not be satisfied under war 
conditions. Moreover, in practice the Government continued to ban any 
political activity by opposition groups beyond small administrative 
meetings. On April 29, the Interior Minister stated that no political 
party was authorized to operate unless it conformed to the decree and 
that no non-profit organization was authorized to operate unless it 
conformed to Decree No. 195.
    In July 1999, Kabila issued a presidential decree that legalized 
the CPP's and proclaimed that all political activity must pass through 
the CPP's, which he leads. This decree was criticized widely.
    Individuals from opposition parties served in Kabila's Government, 
but in their individual capacities (see Section 3). Political party 
offices generally remained open, and parties continued internal 
administrative functions. At different times and for different periods, 
the headquarters of various political parties were under surveillance, 
padlocked, or patrolled by soldiers (see Section 3). The Government 
effectively prevented public political gatherings and even arrested 
opposition activists engaged in small private meetings (see Section 
1.d.). The effects of the restrictions on political parties varied 
widely throughout the country, and they were enforced less strictly in 
some provinces.
    The law allows anyone to form a new political party by registering 
with the Minister of Interior; however, in practice no political 
parties were registered during the year. The President's January 1999 
decree required that all political parties, including existing parties, 
register. Two progovernment parties and a splinter group completed the 
registration process but were not registered by year's end. The 
splinter group was a dissident faction of the UDPS. The Government 
recognized and registered the group in September in an attempt to 
diminish the stature and political potential of the original UDPS and 
its leader, Etienne Tshisekedi. The move came shortly after 
Tshisekedi's party filed a legal claim against President Kabila in a 
Belgian court. The UDPS already had filed a similar claim against then-
Foreign Minister Yerodia Abdoulaye, which concluded in July with the 
issuance of an international arrest warrant for Yerodia on changes of 
inciting racial hatred and genocide (see Section 1.a.).
    On January 16, policemen surrounded the home of Joseph Olenghankoy, 
president of the FONUS opposition party, in the Ngaliema neighborhood 
of Kinshasa, to disrupt a ceremony in which Olenghankoy intended to 
deliver a New Year's Message. Police arrested Mukendi Kadima, who was 
attending the ceremony, after they searched him and discovered a 
business card belonging to the leader of the Human Rights NGO, La Voix 
des Sans Voix (VSV). Mukendi was detained for 2 days and questioned by 
police. Under pressure from the VSV and family members, police released 
Mukendi on January 18.
    On February 14, police and ANR agents in Matadi stopped five 
members of Bundi Dia Kongo (BDK) and told them that the provincial 
governor wished to see them. The police drove them to the train station 
and sent them to Kinshasa where they were arrested and detained by the 
ANR. The five were detained without formal charges until March 7; 
however, police claimed that they were conspiring to incite an anti-
Kabila revolt in the Bas Congo Province.
    On February 29, police arrested 10 members of the UDPS opposition 
political party, who reportedly were standing outside the home of party 
president Etienne Tshisekedi, when they became involved in a 
confrontation with two women who reportedly provoked them by singing 
pro-Kabila songs. Police released them on March 1 without filing any 
formal charges.
    On April 8, police arrested 12 members of the National Alliance for 
Development and Reconstruction (ANADER) in the Lemba district of 
Kinshasa. They were charged with conducting political activities 
outlawed under Decree No. 194, which governs political activity. Police 
released them on April 10.
    On June 5, security agents at Ndjili airport in Kinshasa prevented 
leaders of opposition parties and civil society from traveling to 
Cotonou, Benin, to attend preparatory meetings for the Congolese 
National Dialogue (see Section 2.d.).
    In November 1999, security forces arrested Cleophas Kamitatu 
Massamba after he founded a political organization of former Mobutuists 
and criticized the Government in a radio broadcast. On June 12, 
Kamitatu was sentenced to 4 years of ``forced labor'' for 
misappropriating state funds. The Kabila Government claimed Kamitatu 
inappropriately had sold the Congolese Embassy building without 
government authorization while he was ambassador to Japan several years 
earlier. He remained in prison at year's end.
    NGO's are required to register with the Minister of Justice and 
file copies of internal regulations and descriptions of organizational 
structure. In 1999 President Kabila promulgated a decree that 
restricted the activities of NGO's, including religious organizations, 
by establishing requirements for their activities. However, some 
existing organizations were exempt, and the decree was not enforced 
during the year.
    Security forces arrested individuals visiting foreign embassies, as 
well as persons who had contact with NGO's or citizens living in other 
countries (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 4).
    Antigovernment forces seriously restricted freedom of assembly and 
association in the areas that they controlled. In March 1999, RCD/Goma 
authorities refused to let women march in Bukavu in celebration of 
International Woman's Day and to protest the war. In March the women 
planned to stay at home in what they called ``A Day Without Women'' in 
order to protest fathers and husbands dying in the war. On March 6, 
RCD/Goma security agents raided the offices of a women's group, Reseau 
des Femmes Pour La Defense de Droits et de la Paix (see Section 4). 
Security agents claimed that the women were plotting genocide and 
threatened to shoot them. Several women lost their jobs after the 
incident after RCD/Goma authorities coerced employers to dismiss them.
    Following the death of Archbishop Kataliko on October 3, RCD/Goma 
security forces used gunfire to disperse a demonstration on October 4 
in Bukavu following news of the Archbishop's death. RCD soldiers 
reportedly killed a child in the shooting.
    On October 9, RCD rebels reportedly dispersed a meeting of a human 
rights umbrella group in Bukavu, and publicly beat, arrested, and 
detained 13 human rights activists who attended the meeting at Camp 
Saio (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Although there is no constitution 
currently in effect, the Government generally respected freedom of 
religion in practice, provided that worshipers neither disturbed public 
order nor contradicted commonly held morals; however, government forces 
committed some abuses.
    A 1971 law regulating religious organizations grants civil servants 
the power to establish and dissolve religious groups. There have been 
no reports of the Government suspending or dissolving a religious group 
since 1990, when the Government suspended its recognition of Jehovah's 
Witnesses; that suspension subsequently was reversed by a court. 
Although this law restricts the process for official recognition, 
officially recognized religions are free to establish places of worship 
and to train clergy. In practice religious groups that are not 
recognized also worship freely.
    On January 29, 1999, President Kabila promulgated a decree that 
restricts the activities of NGO's, including religious organizations, 
by establishing requirements for them; however, existing religious 
organizations were exempt, and the decree subsequently was not 
enforced.
    In July the progovernment press printed articles critical of 
religious organizations.
    Although the Government required foreign religious groups to obtain 
the approval of the President through the Minister of Justice, foreign 
religious groups generally operate without restriction once they 
receive approval from the Government. Many recognized churches have 
external ties, and foreign missionaries are allowed to proselytize. The 
Government generally did not interfere with foreign missionaries. 
However, foreign missionaries have not been exempt from general human 
rights abuses by security forces.
    While the Government is tolerant in matters of religion, some 
abuses occurred in government-controlled areas as a result of the war. 
These abuses, usually the ransacking of churches and the pilfering of 
church property, generally were the result of a lack of discipline 
among government troops.
    A government order in July 1999 prohibiting private radio stations 
from transmitting foreign radio broadcasts effectively targeted a 
Catholic radio station that was compelled to cease broadcasting 
programs of foreign origin (see Section 2.a.). The target was not 
religious broadcasts; rather it was foreign programs critical of the 
Government. Catholic radio stations did not broadcast foreign radio 
transmissions during the year.
    On January 10, ANR agents summoned Father Fabien Kenta, director of 
the private Catholic radio station Radio Elikya to an unknown location. 
Security agents said that the radio station had broadcast anti-Kabila 
messages under the guise of human rights information and ordered Kenta 
not to broadcast anti-Kabila messages.
    In areas of the country under the military occupation of Rwanda, 
Uganda, and their respective rebel clients, religious freedom 
deteriorated. Numerous human rights groups reported significant abuses 
in these areas by the occupying troops of Rwanda and Uganda, as well as 
various rebel factions, which targeted Catholic clergy. Abuses 
reportedly took the form of attacks on missions, killings of priests, 
the rape of nuns, and the burning of churches. Credible reports 
indicate that occupying troops and their rebel allies deliberately 
targeted Catholic churches as a means of both intimidating the local 
population and in revenge for the Church's perceived role in the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda.
    On February 11, RCD/Goma rebel forces operating in eastern areas of 
the country prevented the Archbishop of Bukavu, Emmanuel Kataliko, from 
returning to his diocese (see Section 2.d.). Rebels alleged that the 
Archbishop's Christmas message urged harassment of Tutsis in the East. 
A number of sources in the occupied territories indicate that the 
decision to exile Kataliko in the town of Bunia was made by officials 
of the Government of Rwanda. Archbishop Kataliko was allowed to return 
to Bukavu in September; however, on October 3, the Archbishop died of a 
heart attack while in Rome.
    On February 16, a Banyamulenge militia attacked a Catholic mission 
in the Kilibu area of South Kivu Province (see Section 2.c.). Two 
priests fled, but militiamen captured a third priest, Father Pepin 
Beta, whom they forced to kneel, and then shot and killed (see Section 
1.a.).
    On June 18 and 19, approximately 50 soldiers attacked and pillaged 
a Catholic church and convent in the town of Kabare, South Kivu 
Province; 3 civilians were killed (see Section 1.a.). The RCD blamed 
the attack on the Interahamwe, but local humanitarian groups disputed 
this claim because of the number of RPA soldiers in the area.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although the law allows for freedom of 
movement, the Government, and in particular the security forces acting 
independently, continued to restrict this freedom; the Government 
increased its restrictions after the war began. The war also brought 
new restrictions on internal travel within the government-controlled 
and rebel-controlled zones and made movement between the two zones 
difficult and dangerous.
    Even before the war, security forces throughout the country 
established and manned many roadblocks at which they demanded that 
travelers produce documents and bribes. There were many more such 
roadblocks than could be justified by public safety considerations; 
both their numbers and the conduct of the security force members 
manning them indicated that their main function was to extort money and 
goods from travelers to supplement their below-subsistence level 
official wages. This made internal travel costlier, more time 
consuming, and more dangerous, since violence, including shootings, was 
not uncommon at these roadblocks.
    In Kinshasa police and soldiers commonly erected roadblocks in 
order to extract bribes from taxibus drivers and passengers. On January 
18, in the Gombe district of Kinshasa, there were unconfirmed reports 
that security forces forced passengers who allegedly were riding in 
excess of the capacity of a taxibus to pay bribes. Security forces 
allegedly severely beat one passenger, 30-year-old Mawete Pindi. 
Reportedly there was no investigation nor action taken in this case by 
year's end. In January FAC soldiers and police erected roadblocks in 
various districts of Kinshasa in order to extort money from each 
minibus passenger who crossed the roadblock. On the evening of January 
20, soldiers under the command of Commandant Mvunzi beat a passenger, 
known as Ndule, for not having enough money to pay the fee. Reportedly 
there was no investigation nor action taken in this case by year's end.
    On April 30, members of the Special Presidential Security Group 
allegedly beat Koyagialo Ahonzima Wasana for ignoring government 
restrictions on movement within the vicinity of the Marble Palace, 
President Kabila's residence (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government required exit visas for all foreign travel. No data 
on the refusal rate for exit visa applications was available; however, 
there were several known cases in which a political leader was denied 
an exit visa during the year. Security forces occasionally hindered 
foreign travel by citizens, including journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    In January immigration officials prevented FONUS opposition leader 
Joseph Olenghankoy from traveling abroad. The Government gave no 
explanation for its actions. On March 8, immigration security agents 
again detained Olenghankoy as he attempted to depart Kinshasa for 
Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo. Immigration officials confiscated 
all of his documents and prevented him from leaving the country.
    On February 16, immigration officials confiscated the passport and 
airline ticket of Christophe Lutundula Apala, a member of the Mouvement 
Solarite pour la Democracie et le Development (MSDD), a think tank, as 
he prepared to board a plane to attend an international conference on 
democratic transitions in Benin. He departed on February 18 after La 
Francophonie and other organizations petitioned the Government to 
permit his departure.
    In June President Kabila and government authorities prevented the 
departure of a number of opposition and civil society leaders, 
including Joseph Olenghankoy (president of FONUS), Francois Lumumba 
(president of the MNC/L), and Catherine Nzuzi wa Mbombo (president of 
the MPR) who were invited to participate in a preparatory meeting of 
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Benin, as authorized by the Lusaka 
Accords (see Section 3). The Government already had expressed its 
intention not to participate in the U.N.-sponsored forum, which had 
been organized by Inter-Congolese Dialogue facilitator and former 
Botswana Prime Minister Sir Ketumile Masire. The Government 
successfully prevented initial efforts to launch the forum by 
preventing civil society and opposition groups from participating and 
confiscating all travel documents of intended participants. By year's 
end, the Government still had not returned the travel documents of 
these individuals.
    The Government also prevented the departure of foreign journalists. 
Airport immigration officials searched luggage, confiscated notes, and 
detained the journalists for questioning (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government lifted Kinshasa's nighttime curfew in December 1999. 
No new curfew was imposed during the year.
    The significant risk of rape, sometimes perpetrated by uniformed 
men, restricted freedom of movement at night for women in many 
neighborhoods. Groups of citizens implemented neighborhood watch 
programs, but women in many parts of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi did not 
leave their homes at night due to fear of attack.
    Freedom of movement in the rebel-controlled territories was 
restricted severely during the year as a result of fighting between the 
rebels, Rwandan and Ugandan forces, the Mai Mai, and the Interahamwe. 
Travel across the war front often was inconvenient and sometimes 
impossible.
    In the eastern portion of the country, rebel forces prevented 
travel and harassed travelers. On February 11, RCD/Goma rebel forces 
operating in eastern areas of the country prevented the Archbishop of 
Bukavu from returning to his diocese (see Section 2.c.). RCD/Goma 
officials allowed Archbishop Kataliko to return to Bukavu in September, 
following visits and direct appeals to the RCD/Goma by high level 
foreign government and Catholic Church officials; however, the 
Archbishop died of a heart attack less then 3 weeks later while in 
Rome.
    Rebel and Rwandan authorities used threats and intimidation to 
prevent several dozen Congolese who had traveled from the occupied 
territories from returning after attending the National Consultations. 
This action resulted in civil society members from the occupied 
territories being stranded in Kinshasa for weeks, and sometimes months, 
after the National Consultations. On April 22, security forces arrested 
civil society activist Bruno Bahati as he returned from the National 
Consultations, and reportedly kept him in detention in both Rwanda and 
the Kivu Provinces until August. Rwandan authorities freed Bahati 
following international pressure (see Section 1.d.).
    An international human rights NGO estimates that there are 
approximately 1.5 million IDP's in the country. Approximately 60,000 
persons were displaced during fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan 
forces in Kisangani in May and June (see Section 1.a.). There are many 
camps for IDP's, especially in the eastern half of the country. Persons 
at these camps were subjected to attacks by government and rebel 
groups. For example, in July a group believed to be Interahamwe 
attacked an IDP camp in North Kivu Province. Approximately 50 persons 
were killed, including some who were burned alive inside their homes 
(see Section 1.a.). During the night of July 9 and 10, an unidentified 
militia attacked an encampment of displaced persons at Sake, in the 
Masisi territory of North Kivu Province (see Section 1.a.).
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 
Government continued to provide first asylum. Refugees were accepted 
into the country from the Republic of the Congo during the year, and 
approximately 330,000 refugees from neighboring countries, including 
Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Uganda, and Sudan, live in the country.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no known reports of the 
forced repatriation of refugees during the year.
    According to international human rights NGO's, approximately 
300,000 Congolese refugees lived in neighboring countries during the 
year, including approximately 100,000 in the Republic of the Congo and 
9,000 in the Central African Republic. In the last months of the year, 
thousands of refugees fled to Zambia from the increased fighting in 
Katanga Province.
    The Government's cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other international agencies fluctuated wildly. 
The Government consistently denied humanitarian access to NGO workers 
in areas controlled by the Government (see Section 4). The Minister of 
Interior personally had to sign travel authorizations for foreign aid 
workers, which created delays in travel. The Ministry of Human Rights 
and in particular Human Rights Minister She Okitundu played an active 
role in organizing the protection and voluntary departure of Tutsis who 
were not incarcerated before their departure from the country. Since 
the start of the war, the Government has stopped its former practice of 
involuntarily repatriating Hutus to Rwanda.
    UNHCR cooperated with NGO's and antigovernment forces in 
voluntarily repatriating Rwandan Hutus to Rwanda. There was no 
independent confirmation of news reports from May 1999 that 
antigovernment forces were repatriating Rwandan Hutus involuntarily; 
there were no known reports of such forced repatriation during the 
year.
    Antigovernment forces also imposed travel restrictions on NGO's 
(see Section 4).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government 
peacefully. Citizens have not been able to change their government 
through free elections since independence in 1960.
    In his May 1997 inaugural address, President Kabila promised a 
constitution and elections by 1999; however, the 1998 outbreak of war 
effectively prevented the holding of national elections. The President 
used the pretext of war to suppress the activities of political 
opposition parties and continued to rule by decree. The war also 
provided a reason for security forces to arrest persons at will on 
charges of subversion or being in league with the rebellion (see 
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
    The Government did not pursue the ratification of the proposed 
constitution drafted in 1998; after it was disseminated in 1998 to the 
press, many leaders of political parties, NGO's, and religious 
organizations criticized it as insufficiently democratic.
    The cease-fire accords signed in July and August 1999 at Lusaka, 
Zambia, between the Government, progovernment, and antigovernment 
forces called for an open national dialog among all political parties 
and civil society groups. However, the Government repeatedly used its 
power to stifle any meaningful dialog. In March church groups attempted 
to hold a National Consultation, an initiative that the Government 
seized to carry out its own agenda; it filled meetings with its own 
supporters. Despite the Government's effort to control the National 
Consultation, the body did not accept the Government's agenda. In April 
the delegates presented President Kabila with a list of 
recommendations. The delegates urged the Government to release 
political prisoners, open the political process, abolish the CPP's, and 
free jailed journalists. The Government ignored these recommendations 
and instead turned to the guidance provided by its own delegates, which 
in essence urged the President to ignore key provisions of the Lusaka 
Accords. The Government subsequently reaffirmed during the year its 
commitment to participate in a national dialog under the control of a 
neutral facilitator; however, it continued to obstruct and frustrate 
facilitator Sir Ketumile Masire. Throughout the year, the Government 
attempted to divert the national dialog by using a variety of political 
maneuvers designed as substitutes for real political discussion and 
sought to create a forum that the Government intended to control. The 
Government created the Constituent and Legislative Assembly to draft a 
new constitution, prepare a national budget, and approve decrees and 
motions handed down by the President. The Government also appointed 
members of the Assembly based on past services to President Kabila and 
loyalty to the Kabila regime.
    In June President Kabila and government authorities prevented the 
departure of a number of opposition and civil society leaders, 
including Joseph Olenghankoy (president of FONUS), Francois Lumumba 
(president of the MNC/L), and Catherine Nzuzi wa Mbombo (president of 
the MPR) who were invited to participate in a preparatory meeting of 
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Benin, as authorized by the Lusaka 
Accords (see Section 2.d.).
    Although the Government did not ban political parties, it continued 
to impose severe restrictions on their activities, and to enforce these 
restrictions with numerous arrests and detentions (see Sections 1.d. 
and 2.b.). On occasion authorities tortured opposition activists, 
including UDPS activist Crispin Ipondo Banda and FONUS second vice 
president Freddy Lomboto wa Lomboto (see Section 1.c.). In practice the 
Government continued to restrict operations of political parties to 
internal administrative functions only. At various times, government 
security forces put opposition political party members under 
surveillance, and police also raided party headquarters and homes (see 
Section 1.f.). Authorities at times denied exit visas to opposition 
political leaders (see Section 2.d.).
    Hundreds of political activists were arrested for engaging in 
political activity and detained for prolonged periods (see Sections 
1.d. and 2.b.). For example, on February 17, ANR agents arrested four 
members of the PALU opposition political party for engaging in 
political activities (see Section 1.d.). They were released on February 
25.
    The State continued to be highly centralized in many ways. The 
central government executive, in Kinshasa, generally appointed 
governors, but once in the provinces they had considerable autonomy, 
due in part to poor communications and transportation infrastructure. 
Territorial administrators also were appointed from Kinshasa. 
Provincial government resources, both financial and logistical, have 
come almost exclusively from Kinshasa since Kabila took control of the 
Government.
    A disproportionate number of officials in Kabila's Government were 
from the President's home province of Katanga and from his Muluba tribe 
(see Section 5).
    There are no official restrictions on the participation of women or 
minorities in politics; however, in practice women and minorities are 
underrepresented in government and politics, and there are few women or 
Muslims in senior positions in the Government or in political parties. 
There were six female ministers and vice ministers in the Cabinet at 
year's end. There were no known Muslim ministers in the Cabinet.
    The rebel movements established civil administrations in the areas 
controlled by antigovernment forces, including appointment of 
provincial governors and issuance of visas for foreigners to travel 
into their areas. Rebel authorities reportedly began training police 
forces but appointed local officials rather than holding local 
elections.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government showed increased hostility to effective human rights 
organizations, both domestic or international, operating in the 
country. Local human rights NGO's continued to investigate and publish 
their findings on human rights cases, but these activities took place 
in the context of significant government harassment. Such harassment 
led to a decrease in reporting of human rights violations. There 
reportedly were several attacks against local and international human 
rights NGO's during the year.
    The main domestic human rights organizations operating in the 
country include Comite Droits de l'Homme Maintenant, a national network 
of human rights organizations; VSV, an active Kinshasabased 
organization; Groupe Jeremie and Groupe Amos, two Christianinspired 
groups that focus on human rights and democracy problems; Comites des 
Observateurs des Droits de l'Homme, a human rights monitoring group; 
Toges Noires, an international association of lawyers and judges 
involved with human rights; and Associations de Defense des Droits de 
l'Homme. In addition numerous groups are active that are involved with 
development and with specific problems such as voter education and 
women's rights.
    Local human rights activists were subjected to frequent harassment, 
arrest, and detention by security forces (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 
1.f.). The legality of such arrests often was unclear, as was the 
authority of the security forces members who affected the arrests and 
detentions. Security agents and police arrested, and on some occasions, 
beat or tortured, a number of persons for being members of human rights 
NGO's or for possessing literature distributed by human rights NGO's, 
including Kayembe Kasuku, a member of Lawyer's Without Borders; Time 
Missine; Betshi Pitcal; Zuzi Phukuta Dieudonne, a reporter for the 
newspaper Palme d'Or and president of Justice Sans Frontiere; and 
Reverend Placide Tshisumpa Tshiakatumba, president of the International 
Society for Human Rights (ISHR) (see Section 1.d.). Unlike in the 
previous year, VSV staff was not subjected to government harassment.
    The Government often obstructed the travel of MONUC personnel 
throughout the country. The Government consistently denied humanitarian 
access to NGO workers in areas controlled by the Government (see 
Section 2.d.).
    U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Roberto Garreton, visited the country in August. After 
reviewing the prevailing human rights situation, the U.N. Rapporteur 
called for the release of political prisoners and the end of capital 
punishment in the country. He expressed concern at the abuses of and 
absence of due process in government military tribunals, as well as at 
a wide variety of serious abuses in both government-controlled and RCD-
controlled territory.
    Human rights groups and members of political, religious, and other 
nongovernmental organizations in the parts of the country held by 
antigovernment forces frequently were harassed and detained on 
suspicion of helping the Government (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On March 6, RCD/Goma security agents raided the offices of a 
women's group, Reseau des Femmes Pour La Defense de Droits et de la 
Paix (see Section 2.b.). Security agents claimed that the women were 
plotting genocide and threatened to shoot them. Several women lost 
their jobs after the incident as RCD/Goma authorities coerced employers 
to dismiss them.
    Rebel security agents, including Rwandan Government and RCD/Goma 
officials, harassed a number of religious and civil society leaders who 
traveled to Kinshasa to take part in the National Consultations in 
March. Over 40 delegates from the occupied territories, many of them 
associated with human rights NGO's, were subjected to harassment, 
delays, and detention in February and March (see Sections 1.d. and 3). 
Following international pressure, all of the delegates were released. 
On April 22, security forces arrested and detained civil society 
activist Bruno Bahati when he returned from the National Consultations 
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    On May 15, RCD/ML forces arrested and detained Sylvain Mudimbi 
Masudi, external relations director of the human rights NGO Friends of 
Nelson Mandela (ANMDH), in Beni, North Kivu Province (see Section 
1.d.).
    On October 9, RCD rebels reportedly dispersed a meeting of a human 
rights umbrella group in Bukavu and publicly beat, arrested, and 
detained 13 human rights activists who attended the meeting at Camp 
Saio in Bukavu (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). The rebels also 
looted the offices of Groupe Jeremie where the meeting occurred.
    Antigovernment forces permitted some humanitarian NGO's to work in 
rebel-held areas, and those NGO's reported that their working 
environment improved in some of those areas during the year.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The previous constitutions prohibited discrimination based on 
ethnicity, sex, or religious affiliation; however, the Government did 
not enforce these prohibitions effectively and continued to act with 
serious official prejudice against members of the Tutsi ethnic group. 
Societal discrimination remained an obstacle to the advancement of 
certain groups, particularly women, Tutsis, Muslims, and the indigenous 
Pygmy (Batwa) people.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women, including rape, is common, 
but there are no known government or NGO statistics on the extent of 
this violence. The police rarely intervene in domestic disputes. Rape 
is a crime, but the press rarely reported incidents of violence against 
women or children. Press reports of rape generally appear only if rape 
occurs in conjunction with another crime.
    Women are relegated to a secondary role in society. They constitute 
the majority of primary agricultural laborers and small-scale traders 
and are almost exclusively responsible for child rearing. In the 
nontraditional sector, women commonly receive less pay for comparable 
work. Only rarely do they occupy positions of authority or high 
responsibility. Women also tend to receive less education than men. 
Women are required by law to obtain their spouse's permission before 
engaging in routine legal transactions, such as selling or renting real 
estate, opening a bank account, accepting employment, or applying for a 
passport. A 1987 revision of the Family Code permits a widow to inherit 
her husband's property, to control her own property, and to receive a 
property settlement in the event of divorce. In practice sometimes 
consistent with customary law, women are denied these rights. Widows 
commonly are stripped of all possessions--as well as their dependent 
children--by the deceased husband's family. Human rights groups and 
church organizations are working to combat this custom, but there 
generally is no government intervention or legal recourse available. 
Women also are denied custody of their children in divorce cases, but 
they retain the right to visit them. Polygyny is practiced, although it 
is illegal. Father-child relationships resulting from polygynous unions 
are recognized legally, but only the first wife is recognized legally 
as a spouse.
    Prostitution is not a crime and there has been an increase in 
prostitution due to poor economic conditions. Women sometimes are 
forced into prostitution by their families due to economic necessity. 
There was no information available as to the extent of prostitution 
outside of the cities.
    There were a number of active and effective women's groups in both 
the government-controlled and rebel-controlled areas of the country.
    Children.--Government spending on children's programs nearly is 
nonexistent. Primary school education is not compulsory, free, or 
universal. Primary school enrollment rates dropped to less than 70 
percent during the year. In public schools, parents are required 
formally to pay a small fee, but parents often are expected informally 
to pay teachers' salaries. Extremely poor economic circumstances often 
hamper parents' ability to afford these added expenses, meaning that 
children may not be able to attend school. Most schools function only 
in areas where parents have formed cooperatives. The Government's 
economic policies have resulted in massive unemployment, inflation, and 
a devaluation of the currency, putting basic education out of reach of 
many families. There have been reports of economic circumstances 
forcing children to hunt or fish for their family's livelihood instead 
of attending school (see Section 6.d.). In both the government- and 
rebel-controlled areas, poverty brought on by the war has led to 
greatly diminished educational opportunities for girls. Parents under 
severe economic hardship no longer can afford to educate both their 
sons and their daughters, resulting in the withdrawal of many girls 
from school.
    The Juvenile Code includes a statute prohibiting prostitution by 
children under the age of 14; however, child prostitution is common in 
Kinshasa and in other parts of the country. There were reports during 
the year that girls as young as 8 years of age were forced into 
prostitution to provide income to their families (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.d.).
    The number of orphans and street children increased during the 
year. Street children in Kinshasa were subject to severe harassment and 
exploitation, particularly by soldiers and police. There were credible 
reports that the FAC sexually exploited homeless girls.
    There are no documented cases in which security agents or others 
targeted children for specific abuse, although children suffer from the 
same conditions of generalized social disorder and widespread disregard 
for human rights that affect society as a whole. These conditions 
sometimes render parents unable to meet their children's basic human 
needs.
    Some children as young as 10 years of age have been allowed to 
enlist as soldiers in the FAC. The Government has not taken 
comprehensive measures to remove child soldiers from its armed forces, 
although it has stated its intention of demobilizing child soldiers 
once the war is over. While many child soldiers continued to serve in 
the armed forces, during the year the Government recruited fewer 
children into the armed forces; however, the Government continued to 
encourage the enlistment of children in paramilitary organizations. 
Commanders reportedly often concealed child soldiers during visits by 
human rights NGO's and other monitoring groups (see Section 1.f.). 
There were credible reports that the FAC forcibly conscripted homeless 
boys to fight. Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that 
unemployed youth in Katanga Province were recruited for military 
service.
    Rebel forces reportedly continued to use child soldiers already in 
service, but greatly reduced recruitment of them during the year (see 
Sections 1.f. and 6.c.). Credible reports have indicated that rebel 
forces have conscripted forcibly boys as young as age 10, and there 
were reports that this practice continued during the year.
    Rwandan and Ugandan troops, in addition to RCD rebels, reportedly 
abducted many young women from the villages they raided. These night 
raids on villages became so frequent that in many parts of the Kivu 
Provinces peasants slept in their fields.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is not widespread, but it is practiced on young 
girls among isolated groups in the north. The Government has not 
addressed the problem.
    People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility 
to buildings or government services for the disabled. There are some 
special schools, many with missionary staff, which use private funds 
and limited public support to provide education and vocational training 
to blind and physically disabled students.
    Physically disabled individuals are subject to discrimination in 
employment, education, and the provision of other government services. 
Disabled persons are not required to conform to all civil laws, such as 
paying taxes.
    Indigenous People.--There is a population of fewer than 10,000 
Pygmies (Batwa), who are believed to have been the country's original 
human inhabitants, and societal discrimination against them continued. 
Although they are citizens, most Pygmies continued to live in remote 
areas and took no part in the political process.
    Religious Minorities.--Approximately 50 percent of the population 
are Roman Catholic, 20 percent are Protestant, and 10 percent are 
Muslim. About 20 percent practice traditional indigenous religions 
exclusively. Many persons practice elements of both traditional 
indigenous religions and Christianity or Islam. Unlike in the previous 
year, there were no known reports of attacks against Muslims nor 
reports that accusations of witchcraft caused tensions or contributed 
to violence between Christians and Muslims during the year.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The last official census was 
taken in 1984. It is estimated that the population is now 45 to 50 
million, and comprises more than 200 separate ethnic groups. These 
groups generally are concentrated regionally and speak distinct primary 
languages. There is no majority ethnic group; the four largest ethnic 
groups are the Mongo, Luba, Kongo, and Angbetu-Azande, who together 
make up about 45 percent of the population. Four indigenous languages, 
Kiswahili, Lingala, Kikongo, and Tshiluba have official status. French 
is the language of government, commerce, and education.
    Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is practiced 
widely by members of virtually all ethnic groups and is evident in 
private hiring and buying patterns and in patterns of de facto ethnic 
segregation in some cities; however, intermarriage across major ethnic 
and regional divides is common in large cities.
    Persons from President Kabila's home province, Katanga, and from 
his Mulaba tribe, filled a disproportionate number of positions in his 
Government and in the senior ranks of the civil service, and dominated 
the FAC officer corps. Katangans in the FAC were substantially more 
likely both to be promoted and to be paid than persons from other 
regions. Since the beginning of the war, Tutsis have been absent from 
the Government, which previously included persons from all regions and 
major ethnic groups.
    Birth on national territory reportedly does not necessarily confer 
citizenship. The Government continued to refuse to recognize the 
citizenship claims of longtime residents whose ancestors immigrated to 
the country, including the Banyamulenge Tutsis. According to some 
accounts, resentment of their noncitizen status contributed to the 
participation of many Tutsi residents of the country, first in Kabila's 
rebellion against Mobutu and then in the RCD rebellion against Kabila.
    Since the start of the war in August 1998, ethnic Tutsis have been 
subjected to serious abuses, both in the capital and elsewhere, by 
government security forces and by some citizens for perceived or 
potential disloyalty to the regime (see Section 1.a.). During the year, 
there were no reports of extrajudicial killings of noncombatant Tutsis 
in government-controlled areas. There were increasing reports of the 
participation of the Government of Rwanda in arming Hutus and sending 
them into the Congo in order to terrorize the population. These groups 
reportedly posed as Interahamwe fighters in order to justify Rwanda's 
military occupation of areas of the Kivu Provinces. Unlike in the 
previous year, government officials and state media did not publish 
anti-Tutsi propaganda. The Government materially supported Mai Mai and 
Hutu armed groups, which, according to credible reports, repeatedly 
killed both unarmed and armed Tutsis in areas militarily dominated by 
antigovernment forces. However, the Government no longer incited mob 
violence against unarmed Tutsis, and there were no reports of mass 
extrajudicial killings of Tutsis by the security forces.
    However, human rights groups increasingly complained that the 
killing of and other human rights violations against Congolese 
civilians by persons perceived to be of Tutsi ethnicity and their 
supporters presented an increasing problem.
    In April 1999, members of the Presidential Guard attacked, severely 
beat, and abducted Ralph Biteo because he had the facial features of a 
Tutsi. Members of the Presidential Guard then also arrested Biteo's 
cousin Mirimo Mulongo and both Biteo and Mulongo were taken to the GLM 
detention facility in the Gombe area of Kinshasa. Both were denied 
visitors and were believed still to be in detention at year's end (see 
Section 1.d.).
    The longstanding violent conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic 
groups continued inside the country; however, unlike in previous years, 
there were no reports that Congolese Hutu militias continued to recruit 
from populations of Hutu refugees from Rwanda and Burundi in 
neighboring countries, including the Republic of the Congo and Zambia.
    Unlike in previous years, government officials and state media did 
not represent the war as part of a larger supranational conflict 
between Bantus and Nilotics, nor did Nilotic-Bantu rhetoric appear in 
private publications and broadcasts in the country.
    State-owned television and radio and progovernment private 
newspapers repeatedly published racist statements directed not only 
against Tutsis and Nilotics, but also against Europeans, in connection 
with propaganda alleging that countries in Europe, and populations 
largely of European ethnicity, supported antigovernment forces in the 
war.
    Following the sudden death on October 3 of Emmanuel Kataliko, the 
Archbishop of Bukavu, who had spent 8 months in rebelimposed internal 
exile, the Kabila Government incited the populace by claiming that 
Tutsis killed Kataliko with poison. These statements, which quickly 
were circulated and published by independent newspapers, possibly 
contributed to demonstrations that broke out in Bukavu, which resulted 
in a child being killed by rebel gunfire.
    Throughout the year in the Ituri district in Orientale Province, an 
area dominated by Ugandan and Ugandan-supported forces, fighting 
between members of the Lendu and Hema tribes reportedly killed 
thousands of persons and displaced tens of thousands of persons. This 
fighting reportedly arose from a dispute over land use (see Section 
1.a.). Reportedly Ugandan troops manipulated the fighting by charging 
the tribes fees in order to provide protection.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Legislation in effect from the Mobutu 
period permits all workers except magistrates and military personnel to 
form and join trade unions. The National Union of Congolese Workers 
(UNTC) remains the largest labor federation. There also are almost 100 
other independent unions, which now are registered with the Labor 
Ministry. Some of the independent unions are affiliated with political 
parties or associated with a single industry or geographic area; 
however, they also have ties to larger unions, such as the UNTC, which 
have more diverse membership. Two other large federations also are 
active.
    The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
alleged in its Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 2000 
that the Labor Code does not protect adequately workers against 
antiunion discrimination and interference by employers into union 
affairs. The ICFTU also claimed that enforcement of the Labor Code 
``remains virtually nonexistent.''
    Government security forces arrested and detained labor leaders and 
activists. On May 5, police arrested four tax authority employees, 
Blaise Banzwa Kabo, Albano Mopipi, Andre Yoba Mbesi, and Kakale Makala, 
and detained them for 10 days for ``endangering state security.'' The 
four previously had spent a year in prison for protesting the 
government policy of moving government employees from one service to 
another.
    On November 30, intelligence officers arrested Steve Mbikay, 
secretary general of the Solidarity Union, as he left a union meeting 
with ONARTRA, the Government's parastatal transportation company (see 
Section 1.d.). He continued to be held without charge at year's end.
    On July 7, provincial police in Goma arrested union organizers who 
sent a letter to the management of OFIDA (the customs office) on behalf 
of workers. Police took Fanchon Sakukombo, Felix Zirahira, Kamitanyi 
Nyarukemba, Jean Sengusu, Bababebole Kadite, and Alexis Balibonera to 
the DGS detention center for questioning; they were released on July 
13.
    Unlike in previous years, police did not arrest any communications 
workers who attempted to form unions for the purpose of collective 
bargaining.
    The law recognizes the right to strike. However, legal strikes 
rarely occur since the law requires prior resort to lengthy mandatory 
arbitration and appeal procedures. Labor unions have not been able to 
defend effectively the rights of workers in the deteriorating economic 
environment. The law prohibits employers or the Government from 
retaliating against strikers, but this prohibition rarely is enforced.
    On March 23, civil servants at the offices of Tax Collection, 
Duties and Customs, and Government Receipts went on strike to protest 
against low salaries. The strike was short-lived because the Government 
laid off some employees and reassigned others to the ``Portfolio 
Ministry.'' The layoffs were conducted along tribal lines and 
intimidated employees who remained in the offices.
    Following a series of strikes in 1999 to protest low salaries and 
unpaid wages, the Government claimed in October 1999 that it would meet 
the demands of the strikers. It did so in June by implementing 
progressively a comprehensive, higher civil service salary scale; 
however, civil servants still were paid only sporadically during the 
year.
    On January 31 in Bukavu, and on February 7 in Goma, citywide 
strikes (``villes mortes'') were held to protest the occupation of the 
two cities by antigovernment forces (see Section 2.b.). The Bukavu 
strike was enforced strictly by organizers who threatened those who 
tried to go to work.
    Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The UNTC 
participates in the organization of African Trade Union Unity, and the 
Central Union of Congo is affiliated with the World Confederation of 
Labor.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to bargain collectively, and an agreement 
between the UNTC and the employers' association formerly provided for 
wages and prices to be negotiated jointly each year under minimal 
government supervision. This system broke down in 1991 as a result of 
the rapid depreciation of the currency. The professional unions and the 
Congolese Business Federation signed a cooperative agreement in 1997; 
however, while collective bargaining still exists in theory, continuing 
inflation encouraged a return to the use of pay rates individually 
arranged between employers and employees.
    The collapse of the formal economy also has resulted in a decline 
in the influence of unions, a tendency to ignore existing labor 
regulations, and a buyer's market for labor. The Labor Code prohibits 
antiunion discrimination, although this regulation was not enforced 
effectively by the Ministry of Labor. The law also requires employers 
to reinstate workers fired for union activities. In the public sector, 
the Government sets wages by decree; public sector unions act only in 
an informal advisory capacity.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor; however, the Government forcibly conscripts 
adults (see Section 1.f.). There also were reports that some Mai Mai 
guerrillas fighting on the side of the Government in the war demanded 
forced labor from persons in rural areas.
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by 
children, and the Government forcibly conscripted children (see 
Sections 1.g. and 5). In addition there also were reports that girls as 
young as 8 years of age were forced into prostitution to provide income 
to their families (see Section 6.d.)
    Antigovernment forces also forcibly conscripted adults and children 
(see Sections 1.f. and 5).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 18 years. 
Employers legally may hire minors between the ages of 14 and 18 with 
the consent of a parent or guardian, but those under age 16 may work a 
maximum of 4 hours per day; those between the ages of 16 and 18 may 
work up to 8 hours. The employment of children of all ages is common in 
the informal sector and in subsistence agriculture, which are the 
dominant portions of the economy. Such employment often is the only way 
a child or family can obtain money for food. Many children have been 
forced by their parents to leave school and beg in the streets or work 
in order to provide income to their families. Neither the Ministry of 
Labor, which is responsible for enforcement, nor the labor unions make 
an effort to enforce child labor laws. Larger enterprises generally do 
not exploit child labor.
    The availability of education for children is extremely limited in 
practice (see Section 5).
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by 
children, and the Government forcibly conscripts children (see Sections 
1.g., 5, and 6.c.). In addition there were reports that girls as young 
as 8 years of age were forced into prostitution to provide income to 
their families (see Section 6.c.).
    The Government did not ratify ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms 
of child labor by year's end, nor does the law provide any provisions 
against such labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Most citizens are engaged in 
subsistence agriculture or commerce outside the formal wage sector. The 
minimum wage, last adjusted by government decree in 1990, subsequently 
was rendered irrelevant by rapid inflation. The average wage does not 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most 
workers rely on the extended family and informal economic activity to 
survive. The maximum legal workweek (excluding voluntary overtime) is 
48 hours. One 24-hour rest period is required every 7 days.
    The Labor Code specifies health and safety standards. The Ministry 
of Labor officially is charged with enforcing these standards, but it 
does not do so effectively. No provisions in the Labor Code permit 
workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without 
penalty.
    f.Trafficking in Persons
    There are no specific laws that prohibit trafficking in persons; 
however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, 
within, or through the country.
                               __________

                         REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

    The Republic of the Congo \1\ continued to be ruled by a 
transitional government that came to power by force of arms in October 
1997. President Denis Sassou-Nguesso wields executive power without 
meaningful legislative or judicial constraints. Forces supporting 
Sassou-Nguesso, a northerner, defeated those of the democratically 
elected former president Pascal Lissouba, a southerner, with the help 
of Angolan troops in 1997. SassouNguesso's principal base of political 
support lay in the sparsely populated northern region of the country. 
Renewed civil conflict broke out in August 1998 and continued 
throughout the south until the end of 1999 between forces supporting 
the Government, which included Angolan allies, Rwandan Hutu militiamen, 
and irregular fighters of Chadian and Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) nationality, and southern rebel groups, which included Cocoye 
militiamen operating in the Bouenza, Niari, and Lekoumou regions, and 
Ninja and Nsiloulou militiamen operating principally in southern Pool 
region. Fighting and heavy looting led to the destruction of many 
southern towns, including parts of Brazzaville, the capital, and 
displaced an estimated 800,000 civilians, approximately onethird of the 
country's total population. In 1999 the Government reestablished 
effective control over most of the south through military offensives, 
offers of amnesty, negotiations, and efforts to broaden the 
Government's political base. In November and December 1999, the 
Government signed cease-fire and reconciliation accords with rebel 
groups, which called for disarmament, demobilization, the reintegration 
of former militiamen, and a ``national dialog without exclusion'' to 
resolve political disputes underlying the military conflict. There were 
no cease-fire violations during the year. Omar Bongo, President of 
Gabon, serves as the facilitator of the cease-fire accords. Soon after 
taking power in 1997, President Sassou-Nguesso's Government replaced 
the country's 1992 constitution with a new Fundamental Act, which 
established a strong and highly centralized presidential system of 
government. The President appoints all members of the Government, all 
senior military officers and all subnational government officials, 
serves as commander in chief of the armed forces, and is mandated 
specifically to direct the general policy of the Government and to 
exercise regulatory powers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The United States Embassy evacuated its facilities in the 
country during the 1997 civil war and subsequently has operated out of 
the American Embassy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Fighting 
in both countries impeded efforts to collect information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Legislative authority is vested in the 75-member National 
Transition Council (NTC), which was elected at the National 
Reconciliation Forum convoked by the Government in January 1998. 
Although the forum included some representatives of opposition 
political parties and nongovernmental actors, the event was 
orchestrated by the executive and did not constitute a sufficiently 
broad-based forum from which to elect a genuinely representative 
legislature. During the forum, the Government announced its intention 
to create a new constitution and hold elections within a flexible 3-
year timetable. A constitutional committee named by the President in 
late 1998 presented him with a draft constitution in August 1999. In 
November the Cabinet formally endorsed the draft. Elections are 
scheduled to take place after the implementation of a draft 
constitution that outlines the structure and institutions of the state. 
The judiciary is overburdened and subject to political interference and 
corruption.
    The security forces include the police, the gendarmerie, and the 
armed forces; however, the functional distinction between these forces 
is not clear. In theory the police should be the first to respond to 
security incidents, with gendarmes and army units intervening later if 
necessary; in practice joint operations are common. Many new recruits 
who have joined the security forces since the 1997 civil war are former 
members of nongovernmental militias. Since the end of the 1998-1999 
conflict, the Government has established increasing control over pro-
government ``Cobra'' militiamen who previously had been effectively 
autonomous. Units of the Angolan armed forces remain in the country in 
support of the Government for security. Rwandan Hutu militiamen, 
formerly in refugee camps in the country, as well as former soldiers 
from Zaire (DRC), remain in the country but no longer participate in 
government military operations. A major challenge for the country is 
re-integration of former militiamen from all sides in the 1998-1999 
conflict who have stopped fighting under the terms of the peace 
accords. In some cases, joint military units comprised of army troops 
and former rebels provide security in former rebel-controlled areas. 
Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights 
abuses during the year.
    The economy suffered serious losses from destruction and looting in 
much of the south during the 1997 civil war and the 199899 conflict, 
particularly in Brazzaville, where more than onethird of the country's 
population of roughly 2.8 million normally resides. However, this 
violence did not affect significantly the oil industry, which operates 
offshore. Oil exports, timber exports, and external assistance remained 
the country's main sources of foreign exchange. High world oil prices 
throughout the year increased government revenues and enabled continued 
payment of salaries to public sector employees, including members of 
the security forces. Although per capita gross domestic product was 
estimated at about $850 per year, this figure includes substantial oil 
exports, the benefits of which are not widely distributed throughout 
the population. Lack of transparency in government and high levels of 
defense and security spending continued to impede rehabilitation and 
development.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
were some improvements in several areas during the year, there 
continued to be numerous serious problems. Citizens do not have the 
right to change their government peacefully. Security forces were 
responsible for extrajudicial killings, including summary executions, 
rapes, beatings, and physical abuse of detainees and the civilian 
population, arbitrary arrest and detention, and looting. The Government 
often deployed undisciplined troops, including some former Cobras. 
These government forces also were responsible for summary executions, 
as well as rape, looting, and other violent acts. Prison conditions 
remained life threatening. The judiciary was overburdened, 
underfinanced, subject to corruption and political influence, and 
unable to ensure fair and expeditious trials. The Government infringed 
on citizens' privacy rights. The Government and its political allies 
continued to monopolize domestic broadcast media; however, private 
newspapers circulated freely and often were critical of the 
authorities. There were some limits on freedom of movement, although 
security force restrictions on freedom of movement within the country 
decreased. The Government permitted opposition political parties and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), including human rights 
organizations, to function, and there was a relatively open dialog on 
public policy issues. The Government sent mixed signals on political 
participation by opposition figures. While many former cabinet 
ministers and other officials of the Lissouba government have returned 
to Brazzaville and resumed political activities, several were tried and 
convicted in absentia of serious war crimes during the year. Violence 
and societal discrimination against women were serious problems; 
however, incidents of rape decreased during the year following the end 
of the 1998-1999 conflict. Societal discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity remained widespread, including against minority indigenous 
Pygmies. Child labor, including forced child labor, continued. Citizens 
sometimes resorted to vigilante justice and killed suspected criminals.
    Members of Angolan troops allied with the government reportedly 
also committed acts of summary execution, rape, and looting.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
continued to commit extrajudicial killings; however, the number of such 
killings decreased during the year following the end of the 1998-1999 
civil conflict. In August soldiers killed two family members of a 
policeman in revenge for the killing of a fellow soldier by another 
policeman. Reportedly there was no investigation nor action taken in 
this case by year's end. In some cases, security forces summarily 
executed soldiers who were responsible for rapes or other abuses (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). For example, in September in Mouyondzi 
(Bouenza Region), the military command executed three soldiers 
recruited from former militia forces for attempted looting and 
extortion. Unlike in the previous year, there were no reported cases of 
the summary execution of suspected rebels among displaced civilians.
    There were a number of armed confrontations between members of 
government military units and affiliated militias during the year, 
which resulted in civilian deaths. On July 13, a personal dispute 
between a member of the Presidential Guard and a Police Officer 
escalated into an armed confrontation between their units, which lasted 
several hours in Brazzaville's Poto-Poto neighborhood. Members of the 
Presidential Guard involved in the incident reportedly were punished 
for undisciplined behavior; however, the forms of punishment were not 
known. In September in Brazzaville's Kinsoundi neighborhood, fighting 
between security forces, Willy Matsanga, a security advisor at the 
Ministry of Interior and former militia commander, and some of 
Matsanga's supporters after a dispute over access to the airport, 
resulted in the death of one civilian by a stray bullet.
    The Government often deployed undisciplined troops, including some 
recruited from President Sassou-Nguesso's former Cobra militia. These 
government forces were responsible for summary executions as well as 
rape, looting, and other violent acts. In October 1999, the Minister of 
Defense announced that military tribunals would be established to bring 
to justice soldiers responsible for abuses, and the Government 
introduced legislation to that end. However, by year's end, no such law 
had been adopted and these tribunals were not yet in place.
    Angolan troops allied with the government generally were better 
disciplined, but individual troops reportedly also committed acts of 
summary execution, rape, and looting.
    On November 12 and 13, 12 persons, many of whom were under the age 
of 18, suffocated in an overcrowded jail cell in Pointe Noire (see 
Section 1.c.). Senior government officials acknowledged the incident 
publicly, and the duty officer was brought to trial. The status of the 
case was not known at year's end.
    According to a report by the International Federation of Leagues of 
Human Rights, one of the detainees held without charge since 1998 in 
Pointe Noire and then in Impfondo, Gabriel Louya, died in detention 
after suffering a stroke as a result of torture and poor prison 
conditions (see Section 1.c.).
    There continued to be deaths due to mob violence, as civilians took 
vigilante action against presumed criminals, although police sometimes 
intervened to stop such action.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of disappearance during 
the year.
    The Justice Ministry's Human Rights Directorate continued to 
investigate allegations that up to 350 young men, who took refuge in 
the DRC in 1999, were separated from their families by security forces 
upon returning to Brazzaville in May 1999, and subsequently 
disappeared. While some sources reported that security forces had shot 
and killed these men, no firm evidence was available, and a poor 
counting of the returnees made it difficult to verify what had happened 
to them after arrival in Brazzaville. The results of the Government's 
investigation were not released by year's end.
    Given the incomplete figures on those killed or displaced in the 
1997 civil war and the 1998-1999 civil conflict, and the massive 
displacement of the civilian population as a result of the fighting, 
many disappearances may have occurred that have not been reported.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment.--
The Fundamental Act prohibits torture; however, in practice, security 
forces sometimes used beatings to extract confessions or merely to 
punish detainees, and sometimes raped women detainees. During the 
second half of the year, a police newsletter published several reports 
of such incidents and described the administrative discipline, criminal 
investigations, and judicial proceedings pursued against those 
responsible. Members of the security forces looted citizens' homes (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.f.), and security forces extorted money from 
travelers at checkpoints, although less frequently than in the previous 
year (see Section 2.d.). There were no reports that security force 
officers beat and released civilian looters instead of arresting them.
    Undisciplined government forces were responsible for summary 
executions as well as rape, looting, and other violent acts. While 
there were some improvements in government forces' discipline, serious 
abuses continued.
    In some cases, security forces summarily executed soldiers who were 
responsible for rapes or other abuses (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.). 
Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that security forces 
harassed internally displaced persons (IDP's); all IDP's returned to 
their homes during the year (see Section 2.d.).
    Angolan troops allied with the government generally were better 
disciplined, but individual troops reportedly also committed acts of 
summary execution, rape, and looting.
    In May a court convicted and sentenced to death in absentia former 
Prime Minister Kolelas of torture and other crimes during the 1997 
civil war (see Section 1.e.). The court also sentenced to death former 
Interior Minister Philippe Bikinkita on similar charges in the same 
trial.
    Unlike during the 1997 civil war and the 1998-1999 conflict, there 
were no reports during the year of activity by rebel militia groups, 
including killings, rape, torture, or looting.
    Prison conditions remained life threatening due to overcrowded 
facilities and scarcity of resources to provide food or health care to 
the inmates. Prisons (Maisons d'Arret) functioned in Brazzaville and 
Pointe Noire and to a lesser degree in the smaller, more remote towns 
of Owando, Ouesso, and Djambala. The Ministry of Justice continued to 
repair some prisons during the year. Detainees held at police stations 
often were subjected to beatings, overcrowding, extortion, and other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. On November 12 and 13, 12 
persons, many of whom were under the age of 18, suffocated in an 
overcrowded jail cell in Pointe Noire (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). 
Police had detained approximately 40 detainees in a cell designed to 
hold 10. The police captain responsible was suspended from his post and 
was being investigated at year's end. The Minister of Interior stated 
publicly that those responsible would be prosecuted; however, no action 
was taken by year's end.
    According to a report by the International Federation of Leagues of 
Human Rights, one of the detainees held without charge since 1998 in 
Pointe Noire and then in Impfondo, Gabriel Louya, died in detention 
after suffering a stroke as a result of torture and poor prison 
conditions (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
    Access to prisons and detention centers by domestic and 
international human rights groups improved during the year. Local human 
rights groups, including the Congolese Observatory for Human Rights 
(OCDH), the Association for the Human Rights of the Incarcerated 
(ADHUC), and a Catholic church organization visited prisons during the 
year. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted 
regular visits to prisons and detention centers throughout the country. 
For example, between September and December, ICRC visited five police 
detention centers and one gendarmerie detention center in Brazzaville 
and Doloise.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Fundamental Act 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, in practice security 
forces frequently commit such acts. The Code of Penal Procedure, which 
remains in force, requires that a person be apprehended openly and that 
a lawyer be present during initial questioning. The code further 
stipulates that warrants be issued before arrests are made and that 
detainees be brought before a judge within 3 days and either charged or 
released within 4 months. In practice the Government often violates 
these legal provisions. However, detainees usually were informed of the 
charges levied against them, and lawyers and family members usually had 
free access to them.
    There were no known political detainees at year's end. In January 
the Government released 17 political detainees who had been held 
without charge since 1998 in Pointe Noire and then in Impfondo. The 
detainees primarily were minor officials of the former Lissouba 
Government and affiliated parties. According to a report by the 
International Federation of Leagues of Human Rights, one of the 
detainees, Gabriel Louya, died in detention after suffering a stroke as 
a result of torture and poor prison conditions (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.).
    The Fundamental Act does not address forced exile, and the 
Government does not practice it formally; however, some officials of 
the predecessor government, including former president Lissouba and 
former Prime Minister Kolelas remained outside the country in self-
imposed exile (see Sections 1.e. and 3). Many other officials of the 
former government, including cabinet members, have returned to the 
country and resumed political activity.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Fundamental Act mandates the 
President to ensure the independence of the judiciary through the 
Higher Council of Magistrates; however, in practice the judiciary 
continued to be overburdened, underfinanced, and subject to corruption 
and political influence. Lack of resources became more acute as a 
result of the destruction and looting sustained by judicial facilities 
during the 1997 and 1998-1999 conflicts. In January Minister of Justice 
Jean Martin Mbemba acknowledged many of these shortcomings in a speech; 
and the Ministry of Justice continued rehabilitation of courthouses 
during the year, including the local court serving the southwest 
Brazzaville neighborhoods of Bacongo and Makelekele.
    The judicial system consists of local courts, courts of appeal, the 
Supreme Court, and traditional courts. In rural areas, traditional 
courts continued to handle many local disputes, especially property and 
probate cases, and domestic conflicts that could not be resolved within 
the extended family.
    In general defendants are tried in a public court of law presided 
over by a state-appointed magistrate. The defense has access to 
prosecution evidence and testimony and the right to counter it. In 
formal courts defendants are presumed innocent and have the right of 
appeal; however, the legal caseload far exceeded the capacity of the 
judiciary to ensure fair and timely trials. Some cases never reach the 
court system. In October 1999, the Government announced plans to 
establish military tribunals to try soldiers for abuses committed 
during recent periods of conflict, and the Government introduced 
legislation to establish these tribunals; however, the tribunals were 
not functioning by year's end.
    In December 1999, President Sassou-Nguesso signed a law and 
implementing regulations to give amnesty for acts committed during the 
conduct of the civil conflicts in 1993-1994, 1997, and 1998-1999; 
however, this amnesty does not cover the political ``authors'' of these 
conflicts.
    In May former Prime Minister Bernard Kolelas was tried, convicted, 
and sentenced to death in absentia on charges of having maintained 
private prisons in which opponents were tortured during the 1997 war. 
The court also sentenced to death former Interior Minister Philippe 
Bikinkita on similar charges in the same trial. The Government asserted 
that this was a purely judicial matter; however, observers believe 
there were political overtones evident in the broadcast of the trial on 
state-run television. In 1999 a court convicted and sentenced in 
absentia to 20 years' imprisonment former President Lissouba and three 
other former government officials on charges of having conspired to 
kill President Sassou-Nguesso in June 1999 (see Section 3).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--The Fundamental Act provides for the inviolability of 
the home, and for privacy of letters, correspondence, 
telecommunications, and other forms of communication, except as may be 
provided by law; however, in practice government security forces 
sometimes illegally entered, searched, and looted private homes; 
however, the widespread systematic looting that occurred during the 
19981999 conflict ceased.
    Citizens generally believed that the Government widely monitored 
private mail and telephone communications; however, unlike in the 
previous year, there were no reports that security forces arrested 
persons due to the content of their private communication.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Fundamental Act provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and in practice the Government 
generally respected these rights; however, it continued to monopolize 
broadcast media. The 1996 Press Law, which sharply increased criminal 
penalties for libel, remained in effect.
    There is no state-owned newspaper. Approximately 10 private 
newspapers appear weekly in Brazzaville. Some of these newspapers take 
editorial positions critical of the Government and print articles 
unflattering to the authorities. Newspapers continued on occasion to 
publish open letters written by opponents of the Government who are in 
detention or living abroad. A small elite in Brazzaville and Pointe 
Noire has access to print media, which do not circulate widely beyond 
the two cities.
    Most citizens obtained their news from the broadcast media, which 
remained effectively a government monopoly.
    Government-owned Radio Congo and Radio Brazzaville broadcast 
approximately 18 hours a day; Government-owned Television Congo 
broadcast for fewer hours. Radio France Internationale was rebroadcast 
on a local FM station, and radio and television broadcasts from 
neighboring Kinshasa, DRC, could be received in Brazzaville. The 
private independent station, Radio Liberte, established by President 
Sassou-Nguesso's forces during the 1997 civil war, continued to 
broadcast. Local rebroadcasts of the Gabon-based Africa Number One also 
continued during the year.
    The news coverage and the editorial lines of the state-owned media 
reflected government priorities and views. Government broadcast media 
focused its attention on the activities of government officials and 
their supporters; there was no meaningful airing of alternative 
political views.
    Internet service was available through the Government's Ministry of 
Post and Telecommunications during the year. Additional connections 
were available through providers based in the DRC.
    There were no known restrictions on academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Fundamental 
Act provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally 
respected this right in practice. Political parties and civic 
associations held numerous meetings during the year. Public 
demonstrations were less common, and there were no known public 
protests. Groups that wished to hold public assemblies were required to 
inform the Ministry of Interior, which could withhold authorization for 
meetings that threatened public order; however, there were no known 
instances in which the authorities withheld permission to meet.
    The Fundamental Act provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respected this right in practice. The act permits 
associations, political parties, and other groups to form freely, 
provided that they respect principles of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, national unity, and democracy. No political parties were 
banned or suspended. The parties of some prominent leaders of the 
former government continued to operate, but under the leadership of 
political figures willing to cooperate with the Government.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Fundamental Act provides for freedom 
of religion and the Government respected this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Fundamental Act provides for freedom 
of movement, and the Government's respect of this right improved during 
the year although there still were some limitations. Military 
checkpoints that sometimes interfered with the movement of civilians 
continued to operate during the year, and soldiers frequently extorted 
money from commercial traders to assure passage through these 
checkpoints; however, the use of checkpoints decreased during the year. 
Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that government 
forces stopped vehicles carrying displaced persons.
    Former Cocoye rebels near the town of Makabana, in Niari region, 
operated informal checkpoints to extort money from travelers during the 
first half of the year, but this practice had ended by mid-year. Former 
Nsiloulou rebels near the town of Vinza in southern Pool continued to 
maintain checkpoints at year's end.
    Unlike during the 1997 civil war and the 1998-1999 conflict, there 
were no reports during the year that rebel ``Ninja'' and ``Nsiloulou'' 
militiamen prevented the return of displaced persons to Brazzaville; 
these rebel groups were dismantled. There also were no reports of the 
disruption of train service between Brazzaville and Pointe Noire.
    According to U.N. estimates, the 1998-1999 conflict displaced 
approximately 800,000 civilians; all IDP's returned to their homes 
during the year.
    Tens of thousands of citizens fled into neighboring countries, 
particularly Gabon and the DRC. A total of approximately 45,000 persons 
fled to the Bas-Congo Province of the DRC in late 1998 and early 1999; 
however, all but about 5,000 had been repatriated to the country by 
year's end. Approximately 15,000 citizens fled to Gabon in 1999 and, 
according to U.N. figures, 12,000 persons remained there at year's end. 
During the year, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began 
discussions with the Government to facilitate the return of these 
persons.
    The Fundamental Act contains provisions for the granting of refugee 
and asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government granted 
first asylum to refugees from other countries. The country continued to 
host a small number of Burundians and approximately 7,000 Rwandans, 
largely members of the Hutu ethnic group, who fled camps in eastern 
Zaire in 1996 and arrived in the country in May and June 1997. The 
Government, in collaboration with the office of UNHCR, integrated 
approximately 2,000 of these refugees in the north-central regions of 
the country; however, some remain loosely grouped in an encampment 
north of Brazzaville, and others have integrated informally into 
Congolese society. In March all UNHCR support to Rwandan refugees 
ended. Approximately 6,000 Angolan refugees fled the Angolan province 
of Cabinda in 1992. Humanitarian NGO's reported that there were 20,800 
Angolan refugees in Pointe Noire at year's end. Of these 5,900 continue 
to receive UNHCR assistance in camps; the remaining 14,900 have 
integrated into the local communities and receive little if any 
assistance.
    More than 100,000 refugees and several hundred combatants, 
including DRC troops, fled to the northern Cuvette and Likouala regions 
of the country due to fighting in the DRC's Equateur Province during 
the year. Some of the combatants were repatriated to Kinshasa by year's 
end. Lack of roads and airstrips, and insecurity along the Congo and 
Ubangui Rivers, complicated humanitarian access to these refugees. 
UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies only had access to approximately 
70,000 of the DRC refugees in the area by year's end.
    Hutu militiamen from refugee camps who had been permitted to join 
in military operations with government forces in 1999 did not 
participate in such operations following the end of the 1998-1999 
conflict.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government 
peacefully. The Sassou-Nguesso Government came to power by force of 
arms in 1997 with the help of the armed forces of Angola. During the 
National Reconciliation Forum that it convened in January 1998, the 
Government announced its intention to enact a new constitution and hold 
elections within 3 years. A constitutional committee appointed by the 
President presented him with a draft Constitution in August 1999. 
According to a schedule outlined by the President in August, the draft 
constitution is to be the subject of nationwide consultations organized 
by the Government, then submitted to the NTC in 2001, and finally 
ratified by a popular referendum. During the summer, the document was 
released publicly, and presented to the Cabinet for review in 
September. The Cabinet considered the draft constitution during three 
meetings in September and October and on October 28, established an ad 
hoc committee to prepare a final draft for Cabinet. On November 15, the 
Cabinet approved an amended version of the constitution draft, which 
will then be submitted to, and is expected to be adopted by, the NTC. 
Following approval by the NTC, the draft must then be ratified by 
popular referendum. In August President Sassou-Nguesso announced that 
Government-led consultations on the draft constitution would constitute 
the ``national dialog without exclusion'' called for in the December 
1999 Peace Accords; however, many opposition groups have criticized 
this claim. Opposition leaders also have criticized key components of 
the draft constitution.
    The executive branch dominates the government. Under the 
Fundamental Act, the President is mandated to direct the general policy 
of the Government and to exercise regulatory powers. He appoints all 
significant military, executive, and judicial officials. The President 
convenes the interim national legislature, the NTC. The NTC was elected 
at the 1998 National Reconciliation Forum, which included some 
representatives of opposition political parties and nongovernmental 
actors; however, the event was orchestrated by the executive branch and 
did not constitute a sufficiently broad-based forum from which to elect 
a genuinely representative legislature. The NTC debates issues freely 
and summons cabinet ministers to answer questions about their 
portfolios; however, it was dominated by supporters of the President 
and did not serve as a meaningful check on executive authority.
    Major political parties included the ruling Congolese Workers' 
Party, the Panafrican Union for Social Democracy, the Congolese 
Movement for Democracy and Integrated Development, the Union for 
Democracy and the Republic, the Rally for Democracy and Social 
Progress, and many others. In some cases, party leaders remained in 
exile while other party officials willing to cooperate with the 
Government or to oppose it non-violently remained in the country (see 
Section 1.d.). In the absence of electoral politics or a constitutional 
framework for such politics, party leaders held meetings and party 
congresses, commented to the media on the political environment, and 
raised questions in the NTC.
    The State is highly centralized. Since the 1997 civil war, key 
regional and local leaders have been appointed by the central 
Government. Subnational government entities lack an independent revenue 
base and do not represent a significant check on central authority.
    In 1998 the NTC passed a law on genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity that permits the exclusion from public office of those 
found guilty of such crimes. This law could be used to exclude 
opponents from the political process, and the mere threat of charges 
under this law may dissuade political figures who are in exile from 
returning to the country. In December 1999, a court convicted in 
absentia former president Lissouba of plotting to kill President 
Sassou-Nguesso, and in May a court convicted in absentia former Prime 
Minister Kolelas of torture and other crimes during the 1997 civil war 
(see Section 1.e.). Nevertheless, many senior officials of the former 
government, including a number of former cabinet ministers, returned to 
the country during the year and resumed political activities without 
incident.
    There are no legal restrictions on political participation by women 
or minority populations; however, women were underrepresented in 
government and politics. Women held 2 of 7 leadership positions in the 
NTC, and 2 of 25 cabinet ministers were female. Pygmies continued to be 
effectively excluded from the political process, in part due to their 
isolation in remote forested areas of the country. The Cabinet included 
members of many ethnic groups from all areas of the country. Many key 
posts were held by northerners, including members of the President's 
Mbochi ethnic group; however, there was no consistent pattern of clear 
overrepresentation of any ethnic or regional group.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several domestic human rights organizations operated with minimal 
government restriction and investigated and published their findings on 
human rights problems. While some human rights leaders maintained that 
they sometimes were subjected to subtle forms of intimidation, they 
continued to publish reports that were highly critical of the 
Government with no apparent reprisal.
    The ICRC maintained an office in Brazzaville and, among other 
activities, continued its program of human rights training for units of 
the armed forces.
    Teams from the International Federation of Leagues of Human Rights 
(FIDH) and from Human Rights Watch Africa visited the country to 
evaluate conditions during the year. The Government permitted these 
teams to conduct their missions, and FIDH published a report of its 
visit.
    Insecurity in the north along the Ubangui River, Kindamba region in 
the Pool, parts of Bouenza, and in the upper Niari river system, 
prevented U.N. and other humanitarian agencies from assessing 
conditions in these areas during much of the year; however, access to 
these areas had improved by year's end, and humanitarian agencies 
visited some of these areas. Full access to the rest of the country was 
made possible by security improvements during the year.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Fundamental Act specifically prohibits such discrimination; 
however, societal discrimination persisted in practice, particularly 
against women and Pygmies. Ethnic and regional differences continued; 
however, there was no organized civil violence during the year.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women, including rape and 
beatings, is widespread but reported rarely. Domestic violence is 
handled within the extended family and only in the most extreme 
incidents is it brought to the police. There are no specific provisions 
under the law for spousal battery, apart from general statutes 
prohibiting assault. Rape is illegal, and widespread rape during the 
1998-1999 civil conflict raised public awareness of violence against 
women. NGO's, such as the International Rescue Committee, continued to 
draw attention to the issue and provided counseling and assistance to 
victims.
    The Fundamental Act provides for the equality of all citizens, 
prohibits discrimination based on sex, and stipulates that women have 
the right to equal pay for equal work. In practice women are 
underrepresented in the formal sector; most work in the informal sector 
and thus have little or no access to employment benefits. Women in 
rural areas especially are disadvantaged in terms of education and wage 
employment and are confined largely to family farming, petty commerce, 
and childrearing responsibilities.
    Marriage and family laws overtly discriminate against women. For 
example, adultery is illegal for women but not for men. Polygyny is 
legal; polyandry is not. While the Legal Code provides that 30 percent 
of the husband's estate goes to the wife, in practice the wife often 
loses all rights of inheritance upon the death of her spouse. The 
symbolic nature of the dowry set in the Family Code often is not 
respected, and men are forced to pay excessive brideprices to the 
woman's family. As a result, the right to divorce is circumscribed for 
some women because they lack the financial means to reimburse the 
brideprice to the husband and his family. This problem is more 
prevalent in rural areas than in urban centers.
    There are a number of nongovernmental organizations that work on 
women's problems. However, their effectiveness varies widely. The 
Ministry of Public Service, Administrative Reform, and the Promotion of 
Women is responsible for coordinating government initiatives regarding 
the status of women.
    Children.--The Fundamental Act affords children equal protection 
under the law. Education is compulsory and free until the age of 16. 
Girls and boys attend primary school in equal numbers; however, school 
attendance by girls declines precipitously at the high school level 
and, especially, at the university level. In 1997 the literacy rate was 
77 percent for the total adult population but only 70 percent for 
women.
    Child labor is illegal; however, in practice this law generally is 
not enforced, particularly in rural areas (see Section 6.d.). Children 
work with their families on farms or in small businesses in the 
informal sector. There are indigent street children in Brazzaville, and 
their numbers appear to be growing as a result of civil conflict since 
1997.
    There have been reports of isolated cases of child prostitution, 
particularly among the growing numbers of street children; however, the 
extent of the problem is not believed to be widespread (see Section 
6.d.).
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is not practiced indigenously, but may occur in 
some of the immigrant communities from countries such as Mauritania and 
Mali, where it is more common.
    There were some reports that child soldiers were used during the 
1997 civil war and the 1998-1999 conflict (see Section 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Fundamental Act prohibits 
discrimination based on physical condition; however, in practice, this 
prohibition generally was not enforced, because the ministry charged 
with implementation faced severe financial constraints. There was no 
overt discrimination against the disabled in employment and education. 
There were no laws mandating access for the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--The Fundamental Act prohibits discrimination 
based on ethnicity. In practice the indigenous Pygmy people, who number 
in the tens of thousands and live primarily in the northern forest 
regions, do not enjoy equal treatment in the predominantly Bantu 
society. Pygmies were marginalized severely in the areas of employment, 
health, and education, in part due to their isolation in remote 
forested areas of the country. They usually are considered social 
inferiors and have little political voice. Many have never heard of the 
concept of voting and have minimal ability to affect government 
decisions affecting their interests. There was no credible information 
on whether traditional practices in which Pygmies worked as indentured 
servants to a Bantu continued during the year. Many Pygmies, possibly 
including children, have been exploited by Bantus; however, little 
information is available regarding the extent of the problem during the 
year.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Fundamental Act prohibits 
discrimination based on ethnicity; however, the Government did not 
enforce this prohibition effectively, and in practice, ethnic divisions 
persist. Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the 
Government or its security forces discriminated against members of 
southern ethnic groups, or used violence against them.
    Four major ethnic groups make up about 95 percent of the country's 
population; these groups speak distinct primary languages and are 
concentrated regionally outside of urban areas. The largest ethnic 
group is the Kongo, who constitute the main ethnic group in the 
southern part of the country and about half the country's population. 
Within the Kongo group are various subgroups, including the Lari and 
the Vili. Other major ethnic groups include the Teke of the central 
region, with approximately 13 percent of the population, and the Mbochi 
of the northern region, with approximately 12 percent of the 
population.
    Societal ethnic discrimination is practiced widely among virtually 
all ethnic groups, and is evident in private sector hiring and buying 
patterns and de facto segregation of urban neighborhoods. Ethnic 
overtones were apparent in the 1997 civil war and the 1998-99 conflict. 
These conflicts sometimes were oversimplified as pitting northerners, 
who support President Sassou-Nguesso, against southerners, who support 
former president Lissouba and former prime minister Kolelas. There does 
tend to be heavy representation from each leader's ethnic group in his 
immediate entourage: Mbochi for Sassou-Nguesso, Lari for Kolelas, and 
the groups of the Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou regions for Lissouba; 
however, the correspondence between ethnic-regional and political 
cleavages is approximate, and supporters of the Government include 
persons from a broad range of ethnic and regional backgrounds.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Fundamental Act provides workers 
with the right to form unions, and the Government respected this right 
in practice. Any worker is free to join a union of his choice. The 
Labor Code affirms the right to associate freely and prohibits 
restrictions on the formation of trade unions. Most workers in the 
formal (wage) sector are union members, and unions have made efforts to 
organize informal sectors such as agriculture and retail trade.
    The Fundamental Act also affirms workers' right to strike, subject 
to conditions established by Law. Unions are free to strike after 
filing a letter of intent with the Ministry of Labor, thereby starting 
a process of nonbinding arbitration under the auspices of a regional 
labor inspector from the Ministry. The letter of intent must include 
the strike date, at which time the strike legally may begin, even if 
arbitration is not complete. Employers have the right to fire workers 
if they do not give advance notice of a strike. No formal strikes 
occurred during the year; however, some informal work stoppages 
occurred. For example, in October university workers protested salary 
arrears. During the year, the Government sought organized labor's 
agreement to a ``social truce'' during the period of post-conflict 
reconstruction, which was opposed by some labor organizations. The 
Government accepted certain conditions, such as regularization of 
salaries and rehiring of certain workers in several sectors; these 
conditions continued to be observed at year's end. Collective 
bargaining is not widespread due to the social disruption and economic 
hardship which occurred during much of the 1990's.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international trade unions and 
they maintain cooperative accords with foreign trade union 
organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
allows for collective bargaining, and this right generally is respected 
and practiced freely. The Government sets industry-specific minimum 
wage scales, but unions usually are able to negotiate higher wages for 
their members. Employers are prohibited from discriminating against 
employees who join a union. There were no reported firings for union 
activities.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children; 
however, such practices occur. There was no credible information on 
whether traditional practices in which Pygmies worked as indentured 
servants to Bantus continued during the year (see Section 5). Many 
Pygmies, possibly including children, have been exploited by Bantus; 
however, little information was available regarding the extent of the 
problem during the year.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Ministry of Labor, which is responsible for enforcing 
child labor laws, concentrates its efforts only on the formal wage 
sector. Child labor is illegal, the minimum age for employment is 14, 
and education is compulsory until the age of 16 (see Section 5); 
however, child labor persists among children who continue to work for 
their families in rural areas and in the informal sector in cities 
without government supervision or monitoring. There were some reports 
that child soldiers were used during the 1997 civil war and 1998-1999 
conflict (see Section 5); however, the numbers appear to be small, and 
the Government plans to demobilize child soldiers as required in the 
cease-fire agreements. It was not known whether any child soldiers were 
demobilized by year's end. There have been reports of isolated cases of 
child prostitution, particularly among the growing numbers of street 
children; however, the extent of the problem is not believed to be 
widespread (see Section 5).
    The law prohibits forced labor by children; however, there have 
been allegations of exploitation of Pygmy children (see Sections 5 and 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Fundamental Law provides 
that each citizen has the right to remuneration according to his work 
and merit. The Labor Code stipulates that overtime must be paid for all 
work in excess of 40 hours per week and that regular days of leisure 
must be granted by employers. The minimum wage is $64 (50,000 CFA 
francs) per month. It is not sufficient to provide a worker and family 
with a decent standard of living. High urban prices and dependent 
extended families oblige many workers to seek opportunities beyond 
their principal employment.
    Although health and safety regulations call for twice-yearly visits 
by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor, in practice such visits occur 
less regularly. While unions generally are vigilant in calling 
attention to dangerous working conditions, the observance of safety 
standards is often lax. Workers have no specific right to remove 
themselves from dangerous working conditions without risking loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit 
trafficking in persons, and there were reports that persons were 
trafficked to, from, within, or through the country. An ILO study 
conducted in March and April in Yaounde, Douala, and Bamenda, Cameroon, 
indicated that regional traffickers transported children between the 
Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria, Benin, Niger, Chad, Togo, and the 
Central African Republic, through Cameroon.
                               __________

                             COTE D'IVOIRE

    Prior to October presidential elections, Cote d'Ivoire had a 
military government. Brigadier General Robert Guei took power on 
December 24, 1999, following a bloodless coup d'etat, which forced the 
departure of then President Henri Konan Bedie. General Guei, who was 
Chief of Staff under Presidents Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Bedie, 
declared himself the new President, suspended the Constitution, 
dissolved the National Assembly, and formed the National Committee for 
Public Salvation (CNSP)--which consisted of himself, seven other 
military officers, one naval enlisted man, and one soldier who 
participated in the coup. Guei initially claimed no interest in 
retaining power and pledged to rewrite the Constitution, clean up 
government corruption, and hold fair and transparent elections during 
the year. In January Guei formed a transitional government made up of 
CNSP members as well as representatives of five political parties and 
civil society. In May Guei reshuffled the cabinet, effectively ridding 
the Government of most members of the Republican Rally (RDR), the party 
of rival presidential candidate and former Prime Minister Alassane 
Ouattara. On September 22, Guei again changed the cabinet, eliminating 
three additional members who were considered sympathetic to the RDR. 
The Constitutional and Electoral Consultative Commission (CCCE), which 
was created by the CNSP and included members of all major political 
parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), and prominent members 
of civil society, drafted a new constitution; however, Guei made 
several substantive changes to the text, including inserting 
controversial language regarding the eligibility requirements to be 
president, before submitting the draft constitution to a referendum. On 
July 23 and 24, the citizens overwhelmingly approved the new 
Constitution in a referendum, and the Constitution was implemented on 
August 4. On October 26, after a flawed October 22 presidential 
election, which was marred by significant violence and irregularities, 
including a suspension of the vote count for several days, the Supreme 
Court declared Laurent Gbagbo the victor with 53 percent of the vote. 
Except for the RDR, which decided not to accept ministerial posts, 
major political parties were represented in the new Government, which 
was made up of 24 ministers. An election for the National Assembly was 
held on December 10 and was marred by violence, irregularities, and a 
very low participation rate. The Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) won 96 of 
the 225 seats; the Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI), the former 
ruling party, won 77; independent candidates won 17; and 4 other 
parties won a combined 7 seats. Twenty-eight seats remained unfilled at 
year's end. To protest the invalidation of the candidacy of party 
president Alassane Ouattara, the RDR boycotted and disrupted the 
legislative elections. The judiciary is subject to executive branch and 
other outside influence.
    Security forces include the army, navy, and air force, all under 
the Ministry of Defense; the Republican Guard, a well-funded 
presidential security force; the national police (Surete Nationale); 
and the Gendarmerie, a branch of the armed forces with responsibility 
for general law enforcement, maintenance of public order, and internal 
security, including suppression of violent crime. The National Security 
Council, which was formed in 1996 and coordinated internal and external 
security policy, was dissolved by the Minister of State for Security in 
January following the December 1999 coup. Also in January, General Guei 
created a special military unit, the P.C. Crise, to assist in 
reestablishing order, to control crime, and to put an end to abuses 
committed by the military. In May General Guei officially disbanded the 
P.C. Crise and other quasi-military groups, including the Kamajors, 
Cosa Nostra, Cobra, and Red Brigade, that had formed within the 
military following the coup, and which had come to be known as the 
``parallel forces.'' However, some members of these groups continued to 
act as vigilante forces, and on September 20, the Government announced 
the formation of a new ``P.C. Crise Marine.'' The civilian Directorate 
of General Intelligence (DRG) is responsible for countering internal 
threats. A security staff (L'Etat Major de la Securite) collects and 
distributes information about crime and coordinates the activities of 
the security forces in times of crisis. The Special Anticrime Police 
Brigade (SAVAC) and the Anti-Riot Brigade (BAE) continued their 
operations. Upon taking office, President Gbagbo combined the 
Ministries of Interior and Security; however, he decided against 
altering the structure of the security forces. While the Gbagbo and 
Guei Governments generally maintained effective control of the security 
forces, there were instances in which security forces acted 
independently of government authority, most notably during military 
mutinies in March and July, and surrounding the presidential and 
parliamentary elections in October and December respectively. In 
addition there are major divisions within the military based on ethnic, 
religious, and political loyalties. Security forces, particularly the 
``parallel forces,'' committed numerous human rights abuses.
    The economy is largely market-based and heavily dependent on the 
commercial agricultural sector. Most of the rural population remains 
dependent on smallholder cash crop production. Principal exports are 
cocoa, coffee, and wood. In 1999 approximately 56 percent of the adult 
population was literate, but the rate among women (44 percent) is only 
two-thirds of the rate among men (66 percent). Recorded gross national 
product per capita in 1999 was about $700. After several years of 6 to 
7 percent annual economic growth following the 1994 currency 
devaluation, growth slowed to about 3 percent in 1999 and was an 
estimated negative 2 to 3 percent during the year. Income remains 
unevenly distributed, and government expenditures for basic education 
and health services were far below planned levels. Widespread 
corruption is rooted in a lack of transparent and accountable 
governance. The political manipulations of the Guei Government, which 
resulted in investor and consumer uncertainty, further impeded economic 
growth. The Guei and Gbagbo Governments only received limited 
assistance from international financial institutions during the year 
due to the coup, government corruption, mismanagement, and political 
unrest following recent elections.
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and there were 
serious problems in a number of areas. Citizens did not fully have the 
right to change their Government. Members of the security forces 
committed hundreds of extrajudicial killings. Following a September 18 
attack on General Guei's residence, military forces and gendarmes 
arrested numerous soldiers; 3 or 4 were tortured to death, and 23 
others were detained and tortured. The security forces beat and abused 
detainees and used force to disperse protesters. Prison conditions 
remained harsh and life threatening. The Government generally failed to 
bring perpetrators of these abuses to justice. The Government used 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged detention remained a 
problem. Journalists and opposition members, in particular, were 
detained without trial for long periods. In January the CNSP released 
from custody all members of the Bedie Government that were arrested 
following the December 1999 coup; however, former Minister of State for 
Interior and Decentralization Emile Constant Bombet was detained again 
for 33 days. By February all of the army officers arrested and detained 
during and after the December 1999 coup were released without having 
been tried. The judiciary did not ensure due process and was subject to 
executive branch influence, particularly in political cases. Security 
forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Guei Government 
restricted freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and movement. 
Despite some formal restrictions on freedom of association, the Guei 
and Gbagbo Governments generally respected this right in practice. At 
least 26 percent of the country's adult population, including many 
lifelong residents of the country, remained politically disenfranchised 
noncitizens. Discrimination and violence against women, abuse of 
children, and female genital mutilation (FGM) remained serious 
problems. Muslims and practitioners of traditional indigenous religions 
were subject to discrimination. Violent ethnic tensions persisted, and 
societal discrimination based on ethnicity remained a problem. Child 
labor, forced child labor, and trafficking in persons, including 
children, continued; however, efforts to combat these problems within 
the country showed some success.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
committed extrajudicial killings, including politically motivated 
killings. There were reports that government security forces killed 
three or four suspected coup plotters after an alleged assassination 
attempt on General Guei on September 18 (see Section 1.b.). For 
example, Sergeant Sansan Kambire was arrested shortly after the 
September 17 and 18 attack on General Guei's residence. His corpse was 
discovered in an Abidjan mortuary 3 days after his arrest. That same 
month, General Guei's personal guard tortured and killed Chief Sergeant 
Souleymane Diomande, also known as ``La Granade,'' while he was 
detained at Akouedo military camp. Soldiers poured acid on Diomande and 
then beat him to death. Guei's guard also arrested and tortured to 
death Corporal Abdoudramani Ouattara and an unidentified person from 
Burkina Faso for the September attack. In October the military 
prosecutor announced that, at the families' request, an investigation 
would be conducted into the deaths of the three soldiers; the 
investigation was ongoing at year's end.
    Security forces frequently resorted to lethal force to combat 
widespread violent crime. The CNSP-created special crime fighting unit, 
P.C. Crise, and other unofficial quasi-militia forces that sprang up 
after the 1999 coup committed the majority of these killings. Members 
of the P.C. Crise, the Kamajors, Cosa Nostra, Cobra, and Red Brigade 
pursued suspected criminals and frequently executed them immediately 
after capture; occasionally they publicly displayed the bodies. 
According to government statements and media reports, the security 
forces had killed hundreds of criminals by year's end. Such killings by 
the P.C. Crise ended after Gbagbo assumed the Presidency and formed the 
P.C. Crise Marine.
    On February 6, security forces shot several persons, including 
students and civil servants, while responding to a problem in a 
nightclub in Abidjan's Treichville neighborhood; two persons died. 
During a military mutiny on July 4 and 5, mutineers killed a woman in 
Abidjan's central business district of Plateau, allegedly because she 
refused to give up her car during a carjacking. The other reported 
deaths during this uprising occurred during clashes between mutineers 
and forces loyal to the Guei Government, in which 4 soldiers died and 
10 civilians were wounded.
    On October 16, a police officer shot a Nigerian woman, Confort 
Egiantey, while she was traveling on a public minibus. The officer was 
chasing the driver of another minibus that had refused to stop for a 
police check. The police officer was arrested, and his trial was 
pending at year's end. According to the Ivoirian Movement for Human 
Rights (MIDH), during and for several days following the October 
presidential election, more than 500 persons were killed in clashes 
with security forces or during clashes with other protesters, by 
gunshot, drowning, or torture. In addition 860 persons, many of whom 
were FPI and RDR militants, were injured. Gendarmes also killed some 
protestors while they were in detention. In December the Malian High 
Council reported that more than 20 Malians were killed and 10 
disappeared during the demonstrations and violence that followed the 
October presidential elections.
    In December there was a press report that security forces had 
killed at least 10 Nigerians, allegedly for supporting the opposition.
    The Gbagbo Government, which took power on October 26, had a mixed 
record in controlling the security forces. In October after the 
presidential elections and again in early December in the period prior 
to the parliamentary elections, gendarmes and police reacted violently 
against RDR political demonstrations. On October 25, 57 bodies of 
Muslims were discovered at a site in the Abidjan district of Yopougon. 
Gendarmes widely are believed to be responsible for these killings. 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other independent investigators published 
the testimony of alleged survivors who claim gendarmes had dragged them 
from their homes, marched them along a road where dozens of dead bodies 
lay, forced them into vans, and then shot dozens of them. Some 
survivors stated that they lay on the ground pretending to be dead 
until the gendarmes departed. After taking office, Gbagbo established 
an inquiry into the massacres at Yopougon; however, by year's end, the 
Government had not published the findings of its investigation nor had 
it taken action against members of the security forces responsible for 
the mass abuse.
    Following the November 30 Supreme Court announcement of the 
disqualification of Alassane Ouattara for legislative elections, 
thousands of RDR supporters demonstrated in protest of the decision 
(see Section 3). According to the Government, approximately 13 persons 
were killed in violent clashes with the military and gendarmes, 
including a municipal treasury official whose throat was slashed by RDR 
demonstrators; the RDR estimated that there were 30 killings. MIDH 
reported that 37 persons had died, most by gunshot, along with several 
hundred persons injured.
    By year's end, the Government had taken no action against the 
gendarmes and police officers responsible for the deaths and abuses 
committed against FPI and RDR demonstrations after the October 22 
presidential elections and in the period prior to and following the 
parliamentary elections on December 10.
    On December 4, gendarmes shot and killed Kaba Bakary, a 60yearold 
Guinean, in front of his family as he was getting ready for Muslim 
prayers. Reportedly he was shot because he was wearing a Muslim robe, 
which the gendarmes believed marked him as a supporter of the RDR. No 
action was taken against the gendarmes by year's end.
    On December 6, following RDR demonstrations, some presidential 
guards arrested RDR President Ouattara's private secretary, Abou 
Coulibaly, as he was passing President Gbagbo's residence in Cocody. 
When they found out that he was working for Ouattara, the presidential 
guards severely beat Coulibaly and took him to the Agban Gendarmerie 
camp where they continued to beat him. The security forces took him to 
a local medical clinic where he died from his injuries on December 7.
    No action was taken against police personnel responsible for a 
number of killings during demonstrations that occurred between April 
and October 1999.
    Trials still are pending at year's end against 15 trainee gendarmes 
arrested in 1999 for beating Camara Yaya to death.
    Police have made no arrests in the December 1998 death in police 
custody of Jean Claude Lama, a 16-year-old street child. The 
authorities continued to characterize the death as a suicide.
    Following the October 22 presidential election and subsequent 
demonstrations and violence, 18 bodies were found that had washed 
ashore in Abidjan's lagoon; the bodies had been shot numerous times. At 
year's end, it remained unknown who was responsible for the killings, 
and a government investigation into the incident was ongoing.
    Ethnic violence between Kroumen and settlers from Burkina Faso in 
the Southwest resulted in at least 13 deaths in September and another 5 
deaths in early October (see Section 1.a.).
    b. Disappearance.--Following the September 18 alleged assassination 
attempt on General Guei, government security forces arrested numerous 
soldiers suspected of involvement in the assassination attempt and in 
coup plotting (see Section 1.d.). Evidence and the testimonies of 13 of 
the 23 released soldiers suggest that 3 or 4 of the soldiers that 
disappeared were tortured and killed (see Section 1.a.).
    In the period following the October 22 presidential elections, 
scores of persons disappeared. Newspapers frequently published the 
appeals of families who were looking for their children or relatives. 
There were numerous reports that parents visited hospitals and the 
morgues looking for their children after failing to find them in any of 
the gendarmerie camps or at the police school. In November an 
independent newspaper, Soir Info, published an appeal from the chief of 
San Pedro to President Gbagbo to help him find his son.
    In December the Malian High Council reported that more than 20 
Malians were killed and 10 disappeared during the demonstrations and 
violence that followed the October presidential elections. It reported 
that most of the persons who had disappeared had been arrested by the 
police.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The new Constitution prohibits cruel and inhuman 
treatment, humiliating and degrading punishment, torture, physical 
violence, and other mistreatment; however, in practice security forces 
regularly beat detainees and prisoners to punish them or to extract 
confessions and frequently forced detainees to perform degrading and 
humiliating tasks, such as crawling, eating dirt, doing push-ups while 
under threat of physical harm, drinking urine or blood, and eating 
excrement. Jurists' union officials and journalists working for the 
opposition press reported that police continue to beat suspects to 
obtain confessions and that suspects are afraid to press charges 
against the police officers involved. According to local human rights 
groups, police and gendarmes beat and humiliate detainees or prisoners. 
Press photographs regularly showed detainees with swollen or bruised 
faces and bodies. In general government officers who are members of the 
security forces are not held accountable for abuses.
    In December 1998, the Government enacted legislation allowing 
lawyers to assist their clients during the early stages of detention 
when abuse is most likely. In spite of this legislation, during the 
year, police officers and gendarmes continued to mistreat suspects and 
other persons summoned to police and gendarmerie stations, and on many 
instances, the security forces did not allow lawyers access to their 
clients (see Section 1.d.). Police also verbally abused lawyers who 
tried to assist their clients.
    On January 11, in Abidjan's Yopougon neighborhood, members of the 
police anti-riot brigade stopped a bus and forced the passengers out of 
the vehicle and beat and kicked several students who were on the bus, 
including a pregnant law student. Military personnel intervened to stop 
the beatings. The police explained their actions to their commander by 
claiming that students on the previous bus that had passed their 
checkpoint had insulted them. No action was taken against the 
responsible police officers.
    On January 18, members of the military beat citizens and ransacked 
residences in the city of Daoukro, the home town of former President 
Bedie, and surrounding villages. Many of the victims were Bedie's 
relatives or associates. On March 14, members of the military returned 
to Daoukro to beat citizens, including members of the Bedie family, and 
confiscated property that Bedie allegedly acquired illegally.
    On February 1, police used tear gas to disperse striking workers at 
the Commune of Cocody City Hall, seriously injuring two of the strikers 
who were hospitalized as a result of their injuries (see Section 6.a.).
    On February 4, ``Dozos'' (traditional northern hunters), who were 
hired by the Guei military Government to provide security, tied up and 
beat a university student after mistaking him for a crime suspect. The 
Government took no action against the Dozos responsible for the 
beating.
    On February 6, members of the P.C. Crise beat singer Honore Djoman 
and then transported him to the Akouedo military camp where they 
continued to beat him. Reportedly the P.C. Crise members were hired to 
beat Djoman by a person with whom he had a business dispute. On 
February 7, members of the P.C. Crise severely beat security guard 
Alain Patrice Dago after being told about a dispute over money that 
Dabo had with an acquaintance.
    On February 21, police severely beat nurse Boua Keke after 
mistaking him for a suspect they were pursuing. No action was taken 
against the police officers.
    On March 25 in Bouake, off-duty P.C. Crise member Salif Keita shot 
and injured a student, Aboudramane Coulibaly, whom he believed was 
going to assault a woman. Following Student Union statements 
criticizing the P.C. Crise, General Guei intervened within 48 hours to 
have Coulibaly transferred to an Abidjan hospital. Keita was tried by a 
military court and sentenced to 12 months in prison.
    On March 28, gendarmes in Man mistakenly beat a fellow gendarme 
after mistaking him for a robbery suspect.
    In May members of the military abused a judge who rendered a 
decision in a labor dispute with which they disagreed (see Section 
1.e.).
    During the July 4 to 5 military mutiny, soldiers seriously injured 
more than 10 civilians, including several who suffered gunshot wounds. 
Thirty-five mutineers were tried; however, they were not tried 
necessarily for their mistreatment of civilians.
    On July 9, gendarmes arrested, beat, and tortured Soumbiala 
Doumbia, a student, following Doumbia's alleged attempt to kill a rival 
student leader. The Government took no action against the responsible 
gendarmes.
    On September 25, members of the military beat students from the 
Federation of High School and University Students of Cote d'Ivoire 
(FESCI) on the university's Cocody campus; three of the students were 
injured seriously (see Section 2.a.). No action was taken against any 
members of the military.
    During and immediately following the October presidential 
elections, security forces killed and injured hundreds of persons (see 
Sections 1.a. and 3). For example, on October 24, soldiers loyal to 
General Guei attempted to disperse an FPI demonstration to protest 
General Guei's decision to remain in power despite his defeat in the 
presidential election. When police superintendent Tiagnere tried to 
prevent the soldiers' actions, the soldiers beat him, then drove him to 
an unknown location in the trunk of a car. He was discovered the 
following day with a broken leg and broken ribs.
    On October 25, 13 of the 27 soldiers arrested for their alleged 
participation in an attack against General Guei's residence on 
September 18 stated that they had been tortured during their detention 
in Akouedo camp. On November 20, le Patriote, a proRDR newspaper, 
published an interview granted by 1 of the 27 soldiers. The soldier 
stated that soldiers loyal to Lieutenant Laurent Yapi Boka and General 
Guei tortured him and his friends during their detention in Akouedo 
military camp in late September and early October. He stated that 
soldiers wrapped them in barbed wire, then stomped on them with their 
heavy boots, in addition to beating them with iron bars.
    In September soldiers tortured to death Sergeant Chief Souleymane 
Diomande while he was in detention (see Section 1.a.).
    On November 26, in the Abidjan district of Adjame-Agban, gendarmes 
beat and left in a critical state a minibus driver, Mourlaye Bamba, 
when another driver refused to stop at a police checkpoint. The 
gendarmes also shot another minibus driver and union leader, Sangouyana 
Cisse, in the leg while his vehicle was stopped at a red light.
    On December 5, gendarmes arrested and beat severely Jean Philippe 
Kabore, the son of RDR Secretary General Henriette Dagri Diabate, for 
allegedly transporting arms in his car. Kabore suffered a fractured 
skull and broken limbs. He was hospitalized for treatment and remained 
in detention in Abidjan's prison at year's end.
    On December 4 and 5, gendarmes and police officers violently 
dispersed members of the RDR who were demonstrating to protest against 
the invalidation of Ouattara's candidacy in the presidential and 
legislative elections, which resulted in numerous injuries (see 
Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 3).
    According to the Ivoirian Association for the Defense of Women's 
Rights (AIDF), during RDR demonstrations on December 4 and 5, gendarmes 
raped at least 10 female protestors at the police school. President 
Gbagbo requested that the Ministry of Interior and Security conduct an 
investigation. The Ministry concluded that ``anti-demonstrators,'' not 
gendarmes or police officers, raped three women near the police school, 
but admitted that the rapes took place in the presence of gendarmes, 
after they had arrested the women.
    On December 5, six police officers that were pursuing RDR 
demonstrations forced their way into Traore Fousseni's house. They 
destroyed furniture, beat him with truncheons, and stole all of his 
money. They also beat Traore's wives and brotherinlaw. Reportedly they 
were beaten because they belonged to the ``Dioula'' ethnic group, which 
is represented highly among RDR members.
    On December 5, BAE members responding to a fire in a mosque used 
tear gas and beat Muslims who had gathered to inspect the damage to the 
mosque (see Sections 1.d., 2.c., and 5).
    On December 6, presidential guards beat to death Abou Coulibaby, 
RDR president Ouattara's private Secretary (see Section 1.a.).
    On December 15, the Agence France Presse (AFP) published the 
testimonies of several persons whom gendarmes tortured during and after 
the December 4 and 5 RDR demonstrations. The victims withheld their 
names, but some stated that they were from the north, while others 
stated that they were from neighboring countries. All claimed that 
drunken policemen beat them every night with truncheons, whips, and 
boards with nails, or burnt them. One man stated that the policemen 
burnt his genitals.
    Security forces regularly beat and harassed journalists (see 
Section 2.a.). For example, on October 26, gendarmes beat Raphael 
Lakpe, the publisher of the pro-RDR Le Populaire, and his bodyguard at 
the Koumassi Commando Camp (see Section 2.a.). On the same day, 
gendarmes also severely beat Bakary Nimaga, chief editor of the pro-RDR 
newspaper Le Liberal (see Section 2.a.).
    Police frequently used excessive force to disperse demonstrations. 
On July 31, military riot police used tear gas, rifle butts, and 
truncheons against demonstrators supporting statements by the French 
Government on candidate participation in the presidential election (see 
Section 2.b.). The demonstrators were prevented from gathering at the 
French Embassy, and many were beaten, forced to do push-ups, eat 
cement, and crawl through downtown streets in Abidjan. Security forces 
also beat a journalist covering the event (see Section 2.a.). There 
were 47 reported injuries, of which 17 were serious. On September 9, 
gendarmes used tear gas to disperse a crowd gathered in the Abidjan 
neighborhood of Yopougon to attend an RDR meeting (see Section 2.b.). 
Upon learning that the meeting had been canceled by the CNSP the 
previous evening, some of the crowd threw stones at the gendarmes, who 
responded with tear gas. Police also frequently used violence to 
restrain and disperse demonstrators.
    Police routinely harassed and abused noncitizen Africans (see 
Section 5). On occasion police entered the homes and businesses of 
citizens, noncitizens Africans, and other noncitizens, and extorted 
money from them (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). In October and December, 
foreigners complained publicly that the police often stopped them for 
identity checks and confiscated their documents to later sell them back 
to the original owners. They reported that even when their residence 
permits were valid, police would take them to police stations where 
they were beaten and detained overnight if they did not pay a bribe to 
the officers. In December a newspaper quoting some of the hundreds of 
Nigerians who returned to Nigeria to escape the antiforeigner violence 
reported that security forces had tortured Nigerians.
    Many unemployed and homeless detainees reported that authorities 
beat them while they were in detention.
    Military and other forces were responsible for numerous robberies, 
carjackings, widespread looting, and acts of intimidation. These abuses 
were widespread particularly during the military mutiny of July 4 and 
5. Mutineers robbed, looted, destroyed property, and terrified the 
citizenry. The mutineers targeted the cities of Abidjan, Bouake, 
Katiola, Korhogo, and Yamoussoukro in particular. Following the July 
mutiny, the Government arrested 114 soldiers and 6 officers for their 
actions during the uprising. The Government released 74 of the soldiers 
after questioning and tried the remaining 40; 35 soldiers were 
convicted of participating in the mutiny. Four of the six officers were 
awaiting trial at year's end; charges against the other two officers 
were dismissed following an investigation.
    No action was taken against the two police officers who shot and 
injured Momble Roger Zemon, a driver for Sucrivoire, in Abidjan's 
Yopougon district in 1999. No action was taken against police officers 
who beat and detained Issa Traore, a 30year-old member of the Truck 
Drivers and Truck Owners Trade Union in Abidjan's Adjame district in 
1999.
    Even though prison deaths have declined, harsh and lifethreatening 
conditions still result in hundreds of fatalities each year. Problems 
include overcrowding, malnutrition, a high incidence of infectious 
disease, and lack of treatment facilities and medications. HIV/AIDS, 
diarrhea, and tuberculosis also reportedly are significant causes of 
death. In 1999 there were 537 inmate deaths in the nation's prison 
system, of which 122 deaths occurred at the Abidjan House of Arrest and 
Corrections (MACA), including 27 deaths of inmates who were trampled on 
December 23, 1999.
    The Director of Penitentiary Administration stated that the death 
rate at the MACA had dropped by 60 percent since October 1998 and was 
expected to remain low due to improvements made in 1999 to the 
sanitation system. Improvements were financed jointly by Doctors 
Without Borders and the Government. Doctors Without Borders reported 
that the death rate in prisons had fallen approximately 90 percent from 
1997.
    During the December 1999 coup, the mutineers released all 6,693 
inmates of the MACA. The unforeseen outcome of this action was improved 
conditions due to less overcrowding; however, by November the MACA 
population numbered approximately 3,800 inmates. The MACA was designed 
to hold only 1,500 inmates. On December 31, President Gbagbo announced 
a presidential pardon for 2,500 prisons nationwide. It was unclear how 
many of those pardons went to MACA prisoners.
    In July the government newspaper Fraternite Matin stated that 
prison conditions for women especially were difficult. In 1998 the 
prison separated female and male prisoners and began using female 
guards for female prisoners and male guards for male prisoners. Female 
prisoners are housed in a separate building that can hold up to 120 
residents, and as of May, there were 78 women detained there. There 
still are no health facilities for women. There continued to be 
credible reports of children born in prison or living in prison with 
their mothers; as of May, there were 13 children living with their 
mothers in prison. During the year, there were no reports that guards 
raped female prisoners. Nevertheless, there still were reports that 
female prisoners engaged in sexual relations with their wardens in 
exchange for food and more privileges.
    Since 1998 the Government has permitted the International Catholic 
Office for Children (BICE) to improve conditions at the MACA for women 
and their children. During the year, BICE removed 34 children from the 
prison and placed them with family members or foster families. BICE 
also provided female inmates with food, medical care, clothing, soap, 
and other necessities. BICE constructed a multi-purpose room for 
pregnant women, mothers, and children.
    Juvenile offenders are held separately from adults. At year's end, 
170 13-to 18-year olds, including 14 girls, were in detention.
    The Government permits access to prisons by local and international 
NGO's that seek to provide food and medical care to prisoners. In 
addition to BICE, humanitarian NGO's, including the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Prisoners Without Borders, and 
Doctors Without Borders had access to the prisons and visited them 
during the year to provide food and medical care to prisoners. However, 
none of these NGO's specifically monitored human rights conditions in 
the prisons. The Ivoirian Human Rights League (LIDHO), which monitors 
human rights conditions in prisons, does not have authorization to 
visit prisons without advance notice. LIDHO usually must write to the 
prison warden if it wants to visit inmates. Wardens rarely grant 
approval on the first request. LIDHO stated publicly that they did not 
visit the MACA during the year because the overcrowding problem 
temporarily was alleviated and conditions had improved somewhat 
following the December 1999 release of all inmates in MACA. However, 
during the year, LIDHO did visit Abidjan's military prison, the MAMA.
    After Gbagbo took office, there were no reports that NGO's had 
difficulty gaining access to prisons.
    On October 27, after five days of protests and fighting following 
the October 22 presidential election, a mass grave containing 57 
persons was discovered at Yopougon, northwest of Abidjan. International 
and local human rights groups immediately called for an inquiry, and 
President Gbagbo agreed to international investigations.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The new Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, in practice 
arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems. Under the Code of 
Penal Procedure, a public prosecutor may order the detention of a 
suspect for only 48 hours without bringing charges. A magistrate may 
order detention for up to 4 months but also must provide the Minister 
of Justice with a written justification for continued detention on a 
monthly basis. However, the law often is violated. Police and the CNSP 
have held persons for more than 48 hours without bringing charges. 
According to members of a jurists' union, this practice is common and 
magistrates often are unable to verify that detainees who are not 
charged are released.
    Defendants do not have the right to a judicial determination of the 
legality of their detention. A judge may release pretrial detainees on 
provisional liberty if the judge believes that the suspect is not 
likely to flee. Inmates continue to suffer long detention periods while 
awaiting trial in the MACA. On July 7, Ministry of Justice figures 
indicated that of the 2,975 inmates in the MACA, 1,063 (36 percent) 
were awaiting trial and 1,912 (64 percent) had been tried and were 
serving their sentences. In the 32 regional prisons outside of Abidjan, 
out of 9,059 inmates, only 1,787 (20 percent) were awaiting trial, 
while 5,275 (80 percent) were serving their sentences. In spite of a 
1998 law that limits pretrial detention to 10 months in civil cases and 
22 months in criminal cases, some detainees have spent as many as 5 
years in detention awaiting trial.
    On February 1, members of the military briefly detained the players 
of the Ivoirian National Soccer Team as they returned from the African 
Cup of Nations in Ghana. Soldiers transported the team to the Zambakro 
Military Camp, confiscated the players' cell phones and passports, and 
detained them for 48 hours. General Guei stated that the team, which 
had performed disappointingly in the tournament, needed to learn a 
lesson in patriotism, civics, and sportsmanship. He threatened the 
players with military service the next time they lacked patriotism.
    On February 3, in the town of Toumodi, members of the military fire 
brigade detained Judge Aka Allou and forced him to release from custody 
their colleague Kouanda Ismalia. Kouanda had been convicted of breach 
of trust and was serving his sentence at the time. Following strong 
protests from two magistrates' unions, the Guei Government intervened 
and ordered the military firemen to release Judge Allou and return 
Ismaili to prison.
    Between February and June, the Guei Government arrested 
approximately a dozen former ministers and high government officials 
considered close to former President Bedie as part of the anti-
corruption fight known as ``Operation Clean Hands'' (see Section 3). 
For some officials, it was their second time being arrested since the 
coup. Authorities released all of the former government members by the 
end of July due to lack of evidence. Among those arrested were former 
Minister of State for the Interior and eventual PDCI presidential 
candidate Emile Constant Bombet. Security forces had arrested Bombet 
following the December 23 overthrow of Bedie and had detained him for 1 
month without charge. He was rearrested in February and held for 33 
days for allegedly having organized gatherings that endangered national 
security and for his alleged involvement in embezzling state funds set 
aside for organizing presidential and legislative elections in 1995. On 
September 6, the same day that Bombet was invested as the PDCI 
presidential candidate, the prosecutor reopened his case for further 
investigation. At year's end, Bombet was awaiting trial but no longer 
was in detention.
    On July 9, gendarmes arrested and tortured a student leader (see 
Section 1.c.).
    On July 12, gendarmes arrested three members and one suspected 
member of the RDR on suspicion of involvement in the July 4 and 5 
military mutiny. For 6 hours, gendarmes questioned Amadou Gon 
Coulibaly, Deputy Secretary General of the RDR; Ally Coulibaly, RDR 
National Secretary for Communication; Amadou Sangafowa, RDR Deputy 
National Secretary for Organization; and Mamadou Coulibaly, Amadou Gon 
Coulibaly's uncle, about the mutiny and then released them after 48 
hours in detention. The Government never disclosed the evidence linking 
the four to involvement in the July 4 and 5 events.
    On July 21, the CNSP briefly detained and questioned National 
Islamic Council (CNI) President El Hadj Idriss Kone Koudouss (see 
Section 2.c.). The CNSP warned Koudouss not to advise Muslims to vote 
against the Constitution in the July 23 referendum, as they accused him 
of doing in a previous sermon. The CNSP noted that such types of 
sermons could be considered inciting violence and rebellion. Koudouss 
was released after the warning.
    On July 28, the military tribunal detained and questioned Professor 
Morifere Bamba, the former Minister of Health in the transitional 
regime and leader of the Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS). He was 
accused of cooperating with the July 4 and 5 mutineers. In August he 
was released for lack of any evidence.
    In August authorities placed Zemogo Fofana, RDR National Secretary 
for External Relations and mayor of Boundiali, under house arrest. The 
Government accused Fofana of recruiting mercenaries to overthrow Guei 
and disrupt presidential elections. Authorities released Fofana within 
a week and allowed him to return to his home in Boundiali after the 
October 22 elections.
    On August 24, the gendarmes detained and questioned El Hadj 
Koudouss, four other prominent imams from the CNI, and one Islamic 
youth leader (see Section 2.c.). The Government accused them of 
procuring arms, in cooperation with RDR presidential candidate 
Ouattara, in order to destabilize the country. The gendarmes released 
all six after questioning. According to the imams, this was the fifth 
time that leaders of the CNI had been called in for questioning since 
the coup.
    On September 8, members of the security forces arrested Amadou 
Kone, computer engineer with the National Geographic Information and 
Teledetection Center. The Government accused him of revealing to the 
RDR strategic information and endangering national security. This 
information was the early partial results of the July 23 and 24 
referendum, which Kone helped the RDR attain by installing a 
computerized information system in their offices. Kone was released 
from custody on September 13, and charges against him were dropped for 
lack of evidence.
    Following the September 18 assassination attempt on General Guei, 
government security forces arrested numerous soldiers suspected of 
involvement in the attempt; one of the soldiers remained unaccounted 
for at year's end (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
    On September 24, uniformed men arrested Alphonse Douaty, FPI 
National Secretary for the Mountains Region, at his home. According to 
his family, the men who arrested Douaty stated that they were taking 
him to General Guei who wanted to discuss Douaty's opposition to the 
General's presidential candidacy. Douaty was released on September 26.
    On November 8, police arrested Quartermaster General Lassana 
Palenfo and Air Force Brigadier General Abdoulaye Coulibaly and charged 
them with orchestrating an assassination plot against General Guei in 
September. Their hearing for the attempted assassination began on 
November 14 and continued at year's end; during the hearing, military 
prosecutors continued to introduce new evidence in order to keep the 
two generals incarcerated (see Section 1.e.).
    On December 5, police detained an imam who attempted to intervene 
to prevent beatings by BAE members of Muslims (see Sections 1.c., 2.c., 
and 5.). The police also entered two mosques and detained persons 
inside. On December 6, some presidential guards arrested and beat Abou 
Coulibaly outside of President Gbagbo's residence; he later died from 
his injuries (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    During the year, members of the military regularly entered 
businesses unannounced and used threats to force local and expatriate 
businessmen to accompany them for questioning. The military members 
claimed to be searching for property that was stolen from the 
Government during the Bedie regime or looking for evidence of economic 
crimes; military members extorted payments frequently for these alleged 
crimes. This abuse decreased under the Gbagbo Government.
    Foreigners complained that they were subject to police harassment; 
in particular that police would take them to police stations where they 
were beaten and detained overnight if they did not pay a bribe to the 
officers (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
    During and following the December 1999 coup, the mutineers arrested 
approximately 150 ministers, military officers, and other officials 
known as supporters of the Bedie Government; however, formal charges 
were not filed. Many of these officials subsequently were released and 
rearrested during the next several months following the coup.
    During student strikes in May 1999, police arrested student leaders 
Kouame Kouakou and Drigone Faye in Bouake on charges of inciting 
violence and destruction of property under the 1992 Antivandalism Law. 
Charles Ble Goude, the secretary general of FESCI, was arrested on 
August 17 and also was charged with inciting violence and destruction 
of property. None of the students were charged with a crime, and all 
three students were released by October 1999.
    In December 1999, the Bedie Government issued a warrant for 
Ouattara's arrest for the alleged falsification of documents and their 
use. Newspaper accounts speculated that Bedie ordered the warrant 
issued to intimidate Ouattara and to prevent him from returning to the 
country.
    Journalists frequently were arrested, detained, or questioned for 
short periods of time without being charged, as were political party 
and religious leaders (see Sections 2.a., 2.c., and 3).
    Although it is prohibited by law, police restrict access to some 
prisoners. For example, gendarmes did not allow the lawyers of four RDR 
suspects arrested on July 12 to speak with their clients during their 
detention. Despite the frequency of arbitrary arrest, there is no 
accurate total of suspects held. There have been no reports of lawyer 
harassment during the year. Police also verbally abused lawyers who 
tried to assist their clients.
    Article 12 of the new Constitution specifically prohibits forced 
exile; however, the Guei Government prevented former President Bedie's 
return to the country. General Guei denied a request from the PDCI to 
allow Bedie's return in August to take part in their convention and 
possibly the presidential race.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The new Constitution provides for 
an independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is subject 
to executive branch, military, and other outside influences. Although 
the judiciary is independent in ordinary criminal cases, it follows the 
lead of the executive in national security or politically sensitive 
cases. Judges serve at the discretion of the executive, and there were 
credible reports that they submit to political pressure.
    The formal judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and 
includes the Court of Appeals and lower courts. In July the Government 
named a new Supreme Court President and a new Constitutional Chamber to 
the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Chamber, whose main 
responsibility is to determine presidential candidate eligibility, was 
hand-picked by General Guei and was headed by Kone Tia, Guei's former 
legal advisor. At year's end, Kone Tia remained president of the 
Supreme Court. The Constitution grants the President of the Republic 
the power to replace the head of the court once a new parliament is in 
place, and Gbagbo is expected to do so in early 2001.
    Military courts do not try civilians. Although there are no 
appellate courts within the military court system, persons convicted by 
a military tribunal may petition the Supreme Court to set aside the 
tribunal's verdict and order a retrial.
    In rural areas, traditional institutions often administer justice 
at the village level, handling domestic disputes and minor land 
questions in accordance with customary law. Dispute resolution is by 
extended debate, with no known instance of resort to physical 
punishment. The formal court system increasingly is superseding these 
traditional mechanisms. In 1996 a Grand Mediator was appointed to 
settle disputes that cannot be resolved by traditional means. The new 
Constitution specifically provided for the office of Grand Mediator, 
which is designed to bridge traditional and modern methods of dispute 
resolution. The President names the Grand Mediator, and Mathieu Ekra 
has been Grand Mediator since the Bedie Government.
    The law provides for the right to public trial, although key 
evidence sometimes is given secretly. The presumption of innocence and 
the right of defendants to be present at their trials often are not 
respected. Those convicted have the right of appeal, although higher 
courts rarely overturn verdicts. Defendants accused of felonies or 
capital crimes have the right to legal counsel, and the judicial system 
provides for courtappointed attorneys; however, no free legal 
assistance is available, except infrequently when members of the bar 
provide pro bono advice to defendants for limited time periods. In 
April the bar began operating a telephone hotline for free legal advice 
from volunteer attorneys. On November 28, the president of the bar 
announced that the bar would not continue to provide free legal 
assistance to poor clients if their transportation and lodging expenses 
were not furnished by the Government. The bar has 200 members that help 
give free legal advice. In practice many defendants cannot afford 
private counsel and court-appointed attorneys are not available 
readily. In many instances, security forces did not allow lawyers' 
access to their clients (see Section 1.d.).
    Members of the military interfered with court cases and attempted 
to intimidate judges. They also intervened directly in labor disputes, 
sometimes arresting and intimidating parties. From May 20 to 22, judges 
stopped working to protest the treatment they were receiving from 
members of the military. Since the coup, the military had been 
attempting to influence court cases and in May verbally harassed and 
threatened Judge Olivier Kouadio after he rendered a decision in a 
labor dispute with which the military disagreed (see Section 6.b.). 
There are no reports of the military attempting to influence court 
cases under the Gbagbo Government.
    On November 8, police arrested CNSP members Quartermaster General 
Lassana Palenfo and Air Force Brigadier General Abdoulaye Coulibaly and 
charged them with orchestrating an assassination plot against General 
Guei in September. Their hearing for the attempted assassination began 
on November 14 and continued at year's end. During the hearing, 
military prosecutors continued to introduce new evidence and charges in 
order to keep the two generals incarcerated; however, there was no 
trial (see Section 1.d.).
    The new Constitution granted immunity to all CNSP members and all 
participants in the December 1999 coup d'etat for all acts committed in 
connection with the coup, which implicitly included all criminal 
activity such as looting, robbery, carjacking, and intimidation that 
occurred during the coup.
    On January 26, the Guei Government granted amnesty for all offenses 
committed during the September 27 and October 27, 1999 political 
demonstrations. This amnesty included all of the RDR leaders who had 
been tried and convicted under the previous regime's antivandalism law, 
which held leaders of a group responsible for any violence committed by 
one of its members during a demonstration. All of the RDR prisoners 
were released from prison on December 24, 1999, by the mutineers 
leading the December 1999 coup (see Section 1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Code of Penal Procedure specifies that a police 
official or investigative magistrate may conduct searches of homes 
without a judicial warrant if there is reason to believe that there is 
evidence on the premises concerning a crime. The official must have the 
prosecutor's agreement to retain any evidence seized in the search and 
is required to have witnesses to the search, which may not take place 
between 9:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. in order to prevent the police and 
gendarmes from entering a home in the middle of night under the auspice 
of a search warrant.
    In practice police sometimes used a general search warrant without 
a name or address. On occasion police have entered the homes of 
noncitizen Africans (or apprehended them at large), taken them to local 
police stations, and extorted small amounts of money for alleged minor 
offenses. In the months following the December coup, soldiers 
frequently extorted money from citizens and foreigners and sold their 
services to private individuals, in some instances beating or abusing 
others on behalf of those citizens (see Section 1.c.). On February 23, 
General Guei reprimanded three members of the military, Sargent Albert 
Ble Ibo, Kouadio Paul Oura, and Konan Alla, who had been using their 
positions to enter homes and extort money from residents, to a military 
court to face sanctions. On February 15, another soldier, Mathurin 
Kouakou, and a police officer, Sargent Jean-Claude Ano, were removed 
from their posts and reprimanded for similar acts; in March they were 
convicted of extortion and given a suspended sentence of 2 months 
imprisonment and fined $43 (FCFA 30,000).
    In January and March, members of the military beat citizens and 
ransacked homes in Daoukro, the hometown of former President Bedie, and 
in surrounding villages (see Section 1.c.).
    On March 20, three soldiers searched the offices of Attorney 
Mathurin Dirabou without a warrant. The soldiers entered the office, 
pulled all of the lawyer's files from his drawers, and left without 
questioning anyone. Dirabou, who at the time was handling former 
Minister of State for the Interior Emile Constant Bombet's defense for 
alleged embezzlement, noted that a similar search had occurred on a 
previous occasion. Following a protest by the Abidjan Bar, the three 
soldiers apologized to Dirabou and stated that their actions were 
unrelated to the attorney's defense of Bombet but were motivated 
personally due to a relative's dispute with Dirabou.
    Police and gendarmes searched 17 mosques for arms prior to the 
October 22 presidential election.
    On August 27, approximately 25 gendarmes searched a mosque in 
Abidjan's Riviera 2 neighborhood, which is headed by one of the leaders 
of the NIC, Imam Sekou Sylla. Gendarmes also mistakenly searched the 
house of one of the imam's neighbors. The gendarmes had intended to 
search the imam's home, allegedly to look for arms that they suspected 
the Muslim community was hiding for the RDR. The gendarmes did not have 
warrants to conduct the search.
    On the night of August 28, gendarmes in the western town of Zouan-
Hounien searched the home of Mouatapha Diably, the RDR Coordinator for 
the Department of Danane. Diably also was accused of storing arms for 
the RDR; the gendarmes did not have a warrant for the search.
    Following the September 18 alleged assassination attempt at General 
Guei's home in Abidjan (see Section 1.a.), gendarmes searched the homes 
of numerous members of the military who were suspected of taking part 
in or plotting the attack. This included the homes of the Minister of 
State for Security, General Lassana Palenfo, and the Minister of State 
for Transport, General Abdoulaye Coulibaly. The search of Palenfo's 
home occurred while he was out of the country attending the Olympic 
Games in Sydney. The RDR party headquarters in the Adjame district of 
Abidjan also were searched and ransacked. The evidentiary basis for the 
searches was unclear and had not been made public by year's end.
    On September 26, security forces searched the home of Zemogo 
Fofana, the RDR's National Secretary for External Relations, in the 
northern city of Boundiali. Although the purpose of the search was 
unclear, it is believed that the security forces were searching for 
arms. Military, police, and gendarmes also searched the residence of 
Kassoum Coulibaly in the northern city of Korhogo, allegedly looking 
for arms. Coulibaly, a former deputy from Korhogo, is considered to be 
close to General Guei.
    In September and October, gendarmes and members of the military 
made frequent visits, sometimes heavily armed and in armored vehicles 
or in boats, to the residence of RDR presidential candidate Alassane 
Ouattara, whose house is located on the Ebrie Lagoon. Despite at least 
one attempt, the security forces never entered Ouattara's home; 
however, their frequent presence restricted the family's movement and 
observers believe it was intended to intimidate Ouattara and his 
family. Hundreds of RDR supporters began full-time protection of the 
house after the visits began.
    On December 5, six police officers that were pursuing RDR 
demonstrators forced their way into Traore Fousseni's house. They 
destroyed furniture, beat him with truncheons, and stole all of his 
money (see Section 1.c.).
    Security forces reportedly monitored some private telephone 
conversations, but the extent of the practice was unknown. For example, 
on May 12, General Guei claimed to have a copy of a taped telephone 
conversation between RDR Deputy Secretary Amadou Gon Coulibaly and a 
student union member, which Guei claimed revealed the RDR's intention 
to endanger national security. Government authorities monitored letters 
and parcels at the post office for potential criminal activity; they 
are believed widely to monitor private correspondence, although no 
evidence of this has been produced. The Guei Government used students 
as informants at the University of Abidjan (see Section 2.a.); however, 
there were no reports the Gbagbo Government used students as 
informants.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The new Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression, and private newspapers frequently criticize 
government policies; however, the Guei Government imposed significant 
restrictions on this right. At times the Guei Government enforced these 
restrictions by inflicting physical harm upon, threatening, and 
arresting journalists, and ransacking media offices. Journalists 
continued to practice self-censorship.
    The two government-owned daily newspapers, Fraternite Matin and 
Ivoir Soir, offer little criticism of government policy. There are a 
number of private newspapers: 17 daily, 30 weekly, 5 bimonthly, and 10 
monthly. While these newspapers voice their disapproval of government 
or presidential actions frequently and sometimes loudly, the Government 
does not tolerate what it considers insults or attacks on the honor of 
the country's highest officials. A law enacted in 1991, soon after the 
Government first allowed substantial numbers of private newspapers to 
operate, authorizes the State to initiate criminal libel prosecutions 
against persons who insult the President, the Prime Minister, foreign 
chiefs of state or government or their diplomatic representatives, 
defame institutions of the State, or undermine the reputation of the 
nation. In addition the State may criminalize a civil libel suit at its 
discretion and at the request of the plaintiff. Criminal libel is 
punishable by 3 months to 2 years in prison. The Guei Government used 
this law against a number of journalists during the year.
    General Guei's initial transition Government included highly 
respected journalist and former television anchorman Levy Niamkey as 
Communications Minister. In October 1999, the Bedie Government had 
suspended Niamkey from his anchor duties due to a dispute over the 
content of his news reports, and eventually he resigned in protest. 
Observers viewed the CNSP's naming of Niamkey positively; however, in 
May Guei replaced Niamkey with CNSP member and Navy Lieutenant Henri 
Cesar Sama, who had no qualifications for the job other than loyalty to 
the General. The Guei Government then named Niamkey director of the 
television portion of the government broadcasting organization, 
Radiodiffusion Television Ivoirienne (RTI); however, he was fired in 
September after trying to provide equal access to television for all 
political parties.
    At the beginning of the year, the media was free to express their 
views in support of whichever candidate or policy they supported; 
however, in the latter half of the year, the Government and General 
Guei used threats, arrests, and beatings of journalists in order to 
control the press.
    On February 11, General Guei's guards summoned Tape Koulou, 
publisher of the staunchly pro-Bedie daily Le National, to the 
presidency. After waiting more than 8 hours, Koulou met with Chief 
Sergeant Ibrahima B. (I.B.) Coulibaly, a member of the presidential 
guard, who told him to stop writing about opposition leader Ouattara. 
On March 24, approximately 10 soldiers led by Corporal Issa Toure 
attacked the offices of Le National after it ran a story critical of 
General Guei. The soldiers fired shots several times into the office 
ceiling, destroyed furniture, threatened the journalists, and forced 
them to do push-ups. On June 23, police detained and questioned Asse 
Alefe, the Director of Publication for Le National, and one journalist 
concerning a story questioning the Ivoirian heritage of CNSP member and 
Minister of Communication Sama. The two journalists were detained for 1 
day before being released. On June 27, following rumors of a coup on 
June 24, the Director of the Cabinet for the Ministry of the Interior 
again questioned Asse Alefe, and his assistant, Traore Bouraima, for 
several hours on their role in the coup rumors. The Director of Cabinet 
accused them of spreading false information because they had reported 
coup rumors on June 22. The public prosecutor's office also questioned 
the two who were released but told to remain available to the courts. 
On June 28, the CNSP issued a statement concerning the incident, 
stating that while the Government supports press freedom, there are 
limits to that freedom. The release added that the articles in Le 
National threatened state security.
    On May 9, communication advisors for General Guei summoned to the 
presidency Honore Sepe and Christian Kara, two journalists from the 
pro-RDR daily Le Liberal, in order to reproach them for writing stories 
on the probable presidential candidacy of General Guei and its negative 
effect on the transition. On July 6, members of the military detained 
Le Liberal publication director Kone Yoro and two of his employees, 
Emmanuel Tanoh and Ibrahim Diamonde, and took them to the Ministry of 
Communication for questioning. Minister Sama warned the journalists 
about the content of their articles following the July 4 and 5 mutiny 
before releasing them from custody. On August 2, gendarmes arrested 
Yoro and Le Liberal journalist Kara Khristian for the defamation of 
General Guei in an article published the previous day concerning a 
check signed by the General, which the newspaper indicated would be 
used to finance Guei's presidential campaign. Gendarmes detained the 
two journalists for 2 days.
    On May 10, soldiers briefly detained and questioned Patrice Pohe, 
the publisher of the pro-RDR newspaper La Reference, and Kone Satigui, 
a journalist, at National Armed Forces Headquarters. The soldiers 
warned the journalists against publishing anti-CNSP articles. On May 
16, five members of the military destroyed computer equipment at the 
offices of La Reference and detained Pohe and three other journalists 
at the presidency, where they kicked the journalists and forced them to 
do push-ups. The four were released after several hours. In June in 
response to criticism from several NGO's regarding these incidents, 
General Guei asked the military to stop mistreating journalists. On 
August 26, military men claiming to be presidential security again 
arrested Pohe and questioned and threatened him for several hours. Pohe 
claimed he was arrested because of his support of opposition leader 
Ouattara.
    On June 28, a court sentenced Sidibe Pate, a Burkina Faso traveler 
who was staying at a hotel in Divo where he was overheard making 
negative comments about General Guei, to 12 months in prison for 
insulting the head of state. On July 31, security forces beat British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) journalist Mohamed Fofana Dara while he 
was covering a demonstration at the French Embassy (see Section 2.b.). 
The military and gendarmes, who forcibly dispersed the demonstration, 
continued to strike Fofana after he identified himself and showed his 
press identification (see Section 1.c.).
    On August 31, the public prosecutor had gendarmes detain Notre Voie 
journalist Freedom Neruda and publisher Eugene Allou and bring them in 
for questioning. During a press conference on August 13, Neruda had 
warned citizens that they should not allow General Guei to build up his 
hometown as previous Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Bedie had done 
with their birthplaces. Gendarmes released the journalists after 1 day 
of questioning but warned them not to leave the country.
    On September 8, members of the military severely beat Joachim 
Buegre, a journalist and the political affairs editor for the Abidjan 
daily Le Jour. The beating occurred immediately following a meeting 
between Beugre and General Guei, during which Guei warned Buegre about 
an article that had appeared in Le Jour the previous day that called 
into question Guei's parentage and his eligibility to participate in 
the October presidential election. After forcing Beugre to show them 
where he lived, the soldiers beat him and left him on the side of an 
Abidjan road near the presidency. Beugre remained hospitalized for 
several days after the incident. In response private newspapers did not 
publish on September 21, and on September 22, journalists marched from 
the headquarters of the journalists' union to the presidency. 
Immediately after the march, General Guei met with the journalists and 
told them to concentrate on constructive criticism rather than on news 
that was false or could divide the country. Minister Sama also warned 
the media to stop publishing stories about the military, on the grounds 
that such articles created divisions in the military. On September 9, a 
presidential press aide called two journalists from the daily Le 
Patriote to the presidency to discuss that newspaper's running of the 
same story for which Le Jour journalist Beugre was beaten. The press 
aide questioned the journalists, who then were released unharmed 
several days after their initial detention.
    On October 24 in the Abidjan district of Plateau, the military 
arrested Franck Andersen Kouassi, a journalist and the deputy chief 
editor of Le Jour, and Yacouba Gbane, a journalist at Le Jour, while 
they were covering an event. The military beat and verbally abused them 
and confiscated their equipment. After several days in detention, they 
were released without being charged.
    On October 26, at the beginning of an RDR protest demonstration to 
demand new presidential elections, a group of 50 FPI members detained 
Raphael Lakpe, the publisher of Le Populaire, a pro-RDR newspaper. They 
then handed Lakpe over to gendarmes who took Lakpe and his bodyguard to 
the Koumassi Camp Commando where the gendarmes beat them with their 
belts, made them swim in dirty water, and insulted them for supporting 
Ouattara.
    On October 26, 20 FPI members severely beat Bakary Nimaga, the 
chief editor of the pro-RDR newspaper Le Liberal as he was going to 
work. They then handed Nimaga over to a group of gendarmes. The 
gendarmes took him to Abidjan's Riviera III suburb where they made him 
swim in a gutter, then took him through the neighborhoods of Anono, 
Blockhauss, and Cocody, where they stopped to beat him in front of 
onlookers. The gendarmes eventually took Nimago to the Agban 
Gendarmerie camp, where they threatened him and used pieces of wood, 
truncheons, and iron sticks to beat him. The gendarmes continued to 
beat Nimago after breaking his arm. Following the intervention of some 
other officers, Nimaga was released from the Agban Gendarmerie camp 
that evening with a broken arm, and wounds on his back, thighs, and 
ears. Nimaga stated that while he was being beaten, he saw 
approximately 40 gendarmes beating more than 100 persons including 2 
elderly men.
    On October 26, gendarmes also destroyed the equipment and the 
headquarters of Le Liberal.
    On November 6, the National Observatory for the Freedom of the 
Press (OLPED) held a press conference to criticize the rough military 
treatment of Franck Andersen Kouassi and Yacouba Gbane, and the 
beatings of Bakary Nimaga and Rapahel Lakpe by gendarmes. The OLPED 
also criticized the gendarmes' destruction of the headquarters of Le 
Liberal and the destruction of another newspaper, La Reference, by a 
crowd of demonstrators on October 25.
    Because literacy rates are very low, and because newspapers and 
television are relatively expensive, radio is the most important medium 
of mass communication. The government-owned broadcast media company, 
RTI, owns two major radio stations; only the primary government radio 
station is broadcast nationwide. Neither station offers criticism of 
the Government. There also are four major private domestic radio 
stations: Radio France Internationale (RFI), the BBC, Africa Number 
One, and Radio Nostalgie. They broadcast on FM in Abidjan only, except 
for RFI, which in 1998 signed an agreement with RTI to allow it to 
broadcast via relay antennas to the north and center of the country. 
The RFI and BBC stations only broadcast internationally produced 
programming. The Africa Number One station, which is 51 percent 
domestically owned, broadcasts 6 hours a day of domestically produced 
programming; the rest of the time it broadcasts programming from Africa 
Number One's headquarters in Libreville, Gabon. Radio Nostalgie is 51 
percent owned by Radio Nostalgie France. The RFI, BBC, and Africa 
Number One stations all broadcast news and political commentary about 
the country. The private stations have complete control over their 
editorial content. However, only Radio Nostalgie frequently was 
critical of the Government in its editorials.
    On July 4, during the military mutiny, gendarmes closed Radio 
Nostalgie. General Guei questioned Hamed Bakayoko, the station 
director, and Yves Zogbo, Jr., the program director. Bakayoko was 
considered an ally of Ouattara, and his station was considered pro-RDR 
by the authorities. Following the October 22 presidential election, RFI 
and BBC FM broadcasts were jammed for over a week.
    Radio station license applications are adjudicated by a commission 
under the Ministry of Information, which has accepted applications and 
awarded licenses only once, in 1993. On that occasion, the commission 
denied 7 of 12 applications on a variety of grounds, including, in one 
case, affiliation with a major opposition political party.
    In 1998 the Government authorized 43 community radio stations with 
very limited broadcast strength, no foreign-language programming, no 
advertisements, and public announcements limited to the local area. 
While the number of authorized community stations now stands at 52, 
only 26 stations were broadcasting at year's end. On August 1, Edmond 
Zeghehi Bouazo, President of the National Council of Audiovisual 
Communication, met with the promoters of community and commercial radio 
stations to remind them of programming restrictions and the prohibition 
on political content in programming. In 1999 Roman Catholic Church 
groups began to operate four community radio stations: Radio Espoir in 
Abidjan, Radio Paix Sanwi in Aboisso, Radio Notre Dame in Yamoussoukro, 
and Radio Dix-Huit Montagnes in Man. Although the Muslim associations 
received a broadcast license in 1999, no Muslim station had begun 
broadcasting by year's end.
    There are two television stations that broadcast domestically 
produced programs. Both are owned and operated by the Government. Only 
one broadcasts nationwide. Neither station criticizes the Government. 
The only private television station, Canal Horizon, is foreign owned 
and broadcasts no domestically produced programs. The Government has 
not accepted any applications to establish a privately owned domestic 
television station.
    On July 6, members of the military stopped journalist Frank Kouassi 
while he was filming a segment for the television program ``Point 
Media,'' forced him into a vehicle, and transported him to the Abgan 
Gendarme Camp for questioning. Captain Fabien Coulibaly questioned 
Kouassi on the events of the July 4 and 5 mutiny and on his relations 
with Ouattara before releasing him the same day.
    The National Council of Audiovisual Communication (NCAC), 
established in 1991 and formally organized in 1995, is responsible for 
regulating media access during the 2-week formal political campaign 
period and for resolving complaints about unfair media access. 
Following the December 1999 coup, the previously PDCI-dominated NCAC 
was taken over by the military Government. Because domestic television 
is controlled by the state, the NCAC is unable to fulfill its mandate 
at times. On October 9, Edmond Zegbehi Bouazo, president of the NCAC, 
announced that each of the five candidates in the October 24 
presidential elections would be granted 5 minutes per day on the radio 
as well as on television from October 9 to October 21. All of the radio 
channels broadcasted the messages of the candidates simultaneously. 
However, during the campaign, the FPI complained that Guei was granted 
more than the allotted 5 minutes on television daily; he and his wife's 
activities were broadcast at length.
    The Government does not restrict access to or distribution of 
electronic media. There are 12 domestic Internet service providers, of 
which 4 are major providers; the first began operations in 1996. All 12 
are privately owned and relatively expensive. The licensing 
requirements imposed by the government telecommunications regulatory 
body, ATCI, reportedly are not unduly restrictive.
    The Government continued to exercise considerable influence over 
the official media's program content, news coverage, and other matters, 
using these media to promote government policies. Much of the news 
programming during the year was devoted to the activities of the 
President, the Government, the PDCI, and proGuei groups. After Gbagbo 
took office, he indicated that the media would no longer be pressured 
to devote programming to his and the Government's activities.
    In June Minister of Communication Sama stopped the airing of RDR 
announcements publicizing a tour of the country by Ouattara. Sama 
claimed the spots featured ``Nazi music'' and forced the RDR to modify 
the advertisements. By the time the spots were cleared, it was too late 
to provide publicity for the tour and the announcement aired only once.
    Beginning in August, when the presidential campaign began, 
government television provided almost exclusive coverage of General 
Guei's activities and excluded coverage of the other candidates and 
their activities. While the political parties and print journalists 
complained about this practice, the content of the programming did not 
change; only occasionally it provided time to other candidates.
    International journalists were subject to government harassment and 
intimidation during the year. Following the September 18 assassination 
attempt on his life, General Guei criticized RFI for reporting ``lies'' 
after it suggested that Guei had orchestrated the assassination plot. 
Prior to the December legislative elections, government authorities 
accused international journalists, such as RFI, of distorting the 
sociopolitical situation and threatened them with brutality if they did 
not report more news favorable to the government. Following the 
December legislative election, unidentified callers threatened Bruno 
Minas of RFI. Minas claims that he was threatened because he reported 
that RDR supporters were victims of government harassment and abuse; 
subsequently he was forced to leave the country for his own safety. 
Correspondents of AFP, the French daily Le Monde, and the BBC's Africa 
Bureau (BBCAfrica) also were forced to leave the country for their 
safety.
    There is no known law specifically concerning academic freedom, 
although academics have cited laws of French origin concerning the 
operations of universities to support their claims of academic freedom. 
In practice the Government tolerates much academic freedom; however, it 
inhibits political expression through its proprietary control of most 
educational facilities, even at the post-secondary level. In April 
1999, the president of the University of Cocody banned all meetings and 
sit-ins on the campus; 2 days later the Council of Ministers ratified 
and extended the President's action, banning all FESCI activities 
throughout the country. Following the December 1999 coup, the Guei 
Government allowed FESCI to resume operations. However, in September 
members of the military beat students from FESCI on the university's 
Cocody campus. Three of the students, all of whom were alleged to 
belong to a branch of FESCI that supports the RDR, were injured 
seriously.
    Unlike in the previous year, students at universities and secondary 
schools did not stage demonstrations and protests about educational 
problems, due to a decision by the student organizations to allow 
General Guei time to organize elections, and to a split within the 
organizations along political party lines. These splits in the student 
ranks led to violent confrontations between students and numerous 
injuries (see Section 1.c.). There were numerous student protests at 
the end of the year (see Section 2.b.).
    Many prominent scholars active in opposition politics have retained 
their positions at state educational facilities; however, some teachers 
and professors suggest that they have been transferred or fear that 
they may be transferred to less desirable positions because of their 
political activities. According to student union statements, government 
security forces continued to use students as informants to monitor 
political activities at the University of Abidjan.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The new 
Constitution allows for freedom of assembly; however, the Government 
restricted this right in practice. Until August 18, groups that wished 
to hold demonstrations or rallies were required by law to submit a 
notice of their intent to do so to the Ministry of Security or the 
Ministry of Interior 48 hours before the proposed event. No law 
expressly authorizes the Government to ban public meetings or events 
for which advance notice has been given in the required manner. 
Nevertheless, the Guei Government often denied the opposition 
permission to meet in public outdoor locations. On August 18, the 
Minister of Security and the Minister of the Interior further tightened 
the restrictions on public demonstrations. Groups were required to have 
authorization from both Ministries to hold a demonstration, and the 
authorization must be requested in writing 3 days in advance of the 
event. Even if authorization is granted, it later can be revoked. 
Gbagbo's Government retained the restrictions on public demonstrations; 
authorization still must be requested in writing 3 days in advance.
    For extended periods during the year, the Guei Government banned 
mass events and political meetings. On February 22, the Government 
issued a ban on political mass meetings and demonstrations until 
further notice. The ban was lifted in May after publication of the new 
constitutional text and electoral code. Initially parties and 
organizations abided by these bans to allow the transitional military 
regime an opportunity to organize. However, as the year progressed, 
opposition parties and other groups attempted to hold demonstrations. 
The Guei Government often refused to permit these demonstrations and 
sometimes prevented them by force. Nevertheless, during and after the 
presidential and legislative elections, several mass events and 
political meetings took place.
    On July 28, the Ministry of the Interior forbade Ouattara and the 
RDR from holding a press conference announcing their party platform for 
the upcoming elections. Officials stated that the official opening of 
the presidential campaign had not yet begun, and thus a political 
meeting could not take place; however, the FPI and the PDCI were 
allowed to hold installation ceremonies for their presidential 
candidates at that time. In September the RDR was allowed to hold their 
installation ceremony for Ouattara.
    In August and early September, the major political parties and 
General Guei generally ignored the new electoral code's ban on 
campaigning until 15 days before the election, which was scheduled for 
September 17. However, on September 7, following the postponement of 
the presidential election until October 22, Minister of the Interior 
Grena Mouassi banned all election meetings until the official opening 
of the campaign; the definition of meeting changed several times. For 
example, groups who supported Guei's candidacy were allowed to meet, 
assemble, and put up public posters.
    On August 24, the Guei Government refused to allow female members 
of a coalition of opposition groups known as the Forum to march in 
protest of General Guei's presidential candidacy. The Minister of 
Security Palenfo stated that the refusal was due to security concerns 
because another group was scheduled to demonstrate at the same time; 
however, observers believe that General Guei had forbidden any marches 
against his candidacy.
    After the alleged assassination attempt on General Guei on 
September 18 (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 1.e.), the Interior 
Minister extended the ban on demonstrations and political activity to 
include all meetings and gatherings except for meetings of party 
leaders at party headquarters.
    Police repeatedly used excessive violence to break up 
demonstrations and gatherings. On July 31, gendarmes and military 
forces forcibly prevented a rally in support of French policy for 
inclusive elections in front of the French Embassy. Security forces 
beat and abused rally participants and a journalist and dispersed the 
crowd using rifle butts and tear gas (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.). The 
majority of protesters at the demonstration were RDR supporters. On 
July 28 and 29, the Guei Government allowed and even encouraged 
demonstrations by its supporters against the French position. On 
September 9, gendarmes used tear gas to disperse a crowd of RDR 
supporters in Abidjan (see Section 1.c.). The supporters had gathered 
to attend an RDR meeting, not knowing that the CNSP had declared the 
meeting illegal the previous evening and had cancelled the event.
    Police forcibly disrupted some demonstrations surrounding the 
October presidential elections and killed or injured hundreds of 
persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). When Gbagbo was inaugurated on 
October 26, gendarmes loyal to the new president violently suppressed 
RDR street demonstrations held to demand new presidential elections.
    Following the November 30 Supreme Court announcement of the 
disqualification of Ouattara for legislative elections, thousands of 
RDR supporters demonstrated in protest of the decision (see Section 3). 
According to MIDH, 37 persons were killed during clashes with the 
military and gendarmes, including 19 by gunshot and 2 by torture; 
several hundred persons were injured; 840 were rounded-up and detained; 
and several disappeared and still were not found by year's end (see 
Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., and 1.d.).
    On April 26, the military Government repealed the 1992 
Antivandalism Law that held organizers of a march or demonstration 
responsible if any of the participants engaged in violence. The LIDHO, 
a leading civil rights NGO, and all major opposition parties criticized 
the law as unduly vague and as one that imposed punishment on some 
persons for the crimes of others.
    The new Constitution provides for freedom of association and allows 
the formation of political parties, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice.
    The new Constitution states that all parties must respect the laws 
of the Republic, including the requirement that all organizations be 
registered before commencing activities. In order to obtain 
registration, political parties must provide information on their 
founding members and produce internal statutes and political platforms 
consistent with the Constitution. Before the December 1999 coup, there 
were 102 legally recognized political parties, of which 3 were 
represented in the National Assembly. At year's end, there were 106 
parties; following the coup, some parties splintered or were formed to 
support the candidacy of General Guei. There were no reports that the 
Guei Government denied registration to any group, nor were there 
reports that the Gbagbo Government denied registration to any group.
    The new Constitution also prohibits the formation of political 
parties along ethnic or religious lines.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The new Constitution provides for freedom 
of religion, and both the Guei Government and the Gbagbo Government 
generally respected this right in practice. There is no state religion; 
however, for historical as well as ethnic reasons, the Government 
informally favors Christianity, in particular the Roman Catholic 
Church. Catholic Church leaders had a much stronger voice in government 
affairs than their Islamic counterparts, which led to feelings of 
disenfranchisement among the Muslim population. After assuming power 
following the coup, General Guei indicated that one of the goals of the 
transition Government was to end this favoritism and put all of the 
major religious faiths on an equal footing. In practice the Guei 
Government did not take steps to bring this about. In November the 
Gbagbo Government announced steps to bring religious groups into the 
national dialogue and included religious representatives on a national 
commission to promote reconciliation.
    The Government establishes requirements for religious groups under 
a 1939 French law. All religious groups wishing to operate in the 
country must submit to the Ministry of the Interior a file including 
the group's by-laws, the names of the founding members, the date of 
founding (or date that the founder received the revelation of his or 
her calling), the minutes of the general assembly, the names of members 
of the administrative board, and other information. The Interior 
Ministry investigates the backgrounds of the founding members to 
ascertain that the group has no politically subversive purpose. 
However, in practice the Government's regulation of religious groups 
generally has not been unduly restrictive since 1990, when the 
Government legalized opposition political parties. Although 
nontraditional religious groups, like all public secular associations, 
are required to register with the Government, no penalties are imposed 
on a group that fails to register. In practice registration can bring 
advantages of public recognition, invitation to official ceremonies and 
events, publicity, gifts, and school subsidies. No religious group has 
complained of arbitrary registration procedures or recognition. The 
Government does not register traditional indigenous religious groups.
    The Catholic Church began to operate community radio stations in 
1998, and on April 21, 1999, the Government authorized Muslims to 
operate a similar station; however, no Muslim radio station had begun 
operations by year's end (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government does not prohibit links to foreign coreligionists 
but informally discourages connections with politically radical 
fundamentalist movements, such as Islamic groups based in Iran and 
Libya.
    Some Muslims believe that their religious or ethnic affiliation 
makes them targets of discrimination by the Government with regard to 
both employment and the renewal of national identity cards (see Section 
5). Due to the tense political situation in the country and the ethnic 
divisions along which political party lines are drawn, northern Muslims 
sometimes are scrutinized more closely in the identity card process. As 
these northern Muslims share names, style of dress, and customs with 
several of the country's predominantly Muslim neighboring countries, 
they sometimes are accused wrongly of attempting to obtain nationality 
cards illegally in order to vote. This creates a hardship for a 
disproportionate number of Muslims.
    In May the Guei Government warned the imam leaders of the Muslim 
community, whom Guei believed to be supporters of Ouattara, to refrain 
from political discourse in their sermons. The Guei Government claimed 
the imams had been jeopardizing security with sermons that were too 
charged politically. In May, June, and July during travels to various 
regions in the country, General Guei continually asked imams and other 
Muslim leaders to stay out of politics. For example, on July 21, the 
CNSP briefly detained and questioned CNI President El Hadj Idriss Kone 
Koudouss; the CNSP warned him not to advise Muslims to vote against the 
new Constitution in his July 23 sermon.
    Security forces and the Government summoned Islamic leaders for 
questioning on several occasions and searched their homes based on 
suspicions that these leaders were plotting civil unrest during the 
year (see Section 1.d.). Muslims say that such acts by the Government 
are an attempt to make the Muslim community a ``scapegoat'' for the 
country's problems.
    On December 5 after youths set fire to a mosque in Abidjan's Abobo 
district, the BAE used tear gas and beat Muslims who had gathered to 
inspect the damage (see Section 5). When imam Bassama Sylla attempted 
to intervene, the police stripped him and detained him (see Section 
1.d.). Police also entered at least two other mosques in Abobo that day 
and detained persons inside.
    In December 1999, the new military regime requested that the 
Islamic Superior Council, an organization of imams that was seen as 
politically active and supportive of the previous regime, disband. The 
president of the council, Moustapha Diaby, did not oppose this demand, 
and the council ceased its operations. In March the Government allowed 
the council to resume its activities.
    In April local governments closed some Harrist churches to prevent 
an escalation of intrareligious violence (see Section 5). The 
Bingerville church had been closed in April 1999 following an appeals 
court decision, but a decision from the judicial chamber of the Supreme 
Court reopened it in December 1999.
    In July the Government allowed Felix Tchotche Mel, a Harrist 
preacher, to reopen his church in Bingerville.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The new Constitution does not provide 
specifically for these rights, and both the Guei and Gbagbo Governments 
on occasion restricted these rights in practice. The Government 
generally does not restrict internal travel. However, police, 
gendarmes, and water, forestry, and customs officials commonly erect 
and operate roadblocks on major roads, where they demand that passing 
motorists or passengers produce identity and vehicle papers and 
regularly extort small amounts of money or goods for contrived or minor 
infractions. The Guei and Gbagbo governments imposed curfews six times 
during the year during periods of political upheaval.
    Citizens normally may travel abroad and emigrate freely and have 
the right of voluntary repatriation. However, the Government severely 
restricted political party leaders from traveling outside of the 
country.
    On May 16, the CNSP announced in a communique that all overseas 
travel by political party leaders must be approved by the CNSP. The 
CNSP justified this action by saying it would allow it to ``better 
manage'' the period leading up to the July 23 referendum. On May 23, 
the CNSP refused to allow the FPI Secretary General, Abou Drahamane 
Sangare, to go to Algeria for the Socialist Forces Front Congress. 
Authorities also prevented Morifere Bamba, the leader of the Party for 
Progress and Socialism (PPS), from leaving the country. On July 25, 
after the referendum, the CNSP announced that the requirement to seek 
CNSP authorization to travel outside the country was no longer in 
force; however, on July 27, airport security forces prevented Ouattara 
from boarding a flight to Paris. On July 29, the CNSP reinstated 
restrictions on political party leaders leaving the country.
    On September 23, General Guei refused to grant political party 
leaders permission to leave the country to attend the special summit of 
African leaders on Cote d'Ivoire, citing the preelection travel ban. 
General Guei did not attend the event but sent Prime Minister Seydou 
Diarra and Foreign Minister Charles Gomis to represent the Government. 
President Gbagbo lifted the international travel ban shortly after 
taking office.
    On February 23, airport police prevented Tape Koulou, Publication 
Director for the pro-Bedie daily newspaper Le National, from boarding a 
flight to France. The airport police who prevented the boarding stated 
that they were directed to do so by higher authorities.
    There are no known cases of revocation of citizenship. The 
citizenship issue was debated extensively during the year; many 
citizens challenged the legitimacy of other voters' claims to 
citizenship. The public debate over Ouattara's citizenship continued at 
year's end. On November 30, the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber 
declared him ineligible for the legislative seat in his ancestral home 
of Kong (see Section 3.). Following that decision, thousands of RDR 
supporters demonstrated in Abidjan and northern cities (see Sections 
1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.).
    The country has not enacted legislation to provide refugee or 
asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. 
The only domestic statute in force is the 1990 immigration law, which 
includes refugees without specifying a separate legal status for them. 
Nevertheless, the Government respects the right to first asylum and 
does not deny recognition to refugees, either by law or custom. There 
were approximately 120,000 refugees in the country at year's end, at 
least 100,000 of whom are Liberian. Following the end of the Liberian 
civil war, an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 refugees returned to Liberia 
either under U.N. auspices or independently. The remaining refugees 
were from Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes region, including Rwanda and 
Burundi.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in health, education, and food distribution programs 
for refugees. In January International Rescue Committee (IRC) staff 
identified sanitation problems and severe overcrowding in schools at 
the Nicla Camp.
    On December 23, the Nigerian Government announced that it had begun 
repatriating its citizens who were subjected to repeated harassment by 
Ivoirian authorities (see Section 1.c.). Approximately 300 Nigerians 
stated that Ivoirian authorities regularly tore up their identity cards 
and stole goods. The Nigerians also accused the police of encouraging 
groups of youths to steal for them. Police would take them to police 
stations where they were beaten and detained overnight if they did not 
pay a bribe to the officers.
    There were no reports that persons who had a valid claim to asylum 
or refugee status were repatriated involuntarily to a country where 
they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The new Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change 
their government peacefully through democratic means; however, 
presidential elections held on October 22 were marred by significant 
violence and irregularities, including a suspension of the vote count 
for several days.
    The presidential elections followed several postponements and a 
controversial Supreme Court decision on October 6 disqualifying 14 of 
the 19 candidates, including all of the PDCI and RDR candidates. The 
new Constitution includes language that is considered more restrictive 
than the Electoral Code of the previous Constitution on the subject of 
parentage and eligibility requirements for candidates. Ouattara was 
excluded from running in the Presidential and the National Assembly 
elections following the Supreme Court's October 6 and November 30 
rulings that he had not demonstrated conclusively that he was of 
Ivoirian parentage. Furthermore the Court maintained that Ouattara had 
considered himself a citizen of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) earlier in 
his career. PDCI candidate and former Minister of State for Interior 
and Decentralization Emile Constant Bombet was disqualified because he 
faced outstanding charges of abuse of office from when he was Minister. 
Former President Bedie was disqualified for not submitting a proper 
medical certificate.
    Following the Supreme Court decision, most international election 
observers decided not to participate in the election. As a result, 
there were only 75 observers nationwide, 29 of whom were EU observers 
who originally were there assessing the overall security situation. The 
nationwide participation rate was 33 percent, and some polling places, 
especially in the North, closed early because of the lack of voters. 
Preliminary results showed that Gbagbo was leading by a significant 
margin. However, during the afternoon of October 23, soldiers and 
gendarmes entered the National Elections Commission (CNE) to stop the 
count. They expelled journalists and disrupted television and radio 
broadcasting. On October 24, Daniel Cheick Bamba, an Interior Ministry 
and CNE official, announced on national radio and television that CNE 
had been dissolved and declared General Guei the victor with 56 percent 
of the vote. Thousands of Gbagbo supporters began protesting almost 
immediately, demanding a proper vote count. Mass demonstrations 
continued until October 26 and resulted in numerous deaths and injuries 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In the early afternoon on October 25, 
national radio and television reported that Guei had stepped down.
    When Gbagbo was inaugurated on October 26, gendarmes loyal to the 
new president violently suppressed RDR street demonstrations held to 
demand new presidential elections.
    On December 4 and 5, gendarmes and police officers violently 
dispersed members of the RDR who were demonstrating to protest against 
the invalidation of Ouattara's candidacy in the legislative elections 
(see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.).
    The National Assembly election took place on December 10 and was 
marred by violence, irregularities, and a very low participation rate. 
The FPI won 96 out of 225 seats in the National Assembly; the PDCI, the 
former ruling party, won 77 seats; independent candidates won 17 seats; 
and 4 other parties won 7 seats. Largely because of the RDR boycott of 
the elections to protest against the invalidation of Ouattara's 
candidacy, the participation rate in the legislative election was only 
33.12 percent. In addition the election could not take place in 26 
electoral districts in the north because RDR activists disrupted 
polling places, burned ballots, and threatened the security of 
elections officials.
    Before the adoption of the new electoral code, the number of 
registered voters in districts of the National Assembly, each of which 
elects one representative, varied by as much as a factor of 10; these 
inequalities systematically favored the ruling party. In August the 
Guei Government announced a fairer redistribution of constituencies. 
Before the December legislative elections, the Gbagbo Government 
completed the redistribution of electoral constituencies in line with 
the 1998 national census.
    The Constitution was drafted by the CNSP-created Constitutional and 
Electoral Consultative Commission (CCCE), which was made up of members 
of major political parties and civil society; however, the CNSP made 
changes to the CCCE's text prior to submitting the draft Constitution 
to a referendum. The Constitution was adopted in a referendum held on 
July 23 and 24 by 86 percent of those voting, the Constitution of the 
Second Republic was implemented formally on August 4. The referendum 
was supervised by a quasi-independent commission that included 
representatives from some government ministries, civil society, and 
political parties.
    The new Constitution and Electoral Code provide for legislative 
elections every 5 years and presidential elections every 5 years by a 
single and secret ballot. The new Constitution also continued the 
tradition of a strong presidency.
    General Guei and the CNSP dominated the governing of the country 
for most of the year, even though a largely civilian cabinet was put in 
place in January. General Guei changed the make-up of this cabinet four 
times during the year. The National Assembly remained suspended until 
the December elections, but the Supreme Court continued to function.
    Upon assuming power in October, Gbagbo sought to include 
representatives from all political parties in his government. Except 
for the Republican Rally (RDR), which decided not to accept ministerial 
posts, most major political parties were represented in the new 
Government, which is made up of 24 ministers including the Prime 
Minister. Nineteen ministers are members of the FPI; three ministers 
are members of the PDCI, the former ruling party, and two ministers are 
members of the PIT, a minor left-wing party.
    Citizens' ability to elect sub-national governments is limited. The 
State remains highly centralized. Sub-national government entities 
exist on several levels, and include 19 regions, 58 departments, 230 
sub-prefectures, and 196 communities. However, at all levels except for 
communities, which are headed by mayors elected for 5-year terms, and 
traditional chieftaincies, which are headed by elected chiefs, all sub-
national government officials are appointed by the central Government. 
Sub-national governments generally must rely on the central Government 
for much of their revenue, but mayors have autonomy to hire and fire 
community administrative personnel.
    Although there are no legal impediments to women assuming political 
leadership roles, women are underrepresented in government and 
politics. Women held 3 of the 26 ministerial positions in the Guei 
transition Government, and Gbagbo's cabinet includes 5 women. There are 
three women on the Supreme Court. At year's end, there were 17 women in 
the National Assembly. In January 1999, Henriette Dagri Diabate was 
elected to the post of Secretary General of the opposition RDR; she 
became the first woman to lead a political party.
    There are no legal impediments to the exercise of political rights 
by any of the more than 60 ethnic groups in the country. General Guei 
increased the number of governmental posts filled by members of his 
ethnic group, the Yacouba, and other western ethnic groups. The Baoule, 
to which both former Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Bedie belonged, 
and other Akan ethnic groups that have tended to support the PDCI, were 
overrepresented previously in both mid-level and low-level appointed 
positions throughout the public sector.
    However, President Gbagbo sought improved ethnic and regional 
balance in the Government by including members from seven different 
ethnic groups. Nine members of Gbagbo's first cabinet were from the 
Krou group in the western provinces from which Gbagbo comes. There were 
three ministers from the North (Mande and Senoufo). The remainder 
mostly were from the center and the east (Baoule). Three Ministers in 
Gbagbo's Cabinet were Muslims.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Both the Guei Government and the Gbagbo Government allowed inquiry 
and reporting by human rights NGO's. The LIDHO, a domestic human rights 
NGO formed in 1987 and recognized by the Government in 1990, 
investigated alleged violations of human rights actively and issued 
press releases and reports, some critical of the Government. Other 
local NGO's also monitored government human rights abuses and published 
press releases critical of the Government's record. For example, the 
MIDH investigated the December demonstrations following Ouattara's 
disqualification from legislative elections (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 
2.b., and 3). The MIDH stated that the Government had been 
accommodating to their investigation.
    The Government cooperated with international inquiries into its 
human rights practices. Following a visit by Amnesty International 
Secretary General Pierre Sane in May, General Guei formally disbanded 
the ``parallel forces'' upon Sane's advice. President Gbagbo invited 
several international human rights groups, including HRW and the 
International Federation of Human Rights, to conduct independent 
investigations into the mass grave at Yopougon (see Section 1.a.).

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The new Constitution and the law prohibit discrimination based on 
race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or religion; however, in 
practice women occupy a subordinate role in society. Societal ethnic 
discrimination and division are problems.
    Women.--Representatives of the Ivoirian Association for the Defense 
of Women (AIDF) state that spousal abuse (usually wife beating) occurs 
frequently and often leads to divorce. A July 1998 AIDF survey found 
that many women refused to discuss their experience of domestic 
violence; of women who completed the AIDF interview process, nearly 90 
percent had been beaten or struck on at least one occasion. Doctors 
state that they rarely see the victims of domestic violence. A severe 
social stigma is attached to such violence, and neighbors often 
intervene in a domestic quarrel to protect a woman who is the known 
object of physical abuse. The courts and police view domestic violence 
as a family problem unless serious bodily harm is inflicted, or the 
victim lodges a complaint, in which case they may initiate criminal 
proceedings. The Government does not collect statistics on rape or 
other physical abuse of women. The Government has no clear policy 
regarding spousal abuse beyond what is contained in the civil code. In 
December 1998, the National Assembly enacted the Law Concerning Crimes 
against Women, which forbids and provides criminal penalties for forced 
or early marriage and sexual harassment, but says nothing about spousal 
abuse.
    Women's advocacy groups have protested the indifference of 
authorities to female victims of violence and called attention to 
domestic violence and female genital mutilation (FGM). The groups also 
reported that women who are the victims of rape or domestic violence 
often are ignored when they attempt to bring the violence to the 
attention of the police. In July 1999, the AIDF launched a petition 
drive to pressure the authorities to enact and enforce laws against 
domestic violence, especially spousal abuse; 18,000 petitions were 
collected by the end of 1999. The AIDF also is active in opposing 
forced marriage and advancing the rights of female domestic workers. On 
July 17, AIDF established a national committee with members of national 
and international institutions in Abidjan to fight violence against 
women. The committee's objective is to define programs and actions to 
reduce social inequalities and to make recommendations on combating 
violence against women. One month after establishing the committee, the 
Minister of Women's Affairs and Family, Constance Yai, held a workshop 
on developing strategies to fight violence against women.
    The new Constitution and the law prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of sex; however, women occupy a subordinate role in society. 
Government policy encourages full participation by women in social and 
economic life; however, there is considerable informal resistance among 
employers to hiring women, whom they consider less dependable because 
of their potential pregnancy. Women are underrepresented in some 
professions and in the managerial sector as a whole. Some women also 
encounter difficulty in obtaining loans, as they cannot meet the 
lending criteria mandated by banks. These criteria include such 
elements as title to a house and production of profitable cash crops, 
specifically coffee and cocoa. Women in the formal sector are paid on 
an equal scale with men. In rural areas, women and men divide the 
labor, with men clearing the land and attending to cash crops like 
cocoa and coffee, while women grow vegetables and other staples and 
perform most menial household tasks.
    Children.--Primary education is compulsory, but this requirement is 
not enforced effectively. Primary education is free but usually ends at 
age 13. Poverty causes many children to leave the formal school system 
when they are between the ages of 12 and 14 if they fail secondary 
school entrance exams. Students who pass entrance exams may elect to go 
to free public secondary schools. Secondary school entrance is 
restricted by the difficulty of the exam, which changes each year, and 
the state's ability to provide sufficient spaces for all who would like 
to attend. Many children leave school after only a few years. According 
to UNICEF statistics, 79 percent of males and 58 percent of females of 
primary school age reportedly were enrolled in the period between 1990 
and 1996; more recent statistics were not available.
    There is a parental preference for educating boys rather than 
girls, which is noticeable throughout the country but is more 
pronounced in rural areas; however, the primary school enrollment rate 
for girls is increasing in the northern part of the country. The 
Minister of National Education stated that almost one-third of the 
primary and secondary school dropout rate of 66 percent was 
attributable to pregnancies, and that many of the sexual partners of 
female students were teachers, to whom girls sometimes granted sexual 
favors in return for good grades or money. In January 1998, in an 
effort to combat low enrollment rates for girls, the Government 
instituted new measures against the statutory rape of students by 
teachers.
    The penalty for statutory rape or attempted rape of either a girl 
or a boy aged 15 years or younger is a 1- to 3-year prison sentence and 
a fine of $140 to 1,400 (FCFA 100,000 to 1,000,000).
    There are large populations of street children in the cities. 
Fraternite Matin, the government daily newspaper, reported in April 
that the number of street children in the country is 200,000, of which 
50,000 are in Abidjan. Some children are employed as domestics and are 
subject to sexual abuse, harassment, and other forms of mistreatment by 
their employers, according to the AIDF and press reports (see Section 
6.d.).
    In September 1998, an Abidjan daily newspaper reported allegations 
by a 14-year-old boy that he had been sodomized repeatedly over many 
months by a network of pedophiles that included former Minister of 
Economic Infrastructure Ezan Akele and a foreign ambassador. Leading 
human rights organizations, including the LIDHO, demanded that the 
alleged pedophiles not be shielded from prosecution. In January 1999, 
judges released six of the eight accused in this matter on provisional 
liberty, and the trial court dismissed the suit in March 1999. The 
boy's parents have appealed the dismissal, and the appeal still was 
pending at year's end.
    According to an UNICEF study, approximately 15,000 Malian children 
were trafficked and sold into indentured servitude on Ivoirian 
plantations in 1999, and observers believe that the rate of trafficking 
remained approximately the same during the year (see Sections 6.c., 
6.d., and 6.f.).
    The Ministries of Public Health and of Employment, Public Service, 
and Social Security seek to safeguard the welfare of children, and the 
Government also has encouraged the formation of NGO's such as the 
Abidjan Legal Center for the Defense of Children. In 1996 the 
Government announced a series of measures aimed at reducing the 
population of street children. These steps include holding parents 
legally and financially responsible for their abandoned children and 
the development of training centers where children can learn a trade; 
however, this in not abided to in practice. One of these centers opened 
in Dabou in July 1999.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is a serious problem. Until 1998 there was no law 
that specifically prohibited FGM, which was considered illegal only as 
a violation of general laws prohibiting crimes against persons. 
However, the December 1998 Law Concerning Crimes against Women 
specifically forbids FGM and makes those who perform it subject to 
criminal penalties of imprisonment for up to 5 years and a fine of 
roughly $650 to $3,500 (360,000 to 2 million FCFA francs); double 
penalties apply for medical practitioners. FGM is practiced 
particularly among the rural populations in the north and west and to a 
lesser extent in the center. The procedure usually is performed on 
young girls or at puberty as part of a rite of passage; it is done 
almost always outside modern medical facilities, and techniques and 
hygiene do not meet modern medical standards. According to the World 
Health Organization and the AIDF, as many as 60 percent of women have 
undergone FGM. Since the law on FGM was enacted in December 1998, six 
girls in Abidjan's Port Bouet district were mutilated, and police and 
social workers neither acted to prevent the mutilation nor to arrest 
the girls' parents. In response the Minister of Solidarity and the 
Promotion of Women organized numerous seminars and informational 
meetings on FGM concentrating on regions where it is practiced widely. 
The seminars targeted police, administrative authorities, and 
traditional political and religious leaders.
    As a result of the active campaign against FGM undertaken by the 
Government and NGO's, several excisors were arrested in the north for 
performing excisions. In prior years, arrests were made only following 
the death of the FGM victim. On May 6, two excisors from Guinea were 
arrested in Abobo and imprisoned following the death of a young 
Burkinabe girl who had been excised. On July 12, police arrested two 
Ivoirian women in the northern city of Kongasso and detained them in 
Seguela for practicing FGM on girls between the ages of 10 and 14.
    Women's advocacy organizations continued to sponsor campaigns 
against FGM, forced marriage, marriage of minors, patterns of 
inheritance that exclude women, and other practices considered harmful 
to women and girls. Children regularly are trafficked into the country 
from neighboring countries and sold into forced labor (see Sections 
6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--In October 1998, the National Assembly 
enacted a law that requires the State to educate and train disabled 
persons, to hire them or help them find jobs, to design houses and 
public facilities for wheelchair access, and to adapt machines, tools, 
and work spaces for access and use by the disabled. The law covers 
individuals with physical, mental, visual, auditory, and cerebral motor 
disabilities. The Government is working to put these regulations into 
effect; however, the law had not been implemented fully by year's end. 
Wheelchair accessible facilities for the disabled are not common, and 
there are few training and job assistance programs for the disabled.
    Laws also exist that prohibit the abandonment of the mentally or 
physically disabled and enjoin acts of violence directed at them.
    Traditional practices, beliefs, and superstitions vary, but 
infanticide in cases of serious birth disabilities is less common than 
in the past. Disabled adults are not specific targets of abuse, but 
they encounter serious difficulties in competing with nondisabled 
workers. The Government supports special schools, associations, and 
artisans' cooperatives for the disabled, but physically disabled 
persons still beg on urban streets and in commercial zones.
    Religious Minorities.--Relations between the various religious 
communities generally are amicable; however, there is some societal 
discrimination against Muslims and followers of traditional indigenous 
religions.
    The country's Islamic communities are subject to a great deal of 
societal discrimination. Some non-Muslims have opposed construction of 
mosques, such as the new mosque in Abidjan's Plateau district, because 
the Islamic duty to give alms daily may attract beggars to 
neighborhoods containing mosques. Some non-Muslims also object to 
having to hear the muezzins' calls to prayer. Some persons consider all 
Muslims as foreigners, fundamentalists, or terrorists. Muslim citizens 
often are treated as foreigners by their fellow citizens, including 
government officials, because most Muslims are members of northern 
ethnic groups that also are found in other African countries from which 
there has been substantial immigration into the country. Muslims also 
frequently were discriminated against because of ethnic origin or 
political leanings. Many Muslims are northerners and tended to support 
the presidential candidacy of Ouattara.
    During the October demonstrations, FPI militants burned several 
mosques in the Abidjan's Yopougon district in retaliation, for RDR 
militants burning churches (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 3). On October 
26 and again in early December, rival political groups burned a number 
of churches and mosques across the country. On December 5, youths set 
fire to a mosque in Abidjan's Abobo district.
    Followers of traditional indigenous religions are subject to 
societal discrimination. Many leaders of religions such as Christianity 
or Islam look down on practitioners of traditional indigenous religions 
as pagans, practitioners of black magic, or human sacrifice. Some 
Christians or Muslims refuse to associate with practitioners of 
traditional indigenous religions. The practices of traditional 
indigenous religions often are shrouded by secrecy, and include 
exclusive initiation rites, oaths of silence, and taboos against 
writing down orally transmitted history. However, there have been no 
reports of human sacrifice in the country since well before 
independence. Although the purported practice of black magic or 
witchcraft continues to be feared widely, it generally is discouraged 
by traditional indigenous religions, aspects of which commonly purport 
to offer protection from witchcraft. Traditional indigenous religions 
commonly involve belief in one supreme deity as well as lesser deities 
or spirits that are to be praised or appeased, some of whom in some 
religions may be believed to inhabit or otherwise be associated with 
particular places, natural objects, or manmade images. However, many 
practitioners of traditional indigenous religions are unaware of 
societal discrimination and have not complained.
    Conflicts between and within religious groups have surfaced 
occasionally. Members of the Limoudim of Rabbi Jesus, a small Christian 
group of unknown origin, have criticized and sometimes attacked other 
Christian groups, allegedly for failing to follow the teachings of 
Jesus. In January 1998, a conflict over land erupted between Catholics 
and Assembly of God members in Abidjan's Yopougon district. The same 
area was the scene of a land conflict between Baptists and their 
neighbors in August 1998; however, there were no reports of such 
conflicts during the year.
    The Celestial Christians are divided because of a leadership 
struggle, as are the Harrists, who have fought on occasion. In March 
due to the internal struggle in the Harrist Church, clergy leader 
Barthelemy Akre Yasse struck from the church rolls Harrist National 
Committee president Felix Tchotche Mel for insubordination. This battle 
for church leadership at the national level led to violent 
confrontations between church members at the local level. In April 
local governments, in order to prevent further violence, closed some 
Harrist churches (see Section 2.c.).
    Prior to the December 1999 coup, the Islamic leadership was 
fractured by disagreement between factions, two of which (the Superior 
Islamic Council and the Ouamma Islamic Front) were allied with the 
former ruling party, and two of which (the National Islamic Council and 
the Islamic Confederation for the Development of Cote d'Ivoire) were 
unaligned politically and had sought to create Islamic organizations 
that enjoy the same freedom from unofficial state oversight and 
guidance that Catholic organizations long have enjoyed. Following the 
December 1999 coup, the organizations began to work together.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of 
approximately 15.3 million (1998 Census) is ethnically diverse. The 
citzenry--not including the large noncitizen part of the population--is 
made up of five major families of ethnic groups. The Akan family made 
up more than 42 percent of the citizenry; the largest Akan ethnic 
group, and the largest ethnic group in the country, is the Baoule. 
Approximately 18 percent of citizens belong to the Northern Mande 
family, of which the Malinke are the largest group. Approximately 11 
percent of citizens belong to the Krou family, of which the Bete are 
the largest group. The Voltaic family accounts for another 18 percent 
of the population, and the Senoufou are the largest Voltaic group. 
Approximately 10 percent belong to the Southern Mande family, of which 
the Yacouba are the largest group. Major ethnic groups generally have 
their own primary languages and their non-urban populations tend to be 
concentrated regionally.
    At least 26 percent of the population is foreign, of which 95 
percent are other Africans. Most of the Africans are from neighboring 
countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso and may not claim citizenship 
legally. Birth in Ivoirian national territory does not confer 
citizenship. The ethnic composition of the whole population, including 
these noncitizens, is quite different from that of the citizenry alone.
    All ethnic groups sometimes practice societal discrimination on the 
basis of ethnicity. Urban neighborhoods still have identifiable ethnic 
characteristics, and major political parties tend to have identifiable 
ethnic and regional bases, although interethnic marriage increasingly 
is common in urban areas.
    Some ethnic groups include many noncitizens, and their share of the 
electorate would be increased by enfranchising noncitizens. Other 
ethnic groups include few noncitizens, and their share of the 
electorate would be decreased by enfranchising noncitizens. There are 
societal and political tensions between these two sets of ethnic 
groups. This cleavage corresponds to some extent to regional 
differences; ethnic groups that include many noncitizens are found 
chiefly in the north. Members of northern ethnic groups that are found 
in neighboring countries as well as in the country often are required 
to document their citizenship, whereas members of historically or 
currently politically powerful ethnic groups of the south and west 
reportedly do not have this problem. Police routinely abuse and harass 
noncitizen Africans residing in the country (see Section 1.c.). 
Official harassment reflects the frequently encountered conviction that 
foreigners are responsible for high crime rates, as well as concern for 
Ivorian national identity and identity card fraud.
    The new Constitution includes a restrictive presidential 
eligibility clause that not only limits presidential candidates to 
those who can prove that both parents were born in the country, but 
also states that a candidate can never have benefited from the use of 
another nationality.
    Election law changes in 1999 also limited presidential candidates 
to those who could prove that both parents were born in the country. 
Because of this restriction, Ouattara was considered ineligible for 
both presidential and legislative elections during the year.
    Differences between members of ethnic groups are a major source of 
political tensions and since 1997 have erupted repeatedly into 
violence. Many members of the Baoule group, which long has inhabited 
the east-central region, have settled in towns and on previously 
uncultivated land in other areas, especially in more westerly regions. 
In the past, the Government generally has viewed use of land as 
conferring de facto ownership of land. However, in December 1998, the 
National Assembly enacted the new Land Use Law, which establishes that 
land title does not transfer from the traditional owner to the user 
simply by virtue of use.
    General Guei initially included many members of the previously 
disenfranchised northern and western ethnic groups in the transition 
Government, but over the course of the year he excluded northerners 
from the power structure. Guei filled an increasing number of 
government positions with members of his ethnic group, the Yacouba, and 
he brought a number of southern PDCI officials back into the 
Government. During the Bedie regime, members of the Baoule ethnic group 
dominated the PDCI and held disproportionate numbers of positions in 
the public sector, including the security forces, the civil service, 
and state-owned businesses (see Section 3). Gbagbo's cabinet, which 
took office on October 27, included three Muslims and three 
northerners, most significantly the Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs.
    Tensions continued in the southwest between Kroumen and settlers 
from Burkina Faso, many of whom were born in the region or have lived 
in the region for up to 30 years. The most significant violence began 
in late August, then continued in September and October. In August and 
September, fighting in the villages of Trahe and Heke (Grand Bereby) 
resulted in at least 13 deaths. In October fighting in Trahe and Heke 
resulted in another five deaths. Fighting between August and October 
drove approximately 2,500 persons from their homes, including citizen 
Baoules and Kroumen who were caught in the battles. In November 1999, 
approximately 12,000 Burkinabe were forced to return to Burkina Faso as 
a result of land battles. Although some of those who left had returned 
by year's end, the majority remained in Burkina Faso. There were no 
further reports of violence between native Kroumen and settlers and 
migrant laborers from Burkina Faso during the year.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The new Constitution and the Labor 
Code grant all citizens, except members of the police and military 
services, the right to form or join unions. Registration of a new union 
requires 3 months. For almost 30 years, the government-sponsored labor 
confederation, the General Union of Workers of Cote d'Ivoire (UGTCI), 
dominated most union activity. The UGTCI's hold on the labor movement 
loosened in 1991 when several formerly UGTCIaffiliated unions broke 
away and became independent. In 1992 a total of 11 formerly independent 
unions joined to form the Federation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Cote 
d'Ivoire. There also are two other registered labor federations not 
affiliated with the Government, including the Dignite labor federation. 
Unions legally are free to join federations other than the UGTCI, 
although in the past the Government pressured unions to join UGTCI.
    The right to strike is provided by the new Constitution, and by 
statute. The Labor Code requires a protracted series of negotiations 
and a 6-day notification period before a strike may take place, making 
legal strikes difficult to organize. In the aftermath of the December 
1999 coup, the CNSP and the Labor Ministry arbitrated more than 80 
labor-related conflicts. Employees working for Solibra, Tropical 
Rubber, Cote d'Ivoire Blohorn, and PISAM Hospital, complained about 
severe problems including being underpaid, working in dangerous job 
conditions, and lack of safety concerns.
    On February 1, police used tear gas to disperse striking workers at 
the Commune of Cocody City Hall (see Section 1.c.).
    Public and private school teachers went on strike several times 
during the year to protest lack of pay raises and perceived government 
apathy to their demands. Public teachers, especially those hired under 
a 1991 law that cut starting salaries in half, demanded that the new 
Government fulfill promises made during the Bedie regime to raise 
salaries and improve benefits. Guei accepted most of their demands and 
agreed to implement the wage increases in 2001. President Gbagbo 
repeated these promises.
    In March private teachers also organized a series of strikes to 
protest nonpayment of salaries. In November six private school teachers 
went on a hunger strike to protest that their pay was not competitive 
with their public school counterparts. In December the Government 
offered to give the six private school teachers $7,000 (500,000 FCFA) 
each.
    In February the union of employees of the company BlohornUnilever 
attempted to negotiate a reduction in the substantial difference in 
salary between foreign workers (especially European) and those hired 
locally. Complaining of what workers called ``Salary Apartheid,'' union 
leaders called a 72-hour strike after talks failed. The strike ended 
when management promised to ``look into the issue;'' however, no 
improvements had been made by year's end.
    In August security guards assigned to a sub-prefecture in Abidjan 
and radio technicians in the Ministry of the Interior and 
Decentralization went on strike over lack of benefits and a set salary 
of $90 (62,000 FCFA) a month for workers regardless of work experience 
and length of service. Instead of negotiating with the workers, 
Interior Minister Grena Mouassi replaced them.
    Minibus owners and drivers union went on strike for 1 day on 
November 27 in response to gendarmes' abuse of some minibus drivers 
(see Section 1.c.). Truck drivers went on strike for 48 hours in 
November and obtained the arrest of the gendarme who had shot at a 
colleague. The gendarme's trial started November 28 but had not been 
completed by year's end.
    Unions are free to join international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The new 
Constitution provides for collective bargaining, and the Labor Code 
grants all citizens, except members of the police and military 
services, the right to bargain collectively. Collective bargaining 
agreements in effect are in many major business enterprises and sectors 
of the civil service. In most cases in which wages are not established 
in direct negotiations between unions and employers, salaries are set 
by job categories by the Ministry of Employment and Civil Service. 
Labor inspectors have the responsibility to enforce a law that 
prohibits antiunion discrimination. There have been no known 
prosecutions or convictions under this law, nor have there been reports 
of anti-union discrimination.
    Members of the military intervened directly in labor disputes, 
sometimes arresting and intimidating parties (see Section 1.e.).
    There were no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is 
prohibited by law; however, the International Labor Organization's 
Committee of Experts in its 1996 annual report questioned a decree that 
places certain categories of prisoners at the disposal of private 
enterprises for work assignments without their apparent consent. 
Legislation exists allowing inmates to work outside of prison walls; 
however, because of a lack of funds to hire warden guards to supervise 
the inmates, the law often is not invoked. In April the NGO Doctors 
without Borders funded a project in which inmates where hired to 
improve the sanitation system in their prison. Although it did not 
finance the project, the Government did permit the prisoners to receive 
a salary for their work.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, the 
Government did not acknowledge the problem until recently and does not 
enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.d.). Children 
regularly are trafficked into the country from neighboring countries 
and sold into forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--In most instances, the legal minimum working age is 14; 
however, the Ministry of Employment and Civil Service enforces this 
provision effectively only in the civil service and in large 
multinational companies. Labor law limits the hours of young workers, 
defined as those under the age of 18. However, children often work on 
family farms, and some children routinely act as vendors, shoe shiners, 
errand boys, car watchers, and washers of car windows in the informal 
sector in cities. There are reliable reports of some use of children in 
``sweatshop'' conditions in small workshops. Children also work in 
familyoperated artisanal gold and diamond mines. Primary education is 
mandatory but far from universally enforced, particularly in rural 
areas (see Section 5). Since 1998 the Government has tried to develop 
special technical and vocational programs for those expelled from 
school at an early age. Some technical and vocational programs began 
operations in March and April; at year's end, it was not clear if they 
would be successful.
    Although the Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor, it 
does not enforce this prohibition effectively. Children regularly are 
trafficked into the country from neighboring countries and sold into 
forced labor. There was widespread abuse of foreign children for forced 
labor on agricultural plantations (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government administratively 
determines monthly minimum wage rates, which last were adjusted in 
1996. President Gbagbo promised an overall pay raise, as did General 
Guei; however, no such raises had been granted by year's end. A 
slightly higher minimum wage rate applies for construction workers. The 
Government enforces the minimum wage rates only for salaried workers 
employed by the Government or registered with the social security 
office. Minimum wages vary according to occupation, with the lowest set 
at approximately $52 (36,607 FCFA) per month for the industrial sector, 
which is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. The majority of the labor force works in agriculture 
or in the informal sector where the minimum wage does not apply. 
According to a Labor Ministry survey, workers in the agricultural and 
fishing sector receive an average of $1040 (726,453 FCFA) a year.
    Through the Ministry of Employment and the Civil Service, the 
Government enforces a comprehensive Labor Code that governs the terms 
and conditions of service for wage earners and salaried workers and 
provides for occupational safety and health standards. Those employed 
in the formal sector generally are protected against unjust 
compensation, excessive hours, and arbitrary discharge from employment. 
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours. The law requires overtime 
payment on a graduated scale for additional hours. The Labor Code 
provides for at least one 24-hour rest period per week.
    Government labor inspectors can order employers to improve 
substandard conditions, and a labor court can levy fines if the 
employer fails to comply with the Labor Code. However, in the large 
informal sector of the economy involving both urban and rural workers, 
the Government's occupational health and safety regulations are 
enforced erratically, if at all. The practice of labor inspectors 
accepting bribes is a growing problem, and observers believe that it is 
widespread. Workers in the formal sector have the right under the Labor 
Code to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without 
jeopardy to continued employment by utilizing the Ministry of Labor's 
inspection system to document dangerous working conditions. However, 
workers in the informal sector ordinarily cannot remove themselves from 
such labor without risking the loss of their employment.
    Labor federations such as Dignite are working to provide some 
relief to workers when companies fail to meet minimum salary 
requirements. For example, the sanitary services company ASH continues 
to pay wages as low as $15.50 (12,000 FCFA) a month to female employees 
who work sweeping the streets of Abidjan. According to Dignite, labor 
inspectors continue to ignore this clear violation of the law. The 
shipbuilding company Carena discriminates between European engineers 
who are paid $11,400 (8 million FCFA) a month, compared with their 
African colleagues who receive $114 (80,000 FCFA) a month. Government 
labor and employment authorities have not responded to these problems.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, and there were credible reports that it occurs. Since the 
mid 1990's, media reports have exposed the widespread practice of 
importing and indenturing Malian boys for field work on Ivoirian 
plantations under abusive conditions. For example, children recruited 
by Malians in the border town of Sikasso are promised easy and 
lucrative jobs in Cote d'Ivoire, transported across the border, and 
then sold to other Malians who disperse them throughout the plantations 
of the central region. These children are forced to work under grueling 
conditions in the fields and locked at night in crowded sheds, with 
their clothing confiscated. The Governments of Mali and Cote d'Ivoire 
confirmed these reports in a joint February press conference with 
UNICEF. The Government of Mali and UNICEF took steps to halt this 
trafficking and repatriate the children in Mali; more than 270 Malian 
children were returned to their families during the year. The extent of 
this practice is difficult to estimate because many Malian adults also 
worked on Ivoirian plantations in the same area under difficult 
conditions.
    On February 18, Ivoirian authorities working with the Malian Consul 
in Bouake repatriated 19 Malian men and children who were working as 
forced labor on a plantation in the western region of Bangolo. The 
youngest was 13 years-of-age, although 14 of them were under the age of 
20. The police filed criminal charges against the farm owner and the 
traffickers in February, but at year's end, their trial had not begun.
    In August the Governments of Cote d'Ivoire and Mali signed the 
Bouake agreement, which recognized the need to be more active in 
repatriating Malian children from Cote d'Ivoire. It is estimated that 
some 15,000 Malian children work on Ivoirian cocoa and coffee 
plantations. Many are under 12 years-of-age, sold into indentured 
servitude for $140 (100,000 FCFA), and work 12-hour days for $135 to 
$189 (95,000 to 125,000 FCFA) per year. In September authorities 
intercepted 26 young Malian children and 13 suspected traffickers led 
by Somboro Moussa on their way to Bouake; the children were repatriated 
in mid-September. During the year, more than 270 Malian children have 
been repatriated from Cote d'Ivoire; however, despite the Bouake 
accord, child trafficking remained a problem. In November the Minister 
of Employment announced that it plans to continue working with Malian 
authorities to repatriate child laborers.
    Children also are trafficked into the country from countries other 
than Mali. During the year, there were reports of children, some as 
young as 6 years-of-age, coming from Benin to work as agricultural 
laborers and maids. Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Togo are other sources of 
child labor. The Government discussed a labor agreement with the 
Government of Togo but had not signed an accord by year's end.
                               __________

                                DJIBOUTI

    On April 9, 1999, Djibouti elected its second president since 
gaining independence from France in 1977. Ismael Omar Guelleh, the 
candidate of the ruling party, the People's Rally for Progress (RPP), 
won the election with 74 percent of the vote. Opposition candidate 
Moussa Ahmed Idriss, of the Unified Djiboutian Opposition (ODU), 
received 26 percent of the vote. For the first time since multiparty 
elections began in 1992, no group boycotted the election. The ODU later 
challenged the results based on election ``irregularities'' and the 
assertion that ``foreigners'' had voted in various districts of the 
capital; however, international and locally-based observers considered 
the election to be generally fair and cited only minor technical 
difficulties. Guelleh took the oath of office as President in May 1999, 
with the support of an alliance between the RPP and the government-
recognized section of the Afar-led Front for the Restoration of Unity 
and Democracy (FRUD). The RPP has been the ruling power since 
independence in 1977. Two main ethnic groups hold most political power: 
Somali Issas (the tribe of the President), and Afars. Citizens from 
other Somali clans (Issak, Gadabursi, and Darod), and those of Yemeni 
and other origins, are limited unofficially in their access to top 
government positions. In 1994 the Government and a faction of the FRUD 
signed a peace accord, ending 3 years of civil war. In the accord, the 
Government agreed to recognize the FRUD as a legitimate political 
party. The Government named two FRUD leaders to Cabinet positions in 
1995. On February 7, the Government and the faction of the FRUD that 
had rejected the 1994 peace accord signed a new peace accord, ending 
FRUD opposition to the Government. Since April the two sides have been 
negotiating many issues, including a role for this faction of the FRUD 
in the Government. Two other legal political parties have existed since 
1992, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Party for Democratic 
Renewal (PRD); neither holds a parliamentary seat or a cabinet level 
post. In 1997 the ruling party coalition that includes the FRUD party 
won all 65 seats in legislative elections, which took place without 
international observers and amid opposition claims of massive fraud. 
The judiciary is not independent of the executive.
    The 8,000-member National Police Force (FNP) is responsible for 
internal security and border control, and is overseen by the Ministry 
of Interior. The Ministry of Defense oversees the army. The Gendarmerie 
Nationale, a police force responsible for the President's security, is 
an autonomous unit under the presidency. A small intelligence bureau 
also reports directly to the President. Civilian authorities generally 
maintain effective control of the security forces, but there were 
instances in which the security forces acted independently of the 
Government's authority. Some members of the security forces committed 
human rights abuses.
    The country has little industry and few natural resources. Services 
provide most of the national income. Minor mineral deposits remain 
mostly unexploited. Only a tenth of the land is arable and only 1 
percent is forested. Outside the capital city, the primary economic 
activity is nomadic subsistence. Citizens are free to pursue private 
business interests and to hold personal and real property. The part of 
the annual gross domestic product not generated by and for the foreign 
community, which includes some 8,000 French citizens, is estimated at 
no more than $250 per capita annually. Unusually low rainfall caused 
drought conditions that negatively impacted some of the population. The 
Government did not pay the salaries of teachers, security forces, and 
civil servants for the 5 months prior to the end of the year.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
were a few improvements in some areas, serious problems remain. 
Although the 1999 presidential elections were considered generally 
fair, the 1997 parliamentary elections took place amid claims of 
massive fraud, and the RPP continues to control the political system to 
suppress organized opposition. Members of the security forces committed 
extrajudicial killings. There were credible reports that security 
forces beat, otherwise abused, and at times tortured detainees, and 
raped female inmates. There were credible reports that police beat 
protesters. Prison conditions remained harsh. The Government continued 
to harass and intimidate political opponents, and to arrest and detain 
persons arbitrarily. Prolonged detention and incommunicado detention 
remained problems. The judiciary is not independent of the executive 
and does not ensure citizens' due process. The Government infringed on 
citizens' privacy rights. The Government at times restricted freedom of 
the press. The Government limited freedom of assembly, and restricted 
freedom of association. While the Government respected freedom of 
religion in general, it discouraged proselytizing. There were some 
limits on freedom of movement. The Government remained antagonistic to 
the formation of human rights groups. Violence and discrimination 
against women persisted, and the practice of female genital mutilation 
(FGM) continued to be widespread. Discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity and clan background persisted. The Government restricted 
unions and harassed and intimidated their leaders. Child labor exists.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
committed several extrajudicial killings. On June 24, in a market in 
Balbala, police shot and killed Daher Guedi Fourreh, the nephew of 
Moumin Bahdon Farah, the leader of the opposition party Groupe pour la 
Democratie et Republique (GDR), because they mistook him for a 
smuggler. Police admitted he was shot by mistake and were investigating 
the shooting at year's end.
    On October 13, while forcibly dispersing an unruly crowd 
demonstrating in support of Palestinians, police fired into the crowd, 
killing one person and injuring several others (see Section 2.b.).
    On December 7, approximately 150 police officers, led by Police 
Chief Yacin Yabeh Galab, attempted to overthrow the Government (see 
Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 3); as many as 9 persons were killed and over 
10 injured during clashes in front of the presidential offices between 
the police and the gendarmerie, who were supporting the President. A 
stray bullet also killed a person praying at a nearby Mosque.
    The Government has not used landmines since signing the Mine Ban 
Treaty in 1997; however, the armed wing of the FRUD used landmines 
during its conflict with the Government. Both parties signed a peace 
accord in February, and efforts have begun since to demine the areas in 
which the FRUD operated. FRUD was cooperating with the Government to 
locate landmines laid in northern areas of the country. Landmines laid 
by the Government and FRUD forces in the 1990's remain in some areas of 
the country, especially in areas controlled by the FRUD prior to the 
peace accord (see Section 2.d.), and there were several deaths and 
injuries from landmine explosions during the year. On February 8, a 
military vehicle hit a landmine in Obock, killing one soldier and 
injuring four others. In March in Obock a landmine explosion seriously 
injured two children.
    There were no reports of any action or investigation into the 
following 1999 cases of extrajudicial killings: The March death of a 
political detainee in the main prison; the April killings of Abdallah 
Ahmed Mohamed Rebeh, Moussa Abdallah, Ahmed Yagouri, and Ali Mohamed 
Ali ``Derbi;'' the August killing of eight persons in Tadjourah 
district when an army helicopter exploded; and the September killing of 
one person by police attempting to arrest Moussa Ahmed Idriss.
    There were no reports of any action or investigation into the 
following 1998 cases of extrajudicial killings: The killing of one man 
when police shot into a crowd while attempting to make an arrest in 
downtown Djibouti and the killing of two Afar community elders near 
Assa Gueyla.
    In March 1999, the Paris-based Association for the Respect of Human 
Rights in Djibouti (ARHRD), and an unidentified citizen presented a 
complaint in a French court against former President Gouled and 
President Guelleh alleging human rights violations, including summary 
executions. The complaint listed a series of human rights abuses and 
judicial abuses dating back to 1995. No action was known to have taken 
place by year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    In May 1999, police detained an Ethiopian guard at a private 
residence, allegedly because he was an illegal immigrant. The guard's 
whereabouts still were unknown at year's end.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution provides that no one shall be subjected 
to torture or to other inhuman, cruel, degrading, or humiliating 
punishments, and torture is punishable by 15 years' imprisonment; 
however, there continued to be credible reports that police and 
gendarmes beat, otherwise physically abused, and at times tortured 
prisoners and detainees.
    On October 13, while forcibly dispersing an unruly crowd 
demonstrating in support of Palestinians, police fired into the crowd 
injuring several persons (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
    On December 7, at least 10 persons were injured during clashes in 
front of the presidential offices between the police and the 
gendarmerie (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 3).
    There were widespread, although unconfirmed, reports that gendarmes 
and police beat, raped, or stole personal property from some of 
approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners arrested and detained on 
December 21; most of those arrested were Ethiopian (see Sections 1.d., 
1.f., 2.d., and 5).
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports during the year 
that government security forces in the northern districts denied access 
to food and water to citizens who refused to declare loyalty to the 
Government and renounce the FRUD.
    Landmine explosions resulted in at least one death and several 
injuries during the year (see Section 1.a.).
    There was no known action taken against members of the security 
forces responsible for torturing, beating, or abusing the persons in 
the following 1999 cases: The April case of Saleh Mohamed Dini who 
reportedly was tortured while in custody; the April case of 
approximately 20 Afars reportedly subjected to physical violence while 
in detention in Obock district; and the May case of a civilian who 
reportedly was beat after he refused to walk on a landmine. In March 
1999, an unidentified citizen in conjunction with the ARHRD presented a 
claim in a French court against President Guelleh and former President 
Gouled, alleging that he had been detained arbitrarily and tortured, 
and had suffered physical and psychological damage as a result. There 
were no reported developments in the case at year's end.
    In previous years, there have been credible reports that security 
force personnel raped at least 120 Afar women in the northern districts 
of Obock and Tadjourah (see Section 5). In almost all of the cases, the 
victims did not press charges due to shame and fear. There were no 
reported cases of rape during the year, and there were no developments 
in the 1999 rape case of Zenaba Agoden.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports of clashes 
between unemployed citizens and Ethiopians in various parts of the 
capital.
    In April unknown persons beat and robbed the cousin of Ali Dahan, a 
FRUD official, several days after the delegation of FRUD leaders 
returned to the country (see Sections 2.d. and 3); Dahan was residing 
at his cousin's residence. It still was unknown who the perpetrators 
were at year's end.
    Prison conditions are harsh, and prisons are overcrowded severely. 
Gabode prison, built for 350 persons, at times housed nearly twice that 
number. The Government sometimes shortens prison terms to reduce 
overcrowding. The Ministry of Justice estimates that 60 percent of 
prisoners are illegal Ethiopian immigrants who have committed crimes in 
the country, but that the majority of the approximately 200 prisoners 
in Gabode prison at year's end were citizens. Children of female 
inmates under the age of 5 sometimes are allowed to stay with their 
mothers; authorities say that milk is provided for them. Prisoners 
reportedly must pay authorities to obtain food. Health care sources 
reported that prison guards raped female inmates. Women and men are 
detained separately. Several prisoners were reported to be suffering 
from untreated illnesses or gunshot wounds received during arrest. 
Medical care is inadequate, and the prison infirmary lacks sufficient 
medication. There are no educational or rehabilitation facilities 
within the prison. The lack of funding hampers the ability of Ministry 
of Justice officials to provide even minimal services. In principle 
juveniles are housed separately from adult prisoners; however, in 
practice this is not always the case.
    In March 1999, Abdi Houfaneh Liban, a 35-year old political 
prisoner arrested in April 1998, died under unexplained circumstances. 
Djiboutian human rights groups in France asserted that Abdi's death was 
caused by harsh living conditions in the Gabode prison. Some opposition 
supporters believe that Abdi's death might have been due to poisoning. 
A foreign journalist who visited the prison shortly after Abdi's death 
believes that Abdi died after taking incorrect medication. The 
journalist noted that the prison infirmary was stocked poorly and 
prisoners often were given incorrect medications.
    Conditions at Nagad detention center, where Ethiopians and Somalis 
are held prior to deportation, also are extremely harsh. Detainees at 
Nagad are held in unsanitary conditions and often are not fed for 
several days before their deportation.
    An International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegate from 
Kenya made quarterly visits to the main prison. In March a visiting 
delegation from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Human Rights 
Committee visited Gabode prison. OAU observers stated that the 
conditions at the prison were desperate. The president of the 
Djiboutian Human Rights League (LDDH) was granted permission to visit 
prisoners in Gabode Prison during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Despite legal 
protections, arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems. The 1995 
Penal Code stipulates that the State may not detain a person beyond 48 
hours without an examining magistrate's formal charge. Detainees may be 
held another 24 hours with the prior approval of the public prosecutor. 
All persons, including those accused of political or national security 
offenses, must be tried within 8 months of arraignment. Nevertheless, 
the police occasionally disregarded these procedures, typically 
arresting persons without warrants, and sometimes detaining them for 
lengthy periods without charge. The penal code provides for bail and 
expeditious trial. Incommunicado detention is used.
    On February 22, police detained and questioned for 7 hours Jean-
Paul Abdi Noel, president of the LDDH, regarding a December 20, 1999, 
communique in which Abdi alleged government indifference to the 
populations of the Tadjourah and Obock districts. In March police again 
detained for 2 hours Abdi in conjunction with the same matter; he was 
not charged.
    On March 6, Abdoulfatah Moussa Ahmed, the son of opposition leader 
Moussa Ahmed Idriss, was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment and a fine 
of $129,980 (23 million DF) for misappropriation of public funds. He 
had been in provisional detention since June 22, 1999. He was released 
in April, and his appeal of the sentence was pending at year's end.
    On May 30, police arrested five bus union leaders for organizing a 
strike to protest fuel price increases (see Section 6.a.). On May 31, 
police arrested 15 bus drivers and owners in connection with the 
strike. All were released after 2 days following an agreement to raise 
bus fares.
    On June 3, police detained approximately 160 persons, mostly women 
and children, for blocking traffic in Djibouti City to protest the 
increased bus fares (see Section 2.b.). All were released after 1 or 2 
days.
    On December 21, gendarmes and police arrested and detained 
approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners, most of whom were 
Ethiopian (see Sections 1.c., 1.f., 2.d., and 5). There were 
widespread, although unconfirmed, reports that gendarmes and police 
beat, raped, and stole personal belongings from some of those detained. 
Many of those detained were deported from the country by year's end.
    In April 1999, authorities arrested more than 20 Afars in the Obock 
district for expressing support for the FRUD. After 4 days in detention 
in a military camp at Medeho, five men were released, one was detained 
further, and nine were transferred to a police prison near the capital. 
The remaining nine were released as a result of an amnesty granted in 
February (see Section 1.e.).
    There were no developments in the 1999 cases of: Abdoulfatah Moussa 
Ahmed, who was rearrested in June 1999 and charged with an economic 
crime; and Saleh Mohamed Dini, chief of Mabla, who was arrested in 
April 1999 allegedly for insulting the President. Both remained in 
detention pending trials at year's end.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is not 
independent of the executive. Constitutional provisions for a fair 
trial are not respected universally, even in nonpolitical cases, 
because of interference from the executive branch. The Minister of 
Justice officially is responsible for human rights.
    The judiciary, based on the French Napoleonic code, is composed of 
a lower court, appeals courts, and a Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
can overrule decisions of the lower courts. Magistrates are appointed 
for life terms. The Constitutional Council rules on the 
constitutionality of laws, including those related to the protection of 
human rights and civil liberties; however, its rulings are not always 
respected.
    The legal system is based on legislation and executive decrees, 
French codified law adopted at independence, Shari'a law, and nomadic 
traditions. Urban crime is dealt with in the regular courts in 
accordance with French-inspired law and judicial practice. Civil 
actions may be brought in regular or traditional courts. Shari'a law is 
restricted to civil and family matters. The Government promulgated a 
new law on judicial organization in August, which included the 
establishment of a National Committee for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights and provided for the separation of the court system 
from the Ministry of Justice. The law was not implemented by year's 
end.
    Traditional law (Xeer) often is used in conflict resolution and 
victim compensation. For example, traditional law often stipulates that 
a blood price be paid to the victim's clan for crimes such as murder 
and rape.
    The Constitution states that the accused is innocent until proven 
guilty and has the right to legal counsel and to be examined by a 
doctor if imprisoned. Although trials are public officially, in 
politically sensitive cases security measures effectively prevent 
public access. Legal counsel is supposed to be available to the 
indigent in criminal and civil matters; however, defendants often do 
not have representation. Court cases are heard in public before a 
presiding judge and two accompanying judges. The latter receive 
assistance from two persons, assessors, who are not members of the 
bench, but who are thought to possess sufficient legal sophistication 
to comprehend court proceedings. The Government chooses assessors from 
the public at large, but credible reports indicate that political and 
ethnic affiliations play a role in the selection.
    Human rights attorney Aref Mohamed Aref and his colleague Djama 
Amareh Meidal remained disbarred for alleged irregularities in their 
representation of a client in a 1994 commercial transaction.
    On November 29, in honor of Ramadan, the Government announced that 
the President had signed a decree approved by the Council of Ministers, 
which granted a general amnesty to all prisoners serving sentences of 2 
years or less, and reduced the sentences by 6 months of all prisoners 
serving sentences of more than 2 years. By year's end, the Government 
had released 201 prisoners in accordance with the amnesty.
    From November 11 to 15, the Government sponsored a series of 
judicial assessment workshops to analyze the judicial system and to 
propose recommendations for strengthening the judiciary. The Government 
invited representatives from all opposition parties (see Section 3); 
however, some opposition leaders refused to participate because they 
had been invited in their personal capacity, not as political party 
leaders. Approximately 150 persons participated in the workshops, and 
the governmentowned media provided coverage of the event. The final 
workshop report and recommendations had not been completed by year's 
end.
    In February 1998, the Committee for the Support of Political 
Prisoners (CSPP) was created. In 1999 the CSPP reported that the 
Government held 52 political prisoners, including 12 relatives of 
former cabinet director Ismael Guedi Hared who were arrested in October 
1998, allegedly for hoarding weapons, and 40 FRUD dissidents who had 
been handed over by Ethiopian authorities or were FRUD rebels captured 
in clashes with the army. In March the Council of Ministers approved a 
law granting amnesty for political crimes committed by the FRUD prior 
to the signing of the peace accord. In February the Government released 
all FRUD political prisoners as a condition of the February peace 
accord; on February 10, the Government released 29 political prisoners, 
all members of the FRUD, and on February 12, the Government released an 
additional 18 political prisoners, including 11 followers of Ismael 
Guedi Hared. There were no remaining political prisoners at year's end.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the 
family, home, correspondence, and communications; however, the 
Government infringed on these rights. The law also requires that the 
authorities obtain a warrant before conducting searches on private 
property; however, in practice the Government does not always obtain 
warrants before conducting such searches, and it reportedly monitors 
and sometimes disrupts the communications of some Government opponents. 
On April 16, authorities searched the home and office of the Somaliland 
representative to Djibouti without a warrant and gave him 3 hours to 
gather his belongings and leave the country (see Section 2.d.). Unlike 
in the previous year, there were no reports that authorities harassed 
the family members of opposition leaders.
    On December 21, gendarmes and police arrested and detained 
approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners, most of whom were 
Ethiopian (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.d., and 5). Unlike previous 
searches, police and gendarmes conducted a house to house search for 
these persons. Traffic into and out of entire neighborhoods was 
prohibited during the searches. Although unconfirmed, there were 
widespread reports that police beat, raped, or stole personal property 
from those who were arrested and detained.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, at times the Government 
restricted these rights in practice. The law prohibits the 
dissemination of false information and regulates the publication of 
newspapers. The Constitution prohibits slander.
    The Government owns the principal newspaper, La Nation, which 
expanded publication from weekly to biweekly printings in 1999. There 
are several opposition-run weekly and monthly publications that 
circulate freely and openly criticize the Government.
    On June 22, the Government deported Abdirazak Hadji Soufi and 
Muridi Aboubaker Mahdi, two delegates attending the Somalia Peace and 
Reconciliation Conference, after they criticized the Government for 
allegedly interfering in the conference process (see Section 2.d.).
    In March the opposition newspapers Le Renouveau and Le Temps began 
publishing again following a 6-month ban imposed in 1999 following 
charges of distributing false information. The newspapers' editors had 
been arrested in August 1999 after Le Temps and Le Renouveau reprinted 
a letter in which the Paris-based FRUD leader Ahmed Dini claimed 
responsibility for the downing of an army helicopter. Both were 
released in December 1999 as part of a presidential amnesty.
    In April the Government banned the importation and sale of the 
Somaliland newspapers Jamhuuriya and The Republican. The ban remained 
in effect at year's end.
    The Government also owns the radio and television stations. The 
official media generally are uncritical of government leaders and 
government policy. On May 28, the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) began ``World Service'' in the country in conjunction with Radio-
Television Djibouti (RTD), the official government station. The BBC and 
RTD plan to broadcast 24 hours a day in four languages on the radio. 
Radio France Internationale also broadcasts in the country.
    In May the Government allegedly restricted the activities of BBC 
journalists covering the Somali Conference.
    The country has one Internet service provider, which is owned by 
the Government.
    There are no specific laws or criminal sanctions that threaten 
academic freedom. In general teachers may speak and conduct research 
without restriction, provided that they do not violate sedition laws.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The right to free 
assembly is provided for in the Constitution; however, the Government 
limited this right in practice. The Ministry of Interior requires 
permits for peaceful assembly and monitors opposition activities. While 
permits generally are approved, the Government commonly uses a show of 
police force and threatening tactics to intimidate and discourage 
would-be demonstrators. Some opposition leaders effectively practiced 
self-censorship and, rather than provoke a Government crackdown, 
refrained from organizing popular demonstrations.
    In June the Government refused a request by the ODU to organize a 
march for peace and democracy in celebration of Independence Day.
    On June 3, police detained approximately 160 persons, mostly women 
and children, for blocking traffic in Djibouti City to protest 
increased bus fares (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
    On October 13, police used teargas to disperse an unruly crowd 
demonstrating in support of Palestinians in Djibouti City. A few police 
also fired into the crowd, killing one person and injuring several 
others.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association provided that 
certain legal requirements are met; however, the Government restricts 
this right in practice. A referendum held in 1993 approved limiting the 
number of political parties to four; however, this result has not yet 
been codified into law.
    Nonpolitical associations must register and be approved by the 
Ministry of Interior. The Ministry has delayed registering the 
Djiboutian Human Rights League, which has been trying to register since 
May 1999. By year's end, it still was not registered.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution, while declaring Islam to 
be the state religion, provides for freedom of religion, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice; however, 
proselytizing is discouraged.
    The Qadi is the country's senior judge of Islamic law and was 
appointed by the Minister of Justice in June 1999. His predecessor was 
named Minister of State for Charitable and Religious Affairs under the 
Ministry of Justice--a position that was created in May 1999, when 
President Guelleh formed his Cabinet and declared that Islam would be a 
central tenet of his Government. Although Islam is the state religion, 
the Government imposes no sanctions on those who choose to ignore 
Islamic teachings, or practice other faiths. Over 99 percent of the 
population is Sunni Muslim.
    The Government requires that religious groups be registered. There 
were no reports that the Government refused to register any religious 
groups.
    There is no legal prohibition against proselytizing, but 
proselytizing is discouraged. On a few occasions, police have 
questioned members of the Baha'i faith for possible proselytizing 
activities, but there have been no arrests.
    Islamic law based on the Koran is used only with regard to family 
matters, and is administered by the Qadi. Civil marriage is permitted 
only to non-Muslim foreigners. Muslims are required to marry in a 
religious ceremony, and non-Muslim men only can marry a Muslim woman 
after converting to Islam.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution allows freedom of 
movement; however, there were instances in which authorities limited 
this right. In general citizens may travel or emigrate without 
restriction or interference; however, a judge may order a passport 
seized for those under judicial surveillance or awaiting trial. In 
March the Embassy of Djibouti in Paris refused to issue a passport to 
Ali Dahan, Permanent Representative of the FRUD to the Americas, prior 
to the return of exiled FRUD leaders to the country. On June 5, the 
Government refused to issue a passport to Aden Robleh Awaleh, president 
of the PND, to attend an African Leadership Forum in Nigeria (see 
Section 3); no passport was issued by year's end. On June 30, airport 
police prevented Bogor Abdillahi Bogor Moussa, a participant in the 
Somalia Peace and Reconciliation Conference, from boarding a plane for 
Puntland, in Somalia. In July the Government returned Aref Mohamed 
Aref's passport, which authorities had seized in December 1998. In 
August the Government returned the passport of GDR leader Moumin Bahdon 
Farah, which it had seized and kept in October 1998 despite a court 
order to return it.
    Customary law, which is based on Shari'a (Islamic law), 
discriminates against women (see Section 5). Women are not permitted to 
travel without the permission of an adult male relative.
    On April 15, after the Administration of Somaliland, in Somalia, 
prevented a delegation from the Djiboutian Government to deplane in 
Hargeisa, the Administration closed its border with Djibouti. On April 
16, the Government closed its border with Somalia and expelled the 
Somaliland representative to Djibouti and his staff in retaliation. On 
June 22, the Government deported Abdirazak Hadji Soufi and Muridi 
Aboubaker Mahdi, two delegates attending the Somalia Peace and 
Reconciliation Conference (see Section 2.a.).
    Landmines laid by the Government and FRUD forces in the 1990's 
remain in some areas of the country, especially in areas controlled by 
the FRUD prior to the peace accord, and landmines laid in Tadjoura and 
Obock districts restricted freedom of movement (see Section 1.a.).
    The law provides for the granting of refugee or asylum status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government offers first asylum; 
however, the government committee responsible for determining refugees' 
status has not met since 1995. While the Government officially does not 
recognize those refugees under the protection of the U.N. High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) absent this approval, the refugees are 
permitted to remain in the country.
    The country hosts up to 100,000 refugees and illegal immigrants 
from neighboring countries, equal to approximately one-fifth of the 
population. These numbers have increased since January due to the 
drought in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in May. The UNHCR 
assists 21,000 Somali and 1,000 Ethiopian residents of the two 
remaining refugee camps. Approximately 2,500 Ethiopian and Somali urban 
refugees are registered with the UNHCR office in Djibouti City. In May 
and June, approximately 1,100 Somali refugees, who were living in a 
camp in Eritrea, fled to a temporary camp in Obock to escape the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean war. In October UNHCR began a facilitated 
repatriation of these refugees back to Somalia. All remaining refugees 
in Obock camp were repatriated, and the camp was closed by year's end.
    In May UNHCR repatriated over 1,700 Ethiopian refugees who had fled 
to the country in 1984-85 and ceased to register Ethiopians as 
refugees. In previous years, the Djiboutian National Office for the 
Assistance of Refugees and Displaced Persons reported that it deported 
up to a thousand Ethiopians each week. Although the number of 
deportations still is believed to be high, no figures were available 
during the year.
    There are reports that members of the security forces sometimes 
compel illegal immigrants to work for them under the threat of 
deportation.
    On December 21, gendarmes and police arrested and detained 
approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners, most of whom were 
Ethiopian (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 5). Police and gendarmes 
cordoned off entire neighborhoods and conducted house to house searches 
for these persons. Although unconfirmed, there were widespread reports 
that police beat, raped, or stole personal property from those who were 
arrested and detained. Many of those detained were deported from the 
country by year's end.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
Government, and citizens exercised this right through a democratic 
process in presidential elections held in April 1999. RPP candidate 
Ismael Omar Guelleh, the designated successor of former President 
Hassan Gouled Aptidon, won the 1999 election with 74 percent of the 
vote. ODU candidate Moussa Ahmed Idriss received 26 percent of the 
vote. For the first time since multiparty elections began in 1992, no 
group boycotted the vote. Although Moussa Ahmed Idriss and the ODU 
challenged the results, alleging election ``irregularities'' and 
asserting that ``foreigners'' voted in various districts of the 
capital, international and domestic observers considered the election 
to be generally fair and transparent, citing only minor irregularities. 
All five of the districts were visited by at least 1 of the 22 
international observers on election day. Observers representing the 
Arab League, the International Organization of Francophone States (La 
Francophonie), and the OAU issued a joint communique that expressed 
satisfaction with the transparency of the election, citing only minor 
technical problems. Representatives of both candidates were present in 
virtually all voting stations, and there was no ethnic strife among 
Afars, Yemenis, and Somalis. Large numbers of persons of all 
communities supported both candidates.
    In the December 1997 legislative elections, the RPP alliance with 
the legal FRUD party won all 65 seats. The elections took place without 
international observers amid opposition claims of fraud.
    The RPP, which has been in power since independence in 1977, 
continues to rule the country. The RPP also continues to control 
carefully the implementation of the four-party system to suppress any 
organized opposition. Previous efforts by both the legal and 
unrecognized opposition parties to unify also floundered due to 
disagreements among their leaders over who should lead a unified 
opposition. There is no independent election commission.
    The 1994 peace agreement between the Government and the FRUD 
required that FRUD members be included in senior government positions. 
Two FRUD members were named to the Cabinet in June 1995, and in May 
1999, two new FRUD members were appointed to the Cabinet: A former FRUD 
military commander was appointed to the Defense portfolio and another 
FRUD member assumed the Health portfolio. The government-recognized 
faction of the FRUD was registered as a political party in 1996. On 
February 7, the Government and the faction of the FRUD that had 
rejected the 1994 peace accord signed a new peace accord, ending FRUD 
opposition to the Government. The two sides were negotiating many 
issues at year's end, including the role of this branch of the FRUD in 
the government.
    Government harassment of opposition leaders continued to be a 
problem; however, the number of incidents reportedly decreased during 
the year. On June 5, Aden Robleh Awaleh, president of the PND, was 
refused a passport to attend an African Leadership Forum in Nigeria 
(see Section 2.d.).
    On December 7, approximately 150 police officers, led by Police 
Chief Yacin Yabeh Galab, attempted to overthrow the Government. As many 
as 9 persons were killed and over 10 others were injured during clashes 
in front of the presidential offices between the police and the 
gendarmerie, who were supporting the President (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.). The coup followed months of nonpayment of police salaries by the 
Government and rumors that the President had fired Yacin (see Section 
6.e.). On December 9, police arrested and detained Yacin and 12 others 
for attempting to overthrow the President (see Section 1.d.). On 
December 13, the magistrate in charge of the investigation charged the 
13 with conspiracy and breach of state security and cited them with 
calling on citizens to take up arms illegally, carrying and making use 
of weapons of war, and damaging public property. The 13 remained in 
detention at Gabode Prison pending trials at year's end. On December 
14, the President replaced Yacin as Police Chief with Colonel Ali 
Hassan.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics and have been 
excluded from senior positions in government and in the political 
parties even though they legally are entitled to participate in the 
political process. No women served in the legislature. In May 1999, the 
President announced the appointment of the first female minister to his 
cabinet. Hawa Ahmed Youssouf serves as Minister of State for the 
Promotion of Women's, Family, and Social Affairs, and reports to the 
Prime Minister. Khadija Abeba, President of the Supreme Court, is the 
highest-ranking female official and, according to the Constitution, 
would become interim President should that position become vacant.
    The President's subclan, the Issa Mamassans, wields 
disproportionate power in affairs of state. Afars hold a number of high 
Ministerial posts; however, they are not well represented at lower 
levels. Somali clans other than the Issa and Djiboutians of Yemeni 
origin are limited unofficially to one ministerial post each, which 
they hold. There also are informal limits on the number of seats for 
each group in the Parliament.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not support the formation of local human rights 
groups. The Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Liberties 
(ADDHL), which ceased operations in 1997, briefly resumed activity as a 
progovernment organization in 1998; however, it has not resumed its 
investigations into, or criticisms of, human right abuses.
    The Committee in Support of Political Prisoners (CSPP) was formed 
in February 1998. The Committee's goal is to publicize the plight of 
political prisoners and mobilize support for the improvement of prison 
conditions and for the release of political prisoners.
    The Djiboutian Human Rights League (LDDH) operated without 
government interference during the year.
    The Union of Djiboutian Women (UNFD) and the Djiboutian Association 
for the Promotion of the Family (ADEPF) promote the rights of women and 
children.
    The ICRC maintains a small office that is staffed with locally-
hired personnel. The ICRC regional representative, who is based in 
Nairobi, makes quarterly visits.
    In March the Government permitted a visit by a delegation of the 
OAU Human Rights Committee for the first time. The delegation met with 
senior government officials and had free access to prisons and human 
rights groups.
    In October 1999, a presidential decree created the post of 
government ombudsman, and in November 1999, the first incumbent took 
office. In August the Government promulgated a new law on judicial 
organization, included the establishment of a National Committee for 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights; however, the Committee 
was not established by year's end.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of language, 
race, sex, or religion; however, discrimination against women and 
ethnic minorities persists. In particular the Government's enforcement 
of laws to protect women and children is weak.
    Women.--Violence against women exists but reported cases are few. 
The Government remained concerned about the problem of rape, and the 
1995 revised Penal Code includes sentences of up to 20 years' 
imprisonment for rapists. More than 80 such cases were tried during the 
year, but only a few led to conviction. Violence against women normally 
is dealt with within the family or clan structure rather than in the 
courts. The police rarely intervene in domestic violence incidents, and 
the media report only the most extreme examples, such as murder. In 
almost all the cases of the rape of Afar women by soldiers in recent 
years, the victims did not press charges due to shame and fear (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Women legally possess full civil rights, but custom and traditional 
societal discrimination in education dictate that they play a secondary 
role in public life and have fewer employment opportunities than men. 
Few women work in managerial and professional positions; women largely 
are confined to trade and secretarial fields. Customary law, which is 
based on Shari'a (Islamic law), discriminates against women in such 
areas as inheritance, divorce, and travel (see Section 2.d.). Male 
children inherit larger percentages of an estate than do female 
children. Women are not permitted to travel without the permission of 
an adult male relative. The few women who are educated increasingly 
turn to the regular courts to defend their interests.
    Children.--The Government devotes almost no public funds to the 
advancement of children's rights and welfare. A few charitable 
organizations work with children. Primary education is compulsory; 
however, the Government does not monitor compliance. The Government 
provides public education for free; however, there are extra expenses 
that may be prohibitive to poorer families, such as transportation, 
book fees, and chalk. Many schools are in poor condition and need 
upgrading. The number of classrooms for secondary students is 
inadequate, and only approximately 20 percent of children who start 
secondary school complete their education. More than 53 percent of the 
population is illiterate: Only 32 percent of girls are literate 
compared with 60 percent of boys. Only 62 percent of girls attend 
primary school compared with 73 percent of boys, and only 23 percent of 
girls attend secondary school compared with 33 percent of boys. Girls 
made up only 36 percent of all secondary students. In November 1999, 
the Government reaffirmed its 1998 commitment to increase the number of 
female students in the educational system to 50 percent; however, there 
was no change in the number of female students or the literacy rate by 
year's end.
    It is believed that as many as 98 percent of females age 7 or older 
have undergone FGM, which is condemned widely by international health 
experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health. FGM 
traditionally is performed on girls between the ages of 7 and 10. In 
1988 the Union of Djiboutian Women (UNFD) began an educational campaign 
against infibulation, the most extensive and dangerous form of FGM. The 
campaign only has had a limited impact on the prevalence of this 
custom, particularly in rural areas, where it is pervasive. After the 
1995 U.N. Women's Conference in Cairo, Egypt, the UNFD declared that 
all forms of mutilation should be forbidden. The Penal Code states that 
``violence causing genital mutilation'' is punishable by 5 years' 
imprisonment and a fine of over $5,650 (1 million DF). However, the 
Government has not yet convicted anyone under this statute. The efforts 
of the UNFD and other groups appeared to be having some effect, at 
least in the capital city. In 1997 some health workers reported a 
precipitous drop in the number of hospitalizations related to FGM in 
Djibouti City. Many believe that the incidence of infibulation has 
decreased, although no systematic data was available on the problem. 
U.N. and other experts believe that lesser forms of FGM still were 
practiced widely and that infibulation still was common in rural areas.
    Child abuse exists; however, except for FGM, it is not thought to 
be common. The Government has not addressed child abuse, which often is 
punished lightly; for example, when a child is raped or abused, the 
perpetrator usually is fined an amount sufficient to cover the child's 
medical care. The Government has not used applicable existing 
provisions of the Penal Code to deal with child abuse more severely.
    Child labor persisted (see Section 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate 
accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled. 
Although disabled persons have access to education and public health 
facilities, there is no specific law that addresses the needs of the 
disabled, and there are no laws or regulations that prevent job 
discrimination against disabled persons. The disabled have difficulty 
finding employment in an economy where at least 60 percent of the able-
bodied adult male population is underemployed or jobless.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government continued to 
discriminate against citizens on the basis of ethnicity in employment 
and job advancement. Somali Issas are the majority ethnic group and 
control the ruling party, the civil and security services, and the 
military forces. Discrimination based on ethnicity and clan affiliation 
limited the role of members of minority groups and clans, particularly 
the Afar minority ethnic group, in government and politics.
    The Government conducted periodic roundups of undocumented 
foreigners, which usually targeted Ethiopians and non-Djiboutian 
Somalis. On December 21, gendarmes and police arrested and detained 
approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners, most of whom were 
Ethiopian (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.). Although 
unconfirmed, there were widespread reports that police beat, raped, or 
stole personal property from those who were arrested and detained. The 
Government blames undocumented foreigners for the country's economy, 
unemployment rate, and rising crime.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Under the Constitution, workers are 
free to join unions and to strike provided that they comply with 
legally prescribed requirements; however, the Government limited these 
rights. In 1999 the Government took control of the two largest labor 
unions, the General Union of Djiboutian Workers (UGTD) and the Union of 
Djiboutian Workers (UDT). In May 1999, police broke into UDT offices 
and confiscated banners and the public address system that were to have 
been used in Labor Day ceremonies. At a July 1999 meeting, the 
Government elected its supporters to head the UDT and UGTD, and in 
September 1999, the Government took possession of union offices. The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) criticized the Government's 
actions. On December 1, 1999, the ILO reported that the situation of 
the country's unions had ``gravely deteriorated.'' The ILO rejected the 
credentials of Government officials claiming to represent the UDT and 
UGTD at several international conferences.
    At its June meeting, the ILO demanded the Government enact the 
labor resolutions it had signed in 1998. The ILO noted ongoing abuses 
by the Government in forbidding union meetings and preventing union 
officials from receiving their mail. Prior to the Government takeover, 
approximately 70 percent of workers in the small formal economy were 
members of the UDT or UGTD; however, since the takeover, there have 
been almost no independent union activities. The Djiboutian Labor 
Congress (CIDJITRA), composed of Ministry of Labor officials, created 
by the Government to counter the UDT and UGTD, did not appear to exist 
any longer.
    The law requires representatives of employees who plan to strike to 
contact the Ministry of Interior 48 hours in advance. The Government 
did not pay the salaries of teachers, security forces, and civil 
servants for the 5 months prior to the end of the year (see Section 3). 
Teachers' strikes continued during the year, primarily to protest 
delays in salary payments. Beginning in May, there were periodic 
demonstrations by teachers and other civil servants protesting salary 
arrears (see Section 6.c.). The demonstrations generally took place on 
Thursday mornings and peacefully dispersed after 1 or 2 hours. Kamil 
Hassan, a schoolteacher, who previously had been detained in February 
1997 as a leader of a teacher's strike, still was not permitted to 
teach in public schools. On May 30, police arrested five bus union 
leaders for organizing a strike to protest fuel price increases, which 
increased 33 percent on May 31 (see Section 1.d.). On May 31, police 
arrested 15 bus drivers and owners in connection with the strike, which 
ended on June 3.
    The law permits unions to maintain relations and exchanges with 
labor organizations abroad. The UDT has been a member of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) since 1994.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Although labor 
has the legal right to organize and bargain collectively, collective 
bargaining rarely occurs. Relations between employers and workers are 
informal and paternalistic. Wage rates generally are established 
unilaterally by employers on the basis of Ministry of Labor guidelines. 
In disputes over wages or health and safety problems, the Ministry of 
Labor encourages direct resolution by labor representatives and 
employers. Workers or employers may request formal administrative 
hearings before the Ministry's inspection service; however, critics 
claim that the service suffers from poor enforcement, due to its low 
priority and inadequate funding. The law prohibits antiunion 
discrimination, and employers found legally guilty of discrimination 
are required to reinstate workers fired for union activities; however, 
the Government does not appear to enforce the law.
    An export processing zone (EPZ) was established in 1994. Firms in 
the EPZ are exempt from the Government's social security and medical 
insurance programs. Instead they must provide either government or 
private accident insurance. Employers within the EPZ have authority to 
pay less than minimum wage, offer less annual leave than the rest of 
the country, and in the EPZ the work week is longer (see Section 6.e.). 
However, plans for the EPZ largely have failed; and it does little 
business and employs few people.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
all forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, while 
the law generally is observed, there are reports that members of the 
security forces sometimes compel illegal immigrants to work for them 
under the threat of deportation. There were no reports of forced child 
labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits all labor by children under the age of 
14, but the Government does not always enforce this prohibition 
effectively, and child labor, although not common, exists. A shortage 
of labor inspectors reduces the likelihood of investigation into 
reports of child labor. Children generally are not employed for 
hazardous work. Children may and do work in family-owned businesses, 
such as restaurants and small shops, at all hours. The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and there were no 
reports of forced child labor (see Section 6.c.). The Government 
ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Only a small minority of the 
population is engaged in wage employment. The Government 
administratively sets minimum wage rates according to occupational 
categories, and the Ministry of Labor is charged with enforcement. The 
monthly wage rate for unskilled labor, set in 1976, is approximately 
$90 (15,840 DF). Most employers pay more than the minimum wage. Some 
workers also receive housing and transportation allowances. The minimum 
wage for unskilled labor does not provide adequate compensation for a 
worker and family to maintain a decent standard of living. The 
Government owed 5 months worth of salary arrears to teachers, security 
forces, and civil servants at year's end (see Sections 3 and 6.a.).
    By law the workweek is 40 hours, often spread over 6 days. Some 
employers ask employees to work up to 12 hours per day and pay them an 
additional wage. Workers are provided daily and weekly rest periods and 
paid annual leave. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing 
occupational health and safety standards, wages, and work hours. 
Because enforcement is ineffective, workers sometimes face hazardous 
working conditions, particularly at the port. Workers rarely protest, 
mainly due to fear that others willing to accept the risks may replace 
them. There are no laws or regulations permitting workers to refuse to 
carry out dangerous work assignments without jeopardy to continued 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports of persons being trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                           EQUATORIAL GUINEA

    Equatorial Guinea nominally is a multiparty constitutional 
republic; however, in practice power is exercised by President Teodoro 
Obiang Nguema and the small Mongomo subclan of the majority Fang tribe, 
which has ruled since the country's independence in 1968. President 
Obiang, who has ruled since seizing power in a military coup d'etat in 
1979, was elected to a 7-year term in February 1996 in elections that 
were marred by extensive fraud and intimidation. The President's 
Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) controls the judiciary and 
the legislature; the latter was elected in elections in March 1999 that 
were criticized widely as seriously flawed by the international 
community. The judiciary is not independent.
    President Obiang exercises control over the police and security 
forces through the Minister of the Interior, who also serves as 
President of the National Electoral Board. The Director General of 
National Security is the President's brother, Armengol Ondo Nguema. The 
security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
    The majority of the population of approximately 474,000 lives by 
subsistence agriculture, supplemented by hunting and fishing. 
Unemployment and underemployment is very high. Barter is a major aspect 
of the economy, and the monetary sector is based on exports of 
petroleum, cocoa, and timber. Most foreign economic assistance was 
suspended due to the lack of economic reform and the Government's poor 
human rights record; however, in December 1999, the Government of Spain 
resumed aid. The per capita gross domestic product is approximately 
$1,800. Earnings from offshore oil exploitation are approximately $140 
million per year. However, the investment and other use of oil revenues 
lacked transparency despite repeated calls in previous years from 
international financial institutions and citizens for greater financial 
openness. Poor fiscal management and a lack of public accounting 
transparency in national finances have undermined the country's 
economic potential. Little evidence is apparent that the country's oil 
wealth is being devoted to the public good.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it 
continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the 
ability to change their government in fair elections. The security 
forces committed a number of abuses, including torture, beating and 
other physical abuse of prisoners, suspects, and opposition political 
members. The Government continued to attempt to control opposition 
groups outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other 
countries. The victims of government kidnapings are detained (usually 
without charge), reportedly beaten or tortured, and later released. 
Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. There were 
reports that prison authorities tortured, beat, and otherwise abused 
prisoners, and that such abuse, combined with a lack of medical care, 
resulted in the deaths of prisoners. Prisoners often are subjected to 
torture to extract confessions. Security forces used arbitrary arrest, 
detention, and incommunicado detention. The judicial system continued 
to fail to ensure due process and remained subject to executive 
pressures. The Government restricted the right to privacy, and security 
forces conducted searches without warrants. Members of the security 
forces generally commit abuses with impunity. The Government severely 
restricted freedom of speech and of the press. It continued to restrict 
the rights of assembly and association. The Government continued to 
limit freedom of religion and freedom of movement. There were no 
effective domestic human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). 
In 1999 the Government promulgated a law that further restricted NGO's 
and precluded them from functioning in the area of human rights. 
Violence and discrimination against women remained a serious problem. 
Discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly the Bubi ethnic 
group, and foreigners continued. During the year, the Government 
restricted labor rights; no labor unions exist. Child labor persists, 
and forced prison labor is used.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of extrajudicial killings. Unlike in previous years, there were 
no reports that security forces committed extrajudicial killings.
    There have been reports that prison authorities tortured, beat, and 
otherwise abused prisoners, and that such abuse, combined with a lack 
of medical care, resulted in the deaths of prisoners.
    The Government did not prosecute any members of the security forces 
considered responsible for extrajudicial killings in previous years.
    On January 21, 1998, in the town of Luba on the island of Bioko, 
noncommissioned officers Felix Ndong Ondo, Mauro Era Nguema, and 
Alberto Nsue were killed. The Government claimed that they had been 
killed by armed men leading a revolt by ethnic Bubis organized by the 
Movement for Self-determination of Bioko (MIAB); MIAB denied 
involvement. There were unconfirmed reports of similar attacks and 
killings in the towns of Moka and Bako Grande. No independent observers 
were able to visit any of these towns or confirm the Government's 
account. A military court convicted 63 persons, 15 of whom were 
sentenced to death although the President subsequently commuted their 
sentences to life in prison (see Section 1.e.).
    b. Disappearance.--In previous years, there were unconfirmed 
reports of politically motivated disappearances; however, during the 
year, there were no reports of disappearances.
    The Government continued to attempt to control opposition groups 
outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other countries 
(see Section 1.e.). Such individuals reportedly are detained, 
questioned, and tortured before being released (see Sections 1.c., 
1.d., and 2.d.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution mandates respect for the liberty and 
dignity of persons, but does not specifically prohibit torture or cruel 
or inhuman punishment, and members of the security forces tortured, 
beat, and otherwise abused suspects and prisoners. The level of these 
abuses is serious. A number of prisoners still are under sentence from 
the alleged revolt of 1998 (see Section 1.a.), and the U.N. Special 
Representative confirmed reports of their abuse and torture in November 
1999.
    Officials reportedly detained, interrogated, beat, and tortured 
opposition political activists (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government continued to attempt to control opposition groups 
outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other countries 
(see Section 1.e.). Such individuals reportedly are detained, 
questioned, and tortured before being released (see Section 2.d.).
    Local authorities singled out foreigners from neighboring countries 
for harassment such as verbal intimidation and extortion. Several 
thousand citizens of Nigeria, Ghana, and Francophone Africa continue to 
reside in the country; most are small traders and businesspersons (see 
Section 5).
    During the campaign period prior to the May municipal elections, 
there were reports that government security forces beat and detained 
opposition politicians daily (see Section 3.)
    Milagrosa Obono Ndong, a voting station representative for the 
Social Democracy Convergence Party (CPDS), was detained by security 
forces to prevent her presence on election day. While in custody she 
reportedly was raped by Jose Luis Abaga Nguema, the district judge of 
Evinayong.
    Conditions in prisons and jails are harsh and life threatening. In 
a 1999 study, a governmental body cited the extremely poor conditions 
of nearly all penal establishments. According to the government 
investigation, inmates are held without access to necessities 
including: food; medical care; working toilets or latrines; drinkable 
water; clean and healthful living space; and minimum equipment (e.g. 
beds). For example, the government investigation found the prison in 
Bata to be in an advanced stage of deterioration and unfit for human 
habitation. The prison had no food, medical care, or sanitation 
facilities; and beds and blankets were not provided.
    In March 41 Bubi prisoners, who were convicted of crimes associated 
with the January 1998 unrest and formerly held at Malabo prison, were 
moved to a mainland prison at Evinayong. The prison is approximately 
300 miles from their homes and families which made it difficult or 
impossible for the families to bring them medicines, food, and moral 
support. An ICRC representative visited them in April, but they have 
not been seen subsequently by international observers.
    There have been reports that prison authorities tortured, beat, and 
otherwise abused prisoners, and that such abuse, combined with a lack 
of medical care, resulted in the deaths of prisoners. The CNDHGE 
reported in 1999 that there was a lack of medical care, but stated that 
the prisoners were not mistreated; Amnesty International reported 
during the year that eight prisoners died as a result of torture and 
lack of medical assistance in 1999. Furthermore, the U.N. Special 
Representative reported in November 1999 that on October 19, 1999, 
Dingo Sepa Tobache died at the Malabo prison as the result of injuries 
caused by beatings and excessive mistreatment by guards during his 
incarceration.
    In November 1999, the U.N. Special Representative reported that 
when he visited the Malabo prison, he witnessed eight persons being 
held in cells measuring approximately 4.92 feet by 2.3 feet. A ninth 
prisoner normally held in the same cells had been hospitalized a few 
days earlier for a serious illness. The Special Representative was told 
that these prisoners were among those condemned to death for the events 
of January 1998, but whose sentences were later commuted to life 
imprisonment. The U.N. Special Representative confirmed that the nine 
persons were held in those cells permanently and were not allowed 
outside; that they received no medical care, although all of them were 
suffering from illnesses due to the prison conditions and the torture 
that they had suffered before trial; that their food was inadequate; 
and that they were allowed no contact with their families. All of the 
prisoners were in poor physical condition. The U.N. Special 
Representative also confirmed that the Bata gendarmerie detained and 
tortured Dr. Antimo Oyono Mba and Dr. Joaquin Mbana Nchama of the UP by 
beating them on the soles of their feet.
    Male and female prisoners were not held in separate facilities, nor 
were adult and juvenile prisoners. The CNDHGE reported that prisoners 
and prison authorities subjected female prisoners to sexual assaults.
    In its 1999 study, a government investigation noted that prisoners 
were exploited as virtual slaves by local judges and by administrators 
of the prisons. Prisoners told the investigators that they were used 
habitually as labor for others and as workers on construction projects 
for certain officials, without pay or other compensation. The U.N. 
Special Representative found that Juan Obiang Late, a man detained at 
the police headquarters in Bata, (see Section 1.d.) was taken from the 
jail to do work for an official in 1999. Judges also reportedly used 
prisoners as domestic workers.
    There are no local NGO's other than the government-controlled 
CNDHGE; as a result, there are no local NGO's that visited prisons or 
promoted prisoners' rights. Prison conditions ostensibly are monitored 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which 
historically has made recommendations to the Government; however, the 
head of the regional ICRC office was not granted access to any prisons 
or detention centers during the first 11 months of 1999. In October 
1999, a government body recommended that the Government enter into a 
dialog with the ICRC; as a result, the ICRC director was granted access 
in December 1999 to the prisons under the jurisdiction of the Minister 
of Justice. The ICRC visited some prisoners during the year, for 
example, in April inmates at Evinayong prison who had recently been 
moved from the Malabo prison. Another ICRC prison visit is planned for 
March 2001.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There are nominal legal 
procedural safeguards regarding detention, the requirement for search 
warrants, and other protection of citizens' rights; however, these 
safeguards are ignored systematically by security forces, which 
continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily.
    Police routinely hold prisoners in incommunicado detention. 
Foreigners from neighboring countries sometimes are targeted for 
arbitrary mistreatment and random arrest. In previous years, these 
included visitors and residents from Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, and Benin. 
Members of the security forces extorted money from them; however, 
reportedly such incidents were reduced during the year, and most 
checkpoints on the road from Luba to Malabo and within Malabo were 
removed.
    Security forces often detain individuals ``on orders from 
superiors'' without any further formality. For example, authorities, 
after receiving orders from their superiors detained Teodoro Abeso 
Nguema and Juan Obiang Late, beginning respectively on November 9 and 
11, 1999, at the Bata prison. According to Nguema, both men were 
detained because they copied an article on the health of President 
Obiang from the Internet (see Section 2.a.).
    Security forces detained relatives of prisoners or criminal 
suspects in an attempt to force the prisoners or suspects to surrender. 
For example, in October 1999, the CNDHGE found that Candida Nsue Mba 
had been held for 2 months at Bata prison as a hostage for her daughter 
who had escaped; at Nzok Nzomo prison, Monica Mangue was held hostage 
for her daughter; and the Mikomeseng and Anisok prisons each held a 
woman hostage against the appearance of their daughters.
    During the year, the Government arrested political activists and 
detained them without charge for periods up to several weeks during 
which time officials reportedly interrogated, beat, and tortured them 
(see Section 1.c.). For example, in September authorities in Bata 
arrested Francisco Nsue Masie, the Director of Public Works and son of 
former president Macias Nguema, and others and charged them with 
conspiracy against the State; they were transferred to the prison in 
Malabo. There were unconfirmed reports that these detainees were 
tortured (see Section 1.c.). Nsue Masie and the others remained in 
custody at year's end, pending a trial. Political detentions seldom 
lasted more than a few months. It was difficult to estimate the number 
of political detainees, although it was believed to be less than 100 
persons. The Government used the psychological effects of arrest, along 
with the fear of beatings and harassment, to intimidate opposition 
party officials and members.
    In September 1999, authorities arrested and detained Placido Miko 
Abodo, Secretary General of the opposition CPDS. Miko was held for a 
week, and upon his provisional release, he was told to report to the 
authorities in Bata twice a month; however, no formal charges ever were 
made against him. At year's end, Miko's case reportedly remained in the 
hands of a military examining magistrate.
    Following the 1998 revolt, approximately 500 ethnic Bubis 
reportedly were arrested and interrogated (see Section 1.e.); however, 
reliable information on the number and identities of detainees was not 
available readily. The majority of them were released, although 15 were 
tried and sentenced to death, but they had their sentences commuted to 
life imprisonment by President Obiang later in 1998.
    There was a report that Mariano Oyono Ndong of the opposition 
Democrat Republican Front (FDR) was confined to the limits of his town 
for 3 years beginning in June 1997, without any judicial action (see 
Section 1.e.). He was released in mid-year.
    Authorities often detain both men and women for failure to repay a 
dowry following the dissolution of a marriage; however, only divorced 
women or their responsible male relatives are imprisoned for not 
repaying a dowry. These cases arise from customary law, where the 
amount of money or goods due is set by traditional courts. A government 
investigation documented that as many as 20 persons were detained 
solely for failure to repay dowries, including Victoriana Abuy and 
Veronica Monanga at Mbini prison and Mariano Nsue Ela and Juan Esono 
Nguema at Nkue prison; two women at Mikomeseng; five men at Ebibeyin; 
one man at Nzok Nzomo; three persons at (Anizok; and two men (one 85 to 
90 years of age) at Akonibe. Their detention was not limited by the 72 
hours established by law even for those suspected of crime.
    During the year, government security forces on occasion detained 
employees of foreign oil companies. Police detained an employee of a 
foreign oil company for a short period in August for alleged 
irregularities in processing the import of equipment. The driver for an 
oil company alleged that police detained and beat him openly.
    The Government continued to attempt to control opposition groups 
outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other countries 
(see Section 1.e.). Such individuals reportedly are detained, 
questioned, and tortured before being released (see Sections 1.b., 
1.c., and 2.d.).
    Security forces responsible for arbitrary arrest and detention and 
other abuses were not held accountable for their actions. The U.N. 
Special Representative noted that some executive officials closely 
related to the security apparatus of the Government are treated as 
being above the law. For example, Francisco Mba Mendam, a government 
delegate from Micomeseng, remained free, despite having been sentenced 
in October 1999 to 30 years in prison for the murder of a former 
ambassador to France; he received a presidential pardon in November.
    The Government does not use forced exile; however, some persons 
have fled the country for political reasons.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for 
judicial independence; however, the judiciary is not independent. 
Judges serve at the pleasure of the President, and they are appointed, 
transferred, and dismissed for political reasons. Corruption is 
widespread.
    The court system is composed of lower provincial courts, two 
appeals courts, a military tribunal, and a Supreme Court. The President 
appoints members of the Supreme Court, who report to him and take their 
orders from him in practice; the President is the most powerful member 
of the judicial branch. Tribal elders adjudicate civil claims and minor 
criminal matters in traditional courts in the countryside.
    There are no objective criteria for the selection of judges below 
the Supreme Court; the law allows the Ministry of Justice to undertake 
periodic inspections and name judges. A government investigation noted 
in its 1999 report that some judges are regularly absent from their 
posts, resulting in delays in judicial proceedings. As a result of 
absences by judges, prisoners remain detained at police stations 
awaiting hearings for longer than the 72 hours prescribed by law and 
the jails available become even more overcrowded and unsanitary. Some 
persons are detained indefinitely as an alternative to formal arrest, 
trial, and imprisonment; they are held without any intention of formal 
judicial action.
    In August 1999, the Government created a Special Commission on 
Corruption to address court corruption. In January the President fired 
a substantial number of judges, including members of the Supreme Court. 
The firings reportedly were the result of the courts' diverting $7 
million from their budgets between 1996 and 1999. Following completion 
of the investigation by the Special Commission on Corruption, the 
President of the Supreme Court and two other justices, together with 
the secretary of the court, were implicated in corruption and replaced. 
Five other justices were not implicated and either were returned to the 
Supreme Court or promoted to other positions. The President of the 
Constitutional Court, one justice, and the attorney for that court also 
were implicated and removed from positions of responsibility.
    The Constitution and laws passed by the Chamber of Deputies provide 
for legal representation in trials and the right to appeal. In practice 
the authorities often do not respect these provisions. Civil cases 
rarely come to public trial. Cases involving national security are 
tried by the military tribunal. Cases that are essentially political in 
nature frequently are referred to military courts, even when the 
defendants are civilians and the charges are not related to the 
military. The 1945 Code of Military Justice permits persons who disobey 
a military authority to be tried in a military tribunal whether or not 
they are civilians. The military courts do not provide for due process 
or other procedural safeguards, and their proceedings are not made 
public. For example, the case of Placido Mico, the civilian opposition 
leader, was heard in secret by a military judge (see Section 1.d.). Two 
other FDR members, Mariano Oyono Ndong and Carmelo Biko Ngua, were 
tried in 1999 by a military tribunal; they remained in custody in June, 
and there was no indication that they had been released at year's end.
    The Government holds a number of political prisoners. In May 1998, 
the Government conducted a public trial before a military tribunal of 
116 persons allegedly involved in the January 1998 revolt on Bioko 
island. The defendants were charged with terrorism, undermining state 
security, and illegal possession of weapons. Many defendants claimed 
that the Government obtained confessions from them by torture (see 
Section 1.c.). At their trials in 1998, some defendants were found to 
be suffering from broken jaws, inflamed testicles, and other conditions 
indicative of torture; however, the president of the military tribunal 
refused to allow defense lawyers to raise the question of torture. The 
conduct of the trials drew universal criticism. The tribunal found 63 
persons guilty on at least 1 charge and acquitted 53 of all charges. It 
sentenced 15 convicted defendants to death, and sentenced the other 48 
to terms ranging from 6 to 26 years in prison. The 15 condemned to 
death were the only defendants absent from the court when the sentences 
were announced. President Obiang in 1998 commuted their sentences to 
life imprisonment.
    Two members of the ruling Mongomo clan and of the banned FDR party, 
former Education Minister Felipe Ondo and former Planning Minister 
Guillermo Nguema, remained in prison. In 1998 they were convicted of 
libel against the Government and sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment 
in 1998, after Equatoguinean security forces repatriated them 
involuntarily from Gabon with the consent of the Government of Gabon 
(see Section 2.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires judicial warrants for searches; 
however, the Government does not enforce the law in practice. Security 
forces regularly search homes and arrest occupants, and they generally 
do so with impunity.
    There reportedly is government surveillance of members of the 
opposition parties and foreign diplomats.
    For lawyers, government employees, and some others, PDGE party 
membership is necessary for employment and promotion. Even in the 
private sector, many citizens claim that party membership is required 
in order to be hired.
    According to credible sources, in previous years, citizens living 
in rural areas were hesitant to associate with or even be seen with 
foreigners, due to the fear of repercussions from the authorities; 
however, there were no reports of such behavior during the year.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely 
restricted these rights in practice. Journalists practice self-
censorship.
    The Government allows mild criticism of infrastructure, public 
institutions, and public sector mismanagement and permitted some 
increased criticism of minor administrative decisions; however, it 
permits no criticism of the President or the security forces. All 
journalists must be registered with the Ministry of Information. 
According to press sources, there are approximately 12 independent 
reporters registered with the Ministry of Information. Between 30 and 
40 reporters employed by the official party or government publications 
also are registered. In previous years, visiting foreign reporters were 
required to be accompanied by guides from the Ministry of Information; 
however, during the year, a journalist traveled unescorted.
    In April 1999, shortly before a national symposium on press liberty 
was scheduled, the Minister of the Interior ordered the removal of the 
democratically elected president of the Press Association (ASOPGE), 
Manuel Nze Nzogo, even though the ASOPGE was a legally recognized 
association. The reason given was that Nzogo supposedly was not 
qualified properly for the position; he remained removed from his 
position during the year and ASOPGE was inactive.
    There are five general-interest newspapers that were published 
regularly: La Gaceta, a Malabo-based publication with informal 
connections to the Government, which was published monthly; El Correo 
Guineo Ecuatoriano, a bimonthly newspaper published by the Gaceta 
group; La Opinion, an opposition newspaper that was published every 2 
to 3 weeks; El Tiempo, an opposition newspaper that published its first 
edition on December 30; and Ebano, a publication of the Ministry of 
Information, Tourism, and Culture, which appeared about twice a month. 
There was also a magazine (AYO) that was published by students at the 
university and a monthly cultural review, El Patio, published by the 
Guinean-Hispano Cultural Center. The PDGE published La Voz del Pueblo, 
and the opposition CPDS published La Verdad, which appeared one or two 
times per year.
    The 1992 press law reportedly is based on Spain's 1967 Franco-era 
press law and authorizes government censorship of all publications. In 
previous years, the Ministry of Information sometimes required 
publishers to submit copy for approval prior to publication; however, 
the practice reportedly has ended. All local publications exercise 
self-censorship and were subject to prior restraint. Few foreign 
publications were available for sale, and security forces confiscated 
literature from Spain that was critical of the Government.
    Radio is the most important medium of mass communication. The 
Government continued effectively to dominate domestic radio 
broadcasting. It owns and operates Radio Malabo; however, it received 
some competition from Radio France International on the FM band, which 
has transmitted from Malabo since 1995. In 1998 the Government 
permitted the establishment of the country's first private domestic 
radio station, the FM station Radio Asonga. However, that station 
reportedly is owned by the Minister of Forestry, Environment, and 
Fisheries, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, the son of the President. The 
Government has not approved the one or two other applications to 
operate private radio stations that have been pending for several 
years.
    The domestic television station is government controlled and 
broadcasts only a few hours a day. Television Asonga, owned by 
President Obiang, broadcast by cable only in Bata. Foreign cable 
television is available, and offers the Cable News Network, French 
news, movies, sports events, and cartoons, but relatively few citizens 
can afford it. Satellite reception is increasingly available.
    The Government generally withholds access to domestic broadcasting 
from opposition parties and rarely refers to the opposition in anything 
but negative terms when broadcasting the news.
    Radio Exterior, the international short-wave service from Spain, 
often broadcasts news about the country and interviews with opposition 
politicians. It is virtually the only means for the opposition to 
disseminate its views and positions widely. Its editorials, like those 
of most of the Spanish media, often are highly critical of the 
Government. The Government regularly accused Radio Exterior--sometimes 
with justification--of misrepresenting the situation in the country, 
and in 1998 it asked the Spanish Government to halt broadcasts that 
``may provoke problems.''
    Internet service is available, although access is expensive, and 
computer ownership is not widespread. In late 1999, two men were 
arrested for possessing an article taken off of the Internet that 
referred to the health of the President (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government recognized respect for academic freedom and 
encouraged educators and students to work ``peacefully and in harmony 
with the moral guidelines of the society;'' however, it imposed a few 
limits on academic freedom. During the year, students at the National 
University wrote a letter to the rector complaining about their food 
and housing. The students were brought before the President in March, 
publicly berated for their lack of gratitude for free accommodations, 
and then immediately evicted from the student housing.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government restricts 
this right in practice. Government authorization must be obtained for 
meetings of more than 10 persons in private homes for discussions that 
the Government considers political. Although the Government formally 
has abolished permit requirements for party meetings within party 
buildings, in practice opposition parties must inform the authorities 
in order to hold gatherings of any kind, regardless of location. 
Security forces generally observe gatherings in public places, even 
small gatherings. The Government required notification for public 
events and routinely denied permission for such events.
    The Government required that the Catholic NGO Autonomous Rural 
Development (DAR), in the diocese of Ebibeyin, inform the locally 
appointed official delegate each time that it had a board meeting. The 
DAR complied with the requirement and received permission to meet, but 
the local delegate insisted on being present during the meetings. The 
DAR refused to hold meetings with the delegate present, and 
consequently it did not meet during the year (see Section 2.c.).
    The Constitution provides for the right of association; however, 
the Government restricted this right in practice. The law prohibits the 
formation of political parties along ethnic lines. A 1999 law on NGO's 
does not permit such groups to defend or promote human rights; any 
group attempting to do so is considered to be illegal (see Section 4); 
however, no groups were prosecuted during the year for attempting to 
promote human rights.
    Police routinely harass and detain members of opposition parties 
(see Section 1.d.). Reportedly the Government bribed members of the 
opposition. Opposition party members complained of disruption of 
meetings and of roadblocks at which they are forced to pay soldiers in 
order to proceed.
    The Progress Party (PP) of Severo Motto appealed a 1997 decision by 
the Government in which the PP was declared illegal. The Court of 
Appeals upheld the suspension of their right to operate, and, during 
the year, the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. The PP was banned because Motto was accused of organizing an 
attempted coup d'etat in 1996. The FDR has sought recognition since 
1995 unsuccessfully; FDR directors are in jail in Malabo and Bata (see 
Section 1.d.). The Independent Democratic and Social Party (PIDS) also 
sought recognition unsuccessfully. The Movement for the Self-
determination of Bioko (MIAB), an ethnic political party, is illegal 
(see Section 3). Reportedly MIAB was banned in reaction to its alleged 
role in the January 1998 unrest; subsequently, legislation made ethnic 
political parties illegal.
    On several occasions the Government reportedly attempted to force 
opposition members or officials to join the PDGE party (see Section 3).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, in practice the Government limits this right in some 
respects.
    The Government continued to restrict the freedom of expression of 
the clergy, particularly regarding any open criticism of the 
Government. The Government requires permission for any religious 
activities outside the church building, but in practice this 
requirement did not appear to hinder organized religious groups.
    Religious groups must be approved by and registered with the 
Ministry of Justice and Religion in order to function legally; however, 
there were no reports that the Government refused to register any 
group. The approval process usually takes several years, but such delay 
apparently is due primarily to general bureaucratic slowness and not 
the result of a clear policy designed to impede the operation of any 
religious group.
    The Government required that the Catholic NGO Autonomous Rural 
Development (DAR), in the diocese of Ebibeyin, inform the local 
delegate each time that it had a board meeting. The DAR complied with 
the requirement and received permission to meet, but the local delegate 
insisted on being present during the meetings. The DAR refused to hold 
meetings with the delegate present, and consequently it did not meet 
during the year (see Section 2.b.).
    Religious study is required in schools and is usually, but not 
exclusively, Catholic.
    In February 1998, security forces arrested a priest, Father Eduardo 
Losoha Belope, a member of the Bubi ethnic group and president of the 
Malabo chapter of the Catholic nongovernmental organization Caritas, in 
connection with the January 1998 revolt. Father Belope remained in 
detention at year's end, and was one of the Bubi prisoners transferred 
in March from Bioko island to Evinayong on the mainland (see Section 
1.c.).
    In July 1998, the Archbishop of Malabo, Laureano Ekua Obama, stated 
publicly that the Government now required Catholic priests to obtain 
government permission before celebrating mass and commented that the 
Government did this because the church repeatedly criticized human 
rights violations, social injustice, and corruption in the country. The 
Archbishop also stated that government harassment made it very 
difficult to be a Catholic priest in the country. Nonetheless, a 1992 
law includes a stated official preference towards the Catholic Church 
and the Reform Church of Equatorial Guinea due to their traditional 
roots and well-known influence in the social and cultural life of the 
populace. For example, a Roman Catholic mass is normally part of any 
major ceremonial function such as the October 12 national day.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement 
and travel throughout the country; however, the Government limits these 
rights in practice. Local police routinely demand bribes from occupants 
of cars, taxis, and other vehicles traveling outside the capital. The 
police routinely stoped citizens, particularly members of the 
opposition, at roadblocks, subject them to searches, and extort money 
from them; however, during the year, the Government eliminated a number 
of checkpoints between Malabo and Luba and in the vicinity of Bata. 
Members of the Bubi ethnic group on the island of Bioko were unable to 
move about freely, according to credible sources. Roadblocks throughout 
the island prevented Bubis from traveling easily between villages.
    During his 1999 visit, the U.N. Special Representative confirmed 
that the existence of roadblocks substantially limited the freedom of 
movement, both on Bioko and on the mainland. The Government justified 
these roadblocks as customs controls to compensate for its inability to 
control the country's borders effectively. In November 1999, the 
Special Representative was stopped after taking a photograph of cars 
waiting at one such barrier, but he was released shortly thereafter. 
The Special Representative also concluded that these roadblocks 
effectively restricted the freedom of movement of members of the 
opposition and prevented them from either leaving or returning to their 
hometowns.
    All citizens are required to obtain permission to travel abroad 
from the local Police Commissioner, and members of opposition parties 
regularly were denied this permission. Those who do travel abroad 
sometimes were interrogated or detained upon their return. However, 
several prominent members of opposition parties were able to travel 
abroad without hindrance during the year.
    Government officials attempt to control the movements of citizens 
by refusing exit visas or denying or confiscating passports. During the 
campaign prior to the municipal elections in May, opposition 
politicians complained that the Government prohibited them from 
traveling from town to town to campaign.
    The Government is a signatory of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. During recent years, 
an average of one or two persons a year, from Mauritania, Nigeria, or 
the Congo, requested refugee or asylee status in the country. The 
Government provides first asylum and generally grants asylum requests. 
Although security forces reportedly have harassed asylum seekers in 
past years, there were no reports of such harassment during the year. 
The police reportedly continued to harass several thousand citizens of 
Nigeria, Ghana, and Francophone Africa most of whom are small traders 
and businesspersons (see Section 5) as well as harassing asylum seekers 
on an individual basis.
    There were no reports of the forced return of any persons to a 
country where they feared persecution.
    The Government continued to attempt to control opposition groups 
outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other countries 
(see Section 1.e.). Such individuals reportedly were detained, 
questioned, and tortured before being released (see Sections 1.c. and 
1.d.).
    In September 1997, 12 Equatoguinean refugees and their families in 
Cameroon were detained by Cameroonian security forces--ostensibly for 
their own protection--at a military base in Yaounde. The majority of 
the heads of family are former military officers and consider 
themselves in opposition to the Government. All have been granted 
refugee status by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. In October 
1999, the Cameroonian press reported that two of the refugees had 
escaped from the base and met with others to plot a coup attempt 
against the Government of Equatorial Guinea. They were arrested in 
Douala and returned to Yaounde. In mid-October 1999, senior government 
officials reportedly requested their extradition to Equatorial Guinea, 
which the Cameroonian Government did not grant. In July three of the 
former officers disappeared from the base in Cameroon after undergoing 
final processing for resettlement, and at year's end, they had not been 
found. The other nine refugees have been resettled with their families 
in another country.
    The Government continued to demand that the Spanish Government 
repatriate Severo Moto, leader of the now-banned Progress Party (see 
Section 2.b.), who led an attempt to overthrow the government by armed 
force in 1996 and to whom the Government of Spain had granted asylum in 
1997.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully; however, in practice there have been no free, 
fair, and transparent elections since independence in 1968. The 
President exercised complete power as head of state, commander of the 
armed forces, and leader of the government party, the PDGE. Leadership 
positions within the Government in general were restricted to the 
President's Mongomo clan of the Fang ethnic group and its closest 
supporters. The elected Chamber of Deputies was dominated completely by 
the Government. The Minister of the Interior also acted as President of 
the National Electoral Board.
    Significant segments of the political opposition either remained 
banned or had yet to be recognized by the Government by year's end, 
including the FDR, the Progress Party (PP), the Independent Democratic 
and Social Party (PIDS), and the Movement for the Self-Determination of 
Bioko (MIAB)(see Section 2.b.).
    The February 1996 presidential election, in which President Obiang 
claimed reelection with 98 percent of the vote, was considered openly 
fraudulent by international observers. Some opposition politicians who 
campaigned were beaten and jailed. Voting was done in the open and 
without secrecy, with opposition parties allegedly being barred from 
access to polling areas. There were credible reports of widespread 
arrests and violence against opposition party members before the 
elections, as well as of beatings, roadblocks, stuffed ballot boxes, 
and the presence of security forces. Most opposition parties, claiming 
that it was futile to run amidst such blatant corruption, boycotted the 
election.
    In 1997 the Government and 13 political parties promulgated a 
revised national pact following 3 months of debate. The pact called for 
the creation of a multiparty electoral commission and an observance 
commission to monitor compliance with the agreement. The pact also 
stipulated an end to various political and electoral abuses and the 
extension of voting rights already nominally provided in the 
Constitution. However, the Government has not abided by most of the 
pact's provisions. Opposition activists reported that the Government 
made virtually no effort to implement the pact. The Government's 
refusal to issue exit visas to some opposition figures violates the 
pact's principle of freedom of travel. The continued arrests of CPDS, 
UP, and FDR activists further undermined the Government's claims that 
it abides by the pact, as did its continued restrictions on freedom of 
movement and the continued lack of access to government media by the 
opposition.
    In 1998 the Government enacted a new electoral law that mandates 
the replacement of open voting by secret ballots in future elections 
but prohibits coalitions between political parties. Nevertheless in 
December five opposition groups including the CPDS, Front for 
Democratic Opposition (PSD), PP, Progressive Democratic Alliance (ADP), 
and the Popular Union (UP) joined to form the Front of Democratic 
Opposition (FOD). At year's end, the Government had not responded to 
this action.
    The legislative elections that should have been held in the fall of 
1998 were postponed until March 1999. The new electoral census was 
completed in December 1998, but not all of the opposition parties 
agreed to sign it due to irregularities including the inclusion of the 
underaged, the dead, and nonresidents, while excluding opposition party 
members. The three opposition parties initially called for a boycott of 
the polls to protest preelection irregularities; however, all but one 
of the parties, the CPDS, ultimately participated in the voting. One 
CPDS candidate was elected; however, he had refused to take his seat at 
year's end.
    International observers considered the legislative election process 
to be seriously flawed. The elections were characterized by numerous 
irregularities and by restrictions on the ability of the opposition to 
campaign. Roadblocks impeded the opposition's ability to travel; and 
opposition leaders were detained intermittently, sometimes with 
mistreatment, torture, or stiff fines. The UP and CPDS opposition 
parties won 5 of the 80 seats, refused to take their seats in the new 
legislature, and called for the results to be annulled and new 
elections held.
    During the municipal elections on May 28, the PDGE won all 30 
municipalities with more than 95 percent of the vote. The elections 
used the same flawed electoral census that was used in the 1999 
legislative elections. According to one opposition party leader, police 
beat and detained opposition politicians daily during the campaign (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Although there are no legal restrictions on the participation of 
women in politics, women remain seriously underrepresented in 
government and politics. There are 4 women in the 41-member Cabinet, 
and 5 in the 80-member legislature.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no effective domestic human rights nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's). In April 1999, the Government promulgated a law 
governing NGO's that restricted NGO's and identifies specific areas in 
which they may operate; human rights is not one of these areas.
    The Government required that the Catholic NGO Autonomous Rural 
Development (DAR), in the diocese of Ebibeyin, inform the local 
delegate each time it had a board meeting. The DAR complied with the 
requirement and received permission to meet, but the local delegate 
insisted on being present during the meetings. The DAR refused to hold 
meetings with the delegate present and consequently did not meet during 
the year.
    No international human rights NGO has a permanent presence in the 
country, and the Government neither acknowledged nor gave credibility 
to reports issued by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and 
other international human rights organizations.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights visited in March and 
December 1998, and ostensibly he received the Government's cooperation; 
however, the Government succeeded in having the Rapporteur replaced 
early in 1999. A new Special Representative visited the country in 
November 1999 and released his report in March with recommendations for 
fundamental reforms, especially in the areas of political rights, the 
administration of justice, and the treatment of prisoners and 
detainees.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution condemns all forms of discrimination; however, 
both governmental and societal discrimination against women and ethnic 
minorities continued.
    Women.--Societal violence against women, particularly wife beating, 
is common. The public beating of wives is forbidden by government 
decree; however, violence in the home generally is tolerated. The 
Government does not prosecute perpetrators of domestic violence.
    Although the Constitution provides for equal rights, women largely 
are confined by custom to traditional roles, particularly in 
agriculture. Polygyny, which is widespread among the Fang, contributes 
to women's secondary status, as does limited educational opportunity. 
On average women receive only one-fifth as much schooling as do men.
    There is no discrimination against women with regard to inheritance 
and family laws, but there is discrimination in traditional practice. 
For an estimated 90 percent of women, including virtually all ethnic 
groups except the Bubi, tradition dictates that if a marriage is 
dissolved, the wife (or her father or brother) must return the dowry 
given her family by the bridegroom at the time of marriage. The husband 
automatically receives custody of all children born after the marriage, 
while the mother maintains custody of all children born prior to the 
marriage. In many instances, the woman has no funds or property after 
the divorce with which to repay the dowry, and, as a result, is 
incarcerated (see Section 1.d.). Many prisons do not have separate 
areas for men and women and women are subjected to sexual abuse from 
both the authorities and other prisoners while in detention (see 
Section 1.e.).
    In the Fang, Ndowe, and Bisio cultures, primogeniture is practiced, 
and because women become members of their husband's family upon 
marriage, they usually are not accorded inheritance rights. According 
to the law, women have the right to buy and sell property and goods; 
however, in practice the male-dominated society permits few women 
access to sufficient funds to engage in more than petty trading or to 
purchase real property beyond a garden plot or modest home.
    Children.--No provisions for the welfare of children are 
legislated. The Government devotes little attention to children's 
rights or their welfare and has no set policy in this area. Education 
is compulsory until the age of 14, but the law is not enforced. In 
practice following primary education, males are expected either to 
complete an additional 7 years of secondary school or to finish a 
program of vocational study. Pregnancy and the requirement to assist in 
agricultural work make this level of education less likely for females. 
The 1999 report by the U.N. Special Representative noted that only 12 
percent of girls reach the secondary level of education compared with 
over 24 percent of boys who reach the same level. Only 9 percent of 
girls finish fifth grade. In 1999 only 1.8 percent of the national 
budget was committed to education. Children suffer poor health and a 
high mortality rate. Child labor is common.
    There was no societal pattern of abuse directed against children. 
When children or adolescents are arrested, they are imprisoned with 
adults (see Section 1.c.). There were no reports of abuse by guards or 
other inmates.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no constitutional or legal 
provision for the physically disabled with respect to discrimination in 
employment, education, or the provision of other government services; 
however, there is no notable discrimination against the disabled in 
practice. No law mandates access for the disabled to buildings or 
government services.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Discrimination against ethnic 
or racial minorities is not legal, and the Government does not overtly 
limit their participation in politics; however, the monopolization of 
political power by the President's Mongomo clan of the Fang ethnic 
group persists. In practice some members of ethnic minorities face 
discrimination because they are not members of the Fang ethnic group, 
or belong to a Fang subclan other than the President's. Ethnic 
minorities do not face discrimination in inheritance, marriage, or 
family laws.
    Differences between the majority Fang ethnic group and the Bubi 
ethnic minority are a source of political tension and historically 
often have erupted into violence. Bubis allegedly led the January 1998, 
separatist revolt on Bioko, after which the Fang-dominated Government 
and the security forces intensified their longstanding 
institutionalized repression of the Bubis and allowed Fang vigilante 
groups to abuse Bubi citizens with impunity. Before independence the 
Bubis were a majority of the population on the island of Bioko (then 
Fernando Po), which was both administratively distinct from and more 
economically developed than the larger and more populous mainland (then 
Rio Muni), where the Fang were a majority. The two Spanish colonies 
were united 9 years before independence, after which many Fang migrated 
to Bioko, where Malabo, the capital, is located. The Fang dominated the 
united independent state; during the first decade after independence, 
misrule by Obiang's uncle, Macias Nguema, reduced the country's 
population by about one-third and devastated the economy.
    Differences among clans of the Fang ethnic group, in particular 
resentment of the political dominance of the Mongomo clan, also were 
sources of significant political tensions and in past years, occasional 
violence; however, there were no reports of such violence during the 
year.
    Several thousand citizens of Nigeria, Ghana, and Francophone Africa 
continued to reside in the country. Most are small traders and 
businesspersons. The police reportedly continued to harass them (see 
Section 1.c.) as well as harassing asylum seekers on an individual 
basis.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Although the Constitution provides 
for the right to organize unions, no labor unions exist; however, there 
are a few cooperatives with limited power. The 1992 Law of Associations 
and Syndicates allows only workers in the same activity, numbering no 
fewer than 50, and grouped in the same geographic area, to form unions; 
this has effectively blocked union formation. Since 1992 the CPDS has 
tried unsuccessfully to legalize its affiliated Union Sindical de 
Trabajadores (UST). An independent union, Sindicator Independiente de 
Servicios (SIS), initially applied for registration twice in 1995 with 
subsequent application in 1996, but the Government denied SIS's 
applications. Although SIS's registration met the requirements of the 
1992 Trade Union Law, the authorities denied it. The 1992 law provides 
that a separate law be enacted to govern unions for civil servants; 
however, this law has not been enacted. The law prohibits strikes. The 
Labor Code contains provisions to uphold worker rights, but the 
Government generally does not enforce them.
    It generally is acknowledged that membership in the PDGE, the 
President's party, is a prerequisite for hiring and promotion, both in 
the public and private sectors (see Section 1.f.). Membership in a 
rival political organization is considered grounds for dismissal from 
any position, public or private. Opposition politicians who are not 
participating in the Government often claimed to have been dismissed 
from their jobs after joining alternate political groups.
    During the year, the country's major private employer, the oil 
industry, which is dominated by foreign firms, continued to take steps 
to reduce government control of hiring in the industry. Having ceased 
their exclusive reliance on the government employment agency APEGESA in 
1999, the companies employed methods ranging from public advertising of 
jobs and objective testing to screening of applicants by non-
Equatoguineans only, in their attempt to eliminate the former political 
bias in the hiring process.
    In the past, APEGESA allegedly kept nearly two-thirds of employees' 
wages, although reportedly its ability to do so has been reduced. 
Recent legislation mandates that oil workers receive at least 60 
percent of their wages. Oil sector workers receive a much higher scale 
than elsewhere in the national economy, often 10 times the minimum 
wage. In the past, when several employees signed a petition complaining 
of ill treatment, they were fired; however, this abuse no longer 
exists.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no law 
regarding these rights or prohibiting antiunion discrimination. There 
is no evidence of collective bargaining by any group. The Government 
and employers set wages, with little or no participation by workers. 
Employers must pay the minimum wages set by the Government, and most 
companies pay more than the government-established minimum.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids 
forced or bonded labor and slavery; however, detainees and convicted 
felons perform extensive labor outside prison, including for prison 
officials, without compensation (see Section 1.c.). The law prohibits 
forced or bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it 
occurred.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for the employment of children is 14 
years, but the Ministry of Labor does not enforce this law, and child 
labor is common particularly on family farms and businesses. The 
Government also does not enforce the law that stipulates mandatory 
education up to the age of 18. Underage youth perform both family farm 
work and street vending. While the Ministry of Labor is responsible for 
the enforcement of labor legislation, the Government does not have a 
comprehensive policy on child labor.
    The Chamber of Deputies approved ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor in December; however, the Government had not 
completed ratification of the convention by year's end. The Government 
has not established or identified any specific organization to 
implement the convention.
    The Labor Code prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and 
there were no reports that it exists (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage was 
approximately $41 (27,000 CFA francs). The minimum wage is not 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family.
    The law prescribes a standard 35-hour workweek and a 48-hour rest 
period, which are observed in practice in the formal economy.
    The Labor Code provides for comprehensive protection for workers 
from occupational hazards; however, the Government does not enforce 
this in practice. The Government has nine labor inspectors, which was 
insufficient to oversee local industry.
    Employees who protested unhealthy or dangerous working conditions 
risked losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, through, or within the country.
    A July 1998 UNICEF study stated that the country is a source for 
traffickers that feeds the domestic labor market in urban centers of 
countries such as Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon.
                               __________

                                ERITREA

    Eritrea became an independent state in 1993, following an 
internationally monitored referendum in which citizens voted 
overwhelmingly for independence from Ethiopia. The Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front (EPLF), which led the 30-year war for independence, 
has controlled the country since it defeated Ethiopian armed forces in 
1991; its leader, Isaias Afwerki, serves as the President. The EPLF 
became the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and 
redefined itself as a political party in 1994; it is the sole political 
party in the country. Elections, which were scheduled originally for 
1998, were postponed again due to the outbreak of an armed conflict 
with Ethiopia that began in May 1998. However, during the year, the 
Government established two committees to develop guidelines and rules 
for new elections and the formation of political parties. National 
Assembly elections are scheduled to take place in 2001. The 
Constitution provides for democratic freedom; however, while it was 
ratified in May 1997, its provisions had not yet been implemented fully 
by year's end. The judiciary is formally independent; however, it is 
weak and subject to executive interference.
    The police are responsible for maintaining internal security, 
although the Government may call on the armed forces, the reserves, and 
demobilized soldiers in response to both domestic and external security 
requirements. In May 1998, fighting broke out between Eritrean armed 
forces and Ethiopian militia along the border. The Government responded 
to an escalating military conflict by calling up reserves and 
increasing its armed forces to approximately 300,000 soldiers. In 
addition to the border conflict, the army has had to deal with the 
Eritrean Islamic Salvation (EIS), a small, Sudan-based insurgent group 
that has mounted terrorist attacks in the north and west since 1993. 
Some members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
    The conflict with Ethiopia has resulted in severe economic 
disruption and the dislocation of more than 1 million persons. Problems 
included higher inflation, an increased fiscal deficit, a drop in 
economic activity, and increased pressure on the local currency as 
foreign exchange reserves fell. The fighting from May to June had a 
severe negative impact on agricultural production, making the country 
partially dependent on food donations. Inflation rose from about 8.3 
percent in 1999 to 30 percent during the year. Private foreign 
investment dropped nearly to zero as a result of the conflict with 
Ethiopia. Economic growth declined from 3 percent in 1999 to negative 9 
percent during the year. The severance of trade relations with 
Ethiopia, Eritrea's largest trading partner before the conflict, led to 
an extremely large drop in exports. The integration of as many as 
75,000 Eritreans or Ethiopians of Eritrean origin who have been 
deported from Ethiopia and the internal displacement of approximately 1 
million persons have strained resources and further aggravated 
pressures on the economy. In addition there was a shortage of skilled 
labor because of increased military conscription. As a result of a lack 
of foreign exchange, imports were curtailed during the year, resulting 
in shortages of basic consumer goods. While trade, services, and 
manufacturing account for the greatest portion of gross domestic 
product (GDP), the rural economy is based largely on subsistence 
agriculture, and more than 70 percent of the population of 3.6 million 
is engaged in farming and herding. The small industrial sector consists 
mainly of light industries, many using outmoded technologies. Principal 
exports include salt, leather products, and fish. Principal imports 
include machinery, spare parts, food, and military materiel. 
International economic assistance has accounted for a significant 
portion of external revenues. Eritreans who live abroad also provide a 
major source of external revenues, estimated at $300 to $400 million a 
year. Nominal GNP was estimated at $695 million. The country has an 
annual per capita income of less than $200, and about a third of the 
population depends on foreign emergency assistance. The PFDJ continues 
to exert a strong economic influence through a variety of investments 
and party-owned businesses.
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems 
remain; however, there were improvements in a few areas. Citizens did 
not have the ability to change their government, which is dominated by 
the PFDJ. Many observers believe that the police occasionally resort to 
torture and physical beatings of prisoners, particularly during 
interrogations, and police severely mistreated army deserters and draft 
dodgers. There were reports that police beat Ethiopians detainees and 
credible reports that soldiers beat and raped female Ethiopian 
deportees. The Government generally does not permit prison visits by 
local or international human rights groups, although it permitted some 
independent monitoring of conditions in detention facilities after the 
conflict with Ethiopia began. In August the Government granted the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to Ethiopian 
civilian detainees and prisoners of war (POW's). Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. An unknown number of persons suspected of 
association with the Ethiopian Mengistu regime, radical Islamic 
elements, or terrorist organizations remained in prolonged detention. 
The judiciary is weak and subject to executive influence. The provision 
of speedy trials was limited by a lack of trained personnel, inadequate 
funding, and poor infrastructure. The use of a special court system 
limited due process. The Government infringed on the right to privacy. 
The Government restricted press freedom, including the rights of the 
religious media, and there were some limits on freedom of association. 
The Government restricted religious freedom in the case of Jehovah's 
Witnesses. The Government restricted freedom of movement. Violence and 
societal discrimination against women also are problems, and female 
genital mutilation (FGM) remains widespread despite government efforts 
to discourage the practice. Members of Jehovah's Witnesses and members 
of the Kunama ethnic group also face some government and societal 
discrimination. The Government restricted workers' rights and there 
were reports of forced labor.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no reports of 
political killings; however, there were reports that security forces 
killed some Ethiopian detainees. For example, there were reports that 
camp guards killed approximately 30 Ethiopian detainees at a camp in 
Wia. There was no investigation into these reports by year's end.
    The Government deployed military police in Asmara to find deserters 
and draft dodgers (see Section 1.d.). The Government authorized the use 
of deadly force against anyone resisting or attempting to flee; 
however, there were no reports that such force was used.
    In July and August, the Government deported thousands of Ethiopians 
to Ethiopia under difficult and dangerous conditions, which resulted in 
a number of deaths (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). On July 31, up to six 
deportees reportedly disappeared crossing the Mereb river and are 
believed to have drowned. Credible sources reported that during a 
deportation on August 2 five Ethiopian deportees disappeared and are 
believed to have died.
    In October six POW's in the Nakfa POW camp died from 
gastrointestinal illnesses (see Section 1.c.). There also were some 
reports that civilian detainees in camps at Sheb Mensheb and Afabet 
died (see Section 1.c.)
    During the year, approximately 100 Ethiopian civilians were killed 
in landmine explosions from landmines laid by Eritrean forces 
withdrawing from occupied territories.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that during the 
year the Government provided support to armed groups opposed to the 
Ethiopian Government operating out of Somalia and Kenya.
    During the year, the Ethiopian army reportedly laid landmines in 
the Eritrean territories that it occupied. According to the Government 
Commission for Coordination with the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission, there 
are an estimated 2.5 million landmines or other unexploded ordnances in 
the country, including approximately 500,000 landmines laid by Ethiopia 
during the 1962-91 war for independence. On occasion, new mines have 
been laid by the EIS or others. During the year, there were 
approximately 48 reported casualties, including a number of deaths, as 
a result of landmines and unexploded ordnances; however, it is not 
clear which landmines in particular were responsible for these 
casualties. The Commission reported that 15 children were killed by 
landmines and unexploded ordnances during the year. For example, in 
February a fuel truck hit a landmine in the west that reportedly was 
laid by the EIS; the driver and his assistant both were killed. In 
December a bus hit a landmine on the Tologamja-Kotobia road; the driver 
was killed and two passengers were injured; the mine was laid the 
previous night, but it is not known by whom. It is probable that there 
were additional, unreported deaths in remote areas.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically 
motivated disappearances; however, the Ethiopian Government and media 
alleged that numerous Ethiopians in Eritrea disappeared during and 
after fighting that took place from May to June. These allegations 
reportedly were under investigation by international observers at 
year's end.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The transitional Penal Code prohibits torture; however, 
many observers believe that the police at least occasionally resort to 
torture and physical beatings of prisoners, particularly during 
interrogations. During the year, the police severely mistreated and 
beat army deserters and draft dodgers, and the army subjected deserters 
and draft dodgers to various military disciplinary actions that 
included prolonged sun exposure in temperatures of up to 113 degrees 
Fahrenheit, or the tying of the hands and feet for extended periods of 
time (see Section 1.d.).
    In October a guard at the Keren detention facility shot in the 
shoulder an Ethiopian detainee who locked himself into a room with 68 
other detainees for fear of being punished. The guard apparently shot 
the detainee through a window. The detainee was treated at a hospital 
and he was repatriated to Ethiopia by year's end. No action is known to 
have been taken against the guard.
    In July the Government deported 92 Ethiopian women to Djibouti by 
boat (see Section 1.d.). There were credible reports that Eritrean 
soldiers beat and raped some of the women while they were in detention 
awaiting deportation.
    There were credible reports that at times security forces beat 
Ethiopian detainees who were awaiting deportation or repatriation to 
Ethiopia.
    In July and August, the Government deported to Ethiopia thousands 
of Ethiopians under potentially difficult or dangerous conditions 
without the participation of the ICRC (see Section 1.d.). On July 31, 
up to six deportees reportedly disappeared crossing the Mereb river and 
are believed to have drowned. During another deportation on August 2 
via the town of Tsorona, credible sources reported that five Ethiopian 
deportees disappeared and are believed to have died, one woman gave 
birth, and returnees were forced to march for 18 hours straight.
    There were some instances in which private Eritrean individuals 
threatened and beat Ethiopians after fighting resumed in May. In some 
cases, police intervened too late to prevent the abuse, or were unable 
to halt such abuse. For example, on May 18, the day after Ethiopian 
troops occupied the Eritrean town of Barentu, students harassed, 
assaulted, and occasionally beat Ethiopians in Asmara.
    During the year, there were approximately 48 reported casualties, 
including a number of deaths, from landmines and unexploded ordnances 
(see Section 1.a.). It is probable that there were additional, 
unreported injuries that occurred in remote areas.
    Prison conditions are Spartan. The Government permits three visits 
per week by family members. There were no confirmed reports that any 
prisoners died due to lack of proper medical care. Women and men are 
held in separate facilities. There are no juvenile detention centers or 
correction facilities and juvenile offenders often are incarcerated 
with adults.
    Between June and September, the Government established detention 
camps for Ethiopians scheduled for repatriation or deportation in a 
number of areas, including Wia, Sheib, Alla, Afabet, Megarih, Shiketi, 
and Wekerti (see Section 1.d.). Monitors who visited the camps at 
Afabet, Adi Abieto, and Alla reported that conditions in the camps were 
Spartan but generally adequate; however, there were reports that 
numerous detainees became sick due to camp conditions at Afabet, and 
that some died. In addition between 10 and 15 persons died in the Sheb 
Mensheb detention camp during the year; most were infants and young 
children who died of dehydration due to the extremely hot weather. The 
Government responded by sending in a team of doctors and additional 
supplies, including water. There were credible reports that at least 
some of these detainees were forced to work outside their camps (see 
Section 6.c). By December the Government reported that most of these 
camps had been shut down and that approximately 1,500 detainees 
remained at Afabet and that 150 Ethiopians who did not want to leave 
the country remained at Alla.
    Approximately 1,000 POW's were being held at a camp in Nakfa at 
year's end. Conditions at the POW camp reportedly were good; however, 
in October six POW's in the Nakfa POW camp died from gastrointestinal 
illnesses (see Section 1.c.). POW's were forced to perform labor on 
road-building projects; however, following an ICRC visit in late 
August, the POW's were no longer forced to perform such labor (see 
Section 6.c.).
    Prior to August 8, the Government generally did not permit prison 
visits by local or international human rights groups; however, in 1998 
the Government began to permit some independent monitoring of 
conditions in detention facilities by international groups after the 
conflict with Ethiopia began. Local groups reportedly were not 
permitted to monitor conditions in prisons. Beginning on August 8, the 
Government allowed the ICRC to visit and register civilian detainees in 
internment camps and prisons, and, beginning on August 30, the ICRC was 
permitted to visit Ethiopian POW's. In November for the first time, the 
ICRC was permitted to visit several police stations in Asmara where 
Ethiopians reportedly were being held. The ICRC was not granted access 
to approximately 800 Ethiopian detainees, mostly young men, who were 
being held at the Keren camp prior to their deportation in October.
    During the year, the Government reportedly denied officials from 
the Government of Sudan access to 14 Sudanese prisoners arrested in 
1994 (see Section 1.d.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Penal Code stipulates that detainees may be 
held for a maximum of 30 days without being charged with a crime. In 
practice the authorities sometimes hold persons suspected of crimes for 
much longer periods. During the year, the Government detained between 
10,000 and 20,000 Ethiopians, many of whom were repatriated or deported 
to Ethiopia. By December the Government reported that approximately 
1,500 detainees remained at the Afabet internment camp and that 150 
Ethiopians who did not want to leave the country remained at the Alla 
internment camp.
    An unknown number of persons associated with radical Islamic 
elements or suspected terrorist organizations remained in detention 
without charge, in some cases for years. There were unconfirmed reports 
that the Government continued to hold numerous members of the Eritrean 
Liberation Front, an armed opposition group. Authorities sometimes 
arbitrarily arrest and detain former combatants or members of the PFDJ 
who violate an unwritten code of conduct (see Section 1.e.).
    In June approximately 200 members of the Kunama ethnic group were 
detained without charges on suspicion of collaborating with Ethiopian 
forces (see Section 5). Most were released within a few months; 
however, at year's end, several Kunamas remained in detention.
    At year's end, approximately five members of Jehovah's Witnesses 
remained in detention without charge and without being tried for 
failing to participate in national service. Some have been detained for 
more than 5 years without charge (see Section 2.c.).
    During the year, the Government released 6 Sudanese from a group of 
20 who reportedly were arrested in 1994. The other 14 Sudanese remained 
in detention at year's end. Officials from the Government of Sudan 
reportedly were denied access to these prisoners.
    The few deportees of Eritrean origin from Ethiopia who cannot 
demonstrate their ties to Eritrea are subject to detention. The 
Government grants these deportees documents that identify them as 
Ethiopians who are permitted to stay in the country (see Section 2.d.). 
Government and army officials who routinely check the identification 
cards of citizens in order to find draft dodgers and deserters 
reportedly consider these Ethiopian deportees to be Eritreans who are 
trying to avoid national service. As a result, they are subject to 
harassment and detention while the authorities check their status.
    There were reports that authorities arrested some Ethiopians in May 
for raising the Ethiopian flag in public places.
    On October 14, authorities detained eight journalists (see Section 
2.a.), six of whom were released on October 18. Reportedly the two 
other journalists were inducted into the military to fulfill their 
national service obligations.
    During the year, the Government deployed military police in Asmara 
to find deserters and draft dodgers (see Section 1.a., 1.c., and 1.f.). 
The military police detained persons who had not done their national 
service, including some disabled and mentally ill individuals who were 
detained in a camp near Asmara. Those who were deemed unfit for 
military training by a military medical board were released; the rest 
were required to fulfill their national service obligations.
    In June the Government began detaining Ethiopians in large numbers, 
and detained between 10,000 and 20,000 Ethiopians during the year. 
Between June and September, the Government established detention camps 
for Ethiopians scheduled for repatriation or deportation in a number of 
areas, including Wia, Sheib, Alla, Afabet, Megarih, Shiketi, Adi 
Abieto, and Wekerti (see Section 1.c.). There were credible reports 
that at least some of these detainees were forced to work outside their 
camps (see Section 6.c.). By December the Government reported that most 
of these camps were shut down and that approximately 1,500 detainees 
remained at Afabet and that 150 Ethiopians who did not want to leave 
the country remained at Alla. An unknown number of Ethiopians, 
particularly men, also were held in police stations, prisons, and jails 
in Asmara. The Government stated that Ethiopians detained in such 
places were being detained either for their own protection, because 
they had committed a crime, or because they were scheduled for 
deportation. There was no credible evidence that Ethiopians detained 
prior to deportation or detained for their protection continued to be 
held in police stations or jails at year's end.
    The Government generally does not use exile as a means of political 
control; however, in August the Government began deporting and 
repatriating Ethiopians to Ethiopia. At year's end the Government had 
returned more than 25,000 Ethiopians from Eritrea to Ethiopia. Most of 
these persons were repatriated voluntarily; however, many were deported 
forcibly. Only about half of these returns were conducted with ICRC 
participation (see Section 2.d.). Ethiopian women in Asmara working as 
barmaids, prostitutes, and housemaids were singled out for detention 
and deportation to Ethiopia (see Section 5). In July and August, the 
Government deported thousands of Ethiopians to Ethiopia under difficult 
and dangerous conditions without the participation of the ICRC. On July 
31, up to six deportees reportedly disappeared crossing the Mereb river 
and are believed to have drowned. During another deportation on August 
2 via the town of Tsorona, credible sources reported that five 
Ethiopian deportees disappeared and are believed to have died, one 
woman gave birth, and returnees had to march for 18 hours straight. Due 
to the long walk or dangerous river conditions, many of the deportees 
were forced to leave their belongings behind during deportations. In 
August the Government stated its intention to refrain from additional 
repatriations except under ICRC auspices.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is formally 
independent; however, it is weak and subject to executive interference. 
The continued use of an executive special court system allowed ongoing 
executive interference with the judicial process. In addition the 
judiciary relies on the Ministry of Justice for logistical and salary 
support, thereby further limiting the judiciary's independence.
    The judicial system has three parts: civilian, military, and 
special courts. The civilian court system consists of village courts, 
subregional courts, regional courts, and the High Court, which also 
serves as an appellate court. The still developing judicial system 
suffers from a lack of trained personnel, inadequate funding, and poor 
infrastructure that, in practice, limit the State's ability to grant 
accused persons a speedy trial. Although 16 new courthouses were 
completed in 1998, further development of the judicial infrastructure 
was constrained due to the conflict with Ethiopia. At independence the 
Government chose to retain the Ethiopian legal system but made some 
modifications to it. The Government has developed new commercial, 
penal, and criminal codes, which were ready for ratification by the 
National Assembly at year's end, although such ratification had not 
occurred by year's end. A new civil code is expected to be completed by 
2001.
    Under the legal system, minor infractions are brought to village 
courts and subregional courts. More serious offenses are argued before 
regional courts, and cases involving murder, rape, and other serious 
felonies are heard by the High Court. All cases except those argued 
before the High Court are heard by a single judge; on the High Court, 
panels of three judges hear cases. Defendants have access to legal 
counsel, usually at their own expense. Although there is no formal 
public defender's office, the Government has requested successfully 
that attorneys work without fee to represent defendants accused of 
serious crimes punishable by more than 10 years in prison, who are 
unable to afford legal counsel. Defendants may appeal verdicts to a 
High Court panel, which is composed of the High Court president and 
four other judges.
    Since the population is largely rural, most citizens only have 
contact with the legal system through the traditional village courts. 
Village judges, who are appointed by a panel composed of heads of 
regional courts, the regional prosecutor, and the regional governor, 
hear civil cases. Magistrates versed in criminal law hear criminal 
cases. Many local issues--for example, property disputes and most petty 
crimes--are adjudicated by local elders according to custom. In the 
case of Muslims, civil cases are heard under Shari'a law. The 
traditional courts cannot impose sentences involving physical 
punishment. The Ministry of Justice also offers training in alternative 
dispute resolution to handle some civil and petty criminal cases.
    The drafting of many civilians, including court administrators, 
defendants, judges, lawyers, and others involved in the legal system, 
into the national service due to the border conflict with Ethiopia has 
had a significant negative impact on the judiciary. The High Court was 
reduced from seven benches to three benches and provincial, zone, and 
village court personnel were reduced by 40 percent. As a result of 
these personnel constraints, there were lengthy delays in the 
processing of cases. However, during the year some court personnel were 
permitted to return to work.
    In February 1997, the Defense Minister created a special court 
system, ostensibly to reduce a growing backlog in the civilian court 
system; however, in practice, the special courts, which ban defense 
counsel and the right of appeal, allow the executive branch to mete out 
punishment without respect for due process. Judges in the special 
courts are senior military officers, most of whom have little or no 
legal experience. The special courts have jurisdiction over some 
criminal cases, such as capital offenses, felonies, misdemeanors, cases 
of tax evasion involving large sums, and cases of embezzlement by 
senior officials. The office of the Attorney General decides which 
cases are to be tried by a special court. The Attorney General also may 
allow the special courts to retry civilian court cases, including those 
decided by the High Court, thereby subjecting defendants to double 
jeopardy.
    The special courts also handle crimes involving corruption, theft, 
and misuse of government authority allegedly committed by former 
members of the EPLF during the war for independence. Senior former 
fighters and members of the PFDJ often are held to a stringent 
unwritten code of conduct, and violations of this code are handled by 
special courts outside the normal judicial process. Those accused of 
violating this circle of trust have been arrested and held without 
formal charge (see Section 1.d.).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government at times infringed on the right to 
privacy. Under the law, warrants are required in routine searches and 
seizures, except in cases where authorities believe individuals may 
attempt to escape or destroy evidence. Warrants also theoretically are 
required before the Government can monitor mail, telephones, or other 
means of private communication; however, in practice the Government 
generally does not bother to obtain warrants and there were reports 
that the Government monitored some international telephone calls. There 
were unconfirmed reports that members of the PFDJ placed Ethiopians 
under surveillance. The Government has the authority to ban the import 
of any foreign publication; however, it has not yet done so (see 
Section 2.a.).
    In July there were credible reports that the Government impeded 
communication between Eritrean POW's being held in Ethiopia and 
immediate family members in Eritrea.
    There were unconfirmed reports that the Government took land from 
members of the Kunama ethnic group without compensation and gave it to 
members of other ethnic groups on the grounds that the land was not 
being exploited efficiently (see Section 5).
    During the year, military police were deployed in Asmara to find 
deserters and draft dodgers. Members of the force carried out frequent 
document checks and routinely detained individuals of military age who 
had not done their national service (see Section 1.d.).
    In August the Government shut down all businesses in Asmara that 
belonged to Ethiopians with only a few days' notice: approximately 300 
businesses owned by Ethiopians were shut down. The Government gave 
Ethiopians occupying government-owned housing a 1-month notice to 
vacate. The Government reportedly also froze some bank accounts and 
seized some assets belonging to Ethiopians. Some Ethiopians had 
difficulty renewing business licenses, driving licenses, resident 
permits, or leases. A significant but unknown number of Ethiopians were 
fired or lost their jobs because of their nationality; in some cases, 
this was due to the fact that Ethiopians were working for Ethiopian 
businessmen who left the country or whose businesses were shut down.
    During the fighting in May and June, Ethiopian forces looted and 
caused significant damage to a number of Eritrean towns and villages. 
Among the properties ransacked and looted were mosques and churches, 
factories, flour mills, health clinics, pharmacies, schools, 
warehouses, bridges, and the homes of government officials.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, in practice, the 
Government restricts these rights, although it did so to a lesser 
extent than in the previous year. The Government uses the libel law to 
intimidate journalists. The editor-in-chief of the independent 
newspaper Kastedebana so far has been charged in seven libel cases; the 
cases were suspended pending the editor's return from serving a 
sentence for hard labor for leaving his post without proper leave 
papers. In 1999 the Government arrested an editor who refused to 
disclose the address of a reader whose letter to the editor criticized 
the commercial practices associated with Saudi Airlines operations in 
the country. He was rearrested briefly in late 1999 for additional 
questioning, and the Government brought more charges against him, some 
of which later were dropped. At year's end, the Saudi Airlines case and 
six other government charges of libel against the editor remained 
pending, and trial proceedings were suspended indefinitely when the 
editor was inducted into the army. While the Government has tolerated 
increased public debate over government decisions since the outbreak of 
conflict with Ethiopia, the media continues to practice self-censorship 
due, in part, to fear of Government reprisals.
    In August the Government arrested and detained for a day without 
charge the editor of the independent newspaper Zemen, allegedly for 
having expired leave papers.
    On October 14, authorities from the Ministry of Defense detained 
eight independent journalists, ostensibly to verify their draft status. 
Observers believe that the journalists were detained because their 
newspapers had been calling for access to National Assembly 
deliberations. Six of the journalists were released on October 18. 
Reportedly the two other journalists were inducted into the military to 
fulfill their national service obligations.
    Some journalists claim that they were targeted unfairly for the 
draft and complained of routine harassment by unknown individuals who 
they believe work for the Government. These journalists also allege 
that they received threatening telephone calls and that unidentified 
individuals showed up at their offices and threatened them.
    The Government controls much of the media, including three 
newspapers, one radio station, one television station, and one of only 
two newspaper printing presses in the country. There are no private 
radio or television stations. The Government has the authority to ban 
the import of any foreign publication, although it has not done so. The 
press proclamation issued in 1996 forbids the local reprinting of 
articles from banned publications. The Government continued to restrict 
the right of the religious media to comment on politics or government 
policies. In theory nonreligious print media are free to criticize the 
Government. Nonetheless, criticism tends to be limited and fairly mild, 
and the media practices a great deal of self-censorship.
    The Government's press proclamation allows individuals to publish 
newspapers, and private newspapers and magazines began publishing at 
the end of 1997. At year's end, there were nine independent newspapers 
and magazines operating. Four independent newspapers or magazines 
closed during the year when all of their reporters were called up for 
military service. Three independent newspapers, Setit, Kastedebana and 
Tsighenai, each have a circulation of 15,000. The pro-Government 
publication of the PFDJ's National Union of Eritrean Youth and 
Students, Trgta, has the widest circulation at 20,000. The press 
proclamation does not allow private ownership of any broadcast media or 
foreign influence or ownership of any media. The proclamation requires 
that all newspapers obtain a license from the Ministry of Information 
before publication and that all reporters must register with the 
Ministry. The Government also may punish ``whosoever insults, abuses, 
defames, or slanders the Government or one of the constituted 
legislative, executive, or judicial authorities,'' and forbids the 
publication of any subject matter that contravenes general morality. 
While there was no direct government censorship of the independent 
press during the year, the Government continued to exert pressure on 
the independent press through advice and warnings.
    In 1999 the Government began the process of implementing Internet 
access through its telecommunications system, and with foreign donor 
assistance, access to the Internet became available in November. There 
also are two independent Internet service providers.
    Although the Government claims that there were no restrictions on 
academic freedom, the University of Asmara refused to give diplomas to 
students who completed their studies unless they did their national 
service. In addition, new graduates occasionally were pressured to work 
for government entities. The University of Asmara was closed formally 
in May, a few weeks before final exams, due to the fighting with 
Ethiopia; it reopened in October, although exams were held in June. 
Students were sent to active duty or to military training.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this 
right in practice. The Government requires a permit from the Ministry 
of Local Government for a public meeting or demonstration. In general 
permits are granted freely for nonpolitical meetings or gatherings, and 
there were no reports that permits for political demonstrations were 
denied.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association and states 
that every citizen shall have the right to form organizations for 
political, social, economic, and cultural ends; however, in practice 
the Government restricts this right. The Government does not allow the 
formation of any political parties; however, during the year, the 
Government established two committees to develop guidelines and rules 
for new elections and the formation of political parties. The 
Government also has stated its opposition to the formation of any party 
based on ethnicity or religion. In 1999 journalists from the country's 
11 independent newspapers formed an organizing committee to establish 
an independent journalists' organization. In October 1999, they filed 
for a license with the Ministry of Local Government; however, the 
Government refused to issue a license and the group had not formed by 
year's end.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in the case of 
Jehovah's Witnesses. The Constitution provides for the ``freedom to 
practice any religion and to manifest such practice,'' and Islam and 
most forms of Christianity are practiced and tolerated widely 
throughout the country with persons free to worship at the church or 
mosque of their choice; however, the Government continued to harass, 
detain, and discriminate against members of the small community of 
Jehovah's Witnesses because of their refusal to perform National 
Service.
    In 1994 in accordance with a presidential decree, the Government 
revoked the trading licenses of some members of Jehovah's Witnesses and 
dismissed most of those who worked in the civil service. This 
governmental action resulted in economic, employment, and travel 
difficulties for many members of Jehovah's Witnesses, especially former 
civil servants and businessmen. In April 1997, the government labor 
office issued a form to all employers in Asmara and the surrounding 
area requesting information on any government personnel who were 
members of Jehovah's Witnesses. In addition to these measures, members 
of Jehovah's Witnesses also often are denied identification cards, 
passports, exit visas, trading licenses, and government housing unless 
they hide their religion.
    Most members of Jehovah's Witnesses refused on religious grounds to 
vote in the referendum on independence and have declined to participate 
in national service. This spurred widespread criticism that members of 
Jehovah's Witnesses collectively were shirking their civic duty. Some 
Muslims also have objected to universal national service with regard to 
the requirement that women perform military duty. The Government does 
not excuse individuals who object to national service for religious 
reasons or reasons of conscience, nor does the Government allow 
alternative service. Although persons from other religious groups have 
been punished in past years for failure to participate in national 
service, only members of Jehovah's Witnesses have been subject to 
dismissal from the civil service, had their trading licenses revoked, 
been evicted from government-owned housing, and been denied passports, 
identity cards, and exit visas. However, there were no reports that 
Jehovah's Witnesses who performed national service and participated in 
the national independence referendum were subject to discrimination. 
Jehovah's Witnesses have several churches and members are not barred 
from meeting in private homes.
    In 1998 several members of Jehovah's Witnesses were arrested for 
failure to comply with the national service law and some were tried, 
although there is no information available regarding the verdicts or 
sentences in these cases. At year's end, approximately five members of 
Jehovah's Witnesses remained in detention without charge and without 
being tried for failing to participate in national service. These 
individuals had been detained for varying period of time, some for more 
than 5 years without charge. The maximum penalty for refusing to 
perform national service is only 3 years' imprisonment. Ministry of 
Justice officials have denied that any members of Jehovah's Witnesses 
were being held without charge, although they acknowledge that some 
members of Jehovah's Witnesses, and a number of Muslims, are in jail 
serving sentences for convictions on charges of evading national 
service. There is no indication that any persons are detained or 
imprisoned solely because of their religious beliefs or practices; 
however, the Government has singled out members of Jehovah's Witnesses 
for harsher treatment than that received by members of other faiths for 
similar actions.
    The army resorted to various forms of extreme physical punishment 
to force objectors, including some members of Jehovah's Witnesses, to 
do their military service (see Section 1.c.).
    Unlike in previous years, there is no evidence that the Government 
discourages proselytizing by members of one faith among adherents of 
another.
    In a 1995 proclamation, the Government described specific 
guidelines on the role of religion and religiously affiliated NGO's in 
development and government, stating that development, politics, and 
public administration are the sole responsibility of the Government and 
citizens. The 1995 Proclamation bans religious organizations from 
involvement in politics and restricts the right of religious media to 
comment on political matters. Pursuant to the 1995 proclamation, 
religious organizations are permitted to fund, but not initiate or 
implement, development projects; however, this proclamation was not 
enforced in practice--several religious organizations executed small-
scale development projects without government interference. The 1995 
proclamation also sets out rules governing relations between religious 
organizations and foreign sponsors.
    In 1998 authorities informed all religious organizations that all 
schools run by religious denominations providing general education 
would be incorporated into the public school system. At the time, it 
was not made clear whether the religious authorities would continue to 
administer the curriculum with government oversight or whether the 
school faculty would be absorbed into the Ministry of education. 
However, no action was taken to implement this initiative because of 
the outbreak of the border conflict with Ethiopia. In 1998 the 
Government decreed that religiously affiliated organizations were 
prohibited from running kindergartens; however, this decree still had 
not been implemented by year's end. According to officials in the 
Religious Affairs Office, the Government is expected to allow religious 
schools to operate independently as long as they adhere to a standard 
curriculum.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the rights 
of movement and emigration; however, while citizens can travel freely 
within the country and change their place of residence and work, 
authorities restrict freedom of movement and emigration in practice. 
The Government requires all citizens to carry national identification 
cards, which they must present on demand at security checkpoints. The 
Government restricted travel to some areas within the country for 
security reasons. Beginning in March, military police periodically set 
up numerous roadblocks in Asmara and other cities to find draft dodgers 
and military deserters (see Section 1.d.); however, the number of such 
roadblocks was reduced significantly by year's end.
    During the year, the Government repatriated or deported more than 
25,000 Ethiopians from Eritrea to Ethiopia (see Section 1.d.). Most of 
those who left the country were repatriated voluntary; however, many 
were deported forcibly (see Section 1.d.). Among the deportees were 
women who alleged that they were prevented from taking their children 
with them because their fathers were Eritreans (see Section 5). An 
estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Ethiopians remain in the country. Only about 
half of the returns were conducted with ICRC participation. In 
September the Government declared that it would conduct future 
repatriations only with the participation of the ICRC; however, while 
the Government generally abided by this declaration, on October 14, 800 
Ethiopians were deported from the Keren camp without ICRC 
participation. The Government stated publicly on several occasions that 
it had not adopted a policy of deporting all Ethiopian nationals from 
the country.
    Clashes between government forces and EIS members in 1997 led the 
Government to restrict travel along much of the border with Sudan. Some 
areas remain heavily mined, a legacy of the war for independence, and 
occasionally new mines are set by the EIS or others, leading to 
additional travel restrictions (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    Some Ethiopians had difficulty renewing residence permits and were 
subject to detention when stopped by authorities with an expired 
residence permit (see Section 1.d.). In general Ethiopians were able to 
get exit visas.
    Citizens largely are free to travel outside the country after 
obtaining an exit visa, although members of Jehovah's Witnesses (see 
Section 2.c.), officials of the former Ethiopian military regime, and 
those who have not completed national service have been denied 
passports or exit visas. In addition as a result of the conflict with 
Ethiopia, the Government increasingly denied exit visas to some young 
men and women, apparently on the ground that they were approaching the 
age of eligibility for national service.
    In general citizens have the right to return; however, Eritreans 
must show proof that they paid a 2 percent tax on their annual income 
to the Government of Eritrea while living abroad in order to receive 
government services upon their return to the country. Instances in 
which citizens living abroad have run afoul of the law, have contracted 
a serious contagious disease, or have been declared ineligible for 
political asylum by other governments are considered on a case-by-case 
basis.
    The border with Ethiopia was closed in May 1998, due to the 
outbreak of war, although Eritreans deported from Ethiopia crossed the 
border and were allowed to resettle in Eritrea. As many as 75,000 
Eritreans or Ethiopians of Eritrean origin have been deported from 
Ethiopia. The deportees, if they wished, were placed in villages with 
friends or family. Those who no longer had connections in Eritrea were 
placed temporarily in camps with internally displaced persons (IDP's) 
before being settled among the general population. In order to 
facilitate the deportees' integration into society, the Government 
provided them with documentation good for 6 months that identified them 
as deportees. If, during that time, the deportees could find three 
Eritrean witnesses willing to testify to their Eritrean ties, the 
Government issued them documentation of Eritrean nationality; they then 
are considered to be permanent citizens. For the small minority of 
deportees who cannot demonstrate Eritrean ties, the Government grants 
them identity documents that specify that they are Ethiopian, but they 
are permitted to stay in the country. At times, these deportees are 
subject to harassment and detention by military authorities (see 
Section 1.d.). Deportees of military age who acknowledged Eritrean 
nationality were ordered to report for military service.
    Approximately 1.1 million citizens have been displaced internally 
as a result of the conflict with Ethiopia. At year's end, approximately 
243,000 IDP's were in 25 camps in the Debub, Gash-Barka, and Northern 
Red Sea zones, and there were approximately 100,000 IDP's outside of 
the camps. Camp facilities are basic, but conditions generally are 
adequate.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates 
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government 
provides first asylum and provided it to Somali and Sudanese refugees 
during the year. In May when fighting resumed with Ethiopia, there were 
750 Sudanese refugees at the Elitte camp and 2,300 Somali refugees at 
the Harsile camp near the port of Assab. During the fighting, 1,228 
Somali refugees were evacuated from the Harsile camp to the Emkulu camp 
near Massawa and another 972 were sent to Yemen and Djibouti by the 
UNHCR. The remaining 100 Somali refugees chose to remain in Assab. The 
ERREC, a government agency, is the principal Eritrean organization 
responsible for refugee and internally displaced issues.
    In May the Government was scheduled to repatriate long-term 
Eritrean refugees from Sudan; however, the repatriations were postponed 
after the fighting with Ethiopia resumed. During the year, 
approximately 50,000 additional Eritreans from towns and villages in 
the southwest of the country fled to Sudan. By year's end, nearly all 
of these refugees in Sudan had returned to their villages or were in 
displacement camps inside Eritrea. The estimated 136,000 long-term 
Eritrean refugees in Sudan remained there at year's end.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: the Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Although the Constitution provides for this right, citizens have 
not been able to change their government in multiparty elections. 
Authority within the Government is held very narrowly among a small 
cadre of former fighters. The Government is dominated completely by the 
PFDJ, which came to power in the 1993 popular referendum in which over 
99.8 percent of voters chose an independent Eritrea managed by a 
transitional government run by the PFDJ rather than electing to remain 
part of Ethiopia. The PFDJ still has not fulfilled the ambitious 
program that it initially outlined for a transition to a democratically 
elected government by 1997. Elections, originally scheduled for 1997, 
have never been held. An electoral commission was established in 1997 
to draft an electoral code for 1998 elections, but accomplished little 
because of the outbreak of the conflict with Ethiopia, and elections 
again were postponed. The only political party permitted to operate is 
the PFDJ, and there are no opposition parties active domestically (see 
Section 2.b.). During the year, the Government established two 
committees to develop guidelines and rules for new elections and the 
formation of political parties; National Assembly elections are 
scheduled to take place in 2001.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In an effort 
to encourage broader participation by women in politics, the PFDJ named 
3 women to the party's 19-member Executive Council and 11 women to the 
75-member Central Council at the last party congress, held in 1994. 
Women participated in the Constitutional Commission (occupying almost 
half of the positions on the 50-person committee) and hold several 
senior government positions, including the positions of Minister of 
Justice and Minister of Labor. By law a third of regional National 
Assembly seats are reserved for women, and women also are able compete 
for the non-reserved seats.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Local 
Governments jointly are responsible for handling human rights 
inquiries. All NGO's must register with the ERREC; there were 36 non-
domestic NGO's operating in the country, the majority of which are 
involved in emergency assistance. A local human rights organization, 
Citizens for Peace in Eritrea (CPE), formed in 1998 to investigate and 
publicize Ethiopian deportations of Eritreans, was registered in July 
as a local NGO and broadened its mandate to include other human rights 
problems. In June the CPE issued a statement appealing to citizens and 
the Government to safeguard the human rights of Ethiopians living in 
the country.
    In 1995 the Government proclaimed that religious organizations, 
including religious-based NGO's, could not engage in development 
activities; however, this proclamation never has been enforced in 
practice. In addition the four main religious groups (Orthodox, 
Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant) continued to coordinate the provision 
of relief services to deportees from Ethiopia in conjunction with the 
ERREC. A 1998 decree prohibiting religiously affiliated organizations 
from running kindergartens has not been implemented yet (see Section 
2.c.).
    A governmental proclamation issued in 1996 required that all 
private NGO's hire only those who have completed their national 
service; however, this proclamation was not enforced in practice. This 
proclamation was part of the Government's effort to provide benefits to 
citizens who have served in the military.
    In January 1998, the Government ordered most of the country's 
remaining NGO's to close down their programs, allegedly because they 
wasted too much money on administrative costs. Most NGO's left in 1998; 
however, several NGO's began returning in 1999 when the Government 
sought to encourage greater NGO participation in development and 
humanitarian aid. At year's end, there were 36 non-domestic NGO's 
operating in the country.
    Most international human rights organizations are not permitted to 
operate within the country, with the exception of the ICRC, which 
continued its programs during the year and provided shelter and 
supplemental food to approximately 243,000 persons displaced by the 
conflict with Ethiopia. However, the ICRC was not permitted to visit 
Ethiopian civilian detainees until August 8 and was not permitted to 
visit Ethiopian POW's until August 30 (see Section 1.c.), nor was it 
granted access to Ethiopian detainees held in several jails in Asmara 
until November (see Section 1.c.). In September the Government agreed 
to conduct future repatriations of Ethiopian civilians under ICRC 
auspices and to allow the ICRC to organize the return of Ethiopian 
POW's held in Eritrea; however, while the Government generally abided 
by this declaration, on October 14, 881 Ethiopians were deported from 
the Keren camp without ICRC participation (see Section 2.d.).

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and the transitional civil code prohibit 
discrimination against women and the disabled, and the Government 
generally enforces these provisions.
    Women.--The Government has taken a firm public stance against 
domestic violence; however, observers believe that violence against 
women, particularly in highland areas, is pervasive. Spousal abuse, 
especially wife beating, is common; however, domestic violence seldom 
is discussed openly by women because of societal pressures. Such 
incidents more commonly are addressed, if at all, within families or by 
religious clergy.
    The Government consistently has advocated improving the status of 
women, many of whom played a significant role as fighters in the 
struggle for independence. Since independence women have enjoyed a 
legal right to equal educational opportunities, equal pay for equal 
work, and legal sanctions against domestic violence. In 1994 the Third 
Party Congress advocated more rights for women, including parity in the 
right to land and other property. However, much of society remains 
traditional and patriarchal, and generally women do not enjoy a social 
status equal to men. The law provides a framework for improving the 
status of women, but laws are implemented unevenly, because of a lack 
of capacity in the legal system and ingrained cultural attitudes. In 
practice males retain privileged access to education, employment, and 
control of economic resources, with more disparities in rural areas 
than in cities.
    When the Government began detaining and returning Ethiopians to 
Ethiopia in June, authorities singled out young Ethiopian women, 
particularly prostitutes, barmaids, and waitresses, for detention and 
involuntary deportation (see Section 1.d. and 2.d.); reportedly this 
was due, in part, to the fear that these women spread HIV/AIDS. 
Reportedly those women who could demonstrate that they had a child with 
an Eritrean father were permitted to remain in the country. However, 
other female deportees alleged that they were prevented from taking 
their children because the fathers were Eritreans.
    The law requires that women between the ages of 18 and 40 
participate in the active national service program, and during the 
year, women were engaged in fighting in the conflict against Ethiopia. 
However, in 1999 the Government began moving more women away from 
direct combat roles and reassigned them to other responsibilities, 
including training and operation of heavy equipment.
    Children.--The Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare is responsible 
for government policies concerning the rights and welfare of children. 
The Children's Affairs Division under the Ministry of Labor and Human 
Welfare covers child care, counseling, and probation. The law 
criminalizes child prostitution, pornography, and sexual exploitation.
    Education through grade seven is compulsory and free; however, 
education above grade seven is neither free nor compulsory, and while 
the situation has improved, there is a shortage of schools and teachers 
at all levels. According the Ministry of Education, only 37 to 38 
percent of children attend school. Approximately 75 percent of the 
population are illiterate. In rural areas, young girls usually leave 
school early to work at home.
    A small number of children under the age of 18 entered military 
service, usually because of a lack of a birth certificate or other 
identification. When soldiers were found to be under the age of 18, 
they were removed from service.
    Child abuse is not thought to be common; however, female genital 
mutilation, which is widely condemned by international health experts 
as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is widespread, 
with estimates placing the number of women and girls who have been 
subjected to FGM at 95 percent. FGM is practiced by almost all ethnic 
and religious groups in the country. In the lowlands, infibulation--the 
most severe from of FGM--is practiced. There is no law prohibiting FGM; 
however, the Government has worked to combat officially the practice of 
FGM. The Government and other organizations, including the National 
Union of Eritrean Women, sponsored education programs that discourage 
the practice. The U.N. Population Fund, through the Ministry of Health, 
sponsors reproductive health projects that provide training and 
awareness programs that focus on the negative physical and 
psychological impacts of FGM.
    People with Disabilities.--The long war for independence and the 
conflict with Ethiopia left thousands of men and women physically 
disabled from injuries they received as guerrillas, soldiers, and 
civilian victims. The Government spends a large share of its resources 
to support and train these disabled fighters, who are regarded as 
heroes, and does not discriminate against them in training, education, 
or employment. There are no laws mandating access for the disabled to 
public thoroughfares or public or private buildings; however, many 
newly constructed buildings provide access for disabled persons.
    Religious Minorities.--Societal attitudes toward members of 
Jehovah's Witnesses are the exception to a widespread religious 
tolerance. Members of Jehovah's Witnesses generally are disliked and 
face some societal discrimination because of their refusal to 
participate in the independence referendum in 1993 and to perform 
national service, a refusal that is seen widely as unpatriotic. 
However, the level of societal discrimination against Jehovah's 
Witnesses has declined since the previous year.
    Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There were reports of government and 
societal discrimination against the Kunama, one of nine ethnic groups 
in the country and which are concentrated primarily in the west. 
Because of the existence of a Kunama opposition group operating in 
Ethiopia and supported by the Ethiopian Government, some Kunama in 
Eritrea are suspected of supporting or having sympathies with the 
Ethiopia Government. During the fighting from May to June, Ethiopian 
forces occupied many areas inhabited by Kunamas; following the 
withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, some Kunama were accused of 
collaborating with the Ethiopian troops or of looting of property. In 
June approximately 200 Kunamas were detained without charges on 
suspicion of collaborating with the Ethiopian forces (see Section 
1.d.). There were unconfirmed reports that the Government took land 
from members of the Kunama ethnic group without compensation and gave 
it to members of other ethnic groups on the grounds that the land was 
not being efficiently exploited. There also is some societal 
discrimination against Kunamas due to the fact that Kunamas are seen, 
ethnically and culturally, as different from the majority of citizens.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Some government policies restrict 
free association or prevent the formation of unions, including within 
the civil service, the military, the police, and other essential 
services. The Ministry of Labor must grant special approval for groups 
of twenty or fewer persons seeking to form a union; the Government 
opposed the creation of a press association during the year (see 
Section 2.b.).
    Proclamation 8 of 1991 provides workers with the legal right to 
form unions and to strike to protect their interests. The National 
Confederation of Eritrean Workers (NCEW), which was part of the EPLF 
during the war, maintains a close affiliation with the Government, and 
its leadership consists of high-ranking PFDJ members. The NCEW 
represents over 25,000 workers from 250 unions and receives some 
assistance from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and foreign 
labor organizations. The largest union within the NCEW is the Textile, 
Leather, and Shoe Federation. There were no strikes reported during the 
year.
    Unions may affiliate internationally, and all five workers' 
federations within the NCEW maintained affiliations with international 
unions during the year.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--In 1993 the ILO 
began assisting the Government with a draft labor code, which prohibits 
antiunion discrimination by employers, allows groups of 20 or fewer 
workers to organize without Ministry of Labor approval, and establishes 
a new tripartite mechanism for resolving disputes; however, the code 
had not implemented by year's end. Under the new labor code, a 
tripartite board composed of workers, employers, and Ministry of Labor 
officials is to work to resolve differences. Under the labor law in 
force during the year, disputes are taken to court. During the year, 
the NCEW brought 65 cases to court, while an additional 75 NCEW cases 
remained pending or were settled through conciliation by the Ministry 
of Labor at year's end.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however, there were reports that 
some Ethiopian civilian detainees were forced to perform paid farm 
labor and road repair. POW's were forced to perform labor on road-
building projects; however, following an ICRC visit in late August, the 
POW's were no longer forced to perform such labor (see Section 1.c.). 
All citizens between the ages of 18 and 40 are required to participate 
in the National Service Program, which includes military training as 
well as civic action programs. High school students also are required 
to participate in a paid summer work program.
    The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children, 
and there were no reports that it occurred.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 18 years, although 
apprentices may be hired at age 14. The law also prohibits apprentices 
under 18 years of age from performing certain dangerous and abusive 
labor, such as working in mines or sewers. Labor inspectors in the 
Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare are responsible for the enforcement 
of laws pertaining to the employment of children; however, due to the 
small number of inspectors, inspections are infrequent. According to 
the Ministry of Education, only 37 to 38 percent of children attend 
school due, in part, to a shortage of schools and teachers. It is 
common for rural children who do not attend classes to work on family 
farms, fetching firewood and water, and herding livestock among other 
activities. In urban areas, some children work as street vendors of 
cigarettes, newspapers, or chewing gum. Children also work as child-
minders, traders, and domestic accountants and in small-scale 
manufacturing. There were reports that the Government inadvertently 
employed children under the age of 18 as soldiers (see section 5).
    The Government has not yet ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor.
    The Constitution prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that 
performed by children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are two systems that 
regulate employment conditions--the civil service system and the labor 
law system. There is no legally mandated minimum wage in the private 
sector. In the civil service sector, wages vary from $34 to $400 (320 
to 3,800 nakfa) per month, with factory workers in government-owned 
enterprises earning the highest wages. The minimum wage in the civil 
service sector does not provide the average worker and family with a 
decent standard of living.
    The standard workweek is 44+ hours, but many persons work fewer 
hours. Under the Labor Law, workers are entitled to 1 day of rest per 
week, and most workers are allowed 1 to 1+ days off per week. The 
Government has instituted occupational health and safety standards, but 
inspection and enforcement vary widely among factories. Workers are 
permitted to remove themselves from dangerous work sites without 
retaliation.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that such trafficking 
occurred to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                ETHIOPIA

    Ethiopia continued its transition from a unitary to a federal 
system of government. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi leads the Government 
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. In May the Ethiopian 
Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) won general elections 
to the federal and regional parliaments. The elections were the second 
held based on an organizational concept of ethnic federalism 
incorporated into the 1994 Constitution. Most opposition political 
parties competed in the May election; however, due to lack of funds and 
often weak political organization, opposition parties contested only 20 
percent of the seats to the federal parliament. EPRDF and affiliated 
parties hold 518 seats in the 547-seat federal parliament. EPRDF and 
affiliated parties also hold all regional parliaments by large 
majorities, although opposition parties hold approximately 30 percent 
in the Addis Ababa region council and 9.5 percent in the southern 
region council. According to international and local observers, the 
elections were generally free and fair in most areas; however, serious 
election irregularities occurred in the Southern Nations and 
Nationalities Peoples' Regional State (SNNPRS or southern region), 
particularly in Hadiya zone. The National Electoral Board (NEB) 
investigated complaints of the irregularities and determined that many 
of them had merit. The NEB conducted new elections in June in the 
SNNPRS, which were determined to be relatively free and fair by 
international observers, and resulted in the opposition winning 29 
seats in the federal parliament and 33 seats in the region council. The 
principal faction within the EPRDF remains Prime Minister Meles' Tigray 
Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF). Federal regions, largely organized 
along ethnic lines, increasingly are autonomous and have a large degree 
of local control over fiscal and most political issues. However, the 
relationship between the central government and local officials and 
among various judiciaries lacks consistent coordination, and 
occasionally actions are taken at the local level that conflict with 
stated federal policy. Highly centralized authority, poverty, civil 
conflict, and unfamiliarity with democratic concepts combine to 
complicate the implementation of federalism. The federal Government's 
ability to protect constitutional rights at the local level is limited 
and uneven. Local administrative, police, and judicial systems remain 
weak throughout the country. The judiciary is weak and overburdened but 
continued to show signs of independence.
    The Government's security forces consist of the military and the 
police, both of which are responsible for internal security. The 
police, which are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, report to the 
Security, Immigration, and Refugees Affairs Authority (SIRAA). The 
military consists of both air and ground forces and reports to the 
Ministry of National Defense. There was renewed fighting in May and 
June between Ethiopian and Eritrean armed forces. In June the two 
countries signed a cessation of hostilities agreement and, on December 
12, signed a formal peace treaty. In 1998 when the conflict with 
Eritrea broke out, military forces assigned to help police and local 
militia in the Gambella and Benishangul-Gomuz regions establish order, 
control banditry, and curtail rebel activities, were redeployed to 
areas bordering Eritrea. Without the military's assistance, these areas 
once again experienced a breakdown in law and order. There was 
increased internal military presence in some parts of the Somali region 
and Oromiya. Military forces conducted an increased number of low-level 
operations against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Somalia-based 
Al'Ittihad terrorist organization, and elements of the Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF) both in the country and in southern Somalia and 
northern Kenya. Some local officials and members of the security forces 
committed human rights abuses.
    The economy is based on smallholder agriculture, with more than 85 
percent of the estimated population of 63 million living in rural areas 
under very basic conditions. Agriculture accounts for approximately 80 
percent of total employment. Per capita gross national product is 
estimated at $100 per year. The real gross domestic product growth rate 
was estimated at 4.6 percent for the year. Total exports increased from 
between 2.9 and 6.9 percent over the previous year. Exports consist 
primarily of coffee, chat, hides, skins, beans, and oilseeds. Coffee 
accounted for 60 percent of the value of exports during the year, 60 
percent of the value of 1999 exports and 70 percent of 1998 exports. 
The conflict with Eritrea led to increased military spending. Military 
spending from July 1999 to July was $830 million dollars (6.8 billion 
birr). The Government continued to implement an economic reform program 
designed to stabilize the country's financial position, promote private 
sector participation in the economy, and attract foreign investment. In 
December 1999, the customs authority introduced a 10 percent surtax on 
most imports to raise funds for the military; however, the surtax was 
rescinded as of January 1.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained. 
Security forces committed a number of extrajudicial killings and at 
times beat and mistreated detainees. Prison conditions are poor. 
Arbitrary arrest and detention and prolonged pretrial detention 
remained problems. The Government continued to detain persons suspected 
of sympathizing with or being involved with the OLF. The Government 
continued to detain and deport without due process Eritreans and 
Ethiopians of Eritrean origin. Since the outbreak of the border 
conflict in May 1998, as many as 75,000 such persons have left Ethiopia 
for Eritrea; the vast majority were deported, although a small number 
left voluntarily. However, the Government stopped deporting Eritreans 
and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin after it signed the cessation of 
hostilities agreement with Eritrea in June. Another 1,200 male 
Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were being held in 
internment camps at Dedesa at year's end. Although prompted by national 
security considerations, the expulsions and detentions raised 
fundamental concerns regarding arbitrary arrest and detention, forced 
exile, the forcible separation of families, and nationality issues, as 
well as the hardships and financial losses suffered by those who were 
detained or expelled. Despite some efforts, the judiciary continued to 
lack sufficient trained staff and funds, which limited its ability to 
provide citizens the full protection provided for in the Constitution. 
During August and September, the federal courts were able to reduce the 
backlog of court cases by approximately a third. The judiciary also 
showed some signs of growing independence. The Government infringed on 
citizen's privacy rights, and the law regarding search warrants was 
ignored widely.
    The Government restricts freedom of the press and continued to 
detain or imprison members of the press; however, fewer journalists 
were detained than in previous years. Most were accused or convicted of 
inciting ethnic hatred, committing libel, or publishing false 
information in violation of the 1992 Press Law. Journalists continued 
to practice self-censorship. The Government at times restricted freedom 
of assembly. The Government limits freedom of association and, while 
the non-governmental organization (NGO) registration process continued 
to improve, the Government continued to refuse to register some NGO's. 
In July legislation to create a constitutionally mandated Human Rights 
Commission and office of the ombudsman, which was passed in October 
1999, entered into force; however, neither entity was operational at 
year's end. The Government generally respected freedom of religion; 
however, on occasion local authorities infringed on this right. The 
Government restricted freedom of movement. The border conflict with 
Eritrea displaced a large number of persons internally; however, 
approximately half of the internally displaced persons (IDP's) were 
able to return home by year's end.
    Violence and societal discrimination against women, and abuse of 
children remained problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is 
widespread. The Government supported efforts to eliminate FGM and other 
harmful traditional practices. The exploitation of children for 
economic and sexual purposes remained a problem. Societal 
discrimination against disabled persons was a problem. Discrimination 
against religious and ethnic minorities continued. Child labor, 
particularly in the informal sector, continued to be a problem. Forced 
labor, including forced child labor, was also a problem, and there were 
reports of trafficking in persons.
    The Government's Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO) continued 
conducting the trials of persons accused of committing crimes under the 
brutal Marxist regime (1974-91) of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. 
Charges have been brought against 5,198 persons. All have been indicted 
and arraigned, and the testimony of victims continued to be heard in 
open court. However, more than half of those accused are not in custody 
and were charged in absentia. Most SPO detainees have been held in 
custody for 7 or 8 years awaiting trial and judgment.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The security forces 
committed a number of extrajudicial killings, including alleged 
political killings. In February in Soro, police tortured and killed two 
farmers--supporters of the opposition--while they were in police 
custody; the farmers allegedly were arrested for the non-payment of 
taxes (see Sections 1.d. and 3). No action was taken against the police 
by year's end. In March in Ambo, police killed a student, Getu Driba, 
injured 6 others, and detained over 1,000 students and 3 teachers after 
a demonstration (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). There was a 
credible report that in March security forces killed a student who was 
attempting to assist another person being arrested for the non-payment 
of taxes (see Section 1.d.). In April in Dembi Dolo, police killed a 
student during a student demonstration in support of detained Ambo 
students and teachers (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In May in the 
SNNPRS region, Hadiya zone, security forces killed two women while they 
were voting, allegedly because they refused to mark their ballots for 
an EPRDF candidate (see Section 3). An election observer who saw the 
bodies stated that the women were shot in the face. A government 
investigation into the killings was conducted during the year; however, 
no results were released or further action taken in the matter by 
year's end. Also in May, according to Beyene Petros, the chairman of 
the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Coalition (SEPDC), police 
killed seven SEPDC supporters who were protesting outside two polling 
stations in the south (see Section 3). In December in Awassa, riot 
police shot and killed a student in a demonstration (see Section 2.a. 
and 2.b.). In December police reportedly beat to death a man detained 
allegedly in retaliation for election activities (see Section 1.c.). 
There also were numerous unconfirmed reports of extrajudicial killings 
by government security forces from Oromiya and the Somali region.
    There were some reports that Ethiopian troops in Somalia killed 
some civilians during the year. For example, on September 23, 
approximately 30 Ethiopian soldiers attacked Haji Salah village in 
Somaliland, killed two persons, and confiscated radio equipment. 
Somaliland President Egal wrote a letter to the Ethiopian Government 
and asked for an explanation for the attack.
    The Government provided financial support to a coalition of 
Eritrean opposition groups based in Sudan, which were reported to have 
laid landmines in Eritrea that resulted in several civilian deaths.
    In late November, armed men reportedly from Ethiopia killed nine 
persons and seriously injured five others in the town of Moyale near 
the Kenyan border. Local politicians claimed that the attackers had 
support from Ethiopian security forces; the incident was not resolved 
by year's end.
    There were some deaths in prison during the year due to illness and 
disease (see Section 1.c.).
    In November 1999, student protests against the arrest of two 
teachers who criticized new textbooks in the Welayita speaking sections 
of the SNNPRS led to widespread demonstrations and riots (see Sections 
1.d. and 5). Special police units called in to suppress the riot killed 
up to 10 persons and injured hundreds of others. The Government 
conducted an investigation into the incident but had not released a 
report by year's end.
    There was no action taken or investigation into reports that in 
August 1999 security forces fired on a group of Somalis who were 
protesting the military's occupation of a Somali border town, killing 
two persons.
    In June 1999, a youth attending the funeral of All Amhara People's 
Organization (AAPO) founder Dr. Asrat Woldeyes was shot and killed by 
an undercover security officer who subsequently was arrested and 
charged for the crime. No further action was taken in the case by 
year's end.
    In 1997 the Federal High Court in Addis Ababa began the arraignment 
and prosecution of 5,198 persons formally charged with genocide and 
other war crimes, including extrajudicial killings, under the previous 
regime (see Section 1.e.). Of the 5,198 persons charged, 2,246 were 
detained, while the remaining 2,952 were charged in absentia. At year's 
end, witnesses still were being heard and evidence taken in the ongoing 
trials. During the year, the Government acquitted and released a number 
of prisoners for lack of evidence. In November 1999, the Federal High 
Court handed down a death sentence in absentia to Getachew Tekeba, a 
former district governor and army lieutenant. Tekeba was convicted of 
ordering the detention, torture, and execution of five alleged 
opponents of the Mengistu Government. Tekeba's whereabouts remained 
unknown at year's end. In November the Federal High Court sentenced 
Colonel Sileshi Mekuria to life imprisonment for killings he committed 
while he was head of the palace guards under Mengistu. The Federal High 
Court also sentenced three former palace guards to 15 years' 
imprisonment.
    During the year, the Ethiopian army reportedly laid landmines in 
the Eritrean territories that it occupied. During the year, there were 
approximately 48 reported casualties in Eritrea, including a number of 
deaths, from landmines and unexploded ordnances; however, in addition 
to the landmines laid by Ethiopia during the conflict, Ethiopian forces 
also laid landmines during the Eritrean war for independence, and 
landmines were laid during the year by an armed group opposed to the 
Eritrean government. It was not clear which landmines in particular 
were responsible for the casualties. During the year, Eritrean forces 
also laid landmines as they withdrew from occupied territories; 
approximately 100 Ethiopian civilians were killed in landmine 
explosions from landmines laid by Eritrea.
    The OLF and the ONLF regularly used landmines, which resulted in 
numerous civilian deaths and injuries (see Section 1.c.). Explosions by 
landmines laid by the OLF and the ONLF were estimated to have killed 2 
to 5 persons per month during the year. The OLF has claimed 
responsibility for several landmine explosions along the railroad line 
from Addis Ababa to Djibouti, which resulted in between 5 and 15 
civilian deaths; OLF responsibility could not be confirmed. For 
example, during the summer, a freight train was derailed by a landmine 
explosion near Nazareth; two persons died and several were injured. 
Observers believe the landmines were laid by the OLF.
    Preelection and postelection violence resulted in some deaths (see 
Section 3). For example, on election day, three persons were killed 
when an EPRDF member threw a grenade into the home of an opposition 
party election observer while the observer was in his residence, 
killing him. In August in the Somali region, nine people, including 
five election observers, one opposition candidate, and three other 
passengers, were killed when the cars they in which they were riding 
were struck by either rockets or landmines. The identity of the 
perpetrators remained unknown at year's end.
    Banditry remained a serious problem in parts of the country. 
Bandits, often heavily armed, killed civilians during robberies and 
attempted robberies. Most evidence suggests that their motives 
primarily were economic.
    Ethnic clashes during the year resulted in a number of deaths (see 
Section 5). The drought has exacerbated tensions between the Oromo 
Borena community and ethnic-Somali Garre pastoralists in the south, and 
reportedly at least 150 people have been killed in clashes between the 
two communities during the year (see Section 5).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of 
disappearances perpetrated by the Government; however, there have been 
some unconfirmed reports of politically motivated disappearances.
    In 1997 the federal High Court in Addis Ababa began the arraignment 
and prosecution of 5,198 persons charged with genocide and other war 
crimes under the previous regime, including the disappearance of 14,209 
persons (see Section 1.a.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture and 
mistreatment; however, there were credible reports that security 
officials sometimes beat or mistreated detainees. Government media 
published occasional reports of officials who were jailed or dismissed 
for abuse of authority and violations of human rights. In the fall, 
police reportedly beat a man who was detained allegedly in retaliation 
for election activities; he was beaten so severely that he sustained 
permanent damage. In December police reportedly beat another man to 
death who was detained for similar reasons (see Section 1.a.)
    In March in Ambo, police injured 6 students who were hospitalized 
for their injuries, killed a student, and detained over 1,000 students 
and 3 teachers after a demonstration (see Section 1.d. and 2.b.).
    In November 1999, student protests against the arrest of two 
teachers who criticized new textbooks in the Welayita speaking sections 
of the SNNPRS led to widespread demonstrations and riots (see Sections 
1.d. and 5). Special police units called in to suppress the riot 
injured hundreds of the demonstrators and killed up to 10 persons. The 
results of a government investigation into the incident were not 
released by year's end.
    Preelection and postelection violence resulted in some injuries and 
deaths (see Sections 1.a and 3).
    The OLF and the ONLF regularly used landmines, which resulted in 
numerous injuries and deaths (see Section 1.a). For example, there was 
a report that a landmine explosion injured a nurse and driver working 
on the National Polio Immunization Campaign. Landmine explosions 
derailed cargo and passenger trains on occasion during the year. For 
example, during the summer, a freight train was derailed by a landmine 
explosion near Nazareth; two persons died and several were injured (see 
Section 1.a.). Observers believe the landmines were laid by the OLF.
    Ethnic clashes throughout the year resulted in numerous injuries 
and the deaths of hundreds of persons (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    Prison conditions are poor, and overcrowding remains a serious 
problem. Prisoners often are allocated fewer than 21.5 square feet of 
sleeping space in a room that may contain up to 200 persons. Prison 
food is inadequate, and many prisoners have food delivered to them 
every day by family members or use their own funds to purchase food 
from local vendors. Prison conditions are unsanitary, and access to 
medical care is not reliable. There were some deaths in prison during 
the year due to illness and disease. Prisoners typically are permitted 
daily access to prison yards, which often include working farms, 
mechanical shops, and rudimentary libraries. Visitors are permitted. 
Prison letters all must be written in Amharic, making outside contact 
difficult for non-Amharic speakers; however, this restriction is not 
enforced. Female prisoners are housed separately from men, and rape 
does not appear to be a problem; however, there was a report in 
September that a guard raped a female prisoner. The guard was arrested 
in September and remained in detention pending a trial at year's end.
    Approximately 2,000 Eritrean soldiers were captured as a result of 
fighting conducted during May and June. These prisoners of war (POW's) 
have been interned in camps in Tigray region, in addition to those 
captured during earlier combat and imprisoned in a camp at Dedesa. In 
June 1999, approximately 1,200 internees of Eritrean origin and 172 
POW's were moved from the Bilate detention camp to the Dedesa 
internment camp in western Oromiya. The new camp is in an area less 
prone to malaria. Conditions in the camp are Spartan, but there are 
adequate housing, food, water and sanitation facilities. In July 1999, 
approximately 350 Eritrean POW's were moved from the Tigray region to 
the Dedesa internment camp. Following the signing of a formal peace 
treaty on December 12, the Government repatriated 359 severely wounded 
or ill POW's to Eritrea.
    The Government permits independent monitoring of prison conditions 
and police stations by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and by diplomatic missions. The ICRC generally had access to 
federal and regional prisons, civilian detention facilities, and police 
stations throughout the country; in May the Government granted the ICRC 
access to the Central Investigation Division (CID) detention facility 
in Addis Ababa, which holds upwards of 200 persons whose cases are 
under investigation. The ICRC had access to the Tatek military 
detention facility in the east but not to other military detention 
facilities where suspected OLF fighters are held. Unlike in the 
previous year, the ICRC was permitted access once in June to all 29 
police stations in Addis Ababa where it identified and registered three 
individuals of Eritrean origin. The Government generally permitted the 
ICRC access to detention facilities holding Eritrean POW's, including 
the main camp at Dedesa. The ICRC also regularly visited civilian 
Eritrean nationals and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin detained on 
national security grounds.
    Government authorities continued to permit diplomats to visit 
prominent detainees held by the SPO for alleged involvement in war 
crimes and terrorist activities. These detainees include the former 
housing ministry official and governor of Sidamo under Mengistu, Abera 
Yemane-Ab, 1968 Olympic marathon winner Mamo Wolde, and former Addis 
Ababa university president Dr. Alemayehu Tefera. Ethiopian Teachers 
Association (ETA) president Dr. Taye Woldesemayat, now serving a 15-
year sentence for plotting violent insurrection, also is permitted 
visitors from the diplomatic community. However, although a delegation 
from the international NGO Education International had received visas 
to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in prison, they were turned back upon arrival 
at Addis Ababa airport in June (see Section 6.a.). A second delegation 
from Education International attempted to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in 
December; however, all but one of the delegation members were denied 
visas (see Section 6.a.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and 
both the criminal and civil codes prohibit arbitrary arrest and 
detention; however, the Government does not always respect these rights 
in practice.
    Under the criminal procedure code, any person detained must be 
charged and informed of the charges within 48 hours and, in most cases, 
be offered release on bail. Those persons believed to have committed 
serious offenses may be detained for 15 days while police conduct an 
investigation, and for additional 15-day periods while the 
investigation continues. Some offenses, such as murder and treason, are 
not bailable. In practice and especially in the outlying regions, 
authorities regularly detain persons without a warrant, do not charge 
them within 48 hours, and--if persons are released on bail--never 
recall them to court. Thousands of criminal suspects remained in 
detention without charge; most were accused of involvement in OLF 
terrorist activities. Often these lengthy detentions are due to the 
severe shortage and limited training of judges, prosecutors, and 
attorneys.
    Federal and regional authorities arrested and detained persons 
without charge or trial for activities allegedly in support of armed 
opposition groups. The vast majority of these incidents took place in 
the Oromiya and Somali regional states. Approximately 7,500 persons 
allegedly associated with armed opposition groups remained in detention 
at year's end. Most detainees were accused of participating in armed 
actions by the OLF or the ONLF. In typical cases, security forces 
arrested and held these persons incommunicado for several days or weeks 
before eventually releasing them.
    In August Dr. Moga Frissa, vice president of Mecha-Tulema, an Oromo 
civic organization, was arrested on charges of involvement with the 
OLF. The police and prosecutor charged Moga with subversion and 
aligning with a terrorist organization; however, the judge in this case 
did not accept the charges and ordered Moga released. Dr. Moga was 
released on September 24.
    There were reports that in June, soldiers arrested 200 persons in 
Malka Jabdu near the site of a landmine explosion that derailed a train 
in May (see Section 1.c.). The individuals arrested were mostly OLF or 
suspected OLF members.
    In February in Soro, police tortured and killed two farmers--
supporters of the opposition--while they were in police custody (see 
Sections 1.a. and 3).
    In March in Ambo, police detained over 1,000 students and 3 
teachers, injured 6 students, and killed a student after a 
demonstration (see Section 1.c. and 2.b.). Most of the students were 
released after questioning, and all of the students and teachers were 
released by year's end.
    In December ethnic tensions between Oromo and Tigrayan students at 
Addis Ababa University led to some fighting and vandalism, and 
authorities arrested some Oromo students (see Section 5). The Oromo 
students claim that the arrests were out of proportion to their 
involvement in the fighting.
    In August authorities arrested the official driver of the Eritrean 
Embassy. He remained in detention at year's end; however, no further 
information on his case was available.
    There were credible reports that local authorities in the Oromiya, 
Amhara, and southern regions periodically arrested and detained 
supporters of opposition parties in the period prior to and following 
the May elections (see Section 3). For example, approximately 500 
Hadiya Nation Democratic Organization (HNDO) supporters were detained 
by the police ostensibly on charges of non-payment of taxes and 
fertilizer loans; most were released just prior to the May elections. 
There was a credible report that in March security forces killed a 
student who was attempting to assist another person being arrested for 
the non-payment of taxes (see Section 1.a.). Representatives of the 
SEPDC alleged in July that authorities in the southern region detained 
hundreds of SEPDC supporters in retaliation for voting for the 
opposition in the May elections (see Section 3). Some of those detained 
were released, some were released after paying a fine, and some 
remained in detention at year's end.
    A total of three journalists were detained during the year and five 
journalists remained in detention at year's end, including four 
journalists detained in 1997, and one journalist sentenced to a 1-year 
prison term in June (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). In February a 
journalist was released after the International Federation of 
Journalists protested her continued detention despite having posted 
bail in December 1999 (see Section 2.a.). She was convicted in July of 
having violated the Press Law and was sentenced to 6 months' 
imprisonment.
    In response to attacks by armed opposition groups operating out of 
Somalia and Kenya (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.), the Ethiopian military 
has conducted operations in and around the areas bordering Somalia and 
Kenya. These operations have resulted in the capture and detention of 
hundreds of opposition fighters and their suspected supporters on both 
sides of these borders.
    In December 1999, the Government arrested 26 Nuer tribal political 
activists associated with the Gambella People's Democratic Congress 
(GPDC); the Government released 12 of the activists, and 14 remained in 
detention at year's end (see Sections 3 and 5). Some of the activists 
were arrested for inciting Nuer students in November to demonstrate for 
the use of the Nuer language in school (see Section 2.b.), while others 
were arrested on suspicion of supporting the OLF.
    In November 1999, student demonstrations against the arrests of two 
teachers in Sodo in the SNNPRS for objecting to the use of a new 
language in student textbooks led to widespread weeklong demonstrations 
and riots (see Section 5). Special police units brought in to suppress 
the demonstrations killed up to 10 persons, injured hundreds, and 
arrested up to 1,000 others (see Sections 1.a. and 5). A former Young 
Men's Christian Association camp in Sodo was used as a temporary 
detention facility for hundreds of demonstrators. Most of those 
arrested were released by year's end; however, approximately 50 elders, 
teachers, and civil servants were charged with subversion and remained 
in detention pending trials at year's end. Bail was set for the 
detainees from between $6,060 to $12,121 (50,000 and 100,000 birr), but 
none of the detainees were able to make bail.
    In June 1999, ETA president Dr. Woldesemayat was convicted of 
treason and alleged involvement in an underground terrorist 
organization and sentenced to 15 years in jail (see Section 6.a.). In 
handing down the sentence the court referenced two alleged terrorist 
acts that had been dropped from the list of charges against Dr. 
Woldesemayat during the trial. Dr. Woldesemayat's attorney appealed the 
conviction.
    The closed trial of 65 Oromos suspected of involvement in OLF 
terrorist acts and arrested in 1997 and indicted in 1998 continued. Six 
of the defendants staged a 10-day hunger strike in May 1999 to protest 
the prison policy of keeping them in handcuffs 24 hours a day. The 
defendants are no longer kept handcuffed.
    In 1997 the SPO formally charged 128 defendants with politically 
motivated genocide dating back to the 1976 ``red terror'' (see Section 
1.e.). The SPO has the authority to arrest and interrogate anyone 
suspected of involvement in the Red Terror Campaign under Mengistu. In 
December 1998, the SPO began presenting prosecution testimony in the 
case of former Addis Ababa University president Alemayehu Tefera, 
imprisoned since 1993, although the charges on which he originally had 
been detained were dropped the same year. His petition to separate his 
case from the 127 other defendants was denied (see Section 1.a.). The 
court also started hearing testimony in December 1998 on the case of 
former Olympic marathon champion Mamo Wolde, who was charged with 
genocide for the state-sponsored killing of 14 teenagers during the 
prior regime. Wolde has been detained since 1992. Both trials were 
ongoing at year's end. During the year, the Government freed a number 
of SPO prisoners for lack of evidence.
    Opposition groups allege that some of the persons detained by the 
SPO are held for political reasons. The Government denies that it holds 
persons for political reasons.
    Some civilian residents of Eritrean origin have been detained since 
the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The 
Government justified these detentions on grounds of security. 
Approximately 1,200 civilian residents of Eritrean origin remained 
detained in the internment camps at Dedesa at year's end (see Section 
1.c). The ICRC was conducting interviews with the detainees at year's 
end to determine their willingness to be repatriated to Eritrea; 
repatriations for those willing are scheduled to occur in early 2001. 
There were credible reports that hundreds of other detainees of 
Eritrean origin were held in police stations for months prior to being 
deported in 1999. In June for the first time, the ICRC was granted 
access to all 29 police stations in Addis Ababa (see Section 1.c.). 
Beginning in April 1999, authorities began releasing Eritrean civilian 
detainees if they could obtain visas to a country other than Eritrea. 
Approximately 90 detainees left Ethiopia in 1999, mostly to other 
African countries, particularly Uganda and Malawi. However, following a 
violent confrontation in August in Malawi between some former detainees 
and Malawi police, the Government reportedly decided to not let 
detainees travel to other African countries (see Section 2.d.).
    Approximately 2,000 Eritrean POW's, captured in fighting between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, remained detained at year's end. In December 359 
severely wounded or ill POW's were repatriated to Eritrea; the 
remaining POW's are scheduled to be repatriated in early 2001 under 
ICRC supervision.
    Exile is illegal, and the Constitution provides that citizens shall 
not be deprived of their nationality against their wills; however, 
since the outbreak of conflict with Eritrea in May 1998, the Government 
has detained and deported as many as 75,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of 
Eritrean origin on national security grounds. Some of the deportees 
were voluntary returnees who had requested return to Eritrea; however, 
the vast majority were deported forcibly. Deportation orders originated 
from the SIRAA in Addis Ababa. The Government's actions raised serious 
issues of due process since there were no preliminary hearings to 
determine the merits of the deportations, no right to counsel was 
provided to detainees, and detainees only had a very circumscribed 
opportunity to register protests. In addition the issue of the 
nationality of Eritrean-origin Ethiopians has not been settled yet. 
Heads of households were taken without warning, detained, and often 
deported via overland routes within 48 hours. Remaining family members 
were given arbitrary deadlines to sell property and sometimes were 
subjected to departure taxes based on estimated annual income and 
unpaid balances on government bank loans. The ICRC monitored the 
deportation or repatriation of approximately 475 Eritreans or 
Ethiopians of Eritrean origin during the year; 747 were deported or 
repatriated without ICRC involvement. The Government stopped deporting 
Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin after it signed the 
cessation of hostilities agreement with Eritrea in June. Approximately 
400 Eritreans were voluntarily repatriated to Eritrea between June and 
December. In August 1999, all Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean 
origin over 18 years of age who had taken part in the 1993 referendum 
on Eritrean independence were required to register with the SIRAA and 
complete residence application forms. After registration applicants 
received identity cards and residence permits valid for 6 months (see 
Section 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary remained weak and 
overburdened. Although the federal and regional courts continued to 
show signs of judicial independence, in practice severe shortages of 
adequately trained personnel in many regions, as well as serious 
financial constraints, combined to deny many citizens the full 
protections provided for in the Constitution.
    Consistent with the Constitution, the Government continued to 
decentralize and restructure the judiciary along federal lines with the 
establishment of courts at the district, zonal, and regional levels. 
The federal High Court and federal Supreme Court hear and adjudicate 
original and appeal cases involving federal law, transregional issues, 
and national security. The regional judiciary is increasingly 
autonomous, with district (woreda), zonal, high, and supreme courts 
mirroring the structure of the federal judiciary. In March the 
president of the federal High Court created two new three-judge benches 
at the High Court level to handle criminal cases. The Government has 
delegated some of the war crimes trials to the supreme courts in the 
regions where the crimes allegedly were committed.
    The Constitution provides legal standing to some preexisting 
religious and customary courts and gives federal and regional 
legislatures the authority to recognize other courts. By law, both 
parties to a dispute must agree before a customary or religious court 
may hear a case. Shari'a (Islamic) courts may hear religious and family 
cases involving Muslims. In addition some traditional courts still 
function. Although not sanctioned by law, these courts resolve disputes 
for the majority of citizens who live in rural areas and who generally 
have little access to formal judicial systems.
    The outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea adversely 
impacted the military justice system. Most foreign assistance to train 
officers and noncommissioned officers was suspended at the same time 
that the rapid expansion of the military greatly increased the need for 
trained military lawyers and judges.
    Regional offices of the federal Ministry of Justice monitor local 
judicial developments, and the regional courts have jurisdiction over 
both local and federal matters, but the federal judicial presence in 
the regions is limited nevertheless. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
some local officials believe they will no longer be held accountable to 
a higher authority. For example, during the year local government 
officials in some areas ignored instructions from the National 
Electoral Board (NEB) on the acceptance of candidate endorsement 
signatures from opposition party candidates (see Section 3).
    To remedy the severe lack of experienced staff in the judicial 
system, the Government continued to identify and train lower court 
judges and prosecutors, although officials acknowledge that the pay 
scale offered does not attract the required numbers of competent 
professionals. Senior government officials charged with judicial 
oversight estimate that the creation of a truly independent and skilled 
judicial apparatus would take decades. The Government has welcomed 
foreign financial and technical assistance to accelerate this process. 
Pending the passage by regional legislatures of laws particular to 
their region, all judges are guided by the federal procedural and 
substantive codes.
    According to the Constitution, accused persons have the right to a 
public trial by an ordinary court of law within a reasonable time after 
having been charged. Accused persons have the right to be represented 
by legal counsel of their choice. However, in practice, lengthy 
pretrial detention was common, closed proceedings occurred, and at 
times, detainees were allowed little or no contact with their legal 
counsel. The public defender's office provides legal counsel to 
indigent defendants, although its scope remains severely limited, 
especially with respect to SPO trials. The law does not allow the 
defense access to prosecutorial evidence before the trial.
    The Constitution provides that persons arrested have the right to 
be released on bail. In most cases, bail is set between approximately 
$120 (1,000 birr) and approximately $1,200 (10,000 birr). Since 1999 
approximately 50 elders, teachers, and civil servants remained in 
detention pending trials at year's end because they were not able to 
make bail (see Section 5). Certain offenses such as capital crimes are 
not bailable.
    Authorities detained hundreds of persons without charge for 
supposed involvement with the OLF and the ONLF (see Section 1.d.). Such 
cases often reflect arbitrary actions on the part of local officials 
but also result from an overburdened and cumbersome judicial system 
marked by a shortage of trained and competent prosecutors and judges.
    The SPO was established in 1992 to create a historical record of 
the abuses committed during the Mengistu Government and to bring to 
justice those criminally responsible for human rights violations. The 
SPO has the authority to arrest and interrogate anyone suspected of 
involvement in the Red Terror Campaign under Mengistu. The federal High 
Court has considered the cases of 2,658 defendants accused of genocide, 
war crimes, and aggravated homicide. Trials began in 1994 and continued 
during the year; however, the process is subject to frequent and 
lengthy adjournments. Court appointed attorneys, sometimes with 
inadequate skills and experience, represent many of the defendants, 
following claims that they could not afford an adequate defense. Of the 
5,198 defendants, the Government is trying 2,952 in absentia, including 
former dictator colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, who remained in exile in 
Zimbabwe. Cases were dealt with more quickly during the year; however, 
most cases still were in progress at year's end. No SPO defendant has 
been released on bail; however, at least 50 defendants were released 
for lack of evidence or acquitted. Several sentences were handed down 
during the year, including 5 death sentences, 1 life imprisonment, and 
at least 27 sentences of imprisonment of up to 15 years (see Sections 
1.a. and 1.c.). In July the special prosecutor, Girma Wakjira, was 
jailed for contempt of court after accusing one of the judges of having 
participated in abuses under Mengistu; he was released after 2 weeks. 
The judge in question was transferred to a different (criminal) court, 
and the president of the federal High Court took his place.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--The law requires judicial search warrants; however, 
they seldom are obtained outside of Addis Ababa in practice. For 
example, in August Dr. Moga Frissa, vice president of an Oromo civic 
organization, was arrested without a warrant on charges of involvement 
with the OLF (see Section 1.d.).
    There were credible but unconfirmed reports that in certain rural 
areas local officials used threats of land redistribution and 
withholding of food aid and fertilizer to enforce support for the 
ruling coalition (see Section 3). There also were credible reports that 
teachers and other government workers have had their employment 
terminated if they were not of the dominant ethnic group in their 
region (see Section 5). According to the SEPDC, some SEPDC supporters 
were suspended or dismissed from their jobs in retaliation for voting 
for the opposition in the May elections (see Section 3).
    According to a few NGO's, there were reports that the Government 
had forcibly conscripted young men from eastern and southern states; 
however, repeated investigations by other international observers found 
no evidence to support these claims. Ethiopia maintains an all-
volunteer military.
    During the fighting in May and June, Ethiopian forces looted and 
caused extensive damage to a number of Eritrean towns and villages. 
Among the properties ransacked and looted were mosques and churches, 
factories, flour mills, health clinics, pharmacies, schools, 
warehouses, bridges, and the homes of government officials.
    During the conflict with Eritrea, Eritrean and Ethiopians of 
Eritrean origin have lost their jobs, business licenses, and access to 
government services including health care facilities, and many were 
deported without due process (see Section 1.d. and 2.d.). Individuals 
often were taken without warning and at night, separated from their 
families, detained, and deported via overland routes within 48 hours. 
Remaining family members were given arbitrary deadlines to sell 
property and sometimes were subjected to departure taxes based on 
estimated annual income and unpaid balances on government bank loans 
(see Section 1.d.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the 1992 
Press Law provide for the freedom of speech and of the press; however, 
the Government used legal and other mechanisms to restrict these rights 
in practice. For example, the Government continued to prosecute 
journalists and editors for publishing articles that violated the Press 
Law. Some journalists practiced self-censorship. Nonetheless the 
private press was active and often published articles extremely 
critical of the Government.
    The Government used provisions of the Press Law concerning 
publishing false information, inciting ethnic hatred, and libel to 
justify the arrest of journalists. Three journalists were arrested 
during the year, and at year's end, five journalists remained in 
detention. Five journalists were released from detention on bail 
pending court cases during the year.
    Five journalists of the Oromo-oriented private weekly ``Urjii,'' 
arrested in October and December 1997, are among the group of 65 Oromos 
indicted for involvement in OLF terrorist activities (see Section 
1.d.). Three of these journalists remained in detention at year's end, 
and their trials for Press Law violations were ongoing. In February a 
journalist with the newspaper Zegabi was released after the 
International Federation of Journalists protested her continued 
detention despite having posted bail in December 1999. In July she was 
convicted of violating the Press Law for writing an article on OLF 
activities and was sentenced to 6 months in prison. Former Urjii 
publisher and president of the Human Rights League, Garoma Bekele, who 
was sentenced to 1-year's imprisonment in 1999, completed his term in 
May but was convicted on two more press charges. He remained in prison 
at year's end, and three other Press Law charges were pending against 
him. In August Solomon Nemera, deputy editor-in-chief of Urjii, was 
convicted on three charges of violating the Press Law and sentenced to 
2 years'' imprisonment and fined approximately $1,600 (13,000 birr). A 
fourth unspecified charge was pending against him at year's end.
    In December journalist Zemedkur Mogus of the newspaper Atkurot, 
originally detained for violating the Press Law in 1998, was released 
on bail. Journalist Melasse Shine of the newspaper Ethop, arrested in 
November for violating the Press Law, reportedly was released on bail 
by year's end. Approximately 24 journalists, including Mogus and Shine, 
who obtained bail still were subject to trial for violations of the 
Press Law at year's end.
    In December 1999, Aberra Wegi, deputy editor-in-chief of Maebel was 
sentenced to 1-year's imprisonment on charges of publishing false 
information in a story about the TPLF killing captured government 
soldiers during the fight against the Derg regime. He was released in 
February without completing his sentence. In January Tesehalene 
Mengesha, deputy editor-in-chief of Zegabi, was sentenced to 6-months'' 
imprisonment on charges of violating the Press Law. She had been 
arrested and released in February on bail of approximately $250 (2000 
birr).
    In June Tewodros Kassa, editor-in-chief of Ethiopia, was sentenced 
to 1-year's imprisonment or a penalty fine of approximately $1,800 
(15,000 birr) on charges of publishing fabricated news in a story about 
the disappearance of an OLF member.
    In January Mekonnen Worku, deputy editor-in-chief of Maebel, 
committed suicide by hanging himself in his home. The Ethiopian Free 
Press Journalists Association (EFPJA) released a statement claiming 
that Worku killed himself because of depression and frustration due to 
police surveillance. Mekonnen had been detained several times, and new 
charges were brought against him 3 weeks before his death.
    At year's end, 27 journalists remained abroad in self-imposed exile 
rather than face Press Law charges upon returning. In June Dawit 
Kebede, editor-in-chief of Fiameta (now defunct), who had 12 press 
charges pending in court, fled the country. In December Israel Seboka, 
the editor-in-chief of Seife Nebelbal newspaper, and Samson Seyoum 
Kebede, the former editor of GOH, fled the country. In 1999 Seyoum had 
been convicted on charges of incitement to war and attempting to spread 
Islamic fundamentalism; he was sentenced to 4+ years'' imprisonment but 
was released pending an appeal of his conviction. Six charges were 
pending against Seboka in court, and he had posted bail on two other 
charges.
    Despite the constant threat of legal action, the private press 
remained active. Many private newspapers continued to publish 
inaccurate information, unsubstantiated stories, and harsh 
antigovernment articles without any official sanction. The Government 
has not banned any newspaper or publication. The office of the 
Government spokesperson was created in 1998 as a temporary entity 
responsible for distributing press releases on the border conflict with 
Eritrea to the Ethiopian news agency, foreign news agencies, foreign 
embassies, and international organizations. The Government continued to 
bar some private newspapers and news organizations from attending 
government briefings and press conferences, and most government 
officials still refuse to meet with private journalists.
    On March 13, after a 7-year wait, EFPJA, which consists of about 80 
members from the private press, was registered as a professional 
association with the Ministry of Justice (see Section 2.b.).
    Although most independent newspapers have supported the 
Government's position on the conflict with Eritrea, the private press 
remained confrontational and continued to publish articles extremely 
critical of the Government and continued to report on human rights 
abuses.
    According to the Constitution, citizens generally are free to 
discuss publicly any topic they choose; however, on occasion the 
Government restricted this right in practice. The Government opposed 
the activities and operations of groups critical of the Government such 
as the ETA and the HRL (see Sections 2.b. and 4). Nevertheless several 
groups critical of the Government held press conferences and public 
meetings without retribution. Prior to the national elections in May, a 
series of political debates conducted in Addis Ababa and in regional 
towns between the EPRDF and opposition political parties were broadcast 
over national television; opposition candidates and members of 
opposition parties voiced sharp criticism of the EPRDF and its policies 
during the debates.
    There are approximately 30 independent political Amharic language 
weekly newspapers and 6 independent English language weekly newspapers 
with an estimated total circulation of approximately 160,000. There are 
5 EPRDF coalition party newspapers, published in Amharic, Tigrigna, and 
Oromiffa languages, with a total circulation of 120,000. In September 
the English thrice-weekly The Monitor began publishing on a daily 
basis, and the first independent daily in Amharic, Addis Daily, began 
publishing.
    Nearly all private newspapers as well as state newspapers are 
printed at one of the state-owned printing presses. In late July, the 
only two printing presses equipped to print tabloids, including the 
major state-run Berhanena Selam printing press, raised printing costs, 
because of an increase in the price of pulp and paper in the world 
market. The majority of private Amharic-language newspapers that are 
members of EFPJA temporarily stopped publication between September 11 
and 18 to protest unsuccessfully against the rise in printing costs.
    The Ministry of Information and Culture requires that newspapers 
show a bank balance of approximately $1,250 (10,000 birr) at the time 
of their annual registration for a license. Some of the newspapers that 
were shut down by the Government for failing to show sufficient bank 
assets began publishing again during the year under different names and 
with new licenses.
    While much of the private press continues to lack professionalism 
in its reporting, some print media are developing into more responsible 
publications. Others actually are opposition newsletters that often 
purvey unsubstantiated criticism of the Government. Several are tied to 
distinct ethnic groups, especially the Amharas and Oromos, and severely 
criticize the Government for being ethnocentric. Newspapers critical of 
government leaders and their policies are available widely in the 
capital but scarce elsewhere.
    Foreign journalists continued to operate freely and often wrote 
articles critical of government policies. They or their local 
affiliates were granted greater access to government officials than 
were local independent journalists. A number of foreign journalists 
were allowed to go to the war front under restricted circumstances. 
About 10 Ethiopian affiliates of foreign news agencies also were 
permitted to go to the war front in June and July to visit liberated 
areas and Eritrean POW's (see Section 1.c.). Local journalists 
representing privately-owned newspapers were denied access to the war 
front.
    Radio remains the most influential medium for reaching citizens, 
especially those who live in rural areas. The Press Law allows for 
private radio stations, but there are no truly independent radio 
stations. Two nongovernmental stations, Radio Fana, a station 
controlled by the ruling EPRDF coalition, and the Tigray People's 
Liberation Front (TPLF) radio, which broadcasts in the Tigrigna 
language from Mekele, have close ties to the Government. In June the 
state-run Radio Ethiopia began broadcasting news and music on a new 18-
hour channel. Broadcasting time is sold to private groups and to 
individuals who want to buy spots for programs and commercials. The 
Government operates the sole television station, and news is controlled 
tightly. In September the state-run ETV started a new entertainment 
channel, ``TV Africa,'' contracted from a South African company. 
However, there are no restrictions on access to international news 
broadcasts. Ownership of private satellite receiving dishes and the 
importation of facsimile machines and modems are permitted. Internet 
access is provided through the government-controlled telecommunications 
company, which maintained a waiting list for new accounts. At the 
beginning of the year, access was restricted to existing lines while 
the Government expanded capacity; however, by year's end, new accounts 
were being issued. The Government issued further regulations for 
licensing private Internet service providers; however, no private 
Internet service providers were operating at year's end. Private 
satellite transmission uplinks generally are not allowed.
    In 1999 the Government issued a broadcast proclamation creating a 
broadcasting authority to review applications for private radio and 
television licenses; however, the authority had not been established by 
year's end. The broadcast proclamation prohibits political parties and 
religious organizations from owning stations; foreign ownership also is 
prohibited. Private entities that would like to be broadcasters claim 
that the delay in implementing the broadcast law is deliberate.
    The official media, including broadcast, wire service, and print 
media, legally are autonomous and responsible for their own management 
and partial revenue generation, although they continue to receive 
government subsidies. Government reporters practice self-censorship. 
The Government's press and information department acts as an official 
spokesperson and implemented the 1996 information policy, which guides 
contacts among the Government, the press, and the public.
    The Government generally respects academic freedom; however, in 
general, political activity is not encouraged on university campuses. 
In addition the Government requires that it appoint all deans and the 
Presidents at all eight public universities. The Ministry of Education 
has approved the charter for the country's first private university, 
Unity College, which began to offer a bachelor's degree program in 
September 1999. In May Unity College began offering a 2-year diploma 
course in journalism and communication.
    In July SEPDC representatives alleged that some teachers in the 
southern region who served as SEPDC election observers were subject to 
retaliation by local authorities (see Section 3); teachers reported 
that they were not able to collect their salaries and that they were 
denied entry to summer update courses.
    On a few occasions, police killed and injured some students during 
student demonstrations during the year (see Section 1.a., 1.c., 1.d. 
and 2.b.). For example, in December in Awassa, riot police shot and 
killed a student who was participating in a demonstration over 
inadequate school services (see Section 2.b.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, on occasion the 
Government restricted this right in practice. Organizers of large 
public meetings or demonstrations must notify the Government in advance 
and obtain a permit. While there were no reports that any permits were 
denied, there were long unexplained delays in issuing permits, which 
hindered the ability of groups to organize events. EHRCO and some 
opposition political parties reported that they had difficulties 
renting halls from local government officials. The ETA was not 
permitted to organize seminars in the regions, despite Ministry of 
Education assurances in 1998 that it would be allowed to do so.
    In March in Ambo, after a group of students demonstrated to protest 
the Government's refusal to fund and send them to fight forest fires in 
Bale zone, police killed a student, injured 6 students who were 
hospitalized, and detained over 1,000 other students and 3 teachers. 
Most of the students were released after questioning and all of the 
students and teachers were released by year's end. In April in Dembi 
Dolo, police killed a student during a student demonstration in support 
of detained Ambo students and teachers. In December in Awassa, riot 
police shot and killed a student who was participating in a 
demonstration over inadequate school services.
    In November 1999, student demonstrations against the arrest of two 
teachers who criticized new textbooks in the Welayita speaking sections 
of the SNNPRS led to widespread demonstrations and riots during which 
police killed up to 10 persons, injured hundreds, and arrested and 
detained as many as 1,000 others (see Sections 1.d. and 5). Most of 
those arrested were released by year's end; however, approximately 50 
elders, teachers, and civil servants were charged with subversion and 
remained in detention pending trials at year's end.
    In November 1999, Nuer students in the Gambella region demonstrated 
for the use of the Nuer language in schools (see Section 5). In 
December 1999, the Government arrested up to 26 Nuer tribal political 
activists and leaders associated with the GPDC on charges of inciting 
the Nuer students to demonstrate (see Sections 1.d. and 5.). Twelve 
were released on bail in 1999, and 14 remained in detention at year's 
end.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association and the right 
to engage in unrestricted peaceful political activity; however, the 
Government limited this right in practice. The Government changed its 
procedures for registration of NGO's in 1996, which improved the NGO 
registration process significantly; however, a number of policy issues 
regarding NGO's remain unresolved, and the NGO registration process 
still was extremely slow. Primary registration rests with the Ministry 
of Justice. In March after a 7-year wait, the EFPJA, which consists of 
80 members from the private press, obtained a certificate of legal 
recognition as a professional association in March from the Ministry of 
Justice. The Ministry of Justice recognizes the Ethiopia Journalists' 
Association, which represents journalists working for government-owned 
media.
    Authorities closed the offices of the HRL in April 1998, on the 
grounds that some HRL board members wished to use the organization as a 
front for the OLF. Board members denied any connection to the OLF. The 
HRL had been operating without a license; however, it had fulfilled the 
prerequisites for licensing and has been waiting 3 years to get a 
license (see Section 4). The Government investigation of the HRL was 
ongoing at year's end, and the contents of its office, confiscated by 
the Government in 1998, have not been returned.
    The Government requires political parties to register with the NEB. 
Parties that do not participate in two consecutive national elections 
are subject to deregistration. Registered political parties also must 
receive permission from regional governments to open local offices. The 
opposition AAPO complained that in 1999 the Oromiya region government 
refused its application to open branch offices in the region. There are 
58 organized political parties; eight are national parties, and the 
remainder operate only in limited areas.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, on occasion local authorities infringed on this right.
    The Government requires that religious groups be registered. 
Religious institutions, like NGO's, are registered with the Ministry of 
Justice and must renew their registration every year. Unlike NGO's, 
religious groups are not subject to a rigorous registration process. 
Two religious organizations reportedly have refused to comply with the 
Government requirement that they register, without consequence. Under 
current law, a religious organization that undertakes development 
activities must register its development wing separately as an NGO. The 
Government does not issue work visas to foreign religious workers 
unless they are attached to the development wing of a religious 
organization. Religious groups are not accorded duty-free status; 
however, with the exception of Jehovah's Witnesses, they are given free 
government land for churches, schools, hospitals, and cemeteries. 
Religious groups, like private individuals or businesses, must apply to 
regional and local governments for land allocation. An interfaith 
effort was underway at year's end to promote revision of the law in 
order for religious organizations to obtain duty-free status.
    There are more than 6,000 members of Jehovah's Witnesses in the 
country. The Government continued its policy of not deporting members 
of Jehovah's Witnesses of Eritrean origin, who might face religious 
repression in Eritrea.
    Evangelical leaders have complained of strict regulations on the 
importation of bibles, as well as heavy customs duty on bibles and 
other religious articles; however, bibles and religious articles are 
subject to the same customs duty as are all imported books and most 
imported items.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no complaints from Muslim 
leaders that public school authorities sometimes interfered with their 
free practice of Islam.
    In December Samson Seyoum Kebede, the former editor of GOH, fled 
the country. In 1999 Seyoum was convicted on charges of incitement to 
war and attempting to spread Islamic fundamentalism; he was sentenced 
to 4+ years'' imprisonment, but was released pending an appeal of his 
conviction (see Section 2.a.). Under the Press Law, it is a crime to 
incite one religion against another.
    The Government has interpreted the constitutional provision for the 
separation of church and state to mean that religious instruction is 
not permitted in schools, whether public or private. Catholic, 
Orthodox, evangelical and Muslim-owned and operated schools are not 
permitted to teach religion as a course of study. Most private schools 
teach a morals course as part of the school's curriculum, and the 
Government Education Bureau in Addis Ababa has complained that such 
courses are not free of religious influence. Churches are permitted to 
have Sunday schools, the Koran is taught at mosques, and public schools 
permit the formation of clubs, including those of a religious nature.
    Protestant groups occasionally complained that local officials 
discriminate against them when seeking land for churches and 
cemeteries. Evangelical leaders complain that, because they are 
perceived as ``newcomers,'' they remain at a disadvantage compared with 
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Supreme Islamic Council when it 
comes to the allocation of land.
    While some Pentecostals and evangelicals complained in past years 
that the police failed to protect them adequately during instances of 
interreligious conflict (see Section 5), there were no complaints of 
inadequate police protection during the year. In most interreligious 
disputes, the Government maintains neutrality and tries to be an 
impartial arbitrator. Some religious leaders have requested the 
establishment of a federal institution to deal with religious groups. 
The Government considered the request but had taken no action to 
establish such a federal institution by year's end.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement, including the right of travel, emigration, and repatriation; 
however, the Government restricted these rights in practice. Some AAPO 
codefendants, convicted in 1998 on charges of treason, completed their 
prison sentences in 1998 and 1999 but have not been permitted to leave 
the country. In May the Government denied entry visas to a Norwegian 
human rights group that wanted to monitor the elections (see Section 
3); they were granted visas when they changed the purpose of their trip 
to academic research.
    In principle citizens can freely change their residence or 
workplace; however, since the outbreak of the border conflict with 
Eritrea in May 1998, Eritreans and Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean 
origin were subjected to detention and deportation to Eritrea. By 
year's end, as many as 75,000 persons had been compelled to leave 
Ethiopia for Eritrea or had left under adverse conditions since 1998; 
the vast majority were deported, although a small number left the 
country voluntarily to join family members who were deported without 
due process (see Section 1.d.). The Government stopped deporting 
Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin after it signed the 
cessation of hostilities agreement with Eritrea in June. It is 
estimated that more than 200,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean 
origin remain in Ethiopia. In 1999 the Government decreed that all 
Eritreans 18 years of age and above residing in Ethiopia, who either 
had taken part in the 1993 referendum on the independence of Eritrea 
from Ethiopia or who had been granted Eritrean citizenship, had to 
register as aliens with the SIRAA. Those registering would be issued an 
identity card and given a 6-month residence permit, which was allowed 
to expire. However, the residence permits did not give individuals 
access to hospitals or other public services. The Ethiopian passports 
of residents of Eritrean origin routinely were confiscated or 
restricted in use for a single exit and no reentry.
    Beginning in April 1999, the Government adopted a policy of 
releasing those Eritrean detainees from the Bilate and Dedesa 
internment camps who could obtain visas to a country other than 
Eritrea. Approximately 90 detainees took advantage of this opportunity, 
with most going to African countries, particularly Uganda and Malawi. 
However, following an incident in August 1999, in which 25 detainees 
obtained fraudulent Malawian visas, traveled to Malawi with government-
issued laissez-passers and were returned forcibly to Ethiopia after a 
violent confrontation with Malawi police in which one former detainee 
was killed and at least six others were injured, the Government 
reportedly decided not to permit detainees to depart for other 
countries in Africa.
    The law requires citizens and residents to obtain an exit visa 
before departing the country. Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean 
origin have been able to obtain exit visas but often are not permitted 
to return to the country.
    In Addis Ababa and western Gondar in the Amhara region there are 
very small concentrations of Ethiopian Jews (Falashas) and those who 
claim that their ancestors were forced to convert from Judaism to 
Ethiopian Orthodoxy (Feles Mora). Approximately 3,000 Feles Mora 
migrated voluntarily from the western Amhara region to Addis Ababa in 
1991 at the time of ``Operation Solomon,'' when a large number of 
Falashas were airlifted to Israel. The Feles Mora also seek to 
immigrate to Israel. The number of Feles Mora in the country is 
approximately 26,000. Israeli officials evaluate the Feles Mora 
immigration claims on a case-by-case basis and estimate that by year's 
end approximately 100 individuals were immigrating to Israel under the 
law of return each week. All of the eligible Falashas from Ethiopia had 
immigrated to Israel by December 1999.
    During the year, more than 25,000 Ethiopians were deported or 
repatriated from Eritrea to Ethiopia. These deportees and returnees 
were initially housed in camps in Adwa and possibly Adrigrat for a few 
days, before returning to their homes and families.
    As a result of the conflict with Eritrea, approximately 343,000 
persons have been displaced internally. The Government has presented 
relief and rehabilitation proposals for these internally displaced 
persons (IDP's) to bilateral donors and NGO's. By year's end, the 
Government, with international assistance, returned at least half of 
the IDP's to their homes and granted other assistance, including food 
and money, to the remaining IDP's.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 
Government generally treats asylum seekers fairly and cooperates with 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees and returning citizens.
    Ethiopia hosts approximately 300,000 refugees; most are from 
Somalia and Sudan. The Government in cooperation with the UNHCR 
continues to provide first asylum to refugees from Sudan and Somalia. 
Along the border of northwest Somalia, 195,345 Somali refugees were 
resident in 8 camps at year's end, down from 600,000 Somali refugees in 
1996. Along the Sudanese border approximately 60,000 Sudanese refugees 
were resident in 4 refugee camps around Gambella and Asossa at year's 
end. Approximately 80 percent of the Sudanese refugees are women and 
children. There are approximately 1,500 Djiboutian Afar asylum-seekers 
remaining in the country, down from a high of 18,000 when Djiboutian 
Afars first entered the country in 1993. By year's end, the UNHCR was 
able to register most Djiboutian Afars in the country, including 1,503 
Djiboutian Afars in the area of Assaita, and 57 in other parts of the 
country. The Afar claim that the Government arbitrarily reduced the 
estimated number of Afar refugees in the country without evidence that 
any refugees had actually left the country. These asylum seekers have 
requested, but never have been granted, formal registration by the 
Ethiopian Agency for Refugee and Resettlement Affairs (ARRA). 
Negotiations began in 1997 between the Government and the UNHCR 
concerning their status and were ongoing at year's end. ARRA conducted 
an informal registration of Djiboutian Afars in May 1999 without UNHCR 
involvement.
    In November the Governments of Ethiopia and Kenya, with UNHCR 
facilitation, began a second effort to repatriate approximately 4,800 
Kenyan refugees from the Moyale area. By year's end, all of the Kenyan 
refugees had been repatriated. During the year, the UNHCR facilitated 
the return of 44,000 Somalis to Somaliland. An additional 8,000 Somalis 
were resettled from camps in the east in the northern Ogaden region.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens exercised the right to vote for a national government in 
May, during elections for the House of People's Representatives (HPR). 
According to observers organized by the Ethiopian Human Rights Council 
(EHRCO), local U.N. staff, diplomatic missions, political parties, and 
domestic NGO's, the elections were generally free and fair in most 
areas; however, serious election irregularities occurred in the SNNPRS 
region, particularly in Hadiya zone. As a result, the NEB, acting on 
its constitutional authority, investigated complaints of the 
irregularities and determined that many of them had merit. These 
included incidents of election officials instructing voters for whom to 
vote, candidates campaigning at polling stations, and candidates being 
pressured into quitting. There were also credible reports of ballot 
stuffing, vote count fraud, voter intimidation or bribery, dismissals 
from work, withholding of salaries, detentions, abductions, and 
killings (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.). The NEB ordered new 
elections in some areas of SNNPRS that were held in June; they were 
declared generally free and fair by international observers. The NEB 
agreed to bring charges against those suspected of the worst election 
abuses in the SNNPRS; however, no action had been taken by year's end. 
Elections in the Somali region took place in August, after delays due 
to a food emergency and voter registration irregularities.
    Seventeen opposition political parties contested the May election, 
including the AAPO, the SEPDC, and the Oromo National Congress. The 
better-funded and better-organized incumbent party, the EPRDF, 
generally dominated over candidates of the relatively weaker and less-
organized opposition parties and independent candidates, except in the 
SNNPRS, where the opposition made significant inroads. EPRDF candidates 
won 481 seats in the HPR, EPRDF affiliate candidates won 37 seats, 
opposition party candidates won 16 seats, and independent candidates 
won 13 seats.
    The Government made efforts to level the playing field for non-
EPRDF political parties, by establishing a donor supported fund for 
opposition party candidates, providing opposition candidates access to 
state-owned electronic media, and changing the law to permit civil 
servants to run for office without first resigning their positions. The 
Government was willing to engage opponents in open debate at candidate 
and party forums. Many of these debates were broadcast live on national 
radio and television and reported on in both government and private 
newspapers (see Section 2.a.). Free radio broadcast time was set aside 
for the elections, and 225 independent candidates and 33 political 
parties made use of it.
    By the end of 1999, the NEB had begun investigating abuses of 
election laws related to candidate registration for the May election in 
the SNNPRS and the Gambella region. There were credible reports that 
local officials throughout the country ignored NEB instructions on the 
acceptance of candidate endorsement signatures from opposition party 
candidates. There were instances in which the NEB had to force local 
authorities to accept nominations. There were credible reports that 
during candidate registration in January, many kebele offices were 
closed for holidays or were otherwise unstaffed, hindering the 
registration process of opposition candidates. In the Somalia region 
prior to the August elections, thousands of ballots were reprinted to 
rectify the fact that a female opposition candidate had not been listed 
despite having met NEB requirements for candidate registration.
    There were credible reports that citizens who tried to register to 
vote were told by government personnel that they had to prove their 
citizenship in order to register; under the law only citizens can vote. 
Reportedly Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were not allowed to register 
or to vote. In May local officials denied three HNDO observers in 
possession of valid election authorization letters admission to a 
Wachara polling station when the ballot box was unsealed. A review of 
the polling station registration book by a diplomatic election observer 
indicated that no more than 20 individuals had voted, although the 
canvas ballot box was filled with ballots. In the Soro zone, there were 
credible reports of many NEB polling station officials being dismissed 
shortly before the election and being replaced by local government 
officials.
    In May the Government denied entry visas to a Norwegian human 
rights group that wanted to monitor the elections; they were granted 
visas when they changed the purpose of their trip to academic research 
(see Section 2.d.).
    There were credible reports that local authorities in the Oromiya, 
Amhara, and southern regions periodically arrested and detained 
supporters of opposition parties in the period prior to and following 
the May elections. Most of these individuals were eventually released 
without being charged formally. For example, in February and March, 16 
HNDO candidates were arrested. All were released on bail in April; 
however, while the charges against them have not been dropped, trials 
are not expected to be held. Three of the candidates were charged with 
treason for allegedly staging a coup d'etat and for publicly accusing 
the ruling party of directing most development money to projects in the 
Tigray region. The coup d'etat charges originated from instances in 
which HDNO personnel legally voted to replace ruling party personnel in 
their local peasant association. In addition approximately 500 HNDO 
supporters were detained by the police in April on charges of non-
payment of taxes and fertilizer loans (see Section 1.d.); all were 
released by the end of that month.
    There were a number of killings as a result of preelection and 
postelection violence (see Section 1.a.). In February in Soro, police 
tortured and killed two farmers--who supported the opposition--while 
they were in police custody; the farmers allegedly were arrested for 
the non-payment of taxes (see Section 1.d.). No action was taken 
against the police by year's end. The deaths led to clashes between the 
villagers and the police, during which three police officers were 
injured. In May in the SNNPRS region, Hadiya zone, security forces 
killed two women while they were voting, allegedly because they refused 
to mark their ballots for an EPRDF candidate. An election observer who 
saw the bodies stated that the women were shot in the face. A 
government investigation into the killings was conducted during the 
year; however, no results were released nor further action taken in the 
matter by year's end. Also in May, according to Beyene Petros, the 
chairman of the SEPDC, police killed seven SEPDC supporters who were 
protesting electoral fraud outside of two polling stations in the 
south. On election day, three persons were killed when an EPRDF member 
threw a grenade into the home of an opposition party election observer 
while the observer was in his residence. The observer's son retaliated 
by killing a polling station official. In May there were reports of at 
least two other killings in the SNNPRS, in particular in the Gurage 
Zone. In August in the Somali region, nine people, including five 
election observers, one opposition candidate, and three other 
passengers, were killed when the cars they were riding in were struck 
by either rockets or landmines (see Section 1.a.). The identity of the 
perpetrators remained unknown at year's end. In the fall, police 
reportedly beat a man who was detained allegedly in retaliation for 
election activities; he was beaten so severely that he sustained 
permanent damage. In December police reportedly beat another man to 
death who was detained for similar reasons (see Section 1.a. and 1.c.).
    Following the May elections, the SEPDC filed a complaint with the 
NEB detailing election irregularities in various constituencies of the 
region. The NEB sent investigators to the region and later ordered that 
new elections be held in the Hadiya zone on June 25. According to the 
NEB, problems in other areas were not serious enough to warrant a new 
election. The NEB agreed to bring charges against those suspected of 
the worst election abuses in the SNNPRS; however, no action had been 
taken by year's end.
    In July there were credible reports that ruling party personnel 
withheld fertilizer and food aid in the SNNPRS region as retaliation 
for voters electing opposition candidates. The amount of government-
supplied fertilizer available in the area was reported to have dropped 
from 100,000 quintals in 1999 to 10,000 quintals during the year, while 
the price was reported to have increased. Representatives of the SEPDC 
alleged in July that authorities in the southern region detained 
hundreds of SEPDC supporters in retaliation for voting for the 
opposition in the May elections (see Section 1.d.). According to the 
SEPDC, some SEPDC supporters were suspended or dismissed from their 
jobs in retaliation for voting for the opposition in the May elections. 
SEPDC representatives also alleged that some teachers in the southern 
region who served as SEPDC election observers were subject to 
retaliation by local authorities; teachers reported that they were not 
able to collect their salaries and that they were denied entry to 
summer update courses.
    In December 1999, the Government arrested 26 Nuer tribal political 
activists associated with the Gambella People's Democratic Congress 
(GPDC) on charges of inciting Nuer students in November 1999 to 
demonstrate for the use of the Nuer language in schools (see Sections 
1.d. and 5). The GPDC claimed that the charges were without merit and 
that the Government was attempting to interfere with the political 
process for the May elections. The NEB sent investigators to the 
region. Just prior to the May elections, 12 of the 26 Nuer tribal 
political activists associated with the GPDC were released. The 
remaining 14 still were in detention at year's end.
    Political participation remains closed to a number of organizations 
that have not renounced violence and do not accept the Government as a 
legitimate authority. These groups include MEDHIN, the Coalition of 
Ethiopian Democratic Forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Party, the OLF, some elements of the ONLF, and several smaller Somali 
groups. The AAPO complained that in 1999 the Oromiya regional 
government refused its application to open branch offices in some areas 
of the region (see Section 2.b.).
    Neither law nor practice restricts the participation of women in 
politics; however, women are underrepresented in government and 
politics. One of the 15 members of the Council of Ministers is a woman; 
2 other women hold Ministerial positions; and a number of other women 
hold senior positions. There are 42 women among the 547 members of the 
HPR, and 10 of 113 members in the House of Federation are female, 
including the Speaker of the House. There are three women on the 
Supreme Court.
    The government policy of ethnic federalism led to the creation of 
individual constituencies to help ensure representation in the HPR of 
all major ethnic groups; however, small ethnic groups were not 
represented in the legislature. There are 23 nationality groups in 6 of 
the regional states that do not have a sufficient population to qualify 
for constituency seats; however, individuals from these nationality 
groups competed for 23 special seats in the 547-seat HPR in the May 
elections.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights organizations include EHRCO, the HRL, the Ethiopian 
Women's Lawyers Association, the Inter-Africa Group, the National 
Committee on Traditional Practices, the Peace and Development 
Committee, the Society for the Advancement of Human Rights Education, 
Enwayay, the Center for Local Capacity Building and Studies, African 
Initiatives for a Democratic World Order, and Hundee. These and 
numerous other groups primarily are engaged in civic and human rights 
education, legal assistance, and trial monitoring. The HRL, founded by 
prominent Oromo civic leaders in 1997, still was being investigated by 
the Government at year's end for its alleged ties to the OLF. 
Authorities closed the offices of the HRL in April 1998 and confiscated 
the contents of its offices, which have not been returned (see Section 
2.b.). In October 1999, the Ministry of Justice decertified the 
Ethiopian Congress for Democracy, reportedly for financial 
irregularities.
    In March 1999, 160 domestic and international NGO's signed a code 
of conduct and formed a code observance committee. The code details 
standards of conduct for numerous areas including moral and ethical 
integrity, transparency and accountability, good governance, gender 
equity, and environmental consciousness. The code observance committee, 
composed of five members elected by the NGO general assembly and two 
representatives from civil society at large, hears and decides matters 
in all instances involving a violation or breach of the code.
    The ICRC was able to carry out more of its normal program of 
registration and intervention than in the previous year. The ICRC 
conducted regular visits to detention centers and prisons throughout 
the country and in May was permitted access to the CID detention 
facility in Addis Ababa, which holds upwards of 200 persons whose cases 
are under investigation (see Section 1.c.). The ICRC was granted access 
to the Tatek military detention facilities but not to other military 
detention facilities where suspected OLF fighters are held. The ICRC 
visited the Dedesa POW internment camp and police stations in Addis 
Ababa once in June (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The ICRC registered 
1,700 new Eritrean POW's in the Tigray region following the May 
offensive. In September Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed that the ICRC would 
be the supervisory organization for the exchange of expellees or 
deportees. In December following the signing of the peace agreement, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed that the ICRC would facilitate all POW 
exchanges. In May and June, the ICRC suspended emergency relief flights 
to Dire Dawa and Gode because Ethiopian Airlines demanded a high 
``handling fee'' for each flight.
    The chairman of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(ACHPR) visited in February and March to investigate Eritrean 
complaints regarding government deportations of Eritreans and 
Ethiopians of Eritrean origin. His program included meetings with 
senior officials of the executive, legislative and judicial branches. 
The ACHPR did not release a report by year's end.
    A delegation from the international NGO Education International 
received visas to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in prison, but were turned 
back upon arrival at Addis Ababa airport in June. A second delegation 
from Education International attempted to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in 
December; however, all but one of the delegation members were denied 
visas (see Section 6.a.).
    The Government is required under the Constitution to establish a 
human rights commission and office of the ombudsman. The office of the 
ombudsman is expected to have the authority to receive and investigate 
complaints with respect to misadministration by executive branch 
offices. Parliament completed legislative action to create both 
entities in July; however, neither entity was operational by year's 
end.
    The Government continues to encourage international human rights 
groups and foreign diplomats to observe the war crimes trials that 
began in 1994. Officials of the Federal Security Authority generally 
have been responsive to requests for information from the diplomatic 
community. Several international human rights groups visited the 
country during the year.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law. 
The law provides that all persons should have equal and effective 
protection without discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, wealth, birth, or other status. However, the Government has not 
yet fully put into place mechanisms for the effective enforcement of 
these protections.
    Women.--Culturally based abuses including wife beating and marital 
rape are pervasive social problems. While women have recourse to the 
police and the courts, societal norms and limited infrastructure 
inhibit many women from seeking legal redress, especially in rural 
areas. Social practices obstruct investigations into rape and the 
prosecution of the rapist, and many women are not aware of their rights 
under the law. It is estimated that there are more than 1,000 rapes a 
year in Addis Ababa alone; however, only 168 rape convictions were 
handed down nationwide from September 1999 to September. Rape sentences 
have increased incrementally to 10 to 13 years, in line with the 10 to 
15 years prescribed by law. There was a report in September that a 
guard raped a female prisoner; he was arrested in September and was 
awaiting trial at year's end (see Section 1.c.).
    The Constitution provides for the equality of women; however, these 
provisions often are not applied in practice. Furthermore, these 
provisions often are in conflict with the 1960 Civil Code and the 1957 
Penal Code, both of which still are in force but under review by the 
Ministry of Justice. The 1960 Civil Code is based on a monarchical 
constitution that treated women as if they were children or disabled. 
Discriminatory regulations in the civil code include recognizing the 
husband as the legal head of the family and designating him as the sole 
guardian of children over 5 years old. Family arbitration councils, 
which in the past had the power to dissolve marriages, engaged only in 
arbitration and reconciliation counseling, and only the courts have the 
legal power to dissolve marriages. Domestic violence is not considered 
a serious justification under the law to obtain a divorce. There is 
only limited juridical recognition of common-law marriage. Irrespective 
of the number of years the marriage has existed, the number of children 
raised, and the joint property, the woman is entitled to only 3 months' 
financial support should the relationship end. However, a husband has 
no obligation to provide financial assistance to his family and, as a 
result, women and children sometimes are abandoned when there is a 
problem in the marriage. All land belongs to the state; however, land 
reforms enacted in March 1997 stipulate that women may obtain 
government leases to land, and the Government has an explicit policy 
implemented in 1995 to provide equal access to land for women. 
Discrimination is most acute in rural areas, where 85 percent of the 
population lives. In urban areas, women have fewer employment 
opportunities than do men, and the jobs available do not provide equal 
pay for equal work.
    As a result of changes in the Labor Law in 1998, thousands of women 
traveled to the Middle East as industrial and domestic workers. There 
were credible reports that female workers were abused in these 
positions (see Section 6.f.).
    Although illegal, the abduction of women and girls as a form of 
marriage still is widely practiced in the Oromiya region and the 
SNNPRS. Forced sexual relationships often accompany most marriages by 
abduction, and women often are abused physically during the abduction. 
Abductions have led to conflicts between families, communities, and 
ethnic groups.
    To enhance the status of women, the Government formally adopted a 
national program of action in 1997. The program seeks to expand 
educational and work opportunities for women, improve women's access to 
health care, and educate women about certain unhealthy traditional 
practices such as early marriage. There have been few improvements in 
the status of women since the inception of this program; however, 
according to a study published by the National Committee on Traditional 
Practices of Ethiopia (NCTPE) in 1998, certain harmful traditional 
practices such as early marriage and marriage by abduction appeared to 
be on the decline. During the year, proclamations were passed that 
established the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the office of the 
ombudsman. The proclamations make special provision for a commissioner, 
in the case of the HRC, and an ombudsman to be particularly responsible 
for the rights of women and children.
    On July 29, Parliament adopted a new family law, drafted by 
Ministry of Justice in 1998; the family law was backdated and took 
effect on July 4. As a result, the revised civil code raises the legal 
age for marriage for girls from 15 to 18, the same as for boys; puts 
civil law above customary and religious law; allows for the legal 
sharing of property for unmarried couples who have lived together for 
at least 5 years (previously, there was no property sharing for couples 
separating, even if they had lived together their entire adult lives); 
eliminates family arbitrators as a means of settling marital disputes 
in lieu of the court system (historically women have fared poorly under 
the family arbitration system); allows for the joint administration of 
common marital property (previously a man could sell joint property 
without the consent or knowledge of his wife); and requires the courts 
to take into account the situation of children or the weakest member of 
the family in the event of a divorce or separation (previously women 
and children were often forced out of the family home in such cases).
    In 1999 the Ministry of Justice completed a revision of the 1957 
Penal Code and a national debate on the revisions continued during the 
year. Critical issues affecting women and children include the 
penalties for rape, domestic violence, and child molestation. However, 
regardless of changes to the Penal Code, tradition and culture often 
prevail over civil and criminal law, and in practice women do not enjoy 
equal status with men. For example, the harmful traditional practice of 
abduction as a form of marriage already is illegal under the Penal Code 
but still is practiced widely in many rural areas.
    Children.--The Government has encouraged efforts by domestic and 
international NGO's that focus on children's social, health, and legal 
issues. For example, local officials provided transportation and free 
facilities to NGO activities. During the year, proclamations were 
passed that established the HRC and the ombudsman. The proclamations 
make special provision for a commissioner, in the case of the HRC, and 
an ombudsman to be particularly responsible for the rights of women and 
children. However, the Government has limited ability to provide 
improved health care and basic education. By law primary education is 
compulsory, free and universal; however, despite efforts by the 
Government to increase the number of schools, there are not enough 
schools to accommodate the country's youth. In 1977 the Government 
adopted a three-shift system in all primary and secondary schools to 
maximize the utilization of classrooms and to provide an opportunity 
for working children to attend school. Nationwide only 61 percent of 
male primary age children and 41 percent of female primary age children 
attend school, and many do so in shifts; girls reportedly attended 
school in greater numbers in some regions. However, government reports 
show that approximately 30 percent of the children who attend school 
leave the system before they reach grade two of primary school. The 
chance of their relapsing to illiteracy is high. Only about 18 percent 
of children reach grade five. The overall literacy rate is 
approximately 20 to 30 percent, and only 17 percent of women are 
literate compared with 26 percent of men; however, it is difficult to 
estimate literacy rates accurately due to a lack of government 
statistics. Only 12 percent of males and 8.5 percent of females attend 
secondary school. During the year, 46,140 males and 27,418 females 
earned a school-leaving certificate, a prerequisite to attend college. 
There is space in institutions of higher education for only a small 
percentage of these graduates.
    In Addis Ababa's police stations, there are 10 Child Protection 
Units, which are staffed by members of an NGO and protect the rights of 
children by assisting them when they become victims of crime. Some 
police officers underwent training in 1997 on procedures for handling 
cases of child abuse and juvenile delinquency. Nevertheless there is a 
clear need for reform of the juvenile justice system. Three federal 
judges sit on one bench to hear all cases of juvenile offenses. There 
is a large backlog of juvenile cases and accused children often remain 
in detention with adults until their cases are heard. There is only one 
juvenile remand home with a capacity of 150 for children under age 15, 
and the juveniles who cannot be accommodated at the juvenile remand 
home are incarcerated with adults (see Section 1.c.).
    Societal abuse of young girls continues to be a problem. The 
majority of girls undergo some form of female genital mutilation (FGM), 
which is widely condemned by international health experts as damaging 
to both physical and psychological health. The NCTPE conducted a survey 
that was published in 1998, which indicated that 72.7 percent of the 
female population had undergone FGM, down from an estimated 90 percent 
of the female population in 1990. Clitoridectomies typically are 
performed 7 days after birth and consist of an excision of the labia. 
Infibulation--the most extreme and dangerous form of FGM--is performed 
at any time between the age of 8 and the onset of puberty. The law does 
not specifically prohibit FGM, although it is discouraged officially, 
and the Government has been very supportive of the NCTPE. The 
Government also is working to discourage the practice of FGM through 
education in public schools.
    Other harmful traditional practices surveyed by the NCTPE included 
uvulectomy, milk-teeth extraction, early marriage, marriage by 
abduction, and food and work prohibitions. A new family law adopted in 
July defines the age of consent as 18 for both females and males; 
however, early childhood marriage is common in rural areas where girls 
as young as age 9 are subjected to arranged marriages. In the Afar 
region of the east, young girls continue to be married to much older 
men, but this traditional practice is coming under greater scrutiny and 
criticism. There was a report that a girl was sold by her father to a 
local man in exchange for cattle; the girl's mother brought the case to 
the Ethiopian Women Lawyer's Association, and, at year's end, the case 
was being prosecuted in the courts (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The 
Tigray Women's Association also has had an impact in changing societal 
attitudes toward early marriage. Pregnancy at an early age often leads 
to obstetric fistulae resulting in lifelong misery due to total and 
permanent incontinence. Treatment is available at only one hospital in 
Addis Ababa that performs over 1,000 fistula operations a year. It 
estimates that for every successful operation performed, 10 other young 
women need the treatment. The maternal mortality rate is extremely high 
due, in part, to food taboos for pregnant women, poverty, early 
marriage, and birth complications related to FGM, especially 
infibulation.
    There are approximately 200,000 street children in urban areas, of 
which 150,000 reside in Addis Ababa; however, the figures are difficult 
to estimate, and observers believe the problem is growing. These 
children beg, sometimes as part of a gang, or work in the informal 
sector in order to survive (see Section 6.d.). Government and privately 
run orphanages are unable to handle the number of street children, and 
older children often abuse younger children. Due to severe resource 
constraints, abandoned infants often are overlooked or neglected at 
hospitals and orphanages. There are a few credible reports that 
children are maimed or blinded by their ``handlers'' in order to raise 
their earnings from begging.
    Child prostitution continues to be a problem and is perceived 
widely to be growing. There are no laws that criminalize child 
prostitution or prostitution in general. In 1996 the National Steering 
Committee Against Sexual Exploitation of Children was formed and is 
chaired by the Children, Youth, and Family Affairs Department of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. In October 1999, the committee 
reported that child prostitution is on the increase especially in major 
urban centers; however, there are no statistics available. NGO's report 
that girls as young as age 11 are recruited to work in houses of 
prostitution where they are kept ignorant of the risks of HIV/AIDS 
infection. There have been many press reports of the large-scale 
employment of children, especially underage girls, as hotel workers, 
barmaids, and prostitutes in resort towns and rural truck stops. There 
were continued reports that poor rural families sold their young 
teenage daughters to hotel and bar owners on the main truck routes; 
however, these reports were difficult to confirm (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.). Social workers note that young girls are prized because their 
clients believe that they are free of sexually transmitted diseases. 
The unwanted babies of these young girls usually are abandoned at 
hospitals, police stations, welfare clinics, and adoption agencies. 
There were numerous anecdotal accounts of young girls going to the 
Middle East to work as house servants and nannies, some of whom were 
abused, including sexually. (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.). 
Factors aggravating the problem of child prostitution are pervasive 
poverty, migration to urban centers, early marriage, HIV/AIDS, and 
limited educational and job opportunities. There are several NGO's 
which work with child prostitutes, including the Forum on Street 
Children-Ethiopia, which provides shelter and protection for child 
prostitutes trying to get off the streets.
    In September 1999, a forum on child labor was launched by over 80 
government, NGO and foreign entities, including the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), to combat such problems as child prostitution. The 
forum held a series of meetings during the year.
    Child labor is pervasive, especially in the informal sector, and 
child laborers sometimes are subjected to abuse, including neglect, 
and, among children working as domestic servants, sexual abuse and rape 
(see Section 6.d.).
    It is the policy of the Ministry of Defense not to permit persons 
under the age of 18 to join the armed forces, and the Government made 
efforts to enforce this policy. While there were reports that some 
children under the age of 18 were recruited into the military in 1999, 
and military officers have admitted that underage applicants sometimes 
were enlisted, there were no such reports during the year. Ethiopia has 
an all-volunteer military; however, scarce birth certificates, poor 
educational opportunities, patriotism, and pervasive poverty conspired 
to entice underage applicants to try to circumvent restrictions on 
underage soldiers. If young boys are found be under the age of 18, they 
are prohibited from doing military service; however, in rural areas 
children often do not have birth certificates. If a unit commander 
suspects but cannot prove that a soldier is underage, he can transfer 
the soldier from a front-line combat unit to a rear-area command. There 
is evidence that children as young as age 14 were permitted to join 
local militia units in an effort to keep them close to home and prevent 
them from attempting to join the regular army.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution stipulates that the 
state shall allocate resources to provide rehabilitation and assistance 
to the physically and mentally disabled; however, the Government 
devoted few resources for these purposes. At year's end, the Government 
had not yet put into place mechanisms to enforce a 1994 law mandating 
equal rights for the disabled. The Government does not mandate access 
to buildings or government services for the disabled, and persons with 
minor disabilities sometimes complain of job discrimination. The 
conflict with Eritrea resulted in numerous soldiers losing limbs, many 
from landmine explosions; however, wheelchairs are rare in the country. 
According to an NGO report in 1998, only 500 of the approximately 
700,000 visually impaired persons in the country have access to 
employment opportunities. Although there are approximately 800,000 
mentally ill persons estimated in the country, there is only 1 mental 
hospital and only 10 psychiatrists. In the past several years, the 
mental hospital trained 117 psychiatric nurses to work in 33 rural 
clinics; however, half of these nurses subsequently left their jobs.
    There are numerous domestic NGO's that work with the disabled. For 
example, the Amhara Development Association operates a project to 
provide vocational training to disabled war veterans in Bahir Dar. The 
Tigray Development Association operates a center in Mekele that 
provides prostheses and seed money for business development, training, 
and counseling for disabled persons. The international NGO Landmine 
Survivors commenced operating in the country during the year; Landmine 
Survivors provides a number of services to victims of landmine 
explosions including counseling, and referrals to rehabilitation 
services. A 1994 census determined that there were 989,000 disabled 
persons in the country; however, observers believe that number has 
grown and is significantly higher.
    Religious Minorities.--Despite the generally broad level of 
societal tolerance for established faiths, there were instances of open 
conflict among religious groups before 1998, most noticeably between 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christians on the one hand, and Pentecostals and 
evangelicals on the other, and there continued to be pockets of 
interreligious tension and criticism during the year. Newer faiths such 
as Jehovah's Witnesses and Pentecostals encountered overt opposition 
from the public. Muslims and Orthodox Christians complained about 
proselytization by Pentecostals and Jehovah's Witnesses. Ethiopian 
Orthodox leaders complained that at times Protestants fail to respect 
Orthodox holy days and Orthodox customs. Muslims complained that some 
Pentecostal preachers disparage Islam in their services. There were 
complaints by Muslim leaders that the Ethiopian Orthodox church's 
desire to ``show supremacy'' sometimes caused irritation in the 
country's various regions. Protestant and Pentecostal leaders 
complained that, on occasion, Orthodox or evangelical adherents 
interrupted Protestant and Pentecostal religious meetings and attempted 
to prevent the construction of Protestant churches in predominately 
Orthodox or evangelical areas.
    In April 1999, two Muslim communities in the Dire Dawa and north 
Welo areas attempted to construct new mosques but abandoned the 
construction when local Orthodox church members caused damage to the 
construction sites and beat one Muslim who tried to prevent their 
actions. The Government intervened, and the mosques were being built at 
year's end.
    Nevertheless in most sections of the country Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims participated in each other's religious observances, and 
there is tolerance for intermarriage and conversion in certain areas, 
most notably in Welo, as well as in urban areas throughout the country. 
In Addis Ababa, persons of different faiths often live side-by-side. 
Most urban areas reflect a mixture of all religious denominations. 
Longstanding evangelical Protestant denominations, particularly the 
Mekane Yesus church and Kale Heywet churches, provide social services 
such as health care and education to nonmembers as well as to members.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are more than 80 ethnic 
groups. Although many of these groups influenced the political and 
cultural life of the country, Amharas and Tigrayans from the northern 
highlands played a dominant role. Some ethnic groups such as the 
Oromos, the largest single group, were subjugated during the 19th 
century. In an attempt to address ethnic concerns, the Government has 
established a federal system with political boundaries drawn roughly 
along major ethnic lines. With federalism regional states have much 
greater control over their affairs. For example, in Oromiya in 1999, 
the regional government required that all primary schools adopt 
Oromiffa as the language of instruction. This drew protests from groups 
that reside in Oromiya whose mother tongue is not Oromiffa and who 
believe that their children are now at a disadvantage. There are 
credible reports that teachers and other government workers have had 
their employment terminated if they are not of the dominant ethnic 
group in the region.
    Ethnic clashes during the year resulted in a number of deaths and 
injuries. In July there were reports of clashes between the Oromo 
Borena community and ethnic-Somali Garre pastoralists in the southeast, 
which reportedly resulted in the deaths of approximately 40 persons and 
the theft of hundreds of livestock. In October there were reports of a 
clash over grazing and watering rights between the two communities, 
which reportedly resulted in the killing of at least 150 people and 
injuries to many others.
    In December ethnic tensions between Oromo and Tigrayan students at 
Addis Ababa University were exacerbated when a Tigrayan student 
presented a paper which allegedly included a derogatory statement about 
Oromos. The students engaged in some fighting and vandalism, and 
authorities arrested some Oromo students (see Section 1.d.).
    In May 1999, local administrators in the SNNPRS informed elementary 
and high school teachers that new textbooks would be used in the North 
Omo zone, which merged four closely related languages spoken in the 
zone: Welayita, Gamo, Goffa, and Dawro. Neither local communities nor 
teachers had been consulted before the decision was made to introduce 
the new textbooks. In November 1999, police arrested two teachers for 
objecting to the new language (see Section 1.d.). The arrests led to 
widespread demonstrations and rioting in the city of Sodo during which 
police killed up to 10 persons, injured hundreds, and arrested and 
detained as many as 1,000 others (see Sections 1.a., 1.c. and 1.d.). 
Most of those arrested were released, but approximately 20 elders, 
teachers, and civil servants were charged with subversion and remained 
in prison at year's end because they could not make bail of between 
$6,000 and $12,500 (50,000 and 100,000 birr--see Section 1.d.). As a 
result of the conflict, Welayita was used as the language of 
instruction in schools during the year, and Welayita became its own 
zone in November.
    There has been a long history of tension between the Nuer and Anuak 
tribal groups. In November 1999, Nuer students in the Gambella region 
demonstrated for the use of the Nuer language in schools instead of the 
Amharic language. In December 1999, the Government arrested 26 Nuer 
tribal political activists associated with the GPDC on charges of 
inciting the Nuer students to demonstrate (see Section 1.d.). The GPDC 
accused the Anuak tribe, whose political organization--the Gambella 
people's democratic party--is an EPRDF affiliate, of interfering with 
their political activities prior to the May elections. Twelve of those 
arrested were released prior to the May elections; 14 remained in 
custody at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    The expansion of the military from a low of 60,000 personnel in 
April 1998 to approximately 285,000 to 300,000 personnel during the 
year aided greatly in the goal of bringing more ethnic groups into the 
military. By most accounts, the military is an ethnically diverse 
organization with very little friction between the various groups 
represented, at least in the lower ranks. At the higher ranks the 
officer personnel is much less ethnically diverse. Promotions awarded 
in November and December were disproportionately high among the 
Tigrayan ethnic group, although promotions were given to officers from 
a range of ethnic groups; Oromos were represented among those promoted 
in higher numbers than the previous year.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides most 
workers with the right to form and join unions, but the 1993 Labor 
Proclamation specifically excluded teachers and civil servants, 
including judges, prosecutors, and security services, from organizing 
unions. Only 300,000 workers are unionized. The 1993 Labor Proclamation 
also decreed that workers who provide essential services are not 
allowed to strike. Essential services are defined broadly to include 
air transport services, railways, bus service, postal, police and fire 
services, banking, telecommunications, and medical services.
    Only a small percentage of the population is involved in wage labor 
employment, which is concentrated largely in urban areas. Approximately 
85 percent of the work force live in the countryside and are engaged in 
subsistence farming.
    The ETA formerly had a membership of 120,000; however, that number 
has decreased significantly due to government intimidation and 
restrictions on ETA activities. In 1995 the leadership of the ETA filed 
with the ILO a freedom of association complaint against the Government 
based upon credible reports that the Government has harassed the ETA 
leadership at all levels since 1993. Security forces harassed members 
of the ETA and closed their offices; however, the ETA still is 
registered. In November the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 
issued a strong criticism of the Government for its restrictions on 
freedom of association. The president of the ETA, Dr. Woldesemayat, was 
sentenced to 15 years in prison in 1999 for inciting violence. In 1994 
the Government encouraged and publicly supported the organization and 
registration of a second teachers'' association. A delegation from the 
international NGO Education International received visas to visit Dr. 
Woldesemayat in prison, but were turned back upon arrival at Addis 
Ababa airport in June. A second delegation from Education International 
attempted to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in December; however, all but one 
of the delegation members were denied visas (see Section 1.c.).
    There is no requirement that unions belong to the Confederation of 
Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU), which was established in 1993, 
decertified in December 1994 because of internal management and 
political disputes, and officially reestablished and recertified in 
April 1997. CETU includes all nine federations organized by industrial 
and service sectors rather than by region.
    The Labor Law stipulates that a trade organization may not act in 
an overtly political manner. The Labor Law explicitly gives workers the 
right to strike to protect their interests, but it also sets forth 
restrictive procedures that apply before a legal strike may take place. 
These apply equally to an employer's right to lock out workers. Strikes 
must be supported by a majority of the workers affected. The Labor Law 
prohibits retribution against strikers, but labor leaders state that 
most workers are not convinced that the Government would enforce this 
protection. Both sides must make efforts at reconciliation, provide at 
least 10 days' notice to the Government, include the reasons for the 
action, and in cases already before a court or labor board, the party 
must provide at least a 30-day warning. If an agreement between unions 
and management cannot be reached, the Minister of Labor may refer the 
case to arbitration by a Labor Relations Board (LRB). The Government 
has established LRB's at the national level and in some regions. The 
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs appoints each LRB chairman, and 
the four board members include two each from trade unions and employer 
groups. Some efforts to enforce labor regulations are made within the 
formal industrial sector. Some private sector workers, including 
construction workers and Ethiopian Airlines mechanics, went on strike 
during the year over salary issues. Labor officials have stated that in 
view of high unemployment and the inattention courts have given to 
labor cases, some workers are afraid to participate in strikes or other 
labor actions.
    Independent unions and those belonging to CETU are free to 
affiliate with and participate in international labor bodies. Some 
unions have affiliated with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is protected under the Labor Law and under the Constitution 
for most workers and is practiced freely throughout the country. 
Collective bargaining agreements concluded between 1975 and the 
promulgation of the 1993 Labor Law remain in force. Labor experts 
estimate that more than 90 percent of unionized workers are covered by 
collective bargaining agreements. Wages are negotiated at the plant 
level. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against 
union members and organizers. There are grievance procedures for 
hearings on allegations of discrimination brought by individuals or 
unions. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required 
to reinstate workers fired for union activities. Labor leaders point to 
a number of court cases that are 4 or 5 years old in which workers have 
been terminated for union activities as examples of inattention by the 
courts to worker rights. Seasonal and part-time agricultural workers 
are not organized even on state-owned plantations. Seasonal workers'' 
compensation, benefits, and working conditions are far below those of 
unionized permanent plantation employees.
    In December a private company dissolved its labor union after a 
disagreement between management and workers. A total of 586 workers 
were expelled from the company, including union leaders. The Government 
attempted to mediate the dispute, but the employer did not cooperate; 
the case is expected to be referred to the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs in 2001.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Criminal Code, 
which applies to persons over the age of 15, specifically prohibits 
forced labor; however, forced labor can be used by court order as a 
punitive measure. Forced or compulsory labor by children is illegal; 
however, young girls reportedly were sold or forced into prostitution 
by family members (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). There were continued 
reports that poor rural families sold their young teenage daughters to 
hotel and bar owners on the main truck routes; however, these reports 
were difficult to confirm. There was a report that a girl was sold by 
her father to a local man in exchange for cattle; the girl's mother 
brought the case to the Ethiopian Women Lawyer's Association, and the 
case was being prosecuted in the courts at year's end (see Sections 5 
and 6.f.). There also were numerous anecdotal accounts of young 
persons, especially girls, traveling to the Middle East to work as 
house servants and nannies, some of whom were abused, including 
sexually (see Section 6.f.). The Constitution proscribes slavery, which 
was abolished officially in 1942, and involuntary servitude. There were 
no reports of slavery within the country.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Under the Labor Law, the minimum age for wage or salary 
employment is 14 years; special provisions cover children between the 
ages of 14 and 18, including the prohibition of night work or hazardous 
work. The Government defines hazardous work as work in factories or 
involving machinery with moving parts, or any work that could 
jeopardize children's health.
    Children may not work more than 7 hours per day; work between the 
hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.; work on public holidays or rest days; or 
perform overtime work. While the Government has made some effort to 
enforce these regulations within the formal industrial sector, social 
welfare activists, civic organizers, government officials, and 
entrepreneurs agree that child labor is pervasive throughout the 
country, especially in the informal sector. In urban areas, children in 
large numbers can be seen working in a variety of jobs, including 
shining shoes, hustling passengers into cabs, working as porters, 
selling lottery tickets, and herding animals. Child domestic workers 
are common.
    Child laborers often are abused. A research study published in 1999 
reported that the prevalence of child abuse among urban child laborers 
is 70 percent, compared with 24.5 percent among non-economically active 
children from the same urban district. The study concluded that 
physical and emotional abuse were twice as common among child workers 
compared with nonworkers, sexual abuse was five times as common, and 
neglect was eight times as common. Among child workers surveyed, rapes 
occurred exclusively among child domestics.
    A second research study of child labor sponsored by CETU's National 
Federation of Farm, Plantation, Fishery, and Agro-industry Trade Unions 
and published in 1999 focused on rural locations. The study reported 
that 30 percent of the workers on state farms surveyed were between the 
ages of 7 and 14. Child workers, who worked alongside parents hired by 
the state, typically worked 6 days a week, received no benefits, and 
earned less than $10 (80 birr) a month. At one plantation, 75 percent 
of the children worked 12-hour days. There also is evidence that 
children as young as age 14 are permitted to join local militias with 
the consent of village leaders. This reportedly is part of an effort to 
keep children in local areas despite limited educational or employment 
opportunities (see Section 5). The Government maintains that most 
economically active children are engaged in family-based, 
nonexploitative child work that is part of the socialization process 
and maintains that there is not a child labor problem.
    In September 1999, a forum on child labor was launched by over 80 
governments, NGO and foreign entities, including the ILO, to combat 
such problems as child prostitution, which is widely perceived to be 
growing (see Section 5). The forum concluded that the worst forms of 
child labor have increased in recent years, particularly child 
prostitution and the use of children in agricultural work where they 
are exposed to pesticides and insecticides.
    The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is the authority 
designated to enforce child labor laws. The Government's definition of 
worst forms of child labor includes prostitution and bonded labor. The 
Government is not a signatory to the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention.
    Forced or compulsory labor by children is illegal; however, there 
are reports that it occurs (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1995 the Government 
established a minimum wage of approximately $15 (120 birr) per month 
for all wage earners in both the private and public sectors. In 
addition each industry and service sector has established its own 
minimum wage. For example, public sector employees, the largest group 
of wage earners, earn a minimum wage of approximately $22 (175 birr) 
per month; employees in the banking and insurance sector have a minimum 
wage of $25 (200 birr) per month. According to the Office of the Study 
of Wages and Other Remuneration, these wages are insufficient to 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. 
Consequently most families must have at least two wage earners to 
survive, which is one of the reasons children leave school early.
    The legal workweek, as stipulated in the Labor Law, is 48 hours, 
consisting of 6 days of 8 hours each, with a 24-hour rest period. 
However, in practice, most employees work a 40-hour workweek consisting 
of 5 8-hour days.
    The Government, industry, and unions negotiate to set occupational 
health and safety standards; however, the inspection department of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs enforces these standards 
ineffectively, due to a lack of human and financial resources. Workers 
have the right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without 
jeopardy to continued employment; however, most workers fear losing 
their jobs if they were to do so.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law and the Constitution prohibit 
trafficking in persons; however, there were continued reports that poor 
rural families sold their young teenage daughters to hotel and bar 
owners on the main truck routes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). There was a 
report that a girl was sold by her father to a local man in exchange 
for cattle; the girl's mother brought the case to the Ethiopian Women 
Lawyer's Association. At year's end, the case was being prosecuted in 
the courts; it is the first case of this kind (see Sections 5 and 
6.c.). There were numerous anecdotal accounts of young girls traveling 
to the Middle East to work as house servants and nannies, some of whom 
are abused, including sexually. There reportedly is a network of 
persons based in the tourism and import-export sectors who are involved 
heavily in soliciting potential clients, recruiting young girls, 
arranging travel, and fabricating counterfeit work permits, travel 
documents, and birth certificates (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    Although illegal, the abduction of women and girls as a form of 
marriage still is widely practiced in Oromiya regions and the SNNPRS 
(see Section 5).
    As a result of a change in the Labor Law, the Government no longer 
acts as an employment agency for workers going abroad. Private entities 
now arrange for overseas work and, as a result, the number of women 
being sent to Middle Eastern countries, particularly Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia, as domestic or industrial workers increased significantly. 
There continued to be credible reports that some domestic workers 
abroad were subjected to abusive conditions, including sexual 
exploitation (see Section 5); however, such reports decreased after the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs established an office in 1998 to 
review the contracts of prospective domestic workers and deny exit 
visas if the contracts did not appear satisfactory.
    The Government continued work on revising the federal Civil and 
Penal Codes to increase the penalties for traffickers. Training 
programs were implemented for police officers on the criminal aspects 
of trafficking. There are several NGO's that work on the issue of 
trafficking, some of which provide protection for trafficking victims.
                               __________

                                 GABON

    Gabon is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. Although 
opposition parties have been legal since 1990, a single party, the 
Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG), has remained in power since 1968 and 
has circumscribed political choice. Elections for the presidency and 
the National Assembly generally have not been free and fair but have 
varied widely in quality; some suffered chiefly from poor organization, 
while others were fraudulent. PDG leader El Hadj Omar Bongo has been 
President since 1967 and was reelected for another 7-year term in a 
December 1998 election marred by irregularities that generally favored 
the incumbent, including incomplete and inaccurate electoral lists and 
the use of false documents to cast votes. In July 1998, following 
opposition victories in 1996 elections for local government offices 
that recently had been made elective, the Government transferred key 
electoral functions to the Interior Ministry from an independent 
National Electoral Commission that had been established pursuant to a 
1995 constitutional referendum. Members of the PDG and allied parties 
hold large majorities of seats in both chambers of the national 
legislature: The directly elected National Assembly, for which the most 
recent elections, held in December 1996, were poorly run and 
fraudulent; and the Senate, members of which are chosen by municipal 
and regional government officials. The judiciary is independent but 
remains vulnerable to government manipulation.
    The national police, which is subordinate to the Interior Ministry, 
and the gendarmerie, which is subordinate to the Defense Ministry, are 
primarily responsible for domestic law enforcement and public security. 
In addition elements of the armed forces and the ``Republican Guard,'' 
an elite, heavily armed unit that protects the President, sometimes 
have performed internal security functions; both the armed forces and 
the Republican Guard are subordinate to the Defense Ministry. Members 
of the security forces occasionally committed human rights abuses.
    The country's economy is underdiversified and heavily dependent 
upon external trade. The State dominates much of the economy through 
telecommunications, timber export, and oil refinery parastatals; 
however, the production of wood, oil, and minerals is largely private, 
and the water, electric, railroad, and sugar parastatals have been 
privatized. Government financial mismanagement and corruption have 
contributed to significant arrears in domestic and external debt 
payments. Since the discovery of offshore oil in the late 1970's, the 
oil industry has generated nearly half of recorded gross national 
product; oil export earnings have allowed the country's approximately 1 
million citizens to enjoy a relatively high material standard of living 
based on imports of consumer goods and have drawn to the country's 
capital, Libreville, a third of the country's citizens and many 
immigrants from poor African countries who work chiefly in the informal 
and service sectors. Average annual per capita gross domestic product 
was approximately $4,700, although income distribution remained badly 
skewed in favor of urban dwellers and a small economic elite, while the 
rural population continued to receive relatively few social services. 
The depletion of proven reserves of oil and timber contributed to 
declining export earnings and state revenues during the year.
    The Government's human rights record was generally poor in some 
areas, and some longstanding human rights abuses continued. The ability 
of citizens to change their government remained limited. Outstanding 
cases of killings by security forces remain unresolved. The security 
forces beat and tortured prisoners and detainees, prison conditions 
remained harsh and life threatening, arbitary arrest and detention were 
problems, the judiciary remained subject to government influence, and 
authorities routinely infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Despite 
some improvements, the Government continued to restrict freedom of the 
press. Violence and societal discrimination against women were 
problems. Forced labor by foreign children as domestic and agricultural 
workers remained a problem, and there were reports of trafficking in 
children.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated extrajudicial killings; and there were 
no confirmed cases in which members of the security forces committed 
other extrajudicial killings. Outstanding cases of extrajudicial 
killings committed by the security forces remained unresolved.
    In April 1999, an off-duty member of the Republican Guard shot and 
killed a taxi driver who had refused to lend his taxi to the soldier. 
Despite demands from the media to prosecute the alleged assailant, the 
suspect never was charged. In the July 1999 case of a group of off-duty 
police officers who reportedly killed 2 persons and wounded 11 in a 
vendetta attack in a Libreville discotheque, the police officers 
initially were cleared of wrongdoing by their superiors, then later 
subjected to minor disciplinary measures. No arrests were made in 
either case.
    Although there were no confirmed reports of attempted killings that 
appeared to be politically motivated, an opposition candidate Pierre 
Mamboundou, who contested the December 1998 presidential election 
stated in December 1998 that armed commandos attempted to kill him on 
December 12, 1998. Mamboundou stated that he believed that the 
Government was responsible for the alleged attack, but no evidence 
supporting this allegation developed.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or cruel and inhuman 
punishment; however, security forces sometimes beat or physically 
mistreated prisoners and detainees as punishment and to exact 
confessions. There were unconfirmed reports in the African immigrant 
community that police and soldiers occasionally beat and raped non-
Gabonese Africans during operations to round up and deport illegal 
immigrants (see Section 2.d.).
    In August a police officer raped a Cameroonian woman in custody. 
The case received wide media coverage, and shortly after the incident, 
the officer was dismissed from the police force. The national police 
leadership asserted that the police officer would be disciplined 
formally and then tried for rape; however, at year's end, the case had 
not been tried, and no further action had been taken against the 
officer.
    There were occasional incidents of violence in which practitioners 
of some traditional indigenous religions inflicted bodily harm on other 
persons (see Section 5). However, the details of these incidents are 
uncertain. The Ministry of the Interior maintained that violence and 
bodily harm to others in the practice of a traditional religion is a 
criminal offense and is prosecuted vigorously. Media reports suggested 
that this was true; however, little information about such prosecutions 
or their results was available.
    Conditions in most prisons are harsh and life threatening. 
Sanitation and ventilation are poor, and medical care is almost 
nonexistent. Prisons provide inadequate food for inmates. There were no 
known visits by human rights monitors to prisons during the year, 
although the Government was not known to have impeded such visits in 
past years.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The law provides for up to 48 hours of initial 
preventive detention, during which period police must charge a detainee 
before a judge. However, in practice police rarely respect this 
provision. Charges often are not filed expeditiously, and persons often 
are detained arbitrarily for long periods. Bail may be set if there is 
to be a further investigation. Pretrial detainees have the right to 
free access to their attorneys, and this right is respected in 
practice. Detainees have the right to an expeditious trial, as defined 
by the law. Pretrial detention is limited to 6 months for a misdemeanor 
and to 1 year for a felony charge. These periods may be extended for 6 
months by the examining magistrate. Prolonged pretrial detention is 
common. The Attorney General's Office estimates that roughly 40 percent 
of persons in custody are pretrial detainees.
    Authorities in Makokou arrested and detained Gabonese Confederation 
of Free Unions (CGSL) representative Jean-Remy Nguelany for over 3 
months in 1998 (see Section 6.b.).
    Members of the security forces frequently detained individuals at 
roadblocks. Although sometimes designed to locate illegal immigrants, 
most such operations were used by the security forces to extort money.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary is generally 
independent in principle, it remains vulnerable to government 
manipulation.
    The judicial system includes the regular courts, a military 
tribunal, and a civilian State Security Court. The regular court system 
includes trial courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The 
Constitutional Court is a separate body charged with examining 
constitutional questions, including the certification of elections. 
There are no traditional or customary courts. In some areas, minor 
disputes may be taken to a local chief, but the State does not 
recognize such decisions. The State Security Court, last convened in 
1990, is constituted by the Government as required to consider matters 
of state security.
    There were systemic resource and personnel shortages in the 
judiciary, which often contributed to prolonged pretrial detention (see 
Section 1.d.).
    The Constitution provides for the right to a public trial and the 
right to legal counsel. These rights generally are respected in 
criminal cases. Nevertheless, procedural safeguards are lacking, 
particularly in state security trials. A judge may thus deliver an 
immediate verdict of guilty at the initial hearing if sufficient 
evidence is presented by the State.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection from 
surveillance, from searches without warrant, and from interference with 
private telecommunications or correspondence; however, the Government 
restricts these rights in practice. As part of criminal investigations, 
police may request search warrants from judges, which they obtain 
easily, sometimes after the fact. The Government has used them in the 
past to gain access to the homes of opposition figures and their 
families.
    Government authorities also routinely monitor private telephone 
conversations, personal mail, and the movements of citizens.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, although citizens 
generally continued to speak freely and criticize the Government, the 
Government continued to restrict press freedom. Legislators in the 
National Assembly openly criticize government policies, ministers, and 
other officials.
    The only daily newspaper was the state-affiliated L'Union. 
Approximately 10 privately owned weekly or monthly publications in 
newspaper format, which represent independent views and those of 
various political parties, appeared during the year; however, most 
appeared irregularly due to financial constraints and, in some 
instances, to government suspensions of their publication licenses. All 
newspapers--including L'Union--actively criticized the Government and 
political leaders of all parties. Most also criticized the President.
    Journalists are subject to the Communication Code, a law that 
specifies their rights and responsibilities. Libel can be either a 
criminal offense or a civil matter. The law authorizes the State to 
initiate criminal libel prosecution against persons for libeling 
elected government officials; it also authorizes the State to 
criminalize civil libel suits.
    In April 1999, the National Communication Council (CNC), a 
government agency subordinate to the Communications Ministry, released 
its draft of a proposed new Communications Code that would further 
restrict press freedom by expanding the scope of criminal libel laws in 
the name of protecting ``dignity of the person;'' however, it would 
shift the penalties for libel away from imprisonment and toward 
monetary fines; it also would reduce prison sentences for journalists 
convicted of criminal libel while increasing fines that could be 
imposed on such journalists and on the newspaper firms that employ 
them. In April the National Assembly passed the new Communications 
Code, but it stalled in the Senate because of concerns about its 
constitutionality. In November the Senate passed a different version of 
the code, and the two bills were referred to a conference committee for 
reconciliation; no further action had been taken by year's end.
    In April 1999, the CNC suspended the publication license of La 
Griffe, a Libreville-based satirical weekly newspaper, on the grounds 
that it was publishing anonymous editorials in contravention of a legal 
requirement, necessary for the enforcement of criminal libel laws, that 
publications name the authors of everything that they publish. The 
Ministry of Communications previously suspended the same newspaper's 
license from August 1998 through March 1999 after the Government 
successfully prosecuted members of the newspaper's staff for criminal 
libel. The suspension of La Griffe's publication license ended in 
August, and the newspaper resumed publication shortly thereafter.
    The Government continued to use prosecutions for civil and criminal 
libel against journalists to restrict freedom of expression, especially 
criticism of the Government. In December 1999, Germain Lendoye, 
publisher of the satirical weekly Cigale Enchantee, was jailed for 2 
months after the newspaper failed to pay a fine of about $290 (200,000 
FCFA) that was awarded in 1999 to the Minister of Equipment and 
Construction for defamation. Cigale Enchantee remained closed for 
financial reasons. In July Lendoye launched a new satirical weekly, Le 
Scribouillard.
    In March and again in June, employees of Sogadel, a parastatal 
agribusiness firm, went on strike to protest the failure to pay back 
wages; police did not intervene. In August journalists at the national 
television station struck for back wages (see Section 6.a.).
    In May journalists Kare Black, Guy Mvelle, and publisher Noel Ngwa 
Nguema of the bimonthly Misamu were fined the equivalent of $14,500 
(10,000,000 FCFA) in a defamation suit brought by the Director General 
of Public Works at the Ministry of Equipment and Construction over a 
January article that alleged a diversion of public funds from a road 
project. The court ruled in favor of the director general despite the 
publication by Misamu of a lengthy rebuttal written by the director 
general.
    In May President Bongo pardoned La Griffe editor in chief Michel 
Ongoundou Loundah and journalist Raphael Ntoume Nkoghe (writing under 
the name of Pulcherie Beaumiel), who were convicted of criminal libel 
in August 1998. The two left the country in 1998 after a court 
sentenced them to 8 months in prison for reporting that the director 
general of the state airline had used the company to smuggle ivory 
internationally; both returned to the country during the year. Dorothee 
Ngouoni, an editor at La Griffe, left the country in July 1999 as a 
result of the same defamation case and was convicted of defamation 
shortly thereafter. She was not pardoned and remained abroad.
    The Government owns and operates two radio stations, which 
broadcast to all areas of the country. Much of their news coverage 
concerns the activities of government officials; however, their 
editorials are sometimes critical of specific government policies and 
even of specific government ministers. The CNC issues and, in the past, 
at times sometimes has suspended the broadcasting licenses of private 
radio and television stations. During the year, all existing 
suspensions were lifted, and no new suspensions were imposed. Financial 
considerations resulted in fluctuations in the number of radio stations 
operating. At year's end, approximately a dozen privately owned radio 
stations operated in the country; most were apolitical. The Government 
owns and operates two television stations, RTG-1 and RTG-2. At year's 
end, four apolitical, privately owned stations were broadcasting.
    In October 1999, the Government suspended the broadcasting license 
of two privately owned radio stations. One resumed broadcasting in 
November 1999; the other, a station affiliated with the Catholic 
Church, resolved its conflict with the Government without interrupting 
its broadcasts (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government did not interfere with domestic reception of 
broadcasts of international radio stations, including the Voice of 
America. Radio France International broadcast locally, and British 
Broadcasting Corporation radio sought and received a license to begin 
local broadcasts; but at year's end, they had not begun to broadcast. 
Foreign newspapers and magazines were widely available.
    The Government did not restrict access to or use of the Internet. 
At year's end, there were two Internet service providers in the 
country, one state owned and the other privately owned. In urban areas, 
there were public facilities that provided relatively affordable access 
to the Internet.
    There are no restrictions on academic freedom, including research.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally 
respected this right in practice for citizens and recognized 
organizations. The law requires that groups obtain permits for public 
gatherings in advance, and the Government usually granted them.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respected this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government generally respected this right in practice. 
There is no state religion, and authorities do not engage in religious 
persecution. A 1983 decree banning Jehovah's Witnesses, which the 
Government promulgated on the grounds that Jehovah's Witnesses 
allegedly do not protect individuals who might dissent from the group's 
views adequately, remained in effect throughout the year; however, the 
Government did not enforce the ban.
    Some Protestants alleged that the government television station 
accorded free transmission time to the Catholic Church but not to 
minority religious groups. Others alleged that the armed forces favor 
Roman Catholics and Muslims in hiring and promotions. Some Protestant 
congregations had difficulty obtaining building permits.
    The Ministry of the Interior maintains an official registry of some 
religious groups; however, it does not register traditional indigenous 
religious groups. The Government does not require religious groups to 
register but recommends that they do so in order to assemble with full 
constitutional protection. No financial or tax benefit is conferred by 
registration. The Government has refused to register about 10 religious 
groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses. In practice the Government 
allows Jehovah's Witnesses to assemble and practice their religion. In 
addition the Government has made uncorroborated claims that it permited 
Jehovah's Witnesses to proselytize.
    In October 1999, the Government suspended the broadcasting license 
of a privately owned radio station affiliated with the Catholic Church. 
The station resolved its conflict with the Government without 
interrupting its broadcasts. Its license was restored in November 1999 
(see Section 2.a.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights. There are no legally mandated restrictions on internal 
movement. Police and gendarmes continued to stop travelers frequently 
to check identity, residence, or registration documents, and members of 
the security forces regularly harassed expatriate Africans working 
legally as merchants, service sector employees, and manual laborers. 
They extorted bribes and demanded services with the threat of 
confiscation of residency documents or imprisonment. Residency permits 
cost up to $145 (100,000 FCFA), and first time applicants also must 
provide the cost of a one-way air ticket to their country of origin. In 
theory, but usually not in practice, the Government refunds the cost of 
the air ticket.
    The government agency that controls immigration intermittently 
enforced an internal regulation requiring married women to have their 
husbands' permission to travel abroad, although a specific law to this 
effect was eliminated in 1990. An exit visa no longer is required for 
citizens to travel abroad; however, aliens resident in the country must 
obtain a visa in order to leave and return.
    There were unconfirmed reports that police occasionally beat and 
raped non-Gabonese Africans during operations to assemble and deport 
illegal immigrants. In November the Government used soldiers to conduct 
an official ``sweep'' operation. According to the Government, the sweep 
was intended to detain bandits, but the Government did not disclose if 
any persons were arrested. The sweep consisted of soldiers stopping and 
searching vehicles at roadblocks, as well as house-to-house searches 
conducted by soldiers and police in impoverished neighborhoods. The 
police conducted the same activity informally on a regular basis and 
frequently stopped vehicles to extort bribes.
    The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government strictly controls the 
process of refugee adjudication. Coordination with the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) generally is adequate. During the 
year, an estimated 17,000 refugees,
    14,000 from the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), remained in the 
country to avoid fighting between Congolese rebels and forces 
supporting the Congolese Government. The Government cooperated with the 
UNHCR and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that 
provided assistance to these refugees.
    There were no reports that the Government forcibly returned persons 
to a country where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The 1991 Constitution explicitly provides this right, but 
mismanagement and serious irregularities in both the 1990 and 1996 
legislative elections and the 1993 and 1998 presidential elections 
called into serious doubt the extent to which this right exists in 
practice. A single party, the PDG, has remained in power since its 
creation by President Bongo in 1968, and political choice has remained 
limited in practice despite the legalization of opposition parties 
since 1990.
    In a July 1995 constitutional referendum, citizens approved by a 96 
percent majority reforms, that included most significantly the 
establishment of an independent National Electoral Commission (NEC). 
The referendum was carried out under arrangements that assured that all 
political parties could monitor voting and vote counting.
    The Republic is dominated by a strong Presidency. The President can 
veto legislation, dissolve the national legislature, call new 
elections, and issue decrees that have the force of law while the 
legislature is not in session. The legislature generally has approved 
legislation presented to it by the President but occasionally has not 
done so. The President appoints and can dismiss judges through the 
Ministry of Justice, to which the judiciary is responsible. The 
President appoints ministers of government, provincial governors, 
prefects and subprefects, and the heads of parastatal firms.
    PDG leader El Hadj Omar Bongo has been President since 1967, when 
the former President died while Bongo was Vice President. He was 
reelected for another 7-year term in a December 1998 election marred by 
irregularities that generally favored his incumbency, including 
incomplete and inaccurate electoral lists and the use of false 
documents to cast multiple votes. In July 1998, the Government 
transferred key electoral functions, including the maintenance of voter 
registration lists, from the NEC to the Interior Ministry. In October 
1998, the representatives of three major opposition parties withdrew 
from the NEC to protest their inability to verify the accuracy of voter 
registration lists. Official results showed Bongo winning approximately 
two-thirds of the votes cast.
    The most recent elections for the National Assembly, the lower 
house of the bicameral national legislature, held in 1996, were run 
poorly and fraudulent. National Assembly elections are held every 5 
years; the next elections are scheduled for late 2001. Candidates 
belonging to the PDG and other parties supporting President Bongo won 
more than 80 of the 120 seats, including 8 of 10 seats in the capital, 
where the opposition recently had won fairer local government 
elections. The military and NEC magistrates fraudulently ensured 
victory for parties supporting the President by altering vote counts 
arbitrarily, particularly in the capital.
    The ability of citizens to choose their subnational governments 
remains limited in practice. Among subnational officials, provincial 
governors, prefects, and subprefects are officers of the central 
Government, responsible to the President. Mayors and municipal councils 
are elected; however, municipal governments have limited financial 
autonomy and depend heavily on funding from the central Government.
    Local elections for mayors and municipal councils held in 1996 were 
organized poorly and later were repeated in key districts. In both sets 
of elections, opposition parties won most of the municipal council 
seats in the capital, Libreville, where the RNB candidate was elected 
mayor.
    The Senate, the upper house of the bicameral national legislature, 
was created in 1996. The first elections for Senators were held in 
1997. Municipal and regional government officials elect all 91 
senators.
    Major opposition parties include the RNB and the Gabonese 
Progressive Party (PGP). The RNB's political base is in the northern 
province of Woleu-Ntem, which is inhabited chiefly by members of the 
Fang ethnic group, and in Libreville neighborhoods with many Fang 
residents, although the party attracts some support from other regions 
and ethnic groups. Before the 1998 presidential election, the RNB split 
into two factions. In December it changed its name to the Rassemblement 
pour les Peuples Gabonais (RPG). The PGP enjoys strong support in Port 
Gentil, the center of the country's petroleum industry, and among the 
Myene ethnic group. Ideological splits and rivalries between Libreville 
and Port Gentil have reduced the effectiveness of the PGP.
    There are no restrictions on the participation of women and 
minorities in politics; however, women and minorities are 
underrepresented in government and politics. At year's end,
    7 of the 120 National Assembly representatives, 12 of the 91 
senators, and 5 of the 41 cabinet members were women. Indigenous 
Pygmies rarely participate in the political process, and the Government 
has made only limited efforts to include them (see Section 5).

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government officially allows the existence of independent human 
rights groups, although few are active. These organizations advocate 
mostly on behalf of women, children, the disabled, and the homeless. 
The largest and best-financed domestic NGO's are government associated 
and financed; the president of one such NGO, GERDDES-Gabon, is a senior 
official of the ruling party. Despite an October 1999 announcement that 
it would establish a National Human Rights Commission, the Government 
had taken no action to establish one by year's end.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution forbids discrimination based on national origin, 
race, gender, or opinion. The Government does not uniformly enforce 
these constitutional provisions and tolerates a substantial degree of 
discrimination against women, especially in domestic affairs. It has 
also provided a lower level of health care and educational services to 
children of families of other African nationalities than it provided to 
citizens.
    Women.--Violence against women is common and is especially 
prevalent in rural areas. While medical authorities have not 
specifically identified rape to be a chronic problem, religious workers 
and hospital staff reported that evidence of beatings of women is 
common. Police rarely intervene in such cases, and women virtually 
never file complaints with civil authorities. Only limited medical and 
legal assistance is available.
    The law provides that women have rights to equal access in 
education, business, and investment. Women own businesses and property, 
participate in politics, and work throughout the government and the 
private sector. Women nevertheless continued to face considerable 
societal and legal discrimination, especially in rural areas. According 
to a U.N. agency, 52 percent of women were literate in 1994, compared 
with 74 percent of men.
    By law couples must stipulate at the time of marriage whether they 
intend to adhere to a monogynous or a polygynous relationship; 
according to one local NGO, polygynous marriages are more common. For 
monogynous married couples, a common property law provides for the 
equal distribution of assets after divorce. In a polygynous marriage, 
husbands are obligated to give all wives the same level of financial 
support; however, he may marry additional wives without permission from 
his existing wives. Wives who leave polygynous husbands receive half of 
their existing support as a one-time payment. In inheritance cases, the 
husband's family must issue a written authorization before his widow 
can inherit property. Common law marriage, which is accepted socially 
and widely practiced, affords a woman no property rights.
    An internal regulation still requires that a woman obtain her 
husband's permission to travel abroad; however, this requirement is not 
enforced consistently.
    Children.--The Government has used oil revenue to build schools, 
pay teachers'' salaries, and promote education, even in rural areas. 
However, with the decline in such revenues in the late 1990's, the 
upkeep of schools and payment of teachers has suffered. Education is 
compulsory until age 16 and is generally available, through sixth 
grade. However, there is evidence that fewer than half of secondary-
school-age children attended school as of 1996; secondary school 
attendance rates for immigrant children appear likely to be lower, 
although public schools accept immigrant children, and the Government 
encouraged them to attend. Education is free except for miscellaneous 
expenses such as books and school supplies.
    The country has a relatively high infant mortality rate, and not 
all children have access to vaccinations, although the Government 
worked with international donors to improve the situation. Traditional 
beliefs and practices provide numerous safeguards for children, but 
children remain the responsibility of the extended family--including 
aunts, grandmothers, and older siblings. There is little evidence of 
physical abuse of children, although there were some reports that girls 
were sexually abused by family members after reaching puberty. 
Protection for children's rights is not codified in law. Forced child 
labor and trafficking in children are problems (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    There is concern about the problems facing the large community of 
children of African noncitizens. Almost all enjoy far less access to 
education and health care than do children of citizens and are 
sometimes victims of child labor abuses (see Section 6.d.). Female 
genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by international 
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, 
occurs among the resident population of expatriate Africans. There are 
no laws against FGM, but according to local women's groups, it is not 
practiced on Gabonese children.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no laws that prohibit 
discrimination against persons with disabilities or that provide for 
access to buildings or services; however, there were no reports of 
discrimination against the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--The Baka people (Pygmies) are the earliest 
known human inhabitants of the country. Several thousand indigenous 
Pygmies live in the country, most in large tracts of still-intact rain 
forest in the northeast. Domestic law grants them the same civil rights 
as other citizens. Pygmies largely are independent of formal authority, 
keeping their own traditions, independent communities, and local 
decisionmaking structures. Pygmies did not participate in government-
instituted programs that integrated many small rural villages into 
larger ones along major roads. As a result, their access to government-
funded health and sanitation facilities was limited. There are no 
specific government programs or policies to assist or hinder Pygmies.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's citizen 
population includes several ethnic groups, each of which generally 
speaks a distinct primary language and is concentrated in an 
identifiable area of the country. There is no majority ethnic group; 
the largest ethnic group is the Fang, which makes up over 30 percent of 
the population and is concentrated in the north. Other major ethnic 
groups include the Myene, the Bapunu, the Bateke, the Obamba, and the 
Nzebi. Urban neighborhoods are not segregated ethnically; interethnic 
marriage is common.
    There was some correlation between ethnic and political divisions. 
Support for the ruling party is stronger among persons from southern 
ethnic groups, including President Bongo's Bateke ethnic group, than 
among the northern Fang group or the coastal Myene group (see Section 
3).
    The Government generally fostered ethnic balance in the public 
sector, throughout which persons from all major ethnic groups continued 
to occupy prominent positions. However, there was evidence that members 
of President's Bateke ethnic group and other ethnic southerners held a 
disproportionately large number of key positions throughout the 
military and security forces (see Section 3).

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution places no 
restrictions on the right of association and recognizes the right of 
citizens to form trade and labor unions. Virtually the entire formal 
private sector work force is unionized. Unions must register with the 
Government in order to be recognized officially. Public sector 
employees may unionize although their right to strike is limited if it 
could jeopardize public safety. Until 1990 there was only one 
recognized labor organization, the Gabonese Labor Confederation 
(COSYGA), to which all unionized workers contributed a mandatory 
percentage of their salaries. In 1992 the Government accepted the 
establishment of independent unions and abolished the mandatory 
contribution to COSYGA. Since 1993 many independent unions have 
emerged, including powerful unions of teachers, civil servants, 
transport workers, and communications workers. Some independent unions 
have associated to form the Gabonese Confederation of Free Unions 
(CGSL). COSYGA has continued to be affiliated with the Government but 
has criticized publicly some government policies it perceived as 
contrary to labor interests.
    In 1994 the National Assembly passed an extensively revised version 
of the Labor Code, which was published and implemented in early 1995. 
The code provides extensive protection of worker rights.
    Strikes are legal if they are held after an 8-day notice advising 
that outside arbitration has failed. The Labor Code prohibits direct 
government action against individual strikers who abide by the 
arbitration and notification provisions. It also provides that the 
Government cannot press charges against a group for criminal activities 
committed by individuals.
    In March and again in June, employees of Sogadel, a parastatal 
agribusiness firm, went on strike to protest the failure to pay back 
wages. In both cases, although strikers burned tires and barricaded 
Libreville's main thoroughfare, police did not intervene. In August 
journalists at the national television station, RTG-1, also struck for 
back wages. The failure to pay salaries in both instances was 
attributed widely to a combination of managerial malfeasance and 
failure to receive adequate funds from the Government (see Section 
2.a.).
    Unions and confederations are free to affiliate with international 
labor bodies and participate in their activities. COSYGA is affiliated 
with the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, while the CGSL is 
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
Both COSYGA and CGSL have ties with numerous other international labor 
organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
provides for collective bargaining by industry, not by firm; 
collectively bargained agreements set wages for whole industries. Labor 
and management meet to negotiate differences, and the Ministry of Labor 
provides an observer. This observer does not take an active part in 
negotiations over pay scales, working conditions, or benefits. 
Agreements also apply to nonunion workers. While no laws specifically 
prohibit antiunion discrimination, the court may require employers who 
are found guilty by civil courts of having engaged in such 
discrimination to compensate employees.
    On October 16, 1998, authorities arrested and detained for more 
than 3 months the CGSL representative Jean-Remy Nguelany (see Section 
1.d.). Nguelany was denied bail initially but was released due to lack 
of evidence in January 1999.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced labor, and there are no reports that it exists in the adult 
community. The Government also specifically prohibits forced and bonded 
labor by children; however it does not enforce this prohibition 
effectively. Children--in particular immigrant children--are forced to 
work as domestic or agricultural help (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). The 
U.N. Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and other concerned 
organizations reported that government officials might be involved in 
the trafficking of foreign children, mainly for use as domestic or 
agricultural workers.
    The Government cooperated actively with the UNICEF and the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) to combat forced child labor. 
The Government cohosted a regional conference on the problem in 
February and subsequently created an interministerial committee to work 
with UNICEF and the ILO to address the issue. However, critics 
maintained that government efforts were ineffective.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Children below the age of 16 may not work without the 
express consent of the Ministries of Labor, Education, and Public 
Health. These ministries rigorously enforce this law with respect to 
Gabonese children, and there are few citizens under the age of 18 
working in the modern wage sector. A significant number of children 
work in marketplaces or perform domestic duties. These children do not 
go to school, receive only limited medical attention, and often are the 
victims of exploitation by employers or foster families. Laws 
forbidding child labor theoretically extend protection to foreign 
children as well, but abuses often are not reported. Estimates of the 
number of child laborers range between 5,000 and 10,000, but the 
problem is difficult to quantify since most children work in the 
informal sector.
    The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182. It made a 
public commitment in February to eliminate the worst forms of child 
labor; however, the law does not define the worst forms of child labor 
or hazardous work, although the Legal Code stipulates fines and prison 
sentences for violations of the minimum age for working. The Ministry 
of Justice is responsible for implementing and enforcing child labor 
laws and regulations. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor are 
responsible for receiving, investigating, and addressing child labor 
complaints; however, the inspection force is inadequate, complaints are 
not investigated routinely, and violations are not addressed 
adequately. There are no legal remedies available to private persons 
victimized by the worst forms of child labor.
    From February 22 to 24, the Government cohosted a conference on 
child trafficking and exploitative labor in Central and West Africa as 
a cooperative effort between the Government, UNICEF, and the ILO; the 
Ministry of Labor chaired an interministerial committee to follow up on 
the recommendations of the regional conference. The Government also 
participated in a conference in Libreville from April 12 to 14 to 
address the problem of abandoned street children.
    Education is compulsory until age 16 and is generally available, 
through sixth grade. However, there is evidence that fewer than half of 
all secondary-school-age children attended school as of 1996; secondary 
school attendance rates for immigrant children appear likely to be 
lower, although public schools accept immigrant children, and the 
Government encourages them to attend.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but 
does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). 
UNICEF and other concerned organizations reported that government 
officials might be involved in the trafficking of foreign children, 
mainly for use as domestic or agricultural help (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code governs working 
conditions and benefits for all sectors and provides a broad range of 
protection to workers. The code stipulates a 40-hour workweek with a 
minimum rest period of 48 consecutive hours. Employers must compensate 
workers for overtime work. All companies in the modern wage sector pay 
competitive wages and grant generous fringe benefits required by law, 
including maternity leave and 6 weeks of annual paid vacation.
    Traditionally, representatives of labor, management, and the 
Government met annually to examine economic and labor conditions and to 
recommend a minimum wage rate within government guidelines to the 
President, who then issued an annual decree. This procedure has not 
been followed since 1994, in part because the Government was pursuing a 
policy of wage austerity recommended by international financial 
institutions. The monthly minimum wage, excluding benefits provided 
only to some workers, was approximately $93 (64,000 FCFA). Government 
workers receive transportation, housing, and family benefits; however, 
the law does not mandate housing or family benefits for private sector 
workers. Given the high cost of living, the minimum wage does not 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    The Ministry of Health has established occupational health and 
safety standards, but it does not enforce or regulate them effectively. 
The application of labor standards varies greatly from company to 
company and between industries. The Government reportedly does not 
enforce Labor Code provisions in sectors where the bulk of the labor 
force is foreign. Foreigners, both documented and undocumented, may be 
obliged to work under substandard conditions; may be dismissed without 
notice or recourse; or may be mistreated physically, especially in the 
case of illegal aliens. Employers frequently require longer hours of 
work from noncitizen Africans and pay them less, often hiring on a 
short-term, casual basis in order to avoid paying taxes, social 
security contributions, and other benefits. In the formal sector, 
workers may remove themselves from dangerous work situations without 
fear of retribution.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically prohibits 
trafficking in persons, (although authorities have indicated that a 
provision of the Constitution that prohibits endangering the physical 
well-being of a person authorizes the State to prosecute persons who 
commit this abuse), and there were reports of trafficking in children.
    Children (especially girls) reportedly were trafficked into the 
country, primarily from West Africa, for use as domestic or 
agricultural labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). Some of the children 
reportedly suffered sexual abuse. UNICEF and other concerned 
organizations reported that government officials might be involved in 
the trafficking of foreign children, mainly for use as domestic or 
agricultural workers (see Section 6.c.). There were no reports that 
adults were trafficked to, from, through, or within the country during 
the year.
                               __________

                               THE GAMBIA

    The Gambia is ruled by President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh, the former 
chairman of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) that 
seized power in a military coup in 1994, deposing a democratically 
elected government. Jammeh resigned his military commission and was 
elected president in controversial elections in September 1996, which 
observers considered neither free nor fair. Two of the 13 members of 
the current Cabinet are retired army officers who were Jammeh's allies 
during or immediately following the coup, and security forces continue 
to exert strong influence in the Government. In January 1997, the 
Constitution of the Second Republic came into effect, restoring formal 
constitutional government, and citizens chose a National Assembly in 
elections, the results of which generally were accepted by the 
opposition. Jammeh's party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation 
and Construction (APRC), won 33 of the 45 assembly seats filled by 
election. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; 
however, the judiciary, especially at lower levels, reportedly is 
subject at times to executive branch pressure, although the courts have 
demonstrated their independence on occasion.
    The Gambian National Army (GNA) reports to the Secretary of State 
for Defense (who is now the President). The police report to the 
Secretary of State for the Interior. The National Intelligence Agency 
(NIA), established in 1995 by government decree, reports directly to 
the President but is otherwise autonomous. Members of the security 
forces committed serious human rights abuses.
    The rapidly growing population of 1.384 million is divided between 
a rural majority and a growing urban minority. Much of the population 
is engaged in subsistence farming. The country's farmers, a majority of 
whom are women, grow rice, millet, corn, and groundnuts (the country's 
primary export crop). The private sector is led by tourism, trading, 
and fisheries. The high population growth rate has diluted the positive 
effects of modest economic expansion. Per capita gross domestic product 
is estimated to be $240, a decline from recent levels partly due to 
currency depreciation.
    The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and it 
continued to commit serious abuses. President Jammeh's dominance and 
restrictions on opposition parties continued. In practice citizens do 
not have an effective right to change their government. Security forces 
committed some extrajudicial killings and beat or otherwise mistreated 
detainees and prisoners. Prison conditions remained very poor. Security 
forces arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens, particularly 
opposition politicians and journalists; some of the detainees alleged 
harsh treatment while being arrested and detained. The courts 
reportedly are subject to executive branch pressure, particularly at 
lower levels, although magistrates occasionally demonstrated some 
independence by ruling against the Government. There were reports of 
political prisoners. The Government at times infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights. The Government significantly limited freedom of speech 
and of the press through intimidation and fear. Journalists practice 
self-censorship. The Government restricted freedom of assembly and 
association. The opposition United Democratic Party (UDP) was 
repeatedly attacked at political rallies by agents of the allegedly 
disbanded progovernment July 22 youth movement. The Government denied 
the UDP party permits to hold rallies at several times throughout the 
year. The Government at times limited freedom of movement. Violence and 
discrimination against women persisted. The practice of female genital 
mutilation (FGM) is widespread and entrenched. Child labor was a 
problem, and there were some instances of child prostitution.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated killings; however, on occasion, 
security forces committed extrajudicial killings.
    On March 9, Ebrima Barry, a student, died after being taken into 
custody and reportedly beaten by fire department personnel. Security 
forces killed at least 14 persons during student riots on April 10 and 
11 to protest the death of the student (see Section 2.b.). Security 
forces shot and killed Omar Barrow, a journalist and Red Cross 
volunteer, while he was working at the Red Cross facility to assist 
wounded demonstrators. Despite the Government's initial insistence that 
security forces did not use live ammunition to suppress the riot, 
student victims and other witnesses alleged otherwise. A government 
commission of inquiry reportedly concluded that the Police Intervention 
Unit (PIU) officers were ``largely responsible'' for many of the deaths 
and other injuries. The inquiry also revealed that five soldiers of the 
2nd Infantry Battalion were responsible for the deaths of two students 
at Brikama. The Government stated that the report implicated several 
PIU officers in the students'' deaths and injuries. The official 
coroner's report and commission of inquiry report were not publicized 
widely by the Government. Three police officers at Brikama were found 
to have unlawfully searched, arrested, and detained people there. At 
year's end, no action had been taken against those responsible for the 
shootings (see Section 1.d.).
    On January 15, soldiers shot and killed two military personnel whom 
they were trying to arrest for allegedly attempting to overthrow the 
Government (see Section 1.d.).
    In January 1999, rebels allegedly belonging to the Movement of 
Democratic Forces for the Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal crossed the 
border and attacked the village of Gambissara, killing two persons. On 
January 16, police arrested three alleged members of the MFDC; however, 
at year's end, the Government had taken no further action in the case.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture or inhuman or degrading 
punishment; however, security forces sometimes beat or otherwise 
mistreated detainees and prisoners. There also were reports that 
security forces beat military and security detainees, and that security 
prisoners sometimes are threatened with summary execution.
    Security forces beat several dozen persons including school 
children during the April 10 and 11 student demonstrations (see 
Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 2.a.). Many detained students claimed that 
armed soldiers beat them with gun butts and iron cables. One student 
detained at the army barracks claimed that he and other students were 
abused and harassed while in detention. Credible witnesses reported 
seeing elementary-school age children released from custody with severe 
bruises, bleeding cuts, and shaved heads, and stripped of their 
clothes. Other witnesses reported that a mother, attempting to see her 
child at the Kairaba police station, was beaten severely with a rifle 
butt. The students were protesting the death of a student on March 9 
while in custody of fire department personnel and the alleged early 
April rape of a girl by an unidentified man in uniform, whom many 
believed to be a member of the Government's security forces.
    On January 15, Ousman Ceesay, a freelance reporter, claimed to have 
suffered rough treatment and threats by soldiers in Banjul for 
interviewing a soldier at the site of an exchange of gunfire between 
soldiers and units of the State House Guards.
    In May a journalist from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
reported that he was arrested, detained, beaten, and denied medical 
treatment by immigration authorities (see Section 1.d.).
    Armed soldiers at times harassed and detained citizens and 
foreigners at gunpoint, particularly at the Denton Bridge checkpoint 
outside of Banjul (see Section 2.d.).
    No action was taken in the 1999 case when police allegedly severely 
beat and tortured an opposition politician who was arrested and 
detained for 2 days. There were no developments in the promised 
investigation of the detention and torture of eight UDP officials in 
1997. At the time of the incident, the Government promised a full 
investigation and appropriate action by the Attorney General. Since the 
incident, police investigators have interviewed some witnesses, but 
some victims have said that they have not been contacted. No one has 
been arrested, and no results of the investigation have been made 
public.
    Conditions at Mile 2, Janjanbureh, and Jeshwang prisons remained 
very poor. Mile 2 prison was reported to be grim, overcrowded, and 
lacking in medical facilities. Prisoners were locked in their cells for 
over 20 hours each day. There were credible reports of beatings, 
malnourishment, and other harsh treatment of political, military, and 
security detainees. Women are housed separately; juveniles are housed 
with adults.
    Conditions in one representative local jail reportedly were 
unsanitary and overcrowded. Inmates slept on cement benches or on the 
floor without blankets. There was one water tap in the cell area but 
often no water. Police are reluctant to terminate fistfights between 
prisoners until the dispute is settled, and many of the prisoners are 
injured.
    Local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) generally are permitted 
to visit prisons upon request. A member of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Prisons 
and Conditions of Detention in Africa visited the three prisons during 
the year. The International Committee of the Red Cross visited local 
prisons several times during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
includes provisions to protect against arbitrary arrest and detention; 
however, on occasion, security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained 
citizens. Periods of detention ranged from a few hours to several days.
    The Government has not revoked formally military decrees enacted 
prior to the current Constitution that give the NIA and the Secretary 
of State for Interior broad power to detain individuals indefinitely 
without charge if ``in the interest of national security.'' The 
Constitution provides that decrees remain in effect unless inconsistent 
with constitutional provisions. These detention decrees appear to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution, but they have not yet been subject 
to judicial challenge. The Government has stated that it no longer 
enforces these decrees; however, in some instances, the Government did 
not respect the constitutional requirement that detainees be brought 
before a court within 72 hours.
    In January military officials arrested and detained Lieutenant 
Landing Sanneh and at least 10 other military personnel accused of 
attempting to overthrow the Government on January 15. Lieutenant Almamo 
Manneh and Corporal Momodou Dumbuya, also implicated in the alleged 
plot, were shot and killed by soldiers who were trying to apprehend 
them. The treason hearing of Lieutenant Sanneh opened on May 12 at the 
High Court, but the other detained soldiers were not brought before a 
military or civilian court by year's end. In September the army 
announced that some of the soldiers who had been detained at the Yundum 
Barracks in connection with the January 15 alleged coup were released 
and returned to active duty. At year's end, at least one soldier, the 
alleged coup leader, was still detained without charge.
    On February 4, police arrested Momodou Wallom Jallow, an 
independent National Assembly member, in his constituency in Niamina 
district and detained him at the NIA headquarters in Banjul for 4 days 
without charge. Jallow's political opponents allegedly reported him to 
the police for making favorable comments regarding the alleged coup 
attempt.
    In April police arrested five UDP activists of Tambakoto village, 
North Bank Division and detained them at the Janjanburay prison for 
several days following a fight with the village head, who subsequently 
seized their farm lands (see Section 1.f.). The five claimed wrongful 
arrest and detention, and complained about poor prison conditions and 
inadequate food (see Section 1.c.).
    Following a demonstration on April 10 (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 
2.b.), security forces arrested hundreds of students and detained them 
at police stations, military barracks, and the NIA headquarters between 
April 10 and 15. Some students were held incommunicado for over 72 
hours, often with little food or water. Student leaders were held for 
longer periods; some were held over 2 weeks. Parents were denied access 
to their children. On May 18 the Supreme Court ordered the release of 
all students. One student detained at the army barracks claimed that he 
and other students were abused and harassed while in detention. 
Credible witnesses report seeing elementary-school age children 
released from custody with severe bruises, bleeding cuts, and shaved 
heads, and stripped of their clothes.
    On April 12, police arrested a UDP National Assembly member, Buba 
Samura, in Brikama while he was traveling to Banjul. He was detained 
incommunicado at the Brikama Police station for several days without 
charge. Allegedly Samura was arrested after he was overheard commending 
the students for their actions during the April 10 and 11 
demonstrations and stating that President Jammeh's misrule caused the 
riots.
    In May Mohamad Mboyo, a visiting journalist from the DRC, reported 
that he was arrested unlawfully and detained for more than 24 hours by 
the police. Mboyo was arrested by an immigration officer at the Banjul 
ferry terminal and accused of ``being a Nigerian'' despite his 
identification papers to the contrary. He allegedly was beaten, 
detained, and denied medical treatment.
    On June 17, during a country-wide political campaign, UDP leader 
Ousainou Darboe, 80 UDP supporters, and journalist Madi Ceesay were 
detained at the Basse police station for 3 days following a clash 
between supporters of the ruling APRC and the UDP in which an APRC 
supporter allegedly was killed. Police denied the UDP party permits to 
hold rallies in Upper River Division after the incident. Darboe, 24 UDP 
supporters, and Ceesay were charged with the murder of the APRC 
supporter Alieu Njie. The Supreme Court dismissed the charges against 
19 UDP members and journalist Madi Ceesay in October; however, the 
murder charge against UDP leader Darboe and 4 of his closest associates 
remained in effect, and Darboe's trial began on November 1. No decision 
had been made on the case by year's end.
    Between June 22 and 23, security agents arrested and detained four 
civilians (Ebrima Yabo, Ebrima Barrow, Momodou Marenah, Modou Saho) and 
two security officers (lieutenants Lalo Jaiteh and Omar Darboe) on 
suspicion of attempting to violate state security. Persons claiming to 
be security forces abducted the civilians from their homes; initially, 
both the NIA and police denied knowledge of their arrests and 
detentions. After 3 weeks of complaints by their families, the 
Inspector General of Police revealed that the four civilians and two 
security officers had been arraigned before a Magistrates'' Court on 
July 14 on charges of treason. According to their attorneys, the 
accused were not charged within the constitutionally required 72 hours. 
At year's end, some of the individuals were released, but others 
continued to be detained pending a trial.
    In June army and NIA officers arrested, detained, and held 
incommunicado a local employee of a foreign embassy. He was questioned 
for 2 days in regard to his official duties and ultimately released 
without charge.
    On July 25, the police arrested the editor in chief and a 
journalist from the Independent newspaper and detained them at the 
Banjul police station for reporting on a hunger strike at Mile 2 Prison 
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
    On September 2, police arrested Omar Kebba Mass, a UDP National 
Assembly member, and 16 UDP supporters and detained them at the 
Mansaknoko police station for approximately 13 hours without charge. 
The UDP officials allegedly were detained because of a fight with APRC 
supporters at a football match; the APRC supporters were not detained.
    In January charges of ``libel against the President'' were dropped 
for three journalists from The Independent newspaper.
    Police arrested and detained several opposition militants. Three 
opposition National Assembly members and supporters were arrested and 
detained during the year, some for more than 72 hours, without charge.
    The Government did not use forced exile; however, former President 
Jawara remains outside the country under threat of arrest and detention 
on corruption charges if he returns. Other senior officials of the 
former government, for example, Vice President Saihou Sabally and 
Secretary General Abdou Sara Janha, also remained outside the country, 
but do not face official charges.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary reportedly is subject at 
times to executive branch pressure, especially at the lower levels. The 
courts nevertheless have demonstrated their independence on several 
occasions, at times in significant cases. For example, following the 
April riots, the Supreme Court ruled that the continued detention of 
Gambia Student Union leaders was illegal. Also the Supreme Court 
required that chieftaincy elections be held in the Saami district in 
November, ruling that a presidentially appointed chief was installed 
unconstitutionally following the President's dismissal of the previous 
chief.
    In 1997 the Court of Appeal, the country's highest court, 
overturned the treason convictions and death sentences of four men who 
led an abortive coup in November 1996. The Government has appealed this 
decision to the Privy Council in London, but at year's end, the case 
was pending before the Supreme Court.
    The judicial system comprises the Court of Appeal, high courts, 
eight magistrate's courts and a Supreme Court, which began operations 
in 1999. Village chiefs preside over local courts at the village level.
    The judicial system recognizes customary, Shari'a, and general law. 
Customary law covers marriage and divorce for non-Muslims, inheritance, 
land tenure, tribal and clan leadership, and all other traditional and 
social relations. Shari'a law is observed primarily in Muslim marriage 
and divorce matters. General law, following the English model, applies 
to felonies, misdemeanors in urban areas, and the formal business 
sector. Trials are public, and defendants have the right to an attorney 
at their own cost.
    Persons have been held extended periods without trial. For example, 
Suwandi Camara was arrested in Senegal in March 1997 and extradited to 
the Gambia in July 1997. Subsequently, he was interrogated by the NIA 
and taken to Mile 2 prison; no charge was brought against him, and in 
December the Government objected to his request for bail. However, on 
December 14, the High Court ruled that Camara's arrest and continued 
detention was unlawful and unconstitutional, and it ordered his 
immediate and unconditional release.
    The 1998 trial of three men accused of complicity in a July 1997 
coup attempt concluded in October 1998 with the conviction of treason 
of the three; they were sentenced to death. Their appeals of the 
convictions were pending at year's end.
    The junta that took power in 1994 appointed four commissions to 
investigate individuals and organizations suspected of corruption 
during the First Republic. These commissions had powers similar to a 
grand jury, with additional authority to recommend the seizure of 
assets, to imprison and fine for contempt, and to imprison or demand 
bond from individuals considered likely to abscond. The commissions 
were closed in December 1999; however, no findings were made public by 
year's end.
    There are reports of a small number of political prisoners, 
including the former AFPRC vice chairman, Lieutenant Sana Sabally, held 
at Mile 2 prison in Banjul. International and domestic human rights 
organizations were not permitted access to these individuals.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such abuses; however, 
although the Government generally respects these prohibitions, in 
practice there were some exceptions. The Government has not canceled 
Decree 45, which abrogates Constitutional safeguards against arbitrary 
search and permits search and seizure of property without due process. 
This decree remains formally in effect, pending a judicial finding that 
the decree is inconsistent with the Constitution. In practice the 
Government appears not to enforce it, but no court case has been 
brought to test the decree's constitutionality.
    Observers assume that the Government monitors citizens possibly 
engaged in activity that it deems objectionable. In the past, 
surveillance included monitoring of telephones and mail. In previous 
years, investigating commissions made findings resulting in the 
forfeiture of private property, principally that property held by 
former government and parastatal officials. The work of these 
commissions, which began under the AFPRC regime, is sanctioned under 
the Constitution with provisions for due process; however, it is not 
clear that the full rights of due process were accorded to officials 
investigated by the commissions before the Constitution took effect. 
The evidentiary standards applied by the commissions in ordering the 
forfeiture of money and property are not clear, and orders by the 
commissions have not yet been subject to effective judicial review.
    Following the student demonstrations, security forces undertook a 
search to arrest students suspected of participating in the 
demonstrations (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
    The Government restricted the right to transfer funds or assets of 
most senior officials of the former Jawara government accused of 
corruption.
    In April the Tambakoto village head illegally seized the land of 
five UDP activists; by year's end, the lands had not been returned.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and the press; however, in practice, the Government 
significantly limited the full exercise of these freedoms by using 
intimidation, police pressure, regulatory scrutiny, and laws that 
inhibit the media. The Government also employed arrest, detention, and 
interrogation to intimidate journalists and newspapers that published 
articles that it considered inaccurate or sensitive (see Section 1.d.). 
As a result, journalists practice a significant degree of self-
censorship.
    In January President Jammeh dropped the libel charges against the 
Independent Newspaper's editor in chief Baba Galleh Jallow, managing 
editor Alhagie Yoro Jallow, and a journalist. The Independent staff 
were arrested and charged for ``libel against the President'' following 
an article they wrote in December 1999 that questioned the stability of 
Jammeh's marriage. However, the editors of The Independent claimed that 
the Government continued to harass and intimidate their staff and 
families after the charges were dropped. On June 20, immigration 
officers questioned Baba Galleh Jallow and Alhagie Yoro Jallow 
regarding their citizenship. On July 25, Baba Galleh Jallow and 
reporter Alhagie Mbye were taken to Banjul Police headquarters and 
detained for 7 hours because of an article that they published 
regarding a hunger strike at Mile 2 prison (see Section 1.c.).
    In July President Jammeh threatened to discharge the staff of the 
state-owned Gambia Radio because he suspected them of being opposition 
sympathizers. Jammeh made the threat during a meeting with APRC youth 
wing members on the anniversary of the July 22 coup that brought him to 
power. He claimed that members of the Radio Gambia staff misrepresented 
his speeches in their news bulletins, and he warned that anybody ``bent 
on disturbing the peace and stability of the nation will be buried 6 
feet deep''. Private journalists and the general public condemned 
Jammeh's threat and accused him of intimidating journalists of the 
public radio and television.
    Decrees 70 and 71, enacted in 1996, remained in effect and 
continued to inhibit free reporting. The decrees require all newspapers 
to post a $6,500 (100,000 Dalasis) bond or cease publication. The bond 
is required to ensure payment of any penalties imposed by a court for 
the publication of blasphemous or seditious articles or other libel. 
State-owned publications are not subject to these decrees. The 
possession and distribution of documents deemed to be ``political 
literature'' also is barred by decree. These decrees and the fear of 
reprisals and government action have had a chilling effect on the 
press. Although still independent, the nongovernment press practices a 
significant degree of self-censorship. However, strong criticism of the 
Government was frequent, and opposition views appeared in the 
independent press. English, French, and other foreign newspapers and 
magazines were available.
    Radio broadcasts from the government station and private stations 
normally reach listeners in the eastern part of the country. Private 
radio stations simulcast news provided by Radio Gambia, the government 
station. Only one private radio station produced independent news 
broadcasts throughout the year. In 1998 the Kanifing Magistrates Court 
seized the independent Citizen FM radio station and its equipment for 
failure to pay licensing fees. On July 3, the High Court ruled that the 
Government had seized Citizen FM radio station wrongly and ordered that 
the station's assets be returned to the station's proprietor. The 
station resumed broadcasting in October. Occasionally there were public 
affairs broadcasts on at least two independent radio stations. The 
British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio France International, and other 
foreign news reports sometimes are rebroadcast by local stations, and 
all are available via shortwave radio. Senegalese television and radio 
are available in many parts of the country. Wealthy residents also used 
television satellite systems for independent news coverage.
    On August 10, a group of unidentified arsonists attempted to burn 
the private radio station, Radio 1 FM. Owner George Christensen, a 
radio announcer, and a watchman were injured while trying to extinguish 
the fire. Christensen reported that he had been alerted 2 days earlier 
that some persons were planning to attack the radio station, and he had 
informed a senior army officer about the matter. On August 14, a group 
of unidentified persons again attempted to burn the house of a Radio 1 
announcer.
    Government radio and television gave very limited coverage to 
opposition activities, including statements by opposition 
parliamentarians in the National Assembly. In most other respects, the 
state media served as propaganda instruments for the Government and its 
supporters.
    There was convenient, inexpensive Internet access through Internet 
cafes and private accounts. The Government did not restrict Internet 
access or operation.
    There were no reports of any government restrictions on academic 
freedom. There is one national college, a university extension program, 
and several smaller, private, postsecondary educational institutions.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricted 
this right in practice. The authorities interfered with efforts by the 
principal opposition party, the UDP, to organize public meetings.
    On April 10, Gambia Student Union members attempted to hold a 
peaceful demonstration to protest the alleged mishandling of the 
investigation into the death of a student while in the custody of fire 
officers (see Section 1.a.). The students also were protesting the 
alleged rape of a 13-year old school girl by an unidentified man in 
uniform (see Section 1.c.). When police attempted to stop the 
demonstration, the student demonstrators burned tires and threw stones. 
In response security forces used live ammunition against the students, 
killing and injuring many students and arrested hundreds of students 
(see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.).
    In June and July, the Government denied the UDP permits to hold 
rallies following a clash between a group of former-July 22 APRC 
Movement members and UDP supporters on June 17. The UDP was blamed for 
violating conditions of the Public Order Act by using abusive words 
against government authorities and individuals at public rallies. 
However, after July the UDP held several rallies in the greater Banjul 
area without government intervention.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice. Decree 89 banned from 
political activity three major opposition political parties, and all 
former presidents, vice presidents, and ministers until 2024. The 
decree's penalty of life imprisonment for an individual or a $65,000 (1 
million Dalasis) fine for an organization considerably restricts 
political activity (see Section 3). Despite the fact that the decree 
apparently conflicts with provisions of the Constitution, it has not 
been challenged in court. The severe penalties for violating the decree 
have inhibited political challenge, since most cases would have to be 
brought by a person who violated the decree. The three banned major 
parties have not resumed activity nor have the various political 
figures covered under the ban done so.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    In May 1998, the imam of the largest mosque in Brikama was arrested 
together with a leading opposition party politician and eight others in 
a dispute over minor construction work at a mosque that reportedly was 
financed by supporters of the ruling party. In February 1999, the High 
Court acquitted all of the defendants of destruction of property and 
discharged the case. However, the Government filed an appeal in the 
High Court for the imam and three others to be retried. The imam's 
lawyer filed a writ of summons in the High Court, which ruled that it 
had no jurisdiction over the matter and referred the case to a district 
tribunal. Subsequently, the case was filed at the Court of Appeal, but 
the case was adjourned until April. At year's end, it had not been 
heard. In November the imam was reinstated at the Brikama mosque and 
was leading prayers.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement but allows for ``reasonable restrictions,'' and there were 
instances in which the Government restricted this right. Following the 
alleged January 15 coup attempt, armed soldiers harassed and detained 
citizens and foreigners at the Denton Bridge checkpoint for not 
carrying their identification cards. However, the Army Chief of Staff, 
at a press conference on January 19, apologized to the victims and 
called on the public to understand that the soldiers only were 
conducting their duties for security reasons. There were no reported 
harassments and detentions thereafter.
    The authorities prohibited those under investigation for corruption 
or security matters from leaving the country. A few politicians 
associated with the opposition UDP also were denied passports, although 
they were not facing corruption or security charges. The leader of the 
opposition UDP and other opposition figures have traveled outside the 
country without incident.
    The law does not provide for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government 
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. 
Although there was no available estimate of the numbers involved, the 
Government provides first asylum and provided it to persons from 
Senegal and Guinea-Bissau during the year. The Government works with 
the UNHCR and local NGO's in processing refugee claims. The country 
hosts approximately 8,000 refugees from Sierra Leone, Senegal, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, and other countries. The Government continued to host 
approximately 3,500 Senegalese refugees from the troubled Casamance 
region. There were no further UNHCR repatriations to the Casamance as 
in previous years.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons with a valid 
claim to refugee status to a country where they feared persecution.
    There were reports that on occasion, immigration authorities 
harassed and detained immigrants and others (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 
and 2.a.).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Despite a new Constitution and legislative elections in 1997, 
citizens still do not have an effective right to change their 
government in practice. Citizens attempted to exercise this right in 
presidential elections in 1996; however, the few international 
observers who were present noted serious problems in the electoral 
process. Foreign governments criticized the election as not being free 
and fair, primarily because of government intimidation, restrictions 
imposed by the Government on opposition campaign efforts, and limited 
access to the government-owned media prior to the election.
    Government-owned media continued to deny news coverage and other 
access to opposition politicians and engaged in a number of other 
practices that restricted political activity (see Section 2.a.). The 
Government frequently refused to authorize opposition meetings (see 
Section 2.b.). Decree 89 bans three former political parties and all 
persons who held the offices of president, vice president, and minister 
since 1965 from involvement in politics until 2024 (see Section 2.b.). 
Although Decree 89 apparently is unconstitutional, it has not been 
challenged in the courts and remained in effect. The severe penalties 
for violating the decree have inhibited challenge, since most cases 
would have to be brought by a person who violated the decree.
    In January 1997, the Constitution of the Second Republic came into 
effect, and citizens chose a new National Assembly in elections whose 
results were accepted by the opposition. President Jammeh's party, the 
Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) won 33 of 
45 assembly seats filled by election; 4 members are appointed by the 
President. Procedural methods are used to restrict debate within the 
National Assembly.
    The Constitution provides for the democratic election of the 
President every 5 years. National Assembly elections are held 3 months 
after the presidential elections. Presidential elections are scheduled 
for 2001. Local elections originally scheduled for 1998 were postponed; 
no new date has been fixed yet.
    There are no legal obstacles to the participation of women in 
government; however, they are underrepresented in government and 
politics. One of the 45 members of the National Assembly is a woman. 
The Vice President (who is also Minister of Women's Affairs) is a 
woman, and there are two female ministers in the Cabinet.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are several organizations whose mandates provide for human 
rights monitoring. The AFPRC's Decree 81 of 1996 requires NGO's to 
register with the National Advisory Council, which has the authority to 
deny, suspend, or cancel the right of any NGO to operate (including 
that of international NGO's). However, the Government did not take 
action against any NGO's during the year.
    There are three major organizations whose primary mandate is the 
promotion of human rights--the International Society for Human Rights 
(ISHRA), the African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies 
(ACDHRS), and the Institute for Human Rights and Development (IHRD). 
Both the ISHRA and the ACDHRS have conducted training in democratic 
rights and civic education. The IHRD focuses principally on the 
operations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, an 
organ of the Organization of African Unity based in Banjul. Other human 
rights groups included the African Society of International and 
Comparative Law with two-full time staff members and the Foundation for 
Research on Women's Health, Productivity, and the Environment organized 
in 1991 to work on issues pertaining to woman's health and productivity 
with two full-time staff working on FGM.
    In May 1999, President Jammeh appointed the first government 
ombudsman as required in the Constitution. On May 3, 1999, the National 
Assembly approved the appointment. During the year, the office of the 
ombudsman began operations and was charged with investigating 
allegations of maladministration, mismanagement, or discrimination; 
however, it did not take significant action in these areas.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, disability, language, or social status, and the Government 
generally respects these prohibitions.
    Women.--Domestic violence, including abuse, is a problem; it is 
reported occasionally, and its occurrence is believed to be common. 
Police tend to consider these incidents to be domestic issues outside 
of their ordinary jurisdiction. Rape and assault are crimes under the 
law; rape is not common. The law does not differentiate between married 
and unmarried women in this regard. Sexual harassment is not believed 
to be widespread, although individual instances have been noted.
    Traditional views of women's roles result in extensive societal 
discrimination in education and employment. Employment in the formal 
sector is open to women at the same salary rates as men. No statutory 
discrimination exists in other kinds of employment; however, women 
generally are employed in endeavors such as food vending or subsistence 
farming.
    Shari'a law usually is applied in divorce and inheritance matters 
for Muslims, who make up approximately 90 percent of the population. 
Women normally receive a lower proportion of assets distributed through 
inheritance than do male relatives.
    Marriages often are arranged and, depending on the ethnic group, 
polygyny is practiced. Women in polygynous unions have property and 
other rights arising from the marriage. They have the option to 
divorce, but not a legal right to approve or be notified in advance of 
subsequent marriages.
    Active women's rights groups exist; they are focused primarily on 
economic issues and the elimination of female genital mutilation (FGM).
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare. The 
Department of Education and the Department of Health, Social Welfare, 
and Women's Affairs are the two most generously funded departments. 
However, the lack of resources limits state provision of both education 
and health services.
    The Constitution mandates free compulsory primary education, but 
the state of the educational infrastructure prevents effective 
compulsory education. However, in February 1998, the President 
announced an end to fees for the first 6 years of schooling, and the 
Government has implemented the decision. Opportunities for secondary 
education are more limited. The participation of girls in education is 
very low. Females constitute about 40 percent of primary school 
students and roughly one-third of high school students. The enrollment 
of girls is particularly low in rural areas where a combination of 
poverty and socio-cultural factors influence parents' decisions not to 
send girls to school.
    The care and welfare of children in distress is considered 
primarily a family responsibility. In cases of divorce, the Department 
of Social Welfare attempts to require periodic financial support by 
fathers; however, there is no criminal prosecution when fathers fail to 
provide financial support.
    Authorities generally intervene when cases of child abuse or 
mistreatment are brought to their attention; however, there is no 
societal pattern of abuse against children. Any person who has carnal 
knowledge of a girl under the age of 16 is guilty of a felony (except 
in the case of marriage, which can be as early as 12 years of age; 
incest is also illegal. These laws generally are enforced. Serious 
cases of abuse and violence against children are subject to criminal 
penalties.
    There are a few instances of child street begging. The tourist 
industry has stimulated a low level of child prostitution, which is 
prosecuted vigorously. In rural areas, most children assist their 
families in farm and housework. In urban areas, many children work as 
street vendors or taxi and bus assistants (see Section 6.d.).
    The practice of female genital mutilation, which is widely 
condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical 
and psychological health, is widespread and entrenched. Reports place 
the number of women having been subjected to FGM at between 60 and 90 
percent. Seven of the nine major ethnic groups practice FGM at ages 
varying from shortly after birth until 16 years old. In recent years, 
the Government publicly has supported efforts to eradicate FGM and 
discourages FGM through health education; however, the Government has 
not passed legislation against FGM, and FGM is not considered a 
criminal act. In February 1999, President Jammeh stated publicly that 
the Government would not ban FGM, and that FGM is a part of the 
country's culture.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no statutes or regulations 
requiring accessibility for the disabled. No legal discrimination 
against the physically disabled exists in employment, education, or 
other state services. Severely disabled individuals subsist primarily 
through private charity. Less severely disabled individuals are 
accepted fully in society, and they encounter no discrimination in 
employment for which they are physically capable.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Labor Act, which applies to 
all workers except civil servants, specifies that workers are free to 
form associations, including trade unions, and provides for their 
registration with the Government. It specifically prohibits police 
officers and military personnel, as well as other civil service 
employees, from forming unions or striking. About 20 percent of the 
work force is employed in the modern wage sector, where unions are most 
active. Approximately 30,000 workers are union members, constituting 
about 10 percent of the work force. The country became a full member of 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1995; however, it has not 
ratified any ILO conventions.
    The Gambian Worker's Confederation and the Gambian Workers' Union 
(GWU) are the two main independent and competing umbrella 
organizations. The Government recognizes both organizations.
    The Labor Act authorizes strikes but requires that unions give the 
Commissioner of Labor 14 days' written notice before beginning an 
industrial action (28 days for essential services). It prohibits 
retribution against strikers who comply with the law regulating 
strikes. Upon application by an employer to a court, the court may 
prohibit industrial action that is ruled to be in pursuit of a 
political objective. The court also may forbid action judged to be in 
breach of a collectively agreed procedure for settlement of industrial 
disputes. Because of these provisions and the weakness of unions, few 
strikes occur.
    In July there was a brief strike for higher wages at a Banjul soft-
drink factory; the strike was resolved, but details of the settlement 
were not disclosed.
    Unions and union confederations may affiliate internationally, and 
there were no restrictions on union members' participation in 
international labor activities. The GWU is a member of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1990 Labor 
Act allows workers to organize and bargain collectively. Although trade 
unions are small and fragmented, collective bargaining takes place. 
Each recognized union has guidelines for its activities specified by 
the appropriate industrial council established and empowered by the 
Labor Act. Union members' wages exceeded legal minimums and are 
determined by collective bargaining, arbitration, or agreements reached 
between unions and management after insuring that the agreements are in 
compliance with labor law. No denial of registration has been reported. 
The act also sets minimum contract standards for hiring, training, 
terms of employment, and provides that contracts may not prohibit union 
membership. Employers may not fire or discriminate against members of 
registered unions for engaging in legal union activities.
    The Government established an export processing zone (EPZ) at the 
port of Banjul and the adjacent bonded warehouses. Several companies, 
including peanut oil exporters, began operation in the EPZ in August.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The 
law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by children; 
however, it is not known to occur. Most children performing customary 
chores or who are engaged in petty trading do so as a part of an 
extended family (see Section 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The statutory minimum age for employment is 18 years. 
There is no effective compulsory education, and because of limited 
secondary school openings, most children complete formal education by 
age 14 and then begin work. Employee labor cards, which include a 
person's age, are registered with the Labor Commissioner, but 
enforcement inspections rarely take place. Child labor protection does 
not extend to youth performing customary chores on family farms or 
engaged in petty trading. In rural areas, most children assisted their 
families in farming and housework. In urban areas, many children worked 
as street vendors or taxi and bus assistants. The tourist industry has 
stimulated a low level of child prostitution (see Section 5).
    On November 8, the National Assembly approved ILO Convention 182 on 
the worst forms of child labor; however, as of year's end, the 
Government had not completed formal ratification procedures. The 
Department of State for Labor is responsible for implementing the terms 
of the convention.
    The law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by 
children; however, such practices are not known to occur (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages and working hours 
are established by law through six joint industrial councils: Commerce; 
Artisans; Transport; Port Operations; Agriculture; and Fisheries. 
Labor, management, and the Government are represented on these 
councils. The lowest minimum wage is about $0.80 (12 Dalasis) per day 
for unskilled labor. This minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Only 20 percent of 
the labor force, essentially those workers in the formal economic 
sector, are covered by the minimum wage law. The majority of workers 
are employed privately or are self-employed, often in agriculture. Most 
citizens do not live on a single worker's earnings, but they share 
resources within extended families.
    The basic legal workweek is 48 hours within a period not to exceed 
6 consecutive days. A 30-minute lunch break is mandated. Nationwide, 
the workweek includes 4 8-hour workdays and 2 4-hour workdays (Friday 
and Saturday). Government employees are entitled to 1 month of paid 
annual leave after 1 year of service. Private sector employees receive 
between 14 and 30 days of paid annual leave, depending on length of 
service.
    The Labor Act specifies safety equipment that an employer must 
provide to employees working in designated occupations. The Factory Act 
authorizes the Ministry of Labor to regulate factory health and safety, 
accident prevention, and dangerous trades, and the Ministry is 
authorized to appoint inspectors to ensure compliance with safety 
standards. Enforcement was inconsistent due to insufficient and 
inadequately trained staff. Workers may demand protective equipment and 
clothing for hazardous workplaces and have recourse to the Labor 
Department. Workers may refuse to work in dangerous situations without 
risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, through, or within the country.
                               __________

                                 GHANA

    Ghana is a constitutional republic dominated by a strong 
presidency. Flight Lieutenant (ret.) Jerry John Rawlings ruled the 
country for 19 years after taking power in 1981. He became the first 
President of the Fourth Republic following controversial elections in 
1992. These elections ended 11 years of authoritarian rule under 
Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), which had 
seized power from an elected government in 1981. Six opposition parties 
and the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) contested the 
presidential and parliamentary elections in December which, despite a 
few incidents of intimidation and election fraud, domestic and 
international observers judged generally free and fair. The largest 
opposition party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), won 100 seats out of 
the 200 seats in Parliament. The NDC, President Rawlings'' party, won 
92 seats; independents and 2 smaller opposition parties won 8 seats. On 
December 28, the NPP candidate John Agyekum Kufuor became president-
elect with 56.7 percent of the vote. He was scheduled to assume office 
on January 7, 2001. The Constitution calls for a system of checks and 
balances, with an executive branch headed by the President, a 
unicameral parliament, an independent judiciary, and several autonomous 
commissions, such as the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ). In reality this system of checks and balances under 
President Rawlings has been circumscribed by a parliament dominated by 
the President's party, a hesitant judicial service, and a system-wide 
lack of resources that hobbled the effectiveness of all three branches. 
The presence of a significant number of opposition parliamentarians has 
led to increased scrutiny of the Government's activities. In 1998 in 
peaceful elections, voters elected new district assembly 
representatives and, for the first time, unit committee members to 
complete the local government structure outlined in the Constitution. 
The judiciary appears subject to executive influence on occasion and 
lacks adequate resources.
    Several security organizations report to various government 
departments. The police, under the jurisdiction of an eightmember 
Police Council, are responsible for maintaining law and order. A 
separate department, the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), 
handles cases considered critical to state security and answers 
directly to the executive branch. Although the security apparatus is 
controlled by and responsive to the Government, the monitoring, 
supervision, and education of the police in particular remain poor. 
Police and other security forces committed some serious human rights 
abuses.
    The economy remains dependent on agriculture, with about 41 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP) and 59 percent of employment derived 
from this sector, according to government statistics. Gold, cocoa, and 
timber are the traditional sources of export earnings, although cocoa 
and gold revenues fell due to the drop in the prices of these 
commodities on the world market. Tourism is the third largest foreign 
exchange earner. Service sector growth outpaced both agriculture and 
industry, according to an International Labor Organization (ILO) study 
released in September 1999. The economy grew at a rate of 3.0 percent, 
down from 4.4 percent in 1999, due to the fall in the world price of 
gold and cocoa and the increase in the price of crude oil. Inflation 
increased from 14 percent to 40 percent. Per capita GDP remained at 
approximately $400.
    The Government's human rights record was poor in a number of areas; 
although there were significant improvements in several areas, some 
serious problems remained. Police use of excessive force resulted in 
some extrajudicial killings and injuries, although fewer than in 
previous years. There continued to be credible reports that members of 
the police beat prisoners and other citizens, and that police and some 
elements of the military arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. 
Police corruption was a problem. Prison conditions remained extremely 
harsh, and prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. Inadequate 
resources and a system vulnerable to political and economic influence 
compromised the integrity of the overburdened judicial system. At times 
the Government infringed on citizens'' privacy rights. The Government 
continued to prosecute two criminal libel cases. The Government 
continued to pressure the media, and some journalists practiced self-
censorship; however, the nongovernment media continued its vigorous and 
outspoken criticism of various government policies. At times the 
Government restricted freedom of assembly. Police used force to 
disperse demonstrations. Violence against women is a serious problem. 
Traditional practices, including a localized form of ritual servitude 
(Trokosi) practiced in some rural areas, still result in considerable 
abuse and discrimination against women and children. Female genital 
mutilation (FGM) still is practiced. Religious differences led to 
tension and occasional clashes between different groups. There were 
some incidents of ethnically motivated violence, and some ethnic groups 
complain of discrimination. Child labor is a problem in the informal 
sector, and forced child labor and trafficking in women and children 
also are problems. Vigilante justice also is a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
committed a number of extrajudicial killings. The number of deaths 
reportedly caused by members of the security services decreased from 
nine in 1999 to five during the year; the continued use of rubber 
bullets and water cannons gave the police the ability to manage crowd 
control situations without killings or serious injuries. In recent 
years, the police service in particular has come under severe criticism 
following incidents of police brutality, corruption, and negligence. 
Public confidence in the police remains low but was improving over the 
previous year; however, mobs attacked several police stations due to 
perceived police inaction, a delay in prosecuting suspects, rumors of 
collaboration with criminals, and the desire to deal with suspects 
through instant justice. In 1999 the presidential Archer Commission 
issued a white paper critiquing police operations and providing 
specific directives as to how to address police manpower, training, and 
logistical needs. The Inspector General of Police (IGP) publicly 
acknowledged these problems and attempted to address them through 
training in human rights and riot control.
    On January 2, a policeman shot a 23-year-old man who was sitting 
with friends in a cemetery in Madina (Greater Accra Region). Police 
investigations into the killing were ongoing at year's end.
    On April 20, police killed a miner during a conflict between 120 
military and police personnel and over 100 men attempting to steal ore 
from a gold mine in Bibiani, a Western Region town. As a result of the 
shooting, the illegal miners rioted, burning and stealing over $1.6 
million (8 billion cedis) worth of property. A joint police and 
military team arrested 94 suspects for involvement in the riot. Forty-
eight were remanded to prison custody pending trial.
    On July 8, police killed a young man who had a history of mental 
illness in Akropong in the Eastern Region. The man reportedly resisted 
arrest and was beaten by police, necessitating a hospital trip for 
treatment. The police reportedly approached him again at the hospital 
and shot him. Police statements alleged that the man had become violent 
during the scuffle at the hospital, and that the policeman's gun fired 
accidentally, killing the man.
    On August 12, one person was killed and another injured during a 
dispute between off-duty junior military officers and the bartender at 
an Accra nightclub. President Rawlings, the Minister of Defense, and 
the acting army commander attended the person's funeral. Rawlings 
assured those at the funeral that the military would cooperate in the 
police investigation. Five officers were accused of involvement in the 
incident and remained in detention at year's end pending the results of 
the investigation, which was transferred from the police to the 
military. A sixth officer present at the nightclub that evening, a 
member of the 64th Infantry Regiment, was identified as the person who 
fired his weapon. He reportedly committed suicide within 2 weeks of the 
incident.
    On November 26, police shot and killed an alleged fuel smuggler in 
the Afedido in the Volta Region. The police were in pursuit of a 
reported fuel smuggling group, which ignored police calls to halt. The 
alleged smuggler died of gunshot wounds to the back and stomach. Police 
investigations were ongoing at year's end.
    A driver who on October 29 allegedly caused an accident involving 
the President and his wife and in which 4 of Rawlings'' bodyguards were 
killed, died of unexplained causes on December 8 while hospitalized. On 
December 5, the suspect had appeared before the Accra Circuit Tribunal 
charged with 2 counts of manslaughter and negligently causing harm. The 
chairman of the tribunal ordered the police to take the suspect to the 
Police Hospital because he appeared ill, which they did on December 6. 
The Bar Association condemned the circumstances of the driver's arrest 
and called for the autopsy report to be released to the public. The 
report had not been released by year's end.
    Many persons died in prisons due to extremely harsh conditions and 
lack of medical treatment (see Section 1.c.)
    A former chief and more than 60 residents of a town who were 
arrested in connection with the January 1999 case in which police shot 
and killed a farmer during a riot at Juaso in the Ashanti Region, were 
released on bail. The case was still under investigation at year's end.
    The IGP recommended an inquiry into the February 1999 case of 
police who fired into a crowd at the Konkomba market in Accra and 
ordered that those liable be prosecuted. The police have yet to 
announce the findings of the investigation.
    The employee of the National Security Council who allegedly shot 
and killed an agricultural officer in June 1999 received a death 
sentence in July. His lawyers filed an appeal.
    In February the Commissioner of the Police Criminal Investigations 
Division (CID) forwarded the 1999 case of a police shooting of a vendor 
who later died at Soe, near Bolgatanga in the Upper East Region, to the 
Attorney General's office for prosecution. The committal proceedings, 
when an alleged offender is brought before a district court to hear 
summary of the evidence against him, were ongoing at year's end.
    A police officer accused of killing a passenger in a truck in 
August 1999, after the driver refused to stop when signaled to do so in 
Winneba in the Central Region, was arraigned before a community 
tribunal and granted bail pending further investigation. The police 
have received the ballistic examination report and forwarded the case 
to the Attorney General for prosecution.
    An investigation into the November 1999 police killing of the 
driver of a timber truck at a police barricade in the Ashanti region 
town of Barekese was ongoing at year's end.
    There were no further developments in the September 1999 case in 
which police shot and killed a driver at his residence in Korpeyia, 
near the border with Togo. The police maintained that the deceased was 
a notorious criminal who threatened to kill a policeman who had gone 
into his house to arrest him, and that the policeman shot him in self-
defense.
    In the December 1999 case of a police and military patrol team's 
killing of two taxi passengers in Tema (Greater Accra Region), the 
regional police commander in Tema submitted his reports to the 
commissioner of the CID in June. The report maintains that the two 
passengers were suspected armed robbers. The case is with the Attorney 
General's office for advice.
    In 1999 the committee investigating the police officer implicated 
in the May 31, 1998 killing of a bystander in Sekondi indicted the 
officer in charge. The police had not compensated the family of the 
victim by year's end, nor was there a trial; however, the leader of the 
police team was facing a departmental service inquiry for 
unprofessional conduct during the operation.
    In June 1999, the family of a man who died on November 9, 1998 in a 
Western Region police cell reasserted that the deceased was brutalized 
by police and detained in handcuffs for 5 days. In response to a family 
petition filed a week after the death, the regional police command 
denied that police mistreated the deceased. No independent inquiry or 
investigation has been conducted.
    The Government continued to refuse to investigate extrajudicial 
killings in the early years of PNDC rule (1981 to 1992), despite the 
July 1999 publication of the names of 199 alleged victims in an 
independent newspaper.
    During the year, chieftancy disputes led to several deaths and a 
number of injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
    The press reported numerous cases of vigilante style ``instant 
justice'' conducted by angry citizens and mobs on suspected criminals 
and suspected witches that led to a number of deaths and injuries.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were 
continued credible reports that members of the police and customs 
officials beat prisoners and other citizens. It generally is believed 
that severe beatings of suspects in police custody occur throughout the 
country but largely go unreported.
    On January 15, following a November 1999 traffic accident, a young 
man, whose 2-year relationship with the President's oldest daughter had 
ended, reportedly was abducted by members of the presidential guard and 
detained at the Castle (the President's office and residence). 
Reportedly the guards beat and threatened him. He claimed that members 
of the presidential guard shaved his head with a broken bottle. The man 
was released without charges on January 17. During his detention, the 
man's parents protested outside the Castle gates without receiving any 
information regarding their son's whereabouts and were detained and 
later convicted of offensive conduct and assault on a public officer 
(see Section 1.e.). On September 1, the First Lady stated that the man 
was arrested for a traffic offense, not abducted, and that his head was 
shaved for routine identification purposes. In July the young man left 
the country.
    In January after reports were made regarding a series of 
disturbances, including arson and looting due to a conflict between two 
chiefs, 20 police officers arrived in Asankranguaaa (Western Region) to 
maintain order. Upon their arrival unknown persons shot at the 
officers, killing one and injuring another. A civilian also was shot by 
another civilian. The police detained 70 persons during their 
investigation of the incident. Four persons accused of murdering the 
police officer were granted bail of $6,000 (30 million cedis) pending 
further police investigation. The regional minister set up a committee 
of inquiry to look into the alleged looting and arson and submit 
recommendations to the minister. In addition the Member of Parliament 
(M.P.) for the area requested that the police inspector further 
investigate allegations of police misconduct during the incident. 
Police burned houses, slaughtered animals, stole property, and 
assaulted civilians during the course of the incident.
    In January a 65-year-old cocoa farmer from Dadieso in the Western 
Region alleged that a police inspector detained him for 2 days without 
bail and beat him after allegations that he owed the Government money. 
The inspector denied the charges and refused to pay the farmer's 
hospital bills. The IGP was investigating the case at year's end.
    In January and June, police dispelled student demonstrations in 
Kumasi and caused some minor injuries (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
    On March 25, police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse a 
crowd that gathered as a result of a dispute between two assemblymen in 
the Eastern Region town of Asutsuare. Sixtyeight civilians were 
arrested 3 days after the conflict, including one of the assemblymen. 
Some of those arrested claimed that police brutalized them during the 
arrest. On July 23, the other assemblyman involved in the dispute and 
some other civilians allegedly attacked farms and residents in 
Asutsuare, burning and looting homes. Members of the 64th Infantry 
Regiment were dispatched to control the situation. Two soldiers later 
were arrested and charged with gross misconduct and unprofessional 
behavior for taking sides in the dispute. On August 14, five policemen 
sent to arrest some of the offenders were attacked by those involved in 
the July 23 incident, and one policeman was injured badly. Thirty men 
eventually were arrested, and 22 were remanded into custody on a charge 
of attempted murder. The military set up a committee to investigate the 
incidents and stated that those involved would be punished severely. 
The District Chief Executive, the M.P., and the chief for the area 
exhorted citizens to resolve their differences. The M.P. also denied 
allegations that he had hired policemen to harass the inhabitants. The 
district assembly agreed to help resettle those whose houses were 
burnt.
    On June 8, 25 off-duty soldiers attacked and injured over 20 
civilians, including a taxi driver who allegedly insulted a group of 
intoxicated soldiers the previous evening in the Asylum Down area of 
Accra. The soldiers chased the taxi driver and other witnesses, and 
allegedly beat them. One soldier was wounded in the counterattack. The 
first victim reported the incident to the police, and the police 
investigation continues. The armed forces stated that it was 
investigating the incidents independently.
    Police used tear gas to disperse a group of civilians who attacked 
the Navrongo police station (Upper East Region) on July 15, in an 
attempt to release suspects in the cells.
    On July 8, police beat a man who resisted arrest and then shot him 
at the hospital where he was being treated for his injuries (see 
Section 1.a.)
    On July 25, thousands of trade union members demonstrated 
nationwide to demand an increase in the minimum wage (see Section 
6.b.). Police used water cannons in Accra to prevent blocking of 
traffic at a major circle; however, no injuries were reported in Accra 
or elsewhere.
    In August a businessman reported that he was detained and abused by 
members of the elite 64th Infantry Regiment. He said that his former 
wife hired the soldiers to force him to repay a debt that she claimed 
that he owed her from a failed business transaction. He alleged that 
military personnel picked him up at his home on July 11, and held and 
beat him for 12 days. He was never charged formally but was released on 
July 24, only to be detained and beaten again from July 28 to July 31. 
He claimed that the soldiers confiscated his car and approximately 
$2,400 (16,320,000 cedis). Military authorities stated that the 64th 
Infantry Regiment, since it contains a detachment of police officers, 
has the authority to investigate civil cases and arrest suspects. They 
confirmed that the man was arrested and held, but denied that he was 
beaten or his property confiscated. The Government stated that it would 
investigate the case but had provided no additional information by 
year's end. This case and the August shooting by the 64th Infantry 
Regiment (see Section 1.a.) fueled growing concerns that unit personnel 
engage in extrajudicial activity and human rights abuses. On July 26, 
military authorities appealed to the public to desist from involving 
the military in solving personal disputes. At a subsequent graduation 
ceremony for new soldiers, an army official warned the soldiers not to 
let themselves be hired to resolve personal disputes. On September 23, 
the IGP warned police personnel not to involve themselves in land 
disputes, debt collection, and other forms of unauthorized duties that 
have no valid relationship to their official duties.
    On August 5, police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse 
students of Yendi Junior Secondary School (Northern Region) who 
attacked the local police station to demand the release of one of their 
teachers, who was arrested for assaulting the District Director of 
Education in a teacher demonstration against the director. The students 
threw stones at the police.
    On December 4, police used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse 
a crowd gathered at the Supreme Court to hear a ruling on the use of 
thumbprint voter identification cards in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections scheduled for December 7. One man was injured 
by a rubber bullet (see Section 2.b.).
    On December 7, a soldier in the Ashanti Region capital of Kumasi 
roughed up a journalist who was trying to take videos of alleged 
electoral malpractice. The M.P. for the area was also injured with the 
butt of the soldier's rifle when he stated that he had been the one who 
brought the video photographer.
    On December 11, journalists from a private television station were 
assaulted by men wearing security uniforms (see Section 2.a.).
    Police set up illegal barriers to demand bribes from motorists (see 
Section 2.d.). In 1999 the IGP dismissed a constable who had been found 
extorting money randomly from drivers; however, police continue to 
demand bribes. There were credible reports that police abused their 
authority by arresting citizens in exchange for bribes from detainees'' 
disgruntled business associates and demanding money before granting 
bail (see Section 1.d.). In March 1999, the IGP banned police from 
firing warning shots and also warned the police against demanding money 
from suspects as a precondition of their release on bail; however, 
police continue to demand money to release persons on bail. A survey 
released in 1999 showed that only 50 percent of the population trusted 
the police.
    There were no reports of progress in the investigations into the 
February and April 1999 beatings of two Kumasi men by off-duty soldiers 
and ``machomen.''
    In February 1999, five Achimota police officers were suspended 
after detaining a woman in a cell with her husband and 15 other males. 
A local human rights group was instrumental in spurring the police 
administration to investigate. In July 1999, after a human rights 
activist alerted the CHRAJ, news media reported the story of a woman 
who had become pregnant by a suspected criminal also in police custody 
while she was held in remand for 16 months on an attempted murder 
charge in Anloga in the Volta Region. In August 1999, the police 
administration suspended the district officer and launched an 
investigation into the breach of the policy that female suspects not be 
detained in cells with male counterparts. Details of the investigation 
reveal that the two suspects were never kept in the same cell but 
shared a common corridor.
    There were no new developments in the May 1999 case of a man shot 
by customs officers in Dodo-Ammanfrom (Volta Region), or the June 1999 
case of six persons wounded by soldiers at Nkunkum (Eastern Region).
    An August 1999 case in which off-duty soldiers clashed with 
civilians in Oshiye resulting in several injuries was pending before 
the courts at year's end.
    No action was taken against police who beat student demonstrators 
in August 1999.
    In March the December 1999 case of nine persons wounded in a 
conflict between soldiers, policemen, and demonstrators in the Western 
Region town of Abontiakoon was forwarded to the Attorney General for 
advice. At year's end, the Circuit Court had adjourned the case and 
released the defendants on bail.
    There were no reports of progress in the investigation into the 
December 1999 confrontation between police and youths in Zabzugu, in 
the Northern Region, which resulted in the wounding of two youths. A 
number of cases from 1998 remained open, although the implicated police 
officers were suspended in most instances. The officers involved in the 
October 7, 1998 beating of a farmer in Pramkese were suspended pending 
investigation. At year's end, the case was still under investigation. 
The police officers involved in the November 2, 1998 shooting of two 
girls in an arrest attempt near Accra were dismissed from the police 
force. Police stated that the officers were performing an unauthorized 
action (which would not obligate the police to compensate the girls'' 
families). Of the remaining detainees in the November 24, 1998 killing 
of 2 police officers in Ablekuma, 9 of the accused were awaiting trial 
at year's end, 14 had their charges dismissed for lack of evidence, and 
7 were still in remand at year's end. Of the 9 suspects standing trial, 
1 was free on bail and 8 were still remanded in police custody at 
year's end. In March police were instructed to arrest 13 additional 
suspects in the case before a trial date could be set. In January a 
woman who was struck by a stray police bullet in December 1998 was 
refused a waiver of the hospital bill she incurred as a result of her 
injuries. The M.P. for her district appealed to the IGP for a reversal 
of the decision.
    In 1999 there were isolated incidents in which Accra Metropolitan 
Assembly (AMA) operatives known as the Chameleon Bombers, allegedly 
inflicted injury and destroyed property; however, the degree of 
violence decreased following media attention, and there were no such 
reports during the year. The AMA officially dissolved the group in late 
1998 following repeated public criticism, but continued to 
``decongest'' vendors from the streets and destroy unauthorized 
structures. The Chameleon Bombers changed their name to the AMA Task 
Force during the year and participated in beautification projects 
around the city. In 1999 Kumasi, the country's second largest city, 
reportedly deployed a force called the Sanitation and Decongestion 
Tigers to remove unlicensed street vendors from city streets.
    ``Machomen'' and land guards, private security enforcers hired by 
citizens to settle private disputes and vendettas, caused injury and 
property damage during the year. The machomen are not legally 
constituted, but organized privately and operate outside the law. 
Unlike in 1999, there were no arrests of machomen during the year.
    During the year, chieftancy disputes led to numerous injuries (see 
Section 5).
    Prisons are in most cases very poorly maintained, and conditions 
are extremely harsh. In 1996 the CHRAJ published a report on prison 
conditions. It described prisons as unsanitary, overcrowded, and poorly 
ventilated. In October the commissioner of CHRAJ reported that 
conditions in prisons had not improved. Prisoners are malnourished. 
Reports of the daily food allowance per prisoner vary. In July 1999, 
the Minister of Interior informed Parliament that the country's 
prisons, with a total capacity of 5,000, housed some 9,783 inmates. The 
Minister also reported that there were about 90 mattresses and few beds 
for the approximately 700 prisoners at the Kumasi central prisons. 
Overcrowding contributes to a high prevalence of skin and other 
communicable diseases among prisoners. In April 1999, the prisoners' 
daily food allowance was raised from approximately $.28 (1,800 cedis) 
to about $.31 (2,000 cedis), bringing the total daily allowance to 
approximately $.50 (3,200 cedis), including housing, medical, and 
clothing costs; however, in practice this was a decline in real terms 
due to inflation and an unfavorable exchange rate. Families still 
supplement prisoners' food and bribe prison guards for visitation 
rights. Prisoners also suffer from lack of medicine unless paid for or 
provided by the inmates or their families, and many die of preventable 
diseases such as malaria because of a lack of medication. The report 
concluded that prison conditions were ``a flagrant violation of the 
individual's fundamental human rights.'' While the Government concurred 
with the 1996 findings, it stated that lack of funding prevented 
further improvements. In April President Rawlings granted amnesty to 
some 1,000 prisoners based on recommendations of the Prisons Service 
Council. Many had served a third of their sentences, and none had been 
convicted for rape, robbery, or narcotics. However, a retired military 
officer from the PNDC era who had been sentenced to death after being 
convicted of killing an intruder on his farm also was released after 
serving 10 years in prison. The President also convened a medical board 
to consider early release for 156 seriously ill or aged prisoners. 
Juveniles were separated from the adult prison population more 
frequently; however, the commissioner of CHRAJ, in his October report, 
noted with concern the continuing sentencing and imprisonment of 
juveniles with adults. The Ghana Prisons Service Council has formed an 
assessment team to inspect facilities. In April the Minister of 
Interior stated that the prisons service would recruit 288 persons to 
increase staff at the prisons, and that work would begin during the 
year to upgrade prison and staff accommodations and construct 3 new 
prisons; however, no steps had been taken to implement these measures 
by year's end.
    The Prison Service Council, established in 1998, visited Central 
and Volta Region prison facilities in early 1999. Following these 
inspections, the Council suggested that prison authorities adopt a more 
humane approach to dealing with prisoners. The Council identified the 
number of remand prisoners due to the courts' inability to hear cases 
promptly as the greatest problem facing the prison system. Some 
suspects allegedly plead guilty in order to be sent to prison and leave 
the unsanitary conditions in the police remand cells. The Council also 
criticized health hazards (including poor sanitation) and the state of 
prison structures. In a December 1999 speech at a prison officers'' 
graduation ceremony, President Rawlings stated that the Government was 
considering the introduction of parole, suspended sentences, and 
community service as a way to alleviate the overcrowding in prisons; 
however, no steps were taken to implement these measures by year's end.
    While the CHRAJ has access to the prisons, the Government resisted 
granting access to the press. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO's) are 
not given access to prisons on a routine basis.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Constitution provides for protection 
against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile and states that an 
individual detained shall be informed immediately, in a language that 
the detained person understands, of the reasons for the detention, and 
of the right to a lawyer and to an interpreter, at state expense. It 
also requires judicial warrants for arrest and provides for arraignment 
within 48 hours. However, in practice many abuses occur, including 
detention without charge for longer than 48 hours and failure to obtain 
a warrant for arrest. Authorities do not routinely notify prisoners' 
families of their incarceration; such information is often obtained 
only by chance. Human rights activists criticized the common practice 
of arresting persons on Friday and keeping them in detention over the 
weekend until court was in session on Monday, which they described as a 
deliberate circumvention of the 48-hour detention rule.
    The court has unlimited discretion to set bail, which can be 
prohibitively high. The court may refuse to release prisoners on bail 
and instead remand them without charge for an indefinite period, 
subject to weekly review by judicial authorities. The Constitution 
allows judicial authorities to hold citizens for up to 48 hours without 
filing charges against them. However, in practice it is common to 
remand a prisoner to investigative custody. The Constitution requires 
that a detainee who has not been tried within a ``reasonable'' time be 
released either unconditionally or subject to conditions necessary to 
ensure that he appears at a later date for court proceedings. In June 
1999, the CHRAJ reported that there were a number of remand prisoners 
held for periods ranging from 1 week to 8 years. As of early July, 
about 20 percent, or approximately 2,000 of the 9,783 inmates 
nationwide, were remand prisoners. In October the acting Ashanti 
Regional Director of CHRAJ stated that over one third of the inmates of 
Kumasi Central Prison are remand prisoners. One-third remain in prison 
even after the warrants committing them to prison had expired. He 
criticized the judicial system for imposing prison sentences instead of 
levying fines, which could prevent further overcrowding of the prisons.
    Despite the provisions of the law, abuses occur. At times persons 
are detained for trivial offenses or on unsubstantiated accusations.
    On January 13, the editor of an independent newspaper, who is also 
the president of the West African Journalists' Association, was 
detained by military police acting on orders and taken to military 
headquarters overnight for questioning (see Section 2.a.).
    On January 15, members of the presidential guard abducted, detained 
at the Castle, and allegedly beat a young man whose 2year relationship 
with the president's oldest daughter had ended (see Section 1.c.).
    In January police detained 70 persons during an investigation into 
violence related to a chieftancy dispute in Asankranguaa (see Section 
1.c.).
    In June three European politicians were detained by Bureau of 
National Investigations (BNI) officers, prevented from leaving the 
country, and held overnight at police headquarters on allegations of 
illegal transfer of funds and breach of security. The politicians were 
visiting the country on business and to consult with opposition party 
leaders, who alleged that the politicians'' detention arose from their 
association with the opposition.
    In August members of the 64th Infantry Regiment allegedly abducted 
and illegally detained a man on two separate occasions. After his 
former wife allegedly hired the soldiers to collect a debt, he was 
detained for more than 2 weeks. He claims that the soldiers confiscated 
his car and approximately $2,400 (16,857,600 cedis). The military 
claims that the man was arrested and detained on charges of fraud, but 
not abused. The case is under investigation (see Section 1.c.).
    In September military police, acting on the orders of the Deputy 
Minister of Defense, briefly detained the news editor of a newspaper in 
Accra (see Section 2.a.).
    In November the BNI detained a television presenter and the editor-
in-chief of a private newspaper (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government has not implemented any meaningful policy to reduce 
the number of pretrial detainees, although the independent press has 
called for reduction of harsh bail conditions for suspects who do not 
pose a threat to society. The Attorney General drafted a bill that 
would provide alternative dispute resolution methods to clear the court 
backlog, including a time limit on pending cases and is scheduled to 
forward it to the Cabinet in 2001. Many credible sources report that 
private citizens pay the police to arrest business associates in deals 
gone awry. The 1996 CHRAJ report on prison conditions recommended 
improvement in the administration of criminal justice, which currently 
denies many citizens their constitutional rights to be charged within 
48 hours, to have bail posted within the same period, and to a speedy 
trial. Similarly, in March 1999, the CHRAJ discovered that 10 
Nigerians, 2 Lebanese, and 4 Ghanaians were detained at the Osu police 
station for periods ranging from 1 to 5 weeks. The suspects had been 
convicted of various offenses and were awaiting deportation. A farmer 
in the Volta Region has been in remand for 9 years. He is suspected of 
poisoning and killing another farmer but has yet to be formally 
charged.
    In December 1999, the IGP warned policemen not to refuse to grant 
bail to suspects in order to settle personal scores and reminded police 
that the law is there to protect citizens and not to harass them.
    In November 1999, after a Muslim-Protestant conflict in the Central 
Region town of Agona Nyakrom, police arrested over 700 men and brought 
them to Accra for investigation (see Section 2.c.). Over 650 of them 
then signed bonds to be on good behavior. Thirty others, including a 
chief, were detained. The case still was pending at year's end.
    In July 14 suspects in the November 1998 murder of two policemen in 
Ablekuma were released for lack of evidence after having been held in 
custody without charge or bail since December 1998 (see Section 1.c.). 
Nine other suspects were charged formally following the Attorney 
General's completion of a bill of indictment. Their trial had not begun 
by year's end.
    Lawyers for a former army sergeant accused of involvement in an 
alleged 1994 plot to overthrow the Government continued their appeal of 
an Accra High Court decision to retry the sergeant for treason. His 
original trial ended in 1996, but judgment was postponed because of the 
illness and subsequent death of one of the trial judges. The defendant 
has been in custody since 1994. Government efforts to persuade the 
court to impanel a new judge were unsuccessful by year's end (see 
Section 1.e.).
    Rural women can be punished with banishment by traditional village 
authorities for being pregnant out-of-wedlock or suspected witchcraft. 
The press reported that hundreds of women accused of witchcraft were 
sent to penal villages in the Northern Region by traditional 
authorities such as a shaman (see Section 5). The CHRAJ estimates that 
over 5,000 women are residents in witches'' camps in the Northern 
Regions. Although the women face no formal legal sanction if they 
leave, most fear that they would be beaten to death if caught outside 
the penal villages (see Section 5).
    In 1999 the Presbyterian Church sponsored a ``go home'' project to 
reintegrate into society women accused of witchcraft and forced to live 
at the Gambaga ``witches'' village. A total of 55 of 200 such women 
have reunited with their families. The project also provided for loans 
to enable the liberated women to become more financially independent 
and to contribute to the well being of their families.
    The Government does not practice forced exile and encourages 
citizens, including dissidents living abroad, to return. Some former 
government and PNDC officials have returned and resumed careers and 
political activities.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary appears to be 
subject on occasion to executive influence. The Constitution allows the 
Government to nominate any number beyond a minimum of nine members to 
the Supreme Court; confirmation is the responsibility of Parliament. 
The Chief Justice is empowered to impanel the justices of his choice to 
hear cases. These provisions, along with a debilitating lack of 
resources, have called into question the court's role as a balance to 
the power of the executive branch and contributed to the perception 
that the judiciary is occasionally subject to executive influence.
    This perception was furthered by the judiciary's crackdown on 
members of the privately owned press in 1998, when three journalists 
were jailed in separate instances for up to a month following 
contemptofcourt cases, and two other journalists had their passports 
seized under court order pending their criminal libel lawsuits. All the 
affected journalists were known to be avowed opponents of the 
Government and aggressive in their highly personal criticism of the 
President and his family. The journalists in the criminal libel cases 
still were awaiting sentencing at year's end. The journalists in the 
contempt of court cases served 1 month imprisonment in 1998 and were 
each fined approximately $4,350 (10 million cedis) (see Section 2.a.).
    In January the editor of an independent newspaper that published an 
article critical of President Rawlings was sentenced to one day in jail 
and a fine for an unrelated article (see Section 2.a.).
    The trial of five defendants for allegedly plotting to overthrow 
the Government in 1994 concluded in 1999. A special court sentenced 
four of the defendants to death after finding them guilty and acquitted 
the fifth defendant for lack of evidence. Attorneys for the four 
condemned defendants appealed the judgment. Four of the defendants and 
a former officer who allegedly was part of the plot remained in prison; 
and the Government did not impanel a tribunal to try the officer by 
year's end. The officer's attorneys plan to contest the case on the 
grounds that he was abducted illegally from Sierra Leone to stand 
trial.
    On August 16, the parents of a man abducted by presidential guards 
who protested his abduction outside the Castle gates were convicted of 
offensive conduct and assault on a public officer. They were granted 
bail but held in remand between the verdict and their August 30 
sentencing. The parents were required to provide a bond of good 
behavior for 12 months or, if they defaulted, would serve a 6 month 
sentence (see Section 1.c.).
    The integrity of the legal system is compromised by a severe lack 
of financial, human, and material resources. There were no official 
charges of corruption on the part of judges; however, in September 
1999, a privately owned paper published an alleged report by the 
Serious Fraud Office that found evidence of malpractice in the awarding 
of contracts by the judicial service. The Government had not responded 
to the report by year's end. In August 1998, the BNI reportedly 
questioned a judge, the chairman of an Accra regional tribunal, about 
allegations that he and his staff accepted a $9,000 bribe to grant bail 
for a Nigerian woman arrested for drug smuggling. He has not been 
charged because the BNI has failed to find proof of the transaction; 
however, in August four judicial service employees were dismissed for 
complicity in the case. A 1997 survey revealed that 66 percent of 
citizens believe that money influences the judicial system.
    The Constitution establishes two basic levels of courts: superior 
and lower. The superior courts include the Supreme Court, the Appeals 
Court, the High Court, and regional tribunals. Parliament may establish 
lower courts or tribunals by decree. The CHRAJ provides a forum to 
which citizens with grievances against government agencies or private 
companies can bring cases for mediation and settlement (see Section 4).
    There are frequent reports that a large number of prisoners are 
held in detention for extended periods, sometimes years, without going 
to trial (see Section 1.d.). For example, a man was arrested in 
December 1995 on charges of robbing a taxi driver of $30 (60,000 cedis) 
and the contents of the driver's wallet. The accused appeared at the 
Accra High Court 17 times, only to have the case adjourned each time 
without proceeding to trial. In November 1999, an appeal for bail was 
filed on the defendant's behalf on the grounds of unreasonable delay in 
going to trial. In June after 4+ years in custody, the High Court judge 
granted bail to the defendant on the basis that he could not guarantee 
when the case would finally come to trial given the number of cases 
pending before the court. The Attorney General has drafted a bill that 
would provide alternative dispute resolution methods to reduce the 
court backlog, including a time limit on pending cases.
    The CHRAJ's charter provides for it to investigate alleged 
violations of human rights and take action to remedy proven violations. 
It continues to hold workshops to educate the public, traditional 
leaders, the police, and the military on human rights issues. It 
mediates and settles cases brought to it by individuals with grievances 
against government agencies or private companies.
    The Chieftaincy Act of 1971 gives village and other traditional 
chiefs power to mediate local matters and enforce customary tribal laws 
dealing with such matters as divorce, child custody, and property 
disputes. However, a number of laws passed during the PNDC era (1981-
92), as well as the 1992 Constitution, have eroded steadily the 
authority of traditional rulers and vested it in civil institutions, 
such as courts and district assemblies.
    Legal safeguards are based on British legal procedures. Defendants 
are presumed innocent, trials are public, and defendants have a right 
to be present, to be represented by an attorney (at public expense if 
necessary), and to cross-examine witnesses. In practice the authorities 
generally respect these safeguards.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that a person shall be free 
from interference within the privacy of his home, property, 
correspondence, or communication; however, this provision has yet to be 
tested in court, and in practice the Government infringed on these 
rights at times. In April 1999, a combined municipal and military team 
without due process demolished a private hotel in Accra, which they 
claimed was blocking a drainage route. The owner of the hotel allegedly 
had fallen out with the ruling party prior to the demolition. Although 
the law requires judicial search warrants, police do not always obtain 
them in practice. On January 5, police forcibly entered the house of a 
freelance journalist and ransacked it (see Section 2.a.). Observers 
assumed that the Government continued surveillance of citizens engaged 
in activities that it deemed objectionable, including monitoring of 
telephones and mail. Several opposition political activists reported 
being followed. Opposition parties, and some persons in private 
business, continued to allege that many government contracts are 
awarded on the basis of ruling party membership. There were credible 
reports that ruling party supporters who associated with opposition 
leaders also were subject to surveillance.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and in practice these provisions 
generally were respected; however, the Government continued to pressure 
the media. Opposition political parties and others frequently criticize 
the Government, and the Government has allowed more control of print 
and electronic media to be transferred to the private sector. In 
February the Supreme Court ruled in a 4year-old case that the President 
cannot appoint chief executives to the state-owned media. Nonetheless, 
the Government continued to pressure some journalists and media 
organizations, sometimes directly (e.g., through telephone calls), and 
by filing libel suits when it found coverage to be offensive. 
Consequently, some journalists exercised selfcensorship. The criminal 
libel laws provide for 10 years' maximum imprisonment for reporting 
intended to injure the reputation of the State. At year's end, there 
were still over 100 libel suits before the courts, some of which had 
been in progress for over 2 years. Two of the pending suits were 
criminal libel suits filed by the Government, and the rest were filed 
by government officials in their personal capacities or by private 
individuals. In March a civil libel case brought by the First Lady in 
1999 was resolved successfully out of court by the National Media 
Commission (NMC), and the NMC settled out of court two pending libel 
cases brought by private citizens during the year. In November 1999, 
the editor of the Free Press was sentenced to 90 days in prison and a 
fine of approximately $460 (1.5 million cedis) in a criminal libel case 
involving allegations about the First Lady.
    There are more than a dozen newspapers including three 
governmentowned dailies, two government-owned weeklies, and several 
privately owned newspapers published weekly, biweekly, or triweekly. 
One of the government-owned dailies has national circulation. However, 
most newspapers circulate only in regional capitals, and many of the 
smaller private newspapers are available only in the capital. Some 
independent newspapers claimed that they were unable to obtain 
advertising revenues due to government pressure on businesses.
    The government-owned media occasionally reported charges of 
corruption or mismanagement in government ministries and government-
owned enterprises, but they rarely criticized the Government's policies 
or President Rawlings' activities. In the past, the Government 
occasionally disciplined or dismissed journalists working in 
government-subsidized media for articles deemed unacceptable. The 
Government ended subsidies to the state-owned publishing companies, and 
the newspapers are published by profitmaking printing companies, but 
these have not been privatized.
    Some privately owned newspapers were harshly critical of the 
Government's policies and of President Rawlings, his wife, and his 
regime generally, and some reporters and editors were alleged, at 
times, to have failed to abide by professional ethical guidelines. 
Parties affected by such lapses--most often Government officials--
showed a tendency to go to court. The Government, government officials, 
and private individuals filed numerous civil libel suits (over 100 
before the courts), and one criminal libel suit remained in progress at 
year's end. The Government continued to prosecute two independent 
journalists charged in 1996 under a rarely used sedition law for 
allegedly libeling President Rawlings and his wife, and, through them, 
the State. The trials, repeatedly postponed, were seen by many 
observers as a sign of press harassment. For example, in July 1998, 
after being found in contempt of court, two newspaper editors were 
sentenced to 1 month's imprisonment and each publisher was fined 
approximately $4,350 (10 million cedis) (see Section 1.e.). According 
to the Minister of Communications, the criminal libel law and other 
such laws simply check the excesses of journalists. The NMC is 
researching comparative freedom of information (FOI) legislation with 
the intent to propose draft FOI legislation for the Government's 
consideration. This draft legislation had not been presented to the 
Government by year's end.
    On January 5, police forcibly entered the house of a freelance 
journalist to arrest him for involvement with an allegedly seditious 
article about President Rawlings. The police ransacked his house and 
removed some documents. On January 31, the editor of the independent 
newspaper that printed the article was sentenced to one day in jail and 
a $200 (1 million cedis) fine for publishing an unrelated story about a 
commercial case pending before the courts. The judge stated that the 
article ``made comments and formed opinion'' on the case, which could 
prejudice the decision in court (see Section 1.e.).
    On January 13, the editor of an independent newspaper and president 
of the West African Journalists' Association was detained by military 
police acting on orders and taken to military headquarters overnight 
for questioning. The editor had printed a story regarding the refusal 
by soldiers to take part in a December 1999 route march; the military 
claimed that the article was ``calculated to create disaffection and 
acrimony'' among soldiers in the wake of the coup in Cote D'Ivoire. 
After public criticism by journalists and private citizens, the editor 
was released the next morning. Opposition parties, trade unions, 
journalists' associations, and foreign diplomats criticized the 
detention. The ruling party and the military justified the detention on 
the grounds that the journalist had endangered the country's peace and 
stability and stated that the military therefore had the right to 
intervene.
    On September 19, military police acting under orders from the 
Deputy Minister of Defense detained the news editor of an Accra 
newspaper. Earlier that day the editor had attempted to contact the 
Deputy Minister after receiving an allegation that he had threatened a 
guard at a local security company. The editor was released later that 
day.
    On November 7, BNI officials arrested and detained for questioning 
2 journalists. One of the journalists, a presenter for a government-
owned television station, was arrested on the charge of insulting 
behavior after he criticized, during a public broadcast, the 
President's behavior at a political rally. He was released that evening 
on bail of $7,350 (50 million cedis). Charges were never pressed. The 
second journalist, the editor-in-chief of a private newspaper, was held 
for nearly 12 hours for questioning on a charge of ``dishonestly 
receiving'' information. He allegedly had received computer diskettes, 
apparently stolen from NDC headquarters, which contained information on 
alleged plans for election fraud on the part of the NDC. The editor was 
released on bail $735 (5 million cedis). On December 21, he was charged 
with the equivalent of possession of stolen goods and ordered to report 
to BNI three times a week until the case is concluded. The Ghana 
Journalists Association and the Private Newspaper Publishers 
Association condemned the arrests and criticized the BNI's role in the 
incident, which they stated circumvented due process. On November 10, 2 
computer technicians were arrested, charged with giving the journalist 
the diskettes, and remanded into BNI custody. On the same day, the 
Minister of Communications accused the journalists of misleading the 
public and defended the role of the BNI by noting that it may 
legitimately assist police in investigations as necessary.
    On December 11, men wearing security uniforms assaulted journalists 
from a private television station who were covering a press conference 
at NDC headquarters in Accra. The journalists allege that the officers 
who assaulted them were not members of the security service, but rather 
``machomen'' disguised in uniform. The Ghana Journalists'' Association, 
the National Union of Ghana Students, and the New Patriotic Party 
condemned the assault. Police investigations were ongoing at year's 
end.
    According to the National Communications Authority, Accra has 1 
government-owned and 12 private FM radio stations, and there are about 
40 private FM stations across the country. Most stations are 
independent and air a wide range of viewpoints. There are several 
private metropolitan television stations that broadcast in Accra and in 
Kumasi. One semi-private Accra station began broadcasting in Kumasi in 
November. There is one government-owned television station that 
broadcasts nationwide. There are also three private cable networks that 
serve Accra, Kumasi, and Takoradi.
    The Government has yet to initiate a formal investigation into the 
substance of a tape publicized in October 1999 that appeared to 
implicate President Rawlings in several infamous extralegal actions of 
the predemocratic era. Neither did the Government pursue prosecution of 
the journalists and publisher involved in the broadcasting of the 
tapes.
    The Government readily granted accreditation to foreign 
journalists. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio 
France International have full-time FM rebroadcasting stations in 
Accra, and several foreign radio broadcasts, including Voice of America 
(VOA), have part-time affiliations with local stations in several 
cities. Foreign periodicals were sold in Accra and other major cities 
and circulated freely even when they contained articles critical of the 
Government. Most citizens obtain their news from the electronic media, 
the VOA, and the BBC radio service. Several companies have cable or 
satellite rebroadcasting stations that serve the country's three major 
cities.
    In the period prior to the December presidential and parliamentary 
elections, the government-owned television and radio stations allotted 
the equal broadcasting time to each of the parties fielding 
presidential candidates, although news coverage of government 
activities such as the commissioning of projects favored the ruling 
party. During the December presidential and parliamentary elections, FM 
radio stations acted as watchdogs, and called attention to 
irregularities in the voting process.
    There are currently three Internet Service providers (ISP's) in the 
country. In July the National Communications Authority closed three 
other ISP's on the grounds that they were providing Internet telephone 
services, which violated a 5-year exclusivity agreement that the 
Government had given to two telephone companies. The companies replied 
that they were unable to monitor telephone use of their ISP and should 
not be held responsible for such use. The Government maintained that 
such use could be monitored. One company had its equipment confiscated 
without due process, and the owner was held in jail overnight but not 
charged (see Section 1.d.). That company stated that it would bring the 
matter to court; however, in November the Government restored the 
company's equipment, and it resumed operations.
    There was no restriction of academic freedom. Academics are allowed 
to publish and pursue research. The National Union of Ghanaian 
Students, one of the more vocal critics of the Government, is allowed 
to organize and hold meetings. However, in late 1997, following a 
serious student brawl, the public university in Accra imposed a ban on 
campus demonstrations, which remained in effect at year's end. In 
January and June, police dispersed student demonstrations in Kumasi and 
caused some minor injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In August 1999 
students demonstrated against increased university fees, and police 
forcibly broke up the demonstration (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice; however, at times it restricted this 
right. The Government does not require permits for demonstrations. 
Parliament passed a public order law in late 1994 requiring that all 
organizers of ``special events'' or ``processions'' inform the police 
of their intentions at least 5 days in advance so that the police can 
institute precautionary measures. The law also provides for curfews and 
arrest without warrants in specified instances. In November 1999, a 
presidential aide called street demonstrations by registered political 
parties ``a provocative attempt to destroy the democratic order'' and 
``a declaration of war on the national democratic order and an act 
totally against the national interest.'' Other government and ruling 
party officials echoed this view, as did other organized bodies who 
were widely believed to have done so at the Government's behest.
    On May 2, Accra textile traders were told that they could not hold 
a demonstration to protest a textile price hike because they lacked a 
police permit, although there is no legal requirement for a permit (see 
Section 6.a.).
    On July 25, thousands of trade union members demonstrated 
nationwide to demand an increase in the minimum wage. Police allowed 
the demonstrations to take place; however, they used water cannons on 
the Accra demonstrators to prevent them from blocking traffic at a 
major traffic circle. No injuries were reported in Accra or elsewhere 
(see Section 6.a.).
    In July the radio personality who was pressured not to hold a 
``million man march'' in October 1999 held a poorly attended march on 
the same theme without any government interference.
    In December police used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse a 
crowd gathered at the Supreme Court to hear a ruling on the use of 
thumbprint voter identification cards in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections scheduled for December 7. One man was injured 
by a rubber bullet (see Section 1.c.).
    The 1997 ban on campus demonstrations remained in effect, but 
generally was not enforced, at the public university in Accra; however, 
in January and again in June, police dispersed student demonstrations 
in Kumasi and caused some minor injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.). 
The students were demonstrating to demand disbursement of their student 
loans. Police reportedly beat the students who allegedly were throwing 
stones at the police, and some students were injured from police use of 
water cannons. In the June demonstration, 35 students were detained, 
but the police dropped the charges after the students apologized for 
their actions.
    Political parties generally held rallies and national congresses 
without hindrance during the year; however, in February the police 
prevented the National Reform Party (NRP) from holding a rally in the 
Labadi district of Accra, although the NRP had given the police the 
required advance notice of the event. Allegedly the police stopped the 
rally to prevent potential conflict because the NDC had planned a rally 
for the same day. The NRP held its rally at a later date.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. NGO's are 
required to register with the Registrar General's office and the 
Department of Social Welfare, but this registration is routine.
    The Electoral Commission (EC) must accredit political parties. The 
parties must show evidence of a ``national character,'' such as 
official representation in all 10 of the country's regions. The EC 
evaluates whether the party has shown evidence of a viable national 
support base before granting accreditation and can annul the 
registration of a party that fails to meet the criteria for being a 
viable party. In July 1999, the EC certified a breakaway faction of the 
ruling party as a political party in its own right.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, on at least one occasion local government officials restricted 
this right. The Government does not always prosecute those responsible 
for religiously motivated attacks. For example, none of those who 
attacked churches during the 1999 annual ban on drumming (see Section 
5) were arrested or charged with an offense. Police authorities said 
that pursuing the cases only would exacerbate tensions. No suspects 
were charged in the attacks on a Christian charismatic church in 
December 1996 and March 1998.
    Religious institutions that wish formal recognition are required to 
register with the Registrar General's Department. This is a formality 
only. Most traditional religions, with the exception of the Afrikania 
Mission, do not register. Formally recognized religions receive some 
tax relief. However, beyond a certain point the institutions are 
required to pay tax.
    There is no state-favored religion and no apparent advantage or 
disadvantage attached to membership in any particular sect or religion. 
Foreign missionary groups generally have operated throughout the 
country with a minimum of formal restrictions.
    The Government requires that all students in public schools up to 
the equivalent of senior secondary school level attend a daily 
``assembly'' or devotional service; however, in practice this 
regulation is not always enforced. This is a Christian service and 
includes the recital of The Lord's Prayer, a Bible reading, and a 
blessing. Students at the senior secondary school level are required to 
attend a similar assembly three times per week. Students attending 
boarding school are required to attend a nondenominational service on 
Sundays.
    On February 20, the Ho (Volta Region) District Chief Executive 
(DCE) led a joint operation with police and health personnel to 
immunize the children at an Apostolic Faith of Kpalexose (``Wellrooted 
Faith'' in the Ewe language) church against poliomyelitis. Church 
members consistently have refused immunizations on the grounds that 
their faith forbids the use of orthodox medicine. Police surrounded the 
church during worship services, and health personnel administered the 
vaccine. It was reported that 155 children up to age 5 received the 
vaccine. Community response supported the overriding of individual 
religious convictions as being in the greater national interest of 
eradicating polio. However, a prominent human rights NGO criticized the 
forced immunizations because it was not applied consistently. Other 
guardians who had refused to immunize their children were not compelled 
to do so, and only approximately half of the children countrywide were 
immunized. The NGO argued that the Government should enact legislation 
compelling all children to be immunized before it could legitimately 
force guardians to immunize their own children. On October 15, members 
of the Baptist church in the James Town area of Accra tried to prevent 
health workers from immunizing children against polio because they 
claimed that their faith forbade members'' accepting medical treatment. 
Although the church members later apologized, the children were not 
immunized.
    The Catholic Church in the Archdiocese of Accra officially 
suspended a priest in April for conducting unorthodox ``healing'' 
services. When he was conducting one of these services, the gates to 
the Cathedral were locked, and police personnel prevented worshipers 
from entering the church premises.
    Although the Constitution prohibits slavery, religious servitude--
Trokosi--exists on a limited scale. In June 1998, Parliament passed and 
the President signed legislation to ban the practice of Trokosi in 
comprehensive legislation to protect women and children's rights. Human 
rights activists believe that the goal of eradicating the Trokosi 
practice is attainable with the new law; however, the practice persists 
(see Section 5).
    The Government took some steps to promote interfaith understanding. 
At government meetings or receptions usually there are 
multidenominational invocations. The Greater Accra Regional 
Coordinating Council conducted a workshop on managing religious 
conflicts in April, several weeks before the annual ban on drumming in 
the ethnic Ga traditional area (May 8 to June 8), which resulted in a 
workable compromise between religious and traditional leaders. This 
compromise helped avoid a repeat of the violence between 
traditionalists and Christians that occurred in 1999. However, on 
August 20, after the ban had been lifted, youth in Teshie besieged the 
Open Heaven Mission International Church, seizing drums and injuring 
six worshippers (see Section 5).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights as an aspect of the provision for personal liberty, and the 
Government generally respects these provisions in practice.
    Citizens and foreigners are free to move throughout the country. 
Police checkpoints exist nationwide to prevent smuggling, but most are 
unmanned during daylight hours. There were numerous reports that police 
used checkpoints to solicit bribes. Citizen complaints about police 
harassment caused the Government to reduce the number of checkpoints 
from 125 to 38 in 1997 and to 31 by the end of 1998. Police roadblocks 
and car searches are a normal part of nighttime travel in larger 
cities. In February and August 1999, taxi drivers struck in Koforidua 
to protest extortion by motor transport and traffic unit police, and in 
June in Accra, police established additional roadblocks in an effort to 
combat a series of local murders of women (see Sections 1.a. and 5). 
The police administration has admitted that the force has a problem 
with some members occasionally erecting illegal barriers to solicit 
bribes from motorists. In November and December, soldiers mounted 
checkpoints around the Brong Ahafo regional capital of Sunyanai and 
outside the Ashanti regional capital of Kumasi prior to national 
elections. Both towns were opposition strongholds. The Government 
stated that it was responding to reports of arms movements before the 
elections; however, many observers viewed these checkpoints as an 
attempt to intimidate voters or to discourage them from travelling to 
vote where they were registered. Citizens generally are free to travel 
internationally and to emigrate or to be repatriated from other 
countries.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates 
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The country has 
a liberal policy of accepting refugees from other West African nations. 
The Government provides first asylum. The country continued to provide 
first asylum to approximately 9,454 Liberians, 1,058 Togolese and 2,103 
Sierra Leoneans. It also provided first asylum to citizens of: Rwanda 
(30); Sudan (21); Ethiopia (6); Libya (6); Burundi (7); Congo 
Brazzaville (5); Cameroon (6); Burkina Faso (1); Somalia (1); Uganda 
(1); Nigeria (6); Bosnia (1); Angola (1); Chad (1); and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (12).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government, and citizens exercised this right through a democratic 
process in presidential and parliamentary elections held in December, 
which despite a few incidents of intimidation and election fraud, 
domestic and international observers judged be generally free and fair. 
The country continued its transition from a one-party state to a more 
established multiparty constitutional system. The political system 
includes recognized opposition parties, which express their views 
freely within Parliament and won a majority of the parliamentary seats 
in the December election.
    In November and December soldiers mounted roadblocks outside 
opposition strongholds, in what many observers interpreted as attempts 
to intimidate voters (see Section 2.d.).
    In the first round of the presidential elections, John Agyekum 
Kufuor of the NPP garnered 48.2 percent of the votes, followed by Vice 
President John Evans Atta Mills with 44.5 percent. On December 28, a 
presidential runoff was held in accordance with the constitutional 
requirement that the president be elected with at least 50 percent plus 
one of the votes. In the runoff Kufuor beat Mills with 56.7 percent of 
the vote. The new administration is scheduled to take office on January 
7, 2001. The NPP won 100 seats and gained control of the 200-member 
Parliament, while the NDC took 92 seats. Other parties and independents 
won the remaining eight seats.
    During the year, opposition members expressed frustration about 
impediments that the executive branch imposed by its refusal to support 
opposition amendments to proposed legislation. Parliament still is 
working to develop effective oversight of the workings of the executive 
branch. Although all M.P.'s can introduce bills, no one has ever done 
so; however, some have introduced motions.
    In 1998 citizens elected representatives to the district assemblies 
and, for the first time, unit committees, which form the basis of the 
local government structure. Of the 16,000 units, elections still must 
be held in the 3,724 units that failed to produce a quorum of 
candidates in 1998. These elections were held on a nonpartisan basis, 
as called for in the 1992 Constitution. However, opposition groups 
contend that the local government system is stacked in favor of the 
ruling party, which appoints approximately one-third of the district 
assembly and unit committee members, as well as the DCE's. DCE's must 
be confirmed by two-thirds of the district assembly members. In May 
1999, police and military forces were highly visible in Kintampo in the 
Brong Ahafo Region the day the district assembly was to vote on a 
controversial nominee for the DCE. The presence of security forces may 
have influenced some district assembly members to vote in favor of the 
ruling party's nominee, despite an earlier petition by the chiefs and 
residents of Kintampo against the nomination.
    There are no legal obstacles to the participation of women in 
government; however, they are underrepresented in government and 
politics. There were 19 female parliamentarians with 17 female M.P.'s 
elected to the new Parliament. Several ministers and Council of State 
members are women. In August a group of female parliamentarians and 
women's rights activists petitioned the Electoral Commission (EC) to 
waive registration fees for female candidates to encourage more women 
to run for office. The EC refused on the grounds that this would make 
competition for parliamentary seats unfair.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    NGO's interested in human rights continued to grow in number and 
effectiveness, and there were 20 NGO's in the field at the end of the 
year. These NGO's operated without government interference (see Section 
2.b.). The Government appears to cooperate with and to be responsive to 
human rights NGO's, with the exception of granting ready access to 
prisons (see Section 1.c.). Prominent NGO's include the Red Cross, 
Amnesty International (AI), the International Federation of Woman 
Lawyers (FIDA), Women in Law and Development in Africa, and Ghanalert. 
The Government cooperates with international humanitarian 
organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC).
    The CHRAJ, established by Parliament in 1993, is charged with 
investigating alleged violations of human rights and taking action to 
remedy proven violations. The CHRAJ continues to hold workshops to 
educate the public, traditional leaders, the police, and the military 
on human rights issues. It mediates and settles cases brought to it by 
individuals with grievances against government agencies or private 
companies. Parliament established the CHRAJ in 1993. By 1998 the CHRAJ 
had received a total of 23,744 petitions in its offices around the 
country and completed action on over 16,638 cases, (70.1 percent). 
Forty percent of the cases were resolved through mediation. On average 
the CHRAJ receives between 4,000 and 5,000 new petitions per year, with 
steady increases each year. The majority of the complaints lodged with 
the Commission were from those who believed that they suffered 
injustice as a result of public or private employers'' abuse of power, 
unfairness, and high handedness.
    In October 1996, the CHRAJ concluded a lengthy corruption probe of 
senior government officials. This probe launched an aggressive 
government rebuttal, which resulted in a 1998 Supreme Court decision 
that the CHRAJ could investigate matters predating the effective date 
of the 1992 Constitution. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Commission did not have jurisdiction to investigate property 
confiscated by the special courts or tribunals during the rule of the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the military group that 
staged President Rawlings' first coup, and during the PNDC period.
    The CHRAJ continues to investigate corruption allegations filed 
against public officials. In 1997 it issued a report on its 
investigations at the ``witches camps'' on the Northern Region. The 
Commission also has provided periodic updates to various sections of 
its report on prison conditions.
    The Commission operates with no overt interference from the 
Government. Its biggest obstacle is a lack of adequate funding. Low 
salaries and poor working conditions result in the loss of many 
CHRAJtrained personnel to other government agencies that are able to 
pay their employees more. In late 1998, the Commission submitted a 
petition on this matter to the Government and had not received a 
response by year's end.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, disability, language, or social status. The courts are 
empowered specifically to order enforcement of these prohibitions, 
although enforcement by the authorities is generally inadequate, in 
part due to limited financial resources.
    Women.--Violence against women, including rape and domestic 
violence, remains a significant problem. A 1998 study revealed that 
particularly in low-income, high-density sections of greater Accra, at 
least 54 percent of women have been assaulted in recent years. A total 
of 95 percent of the victims of domestic violence are women, according 
to data gathered by the FIDA. These abuses usually go unreported and 
seldom come before the courts. The police tend not to intervene in 
domestic disputes. However, 1998 legislation doubled the mandatory 
sentence for rape. The media increasingly report cases of assault and 
rape. In late 1998, the police administration established a ``women and 
juvenile unit'' to handle cases involving domestic violence, child 
abuse, and juvenile offenses. Located in Accra and Kumasi, the unit 
works closely with the Department of Social Welfare, FIDA, and the 
Legal Aid Board. During the year, the Accra Branch of this unit 
recorded over 530 cases, including 181 defilement cases, 35 rapes, 6 
cases of incest, 17 indecent assaults, 86 instances of assault and wife 
battery, 6 abductions, and 200 neglect cases.
    In May FIDA held a seminar to coordinate government and NGO support 
of the country's first domestic violence bill. FIDA presented the draft 
bill to the Director of Legislative Drafting of the Parliament, who is 
responsible for converting proposed bills into proper legislative 
format for eventual consideration by Parliament. The bill was not taken 
up by Parliament by year's end.
    In late 1998, a series of ``mysterious'' murders of women began to 
occur in the Mateheko area of Accra. Three of the 20 murders reportedly 
involved husbands' suspicion of their wives' infidelity. The men 
subsequently were arrested, but they were not convicted. There have 
been more than 30 murders in the past 2 years, and they are referred to 
as ``serial murders.'' Police have had no success in solving any of the 
murders and have instituted evening roadblocks throughout Accra in an 
attempt to catch the murderers. In March the Ministry of Interior 
offered a $10,000 reward to any member of the public who provided 
information leading to the arrest of any of the murderers. In July a 
group of seven organizations, including FIDA, AI, The Ghana Employers 
Association, and The Association of Business and Professional Women, 
issued a joint statement reflecting their disappointment at the 
police's lack of success, and encouraging the Government to seek 
international help to solve the murders. On December 22, this group, 
known as Sisters Keepers, marched peacefully to the Castle and 
submitted a petition to the President calling for the Minister of 
Interior and the IGP to resign because of their failure to solve the 
murders.
    On 3 occasions in 1999 and during the year, women in Accra 
demonstrated in a concerted effort to attract attention to violence 
against women.
    In 1998 Parliament passed legislation that amended the 1960 
Criminal Code to provide additional protection for women and children. 
The legislation added new definitions of sexual offenses and 
strengthened punishments for others. The provisions of the bill ban the 
practice of ``customary servitude'' (known as Trokosi), protect women 
accused of witchcraft, double the mandatory sentence for rape, raise 
the age of criminal responsibility from 7 years to 12, criminalize 
indecent assault and forced marriages, and raise punishments for 
defilement, incest, and prostitution involving children. There are no 
laws that specifically protect women from sexual harassment.
    In January 1999, the CHRAJ announced its decision in the country's 
first sexual harassment case, involving a flight attendant for a 
private airline and her immediate supervisor. The CHRAJ determined that 
the 22-year-old attendant was terminated for her refusal to submit to 
her supervisor's sexual advances over a 10-month period. The CHRAJ 
awarded her compensation for legal costs. However, the company's chief 
executive did not comply with the terms of the decision, and in 
December 1999, the CHRAJ went back to court to seek enforcement of the 
judgment. The case was not settled by year's end, principally because 
the airline had gone out of business.
    Rural women can be punished with banishment by traditional village 
authorities for pregnancy outside of wedlock or suspected witchcraft. 
The press reported that hundreds of women accused of witchcraft were 
sent to penal villages in the Northern Region by traditional 
authorities, such as a shaman. In 1998 a total of 815 persons (802 
women and 13 men, from 35 to 90 years old) were found to be living in 
witches' villages in four districts in the Northern Region. The CHRAJ 
estimates that as many as 5,000 women are inhabitants of camps 
throughout northern Ghana. In some cases, the women were sentenced by 
village authorities who claimed to have the power to determine who were 
witches. In other cases, relatives, or the women themselves, came to 
the village believing that they were witches, and asking to be 
protected and/or cured of the affliction. Human rights NGO's estimate 
that the number of occupants of the witches' camp is growing. NGO's 
also have found that at the Gambaga witches camp, 99 percent of those 
there are illiterate. Although the women face no formal legal sanction 
if they leave, most fear that they would be beaten to death or lynched 
if caught outside the penal villages (see Section 1.a.). Forced labor 
also occurs at the camps for women accused of witchcraft. Legislation 
passed in 1998 provides some additional protection to women banned from 
their communities for alleged witchcraft. The CHRAJ and human rights 
NGO's have mounted a campaign to end this traditional practice, which 
violates the victims' constitutional rights, but little concrete action 
has been taken. The challenge lies not only in persuading custodians of 
the witches' homes to abolish the practice, but also in educating the 
community so the women will be allowed to return safely to their homes. 
In 1998 FIDA had persuaded custodians to abolish the Gambaga witches 
home in the Northern Region, contingent on the performance of 
``exorcism'' rites and payment of accommodation and discharge fees. 
However, a few months later, there was an increase in the number of 
alleged witches banished to the home, largely due to the communities' 
belief that these women were responsible for an outbreak of 
cerebrospinal meningitis which claimed many lives in the region.
    Women continue to experience societal discrimination. Women in 
urban centers and those with skills and training encounter little overt 
bias, but resistance to women entering nontraditional fields persists. 
Only about one quarter of university students are women, although 
women's enrollment is increasing. Women, especially in rural areas, 
remain subject to burdensome labor conditions and traditional male 
dominance. Traditional practices and social norms often deny women 
their statutory entitlements to inheritances and property, a legally 
registered marriage (and with it, certain legal rights), and the 
maintenance and custody of children.
    Women's rights groups are active in educational campaigns and in 
programs to provide vocational training, legal aid, and other support 
to women. The Government also is active in educational programs, and 
President Rawlings and his wife were among the most outspoken advocates 
of women's rights. In August the Government established a women's desk 
responsible for addressing the gender imbalance in the civil service.
    Children.--Within the limits of its resources, the Government is 
committed to protecting the rights and welfare of children. Education 
is neither free nor compulsory, and costs associated with schooling, 
such as uniforms and school supplies, preclude some children from 
attending school. While the Government states that basic education is 
free, in practice schools impose fees of up to $50 (335,000 cedis) per 
term, and students also must purchase uniforms and books. In addition 
teachers often withhold material during their regular lessons and ask 
students to pay additional fees for after-hours `tutoring' in those 
subjects as a way to supplement their incomes. Some children are unable 
to attend school because they must work to supplement their family's 
income (see Section 6.d.); they must travel long distances to reach the 
school; or there is a lack of teachers, especially in more rural areas. 
The Government has taken some concrete steps to support education, 
including support of ``informal'' schools (NGO-sponsored schools that 
are not regulated by the Government and provide nontraditional 
education), and increased emphasis on making sure students progress 
from one school grade to another. The dropout rate is decreasing, from 
9.1 percent nationwide in 1998 to 8 percent in 1999; however, the 
school enrollment rate has also dropped slightly from 2.58 million in 
1997 to 2.56 million in 1999. Overall enrollment probably is even 
lower, taking into account the country's almost 2.4 percent annual 
population growth.
    There is little or no discrimination against female children in 
education, but girls and women frequently drop out of school due to 
societal or economic pressures. The Government actively campaigns for 
girls' education and in 1997 established a girls' education unit within 
the basic education division of the Ghana Educational Service. Although 
the percentages of girls enrolled in school increased from 1996, 
participation is still low. In September 1999, the Government estimated 
that girls'' enrollment in primary school had increased from 75 percent 
in 1992 to 81 percent in 1997. Enrollment of women at the university 
level has increased by 5 percent from 1993 to 1998.
    A 1997 country report by the Ghana National Commission on Children 
further substantiated the gap between enrollment of boys and girls, 
particularly at the high school level. In the 8 districts examined, 
there were 22,418 boys and 14,318 girls enrolled at the high school 
level. In the report, officials attribute the lower female enrollment 
to the fact that many girls marry early or become pregnant. In the 
1998-99 academic year, the University of Ghana enrolled 852 women and 
2,226 men. In May the First Lady launched an initiative to establish 
the country's first women's university.
    The Ghana National Commission on Children (GNCC) is a policymaking 
and coordinating body established to improve the lives of children. The 
GNCC has provided the Women and Juvenile Unit of the police force with 
office equipment. The GNCC also has administered training programs for 
law enforcement and judicial officials around the country to 
familiarize them with the Children's Act and other pertinent child 
labor legislation.
    The governments of Ghana and Canada hosted a conference on children 
affected by war in West Africa on April 27-28. The resulting plan of 
action focused on ways that Economic Community of West African States 
could integrate child protection into ECOWAS peacemaking and 
peacekeeping initiatives.
    There are several traditional discriminatory practices that are 
injurious to the health and development of young females. In 
particular, female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned 
by international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is a serious problem. A 1998 study estimated that 
9 to 12 percent of women have been mutilated, but some estimates are as 
high as 30 percent. A Ministry of Health survey conducted between 1995 
and 1998 found that FGM is practiced among nearly all the northern 
sector ethnic groups, up to 86 percent in rural parts of the Upper West 
and Upper East Regions. A 1998 study reported that 51 percent of all 
women who had undergone FGM were excised before age 1, and 85 percent 
of total excisions were performed on girls under the age of 15. A 1999 
survey indicated that more than 50 percent of the women who were 
mutilated indicated that they disapproved of the practice. Officials at 
all levels have spoken out against the practice, and local NGO's are 
making some inroads through their educational campaigns to encourage 
abandonment of FGM and to retrain practitioners. There were no reports 
of arrests in the year. There have been seven arrests for the practice 
of FGM since the 1994 law made FGM a crime. Of those arrested, two 
offenders have been prosecuted and convicted. In some cases in which 
FGM is performed, the victims actively seek out practitioners, 
sometimes without their parents'' knowledge, in a quest to become ready 
for marriage.
    Members of the legal community advocate legislation to close 
loopholes in the FGM law, including extending culpability to family 
members and others who aid in carrying out FGM and to citizens who 
commit the crime outside the country's borders. Any person who conceals 
information about an instance of FGM would be liable. In addition, FGM 
would be banned no matter how medically safe the procedure is made--
dispelling a belief by some that FGM is acceptable as long as the 
girls' health is protected. Traditional chiefs became more outspoken in 
their opposition to the practice of FGM.
    Although the Constitution prohibits slavery, it exists on a limited 
scale. Trokosi, a traditional practice found among the Ewe ethnic group 
and in part of the Volta Region, is an especially severe human rights 
abuse and an extremely serious violation of children's and women's 
rights. It is a system in which a young girl, sometimes under the age 
of 10, is made a slave to a fetish shrine for offenses allegedly 
committed by a member of the girl's family. In rare instances, boys are 
offered. The belief is that, if someone in that family has committed a 
crime, such as stealing, members of the family may begin to die in 
large numbers unless a young girl is given to the local fetish shrine 
to atone for the offense. The girl becomes the property of the fetish 
priest, must work on the priest's farm, and perform other labors for 
him. Because they are the sexual property of the priests, most Trokosi 
slaves have children by the priests. Although the girls' families must 
provide for their needs such as food, most are unable to do so. There 
are at least 2,200 girls and women bound to various shrines in the 
Trokosi system, a figure that does not include the slaves' children. 
Even when freed by her fetish priest from the more onerous aspects of 
her bondage, whether voluntarily or as a result of intervention by 
activists, a Trokosi woman generally has few marketable skills and 
little hope of marriage and typically remains bound to the shrine for 
life by psychological and social pressure arising from a traditional 
belief that misfortune may befall a Trokosi woman's family or village 
if she abandons her obligations to the shrine. When a fetish slave 
dies, her family is expected to replace her with another young girl, 
thus perpetuating the bondage to the fetish shrine from generation to 
generation.
    In 1998 Parliament passed legislation that banned the practice of 
Trokosi in comprehensive legislation to protect women and children's 
rights. Human rights activists believe that the goal of eradicating the 
Trokosi practice is achievable with the new law. NGO's, such as 
International Needs, and government agencies, like the CHRAJ, have been 
campaigning against Trokosi for several years and are familiar with the 
locations of the fetish shrines and the numbers of women and children 
enslaved. Activists know the community leaders and fetish priests and, 
thus, know with whom to negotiate. The CHRAJ and International Needs 
have had some success in approaching village authorities and fetish 
priests at over 316 of the major and minor shrines, winning the release 
of 2,800 Trokosi slaves to date and retraining them for new 
professions. The organizations continue to work for additional 
releases. The Government has not prosecuted any practitioners of 
Trokosi, and in August 1999, a presidential aide criticized anti-
Trokosi activists for being insensitive to indigenous cultural and 
``religious'' beliefs and practices. A local group, calling itself the 
``Troxovi Institutional Council'' (Troxovi is alternate spelling for 
Trokosi), declared that Trokosi, as defined by CHRAJ and other human 
rights groups to be a form of ritual servitude, does not exist in the 
country. The group claimed that the practice of `Troxovi' does exist 
but neither enslaves nor exploits anyone. The Council also listed 23 
`genuine Troxovi shrines' in Ghana, describing them as educational 
institutions and as part of the ``Afrikania religion.'' These claims 
were widely refuted by chiefs, the press, and NGO's.
    There were reports that trafficking in children occurred, including 
children being sold into slavery either for forced labor or sexual 
exploitation (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Child labor is also a 
problem (see Section 6.d.).
    Another traditional practice that violates the rights of children 
is forced childhood marriage, which became illegal under the Children's 
Act. In February the Agona Swedru Circuit Court in the Central Region 
sentenced a man to 15 years'' imprisonment and hard labor for defiling 
a 7-year-old girl. In May a teacher in Kyermasu in the Brong Ahafo 
Region was sentenced to 18 years'' imprisonment and hard labor for 
defiling and impregnating a 15-year-old girl.
    In October the GNCC stated that it was working with the CHRAJ to 
effect the prosecution of the chief of Mpeasem-Easuakyir, in the 
Central Region, who coerced a 14-year-old girl into marrying him after 
he abused and impregnated her. FIDA supported the efforts and 
emphasized that the marriage violated the Children's Act, which sets 
the marriageable age at 18, as well as the Criminal Code, which 
prohibits sex with a child under 16 years of age.
    Child prostitution, although illegal, also exists. In March the 
Eastern regional branch of the Ghana Hairdressers and Beauticians 
Association announced that it would offer free apprenticeships to 150 
street girls in the Eastern Region to equip them with marketable 
skills.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution specifically provides 
for the rights of the disabled, including protection against 
exploitation and discrimination. In practice the disabled are not 
discriminated against in any systematic or overt manner. The 
Constitution also states that ``as far as practicable, every place to 
which the public has access shall have appropriate facilities for 
disabled persons.'' However, in practice this provision has yet to be 
implemented. In late August, Government officials stated that companies 
should take the needs of disabled persons into account when building 
and designing buildings and reminded the public that the disabled have 
rights that should be protected.
    Religious Minorities.--There was tension between ethnic Ga 
traditionalists and members of some Christian charismatic churches over 
the annual ban by Ga traditional leaders on drumming and noise-making 
prior to the Ga Homowo (harvest) festival; however, the level of such 
tension decreased compared with the previous year. Traditionalists 
believed that their time-honored customs should be accorded due 
respect, while some Christians resented the imposition of bans, which 
they believed infringed on their right to worship. The Government 
advocated mutual coexistence and understanding and alerted the 
population that police resources were insufficient to protect all 
churches during the several-week ban on drumming. There were attacks on 
churches in 1999 and in 1998. There were no reports of similar attacks 
during the year. No police action was taken in regard to attacks from 
previous years. Police are reluctant to prosecute any members of these 
groups due to an apparent fear of retaliation or counterattack.
    On January 25, members of the Christo Asafo Christian Church 
clashed with members of the Boade Baaka traditional shrine at Taifa, 
Greater Accra Region. The dispute arose days earlier after shrine 
members accused a Christian woman of witchcraft. In the process, the 
woman was injured slightly, and a crowd formed. Christo Asafo members 
attacked the shrine in retaliation. There were some minor injuries. 
Police did not arrest or prosecute any of the participants, but 
continue to investigate the incident.
    In March a dispute between five Pentecostal churches and landowners 
(tendaabas) led to tension in Jirapa, Upper West Region. After a member 
of the Kingdom of God ministries allegedly burned down a local shrine, 
the tendaabas banned religious activities of all churches except the 
Roman Catholic Church, until May when the Regional Coordinating Council 
brokered a resolution.
    On July 21, three Muslims were injured at Effiduase (Eastern 
Region) in a clash between two Muslim sects over doctrinal differences. 
Members of the Tijanniya school of Islam allegedly attacked members of 
the Al-Sunna school.
    On August 20, after the ban on drumming had been lifted, youth in 
Teshie (Greater Accra Region) besieged the Open Heaven Mission 
International Church, seizing drums and injuring six worshipers (see 
Section 2.c.).
    There was a development in the case of the November 1999 dispute 
between an Islamic middle school and a Methodist middle school in Agona 
Nyakrom in the Central Region, where five persons suffered gunshot 
wounds, and Muslim property was destroyed. All of those arrested were 
released, and the police have not charged any suspects. In June the 
Committee of Inquiry set up by the Central Regional Coordinating 
Council presented its report to the Central Regional Minister. Details 
of the report were not published; however, the Committee recommended 
ways to ensure lasting peace between the two communities, and the 
Regional Minister agreed to implement the recommendations.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the Government plays 
down the importance of ethnic differences, its opponents occasionally 
complain that it is dominated by the Ewe ethnic group from the eastern 
part of the country. The President and some of his close advisers are 
Ewe, but most ministers are of other ethnic origins. A 1997 survey 
found that 25 percent of the respondents believed that they had 
experienced discrimination because of their tribal origins.
    During the year, there were several violent confrontations between 
and within ethnic groups related to chieftaincy issues, particularly 
those of succession and land. In January 1999, a chieftancy dispute in 
Juaso in the Ashanti Region resulted in the death of a policeman, 
several injuries, the burning of the police station, and the arrest of 
over 60 persons. The chief and his supporters were brought before the 
Kumasi tribunal and later granted bail. The case was ongoing at year's 
end. The police also are investigating some Juaso residents' claim of 
police mistreatment during the same event (see Section 1.a.). In July 
the Tamong and Puli clans in Bimbagu (West Mamprusi District in the 
Northern Region) clashed in a chieftancy dispute. Two persons were 
killed, and 56 houses were burned (see Section 1.a.). The police were 
sent to Bimbagu to maintain order during the clash. The police still 
were investigating the incident at year's end.
    On August 13, four persons were killed after a conflict over a 
chieftancy dispute in Weija (Greater Accra Region.)
    On December 7, 13 persons reportedly died, and over 25 were wounded 
in the Upper East Region capital Bawku in an electionrelated dispute 
that had ethnic overtones. The conflict initially was a dispute between 
ruling party and opposition supporters, and was fueled by ongoing 
tensions between the Mamprusi and Kusasi ethnic groups.
    Elders from the Guan and Akan ethnic groups, who were arrested and 
detained in 1999 for violence related to a chieftancy dispute, were 
awaiting prosecution at year's end. A 1999 chieftancy dispute in Teshie 
that resulted in numerous gunshot wounds, a stabbing, and destruction 
of property was pending before the Ga traditional council at year's 
end.
    An August 1999 case in which off-duty soldiers clashed with 
civilians in the Oshiye area of Accra in a chieftancy dispute, 
resulting in several injuries, was pending before the courts at year's 
end.
    In 1995 the Government created a permanent negotiating team made up 
of religious leaders, NGO representatives, Council of State members, 
and other interested parties to help resolve the continuing tensions 
between the Konkomba and other ethnic groups in the north. The 
Permanent Peace Negotiating Team (PPNT) is a facilitative body whose 
primary purpose is to mediate disputes. In 1997 in response to reports 
of latent insecurity, the PPNT extended its activities to some northern 
parts of the Volta Region and supervised a peace accord among all 
parties to the conflict there. Since 1997 there have been organized 
seminars and workshops designed to promote dialog between two feuding 
factions. The Government has a ban on firearms in the Northern Region 
and northern part of the Volta Region. Government officials, M.P.'s, 
and other prominent opinion leaders regularly call for peaceful 
coexistence. In February 1999, after 14 years of animosity, the Bimobas 
and the Konkombas of the East Mamprusi District of the Northern Region 
held a pacification and reconciliation ceremony. In August 1999, the 
Northern Region Youth and Development Association, an umbrella group of 
all the ethnic groups in the area, organized a workshop on building 
peace at the grassroots level.
    In January 1999, the Nipa-O-Nipa and Sika-O-Sika factions of 
Kumasi's ethnic Moshie community signed a peace agreement at the behest 
of the then Regional Minister. However, the longstanding dispute 
resurfaced in December 1999, after the Supreme Court had ruled on the 
Moshie leadership issue. One man died from a stab wound, and another 
was injured. In January a member of the Nipa-O-Nipa faction was 
sentenced to a week in prison for wounding a student during the 
December 1999 leadership dispute. In June three members of the Sika-O-
Sika faction were sentenced to death by hanging for the murder of the 
son of the leader of the Nipa-O-Nipa faction. The lawyers for the three 
Sika-O-Sika faction members filed an appeal, which was pending at 
year's end. The dispute was resolved May after the Ashanti paramount 
chief gave formal recognition to the Sika-O-Sika faction's leadership 
claim.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom 
of association. This right is restricted formally, as the Trades Union 
Ordinance confers broad powers on the Government to refuse to register 
a trade union; however, the Government has not interfered with the 
right of workers to associate in labor unions and has encouraged 
pluralism in labor organizations. The Industrial Relations Act (IRA), 
initially enacted in 1958 and amended in 1965 and 1972, governs trade 
unions and their activities. The percentage of workers belonging to 
unions appears to be decreasing from 9 percent in 1998 as more of the 
workforce enters the informal sector where there is no union activity. 
The Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare has estimated that 86 
percent of the work force is employed in the informal sector, and that 
number is expected to increase. In August 1999, the Ghana Federation of 
Labor (GFL) was inaugurated. The GFL is intended to serve as an 
umbrella organization for several other labor unions, which were either 
previously part of or not encompassed by the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC), the original federation. The TUC, the largest labor organization 
in the country, consists of 17 national unions.
    Led by experienced union leaders, the TUC has been a vocal and 
constructive critic of the Government's economic policies when it felt 
it to be necessary. Civil servants have their own union, the Civil 
Servants Association, which operates outside of the TUC umbrella.
    The law recognizes a right to strike, but there have been no legal 
strikes since independence. Under the IRA, the Government established a 
system of settling disputes, first through conciliation, then through 
arbitration. A union may call a legal strike if the Government does not 
call for formal arbitration. However, no union has ever gone through 
the complete process. There were numerous unsanctioned strike actions 
during the year, none of which met the requirements for a legal strike 
detailed in the IRA. The IRA prohibits retribution against strikers, 
and this law is enforced. On May 2, Accra textile traders were told 
that they could not hold a demonstration to protest a textile price 
hike because they lacked a police permit. Instead they presented a 
petition to the Government on the issue (see Section 2.b.). On July 25, 
thousands of trade union members demonstrated nationwide to demand an 
increase in the minimum wage. Police used water cannons on the Accra 
demonstrators to prevent them from blocking traffic at a major traffic 
circle. No injuries were reported in Accra or elsewhere (see Sections 
1.c. and 2.b.).
    The Government convened a committee to investigate reports that a 
gold-miners' strike in May 1999 was instigated by persons not employed 
by the mine. The committee completed its report in September 1999, but 
the conclusions were not made public by year's end.
    Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies. The 
TUC is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Union Unity 
headquartered in Accra and is also a member of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The IRA 
provides a framework for collective bargaining and some protection 
against antiunion discrimination. Trade unions engage in collective 
bargaining for wages and benefits for both private and state-owned 
enterprises without government interference. However, the Government, 
labor, and employers negotiate together through a tripartite commission 
to set minimum standards for wages and working conditions. A July 25 
trade union demonstration (see Section 6.a.) resulted from trade 
unions' accusations that they had not been consulted adequately in the 
Government's deliberations on the minimum wage. The Government argued 
that the unions had been included in tripartite dialog on the issue. 
The law requires employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination to 
reinstate workers fired for union activities. No union leaders have 
been detained in recent years for union or other activities.
    There is legislation that authorizes export processing zones 
(EPZ's), and a few EPZ's are in operation. Existing labor law applies 
in any EPZ, including the right to organize.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits slavery, and the law also prohibits forced or bonded labor, 
including that performed by children; however, at least 2,200 women and 
girls are bound to shrines through the localized Trokosi system (see 
Section 5). Forced labor also occurs at the camps in the north for 
women accused of witchcraft (see Section 5). Apart from the Trokosi 
system, it is difficult to determine the extent to which forced or 
bonded labor by children is practiced. In April the ILO commissioned 
the African Center for Human Development, a local NGO, to conduct a 
survey of the child labor situation. The NGO found that child labor and 
child trafficking are widespread in the informal labor sector, 
especially in larger cities and border areas. The country is both a 
source and a destination country for trafficked children (see Section 
6.f.). The NGO noted that law enforcement officials expressed a 
``complete disregard'' for child labor and trafficking issues. The 
study recommended that law enforcement officials be tasked with 
monitoring and combating child labor and child trafficking.
    According to government labor officials, child labor problems do 
not exist in the formal labor sector because ``exploitive child labor'' 
(defined as that which deprives a child of health, education, or 
development) is prohibited. However, many problems still exist in the 
informal sector. NGO's report that children as young as age 7 work 
illegally as porters, domestic servants, ``hawkers,'' rock-breakers in 
quarries, small-scale miners, farmers, and fishermen. They are paid 
poorly, if at all, and sometimes are molested or abused. They seldom 
receive sufficient food or health care, and do not attend school.
    There have been newspaper reports of children being sold into 
slavery for either sexual exploitation or labor, such as 10- to 12-
year-old boys toiling in the service of fisherman in exchange for a 
yearly remittance to their families. A June 1999, report described this 
practice as rampant in 156 fishing villages along the Afram River and 
settlements along the Volta Lake in the Afram plains (see Section 
6.f.). The ILO continues to urge the Government to revise various legal 
provisions that permit imprisonment with an obligation to perform labor 
for offenses that are not countenanced under ILO Convention 105.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Labor legislation sets a minimum employment age of 15 
years and prohibits night work and certain types of hazardous labor for 
those under 18 years of age. In practice child employment is 
widespread, and young children of school age often perform menial tasks 
during the day in the market or collect fares on local buses. An ILO 
survey conducted in three rural districts between 1992 and 1993 
concluded that 11 percent of school-age children were employed for 
wages and another 15 percent work without remuneration (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.). In August the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare 
estimated that 18,000 children are working in Accra and 800,000 
countrywide. Of those, 70 percent have no education while 21 percent 
only have a primary education.
    The migration of children from rural to urban areas is increasing, 
due to economic hardship. Children are driven to the streets to fend 
for themselves, increasing child labor and the school dropout rate. 
Another ILO study in 1992 and 1993 found that almost 90 percent of the 
surveyed street children in Accra did not attend school. Observance of 
minimum age laws is eroded by local custom and economic circumstances 
that encourage children to work to help support their families. A 1996 
ILO survey revealed that the economic activity of more than 75 percent 
of children between ages 5 and 14 takes place in the context of a 
family enterprise.
    In late 1998, the President signed into law legislation to provide 
additional child labor protection and strengthen the punishment for 
violators under a comprehensive children's act. The act incorporates 
the existing labor legislation's minimum age for employment and 
prohibitions on night work and hazardous labor. In addition, the 
legislation allows for children aged 15 years and above to have an 
apprenticeship whereby the craftsmen and employers have the obligation 
to provide a safe and healthy work environment along with training and 
tools. Fines and imprisonment for violators are increased considerably. 
In May Parliament ratified ILO Convention 182 concerning the 
elimination of the worst forms of child labor.
    On March 1, the Government signed a memorandum of understanding 
with the ILO to inaugurate the International Program on the Elimination 
of Child Labor (IPEC) in Ghana. Implementation of the IPEC began during 
the year; a national coordinator and steering committee were 
established, and the Government's statistical service was conducting a 
national survey of the child labor problem.
    In May the acting executive secretary of the Ghana National 
Commission on Children (GNCC) expressed concern about the increasing 
use of child labor in fishing enterprises, and advocated greater law 
enforcement of child labor laws. She appealed to parents and fishing 
communities to combat the practice.
    Officials only occasionally punish violators of regulations that 
prohibit heavy labor and night work for children. Inspectors from the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare are responsible for enforcement of 
child labor regulations. They visit each workplace annually and make 
spot checks whenever they receive allegations of violations.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that performed 
by children; however, at least 2,200 women and girls are bound to 
shrines through the Trokosi system and children are trafficked into and 
from the country (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    There were media reports of children being sold into slavery for 
either sexual exploitation or labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1991 minimum standards for 
wages and working conditions were set by a tripartite commission 
composed of representatives of the Government, labor, and employers. In 
November the daily minimum wage increased from about $.42 (2,900 cedis) 
to about $.62 (4,200 cedis), but is still insufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a single wage earner and family. 
Furthermore, there is widespread violation of the minimum wage law. In 
most cases, households have multiple wage earners, and family members 
engage in some family farming or other family-based commercial 
activities. Trade unions are lobbying the Government to increase the 
minimum wage to $.81 (5,500 cedis) and argue that an eventual minimum 
of a $1.00 (6,800 cedis) a day would provide a living wage to workers.
    The law sets the maximum workweek at 45 hours, with one break of at 
least 36 consecutive hours every 7 days. Through collective bargaining, 
however, the basic workweek for most unionized workers is 40 hours. In 
July 1999, the Government began compensating extra duty hours only for 
overtime actually worked, in accordance with labor equity, rather than 
as an automatic salary supplement.
    Occupational safety and health regulations exist, and the Labor 
Department of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare occasionally 
imposes sanctions on violators. However, safety inspectors are few and 
poorly trained. They take action if matters are called to their 
attention, but lack the resources to seek out violations. Workers have 
the right to withdraw themselves from dangerous work situations without 
jeopardy to continued employment, although they rarely exercise this 
right.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons, and trafficking in persons is a 
problem.
    The country is both a source and a destination country for 
trafficked children. A local NGO noted that law enforcement officials 
expressed a ``complete disregard'' for child labor and trafficking 
issues (see Section 6.c.). Law enforcement officials also have a 
difficult time identifying persons who are being trafficked because of 
the fluid nature of family relations in the country e.g. a friend often 
is called a ``cousin,'' and an older woman an ``aunt,'' even if there 
is no blood relation. Trafficking's most common form involved teenage 
girls from the rural areas being sent by relatives to work in the 
cities as housemaids for little remuneration. Often an assurance is 
given that after several years' service, the housemaid would be 
sponsored to train in dressmaking or hairdressing. However, often an 
excuse is found to fire the housemaid before such apprenticeship 
begins. Over 100 boys were reportedly contracted out to Lake Volta 
fishermen (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). There were also reports of 
children abducted to work either in the country or in neighboring 
countries. Young persons (girls and boys) are lured into prostitution 
and hard labor in Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria on the 
pretext of finding work in agriculture or as domestic help. Women 
reportedly are also drafted into prostitution in Germany and the 
Netherlands. Citizens reportedly were lured to the Middle East, 
particularly to Lebanon, to work illegally in menial jobs. Traffickers 
in persons from other countries also reportedly used Accra as a transit 
point to Europe.
    In May two men who had attempted to sell two young men into forced 
labor for $9,100 (50 million cedis) each were remanded to prison 
custody and charged with ``slave dealings.'' The case was pending in 
court at year's end. In June the Government repatriated 180 citizens, 
mostly girls, who were stranded in Lebanon as indentured servants. 
These girls were told that they were to work as household help to 
Lebanese families; upon arrival in Lebanon their documents and money 
were stolen and some of the women were beaten.
    A local NGO in the north conducts rehabilitation programs for women 
who have been trafficked. The NGO provides counseling and training in 
professions such as sewing and hairdressing to give them a source of 
income. The NGO also carries out a public information program about the 
dangers of trafficking and prostitution.
                               __________

                                 GUINEA

    Guinea is a constitutional republic in which effective power is 
concentrated in a strong presidency. President Lansana Conte has ruled 
since 1984, when he led the only successful coup d'etat in the 
country's history, first as head of a military junta, and since 1994 as 
a civilian president elected in 1993. Guinea held its first multiparty 
legislative elections in 1995, delivering more than 60 percent of the 
National Assembly seats to President Conte's Party of Unity and 
Progress (PUP). The PUP is one seat short of the number required to 
amend the Constitution. Although the PUP continues to dominate all 
three branches of Government, opposition parties on occasion have 
persuaded PUP Members of Parliament, including the National Assembly 
leadership, to vote with the opposition on specific legislative 
matters. Conte won a second 5-year term in a December 1998 election 
that was marred by violence and civil unrest before and after election 
day, widespread and diverse irregularities that tended to favor the 
incumbent, and the arrest and detention of major opposition candidates 
during the vote-counting process. Nevertheless, the election was much 
more transparent and fair than the 1993 election. In the 1998 
presidential election, the Government continued to dominate the 
electoral process and did not create an independent electoral 
commission as initially demanded by both opposition parties and ruling 
party dissidents; instead, it struck a compromise with the opposition 
and formed a High Council for Electoral Affairs, composed of 
representatives from many parties, but with authority limited to local 
vote counting and the transmission of results. The Government postponed 
municipal elections scheduled for 1999 until June. The elections were 
deeply flawed, with the opposition making credible charges of 
government intimidation, fraud, and manipulation. Legislative elections 
originally scheduled for 1999 have been postponed indefinitely at the 
request of both the PUP and opposition parties due to instability in 
the border region, which makes voter registration and campaigning 
extremely difficult. An increasingly disproportionate number of public 
sector positions, including senior military and cabinet posts, are held 
by members of the President's own minority ethnic group, the Soussou. 
The judiciary is subject to executive influence, particularly in 
politically sensitive cases.
    The gendarmerie and the national police share responsibility for 
internal security and sometimes play an oppressive role in the daily 
lives of citizens. Members of the Presidential Guard are accountable to 
almost no one except the President. Members of the security forces 
frequently committed human rights abuses.
    About 85 percent of the country's population of 7.6 million engage 
in subsistence agriculture. Annual recorded per capita gross domestic 
product was about $595 in 1999. More than 80 percent of export earnings 
come from mining, particularly bauxite, gold, and diamonds. Other 
exports include coffee and fruit. There has been modest economic growth 
in recent years, especially between 1996 and 1999, due in part to 
substantial assistance from international financial institutions and 
bilateral donors. However, economic performance has lagged since 1999, 
and government collaboration with international financial institutions 
and donors was complicated by additional defense spending in response 
to attacks from Sierra Leone and Liberia by RUF rebels and Liberian 
forces. In addition widespread corruption and limited transparency in 
Government blocked efforts at economic and fiscal reform; in particular 
corruption at the port and customs offices hampered effective 
collection of nonmining receipts.
    The Government's human rights record was poor; although there were 
some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained in many 
others. The Government's tight and sometimes partisan control of the 
electoral process, both in the 1998 presidential election and the 
deeply flawed June municipal elections; its refusal to create an 
independent electoral oversight mechanism; and its prohibition of 
nongovernmental broadcast media, effectively restricted citizens'' 
right to change their government. Major human rights abuses include: 
Extrajudicial killings; disappearances; use of torture, beatings, and 
rape by police and military personnel; and police abuse of prisoners 
and detainees. Soldiers, police, and civilian militia groups killed, 
beat, and raped citizens, as well as refugees from Sierra Leone and 
Liberia. Security forces used arbitrary arrest and detention. Members 
of the security forces committed abuses with impunity. Prison 
conditions are inhuman and combined with inadequate medical care 
frequently resulted in deaths. Prolonged pretrial detention is a 
problem. The Government failed to ensure access by attorneys to clients 
in prison, maintained the executive branch's influence over the 
judicial system and the electoral process, and infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights. The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the 
press. The private print press criticized the Government freely, but 
the Government continued to monopolize the broadcast media, including 
radio, the most important medium of mass communication. The Government 
restricted freedom of assembly. The Government imposed cumbersome 
requirements for official recognition on associations, and infringed on 
freedom of movement. Violence and societal discrimination against 
women, prostitution of young girls, female genital mutilation (FGM), 
ethnic discrimination and interethnic violence, child labor, reports of 
trafficking of women and children, and vigilante actions by victims or 
others persisted.
    RUF rebels from Sierra Leone and armed attackers from Liberia 
committed a large number of killings, mutilations, abductions, and 
other abuses, including the burning of homes.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
committed fewer extrajudicial killings than during the previous year, 
and there were fewer violent riots and instances of government 
overreaction than in the previous year. However, during municipal 
elections held in June, security forces, along with ruling party 
militants, clashed with opposition party supporters, resulting in the 
death of eight persons and injuries to several others. There was no 
investigation into the incident. In late November or early December, 
security forces killed six persons, including a university professor, 
in Conakry; they reportedly were meeting to plan a demonstration 
against the Government's policy in the forest region, and security 
forces claimed that they thought they were armed rebels (see Section 
2.b.). No action was taken against the security forces by year's end.
    At the beginning of November, the army bombed several villages in 
northern Sierra Leone in a campaign against rebels from Sierra Leone 
and Liberia. On December 8, troops attacked Rosint Village in northern 
Sierra Leone and killed several civilians, abducted over 50 persons, 
and burned over 30 houses.
    There was at least one reported case of a prisoner being tortured 
to death (see Section 1.c.). Some opposition members believe that his 
death was linked directly to torture by government authorities at a 
small military camp on Kassa Island. The Government denied these 
charges. In addition in January 1999, during Alpha Conde's detention 
(see Section 1.e.), one of his codefendants died in prison, reportedly 
because of torture (see Sections 1.c.).
    Deaths in custody due to inhuman prison conditions and inadequate 
medical treatment remained frequent (see Section 1.c.). Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) confirmed that a refugee detained along with approximately 
3,000 others following a series of crossborder rebel raids died while 
in detention because of poor prison conditions (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.d.).
    There was no action taken in the October 1999 case in which 
security forces killed two students when using unauthorized lethal 
force to bring a violent protest under control; nor in the 1999 case of 
a woman who died of injuries inflicted by members of the security 
forces during their suppression of riots in Labe.
    No action was taken against Banian subprefect Jean Traore, who shot 
and killed a man and wounded two other persons in 1998 while attempting 
to disperse a gathering of supporters of the Rally of the Guinean 
People (RPG). No action was taken against members of the security 
forces or government officials, who used excessive force against 
opposition party supporters, resulting in deaths both before and after 
the December 1998 presidential elections.
    Government authorities continued to block efforts by human rights 
groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to investigate 
political killings that took place in the 1970's under thenPresident 
Sekou Toure. Visits during the year to Camp Boiro, where political 
prisoners were held during the Sekou Toure regime, suggested that there 
is an ongoing effort to destroy evidence of the former use of the camp.
    In January violent clashes between Christian and Muslim villages in 
the forest region left 30 persons dead (see Section 5).
    Many victims of crime fear that they may never receive justice 
because of judicial corruption and at times resort to exacting their 
own form of retribution through vigilante violence. Some suspected 
criminals, notably thieves and rapists, are beaten to death or burned 
by their victims or others after being soaked with a flammable liquid.
    RUF rebels from Sierra Leone and armed attackers from Liberia 
killed hundreds of civilians and members of the security forces in 
crossborder raids during the year. In the latter half of the year, 
armed Liberians crossed the border and attacked the town of Macenta, 
while RUF rebels from Sierra Leone attacked Forecariah; both groups 
killed villagers, burned houses, pillaged crops, and looted property 
(see Section 1.f.). Since early September, crossborder clashes resulted 
in over 900 deaths. For example, on September 3, RUF rebels and 
Liberian forces attacked the village of Massadou on the Liberian 
border, killed 47 persons, burned homes, and looted food supplies. On 
September 6, suspected RUF rebels from Sierra Leone killed 27 persons 
in a crossborder raid on the village of Pamalap. On September 16, in an 
attack on the border town of Macenta, unidentified armed men from 
Liberia killed Mensah Kpognon, a humanitarian worker from Togo, and 34 
other persons. They also abducted Sapeu Laurence Djeya, a humanitarian 
worker from Cote d'Ivoire, who was released on September 28 (see 
Section 1.b.). On September 27, suspected Liberian armed attackers 
possibly supported by Guinean dissidents in exile killed 67 persons, 
including 3 soldiers after an attack on Macenta. On September 30, armed 
rebels attacked the villages of Macenta and Forecariah; the Government 
reported that there were numerous deaths and injuries. On October 2, 
armed men from Liberia killed three persons in an attack on the village 
of Koyama. On November 13, rebels attacked Yagouya and Soumbazaya 
villages, killing one person and abducting all of the village 
residents. After a relatively calm period, hostilities increased at the 
beginning of December when RUF rebels and Liberian forces attacked 
Gueckedou and Kissidougou, killing approximately 100 civilians and 
displacing thousands of persons.
    b. Disappearance.--Opposition leaders, local NGO's, and the 
independent press occasionally report cases of politically motivated 
temporary disappearances that usually ended with the eventual release 
of the prisoners who were held by security forces.
    There were reports that members of the armed forces abducted 
persons from Sierra Leone after attacks by RUF rebels and Guinean 
dissidents. For example, on December 8, troops attacked Rosint Village 
in northern Sierra Leone and abducted over 50 persons, killed several 
civilians, and burned over 30 houses.
    In the months after the February 1996 mutiny, hundreds of soldiers 
and civilians disappeared during neighborhood sweeps conducted by armed 
members of the security forces. Baba Sarr, a relative of reported 
mutiny ringleader Major Gbago Zoumanigui, remains missing since his 
detention following the mutiny. Many of those missing after the 1996 
mutiny were in self-imposed exile, according to family members.
    On September 6, during a crossborder raid, RUF rebels from Sierra 
Leone abducted two Italian missionaries; they escaped on December 3. On 
September 17, armed attackers from Liberia abducted Sapeu Laurence 
Djeya, an Ivorian humanitarian worker; she was released after several 
days. Survivors of some of the crossborder attacks report that the 
entire populations of small villages were abducted and taken to Sierra 
Leone. For example, on November 13, rebels attacked Yagouya and 
Soumbazaya villages, abducting everyone then in the village and killing 
one person (see Section 1.a.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Penal Code and the Constitution prohibit torture and 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, both civilian and 
military security forces beat and otherwise abused civilians. There 
were also reports that security forces often use torture and beatings 
to extract confessions and employ other forms of brutality, including 
holding prisoners incommunicado without charges and under inhuman 
conditions. Local human rights organizations and former detainees 
stated that some prisoners are bound and hung by their feet before 
being beaten. There were no reported judicial proceedings against 
officers suspected of committing abuses. Many citizens view the 
security forces as corrupt, ineffective, and even dangerous. Police 
ignore legal procedures, and extort money from citizens at roadblocks 
(see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). Refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone 
reported that some soldiers demanded sex in exchange for entry into the 
country. There are also reports of sexual assaults on refugees (see 
Section 2.d.).
    During June's municipal elections, diplomatic observers witnessed 
security personnel beating unresisting persons. A local human rights 
NGO reported that security forces also shot, beat, and raped civilians, 
and pillaged personal property during the June elections (see Sections 
1.a. and 3).
    In early September, after a series of rebel raids into the country, 
President Conte blamed the attacks on refugees. Subsequently soldiers, 
police, and civilian militia groups detained thousands of refugees from 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, so of whom they beat and raped (see Section 
2.d.).
    Defendants in the Alpha Conde trial often reported that they were 
tortured, starved, and neglected during their detention (see Sections 
1.a. and 1.e.). In January 1999, prison officials reportedly tortured 
to death warrant officer Guey Keita.
    Vigilante groups beat and robbed Liberian nationals in Conakry on 
several occasions. Refugees in the Katkama refugee camp reported at 
least two instances of sexual assault by vigilantes during the year. On 
September 30, armed gangs attacked the Farmoriah refugee camp near 
Forecariah, beating the refugees and burning their belongings. Groups 
of vigilantes in the Gueckedou area forced refugees and humanitarian 
workers to undress and then examined them for tattoos, which are 
presumed to be identification marks for rebel groups. In one instance 
in October, a group of vigilantes forced five of the refugees to the 
police station in Gueckedou where they were detained (see Sections 1.d. 
and 2.d.).
    During the year, RUF rebels from Sierra Leone and Liberian rebels 
conducted a number of crossborder raids during which they killed, 
injured, and displaced persons, and burned and looted homes (see 
Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions are inhuman and life threatening. Family members 
and friends are responsible for feeding prisoners. Guards often 
demanded bribes in exchange for letting food through to those 
incarcerated. Standards of sanitation remained poor, and there were 
several dozen deaths due to malnutrition and disease. A former inmate 
held in the central prison in Conakry reported in 1998 being housed 
with between 60 and 80 prisoners in 1 cell, with a single toilet and no 
beds. Some prisoners have reported sleeping on their knees because 
their cells were so small. Prisoners reported threats, beatings, and 
harassment by guards, and some reported being denied food and a place 
to lie down. There are credible reports from prisoners that female 
inmates are subject to harassment and sexual assault by guards. Men and 
women are housed separately, but juveniles generally are mixed in with 
adults.
    The Organisation Guineenne de Defense des Droits de L'Homme et du 
Citoyen (OGDH) determined that prisoners in at least one major prison, 
located in N'Zerekore, suffered more from neglect and lack of resources 
than from mistreatment. According to the OGDH, the N'Zerekore prison is 
a converted grain warehouse built in 1932 for 70 prisoners, but it 
houses 120. There is no electricity or running water.
    The independent press, a local human rights organization, and a 
former prisoner reported in previous years that inmates routinely are 
beaten and subjected to other forms of abuse at the prison in Koundara 
in the north. Although the Minister of Justice has criticized inhuman 
prison conditions during televised visits to prison facilities, no 
concrete action was taken to improve conditions by year's end.
    The Government permits prison visits by local humanitarian and 
religious organizations, which offer medical care and food for those in 
severe need. A former prisoner reported that without this assistance 
those who do not have families or friends would starve to death.
    Opposition party members alleged that they had not been permitted 
to visit Alpha Conde in prison at year's end.
    In November 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) signed a detention accord with the Government for satisfactory 
access to prisoners. The ICRC reported that, for the most part, it had 
access to prisoners during the year (see Section 4).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces 
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention regularly, despite 
procedural provisions in the Penal Code designed to safeguard 
detainees. In practice administrative controls over the police are 
ineffective, and security forces rarely follow the Penal Code.
    The Code of Penal Procedure allows only the gendarmerie to make 
arrests, but the army, the Presidential Guard (Red Berets), and the 
state police often detain persons as well. The Penal Code requires that 
the Government issue a warrant before an arrest can be made and that 
detainees be charged before a magistrate within 72 hours; however, many 
detainees are incarcerated for longer periods before being charged. 
After being charged, the accused may be held until the conclusion of 
the case, including a period of appeal. Release on bail is at the 
discretion of the magistrate who has jurisdiction. The Constitution 
proscribes incommunicado detention; however, at times it occurs in 
practice. The law provides for access by attorneys to their clients, 
but authorities frequently do not respect this provision.
    On February 7, police detained approximately 30 students, who were 
marching to protest poor conditions in school (see Section 2.b.).
    The Penal Code strictly forbids civilians being detained at 
military camps; however, this provision largely is ignored. During 
June's municipal elections, police arrested and detained 44 persons, 
including children, women, old men, and an imam. They were taken to a 
military camp, where they reportedly were stripped, threatened, beaten, 
and tortured. They were released through the intervention of local and 
religious authorities (see Sections 1.c. and 3).
    RPG members allege that authorities arrested and detained an 
individual who brought food to Alpha Conde; he was accused of 
threatening national security and was held in solitary confinement for 
one week before being released.
    Some police forces took advantage of the Alpha Conde trial (see 
Section 1.e.) by arresting and detaining their creditors and other 
enemies, beating them, and then falsely accusing them of complicity 
with Conde.
    In early September, after a series of crossborder raids by RUF 
rebels and mercenaries, police detained approximately 3,000 refugees, 
although most were released within several days (see Section 2.d.). HRW 
confirmed that a refugee died while in detention because of poor prison 
conditions (see Sections 1.a. and 2.d.). In September in Massakoundou, 
police arrested four refugees found to have tattoos on their bodies, 
although they were released a few days later. In October five refugees 
from the Gueckedou refugee camp were detained after vigilantes found 
tattoos on them (see Section 1.c.). Two eventually were released; 
however, one still is in detention in the Gueckedou police station, and 
two were transferred to Conakry.
    Bar Association attorneys, the independent press, and government 
sources describe a parallel system of justice run by unidentified 
uniformed personnel who conduct midnight arrests, detain suspects, and 
use torture in secret prisons to obtain confessions before transferring 
detainees to prosecutors (see Section 1.c.). In previous years, a 
member of a political opposition party, a soldier, a local human rights 
organization, and former prisoners all reported that the Government 
imprisons for political reasons persons considered a threat to state 
security at Kassa prison, allegedly located in a former French colonial 
structure on an island off the coast of Conakry. The Government denied 
the existence of the Kassa Island Prison and stated that prisoners 
identified as political detainees have been incarcerated for criminal 
acts and are located in other prisons. In 1998 foreign diplomats 
visited the military installation on Kassa Island, where they saw no 
evidence of a torture facility. However, there continued to be reports 
of the Kassa facility's existence. During the trial of Alpha Conde, 
many of the accused claimed that they were brought to Kassa Island and 
were tortured for time periods that ranged from a few days to several 
weeks (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.e.).
    Security forces frequently detained persons at roadblocks and 
extorted money from them (see Section 2.d.).
    On at least one occasion, authorities arrested a journalist (see 
Section 2.a.).
    On December 15, 1998, the day after the election, members of the 
security forces arrested Alpha Conde, the presidential candidate of the 
RPG opposition party, at the town of Lola on the Liberian border. The 
Government detained Conde incommunicado until December 30, 1998, when 
it charged him with trying to leave the country illegally, resisting 
arrest, engaging in illegal foreign currency transactions, and training 
an armed force to overthrow the Government. During the year, foreign 
officials, including the Senegalese Minister of Justice, and several 
foreign diplomats visited Alpha Conde in detention. Conde's lawyers 
reported that they had generally free access to their client as well as 
to the dossier of his case. Conde's doctor, but not his family members, 
also had access to him. Conde's trial, originally scheduled for 1999, 
was postponed until April and concluded in September (see Section 
1.e.).
    The Government does not practice forced exile, although several 
soldiers who fled the country in 1996 after a mutiny attempt remained 
in self-imposed exile according to their families (see Section 1.b.). 
There are credible reports that these soldiers were engaged in the 
armed attacks on the country in conjunction with RUF rebels from Sierra 
Leone and Liberian forces (see Section 1.a.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
judiciary's independence; however, judicial authorities routinely defer 
to executive authorities in politically sensitive cases. Magistrates 
are civil servants with no assurance of tenure. Due to corruption and 
nepotism in the judiciary, relatives of influential members of the 
Government often are, in effect, above the law. In 1996 the Cabinet 
stated that it would pursue those who violate the law but avoid 
punishment due to judicial corruption, including the autonomous 
Presidential Guard; however, no action has been taken. Judges often do 
not act independently, and their verdicts are subject to outside 
interference. Influential persons often intervene on behalf of their 
relatives to prevent a negative judgment from being carried out.
    The judiciary includes courts of first instance, the two Courts of 
Appeal, and the Supreme Court, which is the court of final appeal. 
Since 1988 civilian courts have rendered all judgments involving 
civilians under the Penal Code. A military tribunal prepares and 
adjudicates charges against accused military personnel, to whom the 
Penal Code does not apply. The Government announced in 1996 the 
creation of a Discipline Council for dealing with civil servants who 
abuse their positions as government employees, but by year's end, the 
Council still had not prosecuted any cases.
    During the year, the State Security Court was used to try Alpha 
Conde and his defendants. The State Security Court is comprised of 
magistrates directly appointed by the President, and the verdict is 
open only to an appeal on a point of law, not for the reexamination of 
evidence.
    The judicial system is plagued by numerous problems, including a 
shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates and an outdated and 
restrictive penal code. The Penal Code provides for the presumption of 
innocence of accused persons, the independence of judges, the equality 
of citizens before the law, the right of the accused to counsel, and 
the right to appeal a judicial decision. Although in principle the 
Government is responsible for funding legal defense costs in serious 
criminal cases, in practice it rarely disburses these funds. The 
attorney for the defense frequently receives no payment. By year's end, 
the new Minister of Justice had introduced a prisoner tracking system 
that enabled him to review the cases of individual prisoners and to 
follow up on cases that did not reach the courts in an appropriate 
amount of time.
    During the December 1998 presidential elections, the Government 
ordered the closure of all land borders. On December 15, 1998, 
presidential candidate Alpha Conde, leader of the RPG, and three others 
were arrested in Pine, Lola, near the Liberian border. Conde 
subsequently was charged with illegal use of military force, 
undermining the authority of the state and the integrity of the 
national territory, use of violence against a state security officer, 
wrongful possession and transfer of foreign currency, and an illegal 
attempt to cross the frontier. Conde's arrest led to street protests by 
RPG militants in Conakry, which were repressed by police, resulting in 
the arrest and detention of many protesters (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.b.).
    The Government continued its investigation, and it later arrested 
and charged several civilians and military officers in connection with 
Conde. In April Alpha Conde and 47 others were brought to trial. At the 
start of the trial, the presiding judge allowed an international team 
of lawyers to defend Conde and allowed international observers in the 
courtroom, over the objections of the Government. However, when the 
court refused to nullify the case based on Conde's parliamentary 
immunity, the legal team resigned in protest. The court immediately 
appointed other lawyers to defend Conde and his codefendants. Conde and 
one other defendant rejected those lawyers and refused to speak in 
court. Others accused the prosecution of witness tampering, 
intimidation, and outright fraud. An international NGO, Commission 
Internationale de Juristes, sent an observer to the trial who noted 
several problems with the conduct of the trial. On September 11, Conde 
was found guilty, and he was sentenced to 5 years in prison. Most of 
Conde's codefendants were found innocent and released, while all of the 
others were sentenced to time served.
    Many citizens are wary of judicial corruption and instead prefer to 
rely on traditional systems of justice at the village or urban 
neighborhood level. Litigants present their civil cases before a 
village chief, a neighborhood leader, or a council of wise men. The 
dividing line between the formal and informal justice systems is vague, 
and authorities may refer a case from the formal to the traditional 
system to ensure compliance by all parties. Similarly, if a case cannot 
be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties in the traditional 
system, it may be referred to the formal system for adjudication. The 
traditional system discriminates against women in that evidence given 
by women carries less weight, in accordance with Islamic precepts (see 
Section 5).
    At year's end, the Government held an unknown number of political 
prisoners. Such prisoners are individuals incarcerated for allegedly 
politically motivated acts, such as protests, meetings, and campaigns; 
but they were arrested and convicted under criminal laws, such as those 
applying to creating disorder, inciting violence, and corruption. 
Consequently some of these individuals received disproportionately 
harsh punishment due to their political affiliation. Members of 
political opposition parties and a local human rights organization 
stated that dozens of persons also are being detained or have 
disappeared for political reasons (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.). The 
Government denies holding any political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the 
home, and judicial search warrants are required by law; however, police 
frequently ignore these procedures. Police and paramilitary police 
often ignore legal procedures in the pursuit of criminals. Police and 
the military frequently detained persons at nighttime roadblocks for 
purposes of security and extortion (see Section 2.d.).
    It is believed widely that security officials monitor mail. Local 
businesses, including foreign companies, often complained of 
intimidation and harassment by public officials and authorities.
    In early September, after a series of crossborder raids, police and 
civilian militias looted houses, stole property, and destroyed property 
belonging to Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees. In late October, 
Governor Mbemba Bangoura reportedly told mayors of different communes 
within Conakry to conduct house to house searches for weapons.
    On December 8, troops entered Rosint Village in northern Sierra 
Leone and burned over 30 houses.
    RUF rebels from Sierra Leone and Liberian forces killed civilians, 
burned homes, pillaged crops, looted food supplies and other goods, and 
took civilian hostages during numerous crossborder raids (see Section 
1.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression, subject to certain limitations; however, despite 
government statements in support of free speech and a free press, the 
Government employs a broad range of restrictions on these rights. The 
Government prohibits what it considers seditious talk or chants in 
public, has established defamation and slander as criminal offenses, 
and prohibits communications that personally insult the President, that 
incite violence, discrimination, or hatred, or that disturb the public 
peace. Resulting sanctions may include revocation of press cards, 
imprisonment, and banishment. In December 1999, two journalists who 
published a financial scandal involving two highly placed ministers 
were arrested under these laws.
    The Government publishes an official newspaper, Horoya, and 
operates the official television and radio (ORTG) stations. In response 
to strong political pressure and in order to protect their jobs, 
journalists for the official press practice selfcensorship and avoid 
reporting on politically controversial issues. However, several younger 
broadcast journalists for the official press reported critically about 
the Government and posed critical questions at official press 
conferences.
    While the only daily newspaper, Horoya, is owned and operated by 
the state, there is a vocal private press that is critical of the 
President and the Government. For example, the weekly satirical 
newspaper Le Lynx published front-page cartoons lampooning the 
President and senior government officials. Five private newspapers (Le 
Lynx, La Lance, L'Oeil, L'Independant, and L'Independant Plus) publish 
weekly in Conakry, and up to 10 other publications appear sporadically, 
although they are hampered by technical and financial difficulties 
stemming from paper and ink taxes, among other informal obstacles. Le 
Lynx and La Lance, under the same management, also are connected to the 
Internet and have web sites. One newspaper, L'Espoir, is affiliated 
with the governing political party, and several other newspapers are 
affiliated with opposition parties. Other newspapers offer news and 
criticism of both the Government and the opposition. However, because 
the literacy rate is only around 35 percent and the price of newspapers 
is beyond the reach of the average citizen, the effect of the print 
media is limited. Despite the limited reach of the print media, the 
Government still occasionally criticized and harassed print journalists 
whom it considers threatening.
    The Government closed L'Independent and L'Independent Plus for 
several weeks during the year, and the editor reportedly was expelled 
from the country. The newspapers reappeared for a period as Le Democrat 
and Le Republicain; however, the original names eventually were 
reinstated.
    In July authorities arrested a journalist after he published an 
article about the electric company Sogel. He later was released, but 
his trial was pending at year's end.
    The Government owns and operates all domestic broadcast media 
including radio, which serves as the most important means of informing 
the public. It is estimated that every household in the country has at 
least one radio. Many citizens listen regularly to foreign-origin 
short-wave radio, because of a lack of confidence in the state media, 
and access to foreign television satellite broadcasts is growing. The 
Government does not restrict access to or distribution of foreign 
television programming via satellite or cable. Although relatively few 
citizens can afford these services, by stringing a network of cables to 
a single satellite dish, entire neighborhoods are gaining access to 
foreign programming.
    On July 28, the National Council of Communication announced the 2-
month suspension of the accreditation of three foreign radio 
correspondents in Conakry for their allegedly biased reporting. Those 
affected by this measure were Mouctar Bah of Radio France International 
(RFI), Ben Daouda Sylla of Africa No. 1 (based in Libreville), and 
Amadou Diallo of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). On 
September 25, the National Council of Communication lifted the 
suspension.
    The country has had full Internet access since 1997. At year's end, 
there were three domestic service providers, two strictly private and 
one affiliated with SOTELGUI, a public and private telephone company 
that holds a monopoly on international telephone lines. The Government 
did not restrict Internet access. Storefront operations offering 
Internet access were common throughout downtown Conakry; however, a 
lack of reliable telephone lines inhibited home Internet access, even 
for the few who could afford it.
    The state-owned media are not impartial; they provide extensive, 
and almost invariably, favorable coverage of the Government and ruling 
party, while providing little coverage of opposition party activities. 
While in theory the law allows private electronic media, the Government 
has held up proposals for private radio and television stations, on the 
grounds of national security and stability.
    Political tracts occasionally circulate in Conakry and other urban 
areas. Some tracts support the Government, while others specifically 
criticize senior officials. Foreign publications, some of which 
criticize the Government, often are available, although the Government 
delayed the distribution of a February issue of L'Intelligent/Jeune 
Afrique for several days, while preparing a rebuttal to an article 
``Guinee C'est L'enfer'' (``Guinea is Hell''), which criticized 
conditions in the prisons and focused on the Alpha Conde case.
    The Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research 
exercises limited control over academic freedom through its influence 
on faculty hiring and control over the curriculum. In general teachers 
are not subject to classroom censorship; however, both public and 
private schools are obliged to follow the Government's curriculum, on 
which the national examinations are based.
    In December security forces killed six persons, including a 
university professor, who were meeting to plan a demonstration against 
the Government's policy in the forest region (see Sections 1.a. and 
2.b.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law restricts 
freedom of assembly, and the Government exercises its power to restrict 
unwanted political activity. The Penal Code bans any meeting that has 
an ethnic or racial character or any gathering ``whose nature threatens 
national unity.'' The Government requires notification 72 hours prior 
to public gatherings, otherwise the events are considered illegal.
    The Government bans all street marches except funerals. The law 
allows local authorities to cancel a demonstration or meeting if they 
believe that it poses a threat to public order. They may hold event 
organizers criminally liable if violence or destruction of property 
ensues.
    On February 7, riot police dispersed a crowd of students who were 
marching to the Education Ministry to protest overcrowding and poor 
conditions in schools. Police detained temporarily approximately 30 
students on the charge of being ``bandits.'' In late November or early 
December, security forces killed six persons, including a university 
professor, who were meeting to plan a demonstration against the 
Government's policy in the forest region; security forces claimed that 
they thought they were armed rebels (see Section 1.a.). In response on 
December 5, the Governor of Conakry announced that written permission 
from his office was required for all public meetings of all 
associations, nongovernmental organizations, groups, cooperatives, and 
political parties.
    Freedom of association is protected by law; however, the Government 
imposes cumbersome requirements to obtain official recognition. 
Political parties must provide information on their founding members 
and produce internal statutes and political platforms consistent with 
the Constitution before the Government recognizes them. There were 
approximately 46 legally recognized political parties; deputies of 9 
different parties were represented in the National Assembly.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and permits religious communities to govern themselves without 
state interference, and the Government generally respects these rights 
in practice. The government-sponsored National Islamic League (NIL) 
represents the country's Sunni Muslim majority, who make up 85 percent 
of the population. The Government requires that all recognized 
Christian churches join the Association of Churches and Missions in 
order to benefit from certain government privileges, such as tax 
benefits and energy subsidies. Missionary groups are required to make a 
declaration of their aims and activities to the Ministry of Interior or 
to the NIL.
    The NIL states that it supports peaceful coexistence with other 
religious denominations and actively attempts to facilitate dialog to 
eliminate ethnic and religious tensions. Although the Government and 
the NIL have spoken out against the proliferation of Shi'a 
fundamentalist sects on the grounds that they ``generate confusion and 
deviation'' within the country's Islamic family, they have not 
restricted these groups. Foreign missionaries and church-affiliated 
relief agencies operate freely.
    Government support of the powerful, semi-official NIL has led some 
non-Muslims to complain that the Government uses its influence to favor 
Muslims over non-Muslims, although non-Muslims are represented in the 
Cabinet, administrative bureaucracy, and the armed forces. Conversions 
of senior officials to Islam, such as that of the Defense Minister, are 
ascribed to the NIL's efforts to influence the religious beliefs of 
senior government leaders. The Government refrains from appointing non-
Muslims to important administrative positions in certain parts of the 
country, in deference to the particularly strong social dominance of 
Islam in these regions.
    There have been no recent reports that government officials have 
obstructed or limited missionary activities of Jehovah's witnesses, who 
had reported isolated instances of harassment in the past.
    Despite claims of separation of church and state, in July the 
Government announced that it would finance the renovation of Conakry's 
grand mosque, the mosque at which President Conte practices.
    In April 1999, for the first time, the Government required 
government ministers to take an oath on either the Koran or the Bible, 
which provoked criticism from those who saw the gesture as incompatible 
with the secular nature of the State.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with 
the right to travel freely within the country and to change their place 
of residence and work; however, authorities infringed on these rights 
in some areas. The Government requires all citizens to carry national 
identification cards, which they must present on demand at security 
checkpoints. Travelers face harassment by police and at military 
roadblocks, particularly late at night. The private press and local 
NGO's reported that travelers often are pressured to pay bribes to 
allow passage. Government officials state that the corruption is being 
perpetrated by a few rogue soldiers; however, abuse at official 
checkpoints is systemic.
    During the June municipal elections, the Government closed roads in 
Conakry, preventing some voters from reaching polling stations (see 
Section 3).
    Although the Government permits foreign travel for its citizens, it 
retains the authority to limit such travel for political reasons. In 
September the speaker of the National Assembly complained that his 
passport was confiscated at Conakry's Gbessia Airport upon his return 
to the country. The Government claimed that it was a simple 
misunderstanding and said that the passport was taken for courtesy 
check-in. Similarly two National Assembly delegates reported that they 
were not given diplomatic passports because they were opposition party 
members.
    Following an August 13 release into Guinea of humanitarian workers 
held hostage in Kolahun, Liberia, by a dissident group, the Government 
closed its border with Liberia (see Section 1.d.). The border was 
reopened, and as of year's end, the border remained officially open.
    The Government closed its border with Sierra Leone intermittently. 
At the beginning of August, the Government closed the border, later 
allowing access only to ``vulnerable'' refugees, including pregnant and 
lactating women, children below the age of 18, and the elderly. At the 
beginning of September, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
confirmed that at least 10,000 civilians were waiting to cross the 
border, and that a pregnant woman and at least 10 children had died due 
to poor conditions in makeshift camps on the border.
    There are approximately 150,000 to 200,000 internally displaced 
persons (IDP's) in the country as a result of the border attacks by RUF 
rebels from Sierra Leone and Liberian forces. The Government estimated 
this number at 209,000; however, the UNCHR believed that the number was 
lower.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates 
with the UNHCR, the World Food Program, other humanitarian 
organizations, and donor countries to assist refugees. The Government 
provides first asylum in accordance with U.N. and Organization of 
African Unity conventions. The UNHCR stated that as of October 3, 
approximately 500,000 Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees were 
resident in the country. According to the UNHCR, more than 200,000 
Sierra Leoneans entered Guinea since January 1998 and are mostly in the 
forest region. The Government claims that many more refugees are 
present in the urban areas of the country, and that the number of 
refugees in the country is closer to a million. Refugees account for 
half or more of the populations of the forest region cities of 
N'Zerekore, Gueckedou, and Macenta. Almost all of the refugees from 
Guinea-Bissau were repatriated by year's end.
    In past years, the Government has provided school buildings, access 
to local medical facilities, and land for farming to assist those 
designated as refugees. However, relief organizations reported that 
some local authorities have demanded portions of donated fuel and food 
from delivery convoys. In October instability in the southern border 
areas where most refugees lived prompted the Government and the UNHCR 
to call for assistance in moving refugees away from the border. 
However, although the Government initially was reluctant to allocate 
suitable arable land for the establishment of new refugee camps further 
from the border, it did so by year's end.
    In previous years, the Government generally was hospitable toward 
refugees; however, as crossborder raids by RUF rebels from Sierra Leone 
and Liberian forces intensified, the Government increasingly become 
less tolerant toward refugees. There was credible evidence that RUF 
forces used refugees as informants and disguised themselves as refugees 
to prepare for attacks on the country. For example, in early September, 
after a series of rebel raids into the country, President Conte, in a 
radio address, accused Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees living in 
the country of fomenting war against the Government. Soldiers, police, 
and civilian militia groups rounded up thousands of refugees, some of 
whom they beat and raped (see Section 1.c.). Approximately 3,000 
refugees were detained, although most were released by year's end (see 
Section 1.d.). HRW confirmed that a refugee died while in detention 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    Reports have become rare that police and border patrol guards 
demanded bribes before allowing refugees into the country or that some 
border officers demanded sex from women who lacked money to pay bribes. 
However, there were some reports that refugees were forced to pay 
bribes to leave refugee camps guarded by the armed forces and then were 
forced to pay bribes to get past many of the checkpoints. Security 
forces arrested suspected rebels at the border as they tried to enter 
the country.
    Vigilante groups attacked Liberian nationals in Conakry on several 
occasions. Refugees in Katkama camp reported at least two instances of 
sexual assault by vigilantes during the year. Groups of vigilantes in 
the Gueckedou area forced refugees and humanitarian workers to undress 
and then examined them for tattoos, which are presumed to be 
identification marks for rebel groups (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Although the 1990 Constitution provides for a popularly elected 
President and National Assembly, the ability of citizens to exercise 
this provision effectively is restricted. The Government's tight and 
sometimes partisan control of the electoral process and lack of an 
independent electoral oversight mechanism call into serious doubt the 
ability of citizens to change their government peacefully.
    Although opposition political parties have been legal since 1991, 
the Government has continued to dominate the electoral process; General 
Conte has remained President, and his PUP party has retained a majority 
in the National Assembly. The Government controlled the first 
multiparty presidential election in 1993 and the first multiparty 
legislative elections in 1995, limiting the opposition to a subordinate 
role.
    Municipal elections took place on June 25; however, national 
legislative elections were postponed indefinitely at the request of 
both the PUP and opposition parties. In the June elections, President 
Conte's ruling PUP party claimed victory in 32 of 38 municipalities. 
The announcement of the results was delayed for several days in the 
wake of postelection violence. Reportedly the police killed eight 
persons during clashes between opposition demonstrators and police, and 
injured several more (see Section 1.a.). A diplomatic observer noticed 
an increased military presence in the interior municipalities of Mamou 
and Kankan, and on June 28, he witnessed eight soldiers beating three 
unresisting citizens (see Section 1.c.). The Government claimed that 
the elections were free and transparent, but the opposition strongly 
disagreed and claimed credibly that the Government and the ruling party 
engaged in massive ``obstruction, fraud, and intimidation'' (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). Opposition figures alleged that the Government 
manipulated the voting by facilitating multiple ballot-casting by 
ruling party regulars and denying voting cards to opposition party 
supporters. President Conte made inflammatory and partisan speeches in 
June and July, threatening opposition leaders with arrest and claiming 
to rule the country by ``divine right,'' which widely were considered 
as attempts to intimidate his opponents. During the June municipal 
elections, the Government closed some roads in Conakry, ostensibly to 
prevent election fraud; however, in practice it prevented many voters 
living outside the district in which they were registered from reaching 
their polling stations and voting (see Section 2.d.). Candidates of a 
new party led by former Prime Minister Sidya Toure were denied access 
to the electoral process.
    When the victorious PUP councils could not agree on who should be 
appointed to leadership positions, President Conte named several mayors 
himself, in a move that observers criticized widely as unconstitutional 
and irregular.
    The country's second multiparty presidential election was held on 
December 14, 1998, under a somewhat improved electoral process; 
however, the Government continued to refuse to establish a national 
election commission independent of the Government, despite opposition 
demands. In September 1998, the Government and the CODEM, an umbrella 
group of opposition parties formed in 1995, agreed to establish a 
Superior Council for Electoral Affairs (SCEA) and local vote counting 
commissions, composed of CODEM as well as government and ruling party 
representatives, with oversight authority over local vote counting and 
transmission of local results to Conakry. However, the Government 
retained exclusive control of all registration and election procedures 
up to and including the casting of votes, as well as of the national 
tabulation of election results.
    According to the Government's tabulation of results, President 
Conte was elected to a second 5-year term, receiving 56 percent of the 
2.7 million votes cast, while Bah Mamadou of the Union pour la Nouvelle 
Republique received 25 percent and Alpha Conde of the RPG received 17 
percent. Had no candidate received a majority of votes cast, the 
Constitution would have required a second election between the two 
leading candidates.
    The election was much more transparent and fair than the 1993 
presidential election. Observers from various organizations affiliated 
chiefly with developing countries issued a statement that found no 
fault with the election-day vote-casting process; however, observers 
from European and other credible foreign organizations did not endorse 
that statement, which was issued before the election results were 
announced and did not address the registration, campaigning, and vote-
counting processes.
    The 1998 presidential election was marred by violence and 
disruption of opposition campaigning before the polling, by civil 
unrest after the polling, by widespread and diverse irregularities that 
tended to favor the incumbent, and by the arrest and detention of major 
opposition candidates during the vote-counting process.
    There were credible reports during the 1998 election campaign that 
ruling party supporters and government officials used force to prevent 
or disrupt opposition party meetings in Conakry and in provincial towns 
during the campaign. Violence between PUP and opposition party 
supporters, as well as violent interethnic clashes with political 
overtones in Conakry, was frequent and widespread during the election 
campaign (see Section 5).
    Opposition candidates suffered from inferior access both to state 
election funds and to coverage by the state-monopolized domestic 
broadcast media, although the Government allotted each candidate an 
equal amount of television and radio broadcast time each day throughout 
the 1998 campaign.
    On election day, international observers noted a shortage of 
ballots for opposition candidates in some districts of Conakry, but an 
abundance of ballots for President Conte. There were no charges of 
widespread, systematic obstruction of pollwatchers, but opposition 
pollwatchers often were absent from heavily proConte areas, suggesting 
at least selective obstruction. Opposition party officials charged that 
security forces arrested and detained over 100 opposition pollwatchers 
on election day; manipulated voting procedures in some areas; and 
overlooked irregularities in voter registration and in ballot-counting 
procedures. Members of the armed forces were required to vote on the 
premises of the military installations to which they were posted and 
were subject to strong pressures to vote for President Conte.
    The Government postponed the announcement of its tabulation of the 
election results from December 16 to December 17, 1998. During the 
interim, there was violence and looting in several areas.
    Members of the PUP continue to hold 60 seats in the unicameral 
National Assembly, 1 short of the supermajority required to amend the 
Constitution.
    The President continued to hold the power to appoint the governors, 
prefects, and their deputies to administer regions and subregions 
respectively. Most of these officials are members of the PUP or of 
parties allied with it.
    Local governments generally have limited autonomy. Although they 
have some financial resources with which to fund local programs, most 
of their funds are controlled by the central Government. However, local 
government staff members, such as deputy prefects, are hired and can be 
fired by local authorities and are not considered central government 
employees.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Four women 
hold seats in the 26-member Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Tourism, and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Promotion of Women. There are 9 female deputies in 
the 114-member National Assembly. There are few women at senior levels 
below minister, and there are no women in the senior ranks of the armed 
forces. Women also play a minor role in the leadership of the major 
political parties.
    The Cabinet and armed forces leadership includes representatives of 
all major ethnic groups. However, a disproportionate number of senior 
military officers are Soussou, the President's ethnic group.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Local NGO's primarily interested in human rights issues include: 
The Guinean Organization for the Defense of Human Rights; the Diallo 
Telli Foundation; the Guinean Human Rights Association; the Children of 
the Victims of Camp Boiro; S.O.S. Burial Grounds; the Association of 
Victims of Repression; Humanitarian Assistance for Prisons; Defense of 
Prisoners' Rights; Women Jurists for Human Rights; the Committee for 
the Defense of Civic Rights; and the Coordinating Committee on 
Traditional Practices Affecting Women's and Children's Health. 
Government officials are generally cooperative and responsive to their 
views; however, some organizations allege that government officials try 
to intimidate them, and that they often meet resistance when trying to 
investigate abuses or engage in civil education. Various government 
officials have blocked private efforts to memorialize victims of the 
Sekou Toure regime that ruled the country from independence until 1984.
    A human rights office within the Ministry of Defense, International 
Humanitarian Rights, has conducted over 100 human rights seminars since 
1994 to teach military personnel about human rights recognized by 
international and regional agreements.
    In November 1999, the ICRC signed a detention accord with the 
Government for full access to prisoners. In January the ICRC suspended 
its prison visits because it was denied access to some prisoners, 
including Alpha Conde; however, the ICRC reported that it had access to 
prisoners, including Alpha Conde, at year's end.
    Following a series of crossborder raids by rebels, several NGO's 
suspended activities due to insecurity.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law 
regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, language, beliefs, political 
opinions, philosophy, or creed; however, the Government does not 
enforce these provisions uniformly.
    Women.--Violence against women is common, although estimates differ 
as to the extent of the problem. Wife beating is a criminal offense and 
constitutes grounds for divorce under civil law; however, police rarely 
intervene in domestic disputes.
    Although the Government has made regular statements in the media 
against sexual harassment, women working in the formal sector in urban 
areas complain of frequent sexual harassment. The social stigma 
attached to rape prevents most victims from reporting it. In particular 
marital rape goes unreported, because most women and men view it as the 
husband's right. Several local NGO's are working to increase public 
awareness of the nature of these crimes and promote increased 
reporting. The Government has not pursued vigorously criminal 
investigations of alleged sexual crimes. There were reports that women 
were trafficked for the sex trade and illegal labor (see Section 6.f.).
    The Constitution provides for equal treatment of men and women, and 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women's Promotion works to advance 
such equality; however, women face discrimination throughout society, 
particularly in rural areas where opportunities are limited by custom, 
and the demands of childrearing and subsistence farming. For example, 
on February 7, President Conte remarked in a speech that there were too 
many women in the customs service, and then he gave instructions to 
recruit only men for the customs service. Women are not denied access 
to land, credit, or businesses, but inheritance laws also favor male 
heirs over females. Government officials acknowledged that polygamy is 
practiced commonly. Divorce laws generally tend to favor men in 
awarding custody and dividing communal assets. Legal evidence given by 
women carries less weight than that given by men (see Section 1.e.). 
The Government has affirmed the principle of equal pay for equal work; 
however, in practice women receive less pay than men in most equally 
demanding jobs.
    On May 17, the Government instituted a working plan to analyze the 
situation of women and children in the country. The program involves 
workshops and training for security and judicial personnel, as well as 
the education community.
    Children.--The Constitution provides that the Government has a 
particular obligation to protect and nurture the nation's youth, and 
the Government allocates a significant percentage of the budget to 
primary education. There is a Minister of Youth and a Cabinet Minister, 
appointed by the President, charged with defending women's and 
children's rights, and in 1996 created a permanent committee dedicated 
to defending the rights of the child, with members chosen from 
different ministries, NGO's, and other sectors. The Government provides 
free, compulsory primary school education for 8 years; however, 
enrollment rates are low due to school fees and lax enforcement of the 
laws mandating school attendance. Approximately 51 percent of all 
eligible students are enrolled in primary school, including 66 percent 
of eligible boys compared with only 37 percent of eligible girls. Girls 
often are taken out of school and sent to work to help pay for their 
brothers' educational expenses. In 1999 the Government spent less than 
6 percent of the national budget on education and training programs.
    Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is very widespread. It is practiced widely in all 
regions and among all religious and ethnic groups. FGM is illegal under 
the Penal Code, and senior officials and both the official and private 
press have spoken against the practice; however, there have been no 
prosecutions for violations of the code. FGM is performed on girls and 
women between the ages of 4 and 70, but exact figures on this procedure 
are difficult to establish due to its private nature. The Coordinating 
Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting Women's and Children's 
Health (CPTAFE), a local NGO dedicated to eradicating FGM and ritual 
scarring, cited a recent decline in the percentage of females subjected 
to FGM, estimating the figure to be between 65 and 75 percent. A 1999 
Demographic Health Survey estimates that over 99 percent of females 
undergo FGM. Expert estimates vary between 65 and 90 percent. The lower 
figure, if accurate, would represent a decline over recent years due to 
education of the population by women's rights groups about the health 
risks involved with the practice. However, infibulation, the most 
dangerous form of FGM, still is performed in the forest region, but 
less frequently than in previous years. Despite diseases resulting from 
crude and unsanitary surgical instruments and deaths resulting from the 
practice, the tradition continues, seriously affecting many women's 
lives. FGM also increases the risk of HIV infection since unsterilized 
instruments are shared among participants.
    The Government has made efforts to educate health workers on the 
dangers of this procedure, and it supports the CPTAFE's efforts. The 
CPTAFE reports high rates of infant mortality and maternal mortality 
due to FGM. In March 1997, working in collaboration with the World 
Health Organization, the Government initiated a 20-year strategy to 
eradicate FGM.
    A growing number of men and women oppose FGM. Urban, educated 
families are opting increasingly to perform only a slight symbolic 
incision on a girl's genitals rather than the complete procedure. In 
November 1999, the CPTAFE held a large public ceremony celebrating the 
``laying down of the excision knife'' in which some traditional 
practitioners of FGM pledged to discontinue the practice; however, most 
of those who perform FGM oppose its eradication since it is quite 
lucrative for them.
    The CPTAFE, in conjunction with the Government, local journalists, 
and international NGO's, also is promoting an education campaign to 
discourage underage marriage. Although such marriages are prohibited by 
law, parents contract marriages for girls as young as 11 years of age 
in the forest region.
    Prostitution exists in the informal economic sector and employs 
girls as young as 14 years of age. The Government does not take action 
when prostitution of minors is brought to its attention, and it does 
not monitor actively child or adult prostitution. There were reports 
that girls were trafficked for prostitution and other labor (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Child labor remains a problem (see Section 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that all 
persons are equal before the law. There are no special constitutional 
provisions for the disabled. The Government has not mandated 
accessibility for the disabled, and few disabled persons work, although 
some develop opportunities in the informal sector.
    Religious Minorities.--Relations between the various religions are 
generally amicable; however, in some parts of the country, Islam's 
dominance is such that there is strong social pressure that discourages 
non-Muslims from practicing their religion openly.
    In January violent clashes between Christian and Muslim villages in 
the forest region left 30 persons dead. According to both the Secretary 
General of the Islamic League and the Archbishop of Conakry, the 
tensions were due primarily to a long-running land dispute, and they 
were not based on religion. The conflict calmed down after a visit by 
the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, but 
the region remained tense.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population is 
ethnically and regionally diverse. No single ethnic group constitutes a 
majority nationwide. The largest ethnic groups are the Puhlar, also 
called Peuhl or Fulani (about 40 percent of the population), the 
Malinke (about 30 percent), and the Soussou (about 20 percent). Each 
group speaks a distinct primary language and is concentrated in a 
distinct region: The Soussou in lower Guinea; the Puhlar in middle 
Guinea; and the Malinke in upper Guinea.
    While the Constitution and the Penal Code prohibit racial or ethnic 
discrimination, ethnic identification is strong. Mutual suspicion 
affects relations across ethnic lines, in and out of the Government. 
Widespread societal ethnic discrimination by members of all major 
ethnic groups is evident in private sector hiring and buying patterns, 
in urban neighborhoods that tend to be segregated ethnically, and in 
the relatively low levels of interethnic marriage, even in cities. The 
proportion of public sector positions occupied by Soussous, 
particularly at senior levels, is perceived widely as exceeding their 
share of the national population.
    The ruling PUP party, although generally supported by Soussous, has 
transcended ethnic boundaries more effectively than the major 
opposition parties, which have readily identifiable ethnic and regional 
bases; the UNR's main base is the Puhlar, while the RPG's main base is 
the Malinke. Soussou preeminence in the public sector and Malinke 
migration into the traditional homelands of smaller ethnic groups in 
the forest region have been major sources of political tensions that 
sometimes have erupted into violence.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of employees to form independent labor unions and prohibits 
discrimination based on union affiliation. Approximately 160,000 
workers were reported as unionized, although inadequate labor 
statistics make it difficult to estimate the exact percentage of 
workers in unions. About 52,000 are government workers and are 
automatically members of the government union. The rest are engaged in 
private, mixed, and informal sectors. The largest independent union, 
Union Syndicale des Travailleurs de Guinee (USTG), claims 64,000 
members, 18,000 of whom are women.
    The Labor Code states that all workers, except military and 
paramilitary personnel, have the right to create and participate in 
organizations that defend and develop their individual and collective 
rights as workers. The Labor Code requires elected worker 
representatives for any enterprise employing 25 or more salaried 
workers.
    The National Confederation of Guinean Workers (CNTG) was the sole 
trade union before the Labor Code was enacted. CNTG is an umbrella 
organization for 16 individual unions of government employees, and each 
of the 16 individual unions is tied to a government ministry. Although 
there are now other trade unions and labor confederations, the CNTG 
remains the largest confederation.
    The CNTG is funded indirectly by the Government, although dissident 
members seek to increase the Confederation's freedom from government 
control. Independent unions and confederations have gained popularity, 
such as the Free Union of Teachers and Researchers of Guinea, the 
Professional Union Federation for Education, and the National 
Organization for Free Trade Unions of Guinea. Several dissident groups 
within the CNTG left the Confederation in 1996 citing corruption among 
its leadership. These groups joined with some independent unions to 
form the United Syndicates of Guinean Workers (USTG).
    The Labor Code grants salaried workers, including public sector 
civilian employees, the right to strike 10 days after their 
representative union makes known its intention to strike. It prohibits 
strikes in sectors providing ``essential services,'' which include 
hospitals, radio and television, army, and police, communications, and 
transport services.
    Strikes are met with intimidation from security forces and, as a 
result, often do not make it out of the organizational stage. In a 1999 
speech to workers at the Coyah water plant, President Conte spoke of 
the willingness of many unemployed workers to take the places of those 
who strike. One organization, SAG, tried to organize a strike, and 
called in the USTG to advise; however, the strike never got out of the 
planning stage because the organizers were fired quickly by their 
employers.
    The Government continues to subsidize CNTG representatives to the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) conferences, by paying their 
travel and lodging expenses. Other independent unions must provide 
their own funding to attend ILO conferences.
    Unions may affiliate freely with international labor groups.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Under the Labor 
Code, representative workers' unions or union groups may organize in 
the workplace and negotiate with employers or employer organizations. 
The law protects the right to bargain collectively concerning wages and 
salaries without government interference. Work rules and work hours are 
established by the employer in consultation with union delegates. The 
Code also prohibits antiunion discrimination. Union delegates represent 
individual and collective claims and grievances with management. 
However, in regional and prefecture levels, unionized labor faces stiff 
opposition from government officials. Union officials are selected on 
the basis of nepotism and patronage, rather than through a hierarchy of 
competence; these individuals are not sensitized to the rights of 
workers, and often view unions as an enemy of the State. As a result, 
union activities in the interior face harassment and interference from 
many governors and prefects. Individual workers threatened with 
dismissal or other sanctions have the right to a hearing before 
management with a union representative present and, if necessary, to 
take the complaint to the Conakry Labor Court, which convenes weekly to 
hear such cases. In the interior, civil courts hear labor cases.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code 
specifically forbids forced or compulsory labor, including forced and 
bonded labor by children; however, there were reports that women and 
girls were trafficked (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--According to the Labor Code, the minimum age for 
employment is 16 years. Apprentices may start to work at 14 years of 
age. Workers and apprentices under the age of 18 are not permitted to 
work at night, for more than 12 consecutive hours, or on Sundays. The 
Labor Code also stipulates that the Minister of Labor and Social 
Affairs must maintain a list of occupations in which women and youth 
under the age of 18 cannot be employed. In practice enforcement by 
ministry inspectors is limited to large firms in the modern sector of 
the economy. In 1997 the Ministry of Planning estimated that in rural 
areas, approximately 66 percent of children between the ages of 7 and 
14 were employed; the rate jumped to 91 percent in the 15 to 19 age 
group. In urban areas, approximately 19 percent of children between the 
ages of 7 and 14 were employed; the rate jumped to 50 percent for 
children between the ages of 15 and 19. Overall about 48 percent of 
children under age 15 were employed, accounting for approximately 20 
percent of the total working population and 26 percent of agricultural 
workers. The Government has not ratified the ILO Convention 182 on the 
worst forms of child labor. Child labor in factories is not a prevalent 
problem because of the low level of manufacturing. Working children are 
found mostly in the informal sector areas of subsistence farming, petty 
commerce, and smallscale mining. Girls as young as age 14 engage in 
prostitution (see Section 5). The worst forms of child labor can be 
found in the artisanal mining sector where children haul granite and 
sand for little or no money. The Government has spoken out against 
child labor, but lacks the resources, enforcement mechanism, and the 
legislative will to combat the problem. As a result, child laborers do 
not have access to education or health care; they suffer from chronic 
malnutrition, traumatic stress, and depression.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, 
there were reports that girls were trafficked (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code of 1988 provides 
for the establishment by decree of a minimum hourly wage; however, the 
Government has not done this. Prevailing wages often were inadequate to 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. There also 
are provisions in the code for overtime and night wages, which are 
fixed percentages of the regular wage.
    According to the Labor Code, regular work is not to exceed 10hour 
days or 48-hour weeks, and there is to be a period of at least 24 
consecutive hours of rest each week, usually on Sunday. Every salaried 
worker has the legal right to an annual paid vacation, accumulated at 
the rate of at least 2 workdays per month of work. In practice the 
authorities enforce these rules only in the relatively small modern 
urban sector.
    The Labor Code contains provisions of a general nature regarding 
occupational safety and health, but the Government has not elaborated a 
set of practical workplace health and safety standards. Moreover, it 
has not issued any of the ministerial orders laying out the specific 
requirements for certain occupations and for certain methods of work 
that are called for in the Labor Code. The Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs is responsible for enforcing labor standards, and its 
inspectors are empowered to suspend work immediately in situations 
hazardous to health; however, enforcement remained more a goal than a 
reality. Labor inspectors acknowledge that they cannot cover even 
Conakry, much less the entire country, with their small staff and 
meager budget.
    Under the Labor Code, workers have the right to refuse to work 
under unsafe conditions without penalty. Nevertheless many workers fear 
retaliation should they refuse to work under unsafe conditions. 
Employees in high-risk professions, such as night guards, drivers, and 
police, have protested conditions without result. Sodefa, a joint 
venture of the Guinean and Chinese Governments, was criticized for 
inhuman working conditions, but when workers tried to protest, security 
forces were called to disperse them.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons; however, some NGO's report that women and children are 
trafficked within the country, as well as internationally, for the sex 
trade and illegal labor. Accurate statistics are difficult to obtain, 
because victims do not report the crime due to fear for their personal 
safety.
                               __________

                             GUINEA-BISSAU

    President Koumba Yala was elected in January with a 72 percent 
electoral majority in a runoff election following multiparty elections 
in November 1999. \1\ Both elections were considered by local and 
international observers to be generally free and fair, although there 
were reports of some irregularities in the November 1999 election. The 
Social Renewal Party (PRS), Yala's party, also won 38 of 102 National 
Assembly seats in the November 1999 elections. The PRS victory ended 
the 26-year domination of the African Party for the Independence of 
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC). In January President Yala named 
16 former Junta members as Ministers, creating an uneasy power-sharing 
arrangement between the military and the civilian government. In March 
at the behest of the U.N. Office on Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), the U.N. 
Security Council called on all parties, particularly the military junta 
that deposed President Bernardo Viera in May 1999, to uphold the 
results of the election. However, General Ansumane Mane, head of the 
military junta, did not accept the authority of the elected government 
completely. The coalition government did not resolve fully the issues 
of control over the budget and the military. This uneasy coalition 
lasted for most of the year, as Mane placed increasing restrictions on 
the elected civilian government. However, in November Yala nominated 30 
members of the armed forces for promotion without consulting Mane. In 
response Mane placed the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces under house 
arrest, declared himself Chief of Staff, and directed his soldiers to 
disarm the Presidential Guard. The Presidential Guard and other 
elements of the armed forces refused to take part in the coup, and 
General Mane and approximately 35 supporters fled the capital. For a 
week, they hid in the countryside; however, on November 30 in 
Quinhamel, 40 miles north of Bissau, Mane and his supporters were 
surrounded, and Mane was killed in an exchange of gunfire with 
government forces. Subsequently President Yala reshuffled his cabinet 
in an effort to control the military and move forward with 
reconstruction. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; 
however, it is subject to political influence and corruption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ On June 14, 1998 the United States Embassy suspended operations 
in the midst of heavy fighting in Bissau and all official personnel in 
the country were evacuated. This report is based on information 
obtained by U.S. embassies in neighboring countries and from other 
sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The police, under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior, 
have primary responsibility for the nation's internal security; 
however, a lack of resources and training continued to hamper their 
effectiveness. The armed forces are responsible for external security 
and may be called upon to assist the police in internal emergencies. 
Members of the police and the military committed serious human rights 
abuses.
    The population of 1.2 million relies largely upon subsistence 
agriculture and the export of cashew nuts. Both activities were 
affected negatively by the fighting beginning in 1998. Annual per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) prior to 1998 has been estimated at 
$840. Due to the conflict, GDP declined by 28 percent in 1998 but 
improved modestly in 1999 and during the year. Exports of cashew nuts 
returned to preconflict levels during the year. Commercial banks and 
other monetary institutions, which had ceased operations with the 
outbreak of hostilities in June 1998, reopened in July 1999. The 
country remains burdened by heavy external debt and massive 
underemployment.
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and, while there 
were improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained. Citizens 
were allowed to vote in generally free and fair elections. Security 
forces committed some extrajudicial killings. The police and members of 
the armed forces continued to use beatings, physical mistreatment, 
other forms of harassment, and arbitrary arrest and detention. The 
Government did not punish any members of the security forces for 
abuses. Prison conditions remained poor. The Government at times used 
incommunicado detention. The judiciary is subject to political 
influence and corruption. The Government infringed on citizens'' 
privacy rights. The Government at times limited freedom of the press, 
and journalists practiced self-censorship. The Government at times 
restricted freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against 
women were problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) was practiced 
widely. Child labor and some forced child labor persisted.
    The conflict that ended with the May 1999 coup caused massive 
civilian dislocation and hardship, but by June 1999 most of the 350,000 
internally displaced persons had returned to their homes. By the end of 
1999, virtually all persons who sought refuge in neighboring countries 
had repatriated spontaneously.
    An estimated 2,000 persons were killed during the 11-month conflict 
between June 1998 and May 1999. Reports continued of deaths and 
injuries from land mines and unexploded shells that remain in populated 
areas.
    Rebel forces were responsible for beatings, other forms of 
harassment, detention, robbery, and looting.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
political killings; however, on November 30, in the aftermath of an 
attempted coup, General Ansumane Mane and eight supporters were killed 
in an exchange of gunfire with government forces, while they were 
attempting to escape.
    Troops loyal to or allied with President Vieira killed an unknown 
number of civilian noncombatants prior to the May 1999 coup.
    Prior to the May 1999 coup, President Vieira took no action to 
encourage forces allied with him to minimize the loss of life among 
prisoners of war and the civilian population. During the 1999 coup, 
reports indicate that loyalist forces based in the Marinha district of 
the capital Bissau fired at advancing rebel forces and killed 60 
civilians who had sought refuge in a nearby mission school. Overall, an 
estimated 2,000 persons were killed during the 11-month conflict. There 
was no investigation into nor action taken against the troops 
responsible for these killings by year's end.
    No suspect has yet been named in the August 22, 1999, murder of 
Nicandro Barreto, Justice Minister under President Vieira. Barreto was 
strangled at his home in Bissau.
    A mass grave uncovered in October 1999 contained the remains of 28 
persons and was believed to include those of former Vice President 
Paolo Correia, former Attorney General Viriato Pa, and military 
officers sentenced to death in 1985 by a military tribunal on charges 
of an attempted coup. No action was taken in this case during the year.
    The attack by rebel troops on the presidential palace in May 1999 
reportedly left 70 persons dead. Reports indicated that indiscriminate 
rebel shelling in civilian neighborhoods killed noncombatants. No 
action was taken against any rebel troops by year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits cruel and inhuman punishment, 
and evidence obtained through torture or coercion is invalid; however, 
the Government often ignored these provisions, and security forces 
beat, mistreated, and otherwise abused persons. Human rights observers 
noted repeated instances of police and members of the armed forces 
beating and abusing civilians for minor social or legal infractions. 
Security and police authorities historically have employed abusive 
interrogation methods, usually in the form of severe beatings or 
deprivation. The Government rarely enforced provisions for punishment 
of abuses committed by security forces.
    On September 7, Joao Monteiro, who had served as the intelligence 
chief under President Vieira, was convicted of torture and assault and 
sentenced to 12 years in prison. The Bissau Regional Court proved that 
while serving as Director General of State Security during the 1998 to 
1999 crisis leading to the overthrow of Vieira, he had ordered the 
arrest of Ansumane Faty, who subsequently was tortured.
    In November the Government arrested approximately 400 citizens and 
soldiers immediately following the attempted coup by General Mane (see 
Section 1.a.). Inacio Tavares, President of the Guinea-Bissau Human 
Rights League, alleged that the soldiers were held in three military 
camps, sometimes without drinking water, food, or medical attention. On 
December 14, he accused the military of physical abuse, torture, and 
persecution of the families of suspects. He called for accelerated 
hearings and permission for family visits, and, at year's end, all 
civilians and some soldiers were released; however, some soldiers 
remained in custody (see Section 1.d.).
    Prior to the May 1999 coup, forces loyal to Vieira engaged in 
widespread harassment, including stopping civilians and subjecting them 
to degrading body searches without cause. In January 1999, there were 
reports that Senegalese soldiers, who had entered the conflict at 
Vieira's request, entered the Simao Mendes hospital in Bissau and 
removed a junta soldier who had been wounded in the conflict. The 
soldier was returned the next morning with several cuts and what 
appeared to be cigarette burns, as well as gangrene, which may have 
been related to his original combat wound. The soldier died within a 
few days. No action was taken against the soldiers by year's end.
    In 1999 human rights monitors reported several incidents in which 
police accused of rape or the mistreatment of prisoners prior to the 
May 1999 coup were not prosecuted.
    In 1999 there were credible reports that rebel soldiers beat and 
harassed civilians suspected of government sympathies.
    Prison conditions remained poor, but generally they were not life 
threatening. Beatings and deprivation were used as a means of coercion. 
The June 1998 rebellion effectively stopped a program aimed at halting 
such methods. Prison authorities had very little control over inmates, 
many of whom simply left during the day. Following a request in 1998 by 
the Interior Minister for international donor assistance to 
rehabilitate the prisons, the European Union renovated two of them, but 
following the fighting in May 1999, no further repairs have been made. 
Many prisons were damaged during the fighting in May 1999, and the 
inmates escaped and have not been recaptured.
    The Human Rights League was given access to most prisoners during 
the year, including 600 loyalist troops detained as prisoners of war 
following the May 1999 coup. Of those persons detained, 180 were 
released immediately and another 50 individuals were released within a 
month. At the end of 1999, more than 385 persons remained in detention; 
however, at year's end, only Afonso Te, Vieira's former deputy chief of 
staff, remained in prison (see Section 1.d.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces 
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons.
    The law provides for procedural rights, such as the right to 
counsel, the right to release if no timely indictment is brought, and 
the right to a speedy trial; however, in practice the judicial system 
generally failed to provide these rights.
    Police detained suspects without judicial authority or warrants, 
occasionally using house arrest. Prior to the May 1999 coup, the 
Government held detainees without charge or trial for extended periods 
of time, sometimes incommunicado; however, during the year, such abuse 
was infrequent, and detainees were held for short duration. The 
authorities routinely did not observe bail procedures.
    In November the Government arrested approximately 400 citizens and 
soldiers immediately following the attempted coup by General Mane. 
Inacio Tavares, President of the Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League, 
accused the military of physical abuse, torture, and persecution of the 
families of suspects. He called for accelerated hearings, and at year's 
end, many of the persons had been released (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.).
    On May 27, the Government arrested Fernando Gomes, the former 
president of the Guinea Bissau Human Rights League and president of the 
newly formed political party, Socialist Alliance of Guinea Bissau, and 
two television journalists. The three were held incommunicado for 2 
days in a windowless, unlighted cell. They were charged with slander 
and defamation after Gomes publicly accused Prime Minister Caetano 
N'tchama of corruption, making false statements, and incompetence. All 
three were released on bail on May 29; charges against the journalists 
were dropped on May 30, and at year's end, no further action had been 
taken against Gomes.
    Between November 24 and 26, the Government arrested several 
opposition politicians on suspicion that they supported the attempted 
coup by General Mane. Those detained included Francisco Benante, the 
president of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea (Bissau) 
and Cape Verde; Fernando Gomes; Fernando Mendoca; and several members 
of the Union for Change opposition party, including Amine Saad--the 
former Procurator General, Manuel Rambout Barcelos, Caramba Ture--an 
M.P., and Agnello Regala--director of Bombolon radio. Reportedly they 
were held for almost a week before a judge released them for lack of 
evidence. President Yala invalidated their passports and placed them 
under house arrest in Bissau. At year's end, some remained under house 
arrest.
    Amnesty International accused the Government of isolated incidents 
of arbitrary arrest and harassment.
    Following the May 1999 coup, the Government detained as prisoners 
of war about 600 of the loyalist forces who had defended Vieira; 180 of 
these soldiers were released immediately, and another 50 were released 
within a month. At the end of 1999, more than 385 remained in 
detention; however, at year's end, only 1 senior official associated 
with the May 1999 coup remained in prison (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government does not use forced exile. Following the May 1999 
coup, the military junta allowed President Vieira safe passage to leave 
the country for The Gambia to receive medical treatment, reportedly 
with the understanding that he would return to the country to stand 
trial on charges of corruption and human rights abuses. After leaving 
the country, Vieira traveled to Portugal and was granted asylum. In 
October 1999, the Attorney General traveled to Portugal to present 
evidence of human rights abuses by Vieira and to request his return to 
Guinea-Bissau to stand trial. The Government of Portugal stated that it 
had not received a request for Vieira's extradition, and there is no 
indication the Government has requested his extradition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, judges are trained and paid poorly, and 
sometimes are subject to political pressure and corruption. The Supreme 
Court is especially vulnerable to political pressure, because its 
members are appointed by the President and serve at his pleasure. The 
judiciary is reluctant to decide cases of a political nature. Cases 
against several former members of the Government were delayed. The 
Supreme Court failed to deal impartially with highly charged political 
cases. However, there is some evidence that the judiciary retains a 
degree of independence. Most officials who were charged with treason 
immediately following the ouster of former President Vieira in May 1999 
have been acquitted for lack of evidence. The Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court was elected democratically by his colleagues on November 
22 and officially installed on December 6; he was not appointed by the 
President.
    Trials involving state security are conducted by civilian courts. 
Under the Code of Military Justice, military courts try only crimes 
committed by armed forces personnel. The Supreme Court is the final 
court of appeal for both military and civilian cases. The President has 
the authority to grant pardons and reduce sentences.
    Citizens who cannot afford an attorney have the right to a court-
appointed lawyer.
    Traditional law still prevails in most rural areas, and urban 
dwellers often bring judicial disputes to traditional counselors to 
avoid the costs and bureaucratic impediments of the official system. 
The police often resolve disputes.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Home, or Correspondence.--
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of domicile, person, 
and correspondence; however, the Government does not always respect 
these rights. The police do not always use judicial warrants and have 
forced entry into some private homes.
    Loyalist forces reportedly searched private residences in Bissau 
without cause and without warrants. Loyalist forces allegedly were 
guilty of theft from both private homes and stores.
    International and domestic mail at times was opened; however, this 
violation was by poorly paid postal employees in search of money or 
other valuables, not by security personnel. Limited mail service 
resumed in June 1999, after a 1-year shutdown following the destruction 
of the country's main post office building during the 1998 rebellion.
    Rebel forces allegedly stole from private homes and stores.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and the press; however, the Government at times 
limited these rights in practice, and journalists continued to practice 
self-censorship.
    Amnesty International alleged that in some cases the Government 
intimidated journalists. On May 17, soldiers fired shots and entered 
the office of the newspaper Diario de Bissau to threaten a journalist 
who wrote an opinion piece critical of President Yala's wife. 
Journalists of the national press faced retribution for making comments 
critical of government operations.
    Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in June 1998, the print media 
consisted of one independent daily, three independent weeklies, one 
government-owned biweekly, and one independent monthly. All of the 
newspapers during the year published only sporadically due to financial 
constraints and dependence on the state printing house. The national 
printing press, the only facility for publishing newspapers in the 
country, often lacked the raw materials to publish them. At the end of 
the year, the government-owned Diario de Bissau published several times 
a week; other newspapers, Banobero, Gazeta de Noticias, and No Pintcha, 
were weeklies.
    Prior to the 1998 rebellion, there were three independent radio 
stations and one government-controlled station in Bissau. In addition 
Radio Portugal and Radio France International broadcasts were received 
from Lisbon and Paris. There were also three community radio stations 
operated by the indigenous nongovernmental organization (NGO) Action 
for Development. One independent station rebroadcast the British 
Broadcasting Corporation and another rebroadcast the Voice of America. 
The government-controlled national radio continued to transmit from 
Radio Mavegro facilities that it took over in June 1998. The Voice of 
the Military Junta broadcasts from facilities that formerly broadcast 
Radio Bombolom, whose owner sympathized with the rebels. During the 
year, the independent stations Radio Pidjiguiti and Radio Mavegro 
resumed broadcasting; however, the NGO-assisted community stations have 
not resumed operations. Reportedly the government-controlled stations 
practice self-censorship.
    In December the Director of National Radio, Julio Ca, was suspended 
by government authorities; journalists said that they accused the 
Director of unbecoming behavior and censoring some stories.
    On May 27, the Government arrested two television journalists, for 
reporting a politician's allegations of corruption and incompetence 
against the Prime Minister. They were held incommunicado for 2 days in 
hot, dirty, and unlighted cells. On May 29, they were charged with 
slander and defamation and released from custody. After a meeting 
between the Prime Minister and journalists on May 30, all charges were 
dropped. In November the Government detained the director of Radio 
Bombolon. Many foreign journalists were able to circulate and report on 
political developments, including the January election.
    The Internet is available in the country; there were no reports of 
government interference.
    Academic freedom generally was observed until the outbreak of 
fighting in 1998. After ceasing to function following the June 1998 
rebellion, schools and research institutions reopened in most parts of 
the country in March 1999.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this 
right in practice. Government approval is required for all assemblies 
and demonstrations. Prior to the June 1998 rebellion and following the 
May 1999 coup, the Government approved all such requests. There were no 
public assemblies or demonstrations between June 1998 and May 1999. 
Following the May 1999 coup, numerous organizations held rallies, some 
of which were critical of the Government; however, there were no 
reports of demonstrations during the year.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respected this right in practice. The Government did not 
prohibit or discourage the formation of associations; however, all 
private associations were required to register with the Government. 
There were no reports of associations being denied registration.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.
    Although the Government must license religious groups, no 
applications were refused during the year; however, there were no 
reports that applications were made.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights; however, the Government limited them in practice. Checkpoints 
and police harassment occurred frequently during the year. After the 
outbreak of fighting in 1998, vehicle traffic was curtailed severely; 
however, during the year, such restriction was intermittent. Both 
government and rebel forces blocked the road from Bissau to the 
interior and interfered with the free movement of traffic. The 
Government carefully controlled movement within Bissau, prohibiting 
most traffic. Movement in the interior was restricted to a lesser 
extent, but it was still subjected to occasional interference by both 
government and rebel forces. The land borders with Senegal were closed 
to travelers during the early stages of the conflict. Later, Senegal 
allowed humanitarian convoys to transit the border. Land borders with 
Guinea generally remained open. The national airport, which had 
remained under rebel control after the outbreak of fighting, was 
reopened to commercial traffic in May 1999. Several times during the 
year, the Government closed the border with Senegal in reaction to 
cross-border raids by bandits in both countries. On September 6 and 7, 
the Governments of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau pledged to work to restore 
free trade and eliminate criminal cross border activities.
    The Minister of the Interior issues passports. Citizens have the 
right to return and are not subject to political revocation of their 
citizenship.
    The conflict that ended with the May 1999 coup caused massive 
civilian dislocation and hardship; however, by year's end, most of the 
350,000 internally displaced persons had returned to their homes; all 
areas of the country were open to returning citizens. By the end of 
1999, virtually all persons who sought refuge in neighboring countries 
had repatriated spontaneously.
    The Government does not have formal provisions to recognize refugee 
status, but it was granted on a case-by-case basis. The Government has 
provided first asylum to refugees from the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and the Casamance region of Senegal. A January 1998 U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) census revealed the presence of just 
under 5,000 Senegalese refugees in Guinea-Bissau. The majority of these 
persons were found along the country's northern border with Senegal. 
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1998, the UNHCR established a 
refugee camp south of the border region at Jolomete, which housed about 
700 refugees. After the May 1999 coup, the UNHCR continued efforts to 
relocate these refugees, most of whom were displaced internally when 
the fighting erupted.
    No refugees were deported forcibly to a country where they feared 
persecution. Foreign refugees who fled Bissau with the outbreak of 
fighting are believed to have done so voluntarily.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    President Koumba Yala was elected in January with a 72 percent 
electoral majority in a runoff election following multiparty elections 
in November 1999. Yala defeated interim president Malam Bacai Sanha of 
the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde 
(PAIGC). Both elections were considered to be generally free and fair 
by international observers, foreign diplomats, and local NGO's. Yala's 
party, the Partida de Renovacao Social (PRS), won 38 of 102 National 
Assembly seats. The victory of the PRS ended the 26-year domination of 
the PAIGC.
    The African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape 
Verde (PAIGC), the country's only legal party from 1974 to 1991 and the 
majority party in the National Assembly until the November 1999 
elections, won 24 of the 102 seats in the National Assembly, while 
opposition parties gained a majority. The Partido de Renovacao Sociat 
(PRS) won 38 seats, and the Resistencia da Guine Bissau (RGB) won 29 
seats, while 4 other parties split the remaining 11 seats. The 
elections, which included candidates from 13 parties, as well as 
several independents, were judged to be generally free and fair by 
international observers, although they reported some irregularities.
    In preparation for the November 1999 elections, the National 
Electoral Commission, with the assistance of the UNOGBIS, conducted a 
voter registration program among the estimated 1.2 million population. 
The current rolls showed 525,367 voters. About 400,000 persons voted in 
the November 1999 elections.
    PRS leader Koumba Yala and interim President Malan Bacai Sanha of 
the PAIGC led a field of 12 candidates for president. Neither candidate 
secured an absolute majority as required by law, so Yala and Sanha 
faced each other in a second round of voting on January 16.
    General Mane and the junta consistently declared that they would 
stay out of politics once a new civilian government was elected; 
however, Mane did not accept completely the authority of Yala's 
Government. When he was inaugurated in January, President Yala named 16 
former junta members as Ministers, creating an uneasy power-sharing 
arrangement between the military and the civilian government. The 
resulting coalition government did not resolve fully issues of control 
over the budget and the military. This uneasy coalition lasted for most 
of the year, as Mane placed increasing restrictions on the elected 
civilian government. However, in November Yala nominated 30 members of 
the armed forces for promotion without consulting Mane. In response 
Mane placed the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces under house arrest, 
declared himself Chief of Staff, and directed his soldiers to disarm 
the Presidential Guard. The Presidential Guard and other elements of 
the armed forces refused to take part in the coup, and General Mane and 
approximately 35 supporters fled the capital. For a week, they hid in 
the countryside, and on November 30 in Quinhamel, 40 miles north of 
Bissau, Mane and 8 of his supporters were killed in an exchange of 
gunfire with government forces. Subsequently, President Yala reshuffled 
his cabinet in an effort to control the military and move forward with 
reconstruction.
    Adequate and timely payment of soldier and veteran benefits 
remained a concern. Some international loan funds were devoted to such 
payments; the problem of back pay for members of the armed forces 
remained unresolved at year's end.
    The Government arrested several opposition politicians during the 
year (see Section 1.d.).
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the 
National Assembly, women occupy 9 of the 102 seats. In the Government 
of National Unity inaugurated in February 1999, 1 of 10 cabinet 
ministers was a woman; however, there are no female ministers in 
President Yala's government.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government did not interfere with the privately operated 
Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League (LGDH), and international human 
rights groups continued to investigate human rights abuses without 
government harassment. International and nongovernmental human rights 
groups, which effectively ceased operations with the outbreak of 
hostilities in June 1998, resumed activities following the inauguration 
of a Government of National Unity in February 1999.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and law prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sex, race, and religion; however, in practice, the Government does not 
enforce these provisions effectively.
    Women.--Physical violence, including wife beating, is an accepted 
means of settling domestic disputes. Although police intervene in 
domestic disputes if requested, the Government has not undertaken 
specific measures to counter social pressure against reporting domestic 
violence, rape, incest, and other mistreatment of women.
    Discrimination against women persists, although officially it is 
prohibited by law. Women are responsible for most work on subsistence 
farms and have limited access to education, especially in rural areas. 
Women do not have equal access to employment. Among certain ethnic 
groups, women cannot own or manage land or inherit property.
    Children.--The Government allocates only limited resources for 
children's welfare and education. According to a November study by an 
international agency, enrollment in basic education rose from 42 
percent in 1993 to 62 percent in 1998 (girls went from 32 percent to 45 
percent, while boys went from 55 percent to 79 percent). However, in 
1998 10 percent of rural schools offered only the first grade, and 23 
percent offered only the first and second grades. Following the 
beginning of fighting in 1998, enrollment fell to 57 percent. Adult 
illiteracy is 66 percent for men and 82 percent for women.
    Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is practiced widely within certain ethnic groups, 
especially the Fulas and the Mandinkas. The practice is increasing as 
the population becomes more Muslim and is being performed not only on 
adolescent girls, but also on babies as young as 4 months old. The 
Government has not outlawed the practice; however, it formed a national 
committee in the mid-1990's that continued to conduct a nationwide 
education campaign to discourage FGM. International NGO's, including 
the Swedish group Radda Barnen and Plan International, as well as 
several domestic NGO's, such as Friends of Children and Sinim Mira 
Nasseque, continued working through the national committee to eliminate 
FGM. The efforts of both domestic and international groups, largely 
suspended after the outbreak of fighting in June 1998, resumed in many 
parts of the country in February 1999.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no law mandating accessibility. 
The law does not prohibit discrimination against the disabled 
specifically, and the Government does not ensure equal access to 
employment and education; however, there were no reports of overt 
societal discrimination. The Government has made some efforts to assist 
disabled veterans through pension programs, but these programs do not 
address adequately veterans' health, housing, and food needs; there are 
no reports of funds for special programs for the disabled.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides all 
civilian workers with the freedom to form and join independent trade 
unions. However, the vast majority of the population works in 
subsistence agriculture. Most union members are government or 
parastatal employees; only a small percentage of workers are in the 
wage sector and are organized.
    The Government registers all labor unions. There are 11 labor 
unions registered and operating. All unions are officially independent 
of the Government, but seven unions are affiliated with the National 
Trade Union Confederation (UNTGB), which retains close informal ties 
with the PAIGC. The law does not favor UNTGB-affiliated unions over 
others. The Constitution provides for the right to strike and 
protection for workers from retribution for strike activities.
    The only legal restriction on strike activity is the requirement 
for prior notice. In past years, several unions have conducted legal 
strikes with no retribution against the strikers; however, there were 
no strikes during the year.
    Both enforcement of the law and the functioning of the formal 
economy, which largely ceased after the outbreak of hostilities in June 
1998, returned to preconflict levels following the inauguration of a 
Government of National Unity in February 1999.
    All unions are able to affiliate freely with national 
confederations and international labor organizations of their choice. 
The Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guinea-Bissau (UNTGB) is 
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
Other unions belong to International Trade Secretariats.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution does not provide for or protect the right to bargain 
collectively, and there were no instances of genuine collective 
bargaining. Most wages are established in bilateral negotiations 
between workers and employers, taking into consideration the minimum 
salaries set annually by the Government's Council of Ministers.
    The Government's provisions for the protection of workers against 
antiunion discrimination have very little effect due to low union 
membership. Although there are no laws providing sanctions against 
employers practicing such discrimination, no workers have alleged 
antiunion discrimination, and the practice is not believed to be 
widespread.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and 
these prohibitions generally are enforced in the formal sector; 
however, children often are forced by their parents or guardians to 
work as street traders or agricultural laborers in the informal sector 
(see Section 6.d.). The Government has not taken action to combat such 
practices.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1986 General Labor Act established a minimum age of 14 
years for general factory labor and 18 years for heavy or dangerous 
labor, including all labor in mines. These minimum age requirements 
generally are followed in the small formal sector, but the Ministry of 
Justice and the Ministry of Civil Service and Labor do not enforce 
these requirements in other sectors. Children in cities often work in 
street trading, and those in rural communities do domestic and field 
work without pay. The Government does not attempt to discourage these 
traditional practices.
    The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children; however, 
while this prohibition generally is enforced in the formal sector, such 
labor occurs in the informal sector (see Section 6.c.).
    The Government has taken no action on ILO Convention 182 on the 
worst forms of child labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government's Council of 
Ministers annually establishes minimum wage rates for all categories of 
work but does not enforce them. The lowest monthly wage is 
approximately $15 (9,000 CFA). This wage is insufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family, and workers must 
supplement their income through other work, reliance on the extended 
family, and subsistence agriculture. The maximum number of hours 
permitted in a normal workweek without further compensation is 45, but 
the Government does not enforce this provision. With the breakdown of 
the formal economy in June 1998, most of the country returned to 
barter, and both the Government and the private sector lacked the funds 
to pay salaries. Following the inauguration of a Government of National 
Unity in February 1999, activity in the formal economy started to 
return to preconflict levels, and the Government was able to pay most 
salary arrearages.
    With the cooperation of the unions, the Ministry of Justice and 
Labor establishes legal health and safety standards for workers, which 
then are adopted into law by the National Assembly. However, these 
standards are not enforced, and many persons work under conditions that 
endanger their health and safety.
    Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from unsafe 
working conditions without losing their jobs. In view of high 
unemployment, a worker who left for such reasons would be replaced 
readily.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, through, or within the country.
                               __________

                                 KENYA

    Kenya is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. President 
Daniel Arap Moi, who has led the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) and 
served as President since 1978, was reelected most recently in 1997, in 
the country's second general election since the restoration of 
multiparty politics in 1991. Since independence in 1963, no president 
ever has left office in consequence of an election, and KANU has 
controlled both the presidency and the national legislature 
continuously, although other parties were illegal only from 1982 to 
1991. KANU again won a majority in the 1997 legislative elections and 
at year's end, KANU members held 118 of 222 seats in the unicameral 
National Assembly. While there were numerous flaws in the 1997 
elections, observers concluded that the vote broadly reflected the 
popular will. In addition to his role as President, Moi is the 
commander in chief of the armed forces, and he controls the security, 
university, civil service, judiciary, and provincial, district, and 
local governance systems. The judiciary suffers from corruption and is 
subject to executive branch influence.
    In addition to the armed forces, there is a large internal security 
apparatus that includes the police Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID), the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), the National 
Police, the Administration Police, and the paramilitary General 
Services Unit (GSU), which details members on a rotating basis to staff 
the 700-person Presidential Escort. The CID investigates criminal 
activity and the NSIS collects intelligence and monitors persons whom 
the State considers subversive. In 1999 in an effort to improve the 
accountability of investigative services, Parliament passed and 
implemented laws that removed arrest authority from the NSIS and 
separated the organization from the CID. Members of the security 
forces, especially the police, continued to commit serious human rights 
abuses.
    The large agricultural sector provides food for local consumption, 
substantial exports of tea, coffee, cut flowers, and vegetables, and 
approximately 70 percent of total employment. Although many sectors 
continued to be dominated by state-owned monopolies, the nonfarm 
economy includes large privately owned light manufacturing, commercial, 
and financial sectors. Tourism was second only to tea exports as the 
largest single source of foreign exchange. Major international 
financial institutions renewed nonproject assistance during the year, 
which had been suspended in 1997 due to widespread government 
corruption associated with a lack of transparency and accountability; 
however, by year's end the disbursement of some assistance was 
suspended due to the Government's inability to meet agreed conditions. 
During the year, annual per capita gross domestic product remained 
virtually unchanged in real terms, at approximately $279. The spread of 
HIV/AIDS, which was estimated to have infected about 14 percent of the 
population between the ages of 14 and 49, as well as drought and famine 
in some rural areas during the year, exacerbated economic problems.
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and although there 
were improvements in some areas, serious problems remained. Citizens' 
ability to change their government peacefully has not yet been 
demonstrated fully. Security forces, particularly the police, continued 
to commit extrajudicial killings, torture and beat detainees, use 
excessive force, rape, and otherwise abuse persons. Prison conditions 
remained life threatening. Police arbitrarily arrested and detained 
persons, including journalists. The Government arrested and prosecuted 
a number of police officers for abuses; however, most police who 
perpetrated abuses were neither investigated nor punished. Lengthy 
pretrial detention is a problem, and the judiciary is subject to 
executive branch influence. The authorities infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights. The Government limited freedom of speech and of the 
press, and harassed, intimidated, and economically pressured newspapers 
that often were critical of the Government; however, the Government 
significantly reduced its domination of the domestic broadcast media. 
The Government repeatedly restricted freedom of assembly, and police 
increasingly disrupted public meetings, used force to disperse 
demonstrators and protesters, and harassed and arbitrarily detained 
political dissidents, including opposition party legislators. The 
Government at times interfered with the activities of religious groups, 
and limited freedom of movement. The Government restricted freedom of 
association. The Government continued to limit the independence of its 
Standing Committee on Human Rights, and the President continued to 
criticize nongovernmental human rights organizations. Violence and 
discrimination against women and abuse of children remained serious 
problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) remained widespread, child 
prostitution remained a problem, and the spread of HIV/AIDS created 
many orphans. There was some discrimination against the disabled, and 
discrimination and violence against religious and ethnic minorities 
remained problems. The Government continued to exacerbate ethnic 
tensions by discriminating against many ethnic groups; interethnic 
tensions continued to result in numerous violent conflicts and some 
deaths. There were reports of a number of ritual murders associated 
with traditional indigenous religious practices, which contributed to 
growing public concern about satanism. The Government continued to 
limit some worker rights. Child labor remained a problem, and there 
were instances of forced child labor. Violence by mobs and by 
nongovernmental armed groups from neighboring countries also resulted 
in many deaths.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces, 
especially members of the police, the GSU, and the CID, continued to 
use lethal force and committed a number of extrajudicial killings. 
According to government figures, police killed 120 suspected criminals, 
and another 39 suspects and detainees died while in police custody by 
year's end. The nongovernmental Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC) 
reported that police killed 198 persons during the year (compared to 
243 persons in 1999), including at least 49 by torture (see Section 
1.c.). Police often lacked restraint in employing lethal force, and the 
Government generally failed to take appropriate action against members 
of the security forces accused of extrajudicial killings.
    On January 1, police attached to the Ng'araria Chief's Camp in 
Murang'a allegedly beat 10-year old Joseph Ndung'u Nyoike for suspected 
theft (see Section 1.c.); the boy died after spending the night in 
prison. District authorities arrested two police officers after autopsy 
results indicated that Ndung'u died from beatings. The case was under 
investigation by authorities at year's end. On January 15, police from 
the Mukuruwei-ini police station allegedly beat to death Philip Machau 
after he was caught stealing a piece of second-hand clothing (see 
Section 1.c.). According to press reports, police severely beat Machau 
despite onlookers' protests; Machau died at the police station that 
night. An inquest into the case by the Chief Magistrate in Nairobi was 
ongoing at year's end. On March 23, Philip Kipkoech Kirui, a brother of 
a nominated local councilor, died after being transferred from prison 
in Londiani to the local hospital for treatment; allegedly he had been 
tortured. Five police officers based at the Londiani Police Station, 
Dickson Liyayi, Peter Chelanga, Isaac Walimbwa, Robert Ombui Onyancha, 
and Boniface Onyango, were charged with Kirui's killing after a march 
was held to protest the alleged abuse of Kirui in Londiani. The case 
was pending in the courts at year's end. On March 24, officers from the 
Flying Squad (a quick response antitheft unit) shot and killed eight 
suspected carjackers as they fled from a car in Nairobi; the driver of 
the vehicle was unharmed. Some human rights observers criticized the 
officers' use of excessive force during the incident. On March 26, a 
police officer in Meru reportedly killed Wallace Kiogora. The officer 
was arrested for Kiogora's murder on March 29. On April 30, there were 
reports that Sophia Nyaguthii Mbogo, a pregnant 21-year-old woman, died 
in custody at the Kagio Police Post reportedly after she was beaten by 
a policeman (see Section 1.c.). No arrests were made in the case; 
however, an inquest before the Principal Magistrate's Court at Kerugoya 
was ongoing at year's end. On September 4, prison guards at the 
King'ong'o Prison in Nyeri killed six inmates who were attempting to 
escape. Officials initially claimed that guards shot the six as they 
fled; however, there were conflicting reports that the six died of 
blows to the head and severe beatings after recapture (see Section 
1.c.). The Attorney General ordered an investigation into the killings, 
and the police were investigating the matter at year's end. The 
Attorney General promised to prosecute the guards if they are suspected 
of wrongdoing. An inquest into the case was ongoing at year's end.
    In April after numerous deadly attacks on police, Marsden Madoka, 
Minister of State in the Office of the President, stated that police 
should use lethal force to eliminate criminals from the streets. The 
Minister's comments reflect a growing concern that security forces 
often are not armed or equipped sufficiently. In responding to 
continuing high levels of crime, some police used excessive force. On 
May 27, members of the Flying Squad allegedly seriously injured two 
suspected carjackers during arrest. The police brought the unconscious 
suspects to the City Morgue where the police reportedly shot and killed 
them. There were no reports of any investigation at year's end. On July 
1, police in Nairobi fired on unarmed suspected carjackers at a major 
traffic circle, killing the driver, Michael Ngigi, and seriously 
injuring the passenger, George Ngugi. Ngugi, a civil servant who owned 
the vehicle, reportedly begged police not to shoot before the officers 
fired at him. Several police officers were arrested; however, no 
charges were filed against them by year's end. There were reports that 
one of the officers involved in the incident fled the country.
    Police also killed several bystanders while exchanging gunfire with 
criminals. For example, in early January in East Baringo, police shot 
and killed 5-year-old Chesortich, when they fired on her family's home. 
Allegedly the officers suspected that the family was harboring cattle 
rustlers. In February police fired at suspected robbers who were 
fleeing from police and seriously wounded a teenaged boy from Maragwa 
in Central Province (see Section 1.c.).
    Some official efforts have been made to investigate and punish 
police abuses. In August 1999, police killed five Muslim worshipers in 
the Anas Bin Malik Mosque in Chai village, near Mombasa. Within 1 month 
of the killing, the Government charged two police officers, Julius 
Mugambi M'nabere and Stephan Musau Kilonzo, with the killings; they 
were released on bail pending trial at year's end. In November 1999, a 
trial began against Justus Munyao Kovu and Gabriel Muendo, two Makueni 
police officers accused of killing Mwendo Kiema during detention in 
July 1999. On September 6, Godwin Mukhwana, a member of the 
Presidential Escort, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 8 
years in prison for killing Jamal Abedi and Henry Musyoka, the driver 
and tout of a passenger van, in December 1998. In December 1998, 
Ephantus Njagi Nguthi died from injuries that he reportedly received 
while in custody in Matanya, Laikipia district. Police reportedly had 
beaten his testicles. Two police officers, Christopher Mugera and 
Muiruri (who died before year's end), were arrested in the case. Three 
Flying Squad officers, Isaiah Muoki Musyoka, Kenneth Kaunda Obiero, and 
Andrew Kimungetich Koros were found guilty of manslaughter and 
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for the July 1998 killing of James 
Odhiambo. On June 29, the High Court sentenced police constable Felix 
Nthiwa Munyao to life in prison for beating his wife to death in July 
1998. Munyao beat his wife so severely that she went into a coma and 
died 5 months later. The case was publicized widely because the police 
refused to charge Munyao with a crime until his wife had died. On June 
7, police officers Jackson Parsalach and Austine Kabarayo were found 
guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 2+ years imprisonment for the 
death in custody of 60-year-old Job Cherutich; police constables 
Michael Chebon Chelimo and Chebon were acquitted. In December an 
inquest was completed into the January 1997 death of Catholic lay 
brother Larry Timmons in Njoro, which concluded that a police officer 
should be prosecuted for the killing; the status of the prosecution was 
not known at year's end. In May a court in Nairobi sentenced to death 
police constable Martin Kimeu for the November 1995 murder of a petty 
theft suspect, Kennedy Omondi Omolo, whom he shot and killed while in 
custody.
    There were no effective police investigations into many cases of 
killings by members of the security forces. The authorities sometimes 
attribute the absence of an investigation into an alleged extrajudicial 
killing to the failure of citizens to file official complaints. 
However, the form required for filing complaints is available only at 
police stations, which often lack the forms or are not forthcoming in 
providing them. There also is considerable public skepticism of a 
process that assigns the investigation of police abuse to the police 
themselves.
    There were no reported investigations into the following 1999 cases 
during the year: The September killing of Mwanzia Mutkuku, who was 
killed when police opened fire on the night club below his apartment; 
the September killings of two armed men at a bank in Nairobi; the July 
killings of Peter Kariuki, Jacob Anaseti, and Ramadhani Barula while in 
police custody; the June killings of Victor Polo and Vincent Odhiambo, 
two suspected robbers; the April killing of Ahluwalia Subir Ahluwalia; 
the February killing of Elijah Kimani Mwaura, who allegedly was 
tortured and beaten to death while in police custody; the March killing 
of Ibrahim Kullow Hussein; the February killing of David Muragi, a 
grammar school student, who died after a night in police custody where 
he allegedly was beaten; and the January killing of two rice farmers in 
Mwea.
    There were no reported investigations into the following 1998 cases 
during the year: The police shooting death of Simon Githinji Kigera, 
also a policeman, in Nairobi--police maintain they shot in self 
defense; the killing of Vincent Nyumba Kiema due to a police beating; 
the killing of Sheik Mohammad Yahyah, who was tortured by army 
personnel; the killing of Muthoka Mukele after he apparently was beaten 
in police custody; and the killing of Alfred Kang'ethe after he was 
beaten by the Uthiru police.
    Several 1998 cases of extrajudicial killings remained unresolved at 
year's end. Police continued to investigate the June 1998 shooting 
death of Pastor Simeon Kiti Mwangoma (or Mwangalee) by Kilifi police, 
but took no further action during the year; police maintain Mwangoma 
was the leader of a notorious gang. Army officer Aden Almi and police 
officers Faneis Malaba Mbiya and Kennedy Bitange faced charges of 
murder in connection with the death in police custody in Garissa of Ali 
Hussein Ali; the High Court in Nairobi is scheduled to hear the case in 
March 2001. Kitui authorities charged assistant chief Simeon Mwandinga 
and four other persons with inciting or participating in the 1998 mob 
killing of Kamwila Kamungu. Two persons were sentenced to 3 years' 
imprisonment; Mwandinga and two other persons were acquitted. Another 
assistant chief, Josephine Matalu, was acquitted of instigating the 
1998 beating death of Kiema Mwisuve. The trial of the suspects in the 
1998 murder of Seth Sendashonga was ongoing at year's end.
    A hearing before the Senior Resident Magistrate in Kitale in the 
1997 deaths in police custody of Moses Macharia Gicheru and Lomurodo 
Amodoi was scheduled for early 2001.
    On August 24, Father John Anthony Kaiser, a Catholic priest working 
in the country for over 30 years, was found dead near Naivasha town. 
Father Kaiser was a vocal human rights activist and a critic of key 
members of the Government. The investigation was ongoing at year's end; 
there are no known suspects.
    On November 30 and December 1, Muslim worshippers and local traders 
fought over land surrounding a mosque in a residential neighborhood in 
Nairobi, resulting in the deaths of four persons and numerous injuries 
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.).
    Hundreds of prisoners died in custody due to life-threatening 
prison conditions, including inadequate food and medical treatment (see 
Section 1.c.). The Government recorded 658 deaths in prisons during the 
first 10 months of the year. On June 10 and 11, inmates at Rumuruti GK 
Prison in Laikipia District rioted over a food shortage, which resulted 
in the death of one prisoner (see Section 1.c.).
    Mob violence increased during the year, which observers believe may 
have been associated with a continuously high crime rate. According to 
the KHRC, 138 persons were killed in mob violence during the year. The 
Government recorded 240 deaths due to mob violence during the year. 
Human rights observers attribute mob violence to a lack of public 
confidence in the police and the judicial process. The great majority 
of mob violence victims, who died by lynching, beating, or burning, 
were persons suspected of criminal activities, including robbery, 
cattle rustling, and membership in terror gangs. However, the social 
acceptability of mob violence also provided cover for personal 
vengeance under the guise of ``mob justice.'' According to media 
reports, on March 26 in Juja (Central Province), parishioners on their 
way to mass stoned to death two carjackers who were attempting to steal 
a fellow parishioner's automobile. No arrests were made in the case. On 
July 16, villagers in Munyu, Thika (Central Province), burned to death 
five teenaged boys, Walter Midamba, Juma Musyimi, Julius Nduati, 
Ibrahim Mburu, and Maina, on suspicion of theft. The five had been 
caught running through the yard of a man whose home had been robbed the 
previous week. In October President Moi advised citizens to rely on the 
police, not vigilantism, to deal with suspects.
    Occasionally mobs killed members of their communities on suspicion 
that they practiced witchcraft (see Sections 2.c. and 5); however, 
there were no known statistics about the number of deaths during the 
year. On October 3, a mob of residents of Nairobi's Kariobangi North 
neighborhood lynched three suspected child abductors (believed to be 
devil worshipers), including a grandfather who was walking with his 
grandchild (see Section 5). In late October in Kisii, police intervened 
to block villagers from killing seven suspected witches. Also in 
October, the press reported that villagers burned alive a suspected 
sorcerer in Kimburini.
    Interethnic violence in rural areas continued to cause numerous 
deaths (see Section 5).
    There were several incidents during the year in which persons were 
killed during interethnic disputes; some of these disputes crossed into 
the country from neighboring countries (see Section 2.d.).
    In late November, armed men reportedly from Ethiopia killed nine 
persons and seriously injured five others near the border town of 
Moyale. Local politicians claimed that the attackers had support from 
Ethiopian security forces; the incident was not resolved by year's end.
    The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an Ethiopian rebel group, 
reportedly has laid landmines in northern areas of the country near the 
Ethiopian border; however, there were no reports of any deaths or 
injuries during the year.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reported cases of politically 
motivated or other disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution states that ``no one shall be subject to 
torture or degrading punishment or other treatment;'' however, security 
forces continued to use torture and physical violence as methods of 
interrogation and to punish both pretrial detainees and convicted 
prisoners. Although police authorities periodically issue directives 
against the use of torture by police, the problem persists. Human 
rights organizations and the press highlighted scores of cases of 
torture, and several cases of indiscriminate beating of groups of 
persons by police during the year. Common methods of torture practiced 
by police included hanging persons upside down for long periods, 
genital mutilation, electric shocks, and deprivation of air by 
submersion of the head in water. The KHRC reported 49 torture related 
deaths during the year (see Section 1.a.).
    There were numerous allegations of police use of excessive force 
and torture. The KHRC recorded 157 cases of police brutality during the 
year. Detainees routinely claimed that they had been tortured, making 
it difficult to separate real from fabricated incidents. On January 1, 
police attached to the Ng'araria Chief's Camp in Murang'a allegedly 
beat 10-year-old Joseph Ndung'u Nyoike for suspected theft; the boy 
died after spending the night in prison (see Section 1.a.). On January 
15, police from the Mukuruwei-ini police station allegedly beat to 
death Philip Machau after he was caught stealing a piece of second-hand 
clothing (see Section 1.a.). In mid-January police in Kapsabet 
allegedly tortured William Tanui for 5 days while he was detained for 
illegally transporting maize. There was no known action taken against 
the police by year's end. In February police fired at suspected robbers 
who were fleeing from police and seriously wounded a teenaged boy from 
Maragwa, Central Province (see Section 1.a.). On February 5, in 
Nyahururu, Laikipia District, Mose Wambugu, a plainclothes police 
officer from the Special Crime Prevention Unit, reportedly shot Miriam 
Wamboi in the head after she refused the officer's demands for sex. 
Wamboi was in a coma for a month following the shooting and the bullet 
remains lodged in her brain. On February 6, Wambugu was arrested and 
remained in detention pending a trial at year's end. In April police 
beat and arrested Mohammed Sheikh, a journalist for the People (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). On April 30, there were reports that Sophia 
Nyaguthii Mbogo, a pregnant 21-year-old woman, died in custody at the 
Kagio Police Post (see Section 1.a.). A newspaper article claimed that 
autopsy results concluded that she died from internal bleeding due to 
``superficial'' bruises. A cellmate of Mbogo's told reporters that she 
saw a Kagio policeman by the name of Kaundu enter Mbogo's cell and beat 
her head with a club. On May 9, police officers Charles King'ori and 
Wilson Kinyanjui from the Makueni Police Station allegedly undressed 
Charles Muteti Mulwa, bound his hands and legs, and beat his testicles. 
A doctor from the Ministry of Health told reporters that Mulwa suffered 
from twisted testicles and cigarette burns on his feet. King'ori and 
Kinyanjui were charged with assault and their cases were pending before 
the Makindu Principal Magistrate at year's end; it was unknown whether 
they were in detention or released on bail. A woman, Margaret Njeri, 
claimed that police tortured her to extract a confession; police 
officers allegedly stripped, whipped, beat her until she bled, and 
sexually abused her. On May 28, Njeri filed a formal complaint to 
police and said that she intended to sue police for damages; the case 
was pending at year's end. In October 1999, police had arrested and 
detained Njeri in prison for 5 months before the courts acquitted her 
of charges of running a group of carjackers. On September 4, prison 
guards at the King'ong'o Prison in Nyeri killed six inmates who were 
attempting to escape (see Section 1.a.). Officials initially claimed 
that guards shot the six as they fled; however, there were media and 
NGO reports that the six had died of blows to the head and severe 
beatings after recapture. By some accounts, the dead inmates had their 
eyes gouged out and heads beaten, and they were disfigured beyond 
recognition. The Attorney General ordered an inquest into the killings, 
and the police were investigating the matter at year's end. The 
Attorney General promised to prosecute the guards if they are suspected 
of wrongdoing. On December 30, police chased and beat Betty Dindi, a 
journalist for The Nation, who was covering a shareholders meeting of 
Mbo-I-Kimati, a land-owning firm, which had been banned by police (see 
Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
    In September a magistrate in Nakuru granted the request of six army 
officers, Nahashoon Kili, Moses Kiprotich, John Masai, Joseph Tanui, 
Henry Buienei, and Tito Rono, to pursue charges of torture against 
members of the 66th Artillery Battalion. The six had been held for 6 
months on suspicion of mutiny in the first half of the year. The case 
was pending at year's end.
    According to organizations that work with street children, police 
also beat and abuse street children (see Section 5). The WEMA Street 
Girls Center pressed charges against two Mombasa police officers, 
Mwinge Chula and Peter Ndwiga, who were arrested for raping a 13-year-
old street girl in May 1999. Hearings on the case began on December 22.
    Police repeatedly used excessive force and beat persons when 
breaking up demonstrations (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). On February 
28, police in Nanyuki disrupted a public civic education play by a 
theater group (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). According to the production 
organizers, the Centre for Governance and Development (CGD), police 
disrupted the play and beat several persons in the audience. On 
December 17, 100 riot police used tear gas and batons to forcibly 
disperse a march headed by 5 M.P.'s, including James Orengo, injuring 
numerous persons (see Section 2.b.).
    Following President Moi's December 8 ban on all future rallies by 
the Muungano wa Mageuzi (Movement for Change) (see Sections 1.d., 2.a., 
2.b., and 3), police prevented or forcibly dispersed all rallies held 
by the group, which resulted in several injuries and arrests.
    In early May, President Moi was quoted widely in the press calling 
for action against the Mungiki religious and political group; police 
forcibly disrupted several of the group's meetings during the year, 
injuring several persons (see Section 2.b.). On July 30, police in 
Nyeri arrested 10 Mungiki members for holding an illegal assembly, 
reportedly injuring some of them (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    Police forcibly dispersed several protests after they became 
violent, injuring some persons (see Section 2.b.). On August 19 in 
Nairobi, there were several violent incidents between progovernment 
supporters, opposition supporters, and the police. When progovernment 
supporters broke up an opposition rally organized by Member of 
Parliament (M.P.) James Orengo (see Section 2.b.), police intervened, 
used tear gas, and beat and kicked participants. Police allegedly beat 
Sammy Mwange who died from severe head wounds, and injured dozens of 
persons. Television cameras also broadcast footage of 30 to 40 men 
outside Parliament searching vehicles, smashing windshields, and 
attacking an opposition M.P. in view of armed police who did not 
intervene. One M.P. claimed that he recognized three off-duty policemen 
in the group present at the Parliament. Rally organizers accused the 
Government of complicity in the violence. On September 11, antiriot 
police responded to a wildcat strike by several hundred guard service 
employees by firing tear gas at the striking guards after they began 
burning vehicles and attacking passers-by; several persons were injured 
(see Section 6.a.). On December 13, police forcibly disrupted a meeting 
held by Kipruto Kirwa, a dissident KANU M.P. (see Section 2.b.). Police 
fired several shots into the crowd while chasing several persons from 
the meeting through the village; one person was injured.
    Student protests and riots occurred frequently during the year, and 
police forcibly dispersed several protests after they became violent, 
which resulted in injuries (see Section 2.b.). On June 12, police 
forcibly dispersed approximately 200 students who commandeered 2 
university buses and attacked the offices of the Nation newspaper. 
Police did not intervene initially; however, they did so after the 
students began to set fire to a building. Police arrested at least 21 
persons (see Section 1.d.); several persons were injured during the 
incident.
    There were several violent incidents during the elections to the 
Kenya Tea Development Authority's Board of Directors (the cooperative 
which represents the country's 45 tea factories). On June 20, in 
Gatundu North Province, during fighting between police and farmers 
boycotting the elections at the Mataara tea center, police shot and 
killed two farmers and injured several others (see Section 1.a.). Later 
that evening, armed farmers in Mataara killed a local policeman and 
seriously injured several other police officers apparently in 
retaliation. On June 21, during fighting between farmers and police in 
Guchu District, police shot three farmers and dozens of others were 
injured.
    On June 21, 94 M.P.'s released a report entitled ``The 
Politicization and Misuse of the Kenya Police and the Administration 
Police Force,'' which criticized the police for misuse of force and 
human rights abuses. On June 22, President Moi ordered police to stop 
using live ammunition when quelling riots. It was unclear if Moi's 
pronouncement had any effect on police behavior by year's end.
    During the year, the Government investigated some allegations of 
police use of excessive force and torture, and prosecuted several 
police officers. According to the Government, two police officers were 
charged and sentenced during the year, and the Government recorded only 
two reported cases of torture during that same period. In May 
authorities disbanded a special squad of 30 police officers attached to 
the CID because they allegedly were involved in numerous robberies, 
carjackings, and killings. There were no reports that members of the 
squad, reportedly code-named Alfa Romeo, were prosecuted by year's end 
due to lack of evidence against them.
    There was no known action taken against members of the security 
forces responsible for torturing, beating, or abusing the persons in 
the following 1999 cases: The September case of Geoffrey Mbuthia 
Nduati, who allegedly was attacked by dogs in policy custody; the May 
case of residents of Balessa and El Hadi, who were beaten or tortured 
by security forces; the April case of Duncan Ndwega, a CID officer, who 
was tortured by the Flying Squad; the April case of M.P. James Orengo, 
who police beat and arrested while he spoke publicly in Nyanza 
province; the February case of Peter Macendu who was whipped and beaten 
unconscious by policemen in Kerugoya; the January case in which police 
beat a crowd protesting the results of the National Assembly by-
election in Eastern Province; the January case of Jeremiah Kasuku, who 
was assaulted and detained illegally in Keiyani; the case of Julius 
Muhoro Mugo, who was tortured by CID officers; and the case of Johnnes 
Musyoka Kimonyi, who was beaten by police in Buru Buru.
    Marches and symposiums marked the beginning of the U.N. 
International Week in Support of Victims of Torture on June 22, which 
generated much discussion of torture in the press. One daily newspaper, 
The People, ran a series of articles on torture, featuring anecdotes, 
discussion of laws, and statistics. On June 23, a group of human rights 
organizations led by People Against Torture marched in Nairobi to mark 
the week. On June 26, more than 2,000 persons gathered at a Mau Mau 
massacre site in Nyeri for masses to commemorate Mau Mau war victims 
and other victims of torture. On June 26, in Nairobi, Attorney General 
Wako was the keynote speaker at a symposium on torture organized by 
human rights groups.
    Caning continued to be used as punishment in cases such as rape 
(see Section 5).
    Acts of violence, including rape, banditry, and shootings, occur 
regularly near refugee camps (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
    There were several violent incidents between progovernment 
supporters and opposition supporters during the year, namely during 
opposition rallies (see Section 2.b.). For example, during incidents 
from January 13 to 15, supporters of National Development Party (NDP) 
Raila Odinga reportedly beat and whipped several persons with whips and 
batons, resulting in numerous injuries. On November 26 in Kisumu, 
progovernment youths forcibly disrupted a meeting of the Ufungamano 
commission, a church-led constitutional review commission (see Sections 
2.b., 2.c., and 3). The youths threw Molotov cocktails, burned a 
vehicle, and beat severely several persons.
    On November 30 and December 1, Muslim worshippers and local traders 
fought over land surrounding a mosque in a residential neighborhood in 
Nairobi, resulting in the deaths of four persons and numerous injuries 
(see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
    Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening, due both to a 
lack of resources and to the Government's unwillingness to address 
deficiencies in the penal system. Prisoners are subjected to severe 
overcrowding, inadequate water, poor diet, substandard bedding, and 
deficient health care. Police and prison guards subject prisoners to 
torture and inhuman treatment (see Section 1.a.). Rape of both male and 
female inmates, primarily by fellow inmates, is a serious problem, as 
is the increasing incidence of HIV/AIDS. Disease is widespread in 
prisons, and the death rate is high. Prisons do not have resident 
doctors, and only one prison had a doctor permanently assigned, 
although the position was vacant during the year. Prisoners sometimes 
are kept in solitary confinement far longer than the maximum 90 days 
allowed by law. Prisoners and detainees frequently are denied the right 
to contact relatives or lawyers (see Section 1.e.).
    The country's prisons reportedly hold 2 to 3 times their estimated 
combined capacity of 15,000 inmates. The average daily population of 
prison inmates was 41,010, 33 percent of which was pretrial detainees. 
While the prison population increased steadily over the last several 
years, prison facilities have not. The Government has built only two 
detention centers since the country became independent in 1963; 
according to the Government, there are 79 prison facilities. 
Overcrowding led to health related problems arising from the sharing of 
amenities, encouraged the spread of infectious diseases, and resulted 
in food and water shortages. According to the Government, 658 prisoners 
died in jails during the first 10 months of the year, compared with 196 
in the first 9 months of 1999, due chiefly to tuberculosis, dysentery, 
anemia, malaria, heart attack, typhoid fever, and HIV/AIDS, for which 
there is little access to health care and medicine.
    Men, women, and children officially are kept in separate cells, and 
unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that men and women 
were placed in the same cells. Women sometimes lack access to sanitary 
napkins and often have only one change of clothes, leaving them naked 
during the washing of their laundry. Young teenagers frequently are 
kept in cells with adults in overcrowded prisons and detention centers. 
Youth detention centers are understaffed, and inmates have minimal 
social and exercise time. Some young inmates remain for years in the 
centers, as their cases await resolution.
    By most accounts, prisoners receive three meals per day; however, 
there have been reports of food shortages, and reports that senior 
prison officers misappropriated the meat provided for prisoners. On 
June 10 and 11, inmates at Rumuruti GK Prison in Laikipia District 
rioted over a food shortage, which resulted in the death of one 
prisoner and injuries to dozens of others (see Section 1.a.). A week 
later at Rumuruti GK prison, according to several media reports, three 
prisoners died from hunger while working at the institution's farm. 
Prison officials denied these allegations. During a September 1999 
visit by the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture, Nigel Rodley, prison 
authorities at Nakuru GK Prison confirmed that inmates on remand 
received half the ration of food provided to regular prisoners, because 
they did not work.
    Nearly all prisoners serving more than 6 months in prison work in 
the prison industries and farms. Men work in printing services, car 
repair, tailoring, metal work, and leather and upholstery work. Women 
are taught sewing, knitting, dressmaking, rug making, basket weaving, 
jewelry making, and other crafts. Outdated laws mandate prisoners' 
earnings at $0.35 to $0.70 per year (10 to 20 Kenyan cents per day). 
Prisoners on good conduct can, with permission, work beyond the 8-hour 
day to produce goods, from which they earn two-thirds of the profits. 
Prisons are unable to invest these sizable profits in the prisons 
because income generated from the sale of prison products is sent 
directly into the Government Consolidated Fund. Some observers allege 
that prison officials use the free prison labor for personal profit; 
however, many inmates leave prison with a valid trade certificate.
    Responding to public allegations of unacceptable detention 
conditions, in January the Government sent a fact-finding team to 
Kodiaga Prison, which found that prison conditions were acceptable. On 
January 30, Commissioner of Prisons Edward Lokopoyit dismissed 
allegations of widespread torture in prisons; however, press reports 
continue to highlight the substandard conditions in the prisons. On 
September 19, the Attorney General said publicly that some prisons were 
``unfit for humans.'' The following day, the Nyeri District 
Commissioner decried poor prison conditions countrywide.
    The courts are responsible partly for overcrowding, as the backlog 
of cases in the penal system continues to fill the remand sections of 
prisons (see Section 1.e.). Many detainees spend more than 3 years in 
prison before their trials are completed, often because they cannot 
afford even the lowest bail. Very few can afford attorneys.
    The Government does not permit consistent independent monitoring of 
prison conditions. In general the Government does not permit domestic 
NGO's to visit prisons; however, some independent NGO's work with the 
Government in evaluating torture cases and performing autopsies on 
deceased prisoners. In July foreign diplomatic officials visited Kimiti 
Maximum Security Prison and Langata Women's Prison. In March the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur for Torture Nigel Rodley released a report on his 
visits to several prisons in 1999. Rodley noted the problems of limited 
access by observers, poor sanitation and health care, and overcrowding.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Despite constitutional 
protections, police continued to arrest and detain citizens 
arbitrarily. The Constitution provides that persons arrested or 
detained shall be brought before a court within 24 hours in noncapital 
offenses and within 14 days in capital cases. The Penal Code 
specifically excludes weekends and holidays from this 14-day period. 
The law does not stipulate the period within which the trial of a 
charged suspect must begin. Indicted suspects often are held for months 
or years before being brought to court. For example, Michael Owour, on 
remand at Kamiti Prison and charged by the Kiambu Court with a violent 
robbery, allegedly had been awaiting trial for 4 years. The Government 
has acknowledged cases in which persons have been held in pretrial 
detention for several years. Police from the arresting location are 
responsible for serving court summons and for picking up remandees from 
the prison each time the courts hear their cases. Police often fail to 
show up or lack the means to transport the remandees, who then must 
await the next hearing of their case. For example, in the case of six 
army officers who pursued charges of torture against members of the 
66th Artillery Battalion, the courts later criticized Police 
Commissioner Philemon Abong'o for failing to serve the accused army 
officials with the court summons; the case was ongoing at year's end 
(see Section 1.c.).
    The law provides that families and attorneys of persons arrested 
and charged are allowed access to them, although this right often is 
not honored. Family members and attorneys may visit prisoners only at 
the discretion of the Government. This privilege often is denied. For 
those who have been charged, it often is possible to be released on 
bail with a bond or other assurance of the suspect's return.
    In the early part of the year, the Government instituted the 
Community Service Order (CSO), a program whereby petty offenders 
perform community service rather than serve a custodial sentence. 
According to the Home Affairs Permanent Secretary, the Government has 
spent $250,000 (20 million shillings) on the CSO and is committed to 
providing $500,000 (40 million shillings) more in the next fiscal year. 
There are 11,000 petty offenders participating in the program 
currently. The program may help alleviate overcrowding; however, there 
was no indication of any change by year's end.
    Citizens frequently accuse police officers of soliciting bribes 
during searches or falsely arresting individuals to extract bribes (see 
Section 1.f.). The police continued repeatedly to conduct massive 
searches (``sweeps'') for illegal immigrants and firearms (see Sections 
1.f. and 2.d.). The KHRC recorded 1,950 arrests during sweeps 
throughout the year.
    Police arrested members of civil society groups and charged them 
with participating in illegal gatherings (see Section 1.c.). On January 
17, President Moi ordered Police Commissioner Philemon Abong'o to 
arrest those responsible for violent protests against the Parliament-
led constitutional review process, namely those protests from January 
13 to 15 that resulted in numerous injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 
2.b.). On January 18, police arrested M.P. James Orengo on charges that 
he incited violence regarding the Parliament-led constitutional review 
process. He was released on bail and a hearing was scheduled for March 
27 and 28; this case and several others against Orengo were pending at 
year's end. On March 30, police in Nakuru arrested and detained 11 
activists who were participating in a public gathering to discuss land 
grievances among the minority Ogiek community (see Section 2.b.). KHRC 
employees Lumbumba Ondeda, Vincent Musebe, and James Nduko and nine 
Commission and Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (4C's) 
members were detained in prison for several days awaiting sentencing 
for holding an illegal gathering. Human rights organizations viewed the 
arrests as a veiled effort by the Government to prevent civic education 
exercises throughout the country. The Attorney General subsequently 
dropped the charges. On April 3, police in Laikipia, allegedly on 
orders from District Officer Njeru, dispersed a Greenbelt Movement 
civic education gathering (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.), and arrested 
Joseph Kirangathi Njoroge, Esther Wamucii, John Gitonga, and Mwangi 
Gachie Kamau. The four were charged with assembling in a manner likely 
to cause a breach of peace, but were released on bail pending trial at 
year's end. On April 13, police in Nairobi arrested and detained for 
several days 63 demonstrators, including 6 nuns and 5 clergymen during 
a march to present a petition to the World Bank offices in Nairobi (see 
Section 2.b.). The Attorney General later dropped the charges because 
the police had no case against the demonstrators.
    Student protests and riots occurred frequently during the year, and 
police arrested numerous students responsible for violence during the 
incidents (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 2.b.).
    On December 9, police in the Western Province dispersed a Mageuzi 
rally, arrested and detained several journalists, and injured six 
persons (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., 2.b., and 3).
    In April police arrested and beat Mohammed Sheikh, a journalist for 
the People, who had been arrested in 1999 for writing ``alarming'' 
articles. He was released on bail and his case was pending at year's 
end. In April police arrested and briefly detained Maneno Mwikwabe, the 
editor of The Dispatch; he was not charged. Mwikwabe had been arrested 
in 1998 for writing ``alarming'' articles, but was released without 
charge.
    On July 30, police in Nyeri arrested 10 Mungiki members, reportedly 
injuring some of them (see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.); the Mungiki were 
charged with illegal assembly.
    During the year, police arrested a number of journalists on charges 
of publishing information ``likely to cause alarm to the public'' (see 
Section 2.a.).
    On February 15, Johan Wandetto, a journalist for the People, who 
was arrested in February 1999, received an 18-month jail sentence for 
writing a report that ``risked causing alarm.''
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is often 
corrupt and subject to executive branch influence. The President has 
extensive powers over appointments, including those of the Attorney 
General, the Chief Justice, and Appeal and High Court judges. The 
President also can dismiss judges and the Attorney General upon the 
recommendation of a special presidentially appointed tribunal. Although 
judges have life tenure (except for the very few foreign judges who are 
hired by contract), the President has extensive authority over 
transfers.
    The court system consists of a Court of Appeals, a High Court, and 
two levels of magistrate courts, where most criminal and civil cases 
originate. The Chief Justice is a member of both the Court of Appeals 
and the High Court, which undercuts the principle of judicial review. 
Military personnel are tried by military courts-martial, and verdicts 
may be appealed through military court channels. The Chief Justice 
appoints attorneys for military personnel on a case-by-case basis.
    There were some indications of executive interference in the 
judiciary. Several cases involving opposition M.P.'s have been pending 
for years, with the courts repeatedly postponing the hearings, thereby 
requiring the M.P.'s to appear periodically in court or risk fines or 
imprisonment. On October 9, a Homa Bay court sentenced M.P. Shem 
Ochuodho to over 3 years in prison for a violent assault on a political 
rival during the 1997 election. While violence may have occurred, 
observers believe the court may have applied the law inequitably--no 
KANU M.P.'s were similarly charged despite credible allegations of 
violence on their part during campaigning. There were a number of 
protests against Ochuodho's conviction. On October 19, High Court 
Justice Barbara Tanui overturned the conviction, ordered a new trial, 
and released Ochuodho. Police immediately rearrested Ochuodho, took a 
statement regarding the case, and then released him on bail.
    Judges who ruled against the Government in the past sometimes were 
punished with transfer or nonrenewal of contracts; however, during the 
year no retaliatory action against justices was reported. Judges 
occasionally demonstrated independence.
    The Attorney General's constitutional power to discontinue 
proceedings in private prosecution cases was a problem. Arguing that 
citizens must first notify his office before initiating private 
prosecution, Attorney General Amos Wako used this authority on a number 
of occasions to terminate cases against government officials.
    In the previous year, the judiciary faced many accusations of 
corruption. In 1998 the Chief Justice appointed a special judiciary 
commission chaired by Justice Richard Kwach to report on the problems 
of the judiciary. The Kwach Commission cited ``corruption, 
incompetence, neglect of duty, theft, drunkeness, lateness, sexual 
harassment, and racketeering'' as common problems in the judiciary. The 
Commission recommended amending the Constitution to allow for the 
removal of incompetent judges, introducing a code of ethics, improving 
the independence of the judiciary, overhauling the Judicial Services 
Commission (the administrative branch of the judiciary), and shifting 
prosecutorial responsibilities from the police to the judiciary. Upon 
receipt of the report, the Chief Justice in late 1998 appointed another 
commission to investigate modalities of implementing the Kwach 
Commission's recommendations for improving the judiciary. No action was 
taken on those recommendations by year's end; however, the Judicial 
Services Commission circulated proposals for a judicial code of conduct 
in the first half of the year.
    There are no customary or traditional courts in the country. 
However, the national courts use the customary law of an ethnic group 
as a guide in civil matters so long as it does not conflict with 
statutory law. This is done most often in cases that involve marriage, 
death, and inheritance issues and in which there is an original 
contract founded in customary law. For example, if a couple married 
under national law, then their divorce is adjudicated under national 
law, but if they married under customary law, then their divorce is 
adjudicated under customary law. Citizens may choose between national 
and customary law when they enter into marriage or other contracts; 
thereafter, however, the courts determine which kind of law governs the 
enforcement of the contract. Some women's organizations seek to 
eliminate customary law because they feel it is biased in favor of men 
(see Section 5).
    Civilians are tried publicly, although some testimony may be given 
in closed session. The law provides for a presumption of innocence, and 
for defendants to have the right to attend their trial, to confront 
witnesses, and to present witnesses and evidence. Civilians also can 
appeal a verdict to the High Court and ultimately to the Court of 
Appeals. Judges hear all cases. In treason and murder cases, the deputy 
registrar of the High Court can appoint three assessors to sit with the 
High Court judge. The assessors are taken from all walks of life and 
receive a sitting allowance for the case. Although the assessors render 
a verdict, their judgment is not binding. Lawyers can object to the 
appointments of specific assessors.
    Defendants do not have the right to government-provided legal 
counsel, except in capital cases. For lesser charges, free legal aid is 
not usually available outside Nairobi or other major cities. As a 
result, poor persons may be convicted for lack of an articulate 
defense. Although defendants have access to an attorney in advance of 
trial, defense lawyers do not always have access to government-held 
evidence. The Government can plead the State Security Secrets Clause as 
a basis for withholding evidence, and local officials sometimes 
classify documents to hide guilt. Court fees for filing and hearing 
cases are high for ordinary citizens. The daily rate of at least $25 
(2,000 shillings) for arguing a case before a judge is beyond the reach 
of most citizens.
    Critics of the Government--politicians, journalists, lawyers, and 
students--have been harassed through abuse of the legal process. In a 
1997 study of the judiciary, the International Bar Association found 
``a persistent and deliberate misuse of the legal system for the 
purpose of harassing opponents and critics of the Government.'' 
Authorities continued to arrest opposition M.P.'s, journalists, and 
student leaders during the year (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.), and a 
number of opposition M.P.'s, student leaders, and human rights 
activists still had one or more court cases pending during the year, 
often for months or even years.
    There were no reported political prisoners during the year.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--At times authorities infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights. Although the Constitution provides that ``no person shall be 
subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by 
others on his premises,'' it permits searches without warrants ``to 
promote the public benefit.'' The Police Act permits police to enter a 
home forcibly if the time required to obtain a search warrant would 
``prejudice'' their investigation. Although security officers generally 
obtain search warrants, they occasionally conduct searches without 
warrants to apprehend suspected criminals or to seize property believed 
to be stolen. Citizens frequently accuse police officers of soliciting 
bribes during searches or falsely arresting individuals to extract 
bribes (see Section 1.d.). Unlike in the previous year, there were no 
reports that Nairobi police searched offices of the media without 
warrants.
    The police continued repeatedly to conduct massive warrantless 
searches (``sweeps'') for illegal immigrants and firearms in 
residential neighborhoods of major cities (see Section 2.d.). The KHRC 
recorded 1,950 arrests during sweeps throughout the year (see Section 
1.d.). Residents complained that police who entered homes on the 
pretense of searching for weapons often asked for radio, television, 
and video receipts and permits and demanded bribes to refrain from 
confiscating those items in the absence of such documents. Unlike in 
the previous year, Nairobi police did not search the offices of tabloid 
publications and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) without 
warrants.
    Security forces monitored closely the activities of dissidents, 
following or otherwise harassing them. They employ various means of 
surveillance, including a network of informants to monitor the 
activities of opposition politicians and human rights advocates. Some 
opposition leaders, students, journalists, and others continued to 
report that the Government subjected them to surveillance and telephone 
wiretaps; however, there were no reports of interference with written 
correspondence during the year.
    According to press reports, in early February, police in Meru 
burned 300 homes, displacing over 1,000 persons. The residents, chiefly 
squatters living in makeshift houses, had occupied the land for as long 
as 10 years. A local councilor and some of the displaced contended that 
the plots previously were misallocated public land.
    Members of the coastal Bajuni, Mijikenda, and Digo communities 
accused the Government of denying them their rights to land (see 
Section 5).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the government broadly 
interprets several existing colonial era laws to restrict free 
expression. The Government continued to harass, beat, and arrest 
elements of the media during the year (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The 
print media has been relatively independent for decades and since 1992 
has multiplied and become more outspoken; there was significant 
liberalization of electronic media during the year, particularly radio, 
television, and the Internet. The developing regulatory framework for 
broadcast media allowed abuse and manipulation in the issuance, 
withholding, and revoking of broadcast permits and frequencies. Police 
repeatedly dispersed demonstrators to prevent criticism of the 
Government (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Some independent periodicals 
reported that the business community came under pressure from the 
Government to refrain from advertising in these magazines, which kept 
some on the edge of insolvency. In spite of these pressures, the press, 
civic organizations, and the opposition continued to present their 
views to the public, particularly in the print media. Government 
pressure led journalists to practice some self-censorship.
    On the whole, the print media remained candid and independent. The 
mainstream print media include four daily newspapers that report on 
national politics. The largest newspaper, the Nation, is independent 
and often publishes articles critical of government policies. The 
second largest newspaper, the East African Standard, is controlled by 
an investment group with close ties to the Government and the ruling 
KANU party. It is generally, although not automatically, supportive of 
the Government. The third daily newspaper, The People, formerly a 
weekly, is owned by an opposition politician and is highly critical of 
the Government. The fourth daily, the Kenya Times, which has a small 
circulation, reflects KANU party views. Two former weekly newspapers, 
The Post and the Kenyan Star, did not publish regularly during the 
year. There also are numerous independent tabloid or ``gutter'' 
periodicals, which appear irregularly and are critical highly of the 
Government. Reporting in these tabloids ran the gamut from revealing 
insider reports to unsubstantiated rumor mongering.
    The Government attempted to intimidate the pro-opposition press 
with arrests and intimidation, and by selective prosecution of 
journalists under a colonial-era section of the Penal Code that 
criminalizes the publication of information likely to cause fear or 
alarm. On February 15, Johan Wandetto, a journalist for The People, who 
was arrested in February 1999, received an 18-month prison sentence for 
writing a report that ``risked causing alarm.'' His story alleged that 
bandits held up the presidential escort. Wandetto appealed the case and 
was released on bond pending appeal. Aola Ooko, a correspondent for the 
Agence France Presse, was arrested following a March 9 article in which 
he fabricated allegations that police in Mombasa had stolen part of a 
4.8-ton drug seizure (see Section 1.d.). Simbi Kisumba, Mombasa bureau 
chief for The People, was arrested and faced charges in early March 
also for publishing an article on seized drugs that allegedly were 
missing from the police station. In March two writers for the small 
publication, Independent, were arrested and later released after 
writing an uncomplimentary article about the personal life of the 
Central Bank Governor (see Section 1.d.). On March 25, police from 
Eldama Ravine detained People reporter Elijah Kinyanjui Maina for 
several hours after he interviewed local residents about allegations 
that some of President Moi's livestock were stolen from his Kelelwet 
farm (see Section 1.d.). Police did not formally charge Maina. In April 
President Moi reportedly accused the Nation newspaper of unfairly 
attacking him and threatened to sue for slander and libel if necessary; 
however, no action was taken against the newspaper by year's end. In 
April police arrested and beat Mohammed Sheikh, a journalist for the 
People, who had been arrested in 1999 for writing ``alarming'' articles 
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). He was released on bail and his case was 
pending at year's end. In April police arrested and briefly detained 
Maneno Mwikwabe, the editor of The Dispatch (see Section 1.d.); he was 
not charged. Mwikwabe had been arrested in 1998 for writing 
``alarming'' articles, but was released without charge. On December 9, 
police in Western Province arrested and detained several journalists 
while forcibly dispersing a Mageuzi rally in Busia (see Sections 1.c., 
1.d., 2.b., and 3). On December 30, in a widely publicized incident, 
police chased and beat Betty Dindi, a journalist for The Nation, who 
was covering a shareholders meeting, which had been banned by police, 
of Mbo-I-Kimati, a land-owning firm (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). The 
police officers reportedly threatened journalists covering the meeting 
for ``inciting shareholders.'' Dindi escaped from the police, but later 
was rebuffed when she went to the police station to register a 
complaint. The KHRC, the Kenya Union of Journalists, and the Kenya 
chapter of the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) 
condemned the attacked on Dindi.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports during the year 
that any publications were refused registration or forced to suspend 
publication due to government action.
    The Government somewhat loosened its control over the electronic 
broadcast media in urban areas during the year--particularly over 
radio, the principal news medium for most citizens. There were 12 radio 
stations operating in Nairobi during the year, compared to 6 in Nairobi 
and 1 in Mombasa in 1999. The Government controls the Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), which operates the country's premier 
radio, broadcast television, and cable television networks, including 
Metro Television, which began broadcasting to the Nairobi area in 
September. KBC stations do not criticize the Government and give a 
large share of news time to government or KANU party functions and 
little coverage to opposition activities. The Kenya Television Network 
(KTN), which is owned by KANU supporters, airs news programs with more 
balanced political coverage. Stellavision is owned by KANU supporters 
and provides balanced coverage. KTN and Stellavision both began 
broadcasting in Mombasa during the year. Citizen Radio covers much of 
the central areas of the country, whereas Citizen TV broadcasts to the 
Nairobi area. Citizen Radio and TV news programs generally are 
objective. Family TV and Radio, a Christian broadcasting network, and 
Nation Television and Radio began broadcasting television and radio in 
the Nairobi metropolitan area in 1999. Nation Television began 
broadcasting in Mombasa in August, providing independent media 
coverage.
    The Government continued to delay action on a large number of radio 
and television license applications throughout most of the year, 
reflecting the arbitrariness of the broadcast licensing process. The 
Ministry of Information, Transport, and Communication, continued to 
argue that it was waiting for the recommendations on media 
liberalization from the Attorney General's Task Force on Press Law. 
That Task Force made its initial report in December 1998; however, it 
still has several outstanding issues to resolve, including the manner 
of selection of the 13-member Media Commission, which would act as an 
independent body issuing broadcast licenses. In September the 
Government issued a permit to Voice of America (VOA) to broadcast 
locally and indicated that it would grant a frequency as soon as 
paperwork is completed; however, there was no progress on this during 
the year and VOA did not begin broadcasting by year's end. The Ministry 
for Information, Transport, and Communication has licensed a total of 
12 television and 20 radio stations to date, although only 5 private 
television stations (KTN, Citizen, Family, Nation, and Stellavision) 
and 9 private radio stations (Citizen, Family, Sayare Rehema, Capital, 
Nation Radio, Kiss, Baraka, BBC Nairobi, and BBC Mombasa) fully are 
operational. In 1999 Nation Media Group received authorization for 
radio broadcasts in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru, and began 
radio and television transmission to Nairobi. Nation Media also sued 
the Government for permission to broadcast radio and television 
nationwide, but the case still was before the courts at year's end. In 
1998 the Ministry approved radio and television broadcast licenses for 
a Muslim group and for a Christian group. In 1999 the Ministry of 
Information, Transport, and Communication licensed an Islamic radio 
station and three Catholic television stations. On May 26, the Supreme 
Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) began test-running Iqra Radio 
Station, which provides information, educational programming, and 
entertainment for Muslim audiences in Nairobi. At year's end, the 
Catholic Church had been assigned regional broadcasting frequencies, 
but not national frequencies; its petition for national frequencies was 
not resolved by year's end.
    In January the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) ordered the 
shutdown of Citizen Radio and Television, a new broadcast operation, 
for unpaid licensing fees and improper use of communications equipment. 
Citizen claimed that the shutdown, which only affected its operations 
outside Nairobi, was politically motivated. Citizen appealed the order 
in the courts and continued broadcasting in Nairobi; however, in March 
the court upheld the CCK's order and Citizen again appealed to the 
highest court, the Court of Appeal.
    In April during a speech to Parliament, Julius Sunkuli, the 
Minister of State in the Office of the President, criticized ethnic 
vernacular radio stations as being tribal and a detriment to national 
unity (see Section 5). In August President Moi's request that the 
Attorney General draft a law to force radio stations to broadcast only 
in English or Kiswahili drew negative public reaction, which caused 
several Government officials to deny that the Government intended to 
ban vernacular broadcasting. No such law was implemented by year's end.
    The KBC remained the only domestic source of current information 
for most persons outside the Nairobi area. This continued to limit 
severely the ability of opposition leaders and other critics of the 
government to communicate with the electorate.
    During the 1997 election campaign the Electoral Commission directed 
that the KBC accord equal treatment to all political parties; however, 
this directive was not implemented fully. KBC coverage remained heavily 
biased in favor of KANU and President Moi. In addition the KBC'S 
limited coverage of the opposition generally was negative, compared 
with uniformly positive coverage of KANU. Opposition politicians 
accused the Government of using similar tactics in the 1999 
byelections.
    Representatives of the international media remained free to 
operate, and approximately 120 foreign correspondents of nearly 100 
media organizations report out of Nairobi.
    The Government does not restrict access to the Internet. There were 
approximately 20 domestic Internet service providers, which generally 
are privately owned. Internet access was limited only by economic and 
infrastructural factors, and was fairly widespread in urban areas.
    A total of 79 publications remained banned, including such works as 
``The Quotations of Chairman Mao Zedong'' and Salmon Rushdie's 
``Satanic Verses.'' The 1997 reforms eliminated sedition as a ground 
for censorship of publications, and directed that a board be 
established to review existing, and future, publication bans. The 
Prohibited Publications Review Board was established in 1998.
    Despite constitutional provisions for free speech, the Government 
and school administrators continued to limit academic freedom. There 
were six private universities and six universities owned, subsidized, 
and administered by the Government. Most post-secondary students 
attended Government-run institutions, due in part to their lower fees. 
President Moi, as chancellor of all state universities, appoints the 
vice chancellors, who managed the institutions under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Education. A number of student activists have been 
expelled from universities in recent years because of political 
activities, and most have been refused readmission. Students claim that 
the Government interferes in student elections to ensure sympathetic 
student leaders. Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports 
that government security forces followed student leaders.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts the 
right in practice. The Public Order Act, which the Government used for 
many years to control public gatherings and to restrict this right, was 
amended in 1997; the requirement that public meetings be licensed was 
replaced by the less restrictive requirement that organizers notify the 
local police in advance of planned public meetings. However, 
authorities continued repeatedly to disrupt public demonstrations about 
which organizers duly informed the police in advance; government 
officials claimed that the organizers lacked authorization to hold 
public gatherings, whereas there no longer appeared to be any basis in 
domestic law for requiring specific authorization. In August President 
Moi repeated his September 1999 statements that government officials 
should deny ``permits'' (for public demonstrations) to politicians who 
use public rallies to abuse other leaders; however, officials have 
legal authority to cancel planned public gatherings only if there are 
simultaneous meetings previously scheduled for the same venue, or if 
there are specific security threats. Cabinet Ministers Shariff Nassir 
and Francis Lotodo were quoted on several occasions during the year as 
threatening political opponents if they attended gatherings in the 
Ministers' constituencies. Lower ranking officials from various 
political parties also made similar threats against opponents.
    Police forcibly disrupted public assemblies, including some 
political protest demonstrations (see Section 1.c.). On February 28, 
police disrupted a public civic education play by a theater group and 
arrested seven members of the group and two persons from the audience 
on the pretext that they were holding an unlawful assembly and carrying 
offensive weapons (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.), a common charge to 
harass meeting organizers and participants. The organizers argued that 
such charges were baseless as plays are not governed by the Public 
Order Act (which requires prior notification) but the Film and Stage 
Plays Act (which has no prior notification clause). In a letter to 
Police Commissioner Philemon Abongo following the incident, CGD 
protested the arrests and claimed that the play was disrupted because 
of its civic education focus. In December the persons arrested were 
acquitted and released. On March 25 in Kapsabet, the officer commanding 
the police station, Gakuo Wanyaga, and riot police attempted to break 
up a rally organized by KANU M.P. Kipruto Kirwa and fellow M.P. John 
Sambu. The organizers claimed that they had notified the authorities of 
the planned meeting as required by law. After Sambu confronted the 
police and the crowd reportedly began chanting, the police left and 
allowed the rally to continue. On March 30, police in Nakuru arrested 
and detained in prison for several days 11 activists who were 
participating in a public gathering to discuss land grievances among 
the minority Ogiek community (see Section 1.d.). The Attorney General 
subsequently dropped the charges. On April 3, police in Laikipia, 
allegedly on orders from District Officer Njeru, dispersed a Greenbelt 
Movement civic education gathering, and arrested 4 persons (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). On April 13, police in Nairobi arrested and 
detained for several days 63 demonstrators, including 6 nuns and 5 
clergymen during a march to present a petition to the World Bank 
offices in Nairobi (see Section 2.b.). The group had given prior notice 
to the police, who permitted them to march peacefully until they 
reached the World Bank offices. The Attorney General later dropped the 
charges because the police had no case against the demonstrators. On 
June 7, police in Molo prevented the KHRC from holding a civic 
education drive for the Ogiek community at Tinet Forest (see Section 
5). The police did not allow the KHRC members to enter the community 
and accused them of failing to obtain clearance from the police to 
stage a public meeting. A spokesperson for the KHRC claimed the police 
deliberately prevented the visit in an attempt to deny the Ogiek their 
rights. On September 30, police in Keiyo disrupted a meeting held by 
members of the Marichor community, even though organizers had notified 
police 2 weeks in advance of the event. The Officer Commanding Station 
Wanyama allegedly claimed that he was acting on orders from higher 
authorities. On December 17, 100 riot police used tear gas and batons 
to forcibly disperse a march headed by 5 M.P.'s, including James 
Orengo; numerous persons were injured and 24 persons were arrested (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). On December 30, police disrupted a 
shareholders meeting of Mbo-I-Kimati, a land-owning firm, which had 
been banned by police as ``illegal'' for ``security reasons.'' The 
meeting was held to choose new directors and discuss a variety of 
grievances. The police officers reportedly threatened journalists 
covering the meeting and chased and beat Betty Dindi, a journalist for 
The Nation (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
    Police dispersed or intervened in some public assemblies after they 
became violent (see Section 1.c.). On January 29, fighting broke out at 
a rally in Bomet after persons allegedly paid by Assistant Minister 
Isaac Ruto attacked rival KANU Minister Kipkalya Kones and his 
supporters. On August 19, progovernment supporters broke up a rally 
organized by opposition M.P. James Orengo, police intervened, used tear 
gas, and beat and kicked participants (see Section 1.c.); police 
simultaneously blocked M.P.'s from leaving Parliament to attend the 
rally. On December 13, police forcibly disrupted a meeting held by 
Kipruto Kirwa, a dissident KANU M.P. (see Section 2.b.). Police 
allegedly sent in a group of 5 to 10 ``troublemakers'' to interrupt the 
meeting, then reportedly intervened and fired tear gas into the 
meeting. Police fired several shots into the crowd while chasing 
several persons through the village; one person was injured (see 
Section 1.c.).
    On December 8, President Moi ordered the police to prevent all 
future rallies by the Muungano wa Mageuzi (Movement for Change), an 
organization backed by a coalition of both opposition and dissident 
KANU M.P.'s (see Section 3), and to cancel any licenses that already 
had been issued. Moi said that licenses would only be given to 
registered political parties, and that the Government would ban events 
by any ``lobby groups, some religious organizations and nongovernmental 
organizations whose aims and operations were sinister.'' On November 
11, police in Eldoret used tear gas and batons to forcibly disperse a 
rally organized by the Mageuzi allegedly because the rally conflicted 
with another event and needed to be cancelled; several minor injuries 
were reported. On December 9, police in the Western Province set up 
roadblocks to prevent M.P.'s from attending a Mageuzi event in Busia, 
and police forcibly dispersed the rally; six persons were injured and 
several journalists were arrested and detained (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.a.). On December 12, police used tear gas and batons to prevent a 
Mageuzi rally at the Kamukunji Grounds in Nairobi; several persons 
suffered minor injuries.
    In early May, President Moi was quoted widely in the press calling 
for action against the Mungiki religious and political group and police 
disrupted several of the group's meetings during the year (see Section 
1.c.). On February 26, police in Thika forcibly dispersed a rally held 
by the Alliance of Patriotic Youth, a young group with strong ties to 
members of the Mungiki group, because the group reportedly had not 
given 3 days notice of their intent to rally. Police used tear gas and 
truncheons to disperse the crowd, which resulted in several injuries 
(see Section 1.c.). On May 14, a few hundred Mungiki reportedly were 
praying at Ngomongo grounds in Nairobi when police broke up the meeting 
and arrested at least three Mungiki members. On May 21, police in Embu 
allegedly blocked a Mungiki recruitment meeting. On September 17, 
police in Nairobi disrupted a Mungiki prayer gathering and then fought 
with Mungiki members, slum dwellers, and street children; there were no 
reported injuries.
    Student protests and riots occurred frequently during the year, and 
police forcibly dispersed several protests after they became violent, 
which resulted in injuries (see Section 1.c.).
    There were several violent incidents between progovernment 
supporters and opposition supporters during the year. On January 13, 
supporters of National Development Party (NDP) Chairman Raila Odinga 
attacked opposition M.P.'s James Orengo and Shem Ochuodho during a 
march against the Parliament-led constitutional review process. 
Supporters of the Parliament process reportedly beat several persons 
with whips and batons (see Section 1.c.). On January 14 and 15, 
students loyal to Orengo again marched in Nairobi to protest against 
the Parliament-led constitutional review process. Fighting between the 
students and pro-KANU and supporters of the Parliament process resulted 
in numerous injuries (see Section 1.c.). On June 22, armed youths 
disrupted meetings of the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) 
in Kisumu, reportedly injuring several NCEC delegates. The incidents 
did not gain national media attention until NCEC leaders blamed M.P. 
Raila Odinga, Chairman of the NDP, and the Provincial Administration 
for instigating the violence; Raila denied the accusations. On November 
26, progovernment youths forcibly disrupted a meeting of the Ufungamano 
Initiative in Kisumu (see Sections 2.c. and 3). The youths threw 
Molotov cocktails, burned a vehicle, and beat severely several persons 
(see Section 1.c.). Police did not intervene.
    The Government continued to use the Societies Act to restrict 
freedom of association. The act requires that every association be 
registered or exempted from registration by the Registrar of Societies. 
For years after opposition parties again were legalized in 1992, the 
Government refused to act on a number of political party registration 
applications. However, since the enactment of reform legislation in 
1997, the Government has acted on some long-pending applications, 
increasing the number of registered political parties from 23 to 40. 
However, the Government continued to refuse to reverse its 1994 denial 
of registration of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), which was involved 
in a number of violent confrontations with police in 1992 (see Sections 
2.c. and 5). The United Democratic Movement political party has awaited 
registration since 1998, and continued to pursue its case in the 
courts; however, it still was not registered at year's end. In 1998 the 
Saba Saba Asili party postponed its petition for registration, because 
it believed that the Government would deny its application.
    The Government continued to criticize publicly and to intimidate 
NGO's, many of which it accuses of being ``subversive'' and of working 
with the opposition to overthrow the Government. The Government NGO 
Coordination Board under the NGO Act registers NGO's. The Government 
used this structure to put pressure on the nongovernmental National NGO 
Council. In 1997 the Board directed the Council to compile a list of 
``political NGO's,'' presumably to carry out President Moi's threat to 
deregister all ``political NGO's,'' but the Council refused. In March 
1999, President Moi publicly stated that NGO's were trying to 
destabilize the country by channeling foreign funds to antigovernment 
student and labor organizations and using foreign funds to organize 
seditious mass protests. In April 1999, the Office of the President 
instructed all district governments to monitor NGO's within their 
districts with a view to ensuring that NGO's either advance government-
approved objectives or cease to operate; however, NGO's did not report 
an increase in government monitoring during the year.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, while groups generally were allowed to worship freely, the 
Government at times interfered with other activities by religious 
groups.
    The Government requires religious organizations to register with 
the Registrar of Societies, which reports to the Office of the Attorney 
General. The Government allows traditional indigenous religious 
organizations to register, although many choose not to do so. Once 
registered, religious organizations enjoy tax-free status and clergy 
are not subject to duty on purchased goods. Religious organizations 
generally receive equal treatment from the Government; however, some 
small splinter groups have found it difficult to register due to their 
inability to define their status as more than an offshoot of a larger 
religious organization. The Government has not granted registration to 
the Tent of the Living God, a small Kikuyu religious group banned 
during the single party-era; however, with the arrival of a multiparty 
system in 1992, the Tent of the Living God has virtually disappeared.
    Despite 1997 legal reforms and the subsequent registration of a 
large number of political parties, the Government refused to reverse 
its 1994 denial of registration of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) on 
the grounds that the IPK had been involved in a number of violent 
confrontations with police in 1992, and because the party refused to 
drop the Islamic title from its party name.
    On April 3, William Ruto, Assistant Minister in the Office of the 
President, said following the discovery of ``cult'' killings in Uganda 
that the Government would crack down on religious groups that endanger 
the safety of their adherents; however, other than the Mungiki, there 
was no reported harassment of religious groups.
    On June 25, local authorities in Nairobi blocked entry to the Buru 
Buru Church of God ostensibly to prevent renewed fighting between rival 
factions in the Church, which had resulted in numerous injuries among 
worshipers 2 weeks earlier. The Church remained closed at year's end.
    Foreign missionary groups of nearly every faith operate in the 
country. The Government generally has permitted them to assist the poor 
and found of schools and hospitals. The missionaries openly promote 
their religious beliefs and have encountered little resistance; 
however, some missionary groups expressed concern following the 1999 
release of the report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into 
Devil Worship. The Commission's widely-publicized report included 
numerous reports of ritual murder, human sacrifice, and cannibalism, 
and feats of magic allegedly done by using powers acquired through such 
acts. It also reported that ``Satanists'' had infiltrated nonindigenous 
religious groups including Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), and the Church of Christ 
Scientist (Christian Scientists), as well as other organizations, 
including the Masonic Order (Freemasons) and the Theosophical Society, 
making them ``doorways'' to Satanism. Most members of the Commission 
were senior members of mainline Christian churches; a deputy director 
of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) also served on the 
Commission. Fears of devil worship persisted during the year. In 
September police in Nairobi reportedly alerted residents to a growing 
number of ritual murders after a 7-year-old girl was found murdered. A 
women was arrested a week earlier for allegedly abducting a child.
    Purporting to practice witchcraft reportedly is a criminal offense 
under colonial-era laws; however, persons generally are prosecuted for 
this offense only in conjunction with some other offense, such as 
murder. Witchcraft traditionally has been a common explanation for 
diseases of which the causes were unknown. Although many traditional 
indigenous religions include or accommodate belief in the efficacy of 
witchcraft, they generally approve of harmful witchcraft only for 
defensive or retaliatory purposes and purport to offer protection 
against it. The practice of witchcraft is widely understood to 
encompass attempts to harm others not only by magic, but also by covert 
means of established efficacy such as poisons.
    Muslim leaders continued to charge that the Government is hostile 
toward Muslims. Muslims complain that non-Muslims receive better 
treatment when applying for proof of citizenship. According to Muslim 
leaders, government authorities more rigorously scrutinize the 
identification cards of persons with Muslim surnames and require them 
to present additional documentation of their citizenship (i.e., birth 
certificates of parents and, sometimes, grandparents). The Government 
has singled out the overwhelmingly Muslim ethnic Somalis as the only 
group whose members are required to carry an additional form of 
identification to prove that they are citizens. Ethnic Somalis must 
produce upon demand their Kenyan identification card and a second 
identification card verifying screening. Both cards also are required 
in order to apply for a passport. Although this heightened scrutiny 
originated as an attempt to deter illegal immigration, a senior 
official of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims alleged that it 
increasingly affects all Muslims.
    The Government at times disrupted public meetings that religious 
groups organized or participated in, sometimes for political reasons. 
For example, on April 3, police in Laikipia broke up a gathering in a 
Catholic church hall, on the grounds that the participants were former 
freedom fighters holding a secret meeting. The police arrested four men 
and charged them with holding an illegal meeting (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.b.).
    The Government historically has been unsympathetic to tribal 
religious groups that have engendered protest movements. The Government 
frequently harassed, and periodically arrested and detained members of 
the Mungiki, a small, controversial, predominately Kikuyu traditional 
religious group with strong political motivations. The group originated 
as an offshoot of the Tent of the Living God religious group, and many 
of its leaders reportedly have converted to Islam. On at least one 
occasion, police fired upon members of the Mungiki while attempting to 
disrupt their prayer meeting. Members of the Mungiki most commonly are 
charged with holding illegal assemblies and possessing offensive 
weapons. Mutual mistrust between Mungiki and police authorities 
aggravated the situation, and in May President Moi was quoted widely in 
the press calling for a crackdown on the Mungiki. On April 23, a few 
hundred members of the Mungiki approached the Nyahururu police station 
to demand the release of three members of the group. Police responded 
with force, including the use of rubber bullets and live ammunition, 
injuring dozens of persons and sending eight persons to the hospital 
with gunshot wounds (see Section 1.c.). Police later removed two of the 
wounded from their hospital beds and detained them, an act that 
hospital authorities strongly criticized (see Section 1.d.). On May 14, 
police reportedly broke up a prayer gathering at Ngomongo grounds in 
Nairobi attended by a few hundred Mungiki and arrested at least three 
adherents (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). On May 21, police in Embu 
allegedly broke up a Mungiki recruitment meeting. On June 25, police 
shot and injured 5 members of the Mungiki and arrested 23 others while 
attempting to disrupt a prayer meeting (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 
2.b.). The Mungiki members responded to the police attempts to disrupt 
their meeting by throwing stones at the police. On July 8, police in 
Nairobi fought with Mungiki members as they gathered for an impromptu 
meeting. On July 30, police in Nyeri arrested 10 Mungiki members for 
holding an illegal gathering, reportedly injuring some of them (see 
Section 1.d.). On September 17, police in Nairobi broke up a Mungiki 
prayer gathering (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.), and then fought with 
Mungiki members, slum dwellers, and street children; there were no 
reported injuries. The debate over the rights of the Mungiki to 
practice their traditional religion and advance their political agenda 
is ongoing. The Mungiki group allegedly promotes female genital 
mutilation (FGM) and the taking of illegal oaths against the 
Government. It remains unclear whether the Mungiki violate the law in 
practicing their religion.
    On August 13, 1999, police killed five Muslim worshipers in an 
altercation in the Anas Bin Malik mosque in Chai village, near Mombasa. 
The Government charged two police officers, Julius Mugambi M'Nabere and 
Stephan Musau Kilonzo, with murder. The case was pending before the 
court at year's end (see Section 1.a.).
    On August 24, Father John Anthony Kaiser, a Catholic priest working 
in the country for over 30 years, was found dead near Naivasha town 
(see Section 1.a.). Father Kaiser was a vocal human rights activist and 
a critic of key members of the Government. The investigation was 
ongoing at year's end; there are no known suspects.
    In December 1999, a group of Christian, Muslim, and Hindu leaders 
formed an alternative process to reform the Constitution, the 
Ufungamano Initiative, which opposes the Parliament-led process (see 
Section 3). The Government, although critical of the Ufungamano group, 
permitted it to proceed with its constitutional review process. 
However, a Minister in the Office of the President, Shariff Nassir, and 
other ruling party politicians, warned of possible confrontation if the 
Ufungamano Commission attempted to collect citizen views in their 
constituencies.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--By law citizens may travel freely within 
the country and there were no reported violations of this right. 
However, police routinely stop vehicles and check vehicles' safety and 
drivers' documents on roads throughout the country. Many vehicles often 
are in disrepair, and many drivers often lack required documentation. 
Police often demand bribes at such checkpoints.
    The Government does not restrict emigration or foreign travel; 
however, the law requires a woman to obtain her husband's or father's 
permission in order to obtain a passport (see Section 5). However, in 
practice, adult women often are able to circumvent this restriction by 
claiming to be unmarried. Civil servants and M.P.'s must get government 
permission for international travel, which generally is granted 
routinely; however, during several legislative periods during the year, 
the Government denied permission to some government Ministers to travel 
because the Ministers were in session.
    In November the Government deported approximately 100 Ugandans who 
were attending a conference in Nairobi, because of fears of contagion 
due to the Ebola outbreak in Uganda.
    The majority of an estimated 400,000 persons displaced or forced to 
relocate during the early 1990's because of ethnic violence are 
believed to have returned to their homes or moved elsewhere; however, 
some still were waiting to return home at year's end. Many of the rural 
residents displaced by the violent ethnic clashes in Rift Valley in 
1991-93 still have not returned to their homes and remain displaced in 
urban areas. Some of the several thousand persons displaced by ethnic 
clashes in Rift Valley in 1998, and in the Pokot-Marakwet region 
throughout 1999, have not returned to their homes due to fear of 
renewed violence (see Section 5).
    In December the Government permitted the return of approximately 
4,500 Kenyan refugees from Ethiopia pursuant to an agreement with the 
UNHCR and Ethiopian Government. Government officials had refused to 
allow their return in November 1999, ostensibly because of concerns 
over the possible effect of their return on ethnic tensions in their 
areas of origin.
    The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylum 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, in 1991 the 
Government drafted legislation to establish a mechanism for granting 
refugee or asylum status. During the year, the drafting committee 
submitted the legislation to the Attorney General's office for review; 
however, no further action was taken by year's end. The UNHCR grants 
refugee status to Somali refugees at the Dadaab camps and to Sudanese 
refugees arriving at the Kakuma camp. A UNHCR eligibility committee in 
Nairobi performs a similar function for individuals of other 
nationalities.
    The Government offers first asylum and provided it to the 
approximately 200,000 refugees registered by the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), who lived in official UNHCR camps. An 
undetermined number of refugees live outside the camps in cities and 
rural areas. Somalis accounted for about 80 percent of the total 
refugee population, followed by large numbers of Sudanese and a 
scattered number of other nationalities from across the region. 
Approximately 2,000 refugees, mostly of Somali and Ethiopian 
background, were repatriated during the year. Police performed 
nighttime sweeps in urban areas to round up illegal immigrants and 
refugees (see Section 1.d.).
    During the period between 1997 and 1999, the UNHCR, at the 
direction of the Government, closed 5 refugee camps near the coastal 
city of Mombasa and relocated over 7,000 refugees against their wishes 
to camps near the Somali and Sudanese borders. The Government requires 
all refugees to reside at these camps unless granted permission to live 
elsewhere in the country, primarily to attend higher education, undergo 
medical treatment, or avoid security threats at the camps. However, 
many refugees live illegally outside the camps, especially in Nairobi.
    The border with Somalia remained officially closed until April 12; 
however, many Somalis continued to arrive overland from Somalia to the 
camps near Dadaab during the closure.
    There were numerous incidents during the year in which persons were 
killed during interethnic disputes; some of which crossed the country's 
border (see Section 5).
    Incidents of rape of women and girls in refugee camps continued to 
occur, especially near the Dadaab camps (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Over 
80 percent of such rapes occurred when women and girls collected 
firewood and building materials outside the camps; however, reported 
rapes declined during the year, largely because of a firewood 
distribution program initiated at the Dadaab camps. On April 3, a court 
in Garissa convicted and sentenced a man to two concurrent 30-year 
prison terms for raping two refugee women near the Dadaab camp (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Acts of violence, including banditry and shootings, occur regularly 
near the camps. In January, February, and April Somali refugees at the 
Kakuma camp burned over 400 of their shelters, reportedly to attract 
attention to their demands for resettlement and to claim food ration 
cards allegedly lost in the fires.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion from the country of 
persons with a valid claim to refugee status.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government through free and fair multiparty elections; however, their 
ability to do so has not yet been demonstrated fully. The National 
Assembly continued to be dominated by the same ruling party. The 
December 1997 general elections, despite numerous logistical and other 
flaws, generally reflected the will of the electorate. They were marked 
by much less violence and intimidation, less fraud, and less overt use 
of government resources to assist KANU candidates, than the 1992 polls. 
Due to greater fragmentation, the opposition was perceived widely to 
pose less of a challenge to Moi's reelection than it had in 1992. 
Opposition candidates won 60 percent of the vote, but these votes were 
split among four main and several fringe parties, thereby enabling Moi 
to win reelection for another 15-year term and giving KANU a narrow 
majority in the unicameral National Assembly. KANU victories in 1998 
and 1999 by-elections (four caused by the deaths of sitting opposition 
M.P.'s and one by a defection to KANU) increased KANU's majority in the 
National Assembly to 118 of 222 seats. The High Court required one by-
election by overturning a 1997 opposition victory; the court continued 
not to take action on any opposition challenges to KANU victories in 
1997.
    At the local level, the President exercises sweeping power over the 
administrative structure. The President appoints both the powerful 
provincial and district commissioners and a multitude of district and 
village officials. In elections many local officials actively assist 
the ruling KANU. Unlike in previous by-elections in 1998 and 1999, 
there were no allegations of partisan electoral abuses by local 
officials during the one by-election in April in the Kwanza 
constituency, Rift Valley.
    At the national level, the Constitution authorizes the President to 
dissolve the legislature and prohibits debate on issues under 
consideration by the courts. This prohibition, in conjunction with a 
ruling by the Speaker of the Assembly that the President's conduct is 
inappropriate for parliamentary debate, has limited the scope of 
deliberation on controversial political issues. M.P.'s are entitled to 
introduce legislation, but in practice it is the Attorney General who 
does so. The President significantly influences the legislative agenda. 
However, in November 1999, the National Assembly amended the 
Constitution to give the National Assembly the power to hire its own 
staff and to vote its own budget, despite President Moi's long-
expressed opposition to this amendment. On November 28, the National 
Assembly passed implementing legislation, which was being implemented 
at year's end.
    The Government continued to use both physical beatings and 
arbitrary arrest and prosecution to harass and intimidate opposition 
M.P.'s and to restrict their freedom of speech and assembly (see 
Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.). The Government's domination of 
domestic broadcast media, especially outside major urban centers, 
continued to restrict severely the ability of opposition politicians to 
communicate with citizens (see Section 2.a.).
    On December 28, President Moi, acting as chairman of KANU, 
suspended six M.P.'s for dissent, including Jimmy Angwenyi, Kipkalya 
Kones, Anthony Kimeto, Cyrus Jirongo, and former Finance Minister 
Simeon Nyachae. The suspension prevents the M.P.'s from bringing any 
motions sponsored by their party to Parliament; however, they could 
still submit motions on their own and participate in all Parliament 
activities.
    Reforms adopted in 1997 ameliorated the lack of independence of the 
presidentially appointed Electoral Commission, which oversees 
elections, by nearly doubling its size to include members nominated by 
the opposition. One parliamentary byelection was held during the year 
on April 15, in the Kwanza constituency, Rift Valley. FORDKenya kept 
their seat in the by-election. While there was some violence in the 
period prior to the election, the election was held without incident.
    Since 1996 a broad coalition of NGO's and religious organizations 
has mobilized public opinion in support of a reform of the Constitution 
to reduce the power of the presidency. In 1997 the National Assembly 
enacted the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, which was amended in 1998 
to create a constitutional review commission to recommend changes in 
the Constitution. In 1999 the constitutional reform process stalled, 
when political parties were unable to agree how seats on the commission 
should be divided among the parties. Although demands by religious 
leaders and NGO's to restart the stalled constitutional reform process 
continued in 1999, Moi continued to insist that only the National 
Assembly was competent to review the Constitution. In December 1999, 
the National Assembly created a Parliamentary Select Committee to 
revise the existing act and form a review commission; the Ufungamano 
Initiative, a church-led group, formed the next day, creating a 
parallel process. The Parliament created a separate review commission 
in November, which also did not complete its review by year's end. In 
the latter half of the year, the Government and police harassed and 
disrupted meetings of the Muungano wa Mageuzi (Movement for Change), an 
organization backed by a coalition of both opposition and dissident 
KANU M.P.'s that promotes opposition unity to achieve political and 
constitutional reform. It is not a political party. On December 8, 
President Moi ordered the police to ban all future rallies by the 
Mageuzi and to cancel any licenses that already had been issued. He 
also accused Mageuzi and the Ufungamano Initiative of planning to 
overthrow the Government (see Section 2.c.). On November 11, police in 
Eldoret used tear gas and batons to disperse Mageuzi demonstrators (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). On December 9, police in the Western Province 
set up roadblocks to prevent M.P.'s from attending a Mageuzi event in 
Busia and forcibly dispersed the rally (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., 
and 2.b.).
    Elected local councils exist, but the executive branch of the 
central Government has arrogated most of the revenues and functions 
that they had at independence. Although rural and municipal councils 
are authorized by law to provide a wide range of health, education, and 
infrastructure services, in practice their functions have been reduced 
to some oversight of nursery schools, secondary and tertiary roads, 
markets, and natural resources such as forests. Most councils lack 
sufficient financial autonomy and revenues to perform adequately even 
these limited services.
    Although there are no legal restrictions, traditional attitudes 
circumscribe the role of women in politics, and women are 
underrepresented in government and politics. The National Assembly 
included eight female M.P.'s (four elected and four nominated), up from 
seven in the last session. The Women's Political Caucus, formed in 
1997, continued to lobby over issues of concern to women and to 
increase the influence of women on government policy. A bill was 
introduced in June to create a number of parliamentary seats reserved 
for women; however, no action was taken on the bill by year's end.
    Although the President's Cabinet included persons from many ethnic 
groups, approximately one-third of the ministers were either Kalenjin 
or Luhya. At year's end, there were only two ministers from the 
country's largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, and no minister from the 
third-largest ethnic group, the Luo; both the Kikuyus and the Luos tend 
to support opposition parties. However, in 1999 President Moi appointed 
a person affiliated with the Kikuyu ethnic group as Vice President. The 
President continued to rely on an inner circle of advisors, drawn 
largely from his Kalenjin ethnic group. There is one nominated M.P. who 
is of Asian origin.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The number of human rights organizations continued to grow. These 
include NGO's such as the KHRC, the Kenya Antirape Organization, the 
Legal Advice Center, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the 
Protestant National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Center for 
Governance and Development, People Against Torture, the Independent 
Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU), and the Release Political Prisoners pressure 
group. An array of legal organizations, including the International 
Commission of Jurists-Kenya, FIDA, the Law Society of Kenya, and the 
Public Law Institute, advocate human rights.
    Several NGO's maintain comprehensive files on human rights abuses. 
A number of attorneys represent the poor and human rights defendants 
without compensation, although they can handle only a small percentage 
of those who need assistance, and are concentrated chiefly in Nairobi 
and other large cities.
    The President instructed government officials to monitor NGO's 
carefully, and government officials including the President continued 
to intimidate, and threaten to disrupt human rights organizations and 
other NGO's (see Section 2.b.). According to a 1999 KBC news report, 
President Moi said that he would reveal a list of names of subversive 
NGO's and their antisocial activities; however, the President did not 
release such a list during the year.
    The Government allowed human rights organizations to witness some 
autopsies of persons who died in police custody. The Attorney General's 
Office generally responded in detail to foreign embassies' human rights 
inquiries.
    The KHRC produces a ``Quarterly Human Rights Report'' (formerly the 
``Quarterly Repression Report'') that catalogs the human rights 
situation in the country, as well as special reports on pressing human 
rights issues. During the year, it also published a report entitled 
``Damned and Debased: Women in Prison and Detention Centers in Kenya'' 
(see Section 1.c.). The Institute for Education in Democracy and other 
NGO's monitor elections in cooperation with the Electoral Commission 
and diplomatic missions.
    The 10-member Government Standing Committee on Human Rights (SCHR) 
established in 1996 is empowered to ``investigate alleged violations of 
constitutional freedoms,'' including abuse of power by public 
officials. It is tasked with drafting recommendations on human rights 
problems and providing these to the government agencies under whose 
purview the problems fall. However, it is subordinate to the Office of 
the President, its chairman is a longstanding KANU loyalist, it has 
received sufficient funds to fill only 8 of its 27 authorized staff 
positions, and it has been relatively inactive. Since its inception, 
the Committee has maintained a low profile and kept its distance from 
most contentious human rights problems. The National Assembly was 
considering draft legislation, drafted by the Attorney General and the 
SCHR with the help of NGO's and civil society, that would grant the 
Committee greater autonomy and independence; however, the Assembly took 
no action on it by year's end.
    In October 1998, the Parliament passed a resolution to create an 
Ombudsman's office that would be charged with addressing complaints 
about inefficiency, corruption, nepotism, and abuse of power by public 
servants; however, the Attorney General had not drafted a bill to turn 
the resolution into law by year's end.
    In July the Government facilitated a fact-finding visit by foreign 
diplomatic personnel to visit the Kamiti Maximum Security Prison and 
Langata Women's Prison (see Section 1.c.).

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of a 
person's ``race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local 
connection, political opinions, color, or creed;'' however, government 
authorities did not enforce effectively many of these provisions. There 
is credible evidence that the Government sponsored large-scale ethnic 
violence during the early 1990's, and there were some indications that 
some government officials have at least tolerated and in some instances 
instigated ethnic violence on a smaller scale since that time.
    Women.--Violence against women is a serious and widespread problem. 
According to the Government, 165 cases of rape were reported to the 
police in Nairobi during the year, compared to 155 in 1999. The 
available statistics probably underreport the number of incidents, as 
social mores deter women from going outside their families or ethnic 
groups to report sexual abuse. A study by Kangemi Women Empowerment 
Centre, a small group based in one of Nairobi's largest low income 
communities, claimed that three out of five women in the community were 
victims of domestic violence, and that one-third of the women had 
suffered sexual abuse. The study noted that the abused women rarely 
reported the violations, because they believed that nothing would 
change. Although the validity of the study is unproven, the basic 
figures reflect other published figures and anecdotal evidence.
    The law carries penalties of up to life imprisonment for rape, 
although actual sentences usually are no more than 10 years. The rate 
of prosecution remains low because of cultural inhibitions against 
publicly discussing sex, fear of retribution, disinclination of police 
to intervene in domestic disputes, and unavailability of doctors who 
otherwise might provide the necessary evidence for conviction. 
Moreover, wife beating is prevalent and largely condoned by much of 
society. Traditional culture permits a man to discipline his wife by 
physical means and is ambivalent about the seriousness of spousal rape. 
There is no law specifically prohibiting spousal rape. Throughout the 
year, the media continued to report on violence against women, 
including widespread spousal abuse.
    There continued to be incidents of rape of refugee Somali women at 
the Dadaab refugee camps, where women were assaulted outside camp 
perimeters in the course of gathering firewood and occasionally within 
the camps themselves (see Section 2.d.). A 1999 KHRC report noted a 
yearly average of over 100 reported cases of rape among refugee women. 
The UNHCR initiated a program to distribute firewood to refugees, which 
reduced the incidence of rape outside the camps; however, such crimes 
remain a problem.
    Since 1994 the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) has collaborated 
with the police to stop domestic violence. Police typically view 
violence against women as a family matter, not a crime. FIDA has 
trained over 800 police officers about gender issues.
    Women experience a wide range of discriminatory practices, limiting 
their political and economic rights and relegating them to second class 
citizenship. The Constitution extends equal protection of rights and 
freedoms to men and women, but only in 1997 was the Constitution 
amended to include a specific prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of gender. However, constitutional provisions allow only males 
automatically to transmit citizenship to their children. The Government 
has not passed domestic enabling legislation to implement international 
conventions on women's rights; however, the Attorney General submitted 
to Parliament three bills that are designed to protect women's rights: 
The Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Bill; The National Commission 
on Gender and Development Bill; and The Children Bill. The Task Force 
on Laws Relating to Women, established by the Attorney General in 1993, 
has yet to make its report.
    Women continue to face both legal and actual discrimination in 
other areas. For example, a married woman legally is required to obtain 
the consent of her husband before obtaining a national identity card or 
a passport.
    The Law of Succession, which governs inheritance rights, provides 
for equal consideration of male and female children; however, in 
practice most inheritance problems do not come before the courts. Women 
often are excluded from inheritance settlements, particularly if 
married, or given smaller shares than male claimants. Moreover, a widow 
cannot be the sole administrator of her husband's estate unless she has 
her children's consent. Most customary law disadvantages women, 
particularly in property rights and inheritance. For example, under the 
customary law of most ethnic groups, a woman cannot inherit land and 
must live on the land as a guest of male relatives by blood or 
marriage.
    Women make up about 75 percent of the agricultural work force and 
have become active in urban small businesses. Nonetheless, the average 
monthly income of women is about two-thirds that of men, and women hold 
only about 5 percent of land titles. Women have difficulty moving into 
nontraditional fields, are promoted more slowly than men, and bear the 
brunt of layoffs. Societal discrimination is most apparent in rural 
areas.
    The nation's best known women's rights and welfare organization, 
Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (``Development of Women'' in Swahili) was 
established as a nonpolitical NGO during the colonial era, but is 
aligned closely with the ruling party. A growing number of women's 
organizations are active in the field of women's rights, including 
FIDA, the National Council of Women of Kenya, the National Commission 
on the Status of Women, the Education Center for Women in Democracy, 
and the League of Kenyan Women Voters.
    Children.--The system of free education in the early years of the 
country's independence has given way to a ``cost-sharing'' education 
system in which students pay both tuition and other costs. These are a 
heavy burden on most families. Although the law mandates that schooling 
be available for all children up through grade 12 and that it be 
compulsory, there is a very high dropout rate in part because of large 
educational expenses. There are an estimated 4 million children between 
6 and 14 years of age who are out of school. The legally mandated 
universal schooling also does not occur in practice because of a 
shortage of schools. Levels of education for boys and girls differ 
widely. Although the number of boys and girls in school is roughly 
equal at the primary level, boys substantially outnumber girls in 
higher education. Rural families are more reluctant to invest in 
educating girls than in educating boys, especially at the higher 
levels. Seventy percent of illiterate persons in the country are 
female. The health care system for school children, which once provided 
periodic medical checkups and free milk, is defunct. Corporal 
punishment of students, including caning, by teachers is widespread in 
schools.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is practiced by certain ethnic groups and remains 
widespread, particularly in rural areas. The press reported severe 
injuries to several girls from the practice of FGM. Health officials 
estimate that as much as 50 percent of women nationwide have suffered 
FGM. According to Maendeleo Ya Wanawake, the percentage is as high as 
80 to 90 percent in some districts of Eastern, Nyanza, and Rift Valley 
provinces. FGM usually is performed at an early age. In September six 
women attacked Josephine Gacheri Mbaabu, an adolescent student, as she 
collected firewood, and attempted to circumcise her. She escaped 
without being circumcised; however, she was injured in the eye, ear, 
and neck. Mbaabu reportedly had undergone a less severe form of FGM, 
which was insufficient for the women. President Moi has issued two 
presidential decrees banning FGM, and the Government prohibits 
government-controlled hospitals and clinics from practicing it; 
however, no law bans FGM. In an attempt to end FGM, some members of the 
Marakwet and Maasai tribes instituted new ``no cut'' initiation rites 
for girls entering adulthood. According to statistics compiled by a 
group of NGO's in Marakwet, only 169 girls suffered FGM in December 
1999, compared to 12,000 girls during the same month in the 4 previous 
years.
    In December a magistrate in Rift Valley ruled in favor of Ednah 
Chebet Kandie and Beatrice Jepkosgei Kandie, two sisters who sued their 
father over his traditional right to force them to undergo FGM. The 
December 12 court order prevents Pius Kandie from forcing his daughters 
to undergo FGM.
    Economic displacement and the spread of HIV/AIDS continued to fuel 
the problem of homeless street children. The number of Nairobi's street 
children is over 60,000, an estimated 20 percent increase from 1999. 
These children often are involved in theft, drug trafficking, assault, 
trespassing, and property damage. According to a 1997 Human Rights 
Watch report, street children face harassment as well as physical and 
sexual abuse from the police and within the juvenile justice system. 
They are held in extremely harsh conditions in crowded police station 
cells, often without toilets or bedding, with little food, and 
inadequate supplies (see Section 1.c.). They often are incarcerated 
with adults and frequently beaten by police.
    The problem of child rape and molestation continued to grow. There 
were frequent press reports of rape of young girls by middle-aged or 
older rapists. There were repeated reports of molestation or rape of 
children by schoolteachers, mostly in rural areas. Teachers at the Top 
Station Primary school in Kitale allegedly raped several students 
during the year. In a letter to the Minister of Education, FIDA 
demanded that the Government fire these teachers; however, no action 
had been taken at year's end. Legally, a man does not ``rape'' a girl 
under age 14 if he has sexual intercourse with her against her will; he 
commits the lesser offense of ``defilement.'' The penalty for the 
felony of rape can be life imprisonment, while the penalty for 
defilement is up to 5 years' imprisonment. Men convicted of rape 
normally receive prison sentences of between 5 and 20 years, plus 
several strokes of the cane.
    On June 9, the Nairobi Chief Magistrate ordered Julius Sunkuli, the 
Minister of State in the Office of the President, to appear before the 
court on June 23 to face rape charges brought by FIDA on behalf of 
Florence Nangini Mpayei, who claimed that Sunkuli raped her in his 
office in 1996 when she was 14 years old. Mpayei also alleged that she 
bore a child as a result of the rape. In September the court dropped 
the case at Mpayei's behest.
    Child prostitution is a major problem in Nairobi and Mombasa, often 
connected with the tourist trade. Child prostitution has grown 
considerably due both to economic contraction and the increase in the 
number of orphans due to the spread of HIV/AIDS.
    There were reports that children were killed for body parts by 
persons practicing healing rituals associated with traditional 
religions (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.). In September authorities in one 
part of Nairobi reportedly banned night worship temporarily after 
several young children were found dead in the area, allegedly victims 
of devil worship. In October several small riots ensued as residents 
attacked suspected child abductors and killed three suspects in the 
process (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.). Similar incidents occurred in 
Mombasa and Nakuru where mobs attacked suspected child abductors. One 
man died when Nakuru police fired on a crowd that was attempting to 
lynch a suspect.
    People with Disabilities.--Government policies do not discriminate 
officially against the disabled with regard to employment, education, 
or state services. However, disabled persons frequently are denied 
licenses to drive. There are no mandated provisions of accessibility 
for the disabled to public buildings or transportation. Kenya 
Television Network broadcasts some news programs in sign language.
    Religious Minorities.--There generally is a great level of 
tolerance among religious groups; however, there were a few instances 
of violence between adherents of different religions, and Muslims 
increasingly perceive themselves to be treated as second-class citizens 
in a predominantly Christian country. Intermarriage between members of 
Christian denominations is common and interfaith prayer services occur 
frequently. Intermarriage between Muslims and Christians, although less 
frequent, is also socially acceptable, and mosques and Christian 
churches can be found on the same city blocks.
    For years Muslims and Christians have held an open debate over 
their respective places in society. Each group claims to have a larger 
number of adherents than is plausible, and some Muslim groups believe 
that the Government and business communities deliberately have impeded 
development in predominantly Muslim areas. Muslims also believe that 
the national business community, dominated by largely Christian ethnic 
groups from inland ``up-country'' areas including the Kikuyu, 
deliberately allocates to non-Muslims most of the jobs it creates in 
predominantly Muslim areas including the coastal area. The debate at 
times has undermined mutual trust. The misuse of authority by mainly 
Christian security forces in the northeast, which is largely Muslim and 
in which banditry is widespread, has long contributed to Muslim 
mistrust. In recent years, the absence of effective government in 
southern Somalia and the OLF insurgency in southern Ethiopia have 
strained Christian-Muslim relations further by causing the Government 
to increase security force presence and operations in the northeast, 
where many security force members may find it hard to distinguish 
Kenyan Muslims from ethnically and culturally similar members of Somali 
militias or the OLF (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.).
    There were a few instances of violence between adherents of 
different religions. On April 21, a group of Muslims allegedly threw 
stones and attacked a group of Catholic worshipers who had stopped in 
front of the Majengo mosque in Nyeri to pray during a Good Friday 
ceremony. The Muslim worshipers were in the middle of their Friday 
prayers and believed that the Catholics were provoking them. A few of 
the Catholics received minor cuts and bruises. Top leaders of the two 
faiths met in Nyeri a few days later to reconcile their differences and 
apologize before the fight escalated. On April 23, Muslim youths in 
Kitui reportedly charged and dispersed a group of Christians who were 
making noise outside a mosque during evening prayers.
    On November 30 and December 1, Muslim worshippers and local traders 
fought over land surrounding a mosque in a residential neighborhood in 
Nairobi, resulting in the deaths of four persons and numerous injuries 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Although originally a land conflict, it 
may have become a religious conflict during the fighting when a mosque, 
a madrassa (learning center), a church, a nightclub, and kiosks were 
burned down. Riot police intervened to restore calm; however, there 
were no reported injuries caused by this intervention.
    During the year, there were reports of ritual murders allegedly 
associated with aspects of traditional indigenous religions. The 
victims, generally believed to be teenaged children, reportedly were 
killed and parts of their bodies removed for use in traditional rituals 
by persons seeking renewed youth or health. The Report of the 1994 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Devil Worship, presented to the 
Parliament in August 1999, contained similar reports from recent years.
    Mob violence against persons suspected of practicing witchcraft 
resulted in dozens of deaths (see Section 1.a.). There were no 
statistics on the number of mob killings of suspected witches during 
the year; however, unsubstantiated accusations of the practice of 
witchcraft or satanism appeared increasingly common.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of 
approximately 29 million was divided into more than 40 ethnic groups, 
among which there were frequent and credible allegations of 
discrimination, as well as sporadic interethnic violence. In general 
each ethnic group has a distinct primary language and is concentrated 
in a distinct region; however, the languages of some groups are very 
similar to the languages of related ethnic groups. In private business 
and in the public sector, members of virtually all ethnic groups 
commonly discriminated in favor of other members of the same group when 
able to do so. Neighborhoods in large cities tended to be segregated 
ethnically, although interethnic marriage has become fairly common in 
urban areas. Political cleavages tended to correlate with ethnic 
cleavages (see Section 3).
    Unofficial results of the 1999 census indicated that the Kikuyu 
still constitute 21 percent of the population, and the Luhya were 
estimated to constitute 16 percent, the Kalenjin 12 percent, the Luo 11 
percent, and the Kamba 10 percent of the population.
    Ethnic-regional differences continue to pose obstacles to political 
and economic liberalization. Members of President Moi's Kalenjin ethnic 
group (a coalition of nine small ethnic groups) and other traditionally 
pastoral Nilotic ethnic groups are represented disproportionately and 
hold key positions in the Government, the ruling KANU party, the GSU, 
and the Presidential Escort. Many members of these groups appear to 
believe that economic and political liberalization would be likely to 
harm their groups, and to favor other groups. The Kikuyu and the 
closely related Kamba, Meru, and Embu groups make up more than a third 
of the country's population; members of these groups also dominate much 
of private commerce and industry and have tended to support opposition 
parties since they were legalized in 1992. The Kikuyu, the largest, 
best-educated, and most prosperous ethnic group, dominated the country 
under its first president, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu.
    In April during a speech to Parliament, Julius Sunkuli, the 
Minister of State in the Office of the President, criticized ethnic 
vernacular radio stations as being tribal and a detriment to national 
unity (see Section 2.a.). In August President Moi also criticized and 
sought ineffectively to ban radio broadcasts in languages other than 
English or Kiswahili (see Section 2.a.).
    In August 1999, a presidential Commission on Ethnic Clashes, a 
government-appointed panel of three judges formed in 1998, submitted to 
President Moi its report on the cause of ethnic clashes that occurred 
in the Rift Valley in 1992 and 1997, the Coast province in 1997, and 
the areas of Molo and Laikipia in 1998. Many of the hearings were 
public, and witnesses often directly accused local politicians of 
abetting the combatants, although they rarely provided other than 
hearsay evidence. However, key churches and NGO's claim that a number 
of witnesses were prevented from testifying, especially after, half way 
through the investigation, the Government changed the Commission's 
aggressive prosecutor John Nyagah Gacivih to the more progovernment 
Deputy Attorney General Bernard Chunga. The Government still had not 
released the report or announced that it was taking any formal action 
on its findings by year's end.
    Attacks and revenge counterattacks continued between ethnic groups 
throughout the country, resulting in an average of 75 to 100 deaths per 
month (see Section 1.a.). Significant conflict occurred between ethnic 
Pokots and Marakwets, between Pokots and Turkanas, between Turkanas and 
Samburus, between Luos and Kisiis, between Boranas and Somalis, and 
among various Somali clans. Many factors contributed to these 
conflicts, including the proliferation of guns, the commercialization 
of traditional cattle rustling, the weakening of state authority, the 
emergence of local militia leaders, the development of a modern 
warrior/bandit culture (distinct from the traditional culture), 
irresponsible local political leadership, shrinking economic prospects 
for affected groups, a regional drought, and the inability or 
unwillingness of security forces to stem the violence. In April 
approximately 400 armed men attacked a Somali clan in Isiolo District; 
20 to 40 persons reportedly were killed. In April an estimated 500 
Pokot raiders attacked a Turkana village near Baragoi; 27 persons were 
killed during the fighting. In June Pokot gangsters raided a Marakwet 
village; 10 persons were killed and several others reportedly were 
missing following the fighting. During the week of June 27, five 
persons were killed when disputes resurfaced over the ownership of a 
plot of land along the common border between Gucha and Migori 
districts, Western Province. When a Luo man attempted to till the land, 
a group of Kisii men attacked and killed him. In response the Luo's 
kinsmen killed two of the suspects. A band of Kisii men then killed 
another Luo in his home in revenge. In July 30 persons were killed 
during fighting between two Somali clans in Wajir district. Violence 
also broke out during several periods between ethnic Somali and Boranas 
in the Isiolo area, resulting in numerous deaths.
    Members of the coastal Bajuni, Mijikenda, and Digo communities 
accused the Government of denying them their rights to land, and of 
favoring members of inland ``up-country'' ethnic groups, who migrated 
to the coast largely during the period when Kenyatta was president. On 
June 7, police in Molo prevented the KHRC from holding a civic 
education drive for the Ogiek community at Tinet Forest (see Section 
2.b.). A spokesperson for the KHRC claimed the police deliberately 
prevented the visit in an attempt to deny the Ogiek their rights.
    The Government has singled out the overwhelmingly-Muslim ethnic 
Somalis as the only group whose members are required to carry an 
additional form of identification to prove that they are citizens. They 
must produce upon demand their national identification card and a 
second identification card verifying screening, which is a form of 
prior verification of citizenship through birth records of parents and 
sometime grandparents. Both cards also were required in order to apply 
for a passport. The continued presence of and at times criminal 
activities by Somali refugees has exacerbated the problems faced by 
citizens of Somali ethnicity (see Sections 2.c. and 2.d.).
    There is widespread resentment among citizens of African ethnicity 
toward Asians living in the country. The Asian community constitutes 
between 0.5 and 1 percent of the total population and consists of 
second and third generation Asians with full citizenship and a smaller 
body of recent immigrants. Many African Kenyans resent persons of Asian 
descent for their affluence, and for their reluctance to assimilate 
African culture and to employ blacks, particularly in management 
positions. They also see Asians as taking jobs and commercial 
opportunities. The involvement of some Asians in corrupt activities 
with government officials further fuels popular resentment. 
Politicians, both opposition and ruling party, from time to time appeal 
to majority prejudices by attacking Asian citizens, accusing them of 
exploiting and usurping the natural inheritance of African citizens. 
Chenge Mbitiru, Democratic Party M.P. from Laikipia West, has called 
Asians ``the greatest economic enemies'' of the country and in early 
September, called for ``Kenyans'' to isolate ``Asians'' unless the 
government acts to constrain them. The M.P. reportedly said that 
President Moi should consider expelling Asians ``or allow the Kenyan 
people to force them to leave through mass action.''
    Police conducted sweeps for illegal immigrants (see Sections 1.d., 
1.f., and 2.d.).

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides that all workers, 
except for central government civil servants, medical personnel, and 
university academic staff, are free to join unions of their choice. The 
Police Act prohibits members of the national police force from joining 
unions. In practice workers employed in export processing zone (EPZ) 
firms, as well as those who work in many small firms, face dismissal if 
they join unions. The law provides that as few as seven workers may 
establish a union, so long as the objectives of the union do not 
contravene the law, and that another union is not representing the 
employees in question already.
    Unions must apply to and be granted registration by the Government. 
The Government also may deregister a union, but the Registrar of Trade 
Unions must give the union 60 days to challenge the deregistration 
notice. An appeal of the Registrar's final decision may be brought 
before the High Court. Since 1980 when the Kenya Civil Servants Union 
was deregistered for political reasons, civil servants also have been 
denied union membership. In August 1999, Dr. Richard Leakey, head of 
the civil service, announced that the Government may reregister the 
union and allow civil servants to become members; however, no action 
had been taken by year's end.
    There were 37 unions representing approximately 600,000 workers, 
about one-third of the country's formal-sector work force. All but five 
of these unions, representing approximately 250,000 workers, are 
affiliated with the one approved national federation--the Central 
Organization of Trade Unions (COTU). The largest non-COTU union is the 
240,000-member Kenya National Union of Teachers, which represents more 
than one-third of all unionized workers. The other four non-COTU unions 
are splinter organizations that separated from older bodies that 
remained within the COTU. The COTU leadership generally does not pursue 
workers' rights vigorously; however, most affiliates chose to remain 
rather than give up its even minimal support. As a result, most union 
activity takes place at the shop steward level and not at the 
industrial level where most labor-related decisions are made. This 
places the average worker at a disadvantage in disputes with 
management. Many COTU unions have evolved into de facto ethnic 
groupings.
    The Government created COTU in 1965 as the successor to the Kenya 
Federation of Labor and the Kenya African Workers' Congress. The 1965 
decree establishing COTU gives the President the power to remove COTU's 
three senior leaders from office and grants nonvoting membership on the 
executive board to representatives of the Ministry of Labor and of 
KANU. Although the board is composed of the leadership of affiliated 
unions, it is common for political parties, especially KANU, to provide 
funding and other support for the election of senior union officials. 
For the past few years, some leaders from affiliated unions have sought 
to bring about democratic reforms in the election of union leaders, 
independence from the Government, and establishment of links with any 
political party that supports worker rights. The reelection of the COTU 
leadership in 1996 indicated that there would be no major changes in 
the near future. Prior to the 1997 national elections, some trade union 
leaders began pushing the COTU to take part in the election reform 
dialog. The COTU leadership took a progovernment position.
    The Trade Disputes Act permits workers to strike, provided that 21 
days have elapsed following the submission of a written letter to the 
Minister of Labor. By law members of the military services, police, 
prison guards, and members of the National Youth Service may not 
strike. Other civil servants, like their private sector counterparts, 
can strike following the 21-day notice period (28 days if it is an 
essential service, such as water, health, education, or air traffic 
control). During this 21-day period, the Minister may mediate the 
dispute, nominate an arbitrator, or refer the matter to the Industrial 
Court, a body of five judges appointed by the President, for binding 
arbitration. Once a dispute is referred to mediation, factfinding, or 
arbitration, any subsequent strike is illegal. Moreover, the act gives 
the Minister of Labor broad discretionary power to determine the 
legality of any strike.
    In past years, the Minister used this power to declare strikes by 
bank workers and teachers illegal, although the required notice had 
been given; however, there were no such incidents during the year. In 
1997 the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) called a nationwide 
strike, which the Government quickly settled with pay increases of over 
200 percent spread over 5 years, rather than risk antagonizing the 
influential teachers before the election. The Government's failure to 
implement the second of the promised pay hikes resulted in a late 1998 
strike by the KNUT, which the Government declared illegal. The strike 
ended after 15 days when the Government refused to renegotiate. In 
November Dr. Gitu, the Ministry of Labor's Permanent Secretary, 
admitted that the Government should not have agreed to pay the 1997 
salary package for teachers. The KNUT threatened to hold a nationwide 
strike at year's end, but did not do so. The Government and the KNUT 
remain in irregular negotiation regarding the implementation of the 
agreed-upon salaries; however, the contracted pay hikes have not been 
paid, and relations between the KNUT and the Government continue to be 
poor.
    During the year there were several ``labor actions,'' usually 
informal or wildcat strikes; however, there were fewer than in the 
previous year. Most lasted 1 or 2 days, and some involved violence on 
the part of the strikers (usually in an attempt to keep other workers 
off the job). On September 11, antiriot police responded to a September 
wildcat strike by several hundred guard service employees by firing 
tear gas at the striking guards after they began burning vehicles and 
attacking passers-by (see Section 1.c.).
    Workers' rights groups continue to raise the general problem of the 
Government's harshness towards labor with the International Labor 
Organization's (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association.
    Internationally, the COTU is affiliated with both the Organization 
of African Trade Union Unity and the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions. Many of its affiliates are linked to international 
trade secretariats.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While not 
having the force of law, the 1962 Industrial Relations Charter, 
executed by the Government, the COTU, and the Federation of Kenya 
Employers, gives workers the right to engage in legitimate trade union 
organizational activities. Both the Trade Disputes Act and the charter 
authorize collective bargaining between unions and employers. Wages and 
conditions of employment are established in negotiations between unions 
and management. In 1994 the Government relaxed wage policy guidelines 
to permit wage increases of up to 100 percent and renegotiation of 
collective agreements. Collective bargaining agreements must be 
registered with the Industrial Court in order to ensure adherence to 
these guidelines.
    The Trade Disputes Act makes it illegal for employers to intimidate 
workers. Employees wrongfully dismissed for union activities can take 
their cases to the Industrial Court, and many have been awarded damages 
in the form of lost wages--reinstatement is not a common remedy. More 
often, aggrieved workers have found alternative employment in the 
lengthy period prior to the hearing of their cases.
    Legislation authorizing the creation of export processing zones 
(EPZ's) was passed in 1990. The EPZ authority decided that local labor 
laws, including the right to organize and bargain collectively would 
apply in the EPZ's, although it grants many exemptions in practice. For 
example, the Government waived aspects of the law that prevent women 
from working in industrial activities at night. In practice workers in 
EPZ firms may face dismissal if they join unions (see Section 6.a.). 
Labor and some government officials continued to criticize health and 
safety conditions in the EPZ's.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
proscribes slavery, servitude, and forced labor, including forced and 
bonded labor by children; however, under the Chiefs' Authority Act, a 
local authority can require persons to perform community services in an 
emergency. The ILO Committee of Experts has found that these and other 
provisions of the law contravene ILO Conventions 29 and 105 concerning 
forced labor. The law remains in effect; however, attempts by chiefs to 
institute arbitrary community service during the year were overruled by 
the Government. Some observers allege that prison officials use free 
prison labor for personal profit. There reportedly were instances 
during the year, especially in rural areas, of children being loaned 
out as workers to pay off family debts (see Section 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Employment Act of 1976 makes the employment in 
industry of children under the age of 16 illegal. The act applies 
neither to the agricultural sector, where about 70 percent of the labor 
force is employed, nor to children serving as apprentices under the 
terms of the Industrial Training Act. Ministry of Labor officers 
nominally enforce the minimum age statute, and the Government is making 
efforts to eliminate child labor, working closely with the COTU and the 
ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor; 
however, there are more than 4 million child laborers in the country. 
The problem has received considerable media attention for several 
years.
    Children often work as domestic servants in private homes. There 
are many instances of children working in the informal sector, mostly 
in family businesses. Children usually assist parents on family plots 
rather than seek employment on their own. However, deteriorating 
economic conditions and the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic have given 
rise to more child labor in the informal sector, which is difficult to 
monitor and control, and is a significant problem. A significant number 
of workers on coffee, sugar, and rice plantations are children, who 
usually work in family units. In addition a large number of underage 
children were active in the sex industry (see Section 5). In view of 
the high levels of adult unemployment and underemployment, the 
employment of children in the formal industrial wage sector in 
violation of the Employment Act is less common but not unknown.
    The Government is a signatory to ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor; however, the Parliament had not ratified the 
convention by year's end. There are no laws on the worst forms of child 
labor. Many NGO's are active in this area.
    Forced or bonded labor by children is prohibited by law; however, 
there reportedly were instances in which it occurred, primarily in 
rural areas as a form of family debt repayment (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for blue-
collar workers in the wage sector has 12 separate scales, varying by 
location, age, and skill level. The lowest minimum wage is currently 
$42 (3,180 shillings) per month in the largest urban areas and $25 
(1,908 shillings) in rural areas. Workers covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA's) generally receive a better wage and 
benefit package than those not covered, including a mandated housing 
allowance of 15 percent and traditional benefits such as a transport 
allowance or a ``house owner occupier'' allowance.
    The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. The 6 percent minimum wage increase 
decreed by the Ministry of Labor in May was criticized widely by the 
workforce. Most workers relied on second jobs, subsistence farming, 
informal sector opportunities, or the extended family for additional 
support.
    The Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act limits the 
normal workweek to 52 hours, although nighttime employees may be 
employed for up to 60 hours per week. Some categories of workers have a 
shorter workweek. As is the case with respect to minimum wage 
limitations, the act specifically excludes agricultural workers. An 
employee in the nonagricultural sector is entitled to 1 rest day per 
week. There also are provisions for 21 days of annual leave and sick 
leave. The law also provides that the total hours worked (regular time 
plus overtime) in any 2-week period for night workers not exceed 144 
hours; the limit is 120 hours for other workers. Workers in some 
enterprises claimed that employers forced them to work extra hours 
without overtime pay. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for 
enforcing these regulations, and there were few reports of violations. 
Foreign workers are covered by the same legislation and work rules as 
citizens.
    The 1951 Factories Act sets forth detailed health and safety 
standards; it was amended in 1990 to include agricultural and other 
workers. The 65 health and safety inspectors attached to the Ministry 
of Labor's Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety Services have 
the authority to inspect factories and work sites. As a result of the 
1990 amendments, the Directorate's inspectors may issue notices 
enjoining employers from practices or activities that involve a risk of 
serious personal injury. Previously, only magistrates were vested with 
this authority. Such notices can be appealed to the Factories Appeals 
Court, a body of four members, one of whom must be a High Court judge. 
The number of factory inspections has increased significantly since 
1992. One section stipulates that factories that employ at least 20 
persons have a health and safety committee with representation from 
workers. However, according to the Government, less than half of even 
the very largest factories have instituted health and safety 
committees. The vast majority of factories have yet to comply with the 
provision. Workers are not forced by law to remain in hazardous 
conditions; however, many would be reluctant to remove themselves 
because of the high unemployment problem and the resulting risk of loss 
of their job.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are no laws that 
specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, there are applicable laws 
against kidnaping and abduction that potentially could be used to 
prosecute traffickers; however, there were no reports that persons were 
trafficked to, from, within, or through the country during the year. In 
past years, there were unverified reports that citizens were trafficked 
to Saudi Arabia under the guise of employment opportunities, and that 
South Asians were trafficked into the country to work in sweatshops.
    The Government does not target trafficking specifically through any 
programs; however, several NGO's provide service to persons who may 
have been victims of trafficking.
                               __________

                                LESOTHO

    Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy with King Letsie III as Head 
of State. Under the 1993 Constitution, the King fills a ceremonial 
role, has no executive authority, and is proscribed from actively 
taking part in political initiatives. Prime Minister Pakalitha 
Mosisili, the leader of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) party, 
took office in June 1998 and is the Head of Government. In the May 1998 
elections, the LCD won 79 seats in the expanded 80-member Parliament. 
The Basotho National Party (BNP) won the one remaining seat. Over 700 
foreign and national election observers concluded that the election met 
international standards for a transparent, multiparty election; 
however, the Langa Commission, a group of election auditors from the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), reported that while 
there was no evidence to substantiate charges of electoral fraud, 
mismanagement of polling data made it impossible to confirm that fraud 
did not occur. Opposition parties claimed that the election result was 
fraudulent and launched a prolonged and aggressive protest at the royal 
palace in Maseru in August 1998. Opposition leaders urged the King--who 
had staged a coup in 1994--to dissolve the newly elected Parliament and 
install a government of national unity on the basis of their claim that 
the LCD rigged the election. In September and October 1998, the armed 
opposition protesters used violence to destabilize the Government, 
disarm the police, intimidate workers and business owners, shut down 
government and business operations, and facilitate a junior officer 
rebellion in the army. The army rebels, who were armed, aligned 
themselves with the opposition protesters. This action resulted in a 
virtual coup and severely strained relations between the Head of State 
and the Government. The palace vigil and protests resulted in 
politically motivated killings, injuries, violence, arson, and 
destruction. These events also precipitated intervention by a SADC 
military task force in September 1998 to quell the army mutiny and 
return society to a state of law and order. In the past, the judiciary 
had been subject at times to government and chieftainship influence; 
however, there were no reports of the use of such influence during the 
year.
    The security forces consist of the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF), the 
Lesotho Police Service (LPS), and the National Security Service (NSS). 
The Prime Minister is the Minister of Defense, with direct authority 
over the LDF and the NSS. The police force is under the authority of 
the Minister of Home Affairs. In 1996 and 1997, the Parliament passed 
the Lesotho Defense Act (1996), Regulations for Military Justice 
(1997), and amended the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police Force Act. This 
legislation was designed to bring these services under direct civilian 
control. However, the politicized armed services have a history of 
intervening in the country's politics and government. The LDF ruled the 
country with two successive military regimes from 1985-90, and 1990-93. 
In September 1998, a SADC task force put down an army rebellion, 
arrested LDF rebels, and disarmed the remaining soldiers. Fifty-two 
army personnel were arrested and tried in courts-martial for rebellion, 
mutiny, and treason. Fifteen of these soldiers were acquitted after 
trial or had the charges against them dropped, 1 died of natural 
causes, and 36 soldiers were convicted and sentenced to prison terms 
ranging from 3 to 13 years. This was the first instance in which a 
court-martial prosecuted LDF soldiers for infractions of the Defense 
Act. The LDF continues to be the subject of a national debate on the 
structure, size, and role of the armed forces. The NSS and the LPS also 
are undergoing comprehensive restructuring. There were allegations that 
members of the security forces on occasion committed human rights 
abuses.
    Lesotho is a landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and 
almost entirely dependent on its sole neighbor for trade, finance, 
employment, and access to the outside world. About 17 percent of the 
adult male work force works in mines in South Africa. Miners' 
remittances account for slightly over one-third of gross national 
product (GNP). Real gross domestic product grew by 2 percent in 1999, 
after a decline of 4.6 percent in 1998. Inflation was slightly more 
than 12 percent, with per capita GNP rising about 8 percent in local 
currency terms, to approximately $590. State-owned enterprises 
predominate in the agroindustrial and agribusiness sectors, but private 
sector activity dominates in the small manufacturing and construction 
sectors. The 1998 opposition protest and SADC intervention resulted in 
a wave of political violence and arson that destroyed nearly 80 percent 
of the commercial infrastructure in Maseru and other towns and 
villages. Thousands of jobs were lost, and many entrepreneurs went 
bankrupt. Hundreds of millions of dollars in losses occured. Under the 
traditional chieftainship structure, land use and tenure is controlled 
by the traditional chiefs and formally owned by the Kingdom (i.e., 
``crown lands'').
    The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there continued to be problems in some areas. There 
were unconfirmed allegations of torture by security forces, and 
credible reports that the police, at times, used excessive force 
against detainees. Prison conditions are poor, and lengthy pretrial 
detention is a problem. There are long delays in trials; 25 of 33 RLMP 
members charged in connection with a February 1997 police mutiny spent 
41 months in jail before being convicted in July. Domestic violence was 
common, and women's rights continued to be restricted severely. 
Societal discrimination against the disabled was common. Some worker 
rights were restricted. Government enforcement of prohibitions against 
child labor was improved in commercial enterprises that involve 
hazardous working conditions.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    During the 1998 opposition palace protest, violence between 
protesters and police, between antagonistic political factions, and 
between policemen and soldiers resulted in nine fatalities, including 
one police officer and eight civilians--four of whom were opposition 
supporters, and numerous injuries. These deaths resulted from gunshot 
wounds and fatal beatings sustained during enforcement actions and 
during violent clashes between political party supporters. Between 
September 21 and 28, 1998, nine South African soldiers were killed 
while suppressing the army mutiny. Over 50 LDF soldiers and 40 
civilians allied with the opposition died in fighting with SADC troops. 
Fifty-two LDF personnel have been arrested and court-martialed for 
mutiny and high treason in connection with these events. In 1999 three 
of the accused were acquitted after trial, and charges against another 
eight were dismissed upon motion by the Crown. In July three of the 
accused were convicted and received sentences ranging from 5 to 13 
years'' imprisonment. One of the accused died of natural causes 
unconnected with his incarceration while in prison. During the year, 4 
of the accused were acquitted after trial, and in December the 
remaining 33 were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 
3 to 13 years.
    In March 1999, the Government began investigating the 1994 palace 
coup and the alleged involvement of military personnel in the killing 
of the Deputy Prime Minister; 14 members of the LDF were arrested and 
charged with involvement in the killing. Four of the soldiers also are 
facing courts-martial for their role in the 1998 army mutiny. The 
trials for the killing of the Deputy Prime Minister have been delayed 
until the courts-martial are completed.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture or inhuman or 
degrading punishment or other treatment, and the Government generally 
respects these provisions; however, there were credible reports that 
the police at times used excessive force against detainees.
    Prison conditions are poor. Prison facilities are overcrowded and 
in disrepair. In 1998 Amnesty International representatives visited the 
LDF soldiers accused of mutiny being held in the maximum security 
prison in Maseru and reported that conditions were poor. In January 
1999, the Judge Advocate ordered prison officials to improve conditions 
in the cells in which the soldiers were being held; conditions were 
improved as a result, and the Judge Advocate did not issue further 
orders. Women are housed separately from men, and juveniles are housed 
separately from adults. Rape in prison reportedly is not a problem.
    Prison conditions were not monitored independently, and there were 
no visits by local or international organizations during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and there were no reports of 
such abuses. During the 1998 crisis, a number of persons were arrested 
for arson, looting, and possession of stolen property and unlawful 
firearms. Some of the persons searched and arrested were opposition 
supporters; however, there was no clear evidence that the authorities 
exclusively targeted opposition supporters. The domestic legal and 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) communities are concerned that 
pretrial detainees, such as those alleged to have been involved in 1998 
arson and looting incidents, can be held for long periods of time 
before trial; however, efforts have been made to improve the judicial 
administration and reduce the backlog of cases. Some persons arrested 
in interior districts in January 1999 for looting, arson, and 
possession of stolen goods in connection with the 1998 crisis were 
tried and sentenced to fines or incarceration.
    In July a trial judge convicted 25 of the 33 RLMP members arrested 
in connection with the January 1997 police mutiny on charges of 
sedition and contravention of the 1984 Internal Security Act (ISA) and 
sentenced them to prison for terms ranging from 1 to 3 years. In 
passing the sentences, the trial judge took into account the 41 months 
that the defendants had spent in prison prior to convictions, and their 
sentences were reduced accordingly. Eight of the convicted RLMP members 
were released due to lack of evidence. Eight others also were charged 
with murder and kidnaping; although their trials were completed, the 
trial court had not rendered a judgment by year's end.
    Pretrial detainees on remand were a significant portion of the 
prison population. Because of serious backlogs of the court caseloads, 
the period of pretrial remand for some suspects can last months or even 
years.
    In 1997 the Government repealed the provisions of the ISA that 
allowed for investigative detention.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in the past, magistrates appeared at 
times to be subject to government and chieftainship influence. There 
were no reports of such influence during the year.
    The judiciary consists of the Court of Appeal (which meets 
semiannually), the High Court, magistrates courts, and customary or 
traditional courts, which existed largely in rural areas to administer 
customary law.
    The High Court also provides procedural and substantive advice and 
guidance on matters of law and procedure to military tribunals; 
however, it does not participate in arriving at judgments. Military 
tribunals operating under the 1996 Defense Act have jurisdiction over 
military cases only. Decisions by military tribunals can be appealed 
only to a special courtmartial appeal court, which is composed of two 
judges from the High Court, one retired military officer with a legal 
background, and the registrar of the High Court. In January 1999, the 
defense lawyers for the accused army mutineers asked the judge advocate 
to dismiss all charges, alleging that the courts-martial hearings were 
unconstitutional on the grounds that the proceedings were subject to 
inappropriate command influence and lacked judicial independence. The 
adjudication panelists were the same LDF officers who were rounded up 
at gunpoint during the mutiny and held incommunicado in the maximum 
security prison. The judge advocate denied the lawyers'' request. In 
June 1999, upon review, the Chief Justice also denied the request, as 
did the Court of Appeals in October 1999.
    Persons detained or arrested in criminal cases and defendants in 
civil cases have the right to legal counsel; however, there is no 
system to provide public defenders. The Ministry of Justice and the NGO 
community maintained a few legal aid clinics. The authorities generally 
respect court decisions and rulings. There is no trial by jury. 
Criminal trials normally are adjudicated by a single High Court judge 
who presides, with two assessors serving in an advisory capacity. In 
civil cases, judges normally hear cases alone. The 1981 Criminal 
Procedures and Evidence Act, as amended in 1984, makes provision for 
granting bail. Bail is granted regularly and generally fairly. There is 
a large case backlog, which leads to lengthy delays in trials. In 
September 1998, a Molotov cocktail attack on the High Court destroyed 
case files and other important documents and further hampered the 
operations of the courts.
    In civil courts, women and men are accorded equal rights; however, 
in traditional and customary courts, certain rights and privileges 
accorded to men are denied to women (see Section 5). When traditional 
law and custom are invoked in a court case, a male plaintiff can opt 
for customary judgments by a principal chief rather than a civil court, 
and the judgment is binding legally. This system greatly disadvantages 
women.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law does not fully protect citizens'' privacy 
rights, but there were no confirmed reports that authorities infringed 
on citizens'' privacy rights during the year. Although search warrants 
are required under normal circumstances, the ISA provided police with 
wide powers to stop and search persons and vehicles and to enter homes 
and other places without a warrant. There were no prohibitions against 
monitoring telephone conversations until 1999, when some restrictions 
were implemented. Observers believed that the security services 
continued to monitor telephone conversations of Basothos and 
foreigners, ostensibly on national security grounds.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice. There are several independent 
newspapers--including one controlled by the Roman Catholic Church, one 
controlled by the Lesotho Evangelical Church, and four English-language 
weeklies--that routinely criticized the Government. The official state-
owned or state-controlled media consist of one radio station, a 1 1/2 
hour daily newscast on a local television channel, and two weekly 
newspapers. All faithfully reflect official positions of the ruling 
party. There are four private radio stations, but no private local 
television station. South African and global satellite television and 
radio broadcasts are widely available. Despite serious damage to a 
number of news publications caused by arson and looting in September 
1998, these news organizations resumed publishing within months.
    Internet services are freely available from a number of private 
Internet service providers.
    There is a lack of free access to government information, which 
often is described as a limitation on the free press; however, there 
are no other barriers that affect press coverage of government 
activities. In 1998 the National Press Association objected to rules 
established by the Independent Electoral Commission, which barred 
reporters from entering polling stations on election day.
    The Government respects academic freedom. Although the Government 
owns and administers the country's only university, the academic staff 
represents the full political spectrum and is free to express its 
views.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice. Under a 1993 revision of the ISA, a public 
meeting, rally, or march no longer required prior police permission, 
only advance notification. Political party meetings and rallies were 
held regularly and without hindrance from the Government.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. In addition to 
the LCD, the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), and the BNP, there were 
nine smaller, registered political parties.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally are able to move 
freely within the country and across national boundaries. The 
Government placed no obstacles in the way of citizens who wished to 
emigrate.
    In September 1998, numerous serious incidents and threats to the 
safety of citizens by opposition supporters who carried out assaults, 
car-jackings, attacks on residences, and sniper attacks led thousands 
of foreigners and ruling LCD supporters to flee to South Africa in the 
weeks immediately following the SADC military intervention. Almost all 
citizens had returned by the end of 1999; however, a large number of 
the foreigners who fled have moved across the border and commuted to 
their jobs in the country.
    The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1994 the Government allowed 
approximately 25 refugees from Somalia and Uganda registered with the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to study in the country. They were 
expected to return to their countries of first asylum after completing 
their studies, but had not done so by year's end. Other than these 
students, there is no resident refugee population. The Government has 
provided first asylum; however, the issue did not arise during the 
year.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    In the first multiparty democratic elections in 1993, after more 
than 20 years of authoritarian and military rule, the BCP came to power 
with complete control of the National Assembly. Despite its landslide 
electoral victory, the BCP Government had to contend with a number of 
challenges to its power, including a violent opposition destabilization 
campaign based on allegations that the BCP had won by fraud. These 
challenges culminated in August 1994 when King Letsie III 
unconstitutionally suspended the Parliament and installed a ruling 
council. Many Basotho responded by demonstrating their support for the 
democratically elected BCP Government. Organized labor and others held 
two national demonstrations--stayaways--to express support for the 
ousted Government, and there were numerous rallies at the National 
University. As a result of both local and international pressure, the 
King reversed himself, and the BCP regained control of the Government.
    A 1994 Memorandum of Understanding between King Letsie III and 
Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle, which was brokered by South Africa, 
Botswana, and Zimbabwe, called for the reinstatement of the King's 
father, Moshoeshoe II, who had been deposed by the previous military 
Government and exiled in 1990, and for measures to broaden 
participation in the political process. In early 1995, Moshoeshoe II 
was reinstated as King. In January 1996, upon the death of his father, 
King Letsie III was sworn in again as King. The formal coronation of 
King Letsie III was held in October 1997. The 1994 suspension of the 
Constitution by Letsie, although short-lived, highlighted the fragility 
of rule within the constitutional monarchy.
    The 1998 crisis was similar to that of the 1993-94 postelectoral 
period. In both cases, opposition party members alleged electoral 
fraud, suborned army supporters, sought the King's involvement, and 
effectively overthrew the elected Government. However, in 1998 the King 
did not take an active role in the opposition campaign, as he did in 
1994, and, based on the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding, Prime 
Minister Mosisili asked SADC to intervene militarily to stabilize the 
situation.
    In the May 1998 elections, the LCD won 79 of 80 parliamentary 
seats. The BNP won the other seat. International observers concluded 
that the elections met international standards for a multiparty 
election and reflected the will of the voters. Despite opposition 
coalition claims, the Langa Commission, composed of international 
observers from four southern African countries, reported no definitive 
findings of vote rigging or fraud; however, postelection management of 
electoral and polling station data was poor. The Commission stated that 
the documentation was in such disarray that it could not prove that 
fraud had not occurred. This judgement encouraged the opposition to 
charge that errors short of fraud could have affected the results.
    In October 1998, the LCD and the newly formed opposition alliance 
agreed to hold new elections within 2 years to resolve the ongoing 
political crisis. Local elections, scheduled to be held late in 1998, 
were postponed because of the 1998 crisis. Negotiations under SADC 
supervision resulted in the December 1998 establishment of the Interim 
Political Authority (IPA) with a mandate to prepare for new elections 
within 18 months (i.e., during the first half of the year). However, 
the IPA made little progress in meeting its objectives. The IPA and the 
Parliament continued efforts to negotiate an electoral arrangement that 
would be acceptable to all parties.
    In February anonymous flyers threatened a return to political 
violence if an election was not held or an election date announced by 
May 16. The flyers warned workers to stay away from work from May 10 to 
16. Although joint police and army patrols were deployed as a 
precaution, some workers stayed home due to a fear of reprisals by the 
opposition. On May 13, the Prime Minister announced that the next 
national multiparty elections were scheduled for March 2001.
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in 
government or politics, but women remain underrepresented in both 
areas. There are 2 women in the 80-member National Assembly, and there 
are 7 women in the 33-member Senate. A woman serves as the Minister of 
Environment, Women, and Youth Affairs. In October 1999, the Parliament 
unanimously elected the first female Speaker of the National Assembly.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of local and international human rights groups operated 
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases, and the Government allowed 
international organizations to visit the country during the year.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, 
        Disability, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, birth, or other status, and the Government generally respected 
these prohibitions in practice; however, the Constitution also 
recognizes customary law as a parallel legal system, and women's 
inheritance and property rights are restricted severely under the 
traditional chieftainship system.
    Women.--Domestic violence, including wife beating, occurs 
frequently. Dependable statistics were not available, but the problem 
was believed to be widespread. In Basotho tradition, a wife may return 
to her ``maiden home'' if physically abused by her husband. Under 
common law, wife beating is a criminal offense and defined as assault; 
however, few domestic violence cases were brought to trial. Beatings 
and violence against women perpetrated by husbands or other male 
relatives occured frequently; however, increasingly it was considered 
socially unacceptable behavior. A national conference held in March 
1998 on the empowerment of women noted that of 100 cases of human 
rights abuses, 90 percent of the victims were women who were victims of 
domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment.
    Both law and custom under the traditional chieftainship system 
severely limited the rights of women in areas such as property rights, 
inheritance, and contracts. Women have the legal and customary right to 
make a will and sue for divorce; however, under customary law, a 
married woman was considered a minor during the lifetime of her 
husband. She cannot enter into legally binding contracts, whether for 
employment, commerce, or education, without her husband's consent. A 
woman married under customary law has no standing in civil court and 
may not sue or be sued without her husband's permission. Government 
officials have criticized publicly this customary practice, which 
discriminates against women. The tradition of paying a bride price 
(lobola) is common. Polygyny was practiced by a very small percentage 
of the population.
    Women's rights organizations have taken a leading role in educating 
women about their rights under customary and common law, highlighting 
the importance of women participating in the democratic process. In 
1998 the Government created a Ministry of Gender Affairs.
    Children.--The Government has not addressed adequately children's 
rights and welfare, although it has devoted substantial resources to 
primary and secondary education. Education is not compulsory even at 
the primary levels, and 25 percent of children do not attend school, 
particularly in rural areas where there are few schools, where children 
are involved in subsistence activities in support of their family's 
welfare, or where families cannot afford the costs associated with 
school attendance (for example, fees for the purchase of uniforms, 
books, and materials). The problem of school nonattendance affects boys 
disproportionately more than girls. In traditional rural Basotho 
society, livestock herding by young boys is a prerequisite to manhood 
in the community, and this frequently interferes with their school 
enrollment. The Government began implementation of a new program that 
provides free public education through the primary grades (one through 
six). The program commenced in all schools in the first grade during 
the year, and it covered the costs of school fees, books, and one meal 
per day. Expansion of the program to the second grade in all schools is 
scheduled for 2001.
    There is no pattern of societal abuse against children, but many 
children work at a relatively young age (see Section 6.d.). Familial 
stress, poverty, the spread of HIV/Aids, and divorce have led to a rise 
in child homelessness and abandonment, creating a growing number of 
street children.
    People with Disabilities.--Discrimination against physically 
disabled persons in employment, education, or provision of other 
government services is unlawful; however, societal discrimination is 
common. The Government has not legislated nor mandated accessibility to 
public buildings for the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Christianity, specifically Roman 
Catholicism, is the predominant religion. Approximately 90 percent of 
the population are Christian, and 70 percent of the Christians are 
Catholic. Muslims, members of other non-Christian religions, and 
atheists constitute the remaining 10 percent. Christians are scattered 
throughout the country, while Muslims are found mainly in the 
northeastern part of the country.
    There is generally mutual understanding and cooperation between 
Christians and Muslims. Although there were some tensions between 
Christians and Muslims in previous years, there were no reports of such 
tensions during the year.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most citizens speak a common 
language and share common historical and cultural traditions. Small 
numbers of Asians (primarily ethnic Chinese and Indians) and South 
African whites are active in the country's commercial life. Economic 
and racial tension between the Chinese business community and the 
Basotho remained a problem. In past years, civil unrest and riots 
targeted persons of Asian descent; however, there were no similar 
incidents reported during the year.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Under the law, workers have the right 
to join or form unions without prior government authorization. The 
Labor Code prohibits civil servants from joining unions. The Government 
regards all work by civil servants as essential. In a 1997 judgment by 
the High Court concerning a petition filed by the Lesotho Union of 
Public Servants (LUPE) against the registrar of law, the Chief Justice 
dismissed the LUPE's application to form a union on the grounds that it 
was not consistent with the Labor Code. The LUPE filed an appeal with 
the Appeals Court, which was dismissed after LUPE failed to file the 
necessary papers to proceed with the case.
    Under the 1993 Labor Code, prepared with the assistance of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), all trade union federations 
require government registration. There are three small trade union 
federations that rarely cooperate with one another: the Lesotho Trade 
Union Congress; the Lesotho Federation of Democratic Unions; and the 
Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions. Unions are not affiliated formally or 
tied to political parties.
    The labor and trade union movement was very weak and fragmented. 
There are several small unions in the public and industrial sectors, 
but there was no unified trade union congress. There were cases of 
unions competitively organizing small numbers of workers in the same 
sector. Overall unionized workers represent only about 10 percent of 
the work force. Consequently efforts toward collective bargaining and 
tripartite policymaking were not amenable to strong trade union 
influences.
    There was credible evidence that some employers prevented union 
organizers from access to factory premises to organize workers or to 
represent them in disputes with owners or managers. There were reports 
that some employers harassed union organizers, intimidated members, and 
frequently fired union activists (see Section 6.b.). The Commission of 
Labor, which operates as part of the Labor Ministry, is charged with 
investigating allegations of labor law violations. Approximately 17 
percent of the male labor force works in the gold and coal mines of 
South Africa, and the majority of those who do not were engaged 
primarily in traditional agriculture. A majority of Basotho mine 
workers were members of the South African National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM); however, as a foreign organization, the NUM is not allowed to 
engage in union activities.
    No legally authorized strike has occurred since independence in 
1966. Because civil servants generally are not allowed to strike, all 
public sector industrial actions are, by definition, unauthorized. In 
the private sector, the Labor Code requires an escalating series of 
procedures to be followed by workers and employers before strike action 
is authorized. In past years, some small unions and their members have 
undertaken wildcat strikes or spontaneous industrial actions without 
following the procedures for dispute resolution; however, there were no 
reported strikes during the year. Legal protection for strikers from 
retribution has not always been enforced in cases of illegal strikes. 
Security forces violently suppressed some wildcat strikes in the 
textile, garment, and construction industries in 1994, 1996, and 1998.
    There were no instances of governmental restrictions on 
international affiliations or contacts by unions or their members.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--In principle 
all legally recognized trade unions in principle enjoy the right to 
organize and bargain collectively, and the Government generally 
respected these rights; however, some employers tried to restrict these 
rights in practice. Employers usually are cooperative; however, some 
employees are threatened with expulsion and loss of employment if they 
join unions. There was credible evidence that some employers in the 
textile and garment sector used blacklists to deny employment to 
workers who have been fired by another employer within that sector. 
There were reports that some employers harassed union organizers. 
Although there was some collective bargaining between unions and 
employers to set wage and benefit rates, employers generally continued 
to set wage rates through unilateral action. Employee grievances 
reportedly were handled promptly by the Labor Commission, and there 
were no significant backlogs of cases during the year.
    In May Parliament passed the Labor Code Amendments Bill; however, 
it was not implemented by year's end. The bill provides for the 
establishment of a Directorate of Dispute Prevention and Settlement 
with full-time arbitrators and conciliators; however, the Directorate 
was not staffed by year's end due to funding constraints. The bill does 
not permit public employees to join unions; however, it does allow them 
to form associations. The country has several industrial zones, in 
which mostly textile and apparel firms manufacture for export. All 
national labor laws apply in these industrial zones; however, employers 
in the zones do not always respect these rights in practice. Employers 
reportedly harassed and intimidated union organizers, and prevented 
them from entering the zones. There were reports that union activists 
often were fired. There were also reports that many companies in the 
zones paied below minimum wage, enforced long hours, and deducted wages 
when employees were found talking or taking more than one break a day.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1987 Employment 
Act prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children, and there were no reports that it occurred.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment in commercial or 
industrial enterprises is 15 years, and legal minimum age for hazardous 
employment is 18 years; however, children under 14 years of age 
reportedly are employed in family-owned businesses. Although there were 
allegations of child labor in the textile and garment sector, 
investigations by the ILO and the Labor Commission found no evidence to 
support the charges.
    There are statutory prohibitions against the employment of minors 
in commercial, industrial, or nonfamily enterprises involving hazardous 
or dangerous working conditions, and although enforcement of 
prohibitions was very lax in previous years, the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment's Inspectorate was adequately staffed and conducted 
quarterly inspections during the year. Children under 18 years of age 
may not be recruited for employment outside of the country. In 
traditional society, rigorous and occasionally dangerous working 
conditions for the country's young livestock, herdboys are considered a 
prerequisite to manhood, essential to the livelihood of families, and a 
fundamental feature of local culture beyond the reach of labor laws. 
Child labor laws covered all sectors except for the agricultural 
sector.
    The Government has not ratified the ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor, although it was being considered by the Cabinet 
at year's end with the support of the Lesotho Manufacturer's 
Association.
    The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In general wages are low. A 
national minimum wage is determined annually by the Wage Advisory 
Board, a tripartite entity, consisting of Government, trade unions, and 
employers. The monthly minimum wage for unskilled laborers is $67 (467 
maloti), and $129 (901 maloti) for heavy vehicle operators. Minimum 
wages for workers in lower skilled jobs were insufficient to ensure a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most wage earners 
supplement their income through subsistence agriculture or remittances 
from relatives employed in South Africa. Many private employers paid 
more than minimum wages to attract and retain motivated employees. 
However, there is also reason to believe that some employers, 
especially in export sectors, treated the minimum wage as a maximum 
wage. This situation was made possible by the high levels of 
unemployment and underemployment, which provide a large pool of surplus 
unskilled labor that bid down wage rates and threatened job security 
for workers who made demands for better wages and conditions of work.
    The Labor Code spells out basic worker rights, including a maximum 
45-hour workweek, a weekly rest period of at least 24 hours, 12 days of 
paid leave per year, and paid public holidays; however, employers did 
not always respect these rights in practice. Unlike in the previous 
year, there were no reports of employers locking in workers until an 
order was finished without overtime pay or of employers refusing sick 
leave.
    Workers generally are unable to obtain an expeditious hearing in 
court on their complaints. The labor court has a large backlog of 
industrial dispute cases on the docket; there is only one labor judge 
to deal with cases filed as early as 1995. However, the Labor 
Commission is staffed adequately and handled most complaints within a 
1-month period, and it cooperated closely with the ILO in establishing 
inspection regimes. Labor inspectors generally conducted unannounced 
inspections in factories 4 times per year. The Labor Commission is 
authorized to order the reinstatement of wrongfully dismissed employees 
and the payment of back wages, but it does not have the authority to 
impose criminal fines.
    The Labor Code requires employers to provide adequate light, 
ventilation, and sanitary facilities for employees and to install and 
maintain machinery in a manner designed to minimize the risk of injury, 
and in practice employers generally follow these regulations. The Labor 
Code does not protect explicitly the right of workers to remove 
themselves from hazardous situations without prejudice to employment; 
however, Labor Code sections on safety in the workplace and dismissal 
implied that dismissal in such circumstances would be illegal.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, and there were no reports of trafficking in persons to, 
from, or within the country during the year. There was a report that 
illegal immigrant smugglers, primarily from South and East Asia, 
continued to take advantage of the country's undersupervised borders to 
pass persons temporarily through the country to transportation hubs in 
South Africa for onward movement to Europe and North America. There was 
no clear evidence that these movements included women or children, or 
that these organizations were recruiting or transporting persons 
illegally for involuntary servitude, slavery, or forced or bonded 
labor. It was suspected that most of the persons who are moved by these 
criminal organizations were primarily economic immigrants seeking 
employment in other countries. There were no reports or evidence of 
forced or bonded labor or servitude in the country resulting from these 
activities.
    The Government took no specific action to address trafficking 
during the year.
                               __________

                                LIBERIA

    Liberia is a centralized republic, dominated by a strong 
presidency. The Constitution provides for three branches of government, 
but no effective system of checks and balances, and presidents 
traditionally have wielded extraordinary power. Americo-Liberians, 
descendants of freed slaves from the United States and the Caribbean, 
who make up approximately 5 percent of the population, dominated the 
country's government through the True Whig party until 1980. In 1980 
Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, a member of the indigenous Krahn ethnic group, 
seized power in a military coup. Doe was killed by rebels in 1990 early 
in the 7yearlong, ethnically divisive civil war, which was ended by the 
Abuja Peace Accords in 1996. Forces led by Charles G. Taylor, who is of 
both indigenous and Americo-Liberian ancestry, emerged dominant. In 
1997, Taylor won the presidential election, and his National Patriotic 
Party (NPP) won threequarters of the seats in the legislature. The 
elections were administratively free and transparent, but were 
conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as most voters believed 
that Taylor's forces would have resumed fighting if he had lost. Most 
other leaders of the former warring factions subsequently left the 
country. The bicameral legislature exercised little independence from 
the executive branch. The judiciary is subject to political influence, 
economic pressure, and corruption.
    The regular security forces include: The Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL); the Liberia National Police (LNP), which has primary 
responsibility for internal security; the Antiterrorist Brigade (ATB) 
created in 1999, composed of an elite special forces group; and the 
Special Security Service (SSS), a large, heavily armed executive 
protective force. There also are numerous irregular security services 
attached to certain key ministries and parastatal corporations, the 
responsibilities of which appear to be defined poorly. The national 
army, which fought against Taylor's faction during the civil war, has 
yet to be downsized and restructured as required by the Abuja Peace 
Accords, due primarily to a lack of funding. By year's end, a 
commission had been formed with funding allocated at approximately 
$100,000. Only a few contingents have been deployed to maintain 
security in parts of rural areas. The ATB absorbed Taylor's most 
experienced civil war fighters, including undisciplined and untrained 
loyalists. During the year, the Government revived the National Bureau 
of Investigation (NBI), which had become defunct during the civil war. 
Security forces frequently acted independently of government authority, 
particularly in rural areas. Members of the security forces committed 
numerous, serious human rights abuses.
    Liberia is a very poor country with a market-based economy that has 
yet to recover from the ravages of the civil war. Average per capita 
income is estimated at $171, only a small fraction of the prewar level. 
Prior to 1990, the cash economy was based primarily on iron ore, 
rubber, timber, diamond, and gold exports. An unemployment rate of 85 
percent, a 25 percent literacy rate, the internal displacement of 
civilians in Lofa and Nimba counties, and the absence of infrastructure 
throughout the country continued to depress productive capacity, 
despite the country's rich natural resources and potential 
selfsufficiency in food. Government officials and former combatants 
continued to exploit the country's natural resources for personal 
benefit. Extortion is widespread in all levels of society.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and there were 
numerous, serious abuses in many areas. The security forces committed 
many extrajudicial killings, and they were accused of killing or 
causing the disappearance of persons. Security forces tortured, beat, 
and otherwise abused or humiliated citizens. The Government 
investigated some of the alleged abuses by the security forces; 
however, offenders were rarely charged or disciplined. Prison 
conditions remained harsh and sometimes life threatening. Security 
forces continued at times to use arbitrary arrest and detention, and 
lengthy pretrial detention remained common. The judicial system, 
hampered by political influence, economic pressure, inefficiency, 
corruption, and a lack of resources, was unable to ensure citizens' 
rights to due process and a fair trial. In some rural areas where the 
judiciary had not been reestablished, clan chieftains administered 
criminal justice through the traditional practice of trial-by-ordeal; 
authorities tacitly condoned this practice. More than 20 political 
prisoners remained in jail. Security forces violated citizens' privacy 
rights, conducted warrantless searches, harassment, illegal 
surveillance, and looted homes. The Government restricted freedom of 
the press; it detained, threatened, and intimidated journalists into 
self-censorship and shut down two radio stations, one temporarily. 
Security forces restricted freedom of movement, using roadblocks to 
extort money from travelers and returning refugees. Security forces 
frequently harassed human rights monitors. Violence and discrimination 
against women remained problems. The welfare of children remained 
widely neglected, and female genital mutilation (FGM) continued to 
increase. Societal ethnic discrimination remained widespread, ethnic 
differences continued to generate violence and political tensions, and 
the Government continued to discriminate against indigenous ethnic 
groups that had opposed Taylor in the civil war, especially the 
Mandingo and the Krahn ethnic groups. Forced labor persisted in rural 
areas. Child labor remained widespread, and there were reports of 
forced child labor. Ritualistic killings also persisted.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Human rights organizations 
estimate the number of such killings to be have increased to several 
hundred during the year. Many of the abuses were linked to ongoing 
violence in Lofa county between security forces and antigovernment 
dissidents who launched a series of crossborder incursions from Guinea. 
No perpetrators were arrested or convicted for any of these killings.
    In February the police shot and killed Nyanqui Luoh, an accused 
armed robber. The police reported that they acted in selfdefense. A 
human rights organization called for an investigation of the incident, 
but none had been undertaken by year's end.
    There were credible reports that government forces as well as 
members of the Lorma ethnic group continued to harass, intimidate, and, 
on occasion, kill members of the Mandingo ethnic group in Lofa county. 
For example, in January armed men reportedly killed 18 Mandingos in the 
town of Bawon. In March security forces arrested and killed five 
Mandingos on a road linking Voinjama, Lofa County with Guinea. Human 
rights monitors reported that hundreds of Mandingos were killed during 
the year.
    There was no investigation into nor action taken in the May 1999 
death of a security officer allegedly while in detention.
    At year's end, the Government had not released a report on its 
November 1999 investigation of the reported killing of as many as 30 
Mandingos in Lofa county in August 1999. In that incident, the 
authorities initially arrested 19 persons, but they did not charge 
anyone with a crime.
    The trial of nine Krahn AFL soldiers accused of involvement in 1998 
violence ended in February; four soldiers were convicted of sedition 
and sentenced to 10 years in prison; the other five were acquitted and 
released.
    There was no further action taken in the 1998 extrajudicial 
killings of Mannah Zekay, John Nimely, or others reported during that 
year.
    In 1999 the President Pro Tempore of the Senate told the 
Interparliamentary Union that the investigation into the 1997 killings 
of opposition political leader Samuel Saye Dokie and three family 
members continued. However, there was no active investigation into the 
case during the year, and the case essentially was dropped.
    Since September there were reports of attacks by fighters based in 
Liberia on the Guinean border towns, which caused several deaths. These 
attacks generally are perpetuated by a combination of Revolutionary 
Front United (RUF) rebels from Sierra Leone, Liberian military, and 
some Guinean rebels; however, some attacks also were perpetuated by 
armed Liberian dissidents based in Guinea. There was at least one 
attack reported on a Guinean town close to the Sierra Leonean border.
    In November attacks were reported in northeastern Nimba, which 
resulted in numerous deaths, but it was unclear whether the rebel 
incursion was from Guinea or Cote d'Ivoire.
    In October in Nimba county, a property dispute between Mandigos and 
members of the Mano and Gio ethnic groups led to rioting, which 
reportedly killed four persons (see Section 5). A mosque and five other 
buildings were burned. Police arrested 12 persons in connection with 
this violence and charged them with arson. The 12 remained in detention 
pending a trial at year's end.
    Incidents of ritualistic killings, in which human body parts used 
in traditional rituals are removed from the victim, continued to be 
reported (see Section 5). The number of such killings is difficult to 
ascertain, since police often described deaths as accidents even when 
body parts have been removed. Deaths that appear to be natural or 
accidental sometimes are rumored to have been the work of ritualistic 
killers (see Section 5). In February there was a riot in the town of 
Ganta, Nimba county when police released on parole two suspects in the 
death and mutilation of a 10-year-old girl. The two suspects eventually 
were charged with her killing. A police investigation launched in 
August 1999 into alleged ritual killings in Harper resulted in the 
acquittal of one of four defendants; no information was available on 
the status of the three remaining defendants.
    b. Disappearance.--Security forces were responsible for 
disappearances. In June security personnel arrested seven refugees 
returning from Guinea in an UNHCR vehicle after discovering that one of 
them carried a photograph of a former faction leader who opposed 
President Taylor during the civil war. The authorities claimed they 
were dissidents plotting to overthrow the Government. The detainees 
were charged with treason; however, their whereabouts were unknown at 
year's end despite legal challenges to the Government to produce them.
    Security forces produced suspects whom they had held without charge 
when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on the applications of 
human rights organizations. Their disappearances often were the result 
of prolonged illegal detention at the Gbartala base (see Section 1.c.).
    There were no indications by year's end that the Government carried 
out its promised investigation of the reported disappearance of 
Mandingos following the violence in Lofa county in 1999.
    There were no developments in the 1998 disappearance case of market 
woman Nowai Flomo.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other degrading 
treatment; however, government police and security forces frequently 
tortured, beat, and otherwise abused and humiliated citizens. In some 
cases, security forces produced suspects whom they had held without 
charge when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on the 
applications of human rights organizations. Detainees continued to 
charge that they were tortured while in detention, especially at a 
security training base in Gbatala. Victims and witnesses reported 
beatings, torture, killings, and sexual abuse at the base. In October 
1999, human rights organizations called for the closure of the base 
because of a number of credible reports of torture there; however, the 
base remained opened. A local NGO, the Catholic Affiliated Justice and 
Peace Commission, tried to investigate claims; however, the Government 
blocked their efforts.
    On several occasions, government security personnel harassed, 
assaulted, and arrested journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    Law enforcement personnel, including the security forces, were 
implicated in numerous reports of harassment, intimidation, and 
looting. For example, in February SSS members carried out a series of 
armed robberies and shot and injured an LNP officer in the West Point 
area of Monrovia. In April armed soldiers clashed with marketers in 
Monrovia; they confiscated goods and harassed the marketers. There was 
a series of incidents involving harassment or looting and assault of 
foreign diplomats and local embassy employees. In February LNP officers 
pulled a foreign diplomat from his car in Monrovia and assaulted him. 
In March LNP officers demanded money from an embassy security guard and 
beat him with metal pipes. After various complaints in March from 
members of diplomatic corps, the Government called for investigations 
and punishment for offenders. Meetings with security agencies also were 
organized to brief them on diplomatic immunity; however, in June 
another local embassy employee was assaulted, searched for weapons, and 
robbed by AFL officers.
    Paul Mulbah, who was appointed director of the LNP in August 1999, 
took some steps in 1999 to curb abuse of the LNP; however, in general 
his efforts were unsuccessful and made no difference in the situation 
by year's end. In February Mulbah ordered that off-duty armed security 
men be removed from the streets. However, a human rights organization 
criticized Mulbah's order to police, issued early in the year, to shoot 
on sight any robbers resisting arrest.
    There were credible reports that government forces as well as 
members of the Lorma ethnic group continued to harass, intimidate, and, 
on occasion, kill members of the Mandingo ethnic group in Lofa county 
(see Section 1.a.).
    Rival security personnel occasionally clashed violently. In March 
there was gunfire at Roberts International Airport between personnel of 
the antiterrorist brigade and the LNP's special operations division 
prior to President Taylor's arrival from an official visit abroad. A 
few persons were injured. There also was shooting between AFL and LNP 
personnel in downtown Monrovia in March, resulting in injuries to two 
bystanders.
    Security force personnel in rural areas were paid and provisioned 
inadequately and often extorted money and goods. For example, in March 
a special task force commander reportedly robbed an army payroll truck 
in Lofa county. There were many credible reports that security forces 
harassed returning refugees and displaced persons, especially in the 
border areas.
    The international community publicly criticized the Government's 
support for the RUF rebels in the civil war in Sierra Leone.
    Clan chieftains continued to use the traditional practice of trial-
by-ordeal to resolve criminal cases in rural areas. The Supreme Court 
ruled that trial-by-ordeal--commonly the placement of a heated metal 
object on a suspect's body in an attempt to determine whether the 
defendant is telling the truth--is unconstitutional; however, the 
practice continued under an executive order. A local human rights 
organization sponsored a conference in March to urge that trial-by-
ordeal be abolished throughout the country. A 1994 lawsuit for injuries 
resulting from a trial-by-ordeal that was pending before the Supreme 
Court was suspended indefinitely.
    Prison conditions remained harsh and in some cases lifethreatening. 
There were credible reports of unofficial detention facilities, 
including one at the executive mansion, in which detainees were held 
without charge and in some cases tortured. The Government did not 
provide detainees or prisoners with adequate food or medical care. 
Cells at Monrovia Central Prison are overcrowded, mostly with detainees 
awaiting trial. Only about 10 percent of the total prison population 
has been convicted of criminal offenses. Convicted prisoners and 
detainees awaiting trial are not confined in separate facilities. 
Similar conditions exist in the Barclay Training Center military 
stockade. In some counties, the structure that serves as a jail is a 
container with bars at one end. In May the wives of 13 Krahn political 
prisoners held at Monrovia's Central Prison publicly complained about 
denial of medical care and other abuse of the detainees. The Government 
did not respond to these complaints by year's end.
    Women, who constituted about 5 percent of the prison population, 
are held in separate cells. Their conditions are comparable to those of 
the male prisoners and detainees. There were no separate facilities for 
juvenile offenders. Women and particularly juveniles were subject to 
abuse by guards or other inmates.
    In a number of cases, human rights groups and interested 
individuals achieved the release of detainees and prisoners. However, 
for the most part, these cases tended to be nonpolitical in nature.
    The Government generally permits the independent monitoring of 
prison conditions by local human rights groups, the media, and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); however, visits to 
unofficial detention centers often are denied. For example, despite 
requests made by NGO's to the Defense Ministry, no independent monitor 
has been allowed to visit the Gbatala base where victims have been 
detained and tortured. The ICRC is allowed to visit persons held in 
prison facilities and police detention centers without third parties 
present and to make regular repeat visits.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces 
continued at times to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. The 
Constitution provides for the rights of the accused, including warrants 
for arrests and the right of detainees either to be charged or released 
within 48 hours. Although the Government generally adheres to these 
standards, warrants were not always based on sufficient evidence, and 
detainees, especially those without the means to hire a lawyer, often 
were held for more than 48 hours without charge. In some cases, persons 
were detained secretly at unofficial detention centers including one at 
the executive mansion (see Section 1.c.).
    The Constitution provides for the right of a person who is charged 
to receive an expeditious trial; however, lengthy pretrial and 
prearraignment detention remained a serious problem. In some cases, the 
length of the pre-trial detention equaled or exceeded the length of 
sentence for the crime in question. Five detained soldiers awaiting 
court-martial for desertion during the September 1998 incident have 
been incarcerated in the stockade since November 1998. Their 
courtsmartials still are pending; should they be convicted, the maximum 
sentence would be 6 months'' imprisonment.
    The police only have limited logistics and forensic capabilities 
and cannot adequately investigate many crimes, including murder cases. 
When the courts release known criminals for lack of evidence, police 
officers often rearrest them on specious charges.
    In August the Government arrested Auditor General Raleigh Seekie 
and charged him with treason. Police searched Seekie's home and office 
for subversive documents, arms, and ammunition but did not find 
anything. Nevertheless, he is charged with aiding armed dissidents 
trying to overthrow the Government.
    Security forces arrested and detained a number of journalists 
during the year (see Section 2.a.). For example, in August the 
Government arrested four foreign journalists and charged them with 
espionage (see Section 2.a.). The four were denied bail but were 
released a week later in response to international pressure.
    The Government did not use forced exile; however, as a result of 
frequent harassment and threats by the security forces, a number of 
opposition figures and human rights activists fled the country due to 
fear for their personal safety or that of their families. These 
included human rights activist James Torh and Muslim organization 
leader Lartin Konneh (see Sections 2.e. and 5). During the year, 
President Taylor publicly alleged that some of these opposition figures 
had gone abroad to conspire in the overthrow of his Government, which 
kept numerous prominent opposition figures and former warlords out of 
the country throughout the year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides 
for an independent judiciary, judges are subjected to political, 
social, familial, and financial pressures, leading to the corruption of 
the judiciary. Some judges and magistrates are not lawyers. The 
judiciary has determined that it is not feasible to retire all judicial 
personnel who are not legally trained, but intends to replace those 
currently sitting with lawyers as they retire. By statute members of 
the bar must be graduates of a law school and pass the bar examination. 
The executive branch continued to exert undue influence on the 
judiciary. For example, in response to an appeal of the 1999 treason 
convictions of 13 ethnic Krahn AFL members, the Government demanded in 
1999 that their sentences be changed from 10 years'' imprisonment to 
death. In December 10 years was added to their sentences for a total of 
20 years'' imprisonment.
    The judiciary is divided into four levels, with the Supreme Court 
at the apex. All levels of the court system in Monrovia, including the 
Supreme Court, functioned sporadically. The Government's efforts to 
revitalize the court system outside of Monrovia continued to be 
troubled by lack of trained personnel, infrastructure, and a lack of 
adequate funding. Although judges were assigned throughout the country, 
in some cases they were unable to hold court due to lack of supplies 
and equipment. Traditional forms of justice administered by clan 
chieftains remained prevalent in some localities (see Section 1.c.).
    Under the Constitution, defendants have due process rights that 
conform to internationally accepted standards; however, in practice 
these rights are not always observed. Defendants have the right to a 
public trial and timely consultation with an attorney; however, there 
is no effective system to provide public defenders, especially in rural 
areas. Some NGO's provide legal services to indigents and others who 
have no free representation. Courts regularly received bribes or other 
illegal gifts out of damages that they awarded in civil cases. Defense 
attorneys often suggested that their clients pay a gratuity to appease 
judges, prosecutors, and police officers to secure favorable rulings. 
In October the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court stated publicly that 
delays in salary payments to judicial personnel contributed to 
corruption in the judiciary.
    Human rights organizations reported that 24 political prisoners, 
including AFL personnel, were sentenced for treason in February and in 
April 1999; however, this number reportedly includes a few political 
detainees who have not yet been convicted of a crime (see Section 
1.a.).
    The Government permits access to political prisoners by 
international humanitarian organizations.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of privacy and 
the sanctity of the home; however, authorities regularly infringed on 
these rights. The Constitution provides that the police must obtain a 
warrant, or have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress, or is 
about to be committed, before entering a private dwelling. In practice 
police and paramilitary officers frequently entered private homes and 
churches without warrants to carry out arrests and investigations.
    The security forces harassed and threatened perceived opposition 
figures and their families by conducting illegal surveillance. In some 
cases, they entered the homes of opposition figures, usually at night. 
For example, security personnel watched the homes of activists James 
Torh and Lartin Konneh for several weeks (see Section 2.a.). Fearing 
for their safety, both activists fled the country. Several student 
leaders remained under surveillance at year's end (see Section 2.a.). 
Several journalists and human rights activists resided in the homes of 
friends or relatives for months at a time due to fear that the security 
forces might follow through with their threats against them. Incidents 
of harassment and threats increased with the continuing violence in 
Lofa county. In rural areas, particularly in remote parts of Lofa 
county, armed security forces illegally entered homes, most often to 
steal food, money, or other property (see Section 1.c.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted 
this right in practice. Security agents threatened, detained, and 
assaulted journalists and intimidated many journalists into practicing 
self-censorship.
    In January human rights activist James Torh's sedition trial for 
criticizing President Taylor began. Decisions made on motions during 
his trial indicated that an impartial judgement was not possible and, 
fearing for his safety, Torh fled the country in March. Muslim 
organization leader Lartin Konneh, charged with treason for calling on 
Muslim government officials to resign their positions, also fled the 
country.
    With some notable exceptions, government officials are reluctantly 
tolerant of the press; however, they frequently rebuked the media 
publicly for what they considered negative reporting of events. 
Security personnel sometimes interpreted such criticism as a license to 
harass, threaten, and even assault targeted persons. Reporting that 
criticized the Government brought threats of violence, closure, or 
directives from powerful government figures to advertisers that they 
should discontinue business with that media outlet. For example, 
another respected newspaper ceased publication, and most of the 
management left the country after repeated threats were made against 
them because of editorials written by the newspaper's publisher from 
his home abroad.
    Nevertheless, in general journalists are outspoken and even 
provocative. However, journalists also practice selfcensorship, 
especially in regard to information about the President and his 
immediate family members and particularly after being threatened or 
harassed.
    In April the LNP briefly detained broadcast journalist Isaac Redd 
of the Liberia Communication Network (LCN) for allegedly making 
inflammatory remarks against the President.
    In August the Government arrested four foreign journalists from 
Britain's Channel Four network who visited the country to gather 
material for a documentary about countries in post-conflict stages in 
West Africa, and charged them with espionage; while in detention, 
security personnel beat and threatened them. They also were denied bail 
because the charge was considered a capital offense by the prosecution, 
although the law did not require such a ruling. The journalists were 
released a week later after the international community criticized the 
Government. In October security forces arrested and briefly detained 
newspaper reporter Philip Moore for alleged treasonous remarks.
    In March security forces detained the president of the Press Union 
of Liberia (PUL), Suah Deddeh, after the organization planned a mass 
meeting to respond to the closing of two radio stations. The meeting 
never happened, and nonmembers of the PUL were threatened with arrest. 
Deddeh was released after spending a night in jail. In May police 
detained Deddeh a second time when the Press Union, in celebration of 
World Press Freedom, was planning a march through the center of 
Monrovia. Security forces also threatened other activists who opposed 
the radio closings.
    No action was taken during the year in the case of the police 
forces'' 1998 flogging of journalist Hassan Bility or the 1999 assault 
on the editor of the Inquirer newspaper, Philip Wesseh.
    In Monrovia eight newspapers were published during the year, 
although some publish very irregularly. Two are independent dailies and 
five generally appeared once or more a week; they vary in their 
political balance. The Public Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of 
Information, Culture, and Tourism publishes one newspaper, and the 
communications network owned by the President publishes one weekly 
newspaper. Several newspapers that had not published regularly, and an 
alternative press organization became active following the news 
blackout in March organized by the press union in response to the 
closure of two radio stations. There were numerous reports that 
government officials funded these newspapers, and that they generally 
reported only progovernment news. The ruling party also published a 
newspaper that circulated frequently during the period following the 
closures of the radio stations; however, the frequency of its 
publishing lessened later in the year.
    Newspaper availability fluctuated during the year. The two leading 
independent dailies continued to publish despite being labeled as 
dissident newspapers after they participated in the news blackout 
following the closure of two radio stations and after subsequently 
being criticized by the Government and the ruling party.
    The Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism did not accept 
late license payment from two newspapers with the result that they had 
to cease publication. The Ministry did not renew the annual licenses of 
two newspapers because the Government believed that they were supported 
by ``agent provocateurs''--persons whom, in the government's view, want 
to overthrow the Government.
    Management of the one printing facility capable of producing 
newspapers is subject to pressure from the Government. To meet costs of 
production, the typical newspaper's eight pages include two or three 
pages of advertisements or paid announcements, further reducing the 
amount of news reported. Some articles included are the result of 
``cadeaux,'' gifts or money that supplement reporters' meager salaries.
    Due to the high price of newspapers, the high rate of illiteracy, 
(estimated at 75 percent), high transportation costs, and the poor 
state of roads elsewhere in the country, newspaper distribution 
generally is limited to the Monrovia area. As a result, radio is the 
primary means of mass communication. A number of independent radio 
stations existed at the beginning of the year in Monrovia including 
Star Radio, Radio Monrovia, two commercial stations (DC-101 and Radio 
Monrovia), and Radio Veritas, which operated under the Catholic 
Archdiocese. Radio Monrovia closed in January due to insufficient 
funding. There also is the national station, and FM and short-wave 
stations operated by President Taylor's private LCN. The President's 
radio station is the only station with a short-wave frequency strong 
enough to reach all parts of the country. Radio Veritas has short-wave 
frequency but a limited broadcast area and antiquated equipment. There 
is a French broadcast through the national radio facility, a religious 
station, and a growing number of small local stations in cities around 
the country. Media practitioners believe that the ruling party funds 
many of these stations.
    Call-in radio talk shows are popular and frequently a forum for 
both government and opposition viewpoints; however, they sometimes 
resulted in threats generally from the Government, party leaders and 
security agents to the radio hosts and station managers. Interviews 
with prominent persons are broadcast frequently.
    Due to the economic situation in the country and the dependence on 
generators requiring expensive fuel purchases, most of the stations 
limited broadcasting hours and in some cases ceased operation for short 
periods.
    In March the Government closed two radio stations (Star Radio and 
Radio Veritas) without due process. Shortly before their closure, both 
stations had been relicensed by the Ministry of Information. The order 
to close them came from the President, who said that the two stations' 
broadcasts threatened the security of the State. Radio Veritas, owned 
by the Catholic Church, was allowed to reopen a week after its closing, 
but Star Radio, which was a politically neutral FM station funded 
primarily through international organizations, remained closed at 
year's end.
    Television is limited to those who can purchase sets, the 
generators, and fuel to provide electricity. For those persons and 
businesses with satellite capability, the Cable News Network is 
available. There are two television stations: the LCN owned by 
President Taylor, and the Ducor Broadcasting Corporation which is 
privately owned but assisted by President Taylor's generator.
    Government officials criticized journalists who used the Internet 
to express opinions that the authorities considered too critical of the 
Government. For much of the year, there was no direct access to 
information through the Internet. Star Radio's internet operations also 
were closed in March. Star Radio had supplied daily news summaries to 
its parent foundation, which put these on the Internet. Copies also 
were provided to the Ministry of Information, and the Government 
demanded (contrary to international practice) a special licensing fee 
for Star Radio's transmission of news on the Internet. During a press 
conference in March following the Government's closure of Radio Veritas 
and Star Radio, President Taylor indicated that he believed ``cyber-
warfare'' was being waged as part of an international conspiracy 
against the country. Many observers believe that the Government blocked 
the operation of potential Internet providers.
    When the closure of Star Radio did not stop the negative propaganda 
about the country on the Internet, which was generated primarily by 
opposition figures abroad, the Government and the ruling party began to 
use the Internet to provide news and sponsored several websites. An 
Internet provider reemerged mid-year and opened a cybercafe that the 
few persons with sufficient funds can access. Because of the ties 
between the provider and the Government, some potential patrons 
believed that their use of the Internet was monitored by government 
security personnel and choose not to use it.
    The Government generally respects academic freedom at the 
University of Liberia; however, on occasion the Government detained 
students who criticized the Government. University administrators were 
concerned about the militancy of student groups on campus, whose 
memberships include a high percentage of former combatants; however, 
actual physical violence was rare. At times students, whom observers 
believe to be paid informants, reported professors'' opinions to 
various government officials. In July student leaders issued a 
statement questioning the official accounts of the seriousness of the 
fighting in Lofa county. In response security forces entered the 
Monrovia campus, took the student leaders in custody, and offered to 
fly them to Lofa to tour the conflict area and forced them to visit 
wounded soldiers hospitalized in Monrovia. The media was urged to cover 
this visit, after which the students were compelled to offer apologies 
and were released. In November student leaders released a press 
statement that strongly criticized the economy and urged the government 
to forge ties with countries that could assist national growth. They 
also called for the expulsion of RUF leader Sam Bockarie and for the 
Government to break ties with Libya and Burkina Faso. LNP director 
Mulbah subsequently visited the campus with armed police to convince 
the students they should meet with President Taylor to discuss their 
complaints and stated publicly that they would not be detained; 
however, fearing arrests, the students went into hiding. After 
continued public declarations by Mulbah and President Taylor that the 
students would not be arrested, the students came out of hiding and met 
with President Taylor at the end of November to discuss their 
complaints. The student leaders continued to be under surveillance and 
received warnings on a regular basis about speaking out.
    Students occasionally protested the lack of resources, which they 
blamed more on central government appropriation practices than on the 
university administration.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
generally respected this right in practice. In May the LNP, citing 
security concerns, abruptly stopped a march through downtown Monrovia 
sponsored by PUL in observance of World Press Freedom Day. The police 
allowed the commemoration to continue indoors. In November President 
Taylor warned that while the Government would tolerate different views, 
it would not tolerate anarchic demonstrations in the streets; however, 
this warning did not result in the subsequent dispersal of any 
demonstrations during the year.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    There is no established state religion. However, government 
ceremonies invariably open and close with prayer and may include hymn 
singing. The prayers and hymns are usually Christian but occasionally 
are Muslim.
    All organizations, including religious groups, must register their 
articles of incorporation with the Government, along with a statement 
of the purpose of the organization. However, traditional indigenous 
religious groups generally need not and do not register. The 
registration is routine, and there have been no reports that the 
registration process is either burdensome or discriminatory in its 
administration.
    The law prohibits religious discrimination; however, Islamic 
leaders complained of discrimination against Muslims. Although there 
are some Muslims in senior government positions, many Muslims believe 
that they are bypassed for desirable jobs. Many Muslim business 
proprietors believe that the Government's decision to enforce an old 
statute prohibiting business on Sunday discriminated against them. Most 
Mandingos, and hence most Muslims, allied with factions that opposed 
Taylor during the civil war and still belong to opposition parties.
    In March the Government suspended Radio Veritas broadcasts, pending 
assurances that the station would confine itself to ``purely religious 
matters.'' The station reopened a week later and resumed its previous 
broadcast programming. The closure was believed to be politically 
motivated rather than prompted by religious discrimination (see Section 
2.a.). There were no Islamic-oriented radio stations and little radio 
broadcasting of any kind in the northern and eastern counties where the 
Muslim population is concentrated.
    In February Muslim activist Lartin Konneh was arrested on charges 
of treason after he called upon Muslims to resign their government jobs 
in protest of the Government's inaction since the burning of five 
mosques in Lofa county in January (see Section 5). Konneh went into 
hiding and subsequently fled the country. While the Government has not 
taken actions openly against Muslims, its inaction over reports of 
abuses in Lofa county contributed to ethnic tension between Muslim and 
nonMuslim ethnic groups in that area of the country.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement throughout the country as well as the right to leave or enter; 
however, the Government restricted this right in practice. Security 
forces maintained checkpoints where travelers routinely were subjected 
to arbitrary searches and petty extortion. Security forces also 
extorted money from returning refugees. In February and October, units 
of the ATB, citing security concerns, set up temporary checkpoints that 
interdicted traffic and visitors to a foreign embassy in Monrovia.
    In June, ostensibly in order to curtail the illegal use of national 
travel documents, President Taylor issued an executive order that 
required passport applicants to obtain clearance from the National 
Security Agency (NSA). Opposition parties and human rights 
organizations criticized this directive, arguing that it violated the 
constitutional right of freedom of travel. Reportedly this executive 
order was not enforced during the year. In November the Government 
announced that it would no longer accept Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) safe conduct documents as valid travel 
documents for entering the country; however, reportedly this was not 
enforced.
    As a result of the civil war, there were 157,000 IDP's in 
approximately 36 camps in 1997. International agencies and the Liberia 
Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) have been able 
to resettle approximately 126,243 displaced persons since 1998. In 
October the fighting in northern Lofa county further increased the 
number of displaced persons. There were an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 
IDP's in the country at year's end. International and local NGO's faced 
limited funding and resources to assist these IDPs.
    In October after some delays approximately 400 Liberian refugees in 
Guinea were repatriated to the country. By year's end, a total of 5,000 
Liberians were repatriated. These refugees, who are mostly Mandingos, 
were resettled in the Lofa or Nimba counties where political and ethnic 
clashes still occurred (see Section 5).
    The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylee status in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government continued 
to provide first asylum to nearly 86,000 refugees, the vast majority of 
whom were from Sierra Leone towards the end of the year. The Government 
generally cooperated with the Office of the U.N. High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees.
    In June security personnel arrested seven Liberians who were 
returning from Guinea in a UNHCR truck (see Section 1.b.). The 
Government claimed that the men were members of a dissident armed 
faction based in Guinea. The men have not been seen since their arrest, 
and NGO's and relatives believe that they were killed.
    In October the UNHCR protested the recruitment of refugees by 
security personnel on behalf of the RUF rebels from Sierra Leone. UNHCR 
reported that such recruitment ceased after its protest.
    Former RUF leader, Sam Bockarie, and several hundred of his 
supporters took refuge in Liberia early in December 1999. President 
Taylor denied that the Government was training the RUF fighters or that 
it has been supplying them with arms. He claimed that the ECOWAS 
leadership permitted these arrangements in order to advance the 
implementation of the Sierra Leone peace process. A coalition of civic, 
religious, and political groups repeatedly have asked for President 
Taylor to expel the RUF rebels and disassociate the Government from 
them.
    In 1999 after a series of raids and attacks by security forces and 
dissidents bases in Guinea, a group of Sierra Leonean refugees migrated 
south from northern Lofa county towards another established refugee 
camp in Sinje. The Government cooperated with the UNHCR's efforts to 
assist the migration to the new location. International donors remained 
unwilling to send any further assistance to Lofa county, and the 
international and domestic NGO's are reluctant to resume operations 
there because of security concerns. The Government and the UNHCR 
established a second refugee camp in Sinje, a location easily 
accessible from Monrovia, to accommodate the refugees from Lofa county.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right to vote in free and fair 
elections, and citizens exercised this right in 1997 in elections that 
international observers deemed free and transparent; however, the 
elections were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as most 
voters believed that military forces loyal to Charles Taylor would have 
resumed the civil war if Taylor lost the election. Since the 
legislative elections were held on the basis of proportional 
representation, Taylor's National Patriotic Party won control of the 
legislature by the same 75 percent majority that he received in the 
popular vote for the presidency. The 1997 legislative and presidential 
elections were held under a special election law in accordance with the 
terms of the Abuja Peace Process.
    The legislature did not exercise genuine independence from the 
executive branch. There were 16 opposition parties, most of which had 
little popular support outside of the capital, and opposition 
legislators, who held only one-quarter of the seats in the House of 
Representatives and in the Senate, generally were more passive than 
members of the ruling NPP. Congressional committees failed to develop 
expertise in their respective areas of responsibility. No major 
legislation was enacted during the year. However, during the year, the 
House of Representatives refused to vote in favor of a government-
sponsored rural property tax and strategic commodities act.
    In August the Government indicted an opposition leader residing 
abroad, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, for treason for alleged ties to armed 
dissidents operating in Lofa county.
    In June Vice President Enoch Dogolea died, and in July President 
Taylor selected Moses Z. Blah, a founding member of the ruling party, 
to fill the position.
    The State is highly centralized. The President appoints the 
superintendents (governors) of the 13 counties. Municipalities and 
chieftaincies are supposed to elect their own officials, but elections, 
postponed in 1998 due to lack of funds and disorganization, were not 
held during the year for the same reason. Local governments at all 
levels have no independent revenue base and rely entirely on the 
central government for funds. Education, health services, and public 
works are provided by the central government. Local officials serve 
mainly to lobby the central Government.
    There are no restrictions on the participation of women in 
politics; however, women remained underrepresented in government and 
politics. The number of women in high-ranking positions in the 
Government and in the various political parties is low. Only 5 of the 
26 senators and 5 of the 64 members of the House of Representatives are 
female. Of the 20 cabinet positions, 4 are held by women. A woman 
serves as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and another chairs the 
National Reconciliation Commission. There are no women's caucuses, but 
the ruling party has a women's organization.
    There are relatively few Muslims in government and politics; only 
one cabinet minister is a Muslim.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government permitted domestic and international human rights 
groups to operate largely without interference; however, members of the 
security forces often harassed domestic democracy and human rights 
activists. During the year, the Government blocked efforts by a local 
NGO, the Catholic Affiliated Justice and Peace Commission, to 
investigate claims of torture at Gbatala security training base (see 
Section 1.c.). Government officials frequently criticized domestic 
human rights groups publicly. For example, in December at a pro-
government rally, President Taylor criticized democracy and human 
rights activists and opposition leaders of destabilizing the 
government, and he warned that these individuals would be punished.
    In November about 100 men ransacked the offices of the Center for 
Democratic Empowerment (CEDE) and beat former interim president and 
human rights defender, Amos Sawyer, and executive director of CEDE, 
Conmany Wesseh. Preliminary investigation by the Government revealed 
that former combatants were responsible; however, only seven or eight 
persons were arrested, and reportedly they were not the primary 
assailants. Numerous sources reported that the attack commenced from 
NPP headquarters, and that those arrested were paid by the NPP after 
they were released on bond. Prosecution still was pending at year's 
end.
    In 1999 legislators from southeast counties sued a child rights 
advocacy group for defaming the counties reputation in its report on 
forced child labor (see Section 6.c.). The suit was dropped when the 
child rights activist who brought the suit fled the country.
    Domestic human rights organizations are underfunded, understaffed, 
and their personnel lacked adequate training. There are three 
coalitions of human rights groups: The National Human Rights Center of 
Liberia has eight member organizations; eight other groups comprise the 
Network of Human Rights Chapters; and four belong to the Federation of 
Human Rights Organizations. All of these organizations sought to 
increase public discussion of human rights problems.
    Some human rights groups paid regular visits to detainees at police 
headquarters and prisoners at the Monrovia Central Prison (see Section 
1.c.). Several domestic human rights organizations have established 
branches outside of the capital and perform similar monitoring 
functions there. No discernible pattern of government interference with 
these activities emerged.
    The Government permits international NGO's and human rights 
organizations to operate in the country, and a few international 
organizations did so during the year. In November an international 
democracy and human rights organization, the Carter Center, terminated 
its programs in the country and stated in a letter to President Taylor 
that it was leaving the country because of conditions in the country 
and the Government's poor human rights record.
    The Government's Human Rights Commission, created in 1997, remained 
largely inactive throughout the year. It received no funding from the 
Government, and the Senate again failed to confirm the appointments of 
three of its five commissioners. The chairman of the Commission fled 
the country in August 1999 and is seeking asylum in another country.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on ethnic 
background, race, sex, creed, place of origin, or political opinion; 
however, discrimination exists. There are no laws against gender 
discrimination, ethnic discrimination, or female genital mutilation. 
Differences involving ethnic groups, notably the Krahn and Mandingo 
ethnic groups, continued to contribute to serious political violence 
and abuses.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women is extensive; however, it 
was not addressed seriously as a problem by the Government, the courts, 
or the media. Several NGO's in Monrovia and Buchanan continued programs 
to treat abused women and girls and increase awareness of their rights.
    The status of women varies by region, ethnic group, and religion. 
Before the outbreak of the civil war, women held onefourth of the 
professional and technical jobs in Monrovia. On the whole, women have 
not recovered from the setbacks caused by the civil war, when most 
schools were closed, and they could not carry out their traditional 
roles in the production, allocation, and sale of food.
    Women married under civil law can inherit land and property; 
however, women married under traditional laws are considered the 
properties of their husbands and are not entitled to inherit from their 
husbands or retain custody of their children if their husbands die. 
Women's organizations continued to press for legislation on behalf of 
inheritance rights in traditional marriages. There continued to be few 
programs to help former combatants reintegrate into society, and there 
were none specifically to benefit former female combatants. However, 
several women's organizations advanced family welfare issues, helped 
promote political reconciliation, and assisted in rehabilitating both 
former female combatants and women who were victims of the civil war.
    Throughout the year, professional women's groups--including 
lawyers, market women, and businesswomen--remained vocal about their 
concerns regarding government corruption, the economy, security abuses, 
rape, domestic violence and children's rights. Government officials 
often responded negatively to public criticism. There were credible 
reports of harassment and possible surveillance of outspoken critics 
(see Section 1.f.). In August the Justice Ministry granted power to the 
Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) to assist in the 
prosecution of rape cases.
    Children.--The Government generally was unable to provide for the 
education and health of children, although it continued its nationwide 
anti-polio vaccination campaign during the year. Due to the poor 
condition of government schools, most children who attended school went 
to private institutions. Since many private schools still need to be 
refurbished due to wartime damage, school fees were increased 
significantly, thereby making education unattainable for many school-
age children. In both public and private schools, families of children 
often were asked to provide their own books, pencils, and paper. At the 
end of 1999, 622,645 out of an estimated 1.4 million school age 
children were enrolled in primary and secondary schools, 263,556 of 
which were girls. Expenditures on education were estimated at $6.4 
million (288 million ld). In 1995 the literacy rate for boys was at 
53.9 percent and girls at 22.4 percent.
    Young persons were victimized seriously during the civil war. An 
estimated 50,000 children were killed; many more were wounded, 
orphaned, or abandoned. Approximately 100 underfunded orphanages 
operate in and around Monrovia; however many orphans live outside these 
institutions. The National Military Families Association of Liberia 
(NAMFA) tries to provide for orphaned military children; it has 
registered 650 street children. These institutions do not receive any 
government funding, but rely on public donations. Nearly all youths 
witnessed terrible atrocities, and some committed atrocities 
themselves. Approximately 21 percent (4,306) of the combatants who 
disarmed under the provisions of the Abuja Peace Accords were child 
soldiers under the age of 17. Many youths remain traumatized, and some 
still are addicted to drugs. The number of street children in Monrovia 
and the number of abandoned infants increased significantly following 
disarmament. NGO's and the U.N. Children's Fund continued retraining 
and rehabilitation programs for a limited number of former child 
fighters; however these children were vulnerable to being recruited in 
subregional conflicts, since most had no other means of support.
    Children continued to be incarcerated with adults, and there were 
long delays in deciding cases involving minors (see Sections 1.c. and 
1.e.).
    Child advocacy groups reported forced child labor in the rural 
areas of the country (see Section 6.c.).
    Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by 
international public health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, traditionally was performed on young girls in 
northern, western, and central ethnic groups, particularly in rural 
areas. Prior to the onset of the civil war in 1989, approximately 50 
percent of women in rural areas between the ages of 8 and 18 were 
subjected to FGM. A local organization, Human Rights Watch Women and 
Children, which does not receive government funding, launched a 
campaign during the year to eradicate FGM. AFELL also has spoken out 
against FGM.
    Social structures and traditional institutions, such as the secret 
societies that often performed FGM as an initiation rite, were 
undermined by the war. While many experts believe that the incidence of 
FGM dropped to as low as 10 percent by the end of the war, traditional 
societies are reestablishing themselves throughout the country, and the 
increase in the incidence of FGM continued. The most extreme form of 
FGM, infibulation, reportedly is not practiced. The Government has 
taken no action against FGM.
    In January a well-known 17-year-old child rights activist fled the 
country to escape persistent harassment of himself, his family, 
teachers, and high school classmates by security personnel (see Section 
1.f.). He remained in self-imposed exile at year's end.
    People with Disabilities.--As a result of the civil war, a large 
number of persons have permanent disabilities, in addition to those 
disabled by accident or illness. It is illegal to discriminate against 
the disabled; however, in practice they do not enjoy equal access to 
public buildings. No laws mandate accessibility to public buildings or 
services. Disabled persons face discrimination particularly in rural 
areas. Deformed babies often are abandoned.
    Religious Minorities.--Some tensions exist between the major 
religious communities. The law prohibits religious discrimination; 
however, Islamic leaders complained of societal discrimination against 
Muslims. The private sector in urban areas, particularly in the 
capital, gives preference to Christianity in civic ceremonies and 
observances, and discrimination against followers of other organized 
religion spills over into areas of individual opportunity and 
employment. There is an interfaith council that brings together leaders 
of the Christian and Islamic faiths.
    Ethnic tensions continued in Lofa County between the predominantly 
Muslim Mandingo ethnic group and the Lorma ethnic group. In January 
five mosques were burned. There was no report of a government 
investigation or action taken against the arsonists.
    Ritual killings, in which body parts used in traditional indigenous 
rituals are removed from the victim, continue to occur. The number of 
such killings is difficult to ascertain, since police often describe 
deaths as accidents even when body parts have been removed. Deaths that 
appear to be natural or accidental sometimes are rumored to be the work 
of ritual killers. Little reliable information is readily available 
about traditions associated with ritual killings. It is believed that 
practitioners of traditional indigenous religions among the Grebo and 
Krahn ethnic groups concentrated in the southeastern counties most 
commonly engage in ritual killings. The victims are usually members of 
the religious group performing the ritual. The underlying religious 
beliefs may be related to incidents during the civil war in which 
faction leaders sometimes ate (and in which one faction leader had 
himself filmed eating) body parts of former leaders of rival factions. 
Removal of body parts for use in traditional rituals is believed to be 
the motive for ritual killings, rather than an abuse incidental to 
killings committed by religious group members called ``heart men.'' 
Since the civil war, common criminals inured to killing also may sell 
body parts.
    In August 1999, the Government sent a high-level delegation of the 
National Police to the southeastern counties to investigate reports of 
ritual killings. There were no reports released from this 
investigation.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the Constitution bans 
ethnic discrimination, it also provides that only ``persons who are 
Negroes or of Negro descent'' may be citizens or own land. Many persons 
of Lebanese and Asian descent who were born or lived most of their 
lives in the country are denied full rights as a result of this racial 
distinction.
    The country is ethnically diverse. The population of about 3 
million is made up of 16 indigenous ethnic groups and the Americo-
Liberian minority--descendants of freed slaves from the United States 
and the Caribbean--which until 1980 dominated the government and the 
public sector through the True Whig party. The indigenous ethnic groups 
generally speak distinct primary languages, and they are concentrated 
regionally. No ethnic group constitutes a majority of the population.
    Many members of the predominantly Muslim Mandingo minority 
encountered hostility when they sought to return, after the end of the 
civil war, to their villages in Lofa, Bong, and Nimba counties. Many 
Mandingos were unable to reoccupy their homes, which had been taken 
over by squatters. Members of the Lorma, Gio, and Mano minorities 
generally held all Mandingos responsible for atrocities committed by 
the Ulimo-Mandingo faction during the civil war. The lack of competent 
security forces and a fully functioning judiciary in these areas 
prevented many Mandingos from seeking redress.
    The continuing cross-border violence in Lofa county exacerbated 
ethnic tensions between the Mandingos and the Lormas (see Section 
1.a.).
    Recent tension with the Guinean government aggravated unrest in 
Nimba between the Manos and Mandingos (see Section 1.a.). For example, 
in October in Nimbia, a property dispute between the Mandingos and 
members of Mano and Gio ethnic groups led to rioting, which reportedly 
killed four persons (see Section 1.a.).

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that 
workers, except members of the military and police, have the right to 
associate in trade unions, and workers are allowed to join unions in 
practice. The Constitution also provides that unions are prohibited 
from engaging in partisan political activity. However, government 
interference in union activities, especially union elections and 
leaderships struggles, was common both before and during the civil war.
    Although most economic activity was interrupted by the war, unions 
proliferated. There are 32 functioning unions organized loosely under 
two umbrella groups--the Federation of Liberian Trade Unions and the 
Congress of Liberian Trade Unions--with the common objective of 
protecting the rights of their 60,000 members, who largely were 
unemployed. The actual power that the unions exercise was extremely 
limited. Since the country's work force is largely illiterate, economic 
activities beyond the subsistence level were very limited, and the 
labor laws tend to favor management.
    During the year, the Government strictly enforced the union 
registration requirements that fell into disuse during the war.
    Labor laws provide for the right to strike. A decree passed by the 
People's Redemption Council in 1984 outlawed strikes, but it was not 
enforced during the year. Due to the destruction of the economy and the 
estimated 85 percent unemployment rate, strikes were infrequent.
    In a wage dispute in February, workers at a rubber plantation in 
Bomi county burned some property. The dispute was settled later that 
month when the management of the plantation agreed to increase wages 
and to provide other benefits.
    Labor unions traditionally have been affiliated with international 
labor groups such as the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--With the 
exception of civil servants, workers (including employees of public 
corporations and autonomous agencies) have the right to organize and 
bargain collectively. In the past, agreements were negotiated freely 
between workers and their employers without government interference; 
however, these rights were largely moot during the year because of the 
lack of economic activity.
    There are no export processing zones. All of those previously 
existing were destroyed during the civil war.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor; however, this prohibition was ignored widely in 
many parts of the country, such as rural areas where farmers were 
pressured into providing free labor on ``community projects'' that 
often benefited only local leaders. The Government denied allegations 
that unpaid laborers were forced to harvest crops on President Taylor's 
private farm.
    The Constitution prohibits forced child labor; however, there were 
reports that it occurred (see Section 5). Some former combatants, 
including some in the security forces, were accused of forcing children 
to work in the mining industry. In 1999 a child rights advocacy group 
released a report on forced child labor in the southeastern counties. 
The advocacy group's report and that of another prominent human rights 
group contradicted an earlier government report that failed to find any 
conclusive evidence of forced child labor. Subsequently legislators 
from three counties sued the child rights advocacy group for defaming 
the counties' reputations. At year's end, the case still was pending.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age 
of 16 during school hours in the wage sector, but enforcement 
traditionally is lax. The Ministry of Labor did not make any 
inspections during the year and lacks the resources to carry out its 
mandate. Throughout rural areas--particularly where there were no 
schools--small children continued to assist their parents as vendors in 
local markets or on the streets, to take care of younger brothers and 
sisters, and to work on family subsistence farms.
    The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor.
    The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; 
however, there were reports that it occurred (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law provides for a 
minimum wage, paid leave, severance benefits, and safety standards, but 
enforcement was targeted solely against profitable firms that generally 
observed these standards. Due to the country's continued economic 
problems, most citizens were forced to accept any work they could find 
regardless of wages or working conditions.
    The 1977 Labor Law requires a minimum wage of approximately $0.25 
(10 ld) per hour not exceeding 8 hours per day, excluding benefits, for 
unskilled laborers. The law requires that agricultural workers are to 
be paid $1.50 (60 ld) for an 8-hour day, excluding benefits. Skilled 
labor has no minimum fixed wage, but industrial workers usually 
received three or four times the wage paid to agricultural workers. The 
muchsoughtafter minimum wage jobs provided a minimal standard of living 
for a worker and family; however, there were very few such jobs. 
Families dependent on minimum wage incomes also engage in subsistence 
farming, small-scale marketing, petty extortion, and begging.
    The Ministry of Labor did not have the resources to monitor 
compliance with labor laws.
    The Labor Law provides for a 48-hour, 6-day regular workweek with a 
30-minute rest period per 5 hours of work. The 6-day workweek may 
extend to 56 hours for service occupations and to 72 hours for miners, 
with overtime pay beyond 48 hours.
    Prior to 1990, there were government-established health and safety 
standards, enforced in theory by the Ministry of Labor. During the war, 
these regulations were not enforced. Even under the Labor Law, workers 
did not have a specific right to remove themselves from dangerous 
situations without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, through, or within the country.
                               __________

                               MADAGASCAR

    Madagascar held its second presidential election under the 1992 
Constitution in 1996, following the impeachment of then-President 
Albert Zafy earlier that year. The election was accepted widely as free 
and fair, and the winner, former Second Republic President Didier 
Ratsiraka, took office in February 1997. An extensive revision of the 
1992 Constitution was approved narrowly in a March 1998 constitutional 
referendum. While observers from the International Foundation for 
Election Systems concluded that the referendum generally was free and 
fair, it was marred by significant difficulties in compiling voter 
lists, distributing electoral cards, and other problems, which led to 
charges of fraud and manipulation. Although power remains formally 
divided between the President, his Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and a 
bicameral legislature (Senate and National Assembly), the revised 
Constitution significantly strengthened the presidency and weakened the 
National Assembly. National Assembly elections held in May 1998 
generally were accepted as free and fair; however, there were a number 
of credible complaints of electoral fraud. In November 1999, nationwide 
communal elections were held that resulted in a near majority for the 
President's party, the Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar 
(AREMA). Other parties criticized the elections as poorly organized and 
fraudulent; a lack of transparency made it difficult to assess reliably 
the extent of abuses. A number of institutions provided for in the 
revised Constitution, including the Senate, a restructured judiciary, 
and autonomous provincial governments, still were pending at year's 
end. The judiciary is subject to executive influence.
    The State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior for Public Security 
and the national police, which are under the State Secretary, are 
responsible for law and order in urban areas. The Ministry of Armed 
Forces oversees the army, the air force, the navy, and the gendarmerie. 
The gendarmerie has primary responsibility for security except in major 
cities and is assisted in some areas by regular army units in 
operations against bandit gangs and cattle thieves. After a number of 
years of decline, the military force has stabilized at about 22,000 
troops, including the gendarmerie. There also are local traditional 
laws called ``dina'' that are enforced by village-level law enforcement 
groups, particularly in areas where the Government's presence is weak. 
There continued to be occasional reports that police, gendarmes, and 
dina authorities committed human rights abuses.
    Madagascar is a very poor country. The economy relies heavily on 
agriculture. Agricultural exports, led by shrimp, grew 4.3 percent with 
vanilla, coffee, cloves, and pepper registering increases. Textiles 
were another major export. The smuggling of vanilla, gold, precious 
stones, and cattle continued to be major concerns. Overall economic 
performance improved, but nearly three-fourths of the population of 
about 14.7 million live in poverty. Living standards are low, with the 
annual per capita gross domestic product estimated at $269. Foreign 
assistance remains a major source of national income. Inflation rose 
from 6.4 percent in 1998 to 14.4 percent in 1999. Unemployment and 
underemployment, especially among youth, remained high, although there 
was significant job growth in Antananarivo during the year. The 
Government made progress on economic reform, including privatization.
    The Government generally respected citizens'' human rights in 
several areas; however, a number of problems remained. There were 
occasional reports that police or other security forces mistreated 
prisoners or detainees. Prison conditions were harsh and life 
threatening. In some prisons, women experienced physical abuse, 
including rape. Arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems. 
Lengthy pretrial detention remained a major problem, and suspects often 
were held for periods that exceeded the maximum sentence for the 
alleged offenses. The Government continued a major effort to reduce the 
number of preventive detainees. Dina authorities imposed summary 
justice--including several executions--in rural areas where the 
Government's presence was weak, although, overall, government efforts 
to bring dina authorities under closer regulation and scrutiny 
continued to show results. At times the Government pressured the media 
to curb its coverage of certain events and issues; journalists 
practiced self-censorship. There was virtually no political violence 
during the year. Women continued to face some societal discrimination. 
Child labor remained a problem. Some prisoners were used as forced 
labor. Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of trafficking 
in women and girls.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government forces; however, harsh 
prison conditions and the authorities'' failure to provide adequate 
food and medical treatment contributed to an undetermined number of 
deaths in custody (see Section 1.c.).
    Village dina authorities continued to mete out summary justice, and 
there were several cases of dina executions in the southeast.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the 
person; however, there were occasional reports that police or other 
security forces mistreated prisoners or detainees.
    Village dina authorities continued to mete out summary judgments. 
Dina authorities continued to use torture to gain confessions.
    Prison conditions remain harsh and life threatening. Prisoners' 
diets are inadequate, and family members must augment daily rations. 
Prisoners without relatives nearby sometimes go for days without food. 
Prison cells average less than 1 square yard of space per inmate. The 
authorities do not provide adequate medical care. The prison population 
of approximately 19,200 suffers a range of medical problems that are 
treated rarely or inadequately, including malnutrition, infections, 
malaria, and tuberculosis. These conditions have caused an unknown 
number of deaths (see Section 1.a.). There were instances in which 
prisoners were used as forced labor (see Section 6.c.).
    Women in prisons suffered abuses, as did children who sometimes 
were confined with them. Gender segregation was not absolute, and rapes 
by other prisoners were reported.
    The Government permits prison visits by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, religious and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), 
lawyers, and investigative journalists.
    For example, a local Catholic NGO visited prisoners during the 
year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides for due process for accused persons; however, arbitrary arrest 
and detention remain problems. In practice the authorities do not 
always observe legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention. 
In particular, excessive investigative detention of suspects resulted 
in the denial of due process. However, as the result of international 
pressure, many long-term detainees were released.
    By law a criminal suspect must be charged, bound over, or released 
within 3 days of arrest. An arrest warrant may be obtained but is not 
always required. Defendants in ordinary criminal cases have the right 
to be informed of the charges against them, must be charged formally 
within the specified time permitted, and must be allowed access to an 
attorney.
    Court-appointed counsel is provided for indigent persons accused of 
crimes that carry a minimum 5-year jail sentence. An attorney or the 
accused may request bail immediately after arrest, after being formally 
charged, or during the appeals process, but bail rarely is granted in 
the case of violent crimes.
    Of a prison population of approximately 19,200, about two-thirds of 
persons held in custody were in pretrial detention. Despite existing 
legal safeguards, investigative detention often exceeds 1 year, and 3 
or 4 years'' detention is common, even for crimes for which the maximum 
penalty may be 2 years or less. The accused may wait years in prison 
only to be exonerated ultimately in court. Poor record keeping, a lack 
of resources, and infrastructure problems that leave parts of the 
country isolated make it difficult to identify long-term pre-trial 
detainees. The Ministry of Justice continued a program to reduce 
excessive pretrial detention through case reviews and expedited 
judgments. Over 665 detainees have been tried and an indeterminate 
number of others were freed. In May the Ministry of Justice reported 
that over 71 percent of prisoners detained 2 years or more had been 
tried and over 1,200 were released. The Ministry stated that its goal 
was to bring the remaining
    long-term detainees to trial during the year.
    Although the law allows detainees to sue the Government for damages 
in cases of unlawful detention, no such suits were reported. By law 
persons accused of subversive activity may be detained incommunicado 
for 15 days and are subject to indefinite detention if considered 
necessary by the Government; however, this law was not invoked during 
the year.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The revised Constitution provides 
for an autonomous judiciary; however, implementing legislation has not 
yet been passed, and the High Constitutional Court is subject to the 
President's influence.
    The judiciary has three levels of jurisdiction: local courts for 
civil and criminal cases carrying limited fines and sentences; the 
Court of Appeals, which includes a criminal court for cases carrying 
sentences of 5 years or more; and the Supreme Court. The judiciary also 
includes courts designed to handle specific kinds of cases such as 
cattle theft. The High Constitutional Court is an autonomous court that 
undertakes technical reviews of laws, decrees, and ordinances, and 
certifies election results. The establishment of a number of 
decentralized courts, also provided for in the Constitution, awaits the 
creation of the Senate, which depends on the as-yet-unscheduled 
elections of autonomous provincial councils.
    The judiciary remained under the control of the Ministry of 
Justice. In 1999 salaries of magistrates were raised to improve their 
performance, but reports of corruption in the judiciary persisted. 
Although efforts were underway to address the problem, a large backlog 
of cases remained, which contributed to excessive investigative 
detention. The Ministry of Justice implemented some measures to 
increase transparency in judicial proceedings, including posting signs 
outside courthouse offices specifying procedures, regulations, costs, 
and timelines, in addition to opening a comment and complaint log in 
all courts.
    Trials are public, and defendants have the right to an attorney, to 
be present at the trial, to confront witnesses, and to present 
evidence. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence under the Penal 
Code.
    The right of traditional village institutions to protect property 
and public order is codified in the Constitution as well as in earlier 
laws. Civil disputes within and between villages sometimes are 
addressed by local traditional laws called dina. Dina also are 
established in some urban areas. In practice, dina deal with criminal 
cases because of the isolation of many rural areas, a rise in crime, 
and the ineffectiveness of the police and the judiciary outside major 
urban centers. Punishments based on dina were at times severe, 
including several cases of executions (see Section 1.a.). There also 
were problems with due process in the administration of dina 
punishments.
    Decisions based on dina are not subject to codified safeguards for 
the accused, but in some instances, they may be challenged at the 
appeals court level. Some cases also have been referred to the Office 
of the Mediator (ombudsman), which investigates and may seek redress 
from formal judicial authorities. An interministerial committee that 
includes the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Armed Forces was 
established to improve the surveillance of dina authorities and assure 
their adherence to the law. The committee held a workshop in each of 
the provinces and drafted a dina to be applied throughout the country. 
After the bill was submitted to the National Assembly in 1999, the 
committee was disbanded. The Ministry of Justice has moved away from 
its earlier permissive approach to dina and emphasized their 
subordination under the formal judicial system.
    The Government continued to combat crime and insecurity in isolated 
rural regions by augmenting the gendarmerie--traditionally responsible 
for law and order in rural areas--with army units. Military courts are 
integrated into the civil judicial system and differ only in the kinds 
of cases tried and in the inclusion of military officers on jury 
panels. Such courts have jurisdiction over some cases involving 
national security, including acts allegedly threatening the nation and 
its political leaders; invasion by foreign forces; and rioting that 
could lead to the overthrow of the Government. Defendants in military 
cases, as in civil law, enjoy an appeals process that reexamines points 
of law rather than the facts of the case. A civilian magistrate, 
usually joined on the bench by a panel of military officers, presides 
over military trials.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and 
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions in 
practice. Violations are subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, at times the Government 
pressures the media to curb its coverage of certain events and issues. 
Opposition politicians rarely are given access to state-run media; 
while they do have access to private media, these do not provide the 
nationwide coverage of state media. In addition journalists practice 
self-censorship.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice; however, local authorities sometimes deny 
requests by political opposition groups to assemble or march in 
specified locations.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    Religious groups must register and obtain authorization from the 
Ministry of Interior. In January 1998, an organization widely perceived 
to be affiliated with the Reverend Sun Myung Moon was refused 
registration, apparently due to concerns about its use of mind-control 
practices. There is no indication that the organization has reapplied 
for registration, nor that the Government has changed its decision.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice; however, the fear 
of crime effectively restricts travel in some areas, especially at 
night.
    The country does not have a law governing refugees nor has it 
ratified the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government cooperates 
closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in processing the 
small number of refugees or asylum seekers in the country. There were 
no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with recognized or 
pending claims to refugee status. The issue of provision of first 
asylum has never arisen.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government through direct 
universal suffrage by secret ballot. Didier Ratsiraka was elected to a 
5-year term as President in 1996 in the second presidential election 
held under the 1992 Constitution. In May 1998, the National Assembly's 
150 members were elected to 5-year terms. In November 1999, communal 
elections were held in which the President's party, AREMA, won over 40 
percent of the mayoral races. The elections were peaceful and well-
organized; however, there were numerous reports of fraud. In December 
1999, the High Constitutional Court recognized serious irregularities 
and reordered elections in five communes. The lack of transparency of 
the electoral process made it difficult to assess reliably the extent 
of abuses.
    On August 25, the National Assembly passed a Law on the Autonomous 
Provinces, and on August 29, the President promulgated the law. The law 
provides for the establishment of autonomous provinces and allows for 
the creation of an upper house of the legislature with provincial 
representatives.
    Under the Constitution, the President has primary responsibility 
for national defense and foreign policy, while the Prime Minister is 
the head of government and responsible for domestic policy. The 
President selects the Prime Minister. The Constitution gives the 
President the right to dissolve the National Assembly for cause. The 
revised Constitution retains the possibility of censure by a two-thirds 
majority of the National Assembly and Senate. The Senate was not 
established pending the creation of autonomous provinces. In September 
1998, the Prime Minister pledged publicly that all of the institutions 
called for in the Constitution would be created by March; however, this 
nonbinding target date was not achieved by year's end, and the 
Government did not make a commitment to implement the institutions by a 
specified date. In August the National Assembly approved a law defining 
the powers of autonomous provincial governments, and the President 
promulgated the law with several implementing decrees. The law allows 
the Senate to be convened, with representatives from the provinces. 
However, there is concern about whether the central Government will 
provide the necessary resources to support the establishment of the 
provincial councils; furthermore, there still is confusion regarding 
the specific responsibilities of the provincial governments. Elections 
were held on December 3 in the provinces to establish provincial 
councils and governorships; however, the results of the provincial 
elections were not published and the provincial councils were not 
established by year's end. Under the revised Constitution,
    two-thirds of the Senate's members are to be elected within the 
autonomous provinces, and one-third of the members are to be appointed 
by the President. The first senatorial elections were scheduled for 
March 2001.
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in 
government or politics, but in practice they are underrepresented in 
both areas. The Government of 31 ministers and state secretaries 
appointed in July 1998 includes 4 women. Less than 7 percent of 
National Assembly deputies (10 of 150) are women.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials usually are cooperative and 
responsive to their views.
    The Government is open to visits by international human rights 
groups and to domestic and international election observers.
    Domestic election observers from local NGO's were active in the 
country during the year.
    The Constitution provides for an independent office to promote and 
protect human rights. In 1994 the National Assembly assigned that role 
to the Office of the Mediator (ombudsman), which relies on moral 
suasion to correct abuses. The office publishes annual reports on its 
activities and distributes brochures to educate citizens on their 
rights and responsibilities. Its reports have outlined the rights of 
women and children and focused public attention on the potential for 
human rights violations under dina laws.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits all forms of discrimination and outlaws 
groups that advocate ethnic or religious segregation. No specific 
government institutions are designated to enforce these 
antidiscrimination provisions.
    Women.--Violence against women is not widespread. Police and legal 
authorities intervene when physical abuse is reported. Only the law 
against rape deals specifically with violence against women. Spouses 
can be tried for nonrape abuses, generally under civil law.
    The law neither prohibits nor condones prostitution. The law 
prohibits the incitement of minors to debauchery. The Government 
criticizes sexual tourism; however, while it attempts to investigate 
allegations of exploitation, a lack of resources hampers effective 
action.
    In urban areas, where many women manage or own businesses or hold 
management positions in state industries, there is relatively little 
societal discrimination against women. According to one government 
official, women own 30 percent of the formal sector companies and 53 
percent of the informal sector companies. However, discrimination 
against women in rural areas remained a problem. A number of NGO's 
focus on the civic education of women and girls to ensure that their 
rights and legal protections are understood fully and acted upon as 
appropriate.
    Under a 1990 law, wives have an equal voice in selecting the 
location of a married couple's residence, and they generally receive an 
equitable share of common property on divorce. Widows with children 
inherit half of joint marital property. A tradition known as ``the 
customary third'' occasionally is observed in some areas. Under this 
custom, the wife has a right to only one-third of a couple's joint 
holdings. However, a widow receives a pension, while a widower does 
not.
    Children.--While official expenditures on children's welfare are 
low, the Government increased the spending levels of the Ministries of 
Health and Education despite continued fiscal austerity. These levels 
are not sufficient to maintain adequate public services under current 
economic conditions. The Government provides education through the 
secondary or vocational level, and it is compulsory through the age of 
14. Although figures vary depending upon the source, approximately 65 
percent of primary-school-age children apparently are enrolled in 
school. However, only 29 percent of working children go to school: 
rural children drop out to help on family farms, and urban children 
work as domestics (see Section 6.d.).
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children, although child 
labor continues to be a pervasive problem. Children sometimes are 
imprisoned with adults (see Section 1.c.).
    People with Disabilities.--There is no systematic discrimination 
against disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision 
of other state services. There is no law mandating access to buildings 
for persons with disabilities. The National Assembly passed a law to 
define the rights of the disabled in February 1998, but implementing 
regulations have not been issued. The Ministry of Population scheduled 
a public consultation exercise for October to discuss the 
implementation with concerned NGO's prior to submitting draft 
regulations to the Government. Interministerial review of the draft 
regulations was still pending at year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Malagasy, who are of mixed 
Malayo-Polynesian, African, and Arab heritage, include 18 distinct 
groups differing in regional and ancestral affiliation. Although there 
are some linguistic differences, nearly all speak a dialect of the 
Malagasy language. None of these groups constitutes a majority of the 
population. There are significant minorities of Chinese and Indo-
Pakistani heritage, as well as a large number of resident French 
nationals.
    A long history of military conquest and political consolidation 
raised the political and economic status of highland ethnic groups of 
Asian origin above that of coastal groups of more African ancestry. 
Centralized administration and economic planning since independence has 
reinforced the concentration of economic and political power in the 
central highlands, where the capital is located. These policies feed 
enduring tension between coastal and highland persons. Ethnicity, 
caste, and regional solidarity often are factors in hiring practices.
    An Indo-Pakistani community has resided in the country since the 
early part of the 20th century. Traditionally engaged in commerce, this 
community now numbers about 20,000. Relatively few of these individuals 
have made successful claims to Malagasy nationality, which is 
customarily acquired through a native-born Malagasy mother. Indo-
Pakistani merchants are mistrusted widely. In past years, their shops 
have been looted during civil disturbances.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1995 Labor 
Code provide workers in the public and private sectors with the legal 
right to establish and join labor unions of their choosing without 
prior authorization; however, essential service workers, including 
police and military personnel, may not form unions. Unions are required 
to register with the Government, and registration is granted routinely. 
About 80 percent of the labor force of 5 million is engaged in agrarian 
production. Union members account for only about 5 percent of the total 
labor force.
    There are a number of trade union federations, many of which are 
affiliated formally with political parties. Neither public nor private 
sector unions have played a major political or economic role in recent 
years. The Government exercises very limited control over organized 
labor.
    The Labor Code and the Constitution include the right to strike. 
This right extends to export processing zones (EPZ's). Workers in 
essential services have a recognized but restricted right to strike, 
although in practice short strikes took place without reprisal. The 
code requires workers to exhaust conciliation, mediation, and 
arbitration procedures before striking, but this has not been a 
significant deterrent to legal strikes in practice.
    Short and generally nondisruptive strikes took place over fiscal 
and administrative issues in some cities.
    The International Labor Organization (ILO) has noted a number of 
instances in which the Government has failed to bring law and 
regulation into conformity with existing conventions or otherwise 
submit texts for ILO review, including those addressing forced labor, 
freedom of association, safeguarding of machinery, hygiene in commerce 
and offices, and weight limits. In most instances, these failures 
indicated legislative inertia rather than abuses.
    Unions freely join and participate in international bodies and may 
form federations or confederations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Both the Labor 
Code and the Constitution provide for the right to bargain 
collectively. The code states that collective bargaining may be 
undertaken between management and labor on the initiative of either 
party; however, collective bargaining agreements are rare in practice. 
The Government often is involved in the bargaining process, in part 
because of the large percentage of public employees who are union 
members.
    The Labor Code prohibits discrimination by employers against labor 
organizers, union members, and unions. In the event of antiunion 
activity, unions or their members may file suit against the employer in 
civil court. Labor laws apply uniformly throughout the country; 
however, the Government's enforcement of labor laws and regulations is 
hampered by a lack of staff and financial resources. Approximately 35 
inspectors from the Ministry of Labor visit industrial work sites with 
some regularity, but most often only those located near the capital.
    There are many EPZ's which are, in practice, firms operating under 
special import and export rules. Such firms are required to follow all 
pertinent labor laws and regulations, including minimum wage laws; 
however, the Government allegedly does not enforce its labor laws 
adequately in EPZ's due to inadequate resources.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code 
explicitly prohibits forced labor, and generally it is not known to 
occur; however, there were instances of prisoners being illegally 
``hired out'' by prison officials to private enterprise. There also 
apparently has been systematic use of detainees and prisoners as 
personal servants by a substantial number of magistrates, judiciary 
officials, and local government figures. Some prison officials or 
judicial authorities have falsified records to ensure a supply of 
unpaid labor for themselves or other government officials. The 
Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and it does 
not occur in practice.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code defines a child as any person under the age 
of 18 years. The legal minimum age of employment is 15 years, and work 
by individuals under the age of 18 is prohibited at sites where there 
is apparent and imminent danger to health, safety, or morals. Night 
work also is forbidden for individuals below age 18. The Government 
enforces child labor laws in the small formal economic sector through 
inspectors of the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Laws; 
however, because inspectors only cover wage earners, the enforcement of 
child labor laws in the informal sector is pursued through the courts. 
Nevertheless, child labor continued to be a pervasive problem: nearly 
one in three children age 7 to 14 works. In the large agricultural 
sector, young children work with parents on family farms at much 
younger ages. In urban areas, many children work as petty traders, 
casual transport workers, and beggars.
    The Government has participated in an international program with 
the ILO to eliminate child labor since 1997. For example, in May over 
20 labor inspectors representing all 6 provinces received training 
regarding the worst forms of child labor.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and it does not 
occur in practice (see Section 6.c.).
    The age of sexual consent is 14, and although the law does not 
criminalize prostitution, it forbids ``inciting to debauchery'' of 
anyone under the age of 21 (see Section 5). The Labor Ministry in 
conjunction with the ILO conducted a national survey of child 
prostitution and trafficking that was ongoing at year's end (see 
Section 6.f).
    Education is compulsory to the age of 14. While approximately 65 
percent of primary-school-age children apparently are enrolled, only 29 
percent of working children attend school (see Section 5).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code and implementing 
legislation prescribe working conditions and wages, which are enforced 
by the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Laws. The law makes 
separate provisions for agricultural and nonagricultural labor.
    The Government sets the minimum wage of approximately $24 (FMG 
160,156) per month for the nonagricultural private sector. This wage 
does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family 
and must be supplemented by subsistence agriculture, petty trade, 
support from relatives, or employment of other family members. Minimum 
wage rates are not respected always, since high unemployment and 
widespread poverty lead workers to accept wages at lower levels.
    The standard legal workweek in nonagricultural and service 
industries is 40 hours, and 42+ hours in agriculture. At least one 
consecutive 24-hour rest period each workweek is mandated. The Labor 
Code sets rules and standards for worker safety and worksite 
sanitation. An administrative decree forbids women and minors from work 
that could endanger their health, safety or morals (see Section 6.d.). 
Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Laws officials monitor 
labor conditions; however, they usually are able to cover only the 
capital region effectively. If violators do not remedy cited violations 
within the time allowed, they may be sanctioned legally or assessed 
administrative penalties. In some sectors, safety equipment is not used 
due to the expense of protective clothing and other safety devices. 
There have been no published reports on occupational health hazards or 
accident trends. There is no explicit right for workers to leave 
dangerous workplaces without jeopardizing their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking; however, 
in 1999 there were reports that women and girls were trafficked to the 
nearby islands of Reunion and Mauritius for prostitution. No arrests or 
convictions have been made in connection with the trafficking. While 
the Government expressed concern, it lacked the resources to address 
this issue effectively. The Government conducted a survey on child 
trafficking which was ongoing at year's end (see Section 6.d.).
                               __________

                                 MALAWI

    On June 15, 1999 the Republic of Malawi held its second democratic 
presidential and parliamentary elections since independence in 1964. 
Independent observers concluded that the elections were ``free and 
substantially fair;'' however, there was limited opposition access to 
media and problems in registration, and the opposition appealed the 
result to the courts. The six parliamentary by-elections held since 
June 1999 have been marred by violence, allegations of vote fraud, and 
contested results. Constitutional power is shared between a popularly 
elected president and the 193-member National Assembly. In the 1999 
elections, President Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
party was reelected to serve a second 5-year term, defeating Gwanda 
Chakuamba, the joint presidential candidate of the two leading 
opposition parties, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the Alliance 
for Democracy (AFORD). The UDF has 96 seats in the National Assembly; 
the MCP has 61 seats; AFORD has 30 seats; and there are 5 independent 
members in the National Assembly. There is no clear-cut ideological 
difference among the three political parties. The first local 
government elections to select councilors and mayors, as mandated under 
the 1998 Local Government Act, were held on November 21. The ruling UDF 
won over 70 percent of the seats in the elections, which were marked by 
low voter turnout and opposition complaints of voter intimidation and 
lack of media access. The Government respects the constitutional 
provisions for an independent judiciary; however, the judicial system 
is inefficient and lacks resources.
    The National Police, headed by the Inspector General of Police 
under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are responsible for internal 
security. The police occasionally called on the army for support. There 
continued to be credible allegations that the police committed human 
rights abuses.
    The country is very poor, with a narrow economic base characterized 
by a small and highly concentrated industrial sector, low levels of 
foreign and domestic investment, and few mineral resources. Agriculture 
dominates the economy, contributing nearly half of its gross national 
product (GNP), and employing over 80 percent of the labor force. 
Tobacco, tea, and sugar crops together generate over 70 percent of 
export earnings, with tobacco providing the largest share (about 60 
percent). There is little industry and mining, and no known 
economically viable deposits of gemstones, precious metals, or oil. The 
country is landlocked, but improved rail service to the Mozambican 
deepwater port of Nacala, subsequent to the December 1999 privatization 
of Malawi Railways, is expected to lower significantly the share of 
transport costs in the country's import bill. The Government continues 
to move forward with its multisector privatization program, and 
endorses private sector participation in infrastructure. Wealth remains 
concentrated in the hands of a small elite. Annual per capita income is 
approximately $200. Average annual inflation was 44.9 percent in 1999, 
up from 29.7 percent in 1998.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
in many areas; however, its record in other areas was poor, and serious 
problems remained. There were extrajudicial killings, including deaths 
of detainees while in, or shortly after release from, police custody. 
The police are known to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and to use 
excessive force in handling criminal suspects. Prison conditions 
remained harsh and life-threatening and resulted in a large number of 
deaths. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common, and lengthy pretrial 
detention is a serious problem. An inefficient and understaffed 
judicial system and limited resources called into question the ability 
of defendants to receive a timely, and in many cases, fair trial. 
Security forces at times infringed on citizens'' privacy rights. The 
print media are able to report freely; however, there were a few 
exceptions, and there was some self-censorship. The seven private radio 
stations experienced relative freedom in broadcasting international 
news and entertainment programming; however, the Government continued 
to control news coverage and editorial content at the Malawi 
Broadcasting Corporation's two radio stations. At times police used 
force against demonstrators. Violence against women is common. Women 
continued to experience severe societal discrimination. The Government 
took steps in its economic development programs to assist disadvantaged 
women. Abuse of children remained a problem. Child labor, including 
instances of forced child labor, also is a problem. Mob violence 
triggered by anger over high levels of common crime resulted in mob 
executions of alleged criminals.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however there were extrajudicial 
killings, including deaths of detainees while in, or shortly after 
release from, police custody. These deaths involved possible use of 
excessive force or possible negligence. There was at least one credible 
report that prison officials beat a prisoner to death. Both the 
Inspectorate of Prisons and the Office of the Commissioner of Prisons 
carried out investigations into the killing, though results of the 
investigations were not released by year's end. Seven prison guards 
were charged in the killing and are currently in custody. Inquests into 
deaths while in custody are not held routinely.
    In August 1999, police shot and killed one former Eritrean detainee 
and wounded six others in a confrontation in Lilongwe. No action was 
taken against the police (see Section 2.d.).
    A large number of prisoners died largely due to harsh prison 
conditions (see Section 1.c.).
    Frustrated by inadequate law enforcement and rising crime, angry 
mobs sometimes resorted to vigilante justice in beating, stoning, or 
burning suspected criminals to death. Serial killings during a 3-month 
period during the year brought international attention to the country. 
During the course of the investigations in February and March, police 
detained and held approximately 25 suspects. One of the suspects died 
while in police custody, allegedly due to police abuse. On May 31, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions eventually charged 4 suspects with the 
killings and scheduled 19 suspects for release. Realizing the potential 
for mob justice or independent acts of violence against the released 
suspects, police and prosecutors mounted a public information campaign, 
including town meetings. The 19 suspects were released on June 8 and 
were able to return to their communities without incident. On September 
16, the Director of Public Prosecutions dropped the charges against one 
of the four charged suspects; on October 6, two of the suspects were 
sentenced to death and one was acquitted.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of disappearances.
    c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, police continued to beat and 
otherwise abuse detainees and to use excessive force in handling 
criminal suspects. The Inspectorate of Prisons is an investigative body 
mandated by the Constitution, and the findings of its May report--the 
most recent document of its kind--are considered indicative of prison 
conditions by domestic and international nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's). The report notes that techniques used by police included 
beatings, physical assault, and the use of wire instead of handcuffs to 
restrain prisoners and to force confessions. Police sometimes hide 
these abuses by keeping prisoners in police custody until wounds heal 
before turning them over to the prison system for remand. The 
mistreatment is partly due to the mistaken belief of many police 
officers that the law requires them to present a case (not just 
charges) to the court within 48 hours of arrest. Lack of financial 
resources for appropriate equipment, facilities, and training also 
contributed to mistreatment.
    At Freedom Day celebrations on July 6, police reportedly beat 
demonstrators outside the official venue (see Section 2.a.).
    In May police used force, including tear gas, to disperse 
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.).
    Police continued efforts to improve investigative skills and to 
introduce the concept of victims'' rights though workshops and other 
training exercises, particularly in the areas of sexual abuse and 
domestic violence (see Section 5). While higher ranking officials 
demonstrated familiarity with new standards for the humane treatment of 
prisoners, their subordinates commonly employed unacceptable 
techniques. The Government continued to seek community involvement in 
its comprehensive reform of the police. In 1999 Parliament created a 
community service alternative for some offenders. Four cities have 
begun pilot community service programs.
    Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. 
Overcrowding, inadequate nutrition, substandard sanitation, and poor 
health facilities remained serious problems. There was at least one 
credible report of prison officials beating a prisoner to death (see 
Section 1.a.).
    According to the 2000 Inspectorate of Prisons report, 140 persons 
died in prison between January and December 1998. Most of the deaths 
resulted from disease, including tuberculosis and AIDS. Between January 
and December 1999, a total of 213 prisoners died at Zomba central 
prison alone. Although women are not kept in separate facilities, they 
are segregated within the prison compound and tended by female guards. 
Although four prisons are supposed to have separate facilities for 
juveniles, in practice the separation is inadequate. In the other 
prisons, juveniles are incarcerated with adults.
    The Inspectorate of Prisons, domestic NGO's, and international 
NGO's are permitted to make visits to monitor prison conditions without 
government interference. NGO's report good collaboration with prison 
authorities.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution grants 
the accused the rights to challenge the legality of detention, to have 
access to legal counsel, and to be released on bail or informed of 
charges by a court of law within 48 hours; however, these rights seldom 
are respected in practice. The use of temporary remand warrants is 
widespread and used to circumvent the 48-hour rule. Police often resort 
to beatings to obtain information deemed necessary to their cases. In 
cases where the court determines that a defendant cannot afford to 
supply his own counsel, legal services are provided by the Government. 
With few persons able to afford legal counsel, the country's five 
public defenders were not sufficient to represent all indigent 
detainees in a timely manner. Bail frequently is granted to reduce 
prison overcrowding. Its use often bears only a tenuous relationship to 
the merits of an individual's situation. There are now over 8,000 
inmates, over half of which are awaiting trial. Police are accused of 
arbitrary arrests due to political motives.
    In February and March, police detained approximately 25 suspects in 
connection with a series of murders (see Section 1.a.).
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice; however, the judicial system is inefficient and is 
handicapped by serious weaknesses, including poor record keeping, a 
shortage of attorneys and trained personnel, a heavy caseload, and a 
lack of resources. The Constitution provides for a High Court, a 
Supreme Court of Appeal, and subordinate magistrate courts. The Chief 
Justice is appointed by the President and confirmed by the National 
Assembly. The President appoints other justices, following a 
recommendation by the Judicial Service Commission. All justices are 
appointed until the age of 65 and may be removed only for reasons of 
incompetence or misbehavior, as determined by the President and a 
majority of the Parliament.
    By law defendants have the right to a public trial but not to a 
trial by jury. In murder cases, the High Court nevertheless used juries 
of 12 persons from the defendant's home district. Defendants also are 
entitled to an attorney, the right to present and challenge evidence 
and witnesses, and the right of appeal. However, the judiciary's 
budgetary and administrative problems effectively denied expeditious 
trials for most defendants. On July 14,the Department of Public 
Prosecutions, under the Ministry of Justice, hired 12 paralegals to 
help reduce the case backlog and assist the very small staff of 9 
prosecuting attorneys. The paralegals are to serve as lay prosecutors 
and to prosecute minor cases in the magistrate courts.
    In July 1999, the High Court concluded a training program for 48 
lay magistrates and conducted training for 61 lay magistrates from 
September 1999 through January. Traditional court judges, absorbed into 
the magistrate court system, also receive some training in court 
procedure and the body of law that they administer. In August 1999, the 
High Court began a 2-month refresher-training program for traditional 
court judges.
    In March Parliament passed the Courts Amendment Bill, which was 
aimed at increasing the civil jurisdiction of magistrates, simplifying 
small claims procedures, and giving magistrate courts jurisdiction over 
customary marriages. Although the law was implemented during the year, 
there were no documented effects of the law by year's end.
    Juvenile offenders have special rights under the Constitution, 
including the right to be separated in custody from adults, to be 
treated in a manner that recognizes their age and the possibility for 
rehabilitation, and to be exempt from the punishment of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release. However, the 
protection they are accorded in principle is often denied in practice, 
and many juvenile offenders are incarcerated with adults (see Section 
1.c.).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Government authorities generally respected 
constitutional provisions that protect these rights; however, army and 
police forces, in carrying out sweeps for illegal weapons, did not 
always obtain search warrants as required by law.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respected these rights in practice; however, there were some 
exceptions. Limited self-censorship still exists, in part due to habits 
that evolved during the country's 30-year single party political 
system, which ended in 1994. A broad spectrum of political and 
ideological opinion is presented in the country's two dozen newspapers, 
usually without government interference. However, the Government still 
threatened and harassed members of the media. At Freedom Day 
celebrations on July 6, police confiscated the camera of a photographer 
with an independent weekly and destroyed her film, allegedly for taking 
pictures of police beating demonstrators outside the official venue 
(see Section 1.c.).
    At the beginning of August, the DPP dropped a 1999 case involving 
the arrest and 3-day detention of an editor and senior reporter of the 
opposition weekly Malawi News for ``inciting to mutiny'' and 
``publishing an article prejudicial to public safety.'' On August 3, 
the High Court ruled that the arrest was contrary to constitutional 
press protections.
    The editor of the main opposition newspaper, The Daily Times, was 
suspended in August by the editor-in-chief and subsequently replaced by 
an acting editor more inclined to refrain from publishing articles 
critical of the Government.
    The state-owned Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) dominates the 
radio market with its two stations, transmitting in major population 
centers throughout the country. News coverage and editorial content are 
clearly progovernment. In June four employees of MBC allegedly were 
suspended due to insufficient loyalty to the ruling party (see Section 
4). The Office of the Ombudsman began an investigation of the incident, 
which was ongoing at year's end. The MBC consistently denied opposition 
candidates equal access to the media during the presidential and 
parliamentary election campaigns in violation of the law. In contrast, 
slogans and songs of the ruling UDF party are broadcast throughout the 
year. The Government began limited television broadcasting in March 
with editorial control similar to that on MBC radio.
    There are five private radio stations. One commercial station began 
broadcasting in Blantyre in August 1998. A second commercial station 
began broadcasting in Blantyre in March. There is a rural community 
radio station run by local women with the help of the Malawi Media 
Women's Association (MAMWA). A religious station broadcasts in the 
capital and its environs.
    In May 1999, the Government established the Malawi Communication 
Regulatory Authority (MACRA), an independent regulatory body, to issue 
broadcasting licenses for radio, television, and Internet service 
providers. The Government split the state-owned Malawi Posts and 
Telecommunication Corporation (MPTC) into the Malawi Posts Corporation 
(MPC) and the Malawi Telecommunications Limited (MTL) in preparation 
for the privatization of MTL. There are two cellular telephone service 
providers and seven Internet service providers. Between February and 
October, MACRA issued licenses to an additional nine providers that had 
not yet begun operations by year's end.
    There were no restrictions on academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice; however, there were instances in which police 
limited this right.
    Authorities routinely granted official permits, which are required 
by law for large meetings. However, in May, police used force to 
disperse a peaceful demonstration, firing tear gas into an unarmed 
crowd that had gathered to protest the World Bank sponsored 
consultative group meetings in Lilongwe. At Freedom Day celebrations on 
July 6, police reportedly beat demonstrators outside the official venue 
(see Section 2.a.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. The Government requires 
organizations, including political parties, to register with the 
Registrar General in the Ministry of Justice. There were no reports of 
groups being denied registration during the year.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Religious 
groups must register with the Government. There were no reports that 
the Government refused to register any religious group.
    Some opposition politicians and clerics have raised Islam as a 
political issue. Citing the President's adherence to Islam, his contact 
with Islamic countries such as Libya and Sudan, and the building of new 
mosques, some opposition politicians and clerics have accused the 
ruling party of attempting to ``Islamicize'' the country. An attempt by 
the Government early in the year to replace ``bible knowledge'' in the 
school curriculum with the more universal ``moral and religious 
education'' course has met with widespread criticism from Christian 
leaders. When the President suspended the introduction of the new 
curriculum and returned ``bible knowledge'' to the curriculum, Muslim 
leaders rebuked him.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have freedom of movement and 
residence within the country, and the right to leave and return.
    The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1961 Protocol; however, there are long delays in the 
process. The Government cooperated with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in providing protection and 
assistance to refugees. According to the UNHCR, the country hosted over 
3,600 refugees, primarily from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
the Great Lakes region, at the country's refugee center in Dowa. The 
majority of refugees reside at the Dzaleka camp, and the UNHCR 
estimates that between 300 and 400 new refugees arrived each month. 
Although the Government grants refugee status, the law does not accept 
refugees for permanent resettlement and does not permit them to work or 
study. While no legal framework exists, the Government has allowed 
refugees to seek both employment and educational opportunities. UNHCR, 
NGO's, and the Government collaborated to provide children in refugee 
camps with access to education. A new school was being constructed at 
the Dowa refugee camp at year's end.
    Asylum applicants are granted hearings to make their case for 
asylum status. The Government denied asylum to many of the Rwandans and 
Congolese who either had requested asylum in another country or had the 
opportunity to do so.
    In August 1999, the Government denied the UNHCR access to a group 
of 25 Eritrean detainees with fraudulent visas. Police killed one 
detainee and forcibly returned the remaining detainees to Ethiopia (see 
Section 1.a.).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens are able to exercise their constitutional right to vote in 
periodic elections. There is universal suffrage for citizens 18 years 
of age and older. International election observers found the June 1999 
presidential and parliamentary elections to be free and substantially 
fair; however, the electoral process was flawed, as opposition access 
to the broadcast media was limited; there were registration problems in 
some areas of the country; and the Electoral Commission at times 
displayed bias in favor of the ruling party. The opposition appealed 
the outcome of the presidential vote, and on May 19, the High Court 
ruled in favor of the President. In October the Supreme Court of Appeal 
upheld the High Court ruling in favor of the President (see Section 
2.a.).
    President Muluzi, First Vice President Justin Malewezi, and a 34-
member cabinet exercise executive authority. The second vice-presidency 
remains vacant. The executive exerts considerable influence over the 
legislature; the legislature follows the parliamentary system, and 
consequently a number of cabinet ministers also sit as Members of 
Parliament (M.P.'s). Although the Government and opposition have never 
reached agreement on the applicability of the 1997 High Court ruling 
that cabinet ministers cannot simultaneously sit as M.P.'s, the issue 
currently is not a topic of debate.
    Local government elections were held on November 21 and were 
conducted in an open and transparent manner according to local and 
international observers; however, they were marked by low voter 
turnout, allegations of voter and candidate intimidation, and unequal 
access to the media. The ruling UDF won over 70 percent of the seats; 
opposition parties and some NGO's criticized the Government for 
manipulating the process.
    Although the Government does not prevent the operation of 
opposition political parties, the parties continue to allege that the 
Government uses bribery and other inducements to encourage opposition 
party divisions and defections of key personnel to the ruling party.
    There are no laws that restrict the participation of women or 
minorities in the political process; however, there are very few women 
in prominent government positions, and women are underrepresented in 
politics and in positions of authority in general. Four of the 34 
cabinet members are women; women hold 17 of the 193 seats in the 
National Assembly. A citizen of European origin and several of Asian 
descent are sitting members of the National Assembly.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups 
operated without government restriction, training civic educators, 
advocating changes to existing laws and cultural practices, and 
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. 
Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their 
views.
    The Ombudsman is mandated by the Constitution to investigate and 
take legal action against government officials responsible for human 
rights violations and other abuses. The Ombudsman's freedom of action 
is circumscribed by legislation that requires a warrant and a 3-day 
waiting period to gain access to certain government records. The 
activities of the Ombudsman are subject to judicial review, and in a 
June case involving MBC employees allegedly dismissed on political 
grounds (see Section 2.a.), the Supreme Court upheld a constitutional 
provision that granted the Ombudsman discretionary authority to 
investigate any and all cases where it is alleged that a person has 
suffered injustices, except when there is a judicial remedy available 
(see Section 2.a.).
    The Constitution provides for a National Compensation Tribunal 
(NCT) to adjudicate claims of criminal and civil liability against the 
former government. As of September, the NCT had registered over 13,000 
claims, of which 4,200 have been awarded interim compensation payments. 
The NCT's lack of funds limits its ability to settle claims. The 
constitutionally mandated Human Rights Commission (HRC) is charged to 
monitor, audit, and promote human rights provided for under the 
Constitution, and to carry out investigations regarding violations of 
any human rights. The Human Rights Commissioners have met more than 10 
times since February 1999. Despite limited resources, in February the 
HRC produced and published its first annual report; the report focused 
primarily on institution-building concerns and the 1999 elections but 
did not address human rights problems. The HRC also has demonstrated 
its independence from the Government. For example, in August the HRC 
released a statement criticizing a presidential decree to round up 
commercial sex workers, describing the decree as unconstitutional and 
gender biased in its targeting of women.
    In December the international human rights organization, Article 
19, released a report that claimed that President Muluzi, senior 
government officials, and UDF leaders refused to support investigations 
or the creation of a proposed independent commission of inquiry into 
human rights abuses during the Banda regime because they feared that 
they would be implicated.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution specifically provides for equal rights for women; 
forbids discrimination based on language, culture, or religion; and 
generally provides for equality and recognition before the law for 
every citizen; however, in practice the capacity of government 
institutions to assure equal rights for all citizens is limited.
    Women.--Spousal abuse, especially wife beating, is common. Society 
has begun to take the problem of violence against women seriously. The 
press published frequent accounts of rape and abuse, and the judiciary 
continued to impose heavier penalties on those convicted of rape. 
However, domestic violence seldom is discussed openly by women, 
reportedly even among themselves, and in part due to the lack of 
resources. There are no confidential shelters or facilities for 
treatment of women who suffer physical or sexual abuse. Police do not 
normally intervene in domestic disputes.
    Under the Constitution, women have the right to full and equal 
protection by law and may not be discriminated against on the basis of 
sex or marital status; however, in practice discrimination against 
women is pervasive, and women do not have opportunities equal to those 
available to men. Women have significantly lower levels of literacy, 
education, formal and nontraditional employment opportunities, and 
access to resources to increase agricultural productivity.
    Women, especially in rural areas, historically have been unable to 
complete even a primary education, and are therefore at a serious 
disadvantage in finding employment. Accepted economic and social 
practice hampers the ability of women and girls to gain an education. 
The literacy rate among women between the ages of 15 and 45 is less 
than 37 percent. Male literacy in the same age group is about 45 
percent.
    Women often have less access to legal and financial assistance, and 
wives are often victims of discriminatory inheritance practices in 
which the majority of the estate is taken unlawfully by the deceased 
husband's family. Women are usually at a disadvantage in marriage, 
family, and property rights, but they have begun to speak out against 
abuse and discrimination. Households headed by women are represented 
disproportionately in the lowest quarter of income distribution. In a 
country where 85 percent of the population is rural, the majority of 
farmers are women; 70 percent of the rural female population farm full 
time. Typically, women work more hours than men to complete the same 
farm tasks because they rarely have comparable tools and equipment and 
remain responsible for all household tasks. Women have limited access 
to agricultural extension services, training, and credit. Some progress 
has been made in all of these areas with gender training for 
agricultural extension workers and the gradual introduction of rural 
credit programs for women. The participation of women in the limited 
formal labor market is particularly constrained; they constitute less 
than 5 percent of managerial and administrative staff.
    The Law Commission has undertaken a review of legislation that 
discriminates against women and has proposed legislation to bring the 
law into compliance with new constitutional standards. Based on the Law 
Commission's recommendations, in 1997 Parliament passed an affiliation 
bill that raised the minimum level of child support. In 1998 Parliament 
passed a wills and inheritance bill that increased widows' rights, and 
in June Parliament debated and passed the Employment Act, which 
includes a provision granting women the right to maternity leave. These 
laws were in effect during the year; however, only individuals who 
utilized the formal legal system benefited from these legal 
protections.
    On May 5, women joined the army for the first time in noncombat 
positions as a result of a 1994 revision in the government directive 
that previously had prohibited women from military service. The Law 
Commission conducted a review and proposed changes in the Army Act to 
the Cabinet during the year that allow for the recruitment and 
deployment of women in the armed services. The Government is studying 
the possibility of allowing women to serve in combat roles.
    The Government addresses women's concerns through the Ministry of 
Gender, Youth, and Community Services.
    Children.--The Constitution provides for equal treatment of 
children under the law, and the Government greatly increased spending 
on children's health and welfare. The Government established free 
primary education for all children in 1994, although education is not 
compulsory. Girls drop out of school more frequently than boys do, and 
in the final year of primary school, only about 25 percent of students 
are girls. Despite recent significant gains in girls' access to 
education, large gaps remain between girls' and boys' achievement 
levels. However, there have been signs of improvement in education for 
girls. In 1999, the last year for which data is available, girls 
entered primary school in the same proportion as boys, although only 39 
percent of secondary school entrants were female.
    Well over half of the country's children live in poverty, mostly in 
rural areas. Children in rural households headed by women are among the 
poorest. A few charitable organizations attempted to reduce the number 
of child beggars in urban areas and find alternative care for them. The 
problem of street children worsened as the number of orphans whose 
parents died from HIV/AIDS increased. A total of 9.2 percent of 
children under age 15 were estimated to be orphans (426,421) and 61.4 
percent of those (251,822) were orphaned due to AIDS. AIDS is expected 
to result in an estimated 364,450 orphans, or 72.9 percent of all 
orphans in the country by 2005. Such children and other orphans 
normally are cared for by extended family members.
    Only a third of children have easy access to safe drinking water. 
Infant mortality is high. Child malnutrition is a serious problem.
    Child labor, including instances of forced child labor, is a 
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    There are societal patterns of abuse of children. There is 
anecdotal evidence that a few small ethnic groups practice female 
genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by international 
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health. 
The Government took no action against FGM during the year. The media 
also have begun to report on the sexual abuse of children, especially 
in relation to traditional practices of initiation. While rites to 
initiate girls into their future adult roles are still secret, 
information suggests that abusive practices are widespread and quite 
damaging. Although the age of sexual consent is 14, there is no age 
specified for the protection of minors from sexual exploitation, child 
prostitution or child pornography. The belief that children are 
unlikely to be HIV positive and the widespread belief that sexual 
intercourse with virgins can cleanse an individual of sexually-
transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS contributes to the sexual 
abuse of minors.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government has not mandated 
accessibility to buildings and services for the disabled, but one of 
the national goals in the Constitution is to support the disabled 
through greater access to public places, fair opportunities in 
employment, and full participation in all spheres of society. There are 
both public and privately supported schools and training centers, which 
assist individuals with disabilities. There are also several self-
supporting businesses run by and for persons with disabilities. In 
December 1998, President Muluzi established a new cabinet-level 
position, the Minister of State Responsible for Persons with 
Disabilities, which currently is held by a disabled person.
    Religious Minorities.--There are generally amicable relations 
between the various religious communities; however, in an isolated 
incident in April, Muslims and Christians clashed over the efforts of 
an evangelical preacher to promote an audiotape comparing the Bible and 
the Koran. Muslims find the tape provocative and blasphemous, and the 
issue remains an open point of contention between followers of the two 
religions.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens of African heritage 
are members of indigenous tribes and are not discriminated against by 
the Government or society. There is no legal discrimination against 
citizens of Asian heritage, although societal tensions exist between 
the communities of African and Asian origin.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1996 Labor Relations Act (LRA) 
governs labor-management relations. Workers have the legal right to 
form and join trade unions; however, union membership is low due to the 
small percentage of the work force in the formal sector (about 12 
percent), the lack of awareness of worker rights and benefits, and a 
resistance on the part of many employees to joining unions. Only 13 
percent of persons employed in the formal sector belong to unions. 
Accurate statistics on the numbers of union members are not available. 
Trade union rights have existed for only 7 years, and labor relations 
are still evolving. Employers, labor unions, and the Government lack 
sufficient knowledge of their legitimate roles in labor relations/
disputes.
    Unions must register with the Registrar of Trade Unions and 
Employers' Organizations in the Ministry of Labor and Vocational 
Training (MOLVT). As of September, 22 unions were registered. Army 
personnel and police may not belong to trade unions, but other civil 
servants are allowed to form unions. There are no unusually difficult 
registration procedures. Unions are independent of the Government, 
parties, and other political forces.
    There are no restrictions on the number of union federations. There 
are two federations in the country: the Malawi Congress of Trade Unions 
(MCTU), with 19 affiliates, and the Congress of Malawi Trade Unions 
(COMATU), with 3 affiliates.
    The LRA allows members of a registered union to strike only after 
all dispute settlement procedures established in a collective agreement 
and conciliation procedures have failed. The law requires a notice in 
writing to the employer and the MOLVT at least 7 days before a strike. 
The law also forbids the temporary replacement of labor, and allows 
peaceful picketing during strikes. However, members of a registered 
union in ``essential services'' do not have the right to strike. 
Essential services are specified as services whose interruption would 
endanger the life, health, or personal safety of the whole or part of 
the population; they are determined by the Industrial Relations Court 
upon application by the Minister of Labor. The law provides similar 
procedures for lockouts. Laws do not specifically prohibit retaliation 
against strikers. There is no prohibition on actions against unions 
that are not registered legally. Arbitration rulings are legally 
enforceable.
    Unions may form or join federations and have the right to affiliate 
with and participate in international workers' organizations, with the 
permission of the Government.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. The LRA requires that at 
least 20 percent of employees (excluding senior managerial staff) 
belong to a union before such a union can engage in collective 
bargaining at the enterprise level. The LRA requires at least 15 
percent union membership for collective bargaining at the sector level. 
The law provides for the establishment of industrial councils in the 
absence of collective agreements for sector-level bargaining. 
Industrial council functions include wage negotiation, dispute 
resolution, and industry-specific labor policy development. Collective 
agreements are binding legally, and both parties must deposit them with 
the Registrar of Trade Unions.
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers and 
requires that employers reinstate workers dismissed because of union 
activities.
    Parliament approved legislation to establish export-processing 
zones (EPZ's) in 1995. At year's end, 25 firms held licenses to operate 
under EPZ status, and all were operational. The full range of labor 
regulations applies to the EPZ's.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor, and such labor generally is not used; however, 
there are allegations that some large agricultural estates engage in 
the practice.
    The law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by 
children; however, at least one local NGO has reported that in urban 
areas it is not uncommon to find young girls working as domestic 
servants, receiving little or no wages, and existing in a state of 
indentured servitude.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution defines children as persons under 16 
years of age. It prohibits the employment of children in work that is 
hazardous, harmful, or interferes with their education. Significant 
child labor in agricultural work and domestic service occurs largely as 
a result of extreme poverty and long-standing cultural traditions. 
Primary education is free and universal, but not compulsory. Budgetary 
constraints largely preclude minimum work age and child labor law 
enforcement by police and MOLVT inspectors. There is significant child 
labor on tobacco and tea farms, subsistence farms, and in domestic 
service. There is no special legal restriction on children's work 
hours.
    In October the Ministry of Labor began a 12-month International 
Labor Organization (ILO) funded study to establish the magnitude of 
child labor and to use the results as a basis for drafting an action 
plan to implement ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor.
    The law does not prohibit forced and bonded labor by children 
specifically, and there was at least one report that it occurs (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The MOLVT sets separate urban 
and rural minimum wage rates based on recommendations of the Tripartite 
Wage Advisory Board (TWAB) composed of representatives of labor, 
government, and the private sector. However, the TWAB has encountered 
problems due to inefficient organizational structure and inadequate 
funding, which hindered timely and accurate revision of the wage rate 
recommendations. The urban minimum wage amounts to about $0.69 (MK 55) 
per day; in all other areas it is roughly $0.51 (MK40.70) per day. 
Although minimum wage rates were raised on December 1, they remain 
insufficient to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of 
living. Wage earners tend to supplement their incomes through farming 
activities. The MOLVT lacks the resources to enforce the minimum wage 
effectively. However, the minimum wage largely is irrelevant for the 
great majority of citizens, who earn their livelihood outside the 
formal wage sector.
    The maximum legal workweek is 48 hours, with a mandatory weekly 24-
hour rest period. The laws require payment for overtime work and 
prohibit compulsory overtime. In practice employers frequently violate 
statutory time restrictions.
    The law protects foreign workers in correct legal status. Illegal 
foreign workers are subject to deportation.
    In 1998 the Government issued a revised ``policy statement and new 
guidelines'' for the issuance and renewal of employment permits (the 
temporary employment permit or ``TEP'') for foreigners that underscored 
its desire to make such permits readily available to foreigners. The 
guidelines state that investors may employ foreign personnel in areas 
where there is a shortage of ``suitable and qualified'' citizens. The 
guidelines also mandated that processing times for TEP applications 
shall not exceed 40 working days. There were no reports of complaints 
concerning TEP's during the year.
    Mechanisms for protecting internationally recognized worker rights 
are weak. There are serious manpower shortages at the Ministry of 
Labor; as a result, there are almost no labor standards inspections.
    The Workers' Compensation Act includes extensive occupational 
health and safety standards. Enforcement of these standards by the 
MOLVT is erratic. Workers--particularly in industrial Jobs--often work 
without basic safety clothing and equipment. Workers dismissed for 
filing complaints about workplace conditions have the right to file a 
complaint at the labor office or sue the employer for wrongful 
dismissal. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous 
work situations without jeopardy to continued employment. However, 
given the low level of education of most workers and the high level of 
unemployment, they are unlikely to exercise this right.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country during the year.
                               __________

                                  MALI

    Mali is a constitutional democracy, which continued to implement a 
decentralized form of government. President Alpha Oumar Konare was 
reelected to a second 5-year term in 1997. A collective of 12 
opposition parties boycotted the 1997 presidential and legislative 
elections, which were administratively flawed but considered generally 
free and without evident fraud. The opposition parties claimed that the 
elections were unconstitutional because the Government failed to carry 
out annual updates of electoral lists; however, some opposition 
candidates chose to participate by running as independents. The ruling 
Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), led by President Konare, 
dominates the National Assembly, which includes representatives of 
opposition and ADEMA-aligned parties. In August the National Assembly 
approved changes to the Constitution and approved changes to the 
electoral law. The process of amending the Constitution, the electoral 
law, and other texts began during a National Political Forum in January 
that involved political parties, civil society, and the Government. The 
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in 
practice the Government continues to exert influence on the judiciary.
    Security forces are composed of the army, air force, Gendarmerie, 
the National Guard, and the police. The army and air force are under 
the control of the civilian Minister of the Armed Forces and Veterans, 
as are the Gendarmerie and the National Guard. The police are under the 
Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. The police and gendarmes 
share responsibility for internal security; the police are in charge of 
urban areas only. The Government completed the process of integrating 
elements of former Tuareg rebel forces into its armed forces in 1999.
    Mali is a very poor country with a market-based economy. Most of 
the work force is employed in the agricultural sector, particularly 
farming and animal husbandry. The country's principal exports are 
cotton, livestock, and gold. There is a very small industrial sector, 
largely based on the manufacture of textiles, beverages, and processed 
food products. The gross national product is approximately $255 per 
capita, which provides most of the population with a low standard of 
living. The economy depends heavily upon foreign assistance. 
Desertification, deforestation, soil degradation, and social 
limitations, including a current estimated literacy rate of 
approximately 30 percent (48 percent for men and 12 percent for women) 
and a high population growth rate (2.8 percent), contribute to poverty. 
Poor infrastructure, minimal foreign investment, administrative 
inefficiency, and corruption are also important factors in limiting 
economic growth.
    The Government generally respected its citizens'' human rights; 
however, problems remained in several areas. Security forces reportedly 
tortured and killed two suspects in custody. The Government did not 
release the results of an investigation into the incident by year's 
end. Prison conditions remained poor. Prolonged pretrial detention is 
sometimes a problem. The judicial system's large case backlog resulted 
in long periods of pretrial detention and lengthy delays in trials. The 
judiciary continued to be subject to executive influence, and there 
were reports of corruption in the courts. Domestic violence against 
women was widespread. Discrimination against women persisted, and 
social and cultural factors continued to limit sharply economic and 
educational opportunities for most women. Female genital mutilation 
(FGM) is widespread, although educational campaigns against FGM are 
underway. Child labor is frequent in agriculture and domestic areas. 
Children were trafficked into forced labor in Cote d'Ivoire; the 
Government returned a number of these children to their families during 
the year. Hereditary servitude relationships continued to link 
different ethnic groups.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by security forces during the year; 
however, there was a report that security forces committed 
extrajudicial killings. Following the February murder of 3 tourists in 
Kidal, the Government questioned at least 40 persons and detained 9 in 
connection with the murders. Three suspects reportedly died while being 
transported to jail; there were reports that soldiers tortured and 
killed two of the suspects (see Section 1.c.). Three other suspects 
remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.). The Government 
initiated an investigation into the incident, but it had not released 
the results by year's end; no action had been taken against the 
soldiers.
    Individuals accused of seeking to disrupt the June 1998 elections 
in Segou by throwing a grenade into the courtyard of the regional 
representative of the electoral commission were released from prison in 
1999. During that 1998 attack, a deputy chief commissioner's daughter 
was killed and several other persons were wounded. On October 12, 1999, 
the detainees were released provisionally to await arraignment and 
trial; during the year, the case was dismissed.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there 
were reports that soldiers tortured and killed two suspects arrested in 
connection with the February murder of three tourists (see Section 
1.a.).
    Some police and gendarmes extorted bribes at vehicle checkpoints 
(see Section 2.d.).
    Prison conditions are poor. Prisons continued to be overcrowded, 
medical facilities were inadequate, and food supplies were limited. In 
Bamako juvenile offenders usually are held in the same prison as adult 
offenders, but they are kept in separate cells. Women are housed in the 
same prison facility as men, but they live in a separate compound. In 
regional prisons outside the capital, men and women are housed in the 
same building but in separate cells. In these facilities, children 
share cells with adult prisoners of the same sex; however, there were 
no reports that women or juveniles were abused by other inmates or by 
guards. The Judiciary Forum meeting of civil society representatives 
held in 1999 concluded that prison conditions remained poor; however, 
the 1999 Democracy Forum noted that the Government had taken some steps 
to improve the conditions for detainees, including opening separate 
facilities for the reeducation of young offenders and training programs 
for guards on the rights of detainees. The Democracy Forum again 
discussed prison conditions at its December 10 meeting, although not in 
extensive detail. It noted improvements in medical attention and food 
quality.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. 
Several organizations, including the Malian Association of Human 
Rights, the Malian Association of Women Jurists, and other 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) have visited prisoners and are 
working with women and juvenile prisoners to improve their conditions. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to visit 
imprisoned leading members of the former government.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and, in general, the 
Government does not employ them. However, in February authorities 
questioned at least 40 persons and arrested 9 suspects in connection 
with the murder of 3 tourists. According to unconfirmed reports, 
soldiers tortured and killed two of the suspects (see Section 1.a.); 
three of the suspects remained in detention. The Government issued 
warrants for murder, but the investigation continued at year's end.
    The Constitution provides that suspects must be charged or released 
within 48 hours and that they are entitled to counsel; however, in 
practice detainees are not always charged within the 48-hour period. 
Moreover, administrative backlogs and insufficient lawyers, judges, and 
courts often caused lengthy delays in bringing persons to trial. In 
extreme cases, individuals have remained in prison for several years 
before coming to trial.
    Judicial warrants are required for arrest. Local lawyers have 
estimated that about half of prison inmates are pretrial detainees. 
This judgment was confirmed in March 1999 during the Judiciary Forum 
seminar. Limited rights of bail or the granting of conditional liberty 
exist, particularly for minor crimes and civil matters. On occasion the 
authorities released defendants on their own recognizance.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the executive branch continues to exert 
influence over the judicial system. The Ministry of Justice appoints 
and has the power to suspend judges; it supervises both law enforcement 
and judicial functions. The President heads the Superior Judicial 
Council, which oversees judicial activity. Domestic human rights groups 
alleged that there were instances of bribery and influence peddling in 
the courts. The Government launched a campaign against corruption early 
in the year that led to the detention of many government senior civil 
servants, businessmen, and political leaders from all parties. At 
year's end, they still were detained and under investigation.
    The Supreme Court has both judicial and administrative powers. The 
Constitution established a separate Constitutional Court that oversees 
issues of constitutionality and acts as an election arbiter. The 
Constitution also provides for the convening of a High Court of Justice 
with the power to try senior government officials in cases of treason.
    Except in the case of minors, trials are public, and defendants 
have the right to be present and have an attorney of their choice. 
Defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to confront 
witnesses and to appeal decisions to the Supreme Court. Court-appointed 
attorneys are provided for the indigent without charge. The village 
chief in consultation with the elders decides the majority of disputes 
in rural areas. If these decisions are challenged in court, only those 
found to have legal merit are upheld.
    In 1997 former President Traore, his wife Mariam, and former 
customs commissioner Douah Abraham Sissoko, who were placed under 
detention following the fall of the Traore regime in 1991, were charged 
with ``economic crimes,'' including ``abuse of a position of power'' 
and ``illicit enrichment.'' They had been convicted and sentenced to 
death in 1993, but President Konare commuted their sentences to prison 
terms in December 1997. The trial in their cases and similar cases 
involving five other senior officials of the Traore regime began in 
October 1998. Traore, his wife Mariam, and Sissoko were convicted and 
sentenced to death in January 1999; these sentences also were commuted 
in 1999, and they are serving life sentences. In August Traore and his 
wife were released in order to travel to Algiers for medical treatment; 
they returned after they received treatment, and they remained in 
prison at year's end. Imprisoned former government leaders also receive 
nondiscriminatory medical treatment.
    There were no other reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the 
home, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
Police searches are infrequent and require judicial warrants. However, 
security forces maintain physical and technical surveillance of 
individuals and groups believed to be threats to internal security, 
including surveillance of telephone and written correspondence of 
individuals deemed by a magistrate to be a threat to national security. 
There were no reports of such government surveillance during the year.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respected these rights in practice.
    The Superior Council of Communication (CSC) was installed 
officially in 1994, although it was created in 1992. The CSC's primary 
function is to regulate the media, both protecting and controlling 
journalists. The Committee of Equal Access to State Media is activated 
during election campaigns. Mandated by the Constitution, it oversees 
equal access to the government- controlled media for all political 
parties.
    There are more than 100 private newspapers and journals in French, 
Arabic, and local languages throughout the country, and there are as 
many as 30 newspapers in Bamako. There are seven daily newspapers: six 
are privately owned, of which one, Les Echoes, is allied with the 
ruling party, and one is government controlled (L'Essor). All 
newspapers must be registered with the Ministry of Communications; 
however, registration not complicated and can be completed quickly.
    The Government controls the only television station and 1 of more 
than 100 radio stations; however, all present a wide range of views, 
including those critical of the Government, the President, the Prime 
Minister, and other politicians. The relative expense of newspapers and 
television, coupled with a low literacy rate, makes radio the most 
prevalent medium of mass information and communication. There are as 
many as 15 private radio stations in Bamako, and there are 
approximately 115 additional stations throughout the country. As well 
as commercial radio stations, private radio broadcasters include those 
run by associations and others directed toward smaller villages (the 
latter two radio services enjoy special tax advantages).
    A number of foreign broadcasters operated in Bamako either through 
local media or a chosen affiliate. These included Radio France 
International, African No. 1, the British Broadcasting Corporation, 
Voice of America, and Radio Netherlands; all have FM frequencies.
    There are no private television stations that broadcast 
domestically produced programs. The legal framework for private 
television has been in place since 1992; however, the Government still 
is developing the fee schedules. The Government made no progress toward 
private television licensing during the year.
    The Government does not censor print, broadcast, or electronic 
media, which frequently offer editorials critical of both the 
Government and the opposition. Laws passed in 1993 regulate the press 
and provide for substantial criminal penalties, including imprisonment, 
for libel and for public injury to the Head of State, other officials, 
and foreign diplomats; these laws leave injury undefined and subject to 
judicial interpretation. However, the Government never has prosecuted 
journalists on criminal libel charges. No journalists were arrested on 
libel charges during the year. In August the National Assembly approved 
a proposal to eliminate imprisonment as a punishment for libel charges; 
however, at year's end, the proposal had not been implemented as law.
    Domestic reception and distribution of foreign satellite and cable 
television is permitted and fairly widespread, especially in Bamako. 
Eight domestic servers provide access to the Internet. Licenses to 
operate Internet servers are granted freely and are not prohibitively 
expensive.
    The Government generally respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice; however, there were a few exceptions. The law 
requires groups that wish to hold public meetings to obtain the mayor's 
permission; however, such permission was granted routinely during the 
year.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
The law allows for religious practices that do not pose a threat to 
social stability and peace. The Constitution declares the country a 
secular state.
    The Government requires that all public associations, including 
religious associations, register with the Government. However, 
registration confers no tax preference and no other legal benefits, and 
failure to register is not penalized in practice. The registration 
process is routine and is not burdensome. Traditional indigenous 
religions are not required to register.
    The Minister of Territorial Administration and Security can 
prohibit religious publications that he concludes defame another 
religion; however, there were no reports of instances in which 
publications were prohibited.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. The 
Government generally does not restrict internal movement and does not 
restrict international travel; however, police routinely stop and check 
both citizens and foreigners to restrict the movement of contraband and 
to verify vehicle registrations. Some police and gendarmes use the 
occasion to extort bribes.
    A 1998 law conforms to the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. As a follow-
up to this law, in December 1998 the Government created a national 
committee in charge of refugees. The committee began operations in 
January 1999 with institutional assistance from the office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Government cooperates with 
the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. 
The Government provides first asylum for refugees.
    According to both UNHCR and government estimates, there were 
approximately 11,000 Mauritanians refugees, mostly Fulani herders, 
living in the Kayes region of western Mali at year's end. However, the 
UNHCR, Mauritania, and Mali never have agreed on recognition of the 
refugee status of these persons, who have lived in the country for 
nearly a decade; members of these pastoralist border groups 
historically make cross-border migrations. Throughout 1998 the UNHCR 
provided some limited material assistance and incentives to 
pastoralists of Mauritanian origin to return to Mauritania. In June 
1999, the UNHCR completed its assistance to such persons, which 
consisted of community support at their living sites as opposed to 
repatriation assistance. Mauritanians may register for refugee status, 
although few actually do.
    The country hosted approximately 1,900 urban refugees as of 
November 1999; four-fifths are from Sierra Leone and 90 percent are in 
Bamako. The Government opened a transit center in 1998 located 120 
miles from Bamako, where it hosts approximately 100 of the most 
vulnerable refugee and asylum applicants. The center has a capacity of 
approximately 300 persons that could be expanded to hold 900.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government and do so 
through periodic elections. In 1997 citizens elected President Alpha 
Oumar Konare to a second 5-year term by secret ballot in elections that 
were open to all and free of evident fraud and manipulation. Konare won 
96 percent of the vote, but voter turnout was reportedly 20 to 25 
percent; most opposition parties boycotted the election, citing flaws 
in the voter registration system. The opposition continued to contend 
that the Government failed to carry out constitutionally mandated 
annual electoral list revisions and that, therefore, the elections 
should be declared invalid; however, the issue was not pursued during 
the year.
    All political parties agreed to participate in and to prepare for 
elections scheduled for 2002. The process of amending the Constitution, 
the electoral law, and other texts began during a National Political 
Forum in January that involved political parties, civil society, and 
the Government. In August the National Assembly approved changes to the 
Constitution and approved changes to the electoral law. Pursuant to 
these changes, legislative elections will provide a mixed system that 
allows for 110 deputies to be elected by majority vote from electoral 
district lists and 40 to be elected on a proportional basis from a 
national list. The constitutional amendments and the revised electoral 
law must be approved by referendum; the referendum is scheduled for 
September 30, 2001.
    Under the Constitution, the President is Chief of State and 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces and is elected for a term of 5 
years with a limit of two terms. The President appoints the Prime 
Minister. Additionally, the President appoints other members of the 
Government and sets limits on their powers. He names civil servants 
(national directors, regional government delegates, and others) and 
high military officers as mandated by the Constitution. The President 
also promulgates laws within 15 days, following transmission to the 
Government of a final adopted text. He can veto and return legislation 
to the National Assembly for reconsideration. There is no provision for 
the National Assembly to override a presidential veto. The President 
may submit any question of national interest to a referendum after 
consultation with the Constitutional Court. He exercises the power of 
pardon and can grant amnesty. The President may dissolve the National 
Assembly and call for new elections, although not in the year following 
legislative elections. Theoretically, he can declare a state of 
emergency and rule by decree, although President Konare has never done 
so.
    National Assembly members were elected in 1992 and 1997. The 
Constitutional Court cancelled the results of the initial 1997 
legislative elections, citing flaws in the electoral process. These 
elections were repeated later in 1997, and the results were 
implemented. Citing problems in the voter registration process, a 
collective of 18 opposition parties boycotted these elections, which, 
although administratively flawed, were considered by most independent 
observers to be generally free and without evident fraud. ADEMA holds 
130 of 147 seats in the National Assembly, with 12 held by allied 
parties and 5 held by opposition parties.
    The Government instituted far-reaching administrative reforms 
during 1999. As of September 1999, governing authority is shared by 
elected mayors in the 701 communes (including the 19 cities), and 
appointed officials (``commissaires du gouvernement'') who are the 
representatives of the central Government in the District of Bamako, 
the regions, and the cercles (districts roughly equivalent to 
counties). Local governments benefit from central government subsidies, 
but they also are able to collect local taxes to support their 
operations. Decentralization is still a controversial issue. The 
process has changed traditional power relationships between government 
and governed and has relieved formerly powerful civil servants of their 
authority. The new administrators often are inexperienced and 
undereducated. Despite governmental pressure to move ahead with 
decentralization, the nonparliamentary opposition says that the 
Government is moving too fast, and it should implement the process step 
by step as administrators lack adequate funding to govern effectively.
    After local elections in 1998 held to choose council members (who 
oversee the activities of mayors in the communes and suggest procedures 
and policies) for the 19 urban communities, the long-awaited rural 
elections were carried out in May and June 1999. Several opposition 
parties that had boycotted earlier elections participated in the rural 
elections with considerable success. In two communities (Kidal and 
Almoustarat), council members could not elect a mayor due to 
intercommunity disputes. In Kidal local traditional authorities 
prevented the woman who was elected as mayor from assuming office. 
These conflicts were solved during the year, and in June the local 
communities in Kidal and Almoustarat appointed mayors by consensus.
    There are no restrictions, legal or otherwise, on voting by women 
or minorities; however, women are underrepresented in government and 
politics. A total of 18 women hold seats in the 147-member National 
Assembly, compared with 3 elected in 1992. There are 7 female cabinet 
members of a total of 21. Members of historically marginalized 
pastoralist ethnic minorities, including the Fulani and the Tuaregs, 
occupy seats in both the Cabinet and National Assembly. The President 
of the Assembly is Fulani (see Section 5).

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Independent human rights organizations--including the Malian 
Association for Human Rights (AMDH), a smaller Malian League of Human 
Rights, and a local chapter of Amnesty International (AI)--operate 
openly and without interference from the Government. The ICRC has 
offices in Bamako, Tomboctou, and Gao.
    Since 1994 the Government has held an annual Democracy and Human 
Rights Forum in December to which it has invited citizens to voice 
discontent and grievances against the Government publicly in the 
presence of the media and international human rights observers. The 
events are well attended by local citizens from all walks of life, and 
discussion is free and open. Held on December 10, the Democracy Forum 
convened to review the previous year's work and to make recommendations 
to the Government. The topics for discussion included women's rights, 
access to government services, and judicial reform. The Forum called on 
the Government to make these issues a priority in the coming year.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on social origin, 
color, language, sex, or race, and the Government respects these 
provisions in practice; however, social and cultural factors give men a 
dominant role.
    Women.--Violence against women, including spousal abuse, is 
tolerated and common; however, no statistics were available on the 
extent of the problem. Assault in marriage is a crime; however, police 
were reluctant to enforce laws against domestic abuse.
    Women's access to employment in the professions and government, and 
to economic and educational opportunities, traditionally has been 
limited. A 1995-96 national demographic and health survey found that 81 
percent of women (compared with 69.3 percent of men) between the ages 
of 15 and 49 received no education. A 1998 report indicated that 
national literacy rate was 12 percent for women over 15 years of age. 
Women constitute approximately 15 percent of the labor force. The 
Government, the country's major employer, pays women the same as men 
for similar work. Women often live under harsh conditions, especially 
in rural areas, where they perform difficult farm work and do most of 
the childrearing. Despite legislation giving women equal rights 
regarding property, traditional practice and ignorance of the law 
prevent women from taking full advantage of the law. Prospective 
spouses choose between polygynous and monogamous marriages; both 
parties must consent to the marriage. However, when no preference is 
specified in the marriage certificate, judges assume that the marriage 
is polygynous. A community property marriage must be specified in the 
marriage contract. Traditional practice discriminates against women in 
inheritance matters.
    Women have equal access to military service, and there are 
approximately 2,500 women and 8,000 men in the armed forces. Service in 
the armed forces is not obligatory; there is alternative national 
service available both to men and women.
    In 1996 the Government launched a 4-year national plan of action 
for the promotion of women. The plan, financed by national, regional, 
and local community budgets, seeks to reduce inequalities between men 
and women in six target areas, including education, health, and legal 
rights. Despite its initial 4-year mandate, the plan is not close to 
completion, and it was not extended officially during the year; 
however, it continued to influence government project development.
    There are numerous, active women's groups that promoted the rights 
of women and children. Women have very limited access to legal 
services. They are particularly vulnerable in cases of divorce, child 
custody, and inheritance rights, as well as in the general protection 
of civil rights.
    Children.--Although by law primary education is compulsory and free 
through the sixth grade, only 50 percent of children receive a basic 
education. Literacy rates among females remain significantly lower than 
for males. There is a low degree of adherence to the requirement for 
compulsory education, a lack of primary schools, poverty, cultural 
tendencies to place less emphasis on education for girls, and the fact 
that most of the population live in rural areas.
    There is no constitutional or legal provision to protect the 
interests and rights of children, and there is no juvenile court 
system. However, the Malian Social Services Department investigates and 
intervenes in cases of reported child abuse or neglect. According to 
local human rights organizations, reported cases are rare; however, 
statistics are unreliable.
    There were credible reports that children were sold into forced 
labor in Cote d'Ivoire (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Female genital mutilation, which is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is still common, especially in rural areas, and 
is performed on girls at an early age. According to domestic NGO's, 
approximately 95 percent of adult women have undergone FGM. The 
practice is widespread among most regions and ethnic groups, is not 
subject to class boundaries, and is not religiously based. There are no 
laws against FGM, and the Government has not proposed legislation 
prohibiting FGM. The Government is pursuing a program of public 
awareness rather than legal prosecution of women involved in the 
practice. It supports educational efforts to eliminate the practice 
through seminars and conferences and provides media access to 
proponents of its elimination. In 1997 the Ministry for the Promotion 
of Women created a National Committee Against Violence Towards Women 
that links all the NGO's active in preventing FGM. Throughout the year, 
various NGO's campaigned against FGM. In 1999 the Government instituted 
a two-phased plan to eliminate all forms of FGM by 2008. The first 
phase, scheduled for 1999-2004, is intended to be one of education and 
dissemination of information. There has been some public dissemination 
of information in urban areas, but the program has developed slowly.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no specific legislation 
protecting the rights of the physically or mentally disabled, nor 
mandating accessibility. The Government does not discriminate against 
the physically disabled in regard to employment, education, and other 
state services; however, the Government has not made provision for the 
disabled in these areas. There is no societal discrimination against 
the disabled; however, in view of the high unemployment rate, the 
physically disabled often are unable to find work.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of about 10 
million is ethnically, culturally, and regionally diverse. Major 
ethnic-cultural groups include: the Mande, concentrated in the 
southwest, which constitutes about half the population and includes the 
Bambara and Malinke ethnic groups; the Voltaic, concentrated in the 
south and comprising the Bobo and Senoufo groups; the Sudanic, 
concentrated in the central regions and comprising the Sarakole, 
Songhai, Dogon, and Bozo groups; and the pastoralist, comprising the 
Tuaregs and Moors of the northeast and northwest, respectively, and the 
Peul (or Fulani) widely dispersed from east to west across the southern 
third of the country.
    Longstanding tensions between the long-marginalized Moor and Tuareg 
pastoralist groups and the more populous nonpastoralist groups have 
been a leading source of political instability and violence, including 
the Tuareg rebellions of the early 1990's. In June and July 1999, there 
were two violent incidents over natural resource management between 
Fulani herders and Sarakole farmers in the western region of Kayes 
bordering Senegal and Mauritania. A dozen persons were killed, and 
several were wounded. Clashes between Arab and Kounta communities in 
September 1999 resulted in the death of 33 persons, with several others 
wounded. In both cases, traditional and parliamentary mediators 
negotiated peace between the parties in conflict. There were no further 
incidents during the year.
    No single ethnic group predominates in either the private sector or 
the public sector. All three presidents since independence have been 
affiliated with the Bambara group, which accounts for roughly half of 
the country's population, but no ethnic group holds disproportionate 
numbers of government positions or predominates in the military or 
civil service. Political parties, by and large, do not have readily 
identifiable ethnic bases, but some reflect regional constituencies.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code 
specifically provide for the freedom of workers to form or join unions 
and protect freedom of association. Only the military, the Gendarmerie, 
and the National Guard are excluded from forming unions. Virtually all 
salaried employees are organized. Workers have established independent 
unions for teachers, magistrates, health workers, and senior civil 
servants, and most are affiliated with the National Union of Malian 
Workers (UNTM) confederation. The UNTM has maintained its autonomy from 
the Government.
    There are two major labor federations, the UNTM and the Syndicated 
Confederation of Malian Workers (CSTM). The UNTM, formerly the only 
major labor body, split in late 1997, dividing the country's 12 labor 
organizations into 2 federations.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, although there 
are restrictions in some areas. For example, civil servants and workers 
in state-owned enterprises must give 2 weeks' notice of a planned 
strike and must enter into mediation and negotiations with the employer 
and a third party, usually the Ministry of Labor. The Labor Code 
prohibits retribution against strikers, and the Government respects 
this requirement in practice. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) requested the Government to amend Section 229 of the 1992 Labor 
Code to restrict the Minister of Labor's authority to impose 
arbitration to end strikes that were liable to cause an acute national 
crisis. The Government noted in its report to the ILO that it was 
undertaking an in-depth, tripartite discussion on Section 229 to make 
the legislation fully consistent with the principles of freedom of 
association; at year's end, the review was ongoing.
    During the year, there were strikes in the transportation, cotton 
growing, and public sectors for better conditions and higher wages. In 
all cases, the Government negotiated in good faith, and the strikes 
ended peacefully. In July judges went on strike to demand better 
working conditions. The strike ended when the Government agreed to 
renegotiate salaries and provide security for judges who believed that 
they were threatened because of their work.
    Unions are free to associate with and participate in international 
bodies. The union representing salaried employees regularly 
participated in programs sponsored by French labor unions. Other unions 
have participated in various programs sponsored by international 
unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The growth of 
independent unions has led to more direct bargaining between these 
unions and their employers. However, wages and salaries for workers 
belonging to the UNTM unions are set by tripartite negotiations between 
the Ministry of Labor, labor unions, and representatives of the 
federation of employers of the sector to which the wages apply. Salary 
levels are pegged nationally to an index established by the Government 
on which civil service pay is based. These negotiations usually set the 
pattern for unions outside the UNTM. The Ministry of Labor acts as a 
mediator in labor disputes. The 1997 split in the UNTM did not change 
the basic procedures of these negotiations.
    Neither the Constitution nor the Labor Code addresses the question 
of antiunion discrimination, but there have been no reports or 
complaints of antiunion behavior or activities. If the parties cannot 
come to agreement, the dispute goes to the Labor Court for decision.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children; however, organized traffickers sold Malian children into 
forced labor in Cote d'Ivoire (see Section 6.f.).
    The law prohibits the contractual use of persons without their 
consent; penalties included a fine and hard labor. The penalties 
increased significantly if a minor, defined as someone under 15 years 
of age, was involved.
    Although there have been no other reports of forced or bonded child 
labor, apprenticeship, often in a family member's or a parent's 
vocation, begins at an early age, especially for children unable to 
attend school.
    There were some reports that the de facto slavery long reported to 
have existed in northern salt mining communities has evolved toward 
wage labor in recent years; however, reliable current evidence about 
labor conditions in those remote facilities remained unavailable. 
Hereditary servitude relationships link different ethnic groups, 
particularly in the north. For example, there is a hereditary service 
relationship between members of the Bellah ethnic group and other 
Tuareg populations.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1996 Labor Code has specific policies that pertain to 
child labor. The authorities enforce the Labor Code provisions through 
the use of labor inspectors from the Ministry of Employment, Public 
Service, and Labor who conduct surprise inspections and complaint-based 
inspections; however, resource limitations restrict the frequency and 
effectiveness of oversight by the Labor Inspection Service, and the 
Service operates only in the modern sector.
    The Labor Code permits children between the ages of 12 and 14 to 
work up to 2 hours per day during school vacations with parental 
approval. Children between the ages of 14 and 16 may work up to 4+ 
hours per day with the permission of a labor inspector, but not during 
nights, holidays, or Sundays. Children between the ages of 16 and 18 
may work in jobs that are not physically demanding; boys may work up to 
8 hours per day and girls up to 6 hours per day.
    These regulations often are ignored in practice. Moreover, the 
Labor Code has no effect on the vast number of children who work in 
rural areas, helping with family farms and herds, and on those who work 
in the informal sector, for example, as street vendors. These children 
are not protected by laws against unjust compensation, excessive hours, 
or capricious discharge.
    The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of 
child labor on July 14. The Programme National de Lutte contre le 
Travail des Enfants au Mali, led by the International Program for the 
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC)-Mali, is responsible for 
investigating abusive forms of child labor. IPEC relies on labor 
inspectors appointed by the Government in Bamako and in regional 
offices in the country. IPEC also was assisted by NGO's combating child 
labor and government regional offices in charge of the promotion of 
women and children. Government resources include inspectors, NGO's, and 
IPEC funding. There is no predetermined number of inspections per year; 
however, investigations are held when information is provided by NGO's 
or the media that there is an instance of abusive child labor.
    Education is free and, in principle, is open to all, although the 
majority of students leave school by the age of 12. Students must 
provide their own uniforms and school supplies to attend public 
schools. While primary school is compulsory, only 50 percent of 
children receive a basic education. Child labor predominates in the 
agricultural sector and, to a lesser degree, in crafts and trades 
apprenticeships, and cottage industries.
    The Labor Code prohibits forced or bonded child labor; however, 
Malian children were sold into forced labor abroad by organized 
traffickers, and apprenticeship begins at an early age (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code specifies 
conditions of employment, including hours, wages, and social security; 
however, in practice many employers either ignore or do not comply 
completely with the regulations. The national minimum wage rate, set in 
1994, is approximately $40 (26,000 CFA francs) per month. Workers must 
be paid overtime for additional hours. The minimum wage does not 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The 
minimum wage is supplemented by a required package of benefits, 
including social security and health care. While this total package 
could provide a minimum standard of living for one person, in practice 
most wage earners support large extended families and must supplement 
their income by some subsistence farming or work in the informal 
sector.
    The normal legal workweek is 40 hours (45 hours for agricultural 
employees), with a requirement for at least one 24-hour rest period. 
The Social Security Code provides a broad range of legal protection 
against hazards in the workplace, and workers' groups have brought 
pressure on employers to respect parts of the regulations, particularly 
those affecting personal hygiene. However, with high unemployment, 
workers often are reluctant to report violations of occupational safety 
regulations. The Labor Inspection Service of the Ministry of Labor 
oversees these standards but limits enforcement to the modern, formal 
sector. It was not effective in investigating and enforcing workers'' 
safety and was funded insufficiently for its responsibilities. Workers 
have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations and 
request an investigation by the Social Security Department, which is 
responsible for recommending remedial action where deemed necessary.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--While the law does not specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons, there are laws that prohibit the 
contractual use of persons without their consent; however, children are 
trafficked for forced labor in Cote d'Ivoire. An estimated 15,000 
Malian children between the ages of 9 and 12 have been sold into forced 
labor on the cotton, coffee, and cocoa plantations of northern Cote 
d'Ivoire over the past few years; an even greater number have been 
pressed into domestic service. Organized networks of traffickers 
deceive the children and their families into believing that they will 
be given paid jobs outside of their villages. They then are sold to 
plantation owners for sums ranging from $20 to $40 (10,000 to 20,000 
CFA). According to media reports the children are forced to work 12 
hours per day without pay, and often they are abused physically.
    Penalties for violations of the law prohibiting forced contractual 
labor include a fine or hard labor; penalties increase if a minor is 
involved; however, these penalties were not applied during the year. 
The problem of trafficking is handled by both the Ministry for the 
Promotion of Women, Children, and the Family and the Ministry of 
Employment, Public Services, and Labor; however, there is no specific 
program of protection for victims. Both ministries in coordination with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration have developed a program designed to operate until the 
end of 2001 to identify and rehabilitate victims, educate the 
population, and strengthen the legal system with regard to the movement 
and trafficking of minors. However, at year's end, the program was 
still being organized.
    The Government took some steps to halt child trafficking and 
repatriate children to the country from Cote d'Ivoire; however, there 
was no estimate of the number of children in Cote d'Ivoire. In the 
spring, more than 50 children were returned to their families from Cote 
d'Ivoire. In August the Governments of Mali and Cote d'Ivoire signed a 
treaty to cooperate in combating trafficking; however, no traffickers 
were prosecuted during the year.
    The Government assisted repatriated workers in communicating with 
family members; however, the total of those assisted was unknown, 
partly because the number of trafficked persons in neighboring 
countries could not be determined.
                               __________

                               MAURITANIA

    Mauritania is a highly centralized Islamic Republic dominated by a 
strong presidency. The 1991 Constitution provides for a civilian 
government composed of a dominant executive branch, a senate, and a 
national assembly. President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya has governed 
since 1984, first as head of a military junta, and since the 1992 
multiparty election as head of a civilian government. In December 1997, 
Taya was reelected President, receiving over 90 percent of the vote. 
The election, which was contested by four opposition candidates but 
boycotted by the five-party Opposition Front coalition, was regarded 
widely as fraudulent. Most opposition parties also boycotted earlier 
parliamentary elections but participated in senate elections in 1994 
and 1996; they gained only one seat. In the country's first multiparty 
elections to the 79-member National Assembly held in 1996, 1 opposition 
and 6 independent candidates were elected; candidates of the ruling 
Republican, Democratic and Social Party (PRDS) won 72 seats. The 
outcome of these elections was marred by fraud on all sides and 
pervasive government intervention. Senate elections held in April 
generally were considered free and fair by international observers; 
however, some opposition parties boycotted the election, and only the 
governing party and the parties associated with it presented 
candidates. The elections resulted in the one sitting opposition member 
being reelected along with three independents. The Constitution 
provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is 
subject to significant pressure from the executive through its ability 
to influence judges.
    The Government maintains order with regular armed forces, the 
National Guard, the Gendarmerie, and the police. The Ministry of 
Defense directs the armed forces and Gendarmerie; the Ministry of 
Interior directs the National Guard and police. The armed forces are 
responsible for national defense. The National Guard performs police 
functions throughout the country in areas in which city police are not 
present. The Gendarmerie is a specialized paramilitary group 
responsible for maintenance of civil order in and outside metropolitan 
areas. Security forces are under the full control of the Government and 
are responsible to it. Some members of the security forces committed 
human rights abuses.
    Mauritania, which has an estimated population of 2.5 million, has a 
generally market-oriented economy based on fishing, mining, subsistence 
farming, herding, and a small commercial sector. Fish and iron ore are 
the country's main export-earners. Drought, desertification, and insect 
infestation have contributed to rapid urbanization, extensive 
unemployment, pervasive poverty, and a burdensome foreign debt. The 
concentration of much of the country's wealth in the hands of a small 
elite, including the President's tribe and related Moor tribes, as well 
as a lack of transparency and accountability in certain areas of 
governance, also impedes economic growth. Annual per capita national 
income is estimated at $440. Mauritania receives foreign assistance 
from bilateral and multilateral sources.
    The Government's human rights record remained generally poor; there 
was some improvement in a few areas, but problems remained in others. 
Democratic institutions remain rudimentary, and the Government 
circumscribes citizens' ability to change their government. Police used 
excessive force, beat or otherwise abused detainees, and used arbitrary 
arrest and detention, incommunicado detention, and illegal searches; 
however, reports of police abuses decreased during the year. The 
Government failed to bring to justice most officials who committed 
abuses, although some abuses were sanctioned during the year. Prison 
conditions remained harsh and unhealthy; however, a new men's prison 
was completed in Nouakchott which improved overcrowding and unsanitary 
conditions. Pretrial detention continued; however, the length of pre-
trial detentions were shorter due to improved organization of the 
courts. The Government continued its program of judicial reform and 
training; however, the executive continued to exercise significant 
pressure on the judiciary, and in practice the right to a fair trial 
was not always realized. At times the Government restricted freedom of 
speech. While the Government tolerates a critical independent press, it 
continued to censor individual editions. The Government restricted 
freedom of assembly and used excessive force in breaking up 
demonstrations by the major opposition party. In May during a period of 
widespread public unrest, the Government banned all public 
demonstrations. The Government limited freedom of assembly and 
religion. The Government continued to refuse to recognize officially 
some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and human rights 
organizations. Discrimination against women continued, and female 
genital mutilation (FGM) remained a serious problem despite government 
efforts to halt the practice. Ethnic tensions continued to ease, but 
the largely southern-based ethnic groups, including the Halpulaar (also 
called Fulani or Peuhl), Soninke, and Wolof ethnic groups, remained 
underrepresented in political life and some of their members feel 
excluded from effective political representation. Child labor in the 
informal sector is common. A system of officially sanctioned slavery in 
which government and society join to force individuals to serve masters 
does not exist; however, there continued to be reports that slavery in 
the form of forced and involuntary servitude persists in some isolated 
areas, or that unofficial, voluntary servitude persists and that former 
slaves continue to work for former masters or others for food, shelter, 
and clothing, although they were under no legal compulsion to do so.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other forms of cruel or 
inhuman punishment; however, the police reportedly continued on 
occasion to beat criminal suspects while in custody. Police used undue 
force in controlling public crowds and breaking up peaceful 
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). In April authorities forcibly 
disrupted political opposition demonstrations in Nouakchott and 
Nouadhibou and beat some demonstrators protesting the detention of an 
opposition leader (see Sections 1.d and 2.b.). On June 17 and 18, 
police used excessive force in breaking up demonstrations by Black 
Moors protesting land redistribution, which resulted in some 
demonstrators being beaten and injured (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 
2.d.). The Government sanctioned the Governor and the head of police by 
removing them from their posts.
    In 1999 the Director of Security traveled to each region of the 
country to meet with police forces to inform their members that the 
Government would not tolerate the use of torture or undue force and 
that violators would be prosecuted. These visits reportedly were 
successful. The Government has continued its in-service training of 
police and other security personnel, which has shown some positive 
results. Reports of the use of excessive force, requests for payoffs, 
or other abusive behavior decreased during the year, and some violators 
were sanctioned.
    In July 1999, two Halpulaar political refugees in France charged 
Mauritanian Captain Ely Ould Dah, a Black Moor in France as part of a 
military cooperation program, with having tortured them during events 
in 1990 and 1991. A French judge in Montpellier had Ould Dah arrested 
under the International Convention against Torture. The arrest sparked 
a lively debate among opinion leaders from all ethnic groups, which was 
covered extensively in the press, on how to further national 
reconciliation (see Section 4). While awaiting trial in France, Ould 
Dah forfeited bail and returned to Mauritania on April 4, apparently 
with the aid of the Government of Mauritania.
    In past years, the National Guard has fired on fish poachers 
causing at least one injury. In July the Government signed an agreement 
with the Government of Senegal to allow and regulate through licensing 
the fishing of small craft fishermen in each others'' waters. Since the 
agreement, there have been no further incidents of police shootings.
    Prison conditions remained harsh; however, conditions in 
Nouakchott's prison continued to improve due to the opening of a newly 
constructed section of the men's prison, which put an end to serious 
overcrowding. The former men's prison is used to provide space for 
educational and sports programs for children. In other prisons, 
overcrowding persisted and sanitation facilities remained inadequate 
and reportedly have contributed to diseases such as tuberculosis, 
diarrhea, and dermatological ailments. Medical supplies, mainly 
provided by an international NGO, remained insufficient in all prisons. 
Some prisoners received special treatment based on family and position. 
Prisoners with high-level connections and families to bring them food, 
medicines, and reading material fared better than the less privileged 
or citizens from other countries. New guard force management continued 
to enforce instructions against beatings and torture; however, there 
were reports of beatings of detainees at the Commissariat outside of 
the prison. The overall prison capacity is 700 and the prison 
population was 1,352 in 1999. The prison population in Nouakchott was 
567, a decrease of 100 from 1998 as a result of shorter pretrial 
detention. There were 517 men, 24 women and 26 minors; minors are held 
in separate facilities. In May 1999, female prisoners were moved to a 
new upgraded facility that contained a communal garden. Children of 
female prisoners remain with their mothers or the Ministry of Justice 
gives temporary custody of the children to another family member. The 
Noura Foundation, an NGO working in the prison, continued to provide a 
program of education and microenterprise projects to the female 
prisoners. UNICEF in collaboration with the French organization CARITAS 
has been providing increased services including training and sports in 
the juvenile detention centers. The Government cooperated with an NGO 
to provide training for female guards to replace the male guards 
currently at the women's prison; in March the Ministry of Justice 
appointed 15 women to serve as prison guards in the women's prison as a 
protective measure for female prisoners. A doctor and nurse assigned to 
the men's prison also provide medical care for the women's and 
children's prison, but the infirmary remains understaffed.
    The new prison administration instituted in August 1997 has 
improved markedly the conditions of prison food, health, hygiene, and 
family contacts; however, last year's budget funding for increased 
expenditures per prisoner for improved food and nutrition, medical 
services and supplies, and new bedding and cleaning supplies was not 
met.
    The Government permits prison visits by domestic and international 
diplomats and human rights monitors. Foreign diplomats visited some 
prisons during the year. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) has access to prisons, but did not conduct prison visits during 
the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
stipulates that authorities cannot arrest, detain, prosecute, or punish 
anyone except as provided for under the law; however, at times police 
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The actual application of 
the constitutional safeguards continued to vary widely from case to 
case.
    The law requires that courts review the legality of a person's 
detention within 48 hours of arrest. The police may extend the period 
for another 48 hours, and a prosecutor or court may detain persons for 
up to 30 days in national security cases. Only after the prosecutor 
submits charges does a suspect have the right to contact an attorney.
    Human rights activists report that police showed greater respect 
for legally mandated procedures and that prison administration 
continued to show improvement; however, pretrial detention after 
arraignment often is prolonged. An estimated 15 to 20 percent of those 
in prison have not yet been tried, or were awaiting sentencing 
following their trials. In May the Government and an NGO sponsored a 
10-day seminar for 50 police officers to inform them of the rights of 
children and the legal treatment of detained suspects.
    Some indicted detainees are released before trial without 
explanation; familial, tribal, or political connections may explain 
some of these cases. There is a provision for granting bail, but it is 
used rarely.
    Security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest, detention, and 
intimidation against the banned opposition party. Police detained Ahmed 
Ould Daddah, leader of the banned opposition party Union of Democratic 
Forces-New Era (UFD-A) and held him for 5 days in April; police 
arrested Ould Daddah again in December and held him incommunicado for 3 
days before releasing him (see Section 2.b). Ould Daddah never was 
charged, but was questioned by the Government about his contacts with 
foreign and local political groups. Other party leaders and members in 
Nouakchott and Nouadhibou protesting his detention in April were beaten 
and detained (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    There continued to be occasional reports of arbitrary arrest and 
detention by security forces against those protesting the 
redistribution of land and against returned refugees in communities in 
the south along the Senegal River (see Section 1.f and 2.d.) The reform 
has met with resistance from those who had part of their traditional 
landholdings that had lain fallow confiscated. On June 18, police 
arrested and beat 13 people in the Brakna region, who protested the 
redistribution of their traditionally held land to relatives of the 
Wali (Governor); they were released 2 weeks later (see Section 1.c.). 
The Governor and the head of police were removed from their posts in 
September. At year's end, the land still had not been restored to its 
original owners. In some cases the fallow land was granted to wealthy 
Moors who developed commercial agricultural enterprises (see Section 
1.f.).
    There were no reports of forced exile. The Government continued to 
welcome the return of any citizens who had been expelled or who had 
fled from 1989 to 1991.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides 
for the independence of the judiciary, in practice the executive branch 
exercises significant pressure on the judiciary through its ability to 
appoint and influence judges. In addition poorly educated and poorly 
trained judges who are susceptible to social, financial, tribal, and 
personal pressures limit the judicial system's fairness. However, the 
Government is carrying out a program to improve judicial performance 
and independence.
    There is a single system of courts with a modernized legal system 
that conforms with the principles of Shari'a (Islamic law). The 
judicial system includes lower-, middle-, and upperlevel courts, each 
with specific jurisdictions. Departmental, regional, and labor 
tribunals are the principal instances at the lower level. The 53 
departmental tribunals, composed of a president and magistrates with 
traditional Islamic legal training, hear civil cases involving sums 
less than $41 (10,000 UM) and family issues, such as domestic, divorce, 
and inheritance cases. Thirteen regional tribunals accept appeals in 
commercial and civil matters from the departmental tribunals and hear 
misdemeanors. Three labor tribunals, composed of a president and two 
assessors (one who represents labor and one who represents employers), 
serve as final arbiters for labor disputes. At the middle level, three 
courts of appeal, each with two chambers (a civil and commercial 
chamber, and a mixed chamber) hear appeals from the regional courts and 
have original jurisdiction for felonies. Nominally independent, the 
Supreme Court is headed by a magistrate appointed to a 5-year term by 
the President. The Supreme Court reviews decisions and rulings made by 
the courts of appeal to determine their compliance with the law and 
procedure. Constitutional review is within the purview of a six-member 
Constitutional Council, composed of three members named by the 
President, two by the National Assembly President, and one by the 
Senate President. Annual review of judicial decisions is undertaken by 
the Supreme Council of Magistrates, over which the President presides; 
the president and senior vice president of the Supreme Court, the 
Minister of Justice, three magistrates, and representatives from the 
Senate and National Assembly are members of this Council. The annual 
review is intended to determine whether courts applied the law 
correctly and followed proper procedures. The most recent review was 
used as a basis for evaluating the reform process, providing for 
retraining of judges, and making reassignments based on their 
qualifications.
    The minimum age for children to be tried is 12. Those between the 
ages of 12 and 18 are tried and sentenced to the juvenile detention 
center (see Section 1.c.). In April a special court to hear the cases 
of children under the age of 18 became operational. Children appearing 
before the court received more lenient sentences than did adults, and 
extenuating circumstances were considered.
    In March the Government continued its education program to upgrade 
the qualifications and training of judicial personnel. In September the 
Government convened a Congress under the auspices of the Minister of 
Justice for government and non-governmental lawyers, magistrates, and 
other judicial professionals. Thirty judicial personnel, out of a total 
of 224, received overseas training to qualify them for one of the 
specialized courts: Children, civil, administrative, commercial, or 
correctional.
    The Constitution provides for due process and the presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty by an established tribunal. All 
defendants, regardless of the court or their ability to pay, have the 
legal right to representation by counsel during the proceedings, which 
are open to the public. If defendants lack the ability to pay for 
counsel, the court appoints an attorney from a list prepared by the 
National Order of Lawyers, which provides defense free of charge. The 
law provides that defendants may confront witnesses, present evidence, 
and appeal their sentences, and these rights generally are observed in 
practice.
    Shari'a Islamic law provides the legal principles upon which the 
law and legal procedure are based, and because of the manner in which 
Shari'a is implemented in the country, courts do not in all cases treat 
women as the equals of men (see Section 5). For example, the testimony 
of two women is necessary to equal that of one man. In addition in 
awarding an indemnity to the family of a woman who has been killed, the 
courts grant only half the amount that they would award for a man's 
death. For commercial and other modern issues not specifically 
addressed by Shari'a, the law and courts treat women and men equally.
    With international assistance, the Government continued a program 
to improve judicial performance and independence, which consists of 
organizing all laws and statutes into a single reference text and 
training officials throughout the justice system. Separate tribunals 
established in 1999 for specific types of disputes held court sessions 
more frequently, and in July, as a result of dropping of the 
requirement to have three judicial personnel present for each trial, 
pre-trial detention periods generally were shorter. The Government 
continued to hold security officials accountable and prosecuted 
officials for abuses. This has improved the public perception of the 
judicial system.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires judicial warrants in order to execute 
home searches; however, the authorities reportedly often ignore this 
requirement.
    Government surveillance of dissidents and the political opposition 
is believed to continue, although the extent to which the Government 
used informants is unknown.
    There were a number of reports that some Government officials were 
misappropriating land under the land reform system, confiscating the 
land of southern ethnic groups or the land traditionally held by 
Haratines, and distributing it to their own friends and family (see 
Section 6.c.). The Government began implementation of the 1983 land 
reform law in 1990. The reform aimed at providing land for rural 
landless persons, including victims of desertification in the northern 
and central regions (both White Moors and Black Moors) and also, in 
recent years, for returning southerners who had been expelled from 1989 
to 1991. The reform also aimed to increase the amount of land under 
cultivation by leasing uncultivated land to those with the means to 
cultivate it. The unconfirmed reports of confiscation may reflect 
abuses in the program's implementation; the proper implementation of 
the land reform does not leave families landless, and the program is 
not explicitly discriminatory. However, there may have been a net 
redistribution of land from southerners and Haratines to White Moors 
under that program, since the south has been less affected by 
desertification than the more northerly regions historically inhabited 
by the Moors. There also were some reports that some southerners who 
had been expelled or fled from the country from 1989 10 1991 were 
unable either to regain possession of the land they had farmed before 
1989 or to gain possession of other land from the Government, although 
other reports indicate that all those previously on the land were 
granted some land rights (see Sections 1.d. and 6.c.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government continues 
to restrict these rights through prepublication press censorship by the 
Interior Ministry. NGO's and the privately owned press openly 
criticized the Government and its leaders. Antigovernment tracts, 
newsletters, and petitions circulated widely in Nouakchott and other 
towns.
    The Press Law requires publishers to submit copies of newspapers to 
the Ministries of Interior and Justice before distributing them. The 
Ministry of the Interior reviews all newspaper copy prior to 
publication and usually authorizes sales and distribution within 2 to 3 
days. However, the Press Law provides that the Minister of the Interior 
can stop publication of material that discredits Islam or threatens 
national security. During the year, the authorities seized 13 
individual issues of different journals and, on December 16, banned the 
weekly newspaper Al Alam. In November the GIRM suspended the 
accreditation of a Middle East Information Agency representative. The 
Government provided no specific reasons for the seizures, the censure 
or the banning other than to cite Article 11 of the Constitution, which 
prohibits materials that undermine national sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, or national unity.
    All newspapers must register with the Ministry of the Interior. 
There are over 400 journals and newspapers registered with the Ministry 
of the Interior, a third of which do not publish regularly, some never 
having issued an edition. There only are approximately 20 privately 
owned newspapers that publish on a regular basis. These journals are 
weeklies and reach limited audiences. The Government issues press cards 
to journalists and requires that they show this identification for 
participation in official press events. Private journals reported 
openly and critically on both the opposition and the Government and 
published party declarations and tracts without government censure or 
restraint during the municipal elections. Publications are exempt from 
all taxes on materials used to produce newspapers, journals, or books 
for the private press.
    All broadcast media (radio and television) and two daily 
newspapers, Horizons and Chaab, are government-owned and operated. 
Radio is the most important medium in reaching the public, and the 
official media strongly support government policies. During the April 
senatorial election campaign, the Government provided all candidates 
with equal access to its two newspapers and to the electronic media, 
allowing citizens to hear and read criticism of the Government in these 
media in addition to in the private press. Opposition parties' access 
to government radio broadcast facilities at other times is limited. 
Citizens can receive foreign television broadcasts including from 
France and from Arab countries; however, in October the Government 
requested that the Government of Qatar discontinue its Al Jazeera 
broadcast in the country, which had aired several programs highly 
critical of the GIRM. In November the Government also discontinued 
broadcasts of Radio France International for the same reason. The 
Government continued to deny private applications to establish domestic 
radio stations.
    There are five domestic Internet servers, which operate without 
governmental restrictions. Internet connections exist in Nouadhibou, 
the major commercial center, and five other regional capitals.
    Academic freedom generally is respected, and there were no cases in 
which the Government prevented research or publication or censored 
lectures. The country's one university is governmentfunded and 
operated.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricted 
this right in practice and forcibly dispersed some demonstrations by 
the opposition (see Sections 1.c and 1.d.). The law requires that all 
recognized political parties and NGO's apply to the local prefect for 
permission for large meetings or assemblies.
    In April authorities forcibly disrupted demonstrations by the 
political opposition protesting increased prices in Nouakchott and 
Nouadhibou. Authorities used teargas and batons to forcibly disperse 
demonstrators and injured three people in Nouakchott and two in 
Nouadhibou (see Section 1.c. and 1.d.).
    Beginning in May, in response to widespread demonstrations on price 
increases and the situation in the Middle East, the Government banned 
all public demonstrations and dispersed some demonstrations. The 
Government also refused to grant permits to demonstrators.
    Citizens in the southwest demonstrated on June 17 and 18 to protest 
land redistribution policies in their region. Police forcibly disrupted 
the demonstrations and detained and beat 13 persons (see Sections 1.c., 
1.d., and 1.f.).
    A number of public marches in November and December protesting 
violence in the Middle East became violent. The authorities used force, 
injured protestors, and prohibited all further public demonstrations.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government limited this right in practice and circumscribed the efforts 
of some groups by denying them official recognition. All political 
parties must register with the Ministry of the Interior. The number of 
political parties, labor unions, and NGO's continued to increase. Some 
23 political parties and a wide array of NGO's, many of them highly 
critical of the Government, functioned openly, issued public 
statements, and chose their own leadership. Since September 1998, the 
Government has recognized 75 new NGO's and associations, bringing the 
total of such organizations to more than 600. The Government has not 
yet granted some NGO's official standing but did not prevent them from 
functioning. Among these are the Mauritanian Association for Human 
Rights (AMDH) and SOS-Esclaves (an antislavery NGO), which the 
Government claims are potentially divisive in that they appeal to 
specific ethnic groups, namely the southern and Black Moor communities 
respectively. However, in October the Government dissolved the major 
opposition party, the Union of Democratic Forces (UFD), claiming it 
threatened security by inciting violence.
    Following diplomatic confrontation with Iraq, resulting from 
Mauritania's opening full diplomatic relations with Israel, the 
Government accused Iraq of undertaking subversive action against it, 
fomenting violent antigovernment demonstrations, and financing the 
Taliaa (Vanguard) political party. The Government disbanded the Taliaa 
party, whose officials had been meeting with Iraqi Ba'ath party 
representatives, citing constitutional prohibitions against 
``cooperation with a foreign party, accepting foreign funds for 
political propaganda, and carrying out illegal acts.''
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes the country 
as an Islamic republic and decrees that Islam is the religion of its 
citizens and the State, and the Government accordingly limits freedom 
of religion.
    There is no religious oath required of government employees or 
members of the ruling political party, except for the President and the 
members of the 5-person Constitutional Council and the 10-person High 
Council of Magistrates presided over by the President. The 
Constitutional Council and the High Council of Magistrates advise the 
President in matters of law and the Constitution. The oath of office 
includes a promise to God to uphold the law of the land in conformity 
with Islamic precepts.
    All but a small number of citizens are Sunni Muslims and are 
prohibited by their religion from converting to another religion. 
Shari'a, proclaimed under a previous government in 1983, includes the 
Koranic prohibition against apostasy; however, it has never been 
codified in civil law or enforced. The small number of known converts 
from Islam suffered no social ostracism, and there were no reports of 
societal or governmental attempts to punish them.
    Although there is no legal codification of a prohibition against 
proselytizing by non-Muslims, in practice the Government prohibits 
proselytizing by non-Muslims under Article 11 of the Press Act, which 
bans the publication of any material that is against Islam or 
contradicts or otherwise threatens Islam. The Government views any 
attempts by Christians to convert Muslims as undermining society. There 
are no known non-Muslim groups engaged in proselytizing; foreign 
Christian NGO's limit their activities to humanitarian and development 
assistance.
    Christians in the foreign community and the few Christian citizens 
practice their religion openly and freely. Under Article 11 of the 
Press Law, the Government may restrict the importation, printing, or 
public distribution of Bibles or other non-Islamic religious 
literature, and in practice Bibles are neither printed nor sold 
publicly in the country. However, the possession of Bibles and other 
Christian religious materials in private homes is not illegal, and 
Bibles and other religious publications are available among the small 
Christian community.
    In addition to privately-run Koranic schools that nearly all 
children attend, the public schools include classes on religion. These 
classes teach both the history and principles of Islam and the 
classical Arabic of the Koran. Although attendance at these religion 
classes is ostensibly required, many students, the great majority of 
whom are Muslims, decline to attend these classes for diverse ethno-
linguistic and religious reasons. They nevertheless are able to advance 
in school and ultimately to graduate with diplomas, provided that they 
compensate for their failure to attend the required religion classes by 
their performance in other classes.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement and residence within all parts of the territory, and provides 
for the freedom to enter and leave, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice. Historically there were few 
restrictions on travel in Mauritania's nomadic society. With 
urbanization and automobile travel, the Government has set up regular 
road checkpoints where the Gendarmerie checks the papers of travelers, 
and reportedly often solicits bribes. During the year, the Government 
reduced the number of road checkpoints, and reduced the time taken in 
questioning and conducting vehicle searches; however, there were 
reports that searches conducted in the southern border areas continued 
to be more stringent.
    Of the approximately 70,000 members of largely southern-based 
ethnic groups who were expelled by the Government or fled to Senegal 
and Mali during the 1989-91 crisis, and of those born abroad since that 
time, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) documented 33,248 
returnees to four provinces along the Senegal River. Both the UNHCR and 
the Government agreed that many others have returned on their own to 
the larger towns and cities. Many more returnees among nomads, who are 
difficult to document, and urban dwellers are not included in UNHCR's 
figures. Informed observers estimate that the actual number of 
returnees ranges between 40,000 and 65,000. Entire villages as well as 
almost all Peulh (nomadic herders of the Halpulaar ethnic group) have 
returned. The Government has stated since 1993 that any citizen outside 
the country may return; however, the Government, the countries of 
asylum, and the UNHCR have signed no tripartite repatriation agreement. 
The UNHCR terminated programs to help returnees at the end of December 
1998. The UNHCR estimated that there are 15,000 to 20,000 Mauritanian 
refugees remaining in Senegal, although refugees have continued to 
return independently in small numbers and have benefited from small-
scale agroforestry, health and sanitation projects continued by NGO's 
and humanitarian workers.
    Cooperation by local authorities in addressing restitution and 
citizenship matters varies greatly, depending on individual officials 
and the returnee's region. Repatriation efforts achieved greater 
results in the Trarza and Brakna regions than in Gorgol and Guidimaka 
to the east; however, observers noted that the situation in Gorgol 
improved considerably. Many returnees received their original homes, 
some property, and all or a portion of their land (see Section 1.f.). 
Timely restoration of identity papers varied, and some of those who 
returned in 1995 have not yet received identification cards. In some 
regions, persons lacking identity cards could not travel freely.
    The law does not contain provisions for the granting of refugee or 
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, in practice the 
Government accepts UNHCR recommendations on the granting of asylum and 
refugee status. The Government, which has cooperated with the UNHCR and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees since 1989 
signed a local headquarters agreement with the UNHCR in May 1999. In 
recent years, the Government has provided first asylum to refugees from 
neighboring countries including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, and Guinea Bissau. The Government also has accepted the 
UNHCR's registration of some 200 asylum seekers, mostly from Sierra 
Leone and Liberia.
    Mauritania is host to over 50,000 nationals of other West African 
countries who seek refuge and employment, primarily in Nouakchott and 
Nouadhibou. An estimated 60 percent of Mauritania's small craft 
fishermen are Senegalese. There is a population of approximately 300 
Sierra Leoneans living in Nouakchott. Some arrived more than 10 years 
ago and are fully employed. Approximately 225 of these have been 
granted refugee status and receive UNHCR assistance. The Sierra 
Leoneans held protest demonstrations at the U.N. compound on several 
occasions throughout the year demanding increased assistance and 
refugee status for all members of the group, including those with full-
time employment, and resettlement in the West.
    Approximately 2,000 former refugees from Mali who could repatriate 
have remained in the country and largely have been integrated into the 
local population. Nearly all these Malian refugees are Moors. The UNHCR 
no longer considers them refugees.
    There were no reports of refugees being forced to return to a 
country where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government; however, the Government circumscribes this right in 
practice. The 1992 multiparty election of a civilian president ended 14 
years of military rule; however, both the opposition and international 
observers concluded that the elections were fraudulent. Although 
civilians fill all ministerial-level positions, some members of the 
Military Council that ruled from 1984 to 1992, in addition to President 
Taya, remained in positions of power within the executive branch, the 
National Assembly, the armed forces, and government-owned enterprises. 
The armed forces avoided involvement in politics during the year; by 
law members of the military must resign if they wish to participate in 
partisan politics. Except during the election campaign, the Government 
denied elements of the opposition the opportunity to receive full 
access to government media and to compete on an equal footing.
    The country's first multiparty legislative elections were held in 
1996 and the ruling PRDS party won by an overwhelming majority; 
subsequent elections are scheduled to be held every 5 years. President 
Taya won an overwhelming victory in the 1997 presidential elections, 
although his opponents fared much better in the cities than in the 
rural areas. The official turnout of 75 percent and the winning 
percentage of 90 percent were inflated, since many individuals voted 
more than once. The Government distributed four voter registration 
cards to some persons, including government employees, instructing them 
to vote repeatedly for the incumbent. The opposition also distributed 
multiple voter registration cards to some persons, instructing them to 
vote repeatedly. The outcome of the elections was marred by fraud on 
all sides including pervasive government intervention to support 
candidates from the ruling party. The 1997 Presidential elections were 
boycotted by a coalition of four opposition parties that had demanded 
enhanced media access, an opposition role in election preparation, 
creation of an independent electoral commission, enlargement of the 
commission charged with revision of the electoral list, and provision 
of official copies of the voting report from each polling station to 
representatives of each candidate. During the election campaigning, the 
Government granted the opposition equal access to the official media, 
but did not meet the other demands.
    One-third of the Senate is elected by the indirect balloting of 
municipal councils every 2 years; the latest elections were held on 
April 17. The elections generally were well-organized and were 
considered free and fair by international observers. However, four 
parties of the Political Opposition Front boycotted the national 
elections. As a result, only the governing party and parties affiliated 
with the governing party presented candidates. The ruling parties 
gained 14 of 18 seats being contested with one independent retaining 
his seat and three members of the ruling PRDS gaining seats as nominal 
independents. The first female candidate was elected to the Senate.
    Elections are held by secret ballot. At polling places on election 
day, registered citizens receive a package of color-coded cards, 
containing one card for each candidate. Each citizen votes by entering 
a booth where they place the card of their candidate of choice into a 
sealed envelope. Voters then deposit the envelope into a sealed ballot 
box in front of observers from each political party. The unused cards 
are discarded on the floor. Although voters could in theory take the 
unused cards out of the polling place with them, the ready availability 
of many unused cards on the floor makes unused cards worthless as 
evidence of how a voter has voted and effectively eliminates the 
potential for abuse in such a multiple ballot system. A countrywide 
census, taken at the end of 1998, designed to register all citizens and 
standardize the current complex system of names, also was aimed in part 
at providing the basis for free and fair elections. In April the 
Government began the distribution of identity cards which is intended 
to form the basis for voter registration in future elections.
    The country is divided into 12 provinces that are divided further 
into prefectures. The Government appoints the Walis (governors) and 
Hakems (prefects). Municipal councils are elected by general ballot, 
and they elect their mayors, usually the head of the majority party's 
list. Most government services are provided by the central Government. 
The elected councils are responsible for some public services, such as 
sanitation, and have fiscal autonomy and taxing power. Their 
administrative staff is independent of the Government. The councils 
elect the national Senate.
    Women have the right to vote, and formed the majority of voters in 
the 1997 presidential election; however, women are underrepresented in 
government and politics. Women occupy some senior government positions: 
Four cabinet level posts including the cabinet-level post in charge of 
informatics, one secretary-general post, two senior presidential 
advisors (including a Halpulaar), and four senior advisors to 
ministers. Women are well represented in the Secretariat of Women's 
Affairs, including a number from minority ethnic groups. There are four 
female members of the National Assembly, and one newly elected Senator. 
Three of the 14 members of the Executive Bureau of the ruling PRDS are 
women, and a woman heads the UDP party, a part of the ruling coalition.
    Haratines, Halpulaars, Soninkes, and Wolofs are underrepresented in 
senior government positions. Of the Government's 20 ministerial posts, 
3 incumbents are Haratine, 2 are Halpulaar,
    1 is Soninke, and 1 is mixed White Moor/Soninke; the remaining 13 
are of either White Moor or mixed White Moor/Haratine ethnicity (see 
Section 5). The full 28-member Cabinet, including secretaries of state, 
has 4 Haratines, 3 Halpulaars,
    1 Soninke, and 1 mixed White Moor/Soninke. The 56-member Senate has 
3 Haratines, 4 Halpulaars, 3 Soninkes, and the remaining 46 are of 
either White Moor or mixed White Moor/Haratine heritage. The 79-member 
National Assembly has 2 Haratines, 7 Halpulaars, 2 Soninkes, and 1 
Wolof.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are three human rights organizations concerned with overall 
human rights issues, only one of which operates with official 
government registration. The oldest is the Mauritanian League for Human 
Rights (LMDH), an independent, government-recognized body. A second 
organization, the Mauritanian Human Rights Association (AMDH), is still 
unrecognized (see Section 2.b.). While not affiliated with the 
opposition, the AMDH has many opposition members. The AMDH has been 
more critical of the Government than the LMDH, particularly on the 
unresolved abuses of the 1989-91 period. The International Study and 
Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social Development in 
Africa (GERDDES-Africa) established a branch in Mauritania in 1994 that 
has not been officially recognized. The Government has not responded to 
the applications of these organizations, on the grounds that they are 
ethnically based organizations that are in violation of the law and 
divisive; however, the unrecognized organizations continued to carry 
out their activities unimpeded.
    Other organizations, including 14 unregistered associations, also 
address human rights issues. Two groups, SOS-Esclaves and the National 
Committee for the Struggle Against the Vestiges of Slavery in 
Mauritania, focus their efforts on overcoming the country's vestiges of 
slavery (see Section 6.c.). SOS-Esclaves is particularly active in 
claiming that slavery remains pervasive and appealing to national and 
international audiences to contribute to its eradication. SOS-Esclaves 
leader Boubacar Ould Messoud traveled abroad freely in 1999 and made 
such claims during a speaking tour; however, during the year, Messoud 
did not conduct speaking tours and there were no reports of SOS-
Esclaves activities.
    Attention to the events of 1989 through 1991 resurfaced following 
the arrest on July 3 of Captain Ely Ould Dah in France and his 
subsequent return on April 4 to the country. Ould Dah, who had been 
undergoing training at the French Army College, was accused by two 
Mauritanians resident in France of torturing them in 1990 (see Section 
1.c.). He was arrested under the International Convention Against 
Torture despite a general amnesty passed by Parliament in 1993. The 
Government reacted strongly to what it considered an infringement on 
its sovereignty by a French court and refused entry to a French 
prosecutor who sought to gather information to support the charges. 
Ould Dah was released on bail in September 1999 and was awaiting trial 
when he returned illegally on April 4 to Mauritania. The arrest and 
Dah's subsequent return engendered public debate on ways to further 
national reconciliation (see Section 1.c.).
    The Committee of Solidarity with the Victims of Repression in 
Mauritania is concerned with the plight of the 1989 expellees. The 
Consultative Group for the Return of the Refugees was founded to 
promote the return of the remaining Mauritanian refugees in Senegal. 
The Collective of Worker Victims of the 1989 Events seeks redress for 
government employees who lost their jobs in the events of 1989. The 
Committee of the Widows and the Collective of Survivors focus on the 
sufferings of the victims of the 1990-91 military purge and their 
families. The Collective of Survivors of Political Detention and 
Torture was established in 1996 to seek redress for abuses committed 
during the 1986-87 period. These groups and other groups of individuals 
with common concerns function openly and actively, but their efforts 
are circumscribed somewhat because they are not recognized officially 
(see Section 2.b.). The Coalition of Human Rights NGO's is an umbrella 
organization for 12 of these organizations; it represents the group in 
various forums, including representations to foreign embassies.
    The only international association concerned with human rights to 
visit the country during the year was the ICRC, which makes routine 
annual visits. In July after consulting with international 
developmental NGO's, both houses of the Parliament passed legislation 
governing the procedures and conditions under which international NGO's 
can conduct business in the country. The Executive signed the 
legislation in July, and at year's end legislation was awaiting a 
decree that would put it into force. This legislation would facilitate 
the legal right for NGO's to conduct their work by providing for duty 
free imports, licensing of vehicles, and other provisions. 
International development NGO's have been working without governing 
legislation.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality before the law for all 
citizens, regardless of race, national origin, sex, or social status, 
and prohibits racial or ethnic propaganda. In practice the Government 
often favors individuals on the basis of ethnic and tribal affiliation, 
social status, and political ties. Societal discrimination against 
women, strongly rooted in traditional society, is endemic, although the 
situation continued to improve.
    Women.--Human rights monitors and female lawyers report that 
physical mistreatment of women by their husbands is rare, particularly 
among the Moor population. The police and judiciary occasionally 
intervene in domestic abuse cases, but women in traditional society 
rarely seek legal redress, relying instead upon family and ethnic group 
members to resolve domestic disputes. The incidence of reported rape is 
low; it occurs, but newspaper accounts of attacks are rare.
    Women have legal rights to property and child custody, and, among 
the more modern and urbanized population, these rights are recognized. 
By local tradition, a woman's first marriage, but not subsequent 
marriages, requires parental consent. In accordance with Shari'a 
(Islamic law) as applied in the country (see Section 1.e.), marriage 
and divorce do not require the woman's consent, polygyny is allowed, 
and a woman does not have the right to refuse her husband's wish to 
marry additional wives. In practice polygyny is very rare among Moors 
but common among other ethnic groups. Arranged marriages are also 
increasingly rare, particularly among the Moor population. Women 
frequently initiate the termination of a marriage, which most often is 
done by husband or wife by repudiation rather than divorce. It is also 
common in Moor society for a woman to obtain, at the time of marriage, 
a contractual agreement that stipulates that her husband must agree to 
end their marriage if he chooses an additional wife. The rate of 
divorce among Moors is estimated to be 37 percent, and the remarriage 
rate after divorce is 72.5 percent.
    Women still face some legal discrimination. For example, the 
testimony of two women is necessary to equal that of one man, and the 
value placed on women's lives in court-awarded indemnities is only half 
the amount awarded for a man's death (see Section 1.e.). However, women 
do not face legal discrimination in areas not specifically addressed by 
Shari'a. The Secretariat for Women's Affairs works with many NGO's and 
cooperatives to improve the status of women. A booklet published late 
in 1996 advises women of their rights. The Government, women's groups, 
and national and international NGO's organized meetings, seminars, and 
workshops throughout the year to publicize women's rights.
    The Government seeks to open new employment opportunities for women 
in areas that traditionally were filled by men, such as health care, 
communications, police, and customs services. Women became more 
involved in the fishing industry and established several women's 
fishing cooperatives. In 1999 for the first time, women were hired by 
the army to serve as police inspectors and customs officials. In June 
the first female Acting Police Commissioner was appointed in the 
capital; she was also serving as Chief Investigator in the same police 
station at year's end. Seventy jurists and female lawyers established 
an association of female jurists and, under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Justice, organized their first national congress dedicated 
to the legal concerns of women.
    The law provides that men and women receive equal pay for equal 
work. While not universally applied in practice, the two largest 
employers, the civil service and the state mining company, respect this 
law. In the modern wage sector, women also receive family benefits, 
including 3 months of maternity leave.
    Children.--The Government does not require attendance at school, 
primarily because it lacks the financial resources to provide 
educational facilities and teachers throughout the country, especially 
in remote areas; however, education receives the largest share of the 
national budget at 11.3 percent. The Government has made universal 
primary education a priority; however, there was no increase in 
attendance from the previous year, in which the school enrollment rate 
was 86 percent. There are no legal restrictions on the education of 
girls. Girls constituted 48.8 percent of all children enrolled in 
school in 1998. Some 84 percent of school-age girls attended elementary 
school in 1998 and 1999, up from 44.8 percent in 1990 (compared with 88 
percent for boys, up from 58.3 percent). At the secondary level, female 
students constituted 37.4 percent of those enrolled. Despite these 
increases, enrollment in eastern Mauritania, the Brakna, and along the 
Senegal River remained at a lower level. The Government introduced a 
special countrywide program in 1995and 1996 to boost female enrollment 
at the elementary level. Female students made up 17 percent of the 
university's 1998-99 enrollment, compared with 9 percent in 1990. 
Female students also constituted 30.5 percent of students enrolled in 
technical schools, compared with 2 percent in 1990. The literacy rate 
for women is 36 percent compared with 50 percent for men. Almost all 
children, regardless of sex or ethnic group, attend Koranic school from 
the ages of 5 to 7 and gain at least rudimentary skills in reading and 
writing Arabic (see Section 2.c.)
    The law makes special provision for the protection of children's 
welfare, and the Government has programs to care for abandoned 
children; however, these programs are hampered by inadequate funding. 
Local NGO's estimate that there are over 253 street children. The 
Government relies on foreign donors in such areas as child 
immunization. Moreover it does not enforce existing child labor laws, 
and children perform a significant amount of labor in the informal 
sector in support of family activities (see Section 6.d.).
    Traditional forms of mistreatment of females continue, mostly in 
isolated rural communities, but these practices appear to be on the 
decline. One form of such mistreatment is the forced feeding of 
adolescent girls (gavage) which is practiced only among the Moors. 
Experts previously estimated that between 60 and 70 percent of women 
experienced gavage but now conclude that very few Moor women continue 
to experience gavage. The change in figures appears to reflect both 
prior overestimation and a significant decline in the practice in 
recent years. While there is no law prohibiting gavage, the Government 
has made it a policy to end the practice. The Government continued 
intensive media and educational campaigns against gavage during the 
year in the Government print and broadcast media and through public 
seminars.
    Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is practiced among all ethnic groups except the 
Wolof. It is performed most often on young girls, often on the seventh 
day after birth and almost always before the age of 6 months. A March 
1996 report by the United Nations Population Fund and a study published 
in 1997 by Jeune Afrique Economie cited the country as one in which 25 
percent of women undergo FGM. Among Halpulaar women, over 95 percent 
undergo FGM. Preliminary results of a foreign-funded study indicate 
that 66 percent of those who perform FGM recognize that the practice is 
detrimental to women's health, and 54 percent of imams agree that the 
practice is dangerous. Local experts agree that the least severe form 
of excision is practiced, and not infibulation, the most severe form of 
FGM. The practice of FGM has decreased in the modern urban sector.
    The Government continued intensive media and educational campaigns 
against FGM during the year. It is a clear public policy of the 
Government, through the Secretariat of Women's Affairs, that FGM should 
be eliminated, and the Government bars hospitals from performing it. 
Public health workers and NGO's educate women to the dangers of FGM and 
to the fact that FGM is not a requirement of Islam. For example, a 1996 
officially produced Guide to the Rights of Women in Mauritania (with 
religious endorsement) stresses that Islam does not require FGM and 
that, if medical experts warn against it for medical reasons, it should 
not be done. The campaign against FGM appears to be changing attitudes 
towards the practice, according to several women's rights experts.
    People with Disabilities.--The law does not provide specifically 
for the disabled, and the Government does not mandate preference in 
employment or education or public accessibility for disabled persons. 
However, it does provide some rehabilitation and other assistance for 
the disabled. NGO's have become increasingly active in raising public 
awareness of issues affecting the disabled. In 1974 the Government 
opened the first school for the deaf and the blind in Nouakchott. It 
became more active in 1986, and during the year it operated 6 
classrooms and enrolled 35 students (20 girls and 15 boys); however, 
they lack trained staff. During the year, the school obtained the 
services of a volunteer expert who provided professional training for 
the staff.
    There is no societal discrimination against the disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic minorities and low-caste 
individuals among all ethnic groups confront societal discrimination. 
Ethnic and cultural tension and discrimination arise from the 
geographic and cultural line between traditionally nomadic Arabic-
speaking (Hassaniya) Moor herders and Peuhl herders of the Halpulaar 
group in the north and center, and sedentary cultivators of the 
Halpulaar (Toucouleur), Soninke, and Wolof ethnic groups in the south. 
Although culturally homogeneous, the Moors are divided among numerous 
ethno-linguistic clan groups and are racially distinguished as Beydane 
and Haratine, or White Moors and Black Moors, though it is often 
difficult to distinguish between the two groups by skin color. The 
majority of those known as Black Moors are Haratine, literally ``one 
who has been freed,'' although some Black Moor families never were 
enslaved. ``White'' Moors, large numbers of whom are dark-skinned after 
centuries of intermarriage with members of Sub-Saharan African groups, 
dominate positions in government and business. The Halpulaar (the 
largest non-Moor group), the Wolof, and the Soninke ethnic groups are 
concentrated in the south and are underrepresented in the military and 
security sectors.
    A number of accounts indicate that redistribution of southern 
farmland to Moors since the acceleration of desertification in the 
1970's has contributed to tensions between Moors and southern-based 
ethnic groups. Although much of the Government's redistribution of land 
has been from southerners to southerners, some Moors have been 
resettled in the south. Ethnic tensions surfaced dramatically in the 
mass expulsions of southern-based ethnic groups--mostly Halpulaars--in 
1989 and 1990 and the purge of Halpulaars from the military in 1991. 
Few regained their positions; however, tensions have lessened.
    The Constitution designates Arabic along with Pulaar, Soninke, and 
Wolof as Mauritania's national languages. However, successive 
governments--both civil and military--have pursued various policies of 
``Arabization'' in the schools and in the workplace. Non-Arabic-
speaking ethnic groups have protested this policy, as have Arabic-
speaking groups that want their children to obtain a bilingual Arabic-
French education.
    In April 1999, the National Assembly approved educational reforms 
to replace the separate track Arabic-French system of education, which 
had been in place for 20 years, with a unified system for all citizens 
in which both French and Arabic would be the languages of instruction 
for all students. Under the separate track system, Moors generally 
attended Arabic language schools, while Halpulaars, Soninke, and Wolof 
attended French-language schools. The Government concluded that the 
separate track system had contributed to ethnic divisions. Reversion to 
the previous unified system, with all students attending the same 
schools, is expected to promote social cohesion. The reform also 
provides for English and civics to be introduced at an early stage. The 
promotion of other national languages, previously included at the 
elementary level, was moved to the university level.
    Ethnic rivalry contributed significantly to political divisions and 
tensions. Some political parties tend to have readily identifiable 
ethnic bases, although political coalitions among them are increasingly 
important. The acceleration of desertification during the 1970's that 
destroyed much of the traditional economic basis of Moorish society, 
and an upsurge of Arab nationalism among White Moors during the 1980's, 
contributed to explosive ethnic violence precipitated by a dispute with 
Senegal during 1989-91; this violence entailed the expulsion or flight 
of many non-Moors living in the south and occupation of much of their 
land by Moors, including Black Moors. Interethnic bitterness and 
hostility persists, and continues to be aggravated by climatic, land, 
and population pressures.
    A number of accounts suggest that some members of the long-dominant 
White Moor community, which traditionally enslaved darker skinned 
groups, may continue to expect or desire servility on the part of 
members of the generally darker Black Moors and southern ethnic groups, 
and that such attitudes may impede efforts to build a nondiscriminatory 
society and to eliminate the vestiges and consequences of slavery, 
goals to which both the Government and major opposition parties are 
committed. There are indications that racism on the part of some White 
Moors may have contributed both to the persistence of vestiges and 
consequences of past White Moor enslavement of Black Moors, and to the 
expulsions and reported dispossession of members of darker southern 
ethnic groups with no tradition of servility to White Moors. However, 
southern-based ethnic groups and Black Moors have manifested little 
racial solidarity socially or politically, and racial differences did 
not contribute either to historical slavery or to the persistence of 
its vestiges and consequences among southern-based ethnic groups.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom 
of association and the right of citizens to join any political or labor 
organization. All workers except members of the military and police are 
free to associate in and establish unions at the local and national 
levels.
    Prior to the 1993 amendment of the Labor Code, which repealed 
provisions restricting trade union pluralism, the governmentcontrolled 
labor confederation, the Union of Mauritania Workers (UTM), was the 
only labor confederation allowed by law. However, there are now three 
labor confederations; the Union of Mauritanian Workers (UTM), the 
General Confederation of Mauritanian Workers (CGTM), and the Free 
Confederation of Mauritanian Workers (CLTM). There are also four 
unaffiliated professionally based labor unions. The oldest of the three 
confederations, UTM, still is viewed by many workers as closely allied 
with the Government and the PRDS. It has lost ground to the CGTM, which 
was recognized in 1994 with 23 member unions, and the CLTM, which was 
founded in 1995 and recognized in 1998. The CGTM is not affiliated with 
any party, although most of its members tend to favor the opposition. 
The CLTM is associated with the opposition party, Action for Change.
    The Government provides funds to the confederations in proportion 
to their memberships. All three confederations supplied representatives 
to the country's four labor tribunals, and were included in most 
government deliberative or consultative bodies. Several independent 
trade unions, in particular three for teachers at the elementary, 
secondary, and university levels, also were active.
    The bulk of the labor force is in the informal sector, with most 
workers engaged in subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry; only 
25 percent are employed in the wage sector. However, nearly 90 percent 
of industrial and commercial workers are organized. The law provides 
workers with the right to strike. It also provides for tripartite 
arbitration committees composed of union, business, and government 
representatives. Once all parties agree to arbitration, the committee 
may impose binding arbitration that automatically terminates any 
strike. There were no strikes or work stoppages during the year. In 
September a dockers'' union of the CLTM threatened a strike during 
negotiations, but a settlement was reached before the date set for the 
strike.
    International trade union activity increased. The Government 
included CGTM, UTM, and CLTM representatives in its delegation to the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) in June. The national syndicates 
continued to organize training workshops for their memberships 
throughout the country.
    Unions are free to affiliate internationally. The UTM participates 
in regional labor organizations. The CGTM and UTM are both members of 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTU). The UTM 
has been accepted into the Organization of African Trade Union Unity 
(OATUU), but the CGTM's application was not accepted, as the OATUU only 
accepts one member union from each country.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides that unions may organize workers freely without government or 
employer interference. General or sectoral agreements on wages, working 
conditions, and social and medical benefits are negotiated in 
tripartite discussion and formalized by government decree. Wages and 
other benefits also can be negotiated bilaterally between employer and 
union and the results of such negotiations are filed with the 
Directorate of Labor.
    Laws provide workers with protection against antiunion 
discrimination and employees or employers may bring labor disputes to 
three-person labor tribunals administered jointly by the Ministries of 
Justice and Labor with the participation of union and employer 
representatives.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
all forms of slavery and forced and bonded labor; however, the 
Government does not enforce this prohibition effectively. Citizens 
continue to suffer the effects and consequences of the practice of 
slavery over generations and of caste distinctions including the 
traditional existence of a slave caste in both Moor and southern 
communities. Slavery was abolished officially three times in 
Mauritania, most recently by the post-independence government in 1980. 
Even before 1980, the practice of slavery among the traditionally 
pastoralist Moors had been greatly reduced by the accelerated 
desertification of the 1970's; many White Moors dismissed their former 
Black Moor slaves because the depletion of their herds left them unable 
either to employ or to feed slaves. However, widespread slavery also 
was traditional among ethnic groups of the largely nonpastoralist 
south, where it had no racial origins or overtones; masters and slaves 
alike were black. The south has suffered less from desertification, and 
some reports identify it as the region in which vestiges and 
consequences of slavery may persist most strongly.
    A system of officially sanctioned slavery in which government and 
society join to force individuals to serve masters does not exist. 
There has been no open trading in slaves for many years; however, there 
continued to be unconfirmed reports that slavery in the form of forced 
and involuntary servitude may persist in some isolated areas. 
Unofficial voluntary servitude persists, with some former slaves 
continuing to work for former masters in exchange for monetary or 
nonmonetary benefits such as lodging, food, or medical care. Many 
persons, including some from all ethnic groups, still use the 
designation of slave in referring to themselves or others. The reasons 
for the persistence of such practices appear to be economic, 
psychological, and religious, although they vary widely and may be 
quite different among pastoralist or formerly pastoralist Moors from 
what they are among the southerners and the less numerous 
nonpastoralist Moors. Poverty, persistent drought, and a weak economy 
provide few economic alternatives for many and leave some former slaves 
vulnerable to possible exploitation by former masters. There are 
reports that some former slaves in some sedentary communities have 
continued to work for their former masters or others in order to retain 
access to the land they traditionally farmed, although the law provides 
for distribution of land to the landless including to former slaves, 
and this law has been enforced in many cases (see Section 1.f.). In 
addition to their usual compensation, some former slaves, who continue 
to work for former masters, also receive gifts on important family 
occasions such as births, marriages, and deaths. Deeply embedded 
psychological and tribal bonds also make it difficult for many 
individuals who have generations of forebears who were slaves to break 
their bonds with former masters or their tribes. Finally, because of 
the belief that their slave status had been religiously ordained, some 
individuals continue to link themselves to former masters for fear of 
religious sanction if that bond is broken.
    Adults cannot be obliged by law to remain with former masters nor 
can they be returned if they leave. However, adult females with 
children may have greater difficulties and may be compelled by 
pressures other than physical force to remain in a condition of 
servitude. For example, in some cases, especially where the former 
master claims to be the father, former masters refuse to allow children 
to accompany their mothers when the mother leaves the master. In most 
cases involving custody disputes between former masters and former 
female slaves the courts have been instructed by the Minister of 
Justice to rule in favor of the women, and in virtually all custody 
cases the courts have ruled for the women. In other cases, the greater 
economic responsibility of supporting a family may be the principal 
impediment to a woman seeking a new life. Children's legal status is 
more tenuous than that of adults. There have been no reports of sales 
or ``transfer'' of children or other individuals from one employer or 
master to another since 1996, when there were occasional confirmed 
cases of transfers; however, reports of sales are rare, cannot be 
confirmed, and appear to be confined to past years.
    The legacy of caste distinctions continues to affect the status and 
opportunities available to various groups. In some groups, for example, 
individuals of a higher caste who seek to marry someone of a lower 
caste may be barred by their families or by the community, and in 
Soninke communities members of the slave caste cannot be buried in the 
same cemetery as other castes.
    NGO positions on the existence of slavery are not uniform. For 
example, SOS-Esclaves in an April 1997 report characterized slavery as 
a persistent social reality, whose occurrence among disadvantaged 
classes is far from negligible (see Section 4). The Organization of 
African Unity's (OAU) African Commission on Human and People's Rights 
issued a report in June 1997 that disputed the conclusions of the April 
1997 SOS-Esclaves report. While allowing for the possibility of 
isolated cases of slavery in the remote countryside, the Commission 
concluded that slavery does not exist as an institution and that the 
persistence of vestiges of slavery was the more convincing explanation 
of social relations. Anti-Slavery International has stated that there 
is insufficient evidence one way or the other to conclude whether or 
not slavery exists, and that an in-depth, long-term study was required 
to determine whether the practice continues.
    Problems related to the vestiges and consequences of slavery 
usually enter the public domain in judicial cases, most often in the 
form of child custody and inheritance disputes between former masters 
and former slaves or their descendants. However, court adjudication of 
such cases is rare. Several inheritance disputes between Haratines and 
the descendants of their former master were adjudicated in court in 
recent years. Most such disputes were decided in accordance with the 
law, as the courts ruled that the descendants of the former slaves 
should inherit their property. However, in some cases involving land 
tenure, courts reportedly did not uphold the property rights of former 
slaves. In June the land of several Black Moor families, some of whom 
were former slaves, in the Dar El Barka and Boghe communes was 
confiscated by the Wali (Governor) for redistribution to his relatives 
and supporters. The Haratines held protest demonstrations during which 
several of them were beaten and detained by the police (see Sections 
1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.). The Government sanctioned the Governor by 
removing him from his post. The new Governor was considering returning 
the land to the Haratine communes, but had not done so by year's end.
    A case involving a former master, who was awarded custody of three 
children in early 1997 because he was deemed to be the father, was 
resolved by mediation in 1999, with the children living with their 
mothers in Nouakchott. The determination of such cases is problematic 
in a country where there is polygyny, ``secret'' marriages, no written 
records, and divorce by repudiation. The courts are prepared to pursue 
the concept of genetic testing to determine paternity, but no such 
cases have yet been brought.
    Three NGO's--SOS-Esclaves, the National Committee for the Struggle 
Against the Vestiges of Slavery in Mauritania, and the Initiative for 
the Support of the Activities of the President--focused on issues 
related to the history of slavery in Mauritania. Of these SOS-Esclaves 
was particularly active in bringing to public attention cases in which 
it found the rights of former slaves to have been abridged and in 
assisting former slaves in their difficulties with former masters. 
Other human rights and civic action NGO's also follow this issue 
closely. The independent press, which includes journals that are 
published by Haratines and southern-based ethnic groups who emphasize 
issues of importance to these ethnic groups, is also quick to report 
any incident that comes to its attention in which the rights of former 
slaves have not been respected.
    The Government focuses on education, literacy, and agrarian reform 
as the main means to eradicate the vestiges of slavery and deal with 
its consequences. The Government has raised the level of primary school 
attendance from 45 percent in 1986 to 85 percent in 1999. Classes are 
fully integrated, including boys and girls from all social and ethnic 
groups. In recent years, the Government's record in cases in which an 
individual's civil rights were adversely affected because of status as 
a former slave was weak. When complaints were filed with the Government 
to remedy cases involving detention of individuals against their will, 
the Government intervened in accordance with the law, although 
sometimes only after considerable prodding and passage of time. In May 
1999, the Government created a new cabinet post, the Commissariat for 
Human Rights, Poverty Alleviation, and Integration. A major focus of 
the commissariat is to address the vestiges and consequences of 
slavery.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and, unlike 
in the previous year, there were no reports that it occurred.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code states explicitly that children must not be 
employed before the age of 14 in the nonagricultural sector unless the 
Minister of Labor grants an exception due to local circumstances. The 
Government has a functional labor inspectorate empowered to refer 
violations directly to the appropriate judicial authorities. The 
Government lacks sufficient resources to enforce existing child labor 
laws (see Section 5).
    Labor law specifies that no child under the age of 13 may be 
employed in the agricultural sector without the permission of the 
Minister of Labor, nor under the age of 14 in the nonagricultural 
sector. The law states that employed children between the ages of 14 
and 16 should receive 70 percent of the minimum wage, and that those 
between the ages of 17 and 18 should receive 90 percent of the minimum 
wage. Young children in the countryside commonly pursue herding, 
cultivation, fishing, and other significant labor in support of their 
families' activities. In keeping with longstanding tradition, many 
children serve apprenticeships in small industries and in the informal 
sector. There is no child labor in the modern industrial sector.
    On July 12, the Government signed ILO Convention 182 against the 
worse forms of child labor; the Convention was ratified in December by 
the Parliament. The Government organized a national campaign in August 
to publicize the rights of children including pertinent labor 
regulations and the objective of universal education.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and, 
unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that it occurred.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage for 
adults is $48.36 (9,872 ouguiya). It is difficult for the average 
family to meet minimum needs and maintain a decent standard of living 
at this salary.
    The standard, legal, nonagricultural workweek may not exceed either 
40 hours or 6 days without overtime compensation, which is paid at 
rates that are graduated according to the number of supplemental hours 
worked. Domestic workers and certain other categories work 56 hours. 
The Labor Directorate of the Ministry of Labor is responsible for 
enforcement of the labor laws, but in practice inadequate funding 
limits the effectiveness of the Directorate's enforcement.
    The Ministry of Labor also is responsible for enforcing safety 
standards but does so inconsistently, due to inadequate funding. In 
principle workers can remove themselves from hazardous conditions 
without risking loss of employment; in practice, they cannot.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
through, to, or within the country.
                               __________

                               MAURITIUS

    The Republic of Mauritius, a parliamentary democracy since 1968, is 
governed by a prime minister, a council of ministers, and a national 
assembly. The President, who is nominated by the Prime Minister and 
confirmed by the National Assembly, serves as Head of State, with 
largely ceremonial powers. National and local elections, supervised by 
an independent commission, take place at regular intervals. According 
to international and local observers, the national elections, held on 
September 11, were free and fair, and resulted in a victory for an 
opposition coalition, the Mauritian Socialist Movement/Militant 
Mauritian Movement (MSM/MMM). There are numerous political parties, and 
partisan politics are open and robust. The judiciary is independent.
    A paramilitary Special Mobile Force under civilian control is 
responsible for internal security. This force, commanded by the 
Commissioner of Police, is backed by a general duty police force. Both 
forces are largely apolitical, but were criticized for being 
inadequately trained to prevent and control rioting that broke out 
nationwide in February 1999. Some members of the security forces 
committed serious human rights abuses.
    The economy is based on labor-intensive, export-oriented 
manufacturing (mainly textiles), as well as sugar and tourism. The 
standard of living is high, with a per capita gross domestic product of 
$3,274 per year. The Government is diversifying the economy by 
promoting investment in new sectors such as information technology and 
financial services.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. There was at 
least one extrajudicial killing by police, and judicial inquiries were 
ongoing in at least eight cases of deaths in police custody. There 
continued to be occasional reports that police abused suspects and 
detainees and delayed suspects'' access to defense counsel. The 
Government's monopoly in broadcasting local news and programming 
continued. In some cases, police restricted freedom of assembly. 
Although the law to establish a national human rights commission to 
investigate complaints against the police, including allegations of 
police brutality, went into effect in February 1999, the commission was 
not established by year's end. Violence and discrimination against 
women and abuse of children continued to be problems. There were some 
restrictions on the rights of workers in the export processing zone 
(EPZ). Child labor and forced child prostitution remained problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated killings; however, police committed at 
least one extrajudicial killing.
    In January in the southern part of the country, police shot and 
killed Rajen Sabapathee, a prisoner who escaped in August 1999; two 
police officers were wounded in the exchange of shots. No action was 
taken against the police officials.
    In November four men were found guilty and sentenced to life in 
prison for setting a May 1999 fire at a Chinese social club in Port 
Louis that resulted in seven deaths (see Section 5).
    On March 23, 1999, the Prime Minister responded to a parliamentary 
question and stated that eight detainees had been found dead in police 
cells between January 1, 1998, and February 28, 1999. The deaths were 
under investigation at year's end (see Section 1.c.). Additionally, 
three persons died in prison in August and November 1999, and three 
more persons died in prison in February and April (see Section 1.c.). 
None of these deaths were reported as involving police abuse; all 
investigations have been closed; however, at year's end, the Government 
had made no official response.
    The judicial inquiry continued into the February 1999 death in 
police custody of a popular Creole singer, Kaya. Kaya's death sparked 3 
days of rioting in February 1999 during which police shot and killed 
three protesters, one police officer died of cardiac arrest, and shops, 
homes, and churches were burned and looted, resulting in an estimated 
$50 million (1,250 million rupees) in damages. Following a second 
inquiry into the death of another Creole musician, who was shot and 
killed by police during the February 1999 riots, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions recommended in May that disciplinary proceedings be 
introduced against the three police officers accused of the killing of 
the second musician. In October the Government released a report on the 
riots compiled by a judicial commission. The report criticized the 
previous Government and the police for their handling of the riots; it 
also criticized some opposition politicians and Creole activists for 
inciting some of the riots. Although the commission did not investigate 
Kaya's death, it criticized the police for holding the musician in a 
high security area although the crime he was accused of did not warrant 
it (see Section 5.) At year's end, the investigation into the death of 
Kaya continued; however, no actions were taken with regard to any of 
the deaths that occurred during the riots.
    Little progress was made in resolving the case of a person who died 
in police custody in 1996. An April 1998 preliminary inquiry into the 
case did not result in any charges being filed against police officers. 
Human rights lawyers asserted that the police were attempting to 
conceal the facts surrounding the death and were not conducting 
thorough, unbiased investigations.
    On December 4, authorities arrested Hizbullah leader Mohammad 
Fakemeeah (also known as Cehl Meeah) and charged him with the killings 
of three rival Muslim political activists during the 1996 municipal 
election campaign (see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.). By year's end, police 
had arrested three other Hizbullah members in connection with the 
killings. In two separate incidents in December, four other suspects 
committed suicide rather than surrender to police. Trials for all four 
suspects were pending at year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and inhuman punishment, and 
authorities generally respected this prohibition; however, there 
continued to be complaints of abuses by the police. The most frequent 
form of alleged police abuse is the use of force to coerce a suspect to 
sign a confession.
    On December 4, police arrested Hizbullah leader Cehl Meeah for a 
1996 killing (see Section 1.a.). Supporters alleged that police 
mistreated Meeah in detention; Meeah was hospitalized on December 6 for 
observation and x rays. The police commissioner appointed a high-level 
committee to investigate the allegations (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
    In October and November, approximately a dozen individuals detained 
by the Central Investigative Division (CID) of the police on suspicion 
of crimes including armed robbery and murder reported that police had 
beaten them during interrogation. In December the Commissioner of 
Police opened an investigation into the complaints; however, at year's 
end, no results had been announced.
    In November officials of an antidrug squad detained a foreign 
national for 2 days, verbally abused him, and subjected him twice to 
intrusive body cavity searches and drug testing (see Section 1.d.).
    A judicial inquiry was ongoing into the circumstances behind the 
February 1999 death in police custody of the popular singer Kaya (see 
Section 1.a.).
    In response to the eight reported deaths in police custody between 
January 1, 1998, and February 28, 1999 (see Section 1.a.), the 
Commissioner of Police established in October 1999 a Complaints 
Investigation Bureau (CIB) to investigate complaints against police; it 
is funded and staffed by the police. Since its inception, the CIB has 
received 587 complaints. The National Human Rights Commission (see 
Section 4), mandated by law in 1998 and scheduled to supervise the CIB, 
had not been formed at year's end.
    Prison conditions generally are adequate; however, there were some 
deaths in prison. Food, water, and medical care were available to all 
prisoners; sanitation was adequate. Women were held separately from 
men, and juveniles were held separately from adults. There were no 
reports of abuse of women or juveniles in prison.
    In February a terminally-ill prisoner died of pneumonia in the 
central prison outside Port Louis; at the time of his death, the 
prisoner's body reportedly was covered with bruises and scratches of 
unknown origin. In April a prisoner in police custody in the southern 
part of the country died of burns that he received when the mattress in 
his cell caught fire. Also in April, a prisoner died in the central 
prison; the cause of death initially was listed as death by cerebral 
pulmonary edema, but later was amended to be death by poisoning after 
authorities concluded laboratory analysis. Authorities still were 
investigating this death at year's end. In all of the other cases of 
deaths in prison subsequent to February 1999, police conducted 
investigations, and there were no reports of abuse or neglect (see 
Section 1.a.).
    The Government has permitted prison visits by foreign diplomats, 
the national Ombudsman, a team from the U.N. Human Rights Commission, 
and the press. The Government stated in 1999 that it would investigate 
conditions and treatment in police holding cells; however, it did not 
begin an investigation by year's end.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally 
observes these prohibitions. In most cases, suspects are provided 
prompt access to family and defense counsel; however, police in some 
cases delayed suspects'' access to defense counsel. Minors and those 
who did not know their rights were more likely not to be provided 
prompt access.
    In November officials of an antidrug squad detained a foreign 
national for 2 days, verbally abused him, and subjected him twice to 
intrusive body cavity searches and drug testing. The officials refused 
to allow him access to embassy officials; ultimately he was released 
without charge. No action was taken against the antidrug officials (see 
Section 1.c.).
    In April an investigation by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
revealed that authorities in the southern part of the country held a 
man suspected of murder in police custody for 2 years without formally 
charging him with a crime. A judicial inquiry is ongoing, but at year's 
end there were no results.
    In January the Government passed the Public Security Act, which 
would allow police with the rank of assistant superintendent and above 
to detain individuals without a warrant in any situation where the 
delay in obtaining a warrant may be prejudicial to public safety; 
however, the Government did not implement the law in response to public 
opposition. The then political opposition, which also opposed the bill, 
became the Government in September (see Section 2.b.) and, at year's 
end, had taken no action on the law.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does 
not use it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this 
provision in practice.
    The judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, which has 
appellate powers, and a series of lower courts. Final appeal may be 
made to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and the 
judiciary vigorously enforces this right. Defendants have the right to 
private or court-appointed counsel. In December the National Assembly 
passed a Dangerous Drugs Act, which allows law enforcement authorities 
to hold suspected drug traffickers for up to 36 hours without access to 
bail or legal counsel. At the same time, the National Assembly passed a 
constitutional amendment to permit the 36-hour detention of suspects 
without legal counsel. A similar Dangerous Drugs Act was passed in 
1995, but it had been undergoing judicial review because of its alleged 
conflict with the Constitution.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these provisions, and violations are 
subject to legal sanction. Both human rights lawyers and police 
authorities stated that illegal entry by the intelligence service had 
ceased. The acting Commissioner of Police stated that police do not use 
illegal wiretaps on telephones.
    In January the Government passed the Public Security Act, which 
would allow police of the rank of assistant superintendent and above to 
search any premises without a warrant in any situation where the delay 
in obtaining a warrant may be prejudicial to public safety; however, 
the Government did not implement the law in response to public 
opposition (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice.
    More than a dozen privately owned newspapers presented varying 
political viewpoints and expressed partisan views freely. The 
Government has the ability to counter press criticism by using strict 
libel laws; however, the Government has not invoked these measures to 
inhibit the press. Libel suits between private parties are common.
    The government monopoly in broadcasting local news and programming 
continued. In August the National Assembly passed legislation, the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, which created the Independent 
Broadcast Authority (IBA). The IBA's mandate is to regulate and license 
all radio and television broadcasting, and the law provides for private 
ownership of broadcasting stations and the independence of the IBA. 
However, the IBA is to be composed of representatives of several 
government ministries and will be chaired by an appointee of the Prime 
Minister. The IBA is also subject to the Prime Minister on matters of 
national security and public order; however, at year's end, it had not 
been created. One private news organization began local news broadcasts 
in July 1998 on the Internet, thereby circumventing the ban on private 
party television or radio local news broadcasts. Foreign international 
news services, such as the United Kingdom's Sky News, France's Canal 
Plus, and Cable News Network, are available to the public by 
subscription.
    Opposition and media observers criticized the state-owned Mauritius 
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) for supporting the governing alliance in 
the September 11 election campaign. The new Government stated following 
the elections that it would depoliticize the MBC. Representatives of 
the Mauritian Journalists Association noted in October that broadcast 
journalists reported less governmental pressure on their reporting, and 
the directors of the MBC met in November to discuss ways to make the 
MBC more apolitical; however, at year's end, no specific action had 
been taken.
    In 1999 the then opposition MSM/MMM, in a judicial challenge to the 
results of a September 1999 by-election, formally accused the MBC of 
providing biased coverage favoring the Government's candidate during 
the by-election campaign; the MBC rejected this charge. The Supreme 
Court postponed a hearing on this matter, which was scheduled for 
November 1999. The hearing was not rescheduled by year's end; and the 
MSM/MMM victory in the September election made further legal action 
unnecessary.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally 
respected this right in practice; however, police permission is 
required for demonstrations and mass meetings, and such permission was 
refused in certain cases during the year. However, there is a right of 
judicial appeal, and in one high-profile case in August during the 
election campaign, the Supreme Court overturned a decision not to 
permit a demonstration. In this case, police refused to allow a public 
gathering to discuss alleged corruption by then-government ministers. 
The Supreme Court overturned this refusal, stating that the threats of 
defamation and disturbing the peace were not sufficiently compelling to 
prohibit the gathering. While groups have the right to challenge 
denials, one group went ahead with its demonstration without police 
permission; police verbally reprimanded its organizer.I11In December 
supporters of Hizbullah leader Cehl Meeah demonstrated on two occasions 
to protest his alleged mistreatment while in police custody (see 
Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.c.). Police did not interfere with the 
demonstrations.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    In January the Government passed the Public Security Act, which 
would allow the Commissioner of Police to proscribe any organization 
believed to promote or engage in terrorism. The act also would allow 
police to arrest any group of 10 or more persons who riot or threaten 
to riot and to arrest any individual present at the scene of a riot. 
The Government did not implement the law in response to public 
opposition (see Section 1.d.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    The Government is generally secular in both name and practice; 
however, the previous administration favored the Hindu majority of the 
population.
    Foreign missionary groups are allowed to operate on a case-by-case 
basis. There are no government regulations detailing the conditions of 
their presence or limiting their proselytizing activities. Groups must 
obtain both a visa and a work permit for each missionary. Foreign 
missionaries sometimes are prohibited from residing in the country 
beyond 5 years (which would permit them to seek Mauritian citizenship), 
but religious organizations are permitted to send new missionaries to 
replace them.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign, Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government does not grant asylum to refugees in general on the 
grounds that the country is small, has limited resources, and does not 
wish to become a haven for large numbers of refugees. In 1999 the 
Government allowed a Seychelles citizen and his family to remain in the 
country while they sought asylum in another country; they were granted 
asylum in another country in March. In June two refugees from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo sought asylum. The U.N. High 
Commissioner on Refugees refused to grant them refugee status, and the 
Government expelled them to Zimbabwe at the end of July.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
    In November a group of citizens who are natives of the Chagos 
Archipelago (also known as the British Indian Ocean Territory) won a 
lawsuit against the British Government that claimed they had been 
removed illegally from their homeland in 1971. In response to the 
lawsuit, the British Government ruled that the Chagossians could return 
to the outer islands of the archipelago but not to Diego Garcia. The 
Chagossians planed to visit the islands in 2001 in preparation for 
their eventual return.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice. 
According to international and local observers, free and fair national 
elections based on universal suffrage were held on September 11, and 
the opposition MSM/MMM federation defeated the governing Labor Party/
Parti Mauricien Xavier Duval coalition. In December 1998, the National 
Assembly passed legislation granting voting rights in the general 
elections to the 300 residents of the island of Agalega; previously, 
they had not been represented in the National Assembly. This leaves 
only the residents of the island of Saint Brandon without suffrage. 
There are approximately 100 fishermen on 6- to 12-month contracts 
living on Saint Brandon.
    Women continued to be underrepresented in government and politics. 
Of the 70 National Assembly seats, 4 are held by women, and there is 1 
female minister. In the National Assembly, up to eight members are 
appointed through a ``best loser'' system to ensure that all ethnic 
groups are represented; there are eight such members.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction and actively investigate and publish their findings on 
human rights cases; these groups include Amnesty International, 
Transparency International, and SOS Femmes. Government officials 
cooperated with and responded to the views of human rights groups.
    The constitutionally mandated, autonomous Ombudsman investigates 
complaints of human rights abuses. The Ombudsman receives approximately 
500 complaints a year and presents an annual report to the Government 
that details the status of investigations into these complaints. A 
National Human Rights Commission, provided for by a 1998 law, had not 
been established by year's end. Authorities have not nominated a 
president of the commission, who according to the law, must be a former 
Supreme Court judge. The commission is to have three other members, of 
whom one must be a lawyer or a judge with 10 years of experience, and 
the other two must have experience in the human rights field. The 
commission is to investigate abuses by any public servant, but it 
cannot investigate complaints that are already the subject of an 
inquiry by the Ombudsman, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the 
Public Service Commission, or the Disciplined Forces Service 
Commission. The commission is to have the authority to visit centers of 
detention or prisons to assess and make recommendations on conditions. 
The commission first tries to resolve complaints through conciliation. 
If not successful, the commission can forward cases to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (if criminal in nature), to the service commissions 
for disciplinary measures, or to the responsible authority in question.
    Numerous international NGO's were active during the year, including 
Amnesty International, Transparency International, Rotary 
International, Soroptomist, and many others.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of race, caste, place of origin, political opinion, color, religion, or 
sex, and the Government generally respected these provisions.
    Women.--Violence against women, particularly spousal abuse, is a 
problem according to the Ministry of Women's Rights, Child Development, 
and Family Welfare, attorneys, and NGO's. The Protection from Domestic 
Violence Act, partially enacted in 1997, came into full force in 1998; 
it criminalized domestic violence and provided the judicial system with 
greater powers to combat this problem. In November the Ministry of 
Women's Rights, Child Development, and Family Welfare released a study 
on domestic violence conducted by independent consultants. The study 
stated that 6,367 cases of domestic violence were reported to 
authorities between September 1998 and August 1999. According to the 
study, 1,242 protection orders were issued against abusive partners in 
1999. According to officials, the number of reported spousal abuse 
cases has risen primarily due to a greater awareness of women's rights 
and the Government's readiness to enforce them. Nevertheless, many 
victims still choose not to prosecute or report their attacker, 
primarily due to cultural pressures. A UNICEF-funded study from 1998 
reported that alcohol was a contributing factor in 56 percent of 
domestic violence cases.
    Since women often depend on their spouses for financial security, 
many remain in abusive situations for fear of being unable to provide 
for their children as single parents. While a magistrate can order a 
spouse to pay child support, some spouses have stopped working in order 
to avoid payment. However, in 1998 several amendments to the Criminal 
Code were enacted that made it a crime to abandon one's family or a 
pregnant spouse for more than 2 months, not to pay court-ordered food 
support, or to engage in sexual harassment.
    Traditionally women have played subordinate roles in society, and 
societal discrimination continues; however, women have access to 
education, employment, and government services. The Minister of Women, 
Family Welfare, and Child Development stated in August 1999 that 25.8 
percent of managers are women.
    Children.--The Government placed strong emphasis on the health and 
welfare of children and displayed a commitment to expand educational 
opportunities for children. Education is free and mandatory until the 
age of 12; attendance at the primary level is 100 percent, but only 60 
percent of children attend school at the secondary level (which 
includes the ages from 12 to 19). In 1998 the former Government set a 
goal to increase this to age 15 once 60 new schools were authorized and 
built. The new Government has stated that it plans to increase 
mandatory education to the age of 16. The new Government confirmed 
plans for school construction, and sites for 20 new schools were 
identified during the year; however, no new schools had been built by 
year's end.
    In 1998 the Government began preparing a curriculum for human 
rights education to be introduced into social studies courses at the 
primary and secondary levels. The original goal was to implement the 
curriculum at the primary level in 1999 and at the secondary level in 
2002; however, the curriculum had not been implemented at either level 
by year's end.
    In 1998 the legislature passed additional provisions to the 
Protection of the Child Act, making certain acts compromising the 
health, security, or morality of children a crime. Under the act, child 
prostitution is criminalized, but only the adult is an offender and the 
child involved is given social aid. Child pornography also is 
criminalized, and the child is offered social aid while the adult 
offender is prosecuted.
    Although incidents of child abuse are reported, private voluntary 
organizations claim that the problem is more widespread than is 
acknowledged publicly. Most government programs are administered by the 
state-funded National Children's Council and the Ministry of Women's 
Rights, Family Welfare, and Child Development, which provides 
counseling, investigates reports of child abuse, and takes remedial 
action to protect affected children. In June the Ministry of Women's 
Rights, Child Development, and Family Welfare announced that 3,350 
cases of child abuse have been reported since 1997.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
government services. The law requires organizations that employ more 
than 10 persons to set aside at least 3 percent of their positions for 
the disabled. There is no law mandating access to public buildings or 
facilities. The law does not require that work sites be accessible to 
the disabled, making it difficult for persons with disabilities to fill 
many jobs.
    Religious Minorities.--Tensions between the Hindu majority and 
Christian, Creole, and Muslim minorities persisted; however, there were 
no violent confrontations during the year.
    Mauritius is a small island nation, and ethnic groups, known as 
``communities,'' are quite tightly knit. Intermarriage is relatively 
rare. An individual's name easily identifies his or her ethnic and 
religious background. There is a strong correlation between religious 
affiliation and ethnicity. Citizens of Indian ethnicity are usually 
Hindus or Muslims. Citizens of Chinese ancestry usually practice 
Buddhism and Catholicism. Creoles and citizens of European-descent are 
usually Catholic. However, there is a growing number of Hindu converts 
to evangelical Christian churches, a fact that is of growing concern to 
Hindu organizations.
    In December police arrested and charged the leader of the local 
chapter of Hizbullah, an international Shia Muslim group, Cehl Meeah 
and three others for the 1996 killing of three rival Muslim political 
activists (see Section 1.a.). On December 5 and 6, Hizbullah supporters 
demonstrated to protest the alleged mistreatment of Meeah while in 
custody (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Despite fears of unrest, there 
were no violent confrontations as a result of the arrest.
    In the wake of violent confrontations in February and May 1999 that 
were partially the result of ethnic tensions, the Government took steps 
to foster unity, including the establishment in October 1999 of an 
annual National Unity Award, which is given to individuals who have 
implemented programs that promote national unity. In April 1999, the 
President also formed a Committee for the Promotion of National Unity, 
which organized activities to foster goodwill between ethnic groups. In 
April 1999, the heads of the Catholic Diocese and the Hindu House 
recommended that the President establish an interreligious council; 
however, such a council had not been created by year's end.
    Some minorities, usually Creoles and Muslims, allege that a glass 
ceiling exists within the upper echelons of the civil service that 
prevents them from reaching the highest levels.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Tensions among the Hindu, 
Creole, Muslim, European, and Chinese communities persisted; however, 
there were no violent confrontations during the year. In February 1999, 
there were several days of rioting and interethnic confrontations after 
a popular Creole singer died in police custody, resulting in four 
deaths and approximately $50 million (1,250 million rupees) in property 
damage. In October the Government released a report on the riots 
compiled by a judicial commission. The report criticized the previous 
government and the police for its handling of the riots; it also 
criticized some opposition politicians and Creole activists for 
inciting some of the riots. The commission made general recommendations 
to the Government and the police for handling similar future incidents 
(see Section 1.a.).
    In November four men were found guilty and sentenced to life in 
prison for setting a fire at a Chinese social club in Port Louis in May 
1999 that resulted in seven deaths.
    As a result of the ethnic violence that occurred in February and 
May 1999, several initiatives were taken in 1999 to improve relations 
between ethnic groups.
    In April 1999, the President established a Committee for the 
Promotion of National Unity, which consists of 20 members from a wide 
cross section of the public and private sectors. The committee has 
sponsored a variety of activities to promote goodwill between ethnic 
groups. The Mauritian Council of Social Service (MACOSS), which serves 
as an umbrella group for NGO's in the country, created a conflict 
resolution working group to address ethnic tensions. The Mauritius 
Peace Initiative held a second conflict resolution seminar in July, and 
the MACOSS working group held meetings throughout the year. In addition 
a group of citizens based in the northern part of the country formed an 
NGO in March 1999 geared toward promoting ethnic unity. During the 
year, they organized community events around religious holidays in 
which residents of all faiths participated.
    In June 1999, the Rodrigues Government Employees Association sued 
the Public Service Commission and the Government for placing different 
service conditions on those civil servants who were born and live on 
Rodrigues, an island 360 miles off the country's east coast with a 
population of 36,000, compared with civil servants who were born on the 
main island of Mauritius and work on Rodrigues. In December the Supreme 
Court rejected the association's suit; however, the group appealed. 
Under the law, a Supreme Court decision may be appealed to the Privy 
Council of the United Kingdom; a Privy Council appeal in this case is 
scheduled for October 2001.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution explicitly protects 
the right of workers to associate in trade unions, and there is an 
active trade union movement. Approximately 335 unions represent 111,231 
workers, or 21.5 percent of the work force. Many unions are small, 
having fewer than 1,000 members. Ten major labor federations serve as 
umbrella organizations for these smaller unions. With the exception of 
members of the ``disciplined force,'' namely, the police and the 
Special Mobile Force, and persons in state services who are not public 
officers such as contractors, workers are free to form and join unions 
and to organize in all sectors, including in the export processing 
zone. Although only 10 percent of EPZ workers are unionized, these 
workers are covered by national labor laws (see Section 6.b.). The 
Mauritian Labor Congress asserts that union membership is low in the 
EPZ in part because employers in the EPZ intimidate employees and 
restrict access to union organizers. The International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) alleged that employers have established 
employer-controlled work councils for workers in the EPZ. Labor unions 
are independent of the Government, and they have established ties to 
domestic political parties and addressed political issues.
    Under the Industrial Relations Act (IRA), unions have the legal 
right to strike; however, the IRA requires a 21-day cooling-off period, 
followed by binding arbitration, which has the effect of making most 
strikes illegal. The IRA states that worker participation in an 
unlawful strike is sufficient grounds for dismissal, but workers may 
seek remedy in court if they believe that their dismissals are 
unjustified. There were no strikes during the year. The IRA grants the 
Prime Minister the prerogative to declare any strike illegal if he 
considers that it ``imperils the economy.''
    Under the law, unions may establish ties with international labor 
bodies, and some unions have done so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
protects the right of employees to bargain collectively with their 
employers. The ICFTU reported that the law does not protect trade 
unions adequately against acts of interference by employers. The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) reported that the Government 
began a labor law reform project with ILO technical assistance; 
however, no new legislation was enacted during the year. Minimum wages 
for nonmanagerial level workers are set by the National Remuneration 
Board (NRB), whose chairman is appointed by the Minister of Labor; 
however, most unions negotiate wages higher than those set by the NRB. 
Almost 13 percent of the labor force works for national or local 
government. The IRA prohibits antiunion discrimination. There is an 
arbitration tribunal that handles any such complaints.
    Approximately 90,765 persons work in the EPZ. Workers in EPZ firms 
enjoy the same basic protections as workers in other firms; however, 
there are some EPZ-specific labor laws, including the provision for 10 
hours per week of mandatory, paid overtime at a higher wage than for 
ordinary working hours. The Mauritian Labor Congress asserts that union 
membership is low in the EPZ in part because employers in the EPZ 
intimidate employees and restrict access to union organizers.
    The ICFTU 2000 report stated that there was very little collective 
bargaining in the EPZ and that the National Renumeration Board 
determined wages after representations by employers and workers'' 
representatives.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that by children, is prohibited by law outside the 
EPZ; however, there are reports of forced child prostitution, which the 
Government has targeted as a top law enforcement priority (see Section 
6.d.). Labor laws that cover the EPZ allow for 10 hours of compulsory 
overtime a week and compulsory work on public holidays, although at a 
higher hourly wage (see Sections 6.b. and 6.e.).
    According to the ILO Committee of Experts, the Merchant Shipping 
Act contains provisions that are not compatible with international 
standards regarding forced labor. Certain breaches of discipline by 
seamen are punishable by imprisonment. The Government indicated that it 
proposed to amend the Merchant Shipping Act to make it compatible with 
ILO Convention 10; however, it took no action during the year.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under age 15 
and limits the employment undertaken by youth between ages 15 and 18; 
the Government respects this law in practice.
    The legal minimum age for the employment of children is 15 years; 
however, children unable to attend secondary school often seek 
apprenticeships in the trades. Six vocational schools were opened in 
1998 to train students who fail the primary education certificate exam 
taken by students at the end of the sixth year of primary education.
    The Ministry of Labor is responsible for the enforcement of child 
labor laws and conducts frequent inspections. According to the Ministry 
of Women's Rights, Child Development, and Family Welfare, 2,000 
children between the ages of 12 and 14 were employed or looking for 
work in 1998. Child labor in homes, on farms, and in shops is common on 
the island of Rodrigues. Forced or bonded labor involving children is 
prohibited by law; however, forced child prostitution exists. In 
October the new Minister of Women's Rights, Child Development, and 
Family Welfare released a 1998 study on the sexual exploitation of 
children that the previous government had withheld. Although it did not 
provide the number of child prostitutes, the study reported that 
children enter into prostitution as early as age 13; their clientele 
included industrialists, professionals, police officers, 
parliamentarians, and ministers. The Government has targeted child 
prostitution as a top law enforcement priority; however, at year's end, 
it had not taken specific action.
    In June the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for 
investigating reports of child labor abuses; 30 inspectors are employed 
by the Ministry to investigate all reports of labor abuses, including 
those of child labor. The inspectors performed approximately 5,000 
inspections during the year.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government administratively 
establishes minimum wages, which vary according to the sector of 
employment, and it mandates minimum wage increases each year based on 
inflation. The minimum wage for an unskilled worker in the EPZ is 
$13.27 (345 rupees) per week, while the minimum wage for an unskilled 
factory worker outside the EPZ is about $14.94 (388 rupees); these sums 
do not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but 
the actual market wage for most workers is much higher due to a labor 
shortage and collective bargaining. The standard legal workweek in the 
industrial sector is 45 hours. Labor laws that cover the EPZ allow for 
10 hours of compulsory overtime a week and compulsory work on public 
holidays, although at a higher hourly wage. According to the Mauritian 
Labor Congress, 10 hours of overtime a week is mandatory at certain 
textile factories in the EPZ (see Section 6.b.).
    In October the Minister for Training Skills Development and 
Productivity reported that there are 24,292 foreign workers in the 
country, 20,081 of whom work in the textile sector. Since they often do 
not speak English, French, or Creole, it is difficult for them to 
demand their rights, which are the same as those of citizen employees, 
including the right to belong to a union. There were cases in which 
foreign workers obtained local legal counsel to redress their 
grievances.
    The Government sets health and safety standards, and Ministry of 
Labor officials inspect working conditions and ensure compliance with 
the law. The small number of inspectors limits the Government's 
enforcement ability; however, through voluntary compliance, the number 
of occupational accidents has been cut. Workers have the right to 
remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardy to 
continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
children, but does not specifically mention trafficking in adults. In 
1999 there were reports from the nearby island of Madagascar that women 
and children were trafficked to the islands of Reunion and Mauritius 
for prostitution; however, there were no further reports of this nature 
during the year. The penalties for those found guilty of child 
trafficking are a minimum fine of $370 (10,000 rupees) or imprisonment 
for up to 5 years.
                               __________

                               MOZAMBIQUE

    Mozambique's constitutional Government, headed by President Joaquim 
Chissano, held its second general multiparty elections in December 
1999. President Chissano was reelected, and his party, the Front for 
the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), won 133 seats in the 250-seat 
Assembly of the Republic, with the remaining 117 seats going to the 
opposition coalition of the Mozambique National Resistance--Electoral 
Union (RENAMO-UE). According to international observers, the elections 
were generally free and fair; however, they were marred by allegations 
of vote-counting irregularities. Chissano and the leadership of 
FRELIMO, which have ruled the country since independence in 1975, 
dominate policymaking and implementation. The Assembly is a multiparty 
parliament that provides increasingly useful debate on national policy 
issues and generates some proposals independently. During legislative 
sessions, the Assembly influenced the executive branch on some policy 
issues, and RENAMO had some limited influence on the executive. 
Opposition parties in the Assembly boycotted most parliamentary 
activities during most of the year to protest the election results; 
however, they resumed full participation in October. Despite the 
boycott and the contentious atmosphere in the Assembly, the FRELIMO 
majority accepted several proposals from opposition parties, including 
one that established ad hoc commissions to revise the electoral law and 
aspects of the Constitution. The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the executive branch dominates the 
judiciary, which lacks adequate resources, and is chronically 
understaffed, susceptible to corruption, and largely ineffectual.
    The forces responsible for internal security under the Ministry of 
Interior include: the Criminal Investigation Police (PIC), the 
Mozambican National Police (PRM), and the Rapid Reaction Police (PIR). 
The State Information and Security Service (SISE) reports directly to 
the President. The military continued to suffer from a lack of money 
and long term strategy. Many former military personnel of all ranks 
work in other government security forces. Members of the security 
forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
    Mozambique is a very poor country. Approximately 80 percent of the 
population is employed in agriculture, mostly on a subsistence level, 
and approximately 75 percent of the population lives in poverty. The 
primary exports are shrimp, sugar, cotton, cashew nuts, and bulk 
electric power. The transition to a market economy continued during the 
year. The gross domestic product (GDP) continued to be approximately 
$3.9 billion. Inflation was approximately 11.4 percent, an increase 
from the 1999 level of 6.2 percent. The economy and government budget 
remained heavily dependent on foreign aid. The economy had a $848 
million trade deficit, down from a $929 million deficit in 1999. Annual 
per capita income was $222. High unemployment and underemployment in 
the formal and informal sectors continued. Corruption continued to be a 
problem in the public and private sectors. Flooding caused by heavy 
rains and cyclones in February and March severely damaged crops, 
livestock, and rural infrastructure in the south-central portion of the 
country. The damage, estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars, 
negatively impacted economic growth.
    The Government's human rights record was generally poor. Police 
continued to commit numerous abuses, including extrajudicial killings, 
disappearances, excessive use of force, torture, and other abuses. 
Police officers tortured and beat persons in custody, and abused 
prostitutes and street children. In September the president of the 
League of Human Rights (LDH), a local non-governmental organization, 
noted that the LDH documented an overall decline in the respect of 
human rights by police forces during the year. Police violently 
dispersed demonstrations by opposition supporters. Prison conditions 
remained extremely harsh and life-threatening; many prisoners died due 
to the harsh conditions, including more than a hundred RENAMO 
demonstrators who suffocated to death in an overcrowded jail cell. 
Police continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy 
pretrial detention was common. Fair and expeditious trials were not 
possible due to an inefficient, understaffed, and underfunded 
judiciary, which is dominated by the executive and subject to 
corruption. There were reports of some infringements on the right to 
privacy. The Government generally respected freedom of the press; 
however, one journalist was killed and many others were harassed during 
the year by unknown assailants. Media outlets owned by the Government 
and State enterprises largely reflected the views of the ruling party; 
however, the number and diversity of independent media increased, and 
their criticism of the Government, its leaders, and their families 
largely is tolerated. Human rights violations received extensive 
coverage in both government and independent media during the year. The 
law restricts freedom of assembly, and security forces forcibly 
dispersed some demonstrations during the year. Both the Government and 
the law imposed some limits on freedom of association. The Government, 
at times, infringed on freedom of movement. Domestic violence against 
women as well as widespread discrimination against women in employment 
and property rights, remained problems. The abuse and criminal 
exploitation of street children, including child prostitution, 
increased in urban areas. Discrimination against the disabled and child 
labor remained problems. There were reports that women were trafficked 
to South Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor. Occasional 
mob violence resulted in several deaths.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1 Respect for Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were several 
unconfirmed reports of political killings by security forces; RENAMO 
officials claimed that security forces killed party members Eduardo 
Foao, Ricardo Moaine, and Geraldo Carvalho in Sofala Province in 
February. Police denied that the three were killed by security forces 
and claimed that an autopsy showed that Moaine died of natural causes. 
There were also reports of extrajudicial killings by security forces.
    On March 31, police arrested Tomas Paulo Nhacumba and Gildo Joaquim 
Bata in Maputo for possession of an illegal firearm. On April 1, police 
visited the families of the two men and demanded $750 for their 
release; the families were unable to pay the sum. When Nhacumba's 
family visited him that same day they witnessed police officers 
torturing detainees. On April 2, family members were informed that the 
two men had been transferred to the Criminal Investigative Unit but 
were unable to locate them. In April the bodies of the two men were 
identified by family members at the Maputo Central Hospital morgue, 
listed under false names. The bodies were delivered to the morgue by 
police officers, who attributed their deaths to natural causes despite 
the presence of bullet wounds in their upper torsos.
    On May 5, police fired upon and reportedly killed at least six 
civilians at a police station during a confrontation between supporters 
of a jailed RENAMO member and the police (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    The LDH reported a possible pattern of execution-style killings 
committed by uniformed police in the Marracuene area. In June police 
allegedly took Emidio Raul Nhancume from his family's home in Matola. 
The family located his body more than a month later in Marracuene, 
Maputo Province. Local residents stated that police shot and killed 
Nhancume on the day of his disappearance, and then buried his body. The 
Government had not investigated the incident nor taken other action by 
year's end. On July 5, Eliseu Geraldo Muainga disappeared after 
visiting his girlfriend's house. The girlfriend observed uniformed 
police hiding outside; she was later advised by neighbors that he was 
being held at a police station. She visited the facility, but the 
police denied that they were holding Muainga. His body was found on 
July 18 in Marracuene by residents of the area. The Government had not 
investigated the incident nor taken other action by year's end.
    On August 23, soldiers of the Presidential Guard who were guarding 
a VIP guesthouse shot and killed an unarmed citizen who had reportedly 
become argumentative when told he could not walk down the street. The 
Government defended the soldier's actions as appropriate under existing 
security laws and took no action to address the incident by year's end.
    On November 9, as many as 54 persons were killed during violence 
related to rallies and marches held throughout the country to protest 
the outcome of the December 1999 elections (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 
1.e., and 2.b.). The total number of persons killed remains in dispute 
among human rights groups, the opposition, and the National Assembly. 
The LDH reported that police in Nampula province and the Balama 
district of Cabo Delgado province fired on, killed, and injured unarmed 
demonstrators to prevent rallies and marches. The LDH alleged that the 
interim police commander in Balama ordered the police under his command 
to kill demonstrators. In Montepuez, Cabo Delgado, there were credible 
reports that RENAMO demonstrators attacked a local jail, freed 
prisoners, ransacked government buildings, and held the local district 
administrator hostage. Police responded with lethal force, killing 17 
persons; 7 police officers also were killed. Rioters reportedly 
mutilated the bodies of the police officers. On December 5, the 
National Assembly established a bipartisan Parliamentary Commission of 
Inquiry to investigate the violence surrounding the November 9 
demonstrations and the subsequent deaths in custody.
    In October 1999, the domestic NGO Human Rights and Development 
(DHD), published a critical assessment of human rights conditions (see 
Section 4); among the complaints were alleged police killings. The 
Government did not respond to the report by year's end.
    Extremely harsh prison conditions and torture resulted in the 
deaths of many persons in custody, and in November more than 100 
detainees died of asphyxiation in their cell (see Section 1.c.).
    In March 1999, relatives of a detainee accused police of killing 
him in Beira central prison. Authorities attributed the man's death to 
an unspecified illness; an eyewitness testified in March that he saw 
police beating the victim on the way to the prison. The case was 
referred by the LDH to the Attorney General's office but still was 
pending at year's end.
    There was no investigation into the 1998 death in police custody of 
Intipa Faque in the northern province of Nampula; nor was any action 
taken against the officers responsible. The LDH sent several written 
inquiries to the Nampula Province prosecutor regarding the case; 
however, they had received no answer by year's end.
    The Government reportedly investigated the police killing of a 
demonstrator during a labor strike at a security services company in 
1998; however, no report was released publicly, nor was any action 
taken against the officers responsible by year's end (see Section 
6.a.).
    Occasional mob and vigilante killings continued in both urban and 
rural areas due to general public frustration with rising crime. In 
Costa de Sol and Matola in the Maputo area, suspected thieves were 
beaten to death by mobs.
    Some of the hundreds of thousands of landmines still in the ground 
since the 1960's caused 8 deaths during the year. The Government 
continued to cooperate with international organizations in demining 
efforts during the year.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances; however, police were responsible for unexplained 
disappearances of prisoners. In some instances persons who disappeared 
while in police custody were later discovered to have been killed (see 
Section 1.a.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture and cruel or 
inhuman treatment; however, the police continued to commit serious 
abuses, and torture, beatings, death threats, physical and mental 
abuse, extortion, and unexplained disappearances of some prisoners 
remained problems. During the year, the LDH reported 59 complaints of 
torture, including several instances involving the sexual abuse of 
women, beating, illegal detention, and death threats. In September the 
LDH reported an overall decline in the observance of human rights.
    Corruption in the police forces extends throughout the ranks, and 
the PRM used violence and detention to intimidate persons from 
reporting abuses.
    Journalists continued to report that police extorted money from 
street vendors, many of whom are widowed and divorced women, sometimes 
beating the women, and often stealing their merchandise. There also 
were reports of police abuse of prostitutes and street children (see 
Section 5).
    The national budget allocated more funding for the hiring and 
training of police, as well as for higher salaries. In 1999, new 
standards for the police force were imposed, requiring a minimum 
educational level of the tenth grade. In September a new 4-year police 
service academy opened, which provides college-level training to police 
officers in the mid-ranks and higher. Human rights training is becoming 
mandatory for all security officers, with human rights groups like the 
DHD teaching some of the courses. The LDH discontinued its training 
program during the year, reportedly because of reluctant cooperation 
from the police.
    On March 31, police arrested Tomas Paulo Nhacumba and Gildo Joaquim 
Bata in Maputo for possession of an illegal firearm. When Nhacumba's 
family visited him on April 1, they witnessed police officers torturing 
detainees (see Section 1.a.).
    On May 3, police reportedly arrested a RENAMO supporter who had 
urged a vendor not to pay a market fee collector in order to protest 
the Government's legitimacy; police forced the man to march naked 
through the town from his home to the local jail. On May 5, when 40 
unarmed friends and family members went to the police station to gain 
the man's release, a police officer allegedly assaulted an elderly man 
in the group, which resulted in a confrontation between the crowd and 
police. The police responded to the confrontation by firing into the 
crowd, reportedly killing at least six persons and injuring several 
others (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). The Government defended the 
actions by the police as appropriate and lawful; however, a group of 
local NGO's, including the LDH, conducted an independent investigation 
and reported that the police used inappropriate force. The Government 
did not respond to the report, and the FRELIMO majority in Parliament 
blocked an initiative to form a commission of inquiry to investigate 
the incident.
    There was some sporadic political violence in the provinces during 
the year related to tensions between supporters of RENAMO and local 
security forces, including incidents in Marumbala, Beira, and Aube. On 
November 9, violence erupted in at least 15 of the more than 60 
demonstrations held throughout the country by RENAMO to protest the 
outcome of the December 1999 elections; as many as 54 persons died in 
the violence (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). In addition, approximately 
200 persons were injured and approximately 457 demonstrators were 
detained (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The LDH reported that police 
used excessive force against the demonstrators in Nampula province and 
Balama, Cabo Delgado province and cited an anonymous police source who 
alleged that police severely beat and tortured detainees in custody. A 
RENAMO Member of Parliament (M.P.) claimed that police beat him and 
broke his right clavicle during his arrest; he publicly stated that 
police tortured him and other detainees while they were held at the 
Beira maximum security prison.
    During November and December, a number of journalists were 
threatened and attacked by unknown assailants (see Section 2.a.).
    Prison conditions in most of the country are extremely harsh and 
continued to pose a threat to inmates' health and lives. A LDH report 
released in January 1999 on the Beira central prison found that 
conditions remain significantly below minimum international standards. 
Latrine facilities are primitive; in some prisons, inmates must keep 
human waste in their cells until they persuade or bribe attendants to 
remove it. Food is substandard and scarce. Most prisoners receive only 
one meal per day on a regular basis. It is customary for families to 
bring food to prisoners; however, there are sporadic reports that 
guards demand bribes in return.
    From September through December, the DHD conducted a series of 
prison and jail visits in 7 of the country's 11 provinces. The DHD 
reported that prisons provided substandard facilities and minimal care 
to detainees. A comprehensive U.N. Development Program (UNDP) report 
released during the year stated that prisons were decaying, 
overcrowded, and inadequately supplied. The Prime Minister responded to 
the UNDP report by calling publicly for a national effort to improve 
prison conditions. The Prison Fellowship of Mozambique (FPM) also 
commenced operations during the year and conducted prison visits (see 
Section 4).
    There were many deaths in prison, the vast majority due to illness 
and disease; the UNDP report noted that there were 157 prison deaths 
during 1999, mostly due to malaria, tuberculosis, and respiratory 
diseases aggravated by poor conditions and lack of space (see Sections 
1.c.). RENAMO alleged that three protestors who were detained during 
the November 9 demonstrations died from asphyxiation in November in a 
maximum security prison in Beira, Sofala. The Government acknowledged 
the death of one of the detainees but attributed his death to natural 
causes. Between November 18 and 19, at least eight detained RENAMO 
supporters died in a Montepuez jail cell. Between November 20 and 21, 
more than 100 additional RENAMO supporters died of asphyxiation in a 
detention cell in Montepuez, Cabo Delgado; lack of water and food may 
have contributed to the deaths. The final number remains in dispute 
between the Government, the opposition, and human rights NGO's; many of 
the detainees never were formally processed and were buried in mass 
graves. The LDH and the DHD alleged that local police officials 
purposely deprived the detainees of oxygen by closing the cell door and 
that the police commander threatened that the detainees would not leave 
the prison alive. The Government, with the assistance of a South 
African team of pathologists, investigated the incident. Although the 
results of the investigation were not released by year's end, the 
Government stated that the deaths were caused by asphyxiation due to 
overcrowding, and independent investigations by the LDH and the DHD 
confirmed the finding. Several police officers were fired, and 
investigations continued at year's end, including a National Assembly 
commission of inquiry. In December President Chissano and RENAMO 
President Dhlakama agreed to establish a separate bipartisan working 
group to investigate the Montepuez deaths; the working group was 
scheduled to begin meeting in February 2001. The Government did not 
investigate the March 1999 deaths of three juveniles who died in 
detention, allegedly from illness and lack of food. While the health 
problems of most inmates remain unattended, the Ministry of Justice and 
the Ministry of the Interior made specific efforts to address some of 
the more serious diseases in the prison system during the year, 
including cholera, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS-related illnesses.
    Two National Directorates of Prisons (DNP's), one under the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the other under the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI), operate prisons in all the provincial capitals. The DNP's also 
hold prisoners at an agricultural penitentiary in Mabalane and 
industrial penitentiaries in Nampula and Maputo. In MOI facilities 
detainees who have not yet been charged are held with prisoners 
sentenced for serious offenses that specify maximum security. Detainees 
who have not been charged are usually held for longer periods than the 
48 hours permitted under the law. In MOJ facilities detainees who have 
been charged but not yet tried are held with prisoners who have been 
tried and sentenced to prison for relatively minor cases where moderate 
security imprisonment is deemed sufficient. Pretrial detainees are 
usually held for several months before trial, and delays over 1 year 
are common. MOI and MOJ facilities, while separate, often are connected 
physically. Military and civilian prisoners are held in the same 
prisons.
    Detention facilities remained severely overcrowded, generally 
housing 4 to 6 times the number of prisoners that they were built to 
accommodate. The National Association for the Support and Protection of 
Prisoners, a domestic NGO, stated that during the year, Beira Central 
Prison held 513 inmates in a prison built to hold 200; Manica held 475 
in a prison built to hold 300; Tete held 464 in a prison built to hold 
90. Inhambane Provincial Prison held 296 in a prison built to hold 75; 
Nampula held 775 in a prison built for 70; and Cabo Delgado held 245 in 
a prison built for 90. Maputo Central Prison, built to hold 800 
inmates, held 2,470 inmates. However, the Maputo Machava Maximum 
Security Prison, with a capacity of 600, held considerably less than 
that. Approximately 4,032 pretrial detainees were held in jails and 
prisons during the year.
    Minors are incarcerated with adult inmates. During a visit to the 
Beira Central Prison in August 1999, the Minister of Coordination of 
Social Action found 25 minors detained there. However, the LDH reported 
noticeably fewer minors held in detention nationwide. At times Maputo 
City Prison houses children as young as 3 years of age, brought there 
by mothers sentenced for long periods.
    International as well as domestic human rights groups may have 
access to prisoners at the discretion of the MOJ and MOI; however, 
officials sometimes cite unsanitary conditions or security risks as 
reasons to delay or cancel visits. Several local and international 
organizations, including the LDH, the DHD, and the UNDP, visited prison 
facilities during the year and reported on prison conditions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides that the duration of preventive imprisonment be set by law; 
however, the police continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens 
in practice. Under the law, the maximum preventive imprisonment is 48 
hours, during which time a detainee has the right to have his case 
reviewed by judicial authorities, after which he can be detained up to 
another 60 days while the case is investigated by the PIC. In cases 
where a person is accused of a very serious crime carrying a sentence 
of more than 8 years, he may be detained up to 84 days without being 
charged formally. If a court approves, such detainees may be held for 
two more periods of 84 days each without charge while the police 
complete the investigation process. The law provides that if the 
prescribed period for investigation has been completed and no charges 
have been brought, the detainee must be released. In many cases, the 
authorities either are unaware of these regulations or ignore them, 
often also ignoring a detainee's constitutional right to counsel and to 
contact relatives or friends.
    On May 3, police reportedly arrested a RENAMO supporter under 
humiliating circumstances after an argument between a market fee 
collector and a vendor (see Section 1.c.).
    In October police arrested three individuals for handing out 
opposition pamphlets in Beira. The court sentenced them to prison terms 
ranging from 12 to 18 months for distributing materials offensive to 
the Government and the President and for incitement to civil 
disobedience (see Section 3).
    In October Mario Frank, a RENAMO member and former general, was 
arrested after police raided RENAMO party headquarters in Beira, Sofala 
province and confiscated a number of weapons. In November officials 
released him after holding him in detention for 22 days without charge.
    During the November 9 demonstrations, police detained approximately 
457 RENAMO members and supporters during more than 60 rallies and 
marches to protest the outcome of the December 1999 elections; there 
were reports that police beat and tortured detainees in custody (se 
Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.e., and 2.b.). Three RENAMO members reportedly 
died in custody in Beira; RENAMO alleged that these deaths resulted 
from asphyxiation (see Section 1.c.). In addition more than 100 RENAMO 
detainees died of asphyxiation in a jail cell in Montepuez (see Section 
1.c.). In November courts in the Manica, Cabo Delgado, Sofala, and 
Nampula provinces acquitted 15 RENAMO members and supporters and 
sentenced 130 others to prison terms ranging from 15 days to 2 years 
for their involvement in the November 9 demonstrations (see Sections 
1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). FRELIMO and RENAMO established a working 
group to examine, among other matters, the cases of the detained 
demonstrators; the group was scheduled to make initial recommendations 
to the President and RENAMO by March 15, 2001.
    Many persons complained that security officials often detained them 
for spurious reasons and demanded identification documents; many 
officers also demanded bribes to permit persons to continue toward 
their destinations (see Section 2.d.). The media reported that citizens 
complained to authorities that police detained persons for not carrying 
identification documents and demanded money when they could not produce 
documents. Many victims lived in areas where there was no notary public 
available to validate their documents. Many victims chose not to seek 
police assistance because of their usual demand for bribes or a lack of 
confidence that the police would help.
    In January the Supreme Court acquitted an imam who was arrested in 
1999 in connection with a murder (see Section 2.c.); in July the court 
found two other men guilty of the murder and sentenced them to 9 and 16 
years'' imprisonment.
    Most citizens also are unaware of their rights provided by the 
Constitution, the law, and the Penal Process Code. As a result, 
detainees can spend many weeks, months, and even years in pretrial 
status. The bail system remains poorly defined, and prisoners, their 
families, and NGO's continue to complain that police and prison 
officials demand bribes to release prisoners. On March 31, police 
arrested Tomas Paulo Nhacumba and Gildo Joaquim Bata in Maputo for 
possession of an illegal firearm. On April 1, police visited the 
families of the two men and demanded $750 for their release; the 
families were unable to pay the sum; they later identified the two 
men's bodies at a hospital morgue (see Section 1.a.).
    Under the Penal Code, only those suspects caught in the act of 
committing a crime can be held in detention. Justice Ministry officials 
say that some police lack adequate training and do not know how to 
charge a person properly with a stated crime. A detainee may be 
subjected to indefinite detention. The National Directorate of Prisons 
reported that there are 6,422 persons in the prison system, 4,032 of 
whom were detainees who had not been charged. In response to this 
problem, a legal enforcement commission convened in May 1999 and 
ordered cases of detainees to be reviewed so that those who had served 
their time or were being held illegally (without charge) could be 
released. In Beira alone, 230 prisoners were released from the central 
prison during May and June 1999. During the year, the Government 
created an inter-ministerial review committee to continue this process, 
and the committee periodically reviewed the status of prisoners 
throughout the country to prevent unnecessary detentions. It was not 
known how many prisoners were released during the year under this 
process. The DHD report on human rights conditions released in October 
1999 gave particular emphasis to the problem of arbitrary arrest and 
detention (see Section 4).
    Drug cases are subject to a special regime. A 1996 law specifies 
that the legal period of preventive detention in drug trafficking cases 
is 10 days. The same law authorizes a long period of investigation--up 
to 9 months--in cases involving drug smuggling, drug production and 
transfer, and criminal association.
    The Constitution expressly prohibits exile, and the Government does 
not use exile as a form of punishment.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution formally 
established an independent judiciary and specifically states that the 
decisions of the courts take precedence over all other authorities and 
individuals and must be obeyed; however the executive, and by extension 
the FRELIMO party, continued to dominate the judiciary, which is 
understaffed and manned by inadequately trained appointees. The DHD 
report on human rights conditions released in October 1999 gave 
particular emphasized to problems in the judiciary (see Section 4).
    The President appoints the President and Vice President of the most 
important tribunal, the Supreme Court. Supreme Court nominations 
initially are prepared by the Higher Judicial Magistrate's Council 
(CSMJ), the body responsible for overseeing professional behavior among 
magistrates. The CSMJ, generally all FRELIMO party members, submits a 
list of qualified persons to the President of the Republic. The 
president then submits his choices to the National Assembly for 
approval. No assembly approval is needed for other judicial 
appointments.
    There are two complementary formal justice systems: the civil/
criminal system and the military system. Civilians are not under the 
jurisdiction of, or tried in, military courts. A 1991 law empowered the 
Supreme Court to administer the civil/criminal system; it also hears 
appeals, including military cases, although the Ministry of Defense 
administers the military courts. Below the Supreme Court there are 
provincial and district courts. There also are courts that exercise 
limited, specialized jurisdiction, such as the administrative court, 
customs court, fiscal court, maritime court, and labor court. The 
Constitution called for the creation of a constitutional court, but the 
Government has not yet passed implementing legislation. In the absence 
of this body, the Supreme Court is tasked with ruling on issues of 
constitutionality, as it did when assessing the eligibility of 
presidential candidates for the general elections. Persons 16 years old 
and younger fall under the jurisdiction of a court system for minors. 
Through this legal channel, the Government can send minors to 
correctional, educational, or other institutions. As with the 
provincial and district courts, the specialized and minor court systems 
are ineffective due to a lack of qualified professionals.
    In August 1999, Supreme Court Chief Justice Mario Mangaze 
complained that only 25 percent of citizens had access to the official 
judicial system. Outside the formal court system, a number of local 
customary courts and traditional authorities adjudicate matters such as 
estate and divorce cases. These courts are staffed by respected local 
arbiters who have no formal training but who exercise a substantial 
judicial and executive role, particularly in the area of arbitration.
    Persons accused of crimes against the State are tried publicly in 
regular civilian courts under standard criminal judicial procedures. 
The law provides definitions of crimes against the State, such as 
treason, terrorism, and sabotage. The Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction over members of Parliament and other persons who are 
immune from trial in the lower courts.
    A judge may order a closed trial because of national security 
interests or to protect the privacy of the plaintiff in cases 
concerning sexual assault.
    In regular courts, all accused persons are in principle presumed 
innocent and have the right to legal counsel and the right of appeal; 
however, authorities do not always respect these rights. The great 
majority of the population is either unaware of these rights or does 
not possess the means to obtain any form of legal counsel. Although the 
law specifically provides for public defenders, such assistance 
generally is not available in practice, particularly in rural areas. 
Some NGO's, such as the LDH, the Government's National Institute for 
Legal Assistance, and the Mozambican Association of Women in Judicial 
Careers, continued to offer limited legal counsel at little or no cost 
to both defendants and prisoners.
    A lack of licensed attorneys exacerbates the judicial system's 
weakness. There are an estimated 200 licensed attorneys in the country; 
the vast majority work in Maputo. There continued to be a shortage of 
qualified judicial personnel, with 160 judges nationwide. There are 
appeals courts in all provinces, but few of these courts are staffed by 
formally trained judges, despite the fact that the Judicial Magistrates 
Statute requires a law degree. Some districts have no formal courts or 
judges at all. Several donor initiatives to remedy these shortages were 
continued or completed during the year, including the training of 
district court judges and public prosecutors.
    In 1998 while speaking at the opening of the Supreme Court session, 
Chief Justice Mangaze complained that a number of judges and others 
responsible to the courts were guilty of unacceptable practices, 
including corruption and bribe taking, chronic absenteeism, unequal 
treatment, and deliberate delays and omissions in handling cases. 
Justice Mangaze also presides over the CSMJ, which has expelled 24 
judges for corruption since 1995. A Ministry of Justice official 
estimated that 17 judges were removed from office since 1998. During 
the year several judicial expulsions occurred, including the dismissal 
of the Attorney General and six of his senior legal staff in July and 
the suspension of a judge involved in a fraud case regarding the Banco 
Comercial de Mocambique (BCM). In 1998 the National Assembly passed a 
law, which was implemented in 1999, that speeds the implementation of 
CSMJ decisions affecting judges who appeal charges of misconduct, thus 
removing them from the bench more swiftly.
    In October a court sentenced 3 individuals to prison terms ranging 
from 12 to 18 months for distributing materials offensive to the 
Government and the President and for incitement to civil disobedience 
(see Section 2.a.).
    In November courts in the Manica, Cabo Delgado, Sofala, and Nampula 
provinces acquitted 15 RENAMO members and supporters and sentenced 130 
others to prison terms ranging from 15 days to 2 years for their 
involvement in the November 9 demonstrations. The courts held that the 
demonstrations were illegal because they took place outside of the 
legal time limits. The speed with which these trials occurred and the 
sentences handed out raised serious questions as to the integrity of 
the judiciary and the right of due process (see Section 1.c.).
    The Penal Code contains legal guidelines for the judicial treatment 
of minors and forbids the imprisonment of minors below the age of 16; 
however, there are many documented reports that some judges ordered the 
incarceration of minors in common prisons without trial (see Section 
1.c.). In most areas of the country, it is difficult to accurately 
assess age because the information is not well documented and many 
persons do not have identification cards.
    There were no confirmed reports of political prisoners; however, 
RENAMO alleged that the persons held in detention for participation in 
the November 9 demonstrations were political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of privacy and 
expressly forbids the use of surveillance techniques, and the 
Government generally respected these provisions. There were no 
documented reports of such search activity; however, some political 
groups claimed that their telephones were tapped by government 
intelligence agencies and claimed that security forces kept watch on 
their activities. By law police need a warrant to enter homes and 
businesses; however, in July a few Maputo residents complained that 
customs agents searched their homes illegally.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution, the 1991 Press 
Law, and the 1992 Rome Peace Accords provide for freedom of expression 
and of the press, and the Government generally respected these 
provisions; however, limitations on these freedoms are permitted if 
they relate to the media's obligations to respect the Constitution, 
human dignity, and imperatives of foreign policy and national defense. 
In 1999 the Higher Council of Social Communication (CSCS), an 
enforcement body for the press law that is dominated by the ruling 
party, expressed concern that the vagueness of ``imperatives of foreign 
policy and national defense'' could lead to unwarranted restrictions. 
However, in December the CSCS expressed its concerns regarding recent 
articles, editorials, and comments that it considered contrary to 
national unity and prescribed media goals; some journalists criticized 
the CSCS for attempting to restrict press freedom and promote self-
censorship. While criticism of the President is not prohibited, the 
1991 Press Law holds that in cases of defamation against the President, 
truth is not a sufficient defense against libel. This law has not been 
tested in court; however, the President experienced considerable verbal 
and written criticism during the year without invoking this clause.
    In October police arrested three individuals for handing out 
opposition pamphlets in Beira. The court sentenced them to prison terms 
ranging from 12 to 18 months for distributing materials offensive to 
the Government and the President and for incitement to civil 
disobedience (see Section 3).
    Government and state-owned media largely reflected the views of the 
ruling party, but many such media sources also carried significant 
criticism of Government actions, including the Government's handling of 
the flood-related rescue operations and post-flood distribution of 
relief goods. Media ownership is diversified. In 1999 the U.N. 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Media 
Project estimated that 34 percent of the country's media were public, 
36 percent were private commercial, and 28 percent were private 
nonprofit (church affiliated); however, the public category includes 
the country's only daily newspapers, the only Sunday newspaper, and the 
only weekly newsmagazine. Two progovernment newspapers--Noticias and 
Domingo--together with a third sports-oriented weekly are owned by a 
single corporation, Noticias Limited, in which state-owned enterprises 
hold majority shares. Both evidenced consistent bias in favor of the 
ruling party, FRELIMO, during the post-election period; however both 
newspapers continued pushing for reform of the justice system.
    A large number of periodicals and broadcasting entities have been 
licensed since 1992, and the independent media criticisms of government 
leaders and their families largely is tolerated. For example, the 
independent media was extremely critical of the Government's reaction 
to the November 9 RENAMO demonstrations (see Section 1.c.). There were 
five independent weekly newspapers published in Maputo, and five other 
independent weekly journals published in provincial capitals. According 
to a survey by the Panos Institute, the 10 weekly newspapers had a 
combined total circulation of 50,910. There are an additional 20 
printed periodicals with a combined circulation of approximately 
34,000. There also are 8 periodicals that transmitted daily editions 
electronically, with a combined subscription of more than 1,500. The 
second oldest faxed daily, Imparcial, is owned by RENAMO. Websites were 
developed in 1999 for several independent media. Only a small minority 
of the population receives news directly through the print media.
    While the Government no longer owns most radio and television 
stations, government stations are the only broadcasters capable of 
countrywide transmission; however, there are local and independent 
broadcasts in almost all urban areas. Government media are showing 
greater transparency in reporting and some independence of editorial 
content. Radio Mozambique, the public's most important source of 
information, is government-owned; however, its news coverage is 
considered generally unbiased and fair. Radio Mozambique receives the 
largest single subsidy from the state budget of any public media 
company. It broadcasts in Portuguese and 18 indigenous languages; its 
external service broadcasts in English as well as in Portuguese for 
citizens in neighboring South Africa. Radio Mozambique regularly 
broadcasts public debates that include a variety of participants with 
differing opinions.
    In addition to Radio Mozambique, there are 16 independent 
(primarily church-supported) and state-supported radio stations, most 
using local languages in addition to Portuguese, which have spread to 
over a dozen cities. One such station, Radio Terra Verde (RTV), is 
linked directly to the principal opposition party, RENAMO. RTV is 
second only to Radio Mozambique's youth-oriented Radio Cidade in 
popularity, outside of broadcast times for soccer matches. Foreign 
radio programs, including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 
Radio France International (RFI), Radio Diffusao Portugal (RDP) Africa, 
and the Voice Of America (VOA) reach all major population centers and 
report local news via Mozambican-based part-time reporters; the BBC and 
the RFI carry news in Portuguese but broadcast most of the day in 
English and French, respectively.
    TV Mozambique (TVM) continued to demonstrate strong bias towards 
the Government. Portuguese Television for Africa (RTP Africa), a 
station owned by the government of Portugal, offers a second source of 
televised news to all parts of the country reached by TVM. Privately 
owned television transmission continued to be limited to Maputo. 
International television news is available via cable in Maputo and via 
satellite nationwide.
    In 1999 a media development report released by UNESCO expressed 
concern about the strong concentration of national and local media in 
Maputo city and province, mirroring lopsided socio-economic development 
nationwide. Furthermore, a 1997 census revealed that 60.5 percent of 
citizens over age 15 are illiterate in any language, and 70 percent of 
the population over 5 years of age do not speak Portuguese, which 
further limits the reach of the media beyond Maputo.
    In 1999 Article 19, a United Kingdom-based NGO, reported that the 
independent media are constrained by the high cost of newsprint, 
distribution, and equipment. It claimed that publications close to the 
Government have an advantage in securing exemptions from customs 
duties. In September 1999, UNESCO's Media Diversity Project announced 
that it would assist 24 private sector print and faxed journals from 
all provinces to lower their paper costs and strengthen their ability 
to negotiate better commercial arrangements with the privatized Cegraf 
printing press in Maputo.
    The National Union of Journalists (SNJ) continued to work with the 
Austrian Institute for North-South Development to improve working 
relationships between journalists and police officers.
    Final debate on recommendations that membership in the CSCS be 
redefined to eliminate majority control by governmental appointees was 
deferred for another year. The CSCS was among the several 
organizations, including a joint operation by the LDH and Article 19, 
which monitored media fairness during the December 1999 presidential 
and parliamentary elections; however, the CSCS did not issue an 
evaluation of the elections by year's end, nor is it expected to do so 
at a future date.
    The Prime Minister's weekly press conferences are important 
opportunities for journalists to discuss politics and government 
policies; while they were suspended during the electoral campaign in 
1999, they were reinstated during the year. The Prime Minister's 
Information Office seeks to facilitate international press access to 
key government officials and to provide policy guidance on how news 
media should be regulated. The Prime Minister's Information Office 
continues to monitor press content informally.
    Journalists were subjected to attacks during the year. In November 
two unknown assailants killed Carlos Cardoso, an investigative 
journalist who was the founder and editor of the news fax agency 
Metical, in an execution-style shooting. In November unknown assailants 
attacked a radio journalist in Beira, slashing his cheek and tongue and 
warning him to ``keep quiet.'' In November unknown assailants beat a 
radio journalist near Maputo; he required hospitalization for his 
injuries. In December the news fax agency Mediacoop received an 
anonymous bomb threat. In December the editor of the newspaper Savana 
received a telephone death threat.
    There are no formal restrictions on academic freedom. Private 
educational institutions, both church-related and secular, are well 
established and continued to expand in several cities. A new Islamic 
college constructed facilities and hired faculty during the year, 
although actual instruction had not commenced by year's end.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the law imposes restrictions 
on this right, and security forces forcibly dispersed some 
demonstrations during the year, including those of the opposition. The 
law regulates public demonstrations but does not apply to private 
gatherings held indoors and by individual invitation, nor does it cover 
religious gatherings or election campaigning.
    The law specifies time limitations on the exercise of the right to 
gather or demonstrate peacefully. The law states that marches, parades, 
and processions can only be held on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or 
between 5:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. on other days. The law provides for 
possible exceptions to this regulation, if justified, but such 
decisions are not made in an open and established manner. Further, the 
law states that any organizers of gatherings or demonstrations must 
submit a notice to civil and police authorities with at least 10 
signatures for the holding of any such demonstration, along with a 
justification of the purpose of the gathering. The law stipulates that 
the Government must reply to any such request within 2 days of 
receiving the request, and that no reply within this period shall be 
understood to mean governmental acceptance.
    On May 5, approximately 40 friends and family members of a detained 
RENAMO supporter went to a police station in Aube, Nampula province, 
for the detainee's release. The police responded by firing into the 
crowd, killing between six and eight civilians and injuring several 
others; the number of deaths remains in dispute, despite numerous 
investigations (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On November 9, violent clashes occurred between police and RENAMO 
supporters during 15 of the more than 60 rallies and marches to protest 
the December 1999 election results; as many as 54 persons were killed, 
approximately 200 persons were injured, and police detained 
approximately 457 demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.e.). 
RENAMO officials maintained that they had applied for and received 
permits to march in most cases; however, police stated that the 
demonstrators did not comply with the law and had blocked roads and 
occupied buildings unlawfully. Courts in Manica, Sofala, and Cabo 
Delgado provinces held that the demonstrations violated the legally-
prescribed time limits for such activities (see Section 1.e.). Security 
forces also disrupted and prevented RENAMO party gatherings in Beira in 
August and Angoche in September.
    The law provides for freedom of association; however, both the 
Government and the law imposed some limits on this right. Legislation 
promulgated in 1991 sets forth the process for the registration of 
political parties. There are 27 registered, active political parties. 
Under 1992 legislation, a political party must demonstrate that it has 
no racial, ethnic, or religious exclusiveness and secure at least 2,000 
signatures of citizens in order to be recognized.
    The Government requires nonpolitical groups such as NGO's and 
religious organizations to register. In 1998 the Government issued a 
decree regulating the registration and activities of foreign NGO's. 
NGO's must register their presence and scope of work with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; the Ministry then issues permits to 
those NGO's whose programs the Government decides complement its 
priorities. Observers believe that these new requirements worsen the 
already lengthy bureaucratic process that NGO's must follow to work in 
the country. Although the registration process is not always 
transparent and can take many months, the authorities rarely reject 
applications from new associations. The law forbids the organization of 
political parties based on religious, ethnic, or regional affiliation; 
however, there were no reports of government attempts to impede the 
right of association for political purposes during the year (see 
Section 2.c.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides that all 
citizens have the freedom to practice or not to practice a religion and 
gives religious denominations the right to pursue their religious aims 
freely; the Government generally respects these rights in practice.
    The 1989 Law on Religious Freedom requires religious institutions 
and missionary organizations to register with the Ministry of Justice, 
reveal their principal source of funds, and provide the names of at 
least 500 followers in good standing. No particular benefits or 
privileges are associated with the registration process, and there were 
no reports that the Government refused to register any religious groups 
during the year.
    In January the Supreme Court acquitted an imam who was arrested in 
1999 in connection with a murder; in July the court found two other men 
guilty of the murder and sentenced them to 9 and 16 years'' 
imprisonment.
    The law governing political parties specifically forbids religious 
parties from organizing, and any party from sponsoring religious 
propaganda. In late 1998, the Independent Party of Mozambique (PIMO), a 
predominantly Muslim group without representation in Parliament, began 
arguing for the right of political parties to base their activities on 
religious principles. The Government has tolerated PIMO's activities, 
although it has criticized the group. PIMO and some members of the 
legislature argued that the Movimento Islamico, a parliamentary caucus 
of Muslims from the ruling FRELIMO party, was tantamount to a religious 
party.
    The Constitution gives religious groups the right to own and 
acquire assets, and these institutions are allowed by law to own and 
operate schools. While virtually all places of worship nationalized by 
the State in 1977 have been returned to the respective religious 
organizations, the Catholic Church and certain Muslim communities 
complained that some other properties such as schools, health centers 
and residences unjustly remain in state hands and continued to press 
for their return. In 1982 the Ministry of Justice founded the 
Directorate for Religious Affairs to address the issue of the return of 
church properties. Government sources stated that the majority of 
property was returned, with a few cases still being examined on an 
individual basis, including two cases in Maputo. Provincial governments 
have the final responsibility for establishing a process for property 
restoration. The return of church property is perhaps most problematic 
when the facility is in use as a public school, health clinic, or 
police station, as funds for construction of new facilities are in 
short supply.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
to live anywhere within national territory and to travel within the 
country and abroad; however, at times authorities infringed on these 
rights.
    Police traffic checkpoints occasionally affected freedom of 
movement, sometimes for security concerns. In an effort to reduce 
harassment and confiscation of travelers' possessions at the borders, 
customs supervisors levied disciplinary fines and fired abusive customs 
agents. In large cities, the police often stop foreign pedestrians and 
order them to present original passports or resident papers, sometimes 
refusing to accept notarized copies, and fining or detaining those who 
failed to show proper documents (most persons do not like to carry the 
originals of documents due to the risk of theft). Police also detained 
local citizens routinely for failure to carry identity papers and 
demanded bribes (see Section 1.d.).
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 
cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
Government offered shelter to approximately 2,000 refugees, the vast 
majority of whom came from other African countries. The UNHCR planned 
to phase out its operations in the country during the year; however, 
the increasing number of refugees, especially from the Great Lakes 
region, prevented this from happening. By early August, there were 
approximately 400 refugees in the Bobole camp in Maputo province. In 
August approximately 100 refugees from the Bobole camp, most of them 
from the Great Lakes region, demonstrated outside the UNHCR office and 
a foreign embassy for better living conditions, employment and 
education opportunities, and resettlement abroad. The Government 
operates two refugee centers near Maputo. Niassa and Tete provinces 
have scattered groups of refugees, many of whom arrived from the Great 
Lakes region and had not settled in existing refugee centers during the 
year. Due to the heightened conflict in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, there were additional refugees in Niassa province. Refugee camp 
conditions continued to be poor, and some refugees claim to fear attack 
by fellow refugees on the basis of ethnicity. The UNHCR occasionally 
makes alternative shelter available to those who feel threatened. The 
Government offers first asylum and offered it to some refugees during 
the year.
    There were several cases of voluntary repatriation but no reports 
of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to elect their 
representatives in universal, direct, secret, and periodic elections, 
and in December 1999 citizens freely exercised their right to vote in 
the country's second multiparty general elections that international 
observers considered to be generally free and fair; however, the 
elections were marred by allegations of vote counting irregularities. 
President Chissano was returned to office with approximately 52 percent 
of the vote, and the ruling FRELIMO party won 133 of the 250 assembly 
seats. The largest opposition group, RENAMO-UE, made a strong showing 
in the elections, winning 117 seats in the Assembly and 48 percent of 
the presidential vote. In January the President appointed a new 
Cabinet; in February the new National Assembly took its oath of office, 
and in July the President announced new provincial governors. All 
ministers and governors, and most vice ministers, are FRELIMO members.
    Voter registration commenced on July 20, 1999 and continued for 60 
days. Despite some minor technical difficulties, including long lines 
and missing equipment, the registration process ran smoothly. 
Approximately 85 percent of the eligible voting population registered 
to vote. The 6-week campaign period was marked by some sporadic 
violence attributable to both FRELIMO and RENAMO-UE supporters, 
although at significantly reduced levels than during the 1994 
elections. Leaders of both parties called for an end to the violence.
    According to international and domestic observers, the voting 
process was transparent, peaceful, and orderly with approximately 75 
percent of the registered voters participating; however, international 
and domestic observers complained of a lack of full access to the vote 
count and the opposition coalition RENAMO-UE charged that there was 
fraud in the votecounting process. Due to a large number of illiterate 
voters, there were a significant number of ballots on which preferences 
were unclear and which required interpretation by the Electoral 
Commission. The Commission also did not count tally sheets from several 
hundred polling stations at both the provincial or national level due 
to mathematical errors, omissions, and other problems.
    International observers were not given full access to the process 
of examining the contested ballots and tally sheets, or to the vote 
counting. RENAMO-UE charged that this affected them disproportionately 
because tally sheets were discarded from provinces where RENAMO-UE 
support was strong. RENAMO-UE took this issue and several others to the 
Supreme Court on December 23, 1999, and on January 4, 1999 the Court 
unanimously rejected RENAMO-UE's complaints, acknowledging that there 
were some minor irregularities but concluding that these did not change 
the results of the elections.
    The opposition coalition refused to accept the election results or 
the Supreme Court's decision and initiated a partial boycott of 
parliamentary activities; however, the FRELIMO majority agreed to 
several RENAMO proposals to create ad hoc committees to revise the 
electoral law and aspects of the Constitution. In October RENAMO ended 
its parliamentary boycott. On December 20, President Chissano and 
RENAMO leader Dhlakama met to discuss the political situation in the 
country. During the meeting, they agreed to establish working groups to 
consider constitutional and judicial matters, defense and security 
matters, civil service appointments and local government official's 
nominations, and the status of RENAMO supporters who were arrested in 
connection with the demonstrations on November 9. The working groups 
were scheduled to begin discussions in February 2001.
    In March RENAMO officials claimed that security forces killed 
several party members in Beira earlier in the month (see Section 1.a.).
    On November 9, RENAMO members and supporters demonstrated in 
approximately 60 locations to protest the December 1999 elections. 
Fifteen of the demonstrations resulted in violent confrontations with 
the police, causing a number of deaths, injuries, and arrests (see 
Sections 1.a., 1.c. and 2.b.).
    Article 19 and the LDH monitored media coverage of the national 
electoral campaign. Radio Mozambique generally presented balanced 
coverage, whereas TVM was biased towards the ruling party. The 
government-supported newspapers Noticias, Diario de Mozambique, and 
Domingo demonstrated pro-government partisanship. The National Election 
Commission was criticized for categorizing these government-supported 
newspapers as private-sector media, thereby exempting them from the 
electoral law's requirement that public media provide fair and balanced 
treatment of all parties during the electoral campaign.
    There are no legal restrictions hindering women's involvement in 
government; however, while the number of women in the National Assembly 
and the Cabinet increased after the December 1999 elections, women are 
underrepresented in government and politics. There are 105 women in the 
250-member National Assembly, three female Cabinet ministers, and five 
female vice ministers. FRELIMO's policy mandates that at least 30 
percent of the party's two governing bodies must be women. During the 
year, the Political and Central Committees met this mandate. 
Nevertheless, cultural factors inhibit women's effectiveness in public 
life (see Section 5).

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no legal obstacles to the formation of domestic human 
rights groups, although registration procedures applying to NGO's are 
onerous and expensive (see Section 2.b.). In December the National 
Human Rights Association (ANDH) was established as an umbrella 
organization for the country's 13 human rights oriented NGO's. The 
Prison Fellowship of Mozambique (FPM) and the National Association for 
the Support and Protection of Prisoners also commenced operations 
during the year and conducted prison visits (see Section 1.c.). In 
October 1999, the DHD published a report on human rights in the country 
and plans to report periodically on human rights. The report's critical 
assessment gave particular emphasis to problems in the judiciary, 
conditions in prisons, and arbitrary arrest and detention of citizens. 
Among the complaints were alleged police killings, domestic violence, 
labor disputes, and land title conflicts. The DHD and the LDH conduct 
human rights education seminars and workshops for a wide range of 
audiences including political parties, security agencies, businesses, 
and NGO's.
    The Government responded to human rights-related inquiries from the 
LDH and the DHD on a case-by-case basis. Both the LDH and the DHD 
investigated the demonstrations and deaths in prison in Montepuez and 
released reports during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Other 
rights-oriented groups also have had contact with the Government.
    In July the Chairwoman of the LDH stated that a police contact 
warned her of police threats on her life following her appearance in a 
televised debate in which she made remarks critical of the PIC. The 
Government did not respond to the matter.
    International NGO's and human rights groups are permitted to visit 
and work in the country. In July Amnesty International visited the 
country in preparation for its annual report.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, or disability; however, in practice discrimination against 
women and the disabled persists.
    Women.--Although official statistics are not kept, according to 
health officials, women's groups, and other sources, domestic violence 
against women--particularly rape and beating--is widespread. Many women 
believe that their spouses have the right to beat them, and cultural 
pressures discourage women from taking legal action against abusive 
spouses. There is no law that defines domestic violence as a crime; 
however, domestic violence can be prosecuted under other crimes such as 
rape, battery, and assault. During the year, the NGO, All Against 
Violence (TCV) registered 699 requests for assistance in cases 
involving domestic violence, of which 10 were forwarded to the courts. 
In May police commanders from the Maputo area held a seminar on 
domestic violence, where they were instructed to handle such cases as 
criminal matters. Hospitals usually do not ascribe evidence of physical 
abuse to domestic violence. The DHD report on human rights conditions 
released in October 1999 gave particular emphasis to the problem of 
domestic violence (see Section 4).
    A group of women's NGO's, including Women in Law and Development, 
Mozambican Women in Education, Women in Judicial Careers, and the 
FRELIMO-sponsored Mozambican Women's Organization, support the 
organization All Against Violence, which serves as a monitoring and 
educational group for problems of domestic violence and sexual abuse of 
women and children, including counseling of victims and mediating 
within families. The organization continued to expand during the year. 
All NGO's actively opposing domestic violence worked to involve police 
in education, enforcement, and identifying domestic violence as a 
public order problem.
    Despite constitutional provisions for the equality of men and women 
in all aspects of political, economic, social, and cultural life, the 
civil and commercial legal codes contradict one another and the 
Constitution. Under the law of the Family and Inheritance, the husband 
or father is the head of household, and both wives and daughters must 
obtain male approval for all legal undertakings. For example, a woman 
must have the written approval of her husband, father, or closest male 
relative in order to start a business. Without such approval, a woman 
cannot lease property, obtain a loan, or contract for goods and 
services. The legal domicile of a married woman is her husband's house, 
and she may work outside the home only with the express consent of her 
husband. While it appears that these legal restrictions on women's 
freedom are not enforced regularly in urban areas they leave women open 
to extortion and other pressures.
    Family law provides that a married couple's assets belong to the 
husband, who has full authority to decide on their disposition. When a 
husband dies, his widow is only fourth in line (after sons, fathers, 
and brothers) to inherit the household goods. A contradictory provision 
of the law states that a widow is entitled to one-half of those goods 
that are acquired during the marriage, but in practice women rarely 
know of or demand this right.
    Customary law varies within the country. In some places, it appears 
to provide women less protection than family law, and unless a marriage 
is registered a woman has no recourse to the judicial branch for 
enforcement of the rights provided her by the civil codes. A new Land 
Law was adopted in 1997; sections pertaining to rural areas came into 
force in 1998, and those related to urban areas became effective in 
1999. The law is expected to have a significant effect on women, who 
are the primary cultivators of family land. Under customary law, they 
often had no rights to the disposition of the land. The revised Land 
Law specifically permits women to exercise rights over community land 
held through customary rights. However, domestic NGO's such as the 
Rural Women's Development Association and Rural Mutual Assistance 
Association have cautioned that a considerable investment of time and 
education would be necessary before the new rights granted to women 
would supersede traditional practice.
    The Constitution grants citizenship to the foreign-born wife of a 
male citizen, but not to the foreign-born husband of a female citizen.
    Women continued to experience economic discrimination in practice. 
Women constitute slightly more than half the population but are 
responsible for two-thirds of economic production, according to the 
1997 census. Women in the workplace receive lower pay than men do for 
the same work. According to Members of Parliament who debated the 
proposed revision of the Labor Law in 1998, women are subject to sexual 
harassment and to discrimination in hiring because of potential 
absences on maternity leave; although the Labor Law entitles a woman to 
60 days of maternity leave, employers often violate this right. The 
Government continued to target maternal and child health and focused on 
immunizations for women in childbearing years and for young children. 
The estimated maternal mortality rate is 1,500 per 100,000. Numerous 
development organizations and health-oriented NGO's also emphasize 
programs to improve women's health and increasingly focus resources to 
combat the spread of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases.
    The law permits the entry of women into the military; however, 
there are few women in the armed forces, and the highest ranking woman 
in the army is a major. The military began to recruit more women during 
the year and brought in 93 new female recruits.
    There were reports that women were trafficked to South Africa for 
forced prostitution and forced labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government has made children's rights and welfare a 
priority, but admits that some children are in significant trouble. 
Primary education is compulsory through the fifth year; however, there 
are few education facilities, which limits enrollment. A few new 
primary schools opened during the year throughout the country; however, 
schools are overcrowded, and there is much corruption in the school 
system. In addition, a number of schools were destroyed or converted to 
emergency shelters during the floods of February and March. Newspapers 
frequently reported that the parents of school children had to bribe 
teachers or officials to enroll their children in school, and that 
girls exchanged or were forced to exchange sex with teachers for 
passing grades. The 1997 census estimated that some 50 percent of 
children of ages 6 through 10 are in primary school. Only a fraction of 
children continue with secondary studies.
    Girls continued to have less access to education than boys above 
the primary level: 42 percent of students in grades 1 through 5 were 
girls, and 40 percent of students in grades 6 through 10 were girls. 
The percentage increased to 48.4 percent for grades 11 and 12. However, 
there are only 105 public secondary schools nationwide, of which only 
23 offer classes through grade 12. About 76 percent of females over 15 
years of age are illiterate. Outside the main cities, secondary schools 
are fewer, and where boarding is required for attendance, the number of 
female students drops significantly. In a case that gained national 
attention in 1998, residents of Morrumbene district in Inhambane 
Province demanded the exclusion of girls from the dormitories at the 
Cambine secondary school. In the absence of separate boarding 
facilities, local residents blamed schoolgirls for immoral behavior in 
the community and pressured authorities to comply with the illegal 
demand, which effectively prevented many girls from attending the 
school. The few out-of-town girls who remained to study were forced to 
live in unprotected shacks.
    An NGO, the Association to Support Mozambican Children (ASEM), 
operated 2 alternative-learning centers in Beira for more than 900 
children who were not able to return to their regular schools after 
being expelled from their homes or because they had left school to 
work. During the year, the Government supplied ASEM with textbooks.
    NGO's and the Government took some steps to protect and reintegrate 
into families or other supervised conditions an estimated 3,000 street 
children in the Maputo metropolitan area. Street children sometimes are 
beaten by police and frequently are victims of sexual abuse. Some 
remedial government programs continued, including programs on 
education, information dissemination, health care, and family 
reunification. The mortality rate for infants was 135 per 1,000, and 
for children under the age of 5 it was 201 per 1,000. The Maputo City 
Social Action Coordination Office continued its program of rescuing 
abandoned orphans and assisting single mothers who head families of 
three or more persons. The same group offered special classes to 
children of broken homes in local schools. Other NGO groups sponsored 
food, shelter, and education programs in all major cities. ASEM, in 
Beira, also provided counseling to parents who have expelled children 
from their homes, which usually happens when a wife has children who 
are unacceptable to a new husband.
    Social workers have found that some parents of disabled children 
did not permit their children to leave their homes; provincial social 
action officials continued their educational campaign to reverse 
traditional attitudes toward disabled children.
    The law does not specifically provide an age of sexual consent, nor 
does the law criminalize the offering or procuring of child 
prostitution or child pornography, and sexual abuse. Exploitation of 
children below the age of 15 continued (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). 
However, authorities in several provinces took steps to combat child 
prostitution. Child prostitution appears to be most prevalent in Maputo 
and Beira, although it may also exist in rural areas. Child 
prostitution reportedly is growing in the Maputo, Beira, and Nacala 
areas, which have highly mobile populations and a large number of 
transport workers. According to the Network for Children, a domestic 
NGO, some members of the U.N. peacekeeping force that was in the 
country between 1992 and 1994 may have initiated child prostitution in 
Manica Province. In addition many child prostitutes have been infected 
with HIV/AIDS.
    In Sofala province, where child prostitution exists along the Beira 
development corridor (frequented by truck drivers and businessmen), the 
Government operates information centers in affected areas to provide 
information to families and friends of children who are raped and 
exploited, and counsels them on how to deal with the police, public 
prosecutors, and judges. In order to address child prostitution, the 
National Assembly passed a law in May 1999 prohibiting the access of 
minors to bars and clubs; however, the Government does not have 
adequate resources to enforce the law effectively. In June the Ministry 
of Women and Social Action launched a campaign against the sexual 
exploitation of children and is working to educate hotels about the 
problem of child prostitution. The UNDP assisted the Government with 
training police to aid child prostitutes; however, there is a lack of 
accommodation centers, and the Government is unable to offer safe 
shelter to child prostitutes when they have been removed from danger.
    In 1999 during an Africa-wide conference on child soldiers that was 
held in Maputo, the NGO Restore Hope was successful in obtaining a 
promise from the Defense Ministry that former child soldiers would not 
be conscripted.
    There were reports that children in rural areas were used as 
bargaining chips to settle financial and other disputes (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.). Families delegated their children to work limited 
periods of time to settle debts.
    There are numerous reports that children are incarcerated with 
adults in prisons throughout the country (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution states that ``disabled 
citizens shall enjoy fully the rights'' that it provides for; however, 
the Government provided few resources to implement this provision. 
Representatives of disabled groups and wounded veterans frequently 
protested that societal discrimination continues against the disabled. 
Victims of landmines are among the most politically organized disabled 
citizens. About 1.9 percent of citizens are physically or mentally 
disabled. In July disabled and homeless veterans occupied vacant land 
in Matola to protest the municipality's delays in allocating land to 
the homeless.
    Disabled women protested in 1998 that the Government only provided 
four schools nationwide for hearing and vision impaired persons and for 
the physically and mentally disabled. There are few job opportunities 
for disabled persons in the formal sector, although the 1997 census 
reported that 55 percent of disabled persons worked or held a job.
    Social workers found that some parents of disabled children in 
several districts, including the populous towns of Gorongosa and Dondo, 
did not permit their children to leave their homes. Provincial Ministry 
of Social Action officials continued their educational campaign to 
reverse traditional attitudes toward disabled children. During the 
year, the Government provided scholarships for 615 disabled children in 
education facilities.
    The Government continued to rely on NGO's to assist the disabled. 
Founded in 1991, the Association of Disabled Mozambicans (ADEMO) 
addresses social and economic needs of the disabled. Smaller NGO's also 
have formed, including the Association of Handicapped Military and 
Paramilitary Mozambicans, the Association of Blind and Visually 
Impaired Mozambicans (ACDVM), the Association of Mozambican Disabled 
Soldiers (ADEMIMO), the Association of Deaf Mozambicans (ASUMO), the 
Association of Demobilized War Veterans (AMODEC), and the Association 
of Disabled Divorced Women (AMODD). In July ADEMO held a conference to 
address the rights of people with disabilities.
    Concerns of the disabled include accessibility to buildings and 
transportation, and a lack of wheelchairs. The only provisions that the 
Government has enacted for accessibility to buildings and 
transportation for the disabled were in the electoral law governing the 
country's first multiparty elections, which addressed the needs of 
disabled voters in the polling booths. Special access facilities are 
rare. On June 23, 1999, the Cabinet issued a resolution that approved 
the first national policy on disabled persons and laid out principles 
and strategies aimed at encouraging their active participation in the 
country's socio-economic development; the plan would address concerns 
of the disabled, including access to public buildings and government 
infrastructure. However, the plan had not been implemented by year's 
end due to funding constraints.
    Religious Minorities.--Relations among communities of different 
faiths generally are amicable, especially at the grassroots level. The 
black and Indian Islamic communities tend to remain separate; however, 
there were no reports of conflict.
    Civil society and the media highlighted aspects of the draft Family 
Law legislation early in the year. Debate focused on the need for legal 
recognition of religious and common law marriages, as only civil 
marriages are legal at present. Under the proposed law, polygamous 
marriages would not be recognized, although the law would offer 
protection to the widows and children of polygamous unions. Several 
leaders within the Islamic community oppose the proposal for not 
recognizing polygamy. On the other hand, approximately 50 Muslim women 
staged a public protest against polygamy in early May. There was also 
debate between some Islamic groups and several Christian groups over a 
section of the law that would raise the legal age of marriage.
    In January the Supreme Court acquitted an imam who was arrested in 
1999 in connection with a murder (see Section 2.c.); in July the court 
found two other men guilty of the murder and sentenced them to 9 and 16 
years'' imprisonment.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There was no systematic 
persecution or discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity; 
however, the FRELIMO Government traditionally has included at all 
levels a large number of southerners, mostly from the Shangaan ethnic 
group, which has engendered complaints from residents of other parts of 
the country. There also were complaints against the Government that it 
favors economic development in the southern part of the country over 
other areas. The Government has taken several steps to address such 
concerns; the central and northern provinces have been included in the 
Government's 5-year development plan, its economic and social plan, its 
poverty alleviation strategy, and its investment incentive program. In 
addition, the President, the Prime Minister, and Cabinet members spent 
significantly more time in the provinces as compared with the previous 
year. The Government also includes in senior positions persons 
originally from the northern part of the country.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that all 
workers are free to join or refrain from joining a trade union, and 
workers enjoy these rights in practice. Labor relations are governed by 
the 1991 Labor Law, which protects workers'' rights to organize and 
engage in union activities, and the 1985 Labor Law which was revised 
and promulgated in 1998. Trade unions remained concerned that free 
trade zones created under the revised 1998 law would result in less 
favorable labor rights, due to government incentives offered to foreign 
investors.
    Until 1992 the only trade union federation was the Organization of 
Mozambican Workers (OTM), which was affiliated with, and dominated by, 
the FRELIMO party. Three unions broke away from the OTM in 1992, and by 
1994 had formed their own central union, the Free and Independent Union 
of Mozambique (SLIM). In January 1999, the Ministry of Labor recognized 
this second central union as a legal entity, known as the Confederation 
of Free and Independent Unions of Mozambique (CONSILMO). CONSILMO is 
permitted to participate in national negotiations on the minimum wage 
with the Consultative Labor Commission, a body including 
representatives from labor, private employers, and Government. CONSILMO 
maintained the SLIM's working relationship with the OTM, and includes 
the powerful 28,000-member Union of Industrial Construction Workers of 
Mozambique (SINTICIM) construction trades union, an early promoter of 
the rights of female workers.
    In 1994 the OTM declared itself free of commitments to any 
political party, companies, or religious groups, and its regulations 
prohibit persons holding high ranks within any political party from 
simultaneously holding top positions in the trade union. Other labor 
unions maintain that the OTM is not independent of the Government.
    The Constitution explicitly provides for the right to strike, with 
the exception of civil servants, police, military personnel, and other 
essential services (which include sanitation, fire fighting, air 
traffic control, health care, water, electricity, fuel, post office, 
telecommunications, and funeral services). In August the OTM and other 
unions threatened a general strike following a lack of progress in 
resetting the minimum wage level in tripartite negotiations involving 
the unions, the Government, and employers'' organizations (see Sections 
6.b. and 6.e.). After negotiations came to a standstill, the Council of 
Ministers implemented a salary increase of 26 percent in July and 
agreed to an additional 4 percent increase; however, the addition was 
not granted during the year due to financial constraints.
    Provisions of the 1991 Labor Law forbid retribution against 
strikers, the hiring of substitute workers, and lockouts by employers. 
Specific labor disputes generally are arbitrated through special 
workers' committees, formally recognized by the Government.
    Two members of the workers' committee of a security services 
company were suspended from their duties after giving advance 
notification of a January 1998 strike action to company management. The 
law specifies that strikers must notify police, government, union, and 
employers 48 hours in advance of intended strikes. The firm charged the 
two with illegally representing employees who were protesting the 
company's failure to answer a wage and benefits appeal made in late 
1997 and with allegedly assaulting company managers. Their case has not 
yet been resolved.
    The Government reportedly investigated the killing by police of a 
demonstrator during a labor strike at a security services company in 
1998; however, no report was released publicly, nor was any action 
taken against the officers responsible by year's end.
    The Constitution and labor legislation give unions the right to 
join and participate in international bodies. The OTM is a member of 
the Organization of African Trade Union Unity and the Southern African 
Trade Union Coordinating Council.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Law 
protects the right of workers to organize and engage in collective 
bargaining. It expressly prohibits discrimination against organized 
labor. In 1991 the Government decreed that it would no longer set all 
salary levels. Negotiation of wage increases was left in the hands of 
existing unions. The Consultative Commission on Labor met periodically 
to negotiate changes in the minimum wage. In August the OTM and other 
unions threatened a general strike following a lack of progress in 
resetting the minimum wage level in tripartite negotiations involving 
the unions, the Government, and employers organizations (see Section 
6.a.). In 1998 for the first time since independence, the country's 
banks, which are entirely privatized, signed a collective bargaining 
agreement, regulating the labor relationship between bank management 
and staff.
    The law provides for the creation of export processing zones 
(EPZ's); in July MOZAL became the first firm to produce goods in an 
EPZ. Workers in EPZ's are subject to the same labor regulations as 
other workers, and worker rights are respected in practice.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is prohibited by law; however, while there were no reports of 
such practices in the formal economy, there were reports that women 
were trafficked to South Africa for forced prostitution and forced 
labor (see Sections 5 and 6.f.) The law does prohibit forced and bonded 
labor by children, although children in rural areas were used as labor 
to settle financial and other disputes, with their families delegating 
their children to work limited periods of time to settle economic debts 
(see Sections 5, 6.d., and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Child labor is regulated by the 1998 Labor Law. In the 
wage economy, the working age without restrictions is 18 years. The 
revised 1998 labor law permits children between the ages of 15 and 18 
to work subject to certain restrictions. Children between the ages of 
12 and 15 are permitted to work under special conditions authorized 
jointly by the Ministries of Labor, Health, and Education. For minors 
under 18 years, the maximum workweek is 38 hours, and the maximum 
workday is 7 hours. Children must undergo a medical examination before 
beginning work. By law children must be paid at least the minimum wage 
or a minimum of two-thirds of the adult salary, whichever is higher. 
The Ministry of Labor regulates child labor in both the informal and 
formal sectors.
    Child labor remains widespread in the country, especially in rural 
areas where children sometimes work alongside their parents or 
independently in seasonal harvests or commercial plantations. Employers 
normally pay children on a piecework basis for such work, which 
principally involves picking cotton or tea leaves.
    Because of high adult unemployment in the formal sector, estimated 
at around 50 percent, few children are employed in regular wage 
positions; however, children, including those under age 15, commonly 
work on family farms or in the urban informal sector, where they 
perform such tasks as ``guarding'' cars, collecting scrap metal, or 
selling trinkets and food in the streets. The informal labor sector is 
unregulated. Children also are employed in domestic positions; the 
number of children in domestic positions appeared to be rising. In a 
September 1999 newspaper survey, labor union representatives noted the 
growing presence of children in construction jobs. Child prostitution 
also appears to be growing, especially in the Maputo, Beira, and Nacala 
development corridors, which have highly mobile populations and a large 
number of transport workers. Child prostitution also appears to be 
growing in rural areas (see Section 5).
    Less than 50 percent of school-age children attend classes (see 
Section 5); children not in school frequently are employed in the 
agricultural and casual labor sectors.
    In June 1999 the Government signed ILO Convention 182 on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labor; however, the Government had not ratified it by 
year's end.
    The law does prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, although 
children in rural areas were used as labor to settle financial and 
other disputes, with families delegating their children to work limited 
periods of time to settle economic debts (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 
6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The industrial minimum wage of 
approximately $35 (568,980 meticais) per month, is set by ministerial 
decree, although the level is recommended through an administrative 
process which consists of a tripartite commission composed of labor 
unions, government representatives, and employer groups. There is also 
an agricultural minimum wage of approximately $24 (382,725 meticais) 
per month, which is established through the same tripartite process. 
Neither minimum wage is considered sufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for an average worker and family, and many workers 
must turn to a second job, if available; maintain their own gardens; or 
depend on the income of other family members to survive. Only a small 
percentage of laborers work at the minimum wage level. Less than 10 
percent of workers are in salaried positions, and the majority of the 
labor force is employed in subsistence farming and the informal sector. 
Although the industrial sector frequently pays above minimum wage, 
there is little industry outside of the Maputo area. In August the OTM 
and other unions threatened a general strike following a lack of 
progress in resetting the minimum wage level in tripartite negotiations 
(see Section 6.a.). Following tripartite negotiations among the 
Government, employers, and labor unions, the Government agreed to raise 
the minimum wage by 30 percent. The Government granted an increase of 
26 percent in July; however, due to funding constraints, the final 4 
percent was not yet implemented by year's end.
    The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage 
rates in the private sector, and the Ministry of Planning and Finance 
in the public sector. Violations of minimum wage rates usually are 
investigated only after workers register a complaint. It is customary 
for workers to receive benefits such as transportation and food in 
addition to wages. There is an obligation for workers or employers to 
participate in a social security scheme, although they voluntarily may 
create and contribute to private accounts or plans with the National 
Institute of Social Security, to cover retirement, unemployment 
compensation, and emergency benefits. Worker complaints about employers 
deducting social security contributions from wages but failing to pay 
them into accounts grew. During the year, many workers were unable to 
claim unemployment benefits. Workers who previously had labored in East 
Germany have requested sums that were set aside from their wages to 
serve as pensions at a later date; the German government previously 
attempted to transfer these amounts to the Government, Government never 
received these amounts due to suspected embezzlement by a government 
employee, and the Government claimed that it could not reimburse the 
workers.
    The standard legal workweek is 44 hours, with a weekly 24-hour rest 
period.
    In the small formal sector, the Government has enacted health and 
environmental laws to protect workers; however, the Ministry of Labor 
enforces these laws ineffectively, and the Government only occasionally 
has closed firms for noncompliance. The Labor Ministry reported 729 
industrial accidents in 1999, with 38 deaths. Most of these accidents 
were blamed on unsafe practices or the lack of safety equipment. During 
the parliamentary debate in 1998 on revision of the Labor Law, 
delegates noted that there continued to be significant violations of 
labor legislation in many companies and services. Workers have the 
right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger their 
health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment, 
although this right was restricted in practice.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific laws that 
prohibit trafficking in persons, although trafficking can be addressed 
under labor, immigration, and child welfare laws, and there were 
reports that women were trafficked to South Africa for forced 
prostitution and forced labor (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Women are 
lured into the country by international organized crime syndicates with 
the promise of jobs and decent wages, and then forced to work as 
prostitutes, in some cases to pay off debts to those who smuggled them 
into the country. The LDH was investigating a report by two women from 
Manhica that they were promised jobs in South Africa and then forced to 
work in a brothel when they arrived there; the investigation was 
ongoing at year's end. On occasion the media reported that citizens 
worked in foreign countries for low wages or in poor conditions.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that women and 
children were trafficked to Swaziland.
    There were reports that children in rural areas often were used as 
bargaining chips to settle financial and other disputes in rural areas 
(see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Families delegate their children to work 
limited periods of time to settle economic debts.
    The Government did not take any specific actions to combat 
trafficking during the year.
                               __________

                                NAMIBIA

    Namibia is a multiparty, multiracial democracy. President Sam 
Nujoma, leader of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), 
was reelected in 1999 general elections, which international and 
domestic observers agreed were free, but included some instances of 
government harassment of the opposition and unequal access to media 
coverage and campaign financing. Although the Constitution formerly 
limited the President to two terms in office, in November 1998, the 
National Assembly amended the Constitution to permit President Nujoma 
to run for a third term. In the 1999 elections, President Nujoma won 77 
percent of the vote and SWAPO won three-quarters of the seats in the 
National Assembly. The judiciary is independent.
    The police, including the paramilitary Special Field Force (SFF), 
supervised by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Namibian Defense 
Force (NDF), supervised by the Ministry of Defense, share 
responsibility for internal security. The Namibian Central Intelligence 
Service (NCIS) has responsibility for national security related 
intelligence inside and outside the country. As a result of crossborder 
fighting from Angola, there were increased abuses by the security 
forces in the Kavango and Caprivi regions. NDF soldiers were sent to 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998 and remained there 
throughout the year. Members of the police force committed serious 
human rights abuses.
    Namibia's modern market sector produces most of its wealth, while a 
traditional subsistence agricultural sector (mainly in the north) 
supports most of its labor force. The principal exports are diamonds 
and other minerals, cattle, and fish. Ranching still is controlled 
largely by white citizens and foreign interests. In other industries, 
including the important mining, fishing, and tourism sectors, the 
participation of indigenous entrepreneurs is being increased to provide 
opportunities for black citizens. Per capita annual gross domestic 
product is approximately $1,400. However, there is an extreme disparity 
between income levels of black citizens and white citizens. 
Unemployment was nearly 40 percent and affected primarily the black 
majority.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were serious problems in several areas. 
Members of the security forces committed several extrajudicial killings 
while conducting extensive security operations in the Kavango and 
Caprivi regions along the country's northern border with Angola. After 
fighting between the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and forces from the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) crossed 
into the country, security forces involved in anti-UNITA security 
operations killed civilians. The Government did not account for the 
whereabouts of some persons detained by the security forces. During 
arrests and detentions, security force members beat citizens and 
Angolan refugees who were suspected of complicity with UNITA. There 
were other reports of police mistreatment of suspects in detention, and 
refugees were denied legal protections during detention. Some security 
force members who committed abuses were arrested and tried in military 
courts or the civilian criminal justice system; however, the Government 
did not take legal or administrative action in many other cases. Prison 
conditions and conditions in military detention facilities were 
spartan. Arbitrary arrest and lengthy pretrial detention are problems. 
A large court backlog, due primarily to resource constraints, continued 
to lead to lengthy delays of trials. High-level government officials 
continued to respond to criticism of ruling party and government 
policies with verbal abuse. There continued to be pressure on 
journalists who worked for government-owned media outlets not to 
criticize the Government. There continued to be a ban on all public 
demonstrations that did not have prior police approval, and, on a few 
occasions, the Government prevented some demonstrations. On occasion 
the Government restricted freedom of movement. The authorities 
continued to deport Angolan citizens without review by an immigration 
tribunal, as required by the law; however, there were no reports of 
such deportations during the latter half of the year. Violence against 
women and children, including rape and child abuse, continued to be 
serious problems; however, the Government took some steps during the 
year to address these problems. Women continued to experience serious 
legal and cultural discrimination. Racial and ethnic discrimination and 
serious disparities in education, health, employment, and working 
conditions continued. Discrimination against indigenous persons 
persisted, especially in remote rural areas where indigenous persons 
often were unaware of their rights. There were reports of forced labor, 
including by children. The Government took steps to end child labor, 
and the problem of child labor declined.
    Members of the FAA and UNITA involved in the crossborder fighting 
in the northern part of the country committed extrajudicial killings, 
beat civilians, and according to local and international human rights 
groups, committed a number of rapes.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the 
security forces committed several extrajudicial killings in the Kavango 
and Caprivi regions along the northern border, where fighting between 
FAA and UNITA forces crossed over into the country. At times security 
forces used excessive violence against citizens and Angolan civilians 
along the northern border of the country, and security forces involved 
in anti-UNITA operations killed a number of civilians during the year. 
On January 10, SFF members in Hakusembe fired into a crowd of refugees 
and shot and killed a 6 year-old girl, Heremine Nyumbu. On January 27, 
SFF members shot and killed Mpengu Haininga as he tried to escape 
arrest in Sheghuru village east of Rundu. On March 10, a SFF member 
shot and killed Mapeu Moroshi in Thipanana Rughongo village. A SFF 
member was arrested and charged with the killing; however, there was no 
further information available on the case by year's end. On June 8, NDF 
soldiers shot and killed Felizberto Toto in the village of Nakazaza 
west of Rundu.
    At times the Government took action against security forces 
responsible for deaths; however, in many other cases, the Government 
failed to take action against security force members responsible for 
killings.
    During the early months of the year, senior civilian and military 
government officials made public statements acknowledging that security 
forces abused and killed civilians in the Kavango and Caprivi regions 
during security operations in response to crossborder UNITA attacks in 
the country, and they publicly called for greater discipline and 
respect for human rights by the NDF and police forces. The NDF and 
police forces implemented human rights training with the assistance of 
UNHCR and the Legal Assistance Center, a domestic nongovernmental 
organization (NGO).
    In November 1999, a police officer in Okahandja beat to death a 
student who was arrested and in custody for disorderly conduct. The 
police officer immediately was suspended, charged, and released on 
bail; his trial was still pending at year's end.
    In August 1999, security force officers killed 8 Caprivi Liberation 
Army (CLA) rebels and several civilians, and they beat, arrested and 
detained suspected CLA rebels and sympathizers during operations 
against the CLA after an August 1999 CLA attack at Katima Mulilo. No 
action had been taken against the implicated officers by year's end. 
Representatives of some international human rights organizations 
visited the country to investigate the August 1999 killings and abuses, 
and Amnesty International (AI) released a report during the year (see 
Section 4).
    There was no further information available on the case against a 
SFF officer who shot and killed James Chilunda, a civilian, in the 
Caprivi village of Singalamwe in July 1999.
    After the Government decided in December 1999 to allow the FAA to 
launch anti-UNITA attacks from the country's territory, there was 
extensive crossborder fighting, which resulted in civilian deaths and 
injuries. On January 9, two civilians were shot and killed during 
crossborder fighting in Nkonke. In February three civilians were killed 
and nine houses were burned during crossborder fighting in Shinyungwe 
village.
    FAA soldiers killed a number of civilians during the year. On 
January 22, an FAA member killed Thadeus Mubili in Mushangara in 
western Caprivi. On May 27, the FAA killed Thaddeus Vili at Bagani near 
the Kavango and Caprivi regions. In both cases, the responsible FAA 
members were arrested immediately after the killings and returned to 
the FAA for punishment; however, it is not known if the FAA took 
further action by year's end.
    During raids in the Kavango and Caprivi regions, UNITA forces 
killed civilians.
    UNITA used landmines, which resulted in dozens of deaths and 
numerous injuries of civilians and security force officers. The 
Government reported that by October 12 persons were killed and 107 were 
injured by landmines in the Kavango region and the western part of the 
Caprivi region (see Section 1.c.). There also was some evidence that 
FAA members used landmines in villages.
    On January 3, unknown armed men attacked a family of foreign 
tourists on the Trans-Caprivi Highway, killing three children and 
injuring their parents; the incident was under investigation at year's 
end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of 
disappearances perpetrated by the security forces during the year. 
Although the Government arrested a number of suspected UNITA supporters 
in the Kavango and Caprivi regions and detained them for several weeks, 
they all were accounted for by year's end.
    During several crossborder attacks into the northern area of the 
country, UNITA kidnaped Namibian citizens and took them to Angola. 
There were reports that some of the kidnaped persons were raped or 
forced to serve as combatants or porters (see Section 6.c.).
    There were no further developments on the disappearance of persons 
detained by SWAPO prior to independence.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution provides that no persons shall be subject 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 
however, in practice, prisoners sometimes were beaten or otherwise 
mistreated by police, especially by members of the SFF. There were 
serious abuses in the Kavango and Caprivi regions along the northern 
border, where fighting between FAA and UNITA forces spilled into the 
country. During arrests and detentions, security force members beat 
citizens and Angolan refugees who were suspected of complicity with 
UNITA.
    On January 7, SFF members arrested Erkki Fiderato in a village east 
of Rundu. The SFF members allegedly beat Fiderato with rifle butts 
during his arrest and with an iron bar while he was in detention at 
Utokota SFF base. On January 10, SFF members in Hakusembe shot and 
wounded Kandepwe Kapama when they fired shots into a crowd of refugees 
(see Section 1.a.). On January 12, police shot and injured Kathumbi 
Diyeve in the head as he ran from security forces in the village of 
Muitjiku in western Caprivi. On January 28, members of the SFF beat 
Lucas Kavura and his father, Daniel Nyambe, in their home in the Sambyu 
area and again at a special field force base. On February 3, SFF 
members arrested Kamungwe Ngondo and held him in detention for 2 weeks 
at the Rundu airport military base, during which time officers 
reportedly beat him with rubber whips, called sjamboks. On February 4, 
members of the SFF shot and wounded Muyeva Thadeus Munango, reportedly 
while he was fishing in the Kavango River. On February 10, SFF officers 
arrested Hompa Anton in Sauyemwa near Rundu; they beat him with rifle 
butts, whipped him, and kicked him during his arrest and detention. He 
was hospitalized for a broken vertebrae.
    SFF members reportedly beat persons whom they stopped for 
identification checks. For example, on January 24, SFF members arrested 
Kapindi Mpepo, Haupindi Hamuyera, and Petrus Paulus and beat them with 
sjamboks when they were unable to produce Namibian identity documents; 
the three were later found to be citizens and were released.
    On September 18, 18 NDF soldiers were convicted by courts-martial 
of assault for severely beating and pouring hot water on seven persons 
on August 21 in Sivara, west of Rundu. The soldiers were sentenced to 2 
years in prison; however, they remained in the NDF and their sentences 
were suspended on the condition that they not commit assault within the 
next 2 years.
    In October there were reports that security forces targeted members 
of the Kxoe minority group for harassment during antiUNITA operations 
in the Caprivi region.
    At times, security force members who committed abuses were arrested 
and tried in military courts or the civilian criminal justice system; 
however, in many other cases, the Government did not take any action 
against those responsible for abuses.
    In 1999 security forces responded with violence to secessionist 
attacks. The Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) was representing former 
parliamentarian Geoffrey Mwilima in a civil suit against the Government 
for damages for their mistreatment by police after the August 1999 CLA 
attack at Katima Mulilo. Security forces beat Mwilima and other 
suspected CLA members and sympathizers with sjamboks and rifle butts 
during arrest and detention. A police spokesman stated publicly on 
several occasions that the Police Complaints and Discipline Unit was 
conducting investigations into the abuse of detainees; however, at 
year's end, the LAC case against the Government had not been heard, and 
the Government had not taken administrative action against those 
responsible. Chrispin Sinfua also initiated a civil suit against the 
Government for the abuse that he suffered in 1999; the trial had not 
begun by year's end. The LAC reported that 120 civil suits had been 
filed relating to the 1999 state of emergency in Caprivi.
    In 1994 the police instituted a human rights training course 
designed by the LAC, which was ongoing; during the year, the LAC 
introduced a police human rights manual. During the March 30 opening of 
the human rights training facility, the head of the Police Complaints 
and Discipline Unit, Commissioner Sebastian Ndeitunga, announced that 
the Inspector General had prohibited the use of sjamboks by police, a 
directive which became effective immediately. The directive generally 
was observed by police and resulted in some decrease in reports of 
police brutality; however, police still are permitted to use batons. 
There was one report of police use of sjamboks after March 30; it is 
not known whether disciplinary action was taken against the officer 
responsible.
    Numerous crossborder attacks into the country by UNITA forces, the 
use of landmines by UNITA, and the abuse of civilians in the northern 
part of the country by FAA troops resulted in dozens of deaths and many 
injuries to civilians (see Section 1.a.). The Government reported that 
by October, 107 persons had been injured by landmines. There were 
reports that UNITA forces kidnaped female citizens and raped them. 
There were reports of intimidation and abuse of civilians by the FAA, 
including sexual harassment, threatening behavior by drunken soldiers, 
and indiscriminate use of firearms. In August the all-SWAPO region 
council for Kavango recommended the removal of Angolan Government 
troops from the country because of their harassment of Namibian 
civilians.
    In September 1999, many detainees exhibited evidence of extensive 
injuries inflicted by police during their detentions, including 
detainees Oscar Lupalezwi, Stephan Ntelamo, and Allen Sameja. All three 
identified their abusers as police sergeant Patrick Liswani and two 
constables named ``Haipa'' and ``Oupa.'' During the year, the 
Prosecutor General requested additional investigations in the criminal 
case against FAA officers Patrick Liswani, Haipa, and Oupa; there was 
no further action on the case by year's end.
    On January 3, foreign tourists were attacked and injured by unknown 
armed men on the Trans-Caprivi Highway (see Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions and conditions in military detention facilities 
are spartan, although the Government continued to focus attention on 
improving living conditions. Visits by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) and foreign diplomats found conditions in prisons 
to be clean and orderly. Human rights organizations continued to 
complain about prison overcrowding. In 1995 the Government created a 
Ministry of Prisons and Correctional Services, charged with 
administering the country's prisons and jails. The Government also made 
efforts to separate youthful offenders from adult criminals, although 
in many rural areas juveniles continued to be held with adults. There 
are several pilot programs that provide alternatives to incarceration 
for juvenile offenders. Female prisoners are held separately from male 
prisoners. There have been allegations that female prisoners sometimes 
were abused by prison guards. The Government continued to grant NGO's 
regular access to prisons and prisoners. The ICRC requested and 
received prison access, including access to the high security Dorbabis 
detention facility.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution forbids 
arbitrary arrest or detention except in situations of national 
emergency; however, security forces used arbitrary arrest and detention 
in practice. According to the Constitution, persons who are arrested 
must be informed of the reason for their arrest and must be brought 
before a magistrate within 48 hours of their detention. Those accused 
are entitled to defense by legal counsel of their choice, and those who 
cannot afford a lawyer are entitled to state-provided counsel. However, 
in practice many accused persons in remote and rural areas are not 
represented by counsel, primarily due to resource constraints. A trial 
must take place within ``a reasonable time,'' or the accused must be 
released. Human rights organizations have criticized the length of time 
that pretrial detainees were held, which have extended up to 1 year in 
some cases (see Section 1.e.). Under a state of emergency, the 
Constitution permits detention without trial, although the names of 
detainees must be published in the government gazette within 14 days, 
and their cases must be reviewed within 1 month by an advisory board 
appointed by the President.
    On January 7, SFF members arrested Erkki Fiderato in a village east 
of Rundu and allegedly beat him while he was in detention at Utokota 
SFF base (see Section 1.c.). On February 10, SFF officers arrested 
Hompa Anton in Sauyemwa near Rundu; they beat him with rifle butts, 
whipped him, and kicked him during his arrest and detention (see 
Section 1.c.). On February 18, the Central Intelligence Service 
detained the Katima Mulilo-based head of National Society for Human 
Rights'' (NSHR) Caprivi office, Moses Nasileli, for questioning and 
they expelled him from the country to Zambia on February 21 (see 
Section 4). On June 9, a group of Angolan and Congolese refugee 
musicians were arrested for performing at a Congress of Democrats (COD) 
rally (see Section 2.d.). The Government returned the musicians to the 
Osire refugee camp and revoked their permission to live in Windhoek. 
When some of the musicians later left the camp without government 
permission, the Government attempted to arrest them. The musicians, 
represented by the LAC, obtained an injunction against their detention 
and expulsion from the country. Although the Government initially 
announced that it would arrest them again, no such action had been 
taken by year's end. During a security force operation in August, the 
Government arrested 82 alleged Angolan illegal immigrants in the 
northern part of the country and detained them under Section 49 of the 
Immigration Control Act, a provision that gives the Government greater 
powers to arrest and detain immigrants who may pose a security threat. 
A majority of the arrested immigrants had lived in the country for many 
years, and they were detained based on suspicion of involvement in 
UNITA crossborder attacks. The detainees were held for a month in 
secrecy before the Government made the arrests and detentions public in 
September. Although the detainees were interviewed by the ICRC and 
UNCHR, they were denied legal counsel. The NSHR stated that at least 
one of the detainees was a citizen and provided his identification card 
number; however, the Government has disputed the detainee's 
citizenship, and he continued to be held at Dorbabis detention facility 
at year's end. The Government stated that it would not forcibly return 
the detained immigrants to Angola. The detainees remained at Dorbabis 
at year's end; they had not been charged, and they were not granted 
access to legal counsel, although ICRC arranged for the Namibian Red 
Cross to transmit messages to and from their families.
    In October there were reports that security forces arrested and 
detained 3 senior headmen and 10 children from the Kxoe minority group 
(see Section 1.c.). The children reportedly were later released.
    Some traditional leaders reportedly continued to detain and 
imprison persons accused of minor offenses without recourse to police 
or judicial review. In response the Government instructed traditional 
leaders on the legal limits of their authority.
    During the August 1999 state of emergency declared in response to 
CLA attacks in Katima Mulilo, the security forces detained several 
hundred of suspected CLA members and sympathizers. Most of the detained 
were held incommunicado for 2 weeks, which the Constitution allows 
during states of emergency, before the Government provided public 
notice of the detentions. All of the detained were arraigned on 
charges, but were denied bail and remained in detention at year's end; 
their trials were postponed until April 2001. While the majority of 
detentions during the state of emergency occurred in the Caprivi 
region, on August 7 and 8, Albert Sibeya and Martin Sichimwa Mutumba 
were arrested in Ongwediva in the north-central part of the country. 
The NSHR protested the use of emergency measures to detain suspects 
outside of the Caprivi region, and the LAC initiated a constitutional 
case against the arrests. The case had not been heard by year's end.
    The Government generally does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The formal court system has three levels: 30 magistrates' courts; 
the High Court; and the Supreme Court. The latter also serves as the 
court of appeals and as a constitutional review court.
    Most rural citizens first encounter the legal system through the 
traditional courts, which deal with minor criminal offenses such as 
petty theft and infractions of local customs among members of the same 
ethnic group. The Traditional Authorities Act delineates which offenses 
may be dealt with under the traditional system.
    The constitutional right to a fair trial with a presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty generally is afforded by the judiciary; 
however, this right is somewhat limited in practice by long delays in 
hearing cases in the regular courts and the uneven application of 
constitutional protections in the traditional system.
    The lack of qualified magistrates, other court officials, and 
private attorneys has resulted in a serious backlog of criminal cases, 
which often translated into delays of up to a year or more between 
arrest and trial, contravening constitutional provisions for the right 
to a speedy trial. Many of those awaiting trial were treated as 
convicted criminals.
    In July the Minister of Home Affairs criticized foreign judges 
serving in the judiciary after a High Court issued a restraining order 
against the Government and threatened to withdraw work permits of 
foreign judges; however, in August the Minister subsequently apologized 
(see Section 2.a.).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides all citizens with the right 
to privacy and requires arresting officers to secure a judicial warrant 
before conducting a search, except in situations of national emergency, 
and government authorities generally respected these rights in 
practice. In general violations were subject to legal action.
    Under the 1997 Namibian Central Intelligence Service (NCIS) Bill, 
the NCIS is authorized to conduct wiretaps, intercept mail, and engage 
in other covert activities, both inside and outside the country, to 
protect national security. However, wiretaps and covert surveillance 
require the consent of a judge.
    In February UNITA forces killed three civilians and burned nine 
houses in Shinyungwe village (see Section 1.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, subject to ``reasonable 
restrictions'' in situations such as a state of emergency, and the 
Government generally respected these rights; however, at times high 
level government officials responded to criticism of the ruling party 
and government policies with verbal abuse. There also were reports of 
government pressure on reporters who worked for the governmentowned 
media.
    Reporters for independent newspapers continued to criticize the 
Government openly and do not engage in self-censorship. During the 
year, high-level government officials sharply and publicly criticized 
journalists, human rights groups, and opposition politicians in 
response to perceived criticism of the Government or ruling party (see 
Section 4). The NSHR issued a report in 1999 citing 20 such incidents. 
Such verbal attacks do not appear to have had a major impact on the 
aggressive style of the independent media or the work of human rights 
groups or opposition political parties. NGO's involved in media issues 
maintained that reporters working for the government-owned New Era 
newspaper were subjected to indirect and direct pressure not to report 
on certain controversial topics, and although the New Era sometimes 
covered opposition party activities and views that were critical of the 
Government, the Government exerted increasing control over its news 
content during the year.
    The government-owned NBC operates most radio and television 
services. Media observers believe that NBC reporters exercised 
considerable self-censorship on certain controversial issues, although 
the NBC provided some coverage to opposition parties and viewpoints 
critical of government policies. However, a newly-appointed NBC 
Director instituted management changes that were criticized for 
enforcing ideological compliance with the Government and seeking to 
diminish government opposition. In September a senior NBC staff member 
won a court injunction against her reassignment, which was part of the 
restructuring process, but it was perceived by journalists and legal 
and human rights groups to be as a response to her critical news 
coverage of the Government.
    There were five private radio stations, one private television 
station in the town of Rehoboth, and a private cable and satellite 
television service that broadcasts the Cable News Network, the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, and a range of South African and 
international news and entertainment programs. The ruling SWAPO party 
owns 51 percent of this cable service. There are no restrictions on the 
private ownership of satellite dishes, and the use of satellite dishes 
and cable television is growing.
    There are no restrictions on Internet access or use. There are 
growing numbers of domestic web pages, and one of the independent 
newspapers has a popular website.
    In October 1997, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 
(MOIB) issued new regulations for journalists. In March the MOIB was 
absorbed into a combined Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Information 
and Broadcasting. Regulations require foreign journalists who seek to 
visit the country to provide a month's advance notice to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Information and Broadcasting, stating the 
purpose of their proposed visit. Journalists are required to schedule 
appointments with government officials through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Information and Broadcasting and request permission to 
visit areas under the control of the Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism. Additionally journalists must obtain a temporary work permit 
from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Several major conferences in the 
country attracted large numbers of international journalists.
    The Government respects academic freedom. There were no reports of 
interference with, or harassment of, these activities.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, except in situations of national 
emergency, and the Government generally has respected this right in 
practice; however, on a few occasions the Government prevented 
demonstrations.
    Organizers of public meetings were required to obtain prior police 
approval, but many public gatherings took place without such approval 
and without interference by the Government. In August the Government 
prevented two peaceful protest marches from delivering petitions to 
State House during the summit of heads of state of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).
    On June 8, SWAPO supporters intimidated COD members arriving for a 
rally in the Gobabis ``singles quarters'' (used during the apartheid 
era to house male workers living away from their families). The COD 
cancelled the rally.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, even in times 
of national emergency, and the Government generally respected this 
right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, except in situations of national emergency; however, on 
occasion the Government restricted these rights in practice. SFF 
members reportedly beat persons whom they stopped for identification 
checks. For example, on January 24, SFF members arrested three persons 
and beat them with sjamboks when they were unable to produce Namibian 
identity documents (see Section 1.c.).
    Namibian and Angolan security forces forcibly returned Angolan 
refugees entering the Kavango region on several occasions during the 
year. There were allegations that young males were separated from their 
families, arrested, returned to Angola, or forced into conscription 
with the Angolan army. UNHCR requested and was granted access to 
immigration tribunal proceedings. The UNHCR provided training for 
security and immigration officials in response to a Government request, 
and there were no reported forced returns during the latter half of the 
year.
    A law containing provisions for dealing with refugees in accordance 
with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol was passed in 1998 and signed into law by the 
President in March 1999. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR on 
the granting of refugee status to asylum seekers. The Government's 
eligibility committee continued to meet on a regular basis to consider 
asylum requests, and the UNHCR was permitted to intervene in those 
cases where immigrants would qualify for refugee status. Illegal 
immigrants continued to be detained for short periods prior to their 
deportation proceedings. In cases where illegal immigrants are alleged 
to pose a security threat, they can be detained for longer periods 
under Section 49 of the Immigration Act.
    The Government provided first asylum and continued to permit asylum 
seekers to enter the country. The UNHCR estimates that approximately 
26,000 persons eligible for refugee status are residing within the 
country. There were approximately 18,000 refugees and asylum seekers at 
the Osire camp, 95 percent of whom are from Angola. The remaining 
refugees are from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, and other African countries. Government officials 
interview asylum seekers. Those granted refugee status generally were 
not permitted to work, live outside the Osire refugee camp, or attend 
schools. Schools have been established at the Osire refugee camp. The 
Osire camp, which was designed to accommodate 5,000 refugees, 
experienced severe overcrowding problems during the year.
    During the first few months of the year, the authorities deported 
some Angolan citizens without review by an immigration tribunal, as 
required by law. The deportation of military-age Angolan men led the 
NSHR to accuse the police of assisting the Angolan government in its 
conscription efforts (see Section 2.d.). After the local UNHCR office 
provided training for immigration and security force officials 
beginning in late 1999, the number of such extra-legal deportations 
declined.
    On February 21, the Central Intelligence Service expelled from the 
country to Zambia the Katima Mulilo-based head of NSHR's Caprivi 
office, Moses Nasileli. Nasileli was a Zambian national who had lived 
in the country since 1985, was married to a citizen, and had six 
citizen children (see Section 4).
    In October officials denied foreign Red Cross members access to the 
Osire refugee camp based on new permit requirements. The Namibian Red 
Cross Society (NRCS) temporarily withdrew from the Osire camp after the 
incident. In April the Government, UNHCR and the NRCS entered into a 
tripartite agreement to provide for refugees in the Osire camp; the 
agreement designates the NRCS as the primarily service provider. As a 
result, coordination among the parties improved during the year.
    In August the Government arrested and detained 82 alleged Angolan 
illegal immigrants in the northern part of the country based on 
suspicion of UNITA involvement. The majority of the arrested immigrants 
had lived in the country for many years. Although the detainees were 
interviewed by the ICRC and UNHCR, they were denied legal counsel. The 
Government stated that it would not forcibly return the detained 
immigrants to Angola (see Section 1.d.).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens exercised their right to change their government by 
electing a President and National Assembly for the second time since 
independence during the November 30 to December 1, 1999, general 
election, which international and domestic observers agreed was 
generally free and well-administered despite some irregularities. 
Observers noted instances of harassment of opposition members during 
the campaign, and unequal access to media coverage and campaign 
financing were problems. Nevertheless voter turnout was over 60 percent 
and the election proceeded peacefully. Sam Nujoma, leader of the ruling 
party SWAPO, was reelected. Although the Constitution formerly limited 
the President to two terms in office, in November 1998, the National 
Assembly amended the Constitution to permit President Nujoma to run for 
a third term. President Nujoma won 77 percent of the vote and SWAPO won 
55 of 72 elected National Assembly seats. Four opposition parties won a 
total of 17 seats in the National Assembly, including the COD party, 
which won the largest number of opposition votes, the Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the United Democratic Front, and the Monitor 
Action Group.
    The Constitution establishes a bicameral Parliament and provides 
for general elections every 5 years and regional elections every 6 
years.
    Opposition parties generally were able to undertake political 
activity such as advertising and holding party conferences and public 
rallies. However, prior to the June National Assembly by-election in 
Gobabis, SWAPO supporters prevented the COD from holding a rally (see 
Section 2.b.).
    In July 1998, the Government created an independent electoral 
commission and named a broad based group of respected individuals to 
the commission. The Government also named a respected former journalist 
as the new Director of Elections.
    Leaders of the opposition have criticized the ruling party for its 
decision to amend the Constitution to permit the President to seek a 
third term. Ambassador Ben Ulenga, the High Commissioner to Great 
Britain and also a high level ruling party official, resigned in 1998 
from his diplomatic post after he was unsuccessful in getting the 
ruling party to debate the third term issue. In March 1999, Ulenga 
formed the COD opposition party, and in the general election the COD 
won approximately 10 percent of the vote and seven seats in the 
National Assembly.
    Members of the National Assembly are elected on a party list system 
on a proportional basis.
    Women remained underrepresented in government and politics. There 
were 3 female ministers and 4 female deputy ministers of a total of 42 
ministerial and deputy ministerial positions. In addition one women 
held a cabinet-level position as Director of the National Planning 
Commission. Women served as Ombudswoman and as the Government Attorney. 
Women held 18 of 98 parliamentary seats in the National Assembly. In 
1996 female legislators formed a Women's Caucus in Parliament to review 
legislation for gender sensitivity.
    Historic economic and educational disadvantages have served to 
limit the participation of the indigenous San ethnic group in politics; 
however, a member of the San community representing the SWAPO party was 
elected to the National Assembly in the 1999 general elections. 
Virtually all of the country's other ethnic minorities were represented 
in Parliament and in senior positions in the Cabinet. Members of 
smaller ethnic groups hold the offices of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime 
Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Speaker of the National 
Assembly.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    During the year, high-level government officials continued to use 
harsh language in responding to criticisms of the ruling party and 
government policies by nongovernmental organizations. For example, 
government officials publicly stated on numerous occasions during the 
year that critics were a ``fifth column for UNITA'' and guilty of 
``treason.'' Government officials also have attacked verbally the NSHR 
and the Breaking of Walls of Silence (BWS) movement, which acts as an 
advocate for former detainees imprisoned by SWAPO prior to 
independence. In January a member-elect of the National Assembly from 
the ruling party stated on a call-in radio show that he supported an 
earlier caller's threat to ``eliminate'' the executive director of the 
NSHR.
    On February 18, the Central Intelligence Service detained the 
Katima Mulilo-based head of NSHR's Caprivi office, Moses Nasileli, for 
questioning and expelled him from the country to Zambia on February 21. 
Although the Government justified the deportation based on his alleged 
support for Caprivi separatists, reportedly he was deported because of 
his NSHR affiliation. Nasileli was a Zambian national who had lived in 
the country since 1985, was married to a citizen, and had six citizen 
children.
    However, despite verbal attacks, other local NGO's such as the LAC, 
the NSHR, the BWS Movement, and those working with indigenous groups 
continue to criticize government policies freely. Both the NSHR and the 
Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID) maintain field offices in the 
Kavango region. Human rights organizations are generally free to 
investigate reports of abuses in the region and to release reports.
    In addition human rights organizations and academic organizations, 
such as the Media Institute for Southern Africa, the Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences, and the Human Rights Documentation Centre, worked 
openly on a variety of human rights problems affecting the press, 
women, ethnic minorities, and other groups. For example, in the early 
part of the year, leaders of the Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN) 
criticized the Government for the behavior of security forces along the 
Angolan border. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), which is 
based in Windhoek, periodically issues reports criticizing the 
Government.
    Representatives of international human rights organizations, 
including AI, visited the country to investigate allegations of human 
rights abuses, including reports of summary executions and the 
treatment of Caprivi separatists arrested in August 1999 (see Sections 
1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.). In March AI issued a highly critical report of 
abuses by security forces along the Angola border.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, creed, 
gender, or religion, and specifically prohibits ``the practice and 
ideology of apartheid.'' During the year, there was a significant 
improvement in the attention paid to women's issues and the rights of 
the disabled.
    Women.--Violence against women, including beating and rape, is 
widespread. Traditional attitudes regarding the subordination of women 
exacerbated problems of sexual and domestic violence. However, there 
continued to be an improvement in the attention paid to the problems of 
rape and domestic violence. Government ministers joined in public 
protests against domestic violence, and the President, members of his 
Cabinet, and parliamentarians continued to speak out against it. Longer 
prison sentences were handed down to convicted rapists and abusers in 
many cases during the year. NGO's expressed concern that the court 
system does not have mechanisms to protect vulnerable witnesses from 
open testimony, and the Government worked on establishing judicial 
procedures to address the problem. Police stated that more women came 
forward to report cases of rape and domestic violence. On February 22, 
the National Assembly passed the Combating of Rape Act. In April the 
act was passed by the National Council and signed by the President. The 
act defines rape in broad terms, and allows for the prosecution of rape 
within marriage.
    In June the police began a special training course on gender 
sensitivity. Centers for abused women and children in Oshakati, 
Windhoek, Keetmanshoop, Walvis Bay, and Rehoboth are staffed with 
specially trained female police officers to assist victims of sexual 
assaults. Safe houses opened in Mariental, Swakopmund, and Tsumeb. At 
the end of February, the LAC sponsored a 3-day national conference on 
violence against women.
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women, including 
employment discrimination. The Married Persons Equality Act prohibits 
discriminatory practices against women married under civil law. Women 
married in customary (traditional) marriages continued to face legal 
and cultural discrimination. Traditional practices that permit family 
members to confiscate the property of deceased men from their widows 
and children still existed; however, the frequency of such cases 
lessened considerably during the year.
    In 1996 the President elevated the head of the Department of Women 
Affairs to cabinet rank, and it became the Ministry of Women's Affairs 
and Child Development in March. In June 1998, President Nujoma 
addressed traditional leaders; he made a forceful case for better 
treatment of women in traditional communities.
    There were reports that UNITA forces kidnaped female citizens and 
raped them (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
    Children.--The Constitution enumerates children's rights, including 
those in the area of education and health. During the year, 25 percent 
of government expenditures were designated for education and 15 percent 
for health care, a slight decrease from previous years. However, in 
practice, outmoded policies and laws and an untrained work force led to 
inadequate attention to child welfare. The Constitution provides 
children with the right to primary and junior secondary education 
(grades 1 to 10); however, the numerous fees, which included fees for 
uniforms, books, hostel costs, and school improvement, placed a burden 
on students'' families. The inability of poorer families to pay the 
fees, which varied greatly between regions, precluded some children 
from attending school. In these cases, families were less likely to 
continue to pay fees for girls, particularly those at the junior 
secondary level. Many San children do not attend school. It is 
difficult for the Government to ensure enforcement of national laws 
against child labor on commercial farms (see Section 6.d.).
    Child abuse is a serious and increasingly acknowledged problem. The 
authorities vigorously prosecuted cases involving crimes against 
children, particularly rape and incest. The 1960 Children's Act 
criminalizes and protects children under 18 years from sexual 
exploitation, child pornography and child prostitution. The age of 
sexual consent is 16 years. Courts handed down stiffer sentences 
against child rapists than in previous years, and the Government 
provided training for police officials to improve the handling of child 
sex abuse cases. Centers for abused women and children were working 
actively to reduce the trauma suffered by abused children. The LAC 
launched a national campaign to revise legislation on child maintenance 
in 1999. The Child Maintenance Bill was sent to the Cabinet for 
discussion in 1999; however, by year's end no movement was made towards 
tabling it in Parliament. The bill would require divorced spouses to 
provide maintenance allowances for their children.
    The Government expanded programs to separate juvenile offenders 
from adults in the criminal justice system. Separate facilities for 
child offenders have been established in Windhoek and Mariental (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Overcrowding at the Osire refugee camp has affected children who 
are residing there. There were approximately 6,000 school-age children 
at Osire, and there was a shortage of classrooms (see Section 2.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--While discrimination on the basis of 
disability is not addressed in the Constitution, the 1992 Labor Act 
prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in employment; 
however, enforcement in this area is weak. Although there was no legal 
discrimination against persons with disabilities, societal 
discrimination persists. The Government legally does not require 
special access to public buildings for the disabled, and many 
ministries remain inaccessible to the disabled. Although some municipal 
governments have installed ramps and special curbing for the disabled 
at street crossings, physical access for those with disabilities 
remained a problem due to resource constraints. Disability issues 
received greater public attention than in previous years, with wider 
press coverage of the human rights problems that confront persons with 
disabilities. In December 1998, the Government launched a campaign to 
expand economic opportunities for and change attitudes about persons 
with disabilities.
    Indigenous People.--The Bushmen, also known as the San people, the 
country's earliest known inhabitants, historically have been exploited 
by other ethnic groups. The Government has taken a number of measures 
to end societal discrimination against the San, including seeking their 
advice about proposed legislation on communally-held lands and 
increasing their access to primary education; however, many San 
children do not attend school. In late 1999, a San was nominated by the 
SWAPO party for the National Assembly and won the election; he was 
sworn in in March. Reports from the NSHR and in the press claim that 
civilians from the Mafwe and Kxoe San ethnic groups were targeted for 
harassment during the police campaign against Caprivi separatists in 
1998 and continued throughout the year.
    By law all indigenous groups participate equally in decisions 
affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and allocations of natural 
resources. However, Bushmen and other indigenous citizens have been 
unable to exercise fully these rights as a result of minimal access to 
education, limited economic opportunities under colonial rule, and 
their relative isolation.
    In 1997 the Government unilaterally announced plans to expand a 
prison in the West Caprivi Game Park on land claimed by the Kxoe ethnic 
group. The expansion would deny access by members of the Kxoe ethnic 
group to revenues from community-based tourism projects on their lands. 
The projects are an important mechanism for empowering the Kxoe to 
benefit from tourism activities in their community. However, there was 
some question regarding the Kxoe's right to occupy that land. As of 
year's end, no final decision on the prison expansion had been 
announced.
    The Government plans to build a hydroelectric dam on the Kunene 
River that would flood ancestral graves and grazing areas of the semi-
nomadic Himba people. The project was highly controversial. The 
Government has made repeated efforts to consult with Himba leaders 
regarding the project, but many of the Himba chiefs remain adamantly 
opposed to the project. Government leaders have criticized harshly 
those opposed to the project, terming them ``enemies of development.''
    The 1995 Traditional Authorities Act, defined the role, duties, and 
powers of traditional leaders. The act provided that customary law is 
invalid if it is inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution. It 
enumerated the types of crimes that may be addressed in traditional 
courts. The act assigned to traditional leaders the role of guardians 
of culture and tradition, and it also mandated that traditional leaders 
elected to Parliament choose between their traditional and elected 
offices before the end of 1996. This provision has not been enforced, 
and several traditional leaders remain in Parliament.
    The Government's authority to confer recognition or withhold it 
from traditional leaders, even in opposition to local preference, was 
especially controversial because of the leaders'' influence on local 
events including local police powers. In some cases, the Government has 
withheld recognition from genuine traditional leaders who have sympathy 
for the political opposition. This has been especially true in the Khoe 
San and Mafwe communities in the Caprivi and in the Herero community. 
Mafwe chief Boniface Mamili fled the country with other Caprivi 
separatists in late 1998. Despite opposition from the Mafwe community, 
Minister of Local Government Nicky Iyambo ruled that Mamili had 
forfeited his position, and in March 1999, the Government installed a 
rival chief. In June 1998, a number of traditional leaders boycotted 
the inauguration of the Traditional Leaders' Council, claiming that the 
installation was illegal, as some of the leaders chosen by the 
Government did not represent their communities.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution prohibits 
discrimination based on race and other factors and specifically 
prohibits ``the practice and ideology of apartheid.'' In July 1998, 
Parliament passed amendments to the 1991 Racial Discrimination 
Prohibition Act that strengthened the act and the penalties for 
discriminatory practices. The act codified certain protections for 
those who cite racial discrimination in the course of research 
(including academic and press reporting) or in trying to reduce racial 
disharmony. Nevertheless, as a result of more than 70 years of South 
African administration, societal, racial, and ethnic discrimination 
persists. There were several reported cases of black farm workers 
suffering discrimination in remote areas at the hands of white farm 
owners. Many non-whites continued to complain that the Government was 
not moving quickly enough in education, health, housing, employment, 
and access to land.
    Some citizens complained that the SWAPO-led government provided 
more development assistance to the numerically dominant Ovambo ethnic 
group of the far north than to other groups or regions of the country.
    NSHR claimed that members of the Kxoe minority were harassed during 
security force operations in the Kavango region (see Sections 1.c. and 
1.d.).

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom 
of association, including freedom to form and join trade unions, and 
the Government respects this right in practice. The 1992 Labor Act 
extended that right to public servants, farm workers, and domestic 
employees. However, farm workers and domestic servants working on rural 
and remote farms often were ignorant of their rights, and unions 
experienced obstacles in attempting to organize these workers; as a 
result, they suffered abuse by employers. Trade unions had no 
difficulty registering, and there were no government restrictions on 
who may serve as a union official. Despite concerns created by a 1999 
Ministry of Labor report that questioned a growing number of trade 
unions, the Government has not taken action to dissolve any trade 
unions.
    Unions are independent of the Government and may form federations. 
The two principal trade union organizations are the National Union of 
Namibian Workers (NUNW) and the Namibia Federation of Trade Unions 
(NFTU). Prior to independence, the NUNW was affiliated with SWAPO; 
despite claims that its affiliation came to an end at independence, the 
two still are closely linked. The NUNW was invited to nominate 
candidates for SWAPO's 1999 National Assembly slate, and the NUNW 
president was nominated by SWAPO and elected to the National Assembly. 
In 1997 the mine workers union established the Mine Workers Union 
Investment Company to supplement union dues. The NFTU, launched in 
October 1998 and made up of several large public service, teachers, 
mining, and maritime unions, is critical of the Government. Less than 
20 percent of full-time wage earners were organized. Trade unions 
lacked capacity and resources.
    Except for workers providing essential services such as jobs 
related to public health and safety, and workers in the export 
processing zones (EPZ's), workers enjoy the right to strike once 
conciliation procedures have been exhausted, and 48-hour notice has 
been given to the employer and labor commissioner. Under the Labor Act, 
strike action can be used only in disputes involving specific worker 
interests, such as pay raises. Disputes over worker rights, including 
dismissals, must be referred to a labor court for arbitration. The 
Labor Act protects workers engaged in legal strikes from unfair 
dismissal. In September there was a strike in the fishing industry.
    Unemployment, which is nearly 40 percent, remained a significant 
problem and affected primarily the black majority.
    Trade unions were free to exchange visits with foreign trade unions 
and to affiliate with international trade union organizations. Unions 
exercise this right without interference.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1992 Labor 
Act provides employees with the right to bargain individually or 
collectively. Collective bargaining is not practiced widely outside the 
mining and construction industries, which have centralized, industry-
wide bargaining. Almost all collective bargaining is at the workplace 
and company level. However, as unions became more active, informal 
collective bargaining was becoming more common. The Ministry of Labor 
cited lack of information and basic negotiation skills as factors 
hampering workers'' ability to bargain with employers successfully.
    The Labor Act provides a process for employer recognition of trade 
unions and protection for members and organizers. The law also empowers 
the Labor Court to remedy unfair labor practices and explicitly forbids 
unfair dismissals, which may be appealed to the Labor Court.
    There are EPZ's at the Walvis Bay and Oshikango industrial parks 
and a number of single-factory EPZ's outside of these parks. The Labor 
Act applies to EPZ's, including the one in Walvis Bay; however, workers 
in EPZ's were prohibited from striking, and employers were prohibited 
from engaging in lockouts. Some trade unionists continued to challenge 
the constitutionality of the agreement reached by government and NUNW 
representatives codified in the 1995 Export Processing Zone Act because 
it limited the right to strike. Under the agreement, labor-related 
issues in the EPZ were referred to a special EPZ dispute settlement 
panel composed of employers and workers for expeditious resolution. If 
a dispute is not resolved at this level, it is referred to compulsory 
arbitration. With only a few businesses operating in the Walvis Bay 
EPZ, the effectiveness of this agreement in securing the rights of 
workers in the EPZ could not be determined.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor by adults and children; however, during the 
year, there were ongoing reports in the media that farm workers 
(including some children on family-owned commercial farms) and domestic 
workers often received inadequate compensation for their labor and were 
subject to strict control by employers. Ministry of Labor inspectors 
sometimes encountered problems in gaining access to the country's 
large, family-owned, commercial farms in order to investigate possible 
labor code violations.
    There were reports that UNITA forces kidnaped citizens and forced 
them to serve as combatants and porters in Angola (see Section 1.b. and 
6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Under the 1992 Labor Act, the minimum age for employment 
is 14 years, with higher age requirements for night work and for 
certain sectors such as mining and construction. Ministry of Labor 
inspectors generally enforced minimum age regulations, but children 
below the age of 14 often worked on family-owned commercial farms and 
in the informal sector. The 1991 census, which reported on the status 
of children, estimated that 13,800 children under 15 years of age were 
in the labor force. Of this total, 41 percent were working as unpaid 
laborers on family-owned, commercial farms. There were also reports 
that Ministry of Labor inspectors reportedly encountered problems 
gaining access to family-owned, commercial farms to investigate 
possible illegal child labor. Since 1991 the Government has taken steps 
to end abuses, and the child labor problem has declined. There were 
also reports that Angolan and Zambian children worked on communal and 
cattle farms in border areas, although such occurrences have been 
curtailed since late 1999 by the deportation of illegal immigrants.
    The 1960 Children's Act criminalizes and protects children under 18 
years from sexual exploitation, child pornography and child 
prostitution. The age of sexual consent is 16 years.
    On November 15, the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the 
worst forms of child labor, and the worst forms of child labor are not 
practiced commonly. Criminal penalties and court orders are available 
to the Government to enforce child labor laws, although there are no 
specific remedies available to individuals for incidents of the worst 
forms of child labor.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; 
however, the media reported that some children worked as farm laborers 
without adequate compensation (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no statutory minimum 
wage law. In Windhoek's non-white urban area townships, many workers 
and their families have difficulty maintaining a minimal standard of 
living. Black citizens were significantly disadvantaged in standards of 
living during the apartheid era; however, since 1990 there has been a 
rapid growth in the living standards of black citizens, and the major 
economic resources in the country are no longer exclusively controlled 
by white citizens.
    The standard legal workweek is 45 hours, and requires at least one 
24-hour rest period per week. An employer may require no more than 10 
hours per week of overtime. The law mandates 24 consecutive days of 
annual leave, at least 30 workdays of sick leave per year, and 3 months 
of unpaid maternity leave. However, in practice these provisions are 
not observed or enforced rigorously by the Ministry of Labor. In 1996 
two NGO studies--one of farm workers and the other of domestic 
employees--highlighted the extremely poor conditions that some 
employees encounter while working in these occupations.
    The Government mandates occupational health and safety standards. 
The Labor Act empowers the President to enforce these standards through 
inspections and criminal penalties. The law requires employers to 
ensure the health, safety, and welfare of their employees. It provides 
employees with the right to remove themselves from dangerous work 
situations; however, some workers do not have this right in practice.
    For example, on April 13, 1999, workers at the Navachab gold mine 
near Karibib occupied the control room at the Ore Mill and shut down 
production to protest the extreme heat and shortage of oxygen in the 
mine's metallurgy plant. A prior agreement between the mine and the 
mineworkers union gave workers the right to leave the workplace if they 
believed that their safety was threatened; however, mine management 
protested the shutting of the mill as an ``illegal industrial action'' 
and threatened to fine the employees involved. On April 22, the workers 
reached a compromise with management to set up an independent panel of 
experts to investigate whether there was an unacceptable health risk at 
the mill. The panel found that health risks existed at the mill, and 
management withdrew disciplinary measures against the workers. Although 
the management agreed to improve working conditions in the mill and to 
address other labor grievances, the company did not pay strikers for 
the time when they were engaged in the industrial action, penalized 
workers who occupied the control room by refusing to give them a 
month's salary, and issued written warnings to other mill workers who 
joined sympathy strikes.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons, it does prohibit slavery, kidnaping, 
forced labor, including forced prostitution, child labor, and alien 
smuggling; however, there were reports that UNITA forces kidnaped 
citizens and forced them to serve as combatants and porters in Angola 
(see Section 1.b. and 6.f.).
                               __________

                                 NIGER

    Niger is beginning a process of consolidating a democratic system 
and a constitutional government following a period of instability 
during the last democratic government and coups d'etat in 1996 and 
1999. An April 1999 coup led to the installation of a military-led 
government, which instituted a 9-month transition to a democracy. A 
July 1999 referendum approved a new Constitution that provided for a 
power sharing-presidential system and granted amnesty to perpetrators 
of the 1996 and 1999 coups. The first round of presidential elections 
took place in October 1999, and presidential runoff and legislative 
elections were held in November 1999. Tandja Mamadou was elected 
president with 60 percent of the vote in an election that international 
observers called free and fair. The National Movement for the 
Development of Society and the Democratic and Socialist Convention 
(MNSD/CDS) coalition, which backed Tandja, won 55 of the 83 seats in 
the National Assembly. In January Tandja appointed MNSD member Hama 
Amadou as Prime Minister. The new Government made some progress toward 
democratization and political modernization, including instituting a 
transparent budget process and auditing the military budget. During the 
year, the legislative and judicial branches exercised for the first 
time their constitutional right to audit the Government's budget. The 
judiciary is showing signs of independence; however, family and 
business ties can influence lower courts.
    Security forces consist of the army, the Republican Guard, the 
gendarmerie (paramilitary police), and the national police. The police 
and gendarmerie traditionally have primary responsibility for internal 
security. Civilian authorities maintain effective control of the 
security forces. The armed forces, after a crisis in June prompted by 
the kidnaping of a senior military official, publicly stated that they 
would abide by the rules of democracy and stayed out of politics. 
Members of the security forces committed abuses.
    The economy is based mainly on subsistence farming, herding, small 
trading, and informal markets. Less than 15 percent of the economy is 
in the modern sector. Uranium is the most important export, though 
declining world demand has made this sector less profitable. Per capita 
income is less than $200, and the country faces problems of drought, 
deforestation, soil degradation, and exceedingly low literacy. The 
economy remained severely depressed. Most international aid (an 
important factor in the economy) was suspended following the April 1999 
coup d'etat; however, following the presidential and legislative 
elections in 1999, the country again is receiving foreign assistance.
    The Government's human rights record remained generally poor; 
although there were improvements in several areas, some serious 
problems remain. With the 1999 election of President Tandja and members 
of the National Assembly in generally free and fair elections, citizens 
exercised their right to change their government. Two prisoners 
disappeared after having last been seen in the custody of military 
officers. Police and members of the security forces beat and otherwise 
abused persons, and there were incidents of torture by the military. 
Prison conditions remained poor, and arbitrary arrest and detention 
remained problems. Delays in trials resulted in long periods of 
pretrial confinement. The judiciary also was subject to executive and 
other influence. Security forces infringed on citizens'' privacy 
rights. The Government limited freedom of the press. While in general 
the Government supports the right to association, on at least one 
occasion, the Government limited this right. The Government frequently 
restricted freedom of movement. Domestic violence and societal 
discrimination against women continue to be serious problems. Female 
genital mutilation (FGM) persists, despite government efforts to combat 
it. There was societal discrimination against the disabled and ethnic 
and religious minorities. Worker rights generally are respected. There 
were reports that a traditional form of servitude still is practiced.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Unlike in the 
previous year, there were no reports of political or other 
extrajudicial killings.
    On April 9, 1999, members of the presidential guard assassinated 
President Ibrahim Mainassara Bare and killed or seriously injured 
several other members of his entourage. The subsequent military-
controlled transition government insisted that Bare was killed in an 
``unfortunate accident;'' all perpetrators were granted amnesty by the 
1999 Constitution and an amnesty law in January. Members of the Bare 
family continued to press for a full investigation and punishment for 
Bare's assassins, although no such action was taken by year's end.
    In August 1999, prison guards used tear gas on a group of prisoners 
in their cells at the Niamey Central Prison, resulting in the deaths of 
29 prisoners. A prison supervisor and guard were arrested as a result 
of the deaths; however, judicial proceedings had not begun by year's 
end (see Section 1.c.). As a result of this incident, the Minister of 
Justice promised in 1999 a full investigation and the reform of the 
prison system, including training guards and humanizing prison 
conditions; however, at year's end, the Government had not completed 
the investigation, and no results were released.
    In February 1999 a mass grave containing 149 bodies alleged to be 
those of missing Toubou former rebels was discovered at Bosso near Lake 
Chad in the far eastern region of the country. The missing men had been 
expelled from Nigeria as part of a Chad-Niger-Nigeria joint military 
operation. When last seen by their families in October 1998, the 
Toubous were in the custody of the Nigerien armed forces. The 
Government acknowledged the existence of the mass grave. Domestic and 
international human rights groups called for an independent 
investigation; however, no such investigation was forthcoming by year's 
end.
    There was no investigation nor action taken in the 1999 case in 
which a Nigerien-Algerian team of security forces attacked a camp of 
alleged Islamic fundamentalists in the northwestern corner of Niger, 
killing between 4 and 15 persons.
    The Lake Chad area continues to be patrolled by Nigerian-Nigerien-
Chadian joint military forces; however, during the year, the region 
became more secure, and intercommunal conflict, which in previous years 
resulted in some killings, declined significantly following the 1998 
Toubou Peace Accords.
    Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of violent 
disagreements over land use between sedentary farmers and herders in 
the Tillaberi Department along the Malian border and the Lake Chad 
region. Government officials maintained active relations with Malian 
officials on security and criminal problems. Likewise, security in the 
North Tillaberi pastoral zones improved significantly, and there were 
no reported instances of violence during the year.
    There were no reports of vigilante killings during the year.
    b. Disappearance.--In June two army sergeants disappeared after 
they were arrested by other soldiers for their alleged involvement in 
the June 10 kidnaping of Major Djibrilla Hima, the commander of the 
army's only armor squadron (see Section 1.d.). Djibrilla was kidnaped 
at an army recreation center and released approximately 24 hours later 
on June 11 (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). Army sources claimed that the 
two escaped from the country, but their families said that they have 
not seen or heard from them since they were arrested. In July an 
investigating judge had a grave on the outskirts of Niamey reopened to 
determine if it contained the remains of one the sergeants, but it was 
impossible to identify the decomposed corpse.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, police 
and soldiers beat and otherwise abused persons, and there were 
incidents of torture by the military.
    On June 11 and 12, soldiers beat severely 3 of the 18 soldiers 
arrested for suspected involvement in the kidnaping of a senior 
military officer, Major Djibrilla Hima (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.); 
others may have been abused. There also were reports that the soldiers 
tortured the detainees by beating them with fists, belts, and rifle 
butts. Soldiers who bribed or threatened prison guards to allow them 
access to the detainees allegedly carried out the beatings. Soldiers 
reportedly beat one of the detainees in front of Djibrilla and his 
wife. The prosecutor with overall responsibility for the kidnaping case 
investigated the torture and disappearance allegations; however, he was 
removed from the case in mid-August following a month of intensive 
investigation. By year's end, there was no further investigation into 
the incident, and no action had been taken against the alleged 
torturers.
    On several occasions, in April and May police used tear gas to 
disperse protesting students (see Section 2.b.). One student reportedly 
suffered a broken leg while running from the tear gas.
    No action was taken against prison guards who beat and otherwise 
abused a taxi driver held in detention without charge in 1999.
    Prison conditions are poor. Prisons are underfunded and 
understaffed; all 35 of the country's prisons are dangerous to the 
health and safety of the prisoners. Prisons are overcrowded. For 
example, in Niamey's Civil Prison there are more than 700 prisoners in 
a facility built for 350. Dietary, health, and sanitary conditions are 
very poor. Family visits are allowed, and prisoners can receive 
supplemental food and other necessities from their families. Prisoners 
are segregated by sex, and minors and adults are incarcerated 
separately.
    Corruption among prison staff is rampant. There are credible 
reports that prisoners can bribe officials to leave prison for the day 
and serve their sentences in the evenings. Prisoners also can claim 
illness and serve their sentences in the national hospital.
    The majority of the prisoners who escaped from the prison in Zinder 
in 1999 were recaptured; however, others remained at large at year's 
end.
    There was neither investigation nor action taken in the March 1999 
case in which military personnel ambushed and beat the publishing 
director of La Voix du Citoyen. There was no action taken in the 
November 1999 case in which police officials used tear gas to disperse 
students holding a sit-in in Niamey to press claims for payments of 
their scholarships; at least 20 students were injured.
    Human rights monitors, including the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, were granted unrestricted access to prisons and detention 
centers and visited them during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. Although the Constitution prohibits arbitrary 
arrest and detention, and the law prohibits detention without charge in 
excess of 48 hours, police sometimes violate these provisions in 
practice. If police fail to gather sufficient evidence within the 
detention period, the prosecutor can give the case to another officer, 
and a new 48-hour detention period begins. Police, acting under 
authority given them by the Security Law, conduct sweeps to detain 
suspected criminals.
    In June authorities arrested 18 soldiers and former soldiers in 
connection with the kidnaping of Major Djibrilla Hima; several were 
beaten or tortured, and 2 disappeared (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.). Six 
individuals remained in custody pending trial; they have been charged 
with kidnaping and conspiracy, but at year's end, they had not been 
brought to trial.
    A number of journalists were arrested during the year (see Section 
2.a.).
    Following the Maradi riots on November 8 and 9, police arrested 
approximately 100 persons in Maradi and others in Niamey. At year's 
end, 31 persons remained in custody in Maradi pending trial and 27 
others were in custody in Niamey; they were charged with unauthorized 
demonstration and threatening public order.
    The judicial system is seriously overloaded. There are no legal 
limits on pretrial confinement of indicted persons. Detention often 
lasts months or years; however, the Justice Ministry made efforts 
during the year to accelerate the process. Nevertheless some persons 
have been waiting as long as 6 years to be charged. Of the prisoners in 
Niamey's Civil Prison, approximately 500 are awaiting trial or had no 
charges brought against them.
    The law provides for a right to counsel, although there is only one 
defense attorney known to have a private practice outside the capital. 
A defendant has the right to a lawyer immediately upon detention. The 
Government provides a defense attorney for all indigents in felony 
cases, including minors. Bail is available for crimes carrying a 
penalty of less than 10 years' imprisonment. Widespread ignorance of 
the law and lack of financial means prevent full exercise of these 
rights.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and there were no reports of its 
use.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, it is occasionally subject to executive 
interference. Although the Supreme Court on occasion has asserted its 
independence, human rights groups claimed that family and business ties 
influence lower courts. Judges sometimes feared reassignment or having 
their financial benefits reduced if they rendered a decision 
unfavorable to the Government. However, there was evidence during the 
year of increased judicial independence; for example, in the cases 
against two Canard Libere journalists, the court dismissed the cases on 
procedural grounds; however, the cases were refiled (see Section 2.a.). 
In addition in the case against six military officers who continued to 
be held at year's end for kidnaping Major Djibrilla (see Section 1.d.), 
the investigating judge actively investigated charges of torture, 
although subsequently he was removed from the case.
    Defendants and prosecutors may appeal a verdict, first to the Court 
of Appeals, then to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals reviews 
questions of fact and law, while the Supreme Court reviews only the 
application of the law and constitutional questions. There are also 
customary courts.
    Traditional chiefs can act as mediators and counselors and have 
authority in customary law cases as well as status under national law 
where they are designated as auxiliaries to local officials. They 
collect local taxes and receive stipends from the Government, but they 
have no police or judicial powers and can only mediate, not arbitrate, 
customary law disputes. Customary courts, located only in large towns 
and cities, try cases involving divorce or inheritance. They are headed 
by a legal practitioner with basic legal training who is advised by an 
assessor knowledgeable in the society's traditions. The judicial 
actions of chiefs and customary courts are not regulated by law, and 
defendants may appeal a verdict to the formal court system. Women do 
not have equal legal status with men and do not enjoy the same access 
to legal redress (see Section 5).
    Defendants have the right to counsel, to be present at trial, to 
confront witnesses, to examine the evidence against them, and to appeal 
verdicts. The Constitution affirms the presumption of innocence. The 
law provides for counsel at public expense for minors and indigent 
defendants charged with crimes carrying a sentence of 10 years or more. 
Although lawyers comply with government requests to provide counsel, 
generally they are not remunerated by the Government.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires that police have a search warrant, 
normally issued by a judge; however, human rights organizations report 
that police often conduct routine searches without warrants. Police may 
conduct searches without warrants when they have strong suspicion that 
a house shelters criminals or stolen property. The State Security Law 
also provides for warrantless searches.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, on several occasions, the 
Government limited this right in practice. On five occasions during the 
year, government officials initiated lawsuits against journalists for 
articles that either criticized them personally or criticized the armed 
forces; however, several of the cases resulted in convictions. Canard 
Libere journalists were convicted of libel against the Prime Minister 
and undermining the morale of the armed forces; the L'Inqueteur 
journalists were convicted of publishing false information.
    The Government publishes a French-language daily newspaper, Le 
Sahel, and its weekend edition. There are approximately 12 private 
French-language weekly or monthly newspapers, some of which are 
affiliated loosely with political parties. The private press remained 
relatively assertive in criticizing government actions. Foreign 
journals circulate and report freely. However, strict accreditation 
requirements imposed on journalists by the 1997 press law remained in 
place.
    In May the armed forces chief of staff, Colonel Moumouni Boureima, 
brought charges of ``undermining the morale of the armed forces'' 
against two Canard Libere journalists, following a series of personal 
slights regarding Boureima. A court dismissed the case for procedural 
reasons in June; however, in July Defense Minister Sabiou Dady Gaoh 
filed the same charge against the same two individuals. They were 
convicted on October 3, sentenced to 6 months in jail, and fined $710 
(500,000 CFA) each. The prison sentence was suspended. The two 
journalists planned to appeal, but the appeal was pending at year's 
end.
    In July police arrested the same two journalists with Canard Libere 
and detained them for several days for publishing an article calling 
Prime Minister Hama Amadou a ``coward'' for his alleged avoidance of 
responsibility in the Djibrilla kidnaping affair. They were tried, but 
the court again dismissed the case for procedural reasons. Hama again 
filed the case in July, and the court found one of the journalists 
guilty of libel in October, fined him approximately $710 (500,000 CFA), 
and gave him a suspended sentence. The decision was appealed, but it 
remained pending at year's end.
    In November three journalists from the newspaper L'Enqueteur were 
convicted on charges brought by the Minister Sabiou for publishing 
``false news'' and ``sensitive information'' related to articles on 
purported troop movements near the Benin border in October. The 
newspaper publisher, Soumana Maiga was sentenced to 8 months in prison 
and fined approximately $710 (500,000 CFA); his editor and a reporter 
received 6-month suspended sentences, and each was fined approximately 
$430 (300,000 CFA). Maiga remained in prison at year's end; all three 
appealed their verdicts, which were pending at year's end.
    Since literacy and personal incomes are both very low, radio is the 
most important medium of public communication. The government-owned 
Radio Voix du Sahel transmits 14 hours per day, providing news and 
other programs in French and several local languages. There are several 
private radio stations; most are locally owned and some feature popular 
news programs in local languages. These private radio stations 
generally were less critical of government actions than were the 
private newspapers. Radio Anfani and Radio et Musique presented news 
coverage that included a variety of points of view. The government-
operated multilingual national radio service provided equitable 
broadcasting time for all political parties during the year.
    In 1998 the Government's Superior Council on Communication 
prohibited domestic broadcasting services from rebroadcasting programs 
of foreign origin, such as Voice of America (VOA), British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), and Deutsche Welle programs without a time delay 
that would enable the Government to hold local broadcasters responsible 
for the programs'' content. However, domestic affiliates of 
international services generally did not comply with this prohibition, 
and during the year, the Government ceased efforts to prohibit domestic 
rebroadcasting of foreign programs.
    Television is a far less important medium than radio. The 
government-owned Tele-Sahel broadcasts about 4 hours every evening, 
with programming emphasizing news in French and other major national 
languages. There was a private television station, TV Tenere. The 
director of a private radio station operates a wireless cable 
television service for the capital, offering access to international 
channels.
    The news coverage of the state-owned media reflects government 
priorities. Presidential activities and conferences dealing with 
development issues always are reported. Analysis or investigative 
reporting on domestic topics is extremely rare.
    SONITEL, the state-owned telephone monopoly, is the country's only 
Internet service provider (ISP). There are no private ISP's because 
telecommunications regulations set rates at prohibitive levels. The 
Government does not restrict access to the Internet through SONITEL, 
although service frequently had technical difficulties.
    Academic freedom is generally respected. In April and May, students 
protested sporadically in protest of the nonpayment of their academic 
scholarships (see Section 2.b.). Ultimately the Government paid 
university students their scholarships; however, at year's end, 
scholarships for high school students had not been paid. Due to 
financial problems, the university did not function during the academic 
year; however, a normal schedule was planned for 2001.
    b. Freedom of Assembly and Association.--The Constitution provides 
for freedom of assembly; however, the Government retains the authority 
to prohibit gatherings either under tense social conditions or if 
advance notice (48 hours) is not provided. Political parties legally 
are permitted to hold demonstrations, and there were no reports of 
political parties being denied permission for demonstrations during the 
year.
    Students protested sporadically in April and May in protest of the 
nonpayment of their academic scholarships and the prospect of fees for 
tuition and examinations. On several occasions, police used tear gas to 
disperse protesting students after they started throwing rocks and 
burning tires.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, 
citizens may not form political parties based on ethnicity, religion, 
or region. In reaction to rioting by Islamic fundamentalist groups in 
November, the Government banned six fundamentalist-oriented 
organizations. There are 24 political parties.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for ``the right 
of the free development of each individual in their...spiritual, 
cultural, and religious dimensions,'' and the Government supports the 
freedom to practice religious beliefs, as long as persons respect 
public order, social peace, and national unity.
    Religious organizations must register with the Interior Ministry. 
This registration is a formality, and there were no reports that it 
ever has been denied. The State must authorize construction of any 
place of worship. Foreign missionaries work freely, but their 
organizations must be registered officially as associations.
    In April 1999, the Assemblies of God Church in Niamey was notified 
by the mayor's office that it had to close until the ``new order'' was 
established, presumably until a democratically elected government was 
in place. The church had been in its location since 1996 and had an 
ongoing dispute with one of its neighbors, another Christian group, 
which had been trying actively to have the church closed since its 
establishment. The authorities ordered the church to close; however, 
this order was not enforced, and the church remained open during the 
year and functioned without interference (see Section 5).
    In reaction to rioting by Islamic fundamentalist groups in 
November, the Government banned six fundamentalist-oriented 
organizations (see Section 5). The Government, supported by local human 
rights NGO's, sought to restore order and discourage further violence. 
In November the country's most important human rights NGO, the 
Association Nigerien de Defense de Droit de L'Homme, strongly 
criticized religious intolerance and violence.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement 
and restricts neither emigration nor repatriation; however, authorities 
imposed some restrictions on these rights. Ministers of the former 
government no longer are prohibited from leaving the country pending 
inquiries into their financial affairs. Security forces at checkpoints 
monitor the travel of persons and the circulation of goods, 
particularly near major population centers, and sometimes demand 
payments or bribes. Attacks by bandits on major routes to the north 
have declined considerably. Among the Hausa and Peul in the east, some 
women are cloistered and may leave their homes only if escorted by a 
man and usually only after dark (see Section 5).
    The law does not provide for granting asylum or refugee status in 
accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government 
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The 
Government offers first asylum, and to date it has offered asylum to 
several thousand persons. A few Chadian refugee families remain in the 
country.
    There were no reports of the forced repatriation of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their 
government, and citizens were able to exercise that right during the 
November 1999 election. However, this has not always been the case; the 
January 1996 coup, the fraudulent 1996 presidential election, the 
disruption of local elections in February 1999, and the April 1999 coup 
effectively disenfranchised citizens in previous years. In November 
1999, Tandja Mamadou was elected president with 60 percent of the vote 
in an election that was considered by international observers to be 
generally free and fair. Reportedly 39 percent of the country's 
population participated in the election. In the November 1999 National 
Assembly elections, the National Movement for the Development of 
Society and the Democratic and Social Convention (MNSD/CDS) coalition, 
which backed Tandja, won 55 of the 83 seats in the assembly. Five of 
the country's 11 active political parties are represented in the 
National Assembly. Tandja was inaugurated on December 22, 1999.
    Pursuant to the July 1999 Constitution, which immediately entered 
into force after it was approved by 90 percent of the 31 percent that 
voted in the constitutional referendum, the country has a power sharing 
presidential system with the President as head of state and the Prime 
Minister as head of government. The President must choose the Prime 
Minister from a list of three persons presented by the majority party 
or coalition in the National Assembly. In January Tandja appointed Hama 
Amadou as Prime Minister.
    The Constitution provides for a political system with checks and 
balances, a representative one-chamber National Assembly, and an 
independent judiciary. Citizens 18 years of age and over can vote, and 
voting is by secret ballot.
    The Constitution granted a general amnesty to the perpetrators of 
the 1996 and 1999 coups; the amnesty was approved during the first 
session of the National Assembly, which met in January. The 
Constitution also allowed governmental authorities to remain in place 
until new elections were held.
    Women traditionally play a subordinate role in politics. The 
societal practice of husbands' voting their wives' proxy ballots 
effectively disenfranchises many women. This practice was used widely 
in the 1999 presidential and National Assembly elections.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Only 1 woman 
won a seat in the 83-seat National Assembly; there are 2 female 
ministers in the Government. The National Assembly passed a law in May 
mandating that women would receive 25 percent of government positions, 
but at year's end, women did not fill that percentage of government 
positions.
    The Government supported greater minority representation in the 
National Assembly, but no seats in the National Assembly are reserved 
for ethnic minorities. Although there are some questions about 
President Tandja's ethnicity, he is reportedly of mixed ethnicity (half 
Peul and half Kanouri). He is the country's first president who is not 
from either the Hausa or the Djerma ethnic groups, which make up about 
56 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the country's population 
(see Section 5). All major ethnic groups are represented in the 
Government.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several independent human rights groups and associations normally 
operate without government hindrance, and they publish findings and 
conclusions that often are highly critical of the Government in their 
own publications and in the small independent press. Notable among the 
associations are the Nigerian Association for the Defense of Human 
Rights (ANDDH); Democracy, Liberty, and Development (DLD); the Nigerien 
League for the Defense of Human Rights (LNDH); the Association for the 
Protection and Defense of Nigerien Human Rights (ADALCI); the Network 
for the Integration and Diffusion of the Rights in the Rural Milieu 
(RIDD-FITLA); the Niger Independent Magistrates Association (SAMAN); 
and the Association of Women Jurists of Niger. There are several other 
women's rights groups. The International Committee of the Red Cross is 
active in the country. During the year, the Government created, but did 
not fund, the National Commission on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Liberties with a mandate to include communication, advocacy, and 
investigation of human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the organization 
functioned during the year; it published in October a credible report 
on the Djibrilla kidnaping case (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, and 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, social 
origin, race, ethnicity, or religion. However, in practice there are 
instances of discrimination against women, children, ethnic minorities, 
and disabled persons, including, but not limited to, limited economic 
and political opportunities.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women is widespread, although 
firm statistics are lacking. Wife beating is reportedly common, even in 
upper social classes. Families often intervene to prevent the worst 
abuses, and women may (and do) divorce because of physical abuse. While 
women have the right to seek redress in the customary or modern courts, 
few do so due to ignorance of the legal system, fear of social stigma, 
or fear of repudiation. Women's rights organizations report that 
prostitution is often the only economic alternative for a woman who 
wants to leave her husband.
    Despite the Constitution's provisions for women's rights, the deep-
seated traditional belief in the submission of women to men results in 
discrimination in education, employment, and property rights. Such 
practices are worse in rural areas, where women do much of the 
subsistence farming as well as child-rearing, water- and wood-
gathering, and other work. Despite constituting 47 percent of the work 
force, women have made only modest inroads in civil service and 
professional employment and remain underrepresented in these areas.
    Women's inferior legal status is evident, for example, in head of 
household status: A male head of household has certain legal rights, 
but divorced or widowed women, even with children, are not considered 
to be heads of households. Among the Hausa and Peul ethnic groups in 
the east, some women are cloistered and may leave their homes only if 
escorted by a male and usually only after dark. In 1999 the Government 
ratified the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women; in August the Ministry of Justice formed 
a committee of legal scholars began reviewing appropriate law. Islamic 
groups criticized the ratification and complained that they were not 
consulted beforehand. Women's groups have so far been silent on the 
ratification, allegedly due to fear of reprisals.
    National service is mandatory for all young women who have 
completed university studies or professional training. National service 
lasts from 18 months to 2 years, and women can serve as teachers, 
health service workers, or technical specialists; however, military 
service is not an option.
    Children.--Although the Constitution provides that the Government 
promote children's welfare, financial resources are extremely limited. 
The minimum period of compulsory education is 6 years; however, only 
about 32 percent of children of primary school age attend school, and 
about 60 percent of those who finish primary schools are boys. The 
majority of young girls are kept at home to work and rarely attend 
school for more than a few years, resulting in a female literacy rate 
of 7 percent, compared with 18 percent for males.
    Some ethnic groups allow families to enter into marriage agreements 
on the basis of which young girls from rural areas are sent by the age 
of 10 or 12 and sometimes younger to join their husband's family under 
the tutelage of their mother-in-law. In August the Minister of Justice 
formed a commission to examine the problem of child brides; at year's 
end, the commission's work was ongoing.
    There are credible reports of underage girls being drawn into 
prostitution, sometimes with the complicity of the family. Child 
prostitution is not specifically criminalized, and there is no precise 
age of consent; however, the law condemns ``indecent'' acts towards 
minors, but it is left to a judge to determine what constitutes an 
indecent act. Such activity and a corollary statute against ``the 
incitement of minors to wrongdoing'' are punishable by 3 to 5 years in 
prison.
    Female genital mutilation, which is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is practiced by several ethnic groups in the 
western department of Tillaberi (which includes Niamey and the towns of 
Say, Torodi, and Ayorou) and the eastern department of Diffa. FGM is 
not illegal, but the Government is engaged in an effort to eliminate 
the practice. A 1998 study by CARE International indicated that 5 
percent of women between 15 and 49 years of age had undergone FGM; 
however, a June 1999 symposium cited a World Health Organization global 
study of 20 percent; statistics regarding this practice are not 
considered to be fully reliable. Clitoridectomy is the most common form 
of FGM. In October seven FGM practitioners turned in their knives at a 
public ceremony attended by the Justice Minister and pledged to 
discontinue performing FGM. The Government worked closely with a local 
NGO, the U.N. Children's Fund, and other donors to develop and 
distribute educational materials at government clinics and maternal 
health centers.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution mandates that the State 
provide for the disabled; however, the Government has yet to implement 
regulations to mandate accessibility to buildings and education for 
those with special needs. Regulations do not mandate accessibility to 
public transport, of which there is little. Societal discrimination 
against persons with disabilities exists.
    Religious Minorities.--There are generally amicable relations 
between the various religious communities, but there have been 
instances when members of the majority religion (Islam) have not been 
tolerant of the rights of members of minority religions to practice 
their faith. In November several hundred Muslims rioted in the 
provincial capital of Maradi, burned a Protestant church and a nearby 
seminary facility belonging to the Abundant Life Church, and looted 
houses and an office at a compound of a foreign missionary 
organization. At year's end, the leaders of the riots were in prison 
awaiting legal action (see Section 2.c.).
    In 1999 members of the Southern Baptist mission in Say received 
threats of physical harm from members of a local Islamic association 
unless they left the city within a week. The missionaries were 
threatened periodically since late 1998 when they announced their 
intention to build a church in Say, which is considered an Islamic holy 
city. Following these threats, the missionaries left Say in late 1999 
and moved permanently to another location in the country (see Section 
2.c.), where they operated without incident. However, some local 
Christians remain in Say. On May 14, the same members of the local 
Islamic community in Say threatened to burn the meeting place of the 
local Christians who remained. Leaders of the same organization also 
threatened to beat or have arrested a local Christian man in the 
village of Ouro Sidi because he continued to work with the Southern 
Baptists; however, there were no reports that such threats were carried 
out.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Hausa and Djerma ethnic 
groups make up about 56 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the 
country's population of some 11 million. These two groups also dominate 
government and business. Tandja Mamadou is the country's first 
president who is neither Hausa nor Djerma; however, Tuaregs, Arabs, 
Peuls, Toubous, and Kanouris have few representatives in the 
Government, and many of these ethnic groups assert that the Hausa and 
Djerma groups discriminate against them. The Government increased 
education for ethnic minorities; health care for minorities was at the 
same level as the rest of the population. It supported the 1995 peace 
accord calling for special development efforts in the north where the 
Tuareg population is dominant. However, nomadic people, such as Tuaregs 
and many Peul, continued to have less access to government services, 
and the temporary suspension of foreign assistance in 1999 limited the 
Government's ability to fulfill its commitments to former rebel areas. 
During the year, foreign assistance resumed, and the region is 
receiving assistance again.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides formal 
recognition of workers' right to establish and join trade unions; 
however, more than 95 percent of the work force is employed in the 
nonunionized subsistence agricultural and small trading sectors.
    The National Union of Nigerien Workers (USTN), a federation 
consisting of 38 unions, represents the majority of salary earners; 
most are government employees, such as civil servants, teachers, and 
employees in state-owned corporations. The USTN and affiliated National 
Union of Nigerian Teachers (SNEN) profess political autonomy, but they 
have informal ties to political parties. There is also a small 
breakaway union confederation and independent teachers' and 
magistrates' unions. The water and forest worker unions, shut by the 
Government in 1996 because of their ``paramilitary nature'' resumed 
operation; however, the police union remains suspended. The National 
Trade Union of Customs Officials of Niger (SNAD), dissolved by the 
Government in 1997, was authorized in April to resume operations.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for 
security forces and police. The law specifies that: labor must give 
notice and begin negotiations before work is stopped; public workers 
must maintain a minimum level of service during a strike; the 
Government can requisition workers to provide minimum service; and 
striking public sector workers may not be paid for the time they are on 
strike. The latter condition already prevailed in the private sector. 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized a 1996 legal 
order that says striking state employees can be requisitioned in 
exceptional cases arising as a result of the need to preserve the 
general interest.
    There were a number of strikes during the year. There were repeated 
work stoppages by judiciary, communications, health care, and education 
workers due to government inability to pay workers'' salaries. In March 
Finance Ministry employees went on strike without providing legal 
notice to demand bonuses; they cancelled a subsequent strike notice 
when threatened with punitive action by the Government.
    On October 16, teachers went on strike for 4 weeks. On November 1, 
the judge ordered the teachers to stop their ``illegal and savage'' 
strike and return to work. SNEN issued a strike notification that they 
believed complied with the law and continued the strike with marches 
scheduled for the week of November 6. The teachers ended their strike 
on November 6 and resumed normal work; they were promised 1 month of 
the 12 months of pay owed to them, to be paid early in 2001.
    The USTN is a member of the Organization of African Trade Union 
Unity and abides by that organization's policy of having no formal 
affiliations outside the African continent; however, it receives 
assistance from some international unions. Individual unions such as 
the teachers union are affiliated with international trade union 
secretariats.
    b. The Right to Bargain Collectively.--In addition to the 
Constitution and the Labor Code, there is a basic framework agreement 
between the USTN, employers, and the Government that defines all 
classes and categories of work, establishes basic conditions of work, 
and defines union activities. In private and state-owned enterprises, 
unions widely used their right to bargain collectively with management 
without government interference for wages greater than the statutory 
minimum as well as for more favorable work conditions. Collective 
bargaining also exists in the public sector. The USTN represents civil 
servants in bargaining with the Government. Agreements between labor 
and management apply uniformly to all employees.
    The Labor Code is based on ILO principles, and it prohibits 
antiunion discrimination by employers; labor unions reported no such 
discrimination.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except by legally convicted 
prisoners; however, although slavery is prohibited by the Constitution, 
there were a few reports that a traditional form of slavery still is 
practiced by the Tuareg and Arab ethnic minorities, particularly in 
remote northern regions. Persons are born into a traditionally 
subordinate caste and are expected to work without pay for those above 
them in the traditional social structure. None of these individuals 
appear to have been forced into servitude. Individuals can change their 
situations and are not pursued if they leave their positions; however, 
most do not and accept their circumstances as natural. A local NGO, 
Timidria, worked actively against this practice.
    In November 1999, a traditional chief was arrested based on charges 
that he practiced slavery. The chief was tried and convicted on the 
charges, served a sentence of several months, and was released during 
the year. The code does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded 
labor by children; however, such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law permits child labor in nonindustrialized 
enterprises under certain conditions. Children under the age of 14 must 
obtain special authorization to work, and those 14 to 18 years of age 
are limited to a maximum of 4+ hours per day and certain types of 
employment so schooling may continue. The law requires employers to 
ensure minimum sanitary working conditions for children. Ministry of 
Labor inspectors enforce child labor laws. Minimum compulsory education 
is 6 years, but far fewer than half of school-age children complete 6 
years of education.
    Child labor is practically nonexistent in the formal (wage) sector, 
and there are no known instances of the use of child labor in 
factories; however, children work in the unregulated agricultural, 
commercial, and artisan sectors, and some, especially foreign youths, 
are hired in homes as general helpers and baby sitters for very low 
pay. The majority of rural children regularly work with their families 
from a very early age--helping in the fields, pounding grain, tending 
animals, getting firewood and water, and other similar tasks. Some 
children are kept out of school to guide a blind relative on begging 
rounds. Others sometimes are employed by marabouts (Koranic teachers) 
to beg in the streets. There is no official recognition of this labor.
    In June the National Assembly passed a law permitting the 
ratification of ILO Convention 182, which bans the worst forms of child 
labor; and the Government subsequently ratified the convention. The 
Ministry of Labor is responsible for implementing the convention; 
however, at year's end no further specific action had been taken.
    Forced or bonded labor by children is not prohibited specifically; 
however, there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code establishes a 
minimum wage for salaried workers of each class and category within the 
formal sector. The lowest minimum wage is $33 (24,565 CFA) per month. 
Additional salary is granted for each family member and for such 
working conditions as night shifts and required travel. Minimum wages 
are not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for workers 
and their families. Government salaries are substantially in arrears. 
Most households have multiple earners (largely in informal commerce) 
and rely on the extended family for support.
    The legal workweek is 40 hours with a minimum of one 24-hour rest 
period; however, for certain occupations the Ministry of Labor 
authorizes longer workweeks of up to 72 hours. There were no reports of 
violations.
    The Labor Code also establishes occupational safety and health 
standards; however, due to staff shortages, inspectors focus on safety 
violations only in the most dangerous industries: mining; building; and 
manufacturing. Although generally satisfied with the safety equipment 
provided by employers, citing in particular adequate protection from 
radiation in the uranium mines, union workers are in many cases not 
well informed of the risks posed by their jobs. Workers have the right 
to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without fear of losing 
their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; while in general there were no reports that persons were 
trafficked, to, from, through, or within the country, there was 
anecdotal evidence that organized rings may victimize young coastal 
girls who come to work as household helpers.
    In August the Justice Minister stated that the Government intended 
to study the issue of trafficking as part of the more comprehensive 
legal modernization effort launched by a commission of legal experts. 
At year's end, the study was ongoing; no statistics were available 
regarding the extent of the problem.
                               __________

                                NIGERIA

    Nigeria is a federal republic composed of 36 states and a capital 
territory, with an elected president and a bicameral legislature. On 
May 29, 1999 President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples Democratic 
Party was inaugurated to a 4-year term after winning elections in 
February 1999 that were marred by fraud and irregularities perpetrated 
by all contesting parties, but most observers agreed the elections 
reflected the will of the majority of voters. These elections marked 
the end of 16 years of military-led regimes. On May 5, 1999, the 
Abubakar Government signed into law a new Constitution based largely on 
the suspended 1979 Constitution; the new Constitution entered into 
effect on May 29, 1999. The Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary; however, in practice the judicial branch remains susceptible 
to executive and legislative branch pressure, is influenced by 
political leaders at both the state and federal levels, and suffers 
from corruption and inefficiency.
    The Federal Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is tasked with law 
enforcement. The Constitution prohibits local and state police forces. 
Internal security is the duty of the State Security Service (SSS). The 
SSS's profile continued to decline under the Obasanjo regime. Until the 
advent of the civilian administration in May 1999, special paramilitary 
anticrime squads called ``Rapid Response Teams'' operated in every 
state. Under Obasanjo the military personnel dispatched to these units 
returned to their barracks, but the units remained intact in most 
states, staffed by regular policemen and with a reduced role and a less 
menacing presence. The Obasanjo Government lessened its reliance on the 
army to quell internal disorder and the degree of civilian control over 
the Rapid Response Teams and the national police force improved during 
the course of the year. Despite these new controls, members of the 
security forces, including the police, anticrime squads, and the armed 
forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
    The economy has declined for much of the last three decades. Most 
of the population of approximately 120 million was rural and engaged in 
small-scale agriculture. Agriculture accounted for less than 40 percent 
of gross domestic product but employed more than 65 percent of the work 
force. The agriculture and manufacturing sectors deteriorated 
considerably during the oil boom decades. The collapse of market 
agriculture contributed significantly to the country's urbanization and 
increased unemployment. Although the great bulk of economic activity is 
outside the formal sector, recorded gross domestic product per capita 
was $250. Much of the nation's wealth continued to be concentrated in 
the hands of a tiny elite mostly through corruption and nontransparent 
government contracting practices. During the year, petroleum accounted 
for over 98 percent of the country's export revenues, most of the 
government's revenues, and almost all foreign investment. During the 
year the economy was static, with growth still impeded by grossly 
inadequate infrastructure, endemic corruption, and general economic 
mismanagement. The country's ports, roads, water, and power 
infrastructure are collapsing. Chronic fuel shortages which afflicted 
the country for several years continued to be a problem. Food 
production has not kept pace with population growth. An estimated two-
thirds of the country's more than 120 million people live in poverty 
and are subject to malnutrition and disease. Since the end of military 
rule in 1999, the Government has made progress in liberalizing the 
exchange rate regime, reducing controls on the private sector, and 
increasing expenditures for key social sectors.
    The Government's human rights record was poor; although there were 
some improvements in several areas during the year, serious problems 
remain. The national police, army, and security forces continued to 
commit extrajudicial killings and used excessive force to quell civil 
unrest and ethnic violence, although they did so less frequently than 
under previous military governments. Army, police, and security force 
officers regularly beat protesters, criminal suspects, detainees, and 
convicted prisoners; however, there were no reports of torture of 
political dissidents. The Government took steps to curb torture and 
beating of detainees and prisoners, including the dismissal and arrest 
of senior officials known for such practices. Shari'a courts sentenced 
persons to harsh punishments including caning and amputation. Prison 
conditions were harsh and life threatening, and along with the lack of 
food and medical treatment, contributed to the death of numerous 
inmates. At different times in the year, the Government released 
several hundred prisoners in an attempt to ease prison congestion. In 
May 1999, the Government repealed the State Security (Detention of 
Persons) Decree of 1984 (Decree 2), which allowed prolonged arbitrary 
detention without charge; however, police and security forces continued 
to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Prolonged pretrial detention 
remains a major problem. The judiciary is subject to political 
influence, and is hampered by corruption and inefficiency. The judicial 
system was incapable of providing citizens with the right to a speedy, 
fair trial. The Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy 
rights; however, there were no reports of members of the armed forces 
looting property, destroying buildings, or driving persons away from 
their homes. The Government generally respected freedom of speech and 
of the press; however, there were some exceptions. Security force 
beatings of journalists, government seizures of newspaper print runs, 
and harassment of newspaper printers, advertisers, and distributors 
continued to decline. The Government continued to relax its 
restrictions on the rights of freedom of association and assembly. The 
Government occasionally restricted freedom of movement. The Government 
restricts freedom of religion in certain respects, and religious 
freedom deteriorated during the year due to the expansion of Shari'a 
law in several northern states. In June 1999, the Government 
established a governmental panel, the Human Rights Violations 
Investigation Panel (HRVIP), to review cases of human rights violations 
since 1966; in October the panel began public hearings.
    Domestic violence against women remained widespread and some forms 
were sanctioned by traditional, customary, or Shari'a law. 
Discrimination against women remained a problem. Female genital 
mutilation (FGM) remained widely practiced, and child abuse and child 
prostitution were common. Localized discrimination and violence against 
religious minorities persisted. Ethnic and regional discrimination 
remained widespread and interethnic, religious, and regional tensions 
increased significantly. Thousands of persons were killed in various 
local ethnic and religious conflicts throughout the country. In 
February and May rioting between Muslim and Christian groups over the 
proposed expansion of Shari'a law resulted in the deaths of more than 
1,500 persons. Some members of the Ijaw ethnic group in the oil-
producing Niger Delta region who seek greater local autonomy continued 
to commit serious abuses, including killings and kidnapings. The police 
often could not protect citizens from interethnic, interreligious, 
communal, and criminal violence. The Government took steps to improve 
worker rights; however, some restrictions continued. Some persons, 
including children, were subjected to forced labor. Child labor 
continued to increase. Trafficking in persons for purposes of forced 
prostitution and forced labor is a problem and collusion of government 
officials in trafficking was alleged. Vigilante violence increased 
throughout the country, particularly in Lagos and Onitsha, where 
suspected criminals were apprehended, beaten, and sometimes killed.
                        respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including 
Freedom From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--National police, 
army, and security forces committed extrajudicial killings and used 
excessive force to quell civil unrest under the Obasanjo Government, 
although they did so less frequently than under previous military 
regimes. The Government largely ceased using lethal force to repress 
nonviolent, purely political activities; however, lethal force was used 
when protests or demonstrations were perceived as becoming violent or 
disruptive, or in the apprehension and detention of suspected 
criminals. The state anticrime task forces remained the most egregious 
human rights offenders. Neither the task forces, the police, nor the 
armed forces were held accountable for excessive, deadly use of force 
or the death of individuals in custody. They operated with impunity in 
the apprehension, illegal detention, and sometimes execution of 
criminal suspects. Since taking office, President Obasanjo largely 
resisted pressure to call in military troops to quell domestic unrest, 
which reduced the risk that the armed forces would overreact or harass 
civilians. Instead, Obasanjo preferred to let the police deal with 
clashes between rival ethnic groups and only sent in military 
reinforcements when the police were unable to restore order; however, 
the President threatened to use military troops in various states to 
reinforce the police. In February and May, the military was deployed in 
Kaduna state to stem ethnic violence that arose following the proposed 
introduction of Shari'a law. Multinational oil companies and Nigerian 
oil producing companies subcontract police and soldiers from area units 
particularly to protect the oil facilities in the volatile Niger Delta 
region.
    On May 5, a member of Lagos deputy governor's security detail 
allegedly killed a young woman when she obstructed the security detail 
as it was trying to clear traffic for a motorcade. Reports vary as to 
whether she was in a car or was a pedestrian. The security officer was 
charged with murder by a magistrate court. At year's end, the case had 
not been transferred to a court with jurisdiction over murder cases and 
a trial date had not been set.
    Police and military personnel used excessive and sometimes deadly 
force in the suppression of civil unrest, property vandalization, and 
interethnic violence, primarily in the oil and gas regions of Lagos, 
Kaduna and Abia states. Confrontations between increasingly militant 
``youths'' (who tend to be unemployed males between the ages of 16 and 
40), oil companies, and government authorities continued during the 
year. Reportedly 28 Delta youths were killed in such conflicts over 
protests or suspected vandalization near oil flow stations.
    The use of excessive force to suppress protests was not confined to 
conflicts pertaining to oil company activities. For example, in March 
and April police conducted operations in Ogoniland, Rivers State, home 
of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which 
resulted in the killing of several civilians, the destruction of a 
number of buildings, and the arrest of several Ogoni activists, 
including Ledum Mitee, the MOSOP leader. In June police killed two 
persons in Abuja and injured hundreds of persons who were involved in a 
5-day petrol increase strike (see Section 6.a.). In July police killed 
one person while dispersing a strike by state workers outside of the 
Lagos State secretariat complex (see Section 6.a.). In July police in 
Lagos used tear gas to disperse a demonstration by striking public 
sector workers. One person died in the violence (see Section 6.a.). In 
August the police protecting President Obasanjo's motorcade killed a 
Nnamdi Azikiwe University student who was protesting the removal of 
Senate President Chuba Okadigbo (see Sections 2.a. and Section 3).
    On many occasions during the year the Government authorized the use 
of deadly force to combat crime, and police, military, and anticrime 
taskforce personnel committed numerous extrajudicial killings in the 
apprehension and detention of suspected criminals. For example, police 
used deadly force against suspected vandals near oil pipelines in the 
Niger Delta Region. In June the police killed at least five persons for 
suspected vandalization. Police were instructed by the Federal 
Government to use deadly force in conflicts in Lagos State with the 
Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) vigilante group. By August police in Lagos 
reported killing 509 armed robbers and injuring 113, during the course 
of making 3,166 arrests; not all of those killed were OPC members. No 
legal action was taken against these security officials by year's end.
    Violence and lethal force at police roadblocks and checkpoints was 
reduced greatly during part of the year; however, some instances of 
such violence continued. Obasanjo's order in 1999 to reduce the number 
of checkpoints and roadblocks also applied to the National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and resulted in a decrease in the use of 
violence and lethal force at NDLEA checkpoints and roadblocks. By 
year's end, the number of roadblocks and checkpoints at major 
intersections increased again as authorities sought to prevent criminal 
activity from reaching major cities (see Section 1.f.); however, the 
violence associated with roadblocks, as reported in the previous year, 
did not increase.
    Criminal suspects died from unnatural causes while in official 
custody, usually as the result of neglect and harsh treatment. The 
Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) (a credible human rights 
organization) filed a petition with the National Human Rights 
Commission and the Justice Pout Panel concerning the death of Godfrey 
Opuoru while in detention in 1999. Sunday Aghedo, the Lagos state 
police commissioner under whose command the death occurred was replaced 
by Mike Okiro on August 2, 1999. The case was referred to a magistrate 
rather than the High Court, and the case was pending at year's end.
    In Anambra State, the state government supported the extrajudicial 
activities of the vigilante group known as the Bakassi Boys. Like most 
vigilante groups, the Bakassi Boys kill suspected criminals rather than 
turn them over to police; however, in some cases, the Bakassi Boys have 
chosen to cut off the hands or arms of perpetrators, rather than 
killing them outright. They also were accused of harassing and 
threatening political opponents of the state government.
    Harsh and life threatening prison conditions and denial of proper 
medical treatment contributed to the death of numerous inmates (see 
Section 1.c.).
    In October the HRVIP began hearings into 150 cases of killings by 
members of the security forces (see Section 4).
    The Government did not address the November 1999 leveling of Odi in 
Bayelsa State by federal troops. The Government did not hold 
accountable any of the soldiers involved in the destruction of the town 
and the killing of several hundred inhabitants; there were newspaper 
reports that some of the soldiers were promoted. Trials against Keniwer 
Imo Neweigha, Monday Diongoli, Timi Epengele, Onoriode David, Ebi 
Clifford Saibu, Derioteidou Aganaba, Timinepre Keren, Joshua Godspower, 
John Zitua, and Benson Odiowei for the alleged murders of 12 policemen 
and 6 civilians that sparked the Odi incident, were ongoing at year's 
end. When the prosecution could not produce Odiowei for trial in 
October, the case was postponed to a later date.
    The prosecution of Hamza al-Mustapha, Mohammed Abacha, Mohammed 
Rabo Lawal, Lateef Shofalan, Mohammed Aminu and Sergeant Rogers 
Mshiella for the 1996 murder of Kudirat Abiola, a prominent 
prodemocracy activist and the wife of Moshood Abiola, was adjourned 
repeatedly during the year; defense lawyers for each individual had 
filed numerous motions for adjournment in the Lagos High Court. The 
Government continued to investigate and detain former Abacha government 
officials and family members, including former Minister of the Interior 
Capital Territory Jerry Useni, former National Security Advisor Ismaila 
Gwarzo, Abacha's wife Maryam, Abacha's son Mohammed, and Colonel 
Ibrahim Yakassai, for the murder and attempted murders of other 
prominent prodemocracy activists in Lagos from 1996 to 1998. All of the 
cases were ongoing at year's end.
    In 1999 the trial against former Army Chief of Staff Ishaya Bamaiyi 
for the attempted murder in 1996 of Guardian newspaper publisher Alex 
Ibru began. Hamza al-Mustapha, former Lagos Police Commissioner James 
Danbaba, and Colonel Yakubu, also were charged in the attempt on Ibru 
but their trials were pending at year's end. All of the defendants were 
being held at Kiri Kiri maximum-security prison at year's end.
    Organized vigilante groups in large cities, particularly Lagos, 
Kano, and Onitsha, committed numerous killings of suspected criminals. 
These vigilante groups engage in lengthy and wellorganized attempts to 
apprehend criminals after the commission of the alleged offenses. In 
Lagos State, the vigilante group known as the OPC clashed repeatedly 
with the police over their protection of Yoruba neighborhoods and over 
political issues. In October an OPC demonstration against Libya's 
expulsion of several Nigerian citizens resulted in a number of injuries 
and the death of a guard at a foreign embassy. On October 14, clashes 
broke out between members of the OPC and police in Ilorin. The violence 
spread to Lagos over the following 2 days; however, the fighting in 
Lagos was between members of the mainly Yoruba OPC and members of the 
Hausa ethnic group and originated in a dispute over the capture and 
killing of alleged robbers of the Hausa ethnic group by members of the 
OPC. The rioting resulted in the deaths of over 100 persons, the 
destruction of buildings in Lagos and the outlawing of the OPC by the 
Government. In some southern states, such as Anambra, vigilante groups 
like the Bakassi Boys are supported and paid by the state government.
    There also were numerous reports of street mobs apprehending and 
killing suspected criminals. The practice of ``necklacing'' criminals 
(placing a gasoline-soaked tire around a victim's neck or torso and 
then igniting it, burning the victim to death) caught in the act 
occurred in several cities.
    During the year, there was an upsurge in lethal interethnic and 
intraethnic violence throughout the country (see Section 5). In 
February and May, rioting between Muslim and Christian groups over the 
proposed extension of Shari'a in Kaduna caused the deaths of more than 
1,500 persons and massive property destruction (see Section 2.c.). Over 
500 persons, predominantly of the Hausas ethnic group, were killed in 
reprisal violence that took place in Abia, Imo, and other eastern 
states. Religious and ethnic violence resulted in deaths in other 
communities as well (see Section 2.c.). For example, one person was 
killed and one Christian church was destroyed in Sokoto when ``area 
boys'' (neighborhood criminals) took advantage of the absence of 
police--who were managing a pro-Shari'a student demonstration elsewhere 
in the city--to attack and loot the church and its rectory in the 
predominantly Christian part of town. In Damboa, Borno, one person was 
killed and five churches were burned in a dispute concerning the 
location of a Christian church in a predominantly Muslim neighborhood. 
In May the discovery of a corpse sparked riots by Christians in the 
Narayi neighborhood in Kaduna; at least 500 persons were killed. A 
National Assembly member, Ibrahim Abdullahi, was burned alive in his 
car during the rioting.
    Clashes between the Ife and the Modakeke ethnic groups caused the 
deaths of as many as 50 persons and much property destruction in Osun 
State (see Section 5).
    In the east, over 150 persons were killed in border disputes 
between Cross River and Akwa Ibom states (see Section 5).
    A clash between rival groups for the throne of the Owo in Ondo 
state cost the lives of at least five persons and the destruction of a 
number of homes and businesses (see Section 5).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically 
motivated disappearances by government security forces during the past 
year; however, the OPC charged that the police were responsible for the 
disappearance of at least two of its members in January (see Section 
1.a.).
    Members of minority ethnic groups in the oil-producing areas 
kidnaped foreign and local oil company employees throughout the year to 
press their demands for more redistribution of wealth generated by 
joint ventures with the state-controlled petroleum corporation and for 
specific projects in their areas. Minority youth groups took as many as 
250 persons hostage during the year. In all instances the victims were 
released unharmed after negotiations between the captors and the oil 
firms; the firms usually paid ransoms and promised improved conditions.
    In addition to the political rationale for kidnaping, there were 
numerous instances of strictly criminal kidnaping, in which the 
perpetrators' sole objective was ransom for the release of the victims. 
Some kidnapings appear to have been part of longstanding ethnic 
disputes. For example, in July a group of youths boarded a boat of 
traders from Okuagbe in Delta State and took all of the passengers 
captive. The attack was believed to be part of a dispute between the 
Ijaw and Urhobo ethnic groups. During the year, kidnapings by criminals 
to extort money were more numerous than those perpetrated for `` 
political'' reasons. Due to limited manpower and resources, the police 
and armed forces rarely were able to confront the perpetrators of these 
acts, especially in the volatile Delta region. A lack of resources 
prevented judicial investigations from taking place so that kidnapings 
were routinely left uninvestigated.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and mistreatment of 
prisoners, and the law provides for punishment for such abuses; 
however, although there were no reports of torture of political 
dissidents during the year, army, police, and security force officers 
regularly beat protesters, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted 
prisoners. Police regularly physically mistreated civilians in attempts 
to extort money from them. Detainees often were kept incommunicado for 
long periods of time. The 1960 Evidence Act prohibits the introduction 
into trials of evidence obtained through torture.
    The extension of Shari'a law in many northern states generated a 
public debate on whether Shari'a punishments such as amputation for 
theft, caning for fornication and public drunkenness constituted 
``torture or'' inhuman or degrading treatment'' as stipulated in the 
Constitution. Caning as a punishment is available under Nigerian common 
law, the Northern Nigerian Penal Code, and Shari'a law and has not been 
successfully challenged in the court system as a violation of the cruel 
and inhuman punishment clause of the 1999 Constitution. In March in 
Zamfara state, Malam Buba Bello Jangebi's hand was amputated after he 
was convicted of cattle rustling in a Shari'a court. Jangebi chose not 
to appeal his sentence. In September a Sokoto Shari'a court handed down 
a sentence of amputation for a thief; the sentence had not been carried 
out by year's end. The first sentence handed down by Zamfara's Shari'a 
courts was for caning for a pregnant unwed mother and her boyfriend; 
both had confessed to fornication. In September Bariya Ibrahim Magazu, 
a 17-year old-girl, was sentenced to 100 lashes for engaging in 
fornication and 80 additional lashes for naming in court but not being 
able to prove who the possible father of the unborn child was. Magazu's 
sentence was suspended until 3 months after the birth of her child and 
at year's end had not been carried out. In August two motorcycle taxi 
drivers were caned for carrying Muslim female passengers in violation 
of the law in Zamfara State (see Section 5). A non-Muslim was pulled 
from a motorcycle in Zamfara State for breaking the new rule requiring 
separate transportation for women.
    In the numerous ethnic clashes that occurred throughout the year 
(see Sections 1.a. and 3.c), hundreds of persons were beaten and 
injured severely. Police and security forces failed to respond to many 
criminal acts in a timely manner and were unable to protect Christians 
and Muslims caught in sectarian unrest in Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, and Abia 
states. For example, during the Kaduna riots of late February (see 
Section 2.c.), Kaduna residents at the Baptist Theological Seminary 
called upon police for protection from the roaming mobs that were 
firebombing their buildings. The police told the seminarians that they 
would have to protect themselves because they were too busy to respond 
to further calls; five persons were killed in the seminary's compound 
during the 2 days of rioting that followed. Mosques and Muslim 
adherents also were attacked during the rioting but were denied police 
protection despite pleas for assistance to the authorities. Order was 
restored only after the military was brought in to quell the 
disturbances.
    No action was taken against army personnel responsible for rapes 
and other abuses in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states as reported in 
1999.
    After the November 1999 release of Jerry Needam, Editor of the 
Ogoni Star newspaper, the Government representatives failed to appear 
in court for any hearings relating to his case. Police reportedly beat 
Needam, forced him to sign a confession, and did not allow him access 
to medical treatment during his detention in 1999.
    In June police killed two persons and injured hundreds of others 
during a 5-day petrol strike (see Section 1.a.).
    In August police reported killing 509 persons and injuring 113 in 
pursuit of robbers in Lagos state (see Section 1.a.).
    On a number of occasions security forces beat and detained 
journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    Prison and detention conditions remained harsh and life 
threatening. Most prisons were built 70 to 80 years ago and lack 
functioning basic facilities. Lack of potable water, inadequate sewage 
facilities, and severe overcrowding resulted in unhealthy and dangerous 
sanitary conditions. Disease was pervasive in the cramped, poorly 
ventilated facilities, and chronic shortages of medical supplies were 
reported. Prison inmates were allowed outside their cells for 
recreation or exercise only irregularly and many inmates had to provide 
their own food. Only those with money or whose relatives brought food 
regularly had sufficient food; petty corruption among prison officials 
made it difficult for money provided for food to reach prisoners. Poor 
inmates often relied on handouts from others to survive. Beds or 
mattresses were not provided to many inmates, forcing them to sleep on 
concrete floors, often without a blanket. Prison officials, police, and 
security forces often denied inmates food and medical treatment as a 
form of punishment or to extort money from them. Harsh conditions and 
denial of proper medical treatment contributed to the deaths in 
detention of numerous prisoners. A reputable human rights organization 
estimated in 1999 that at least one inmate died per day in the Kiri 
Kiri prison in Lagos alone. According to the same nongovernmental 
organization (NGO), dead inmates promptly are buried in mass graves on 
the prison compounds, usually without their families having been 
notified. A nationwide estimate of the number of inmates who die daily 
in the country's prisons is difficult to obtain because of poor (if not 
nonexistent) record keeping by prison officials. A number of NGO's 
alleged that prison conditions were worse in rural areas than in urban 
districts.
    In practice women and juveniles are held with males, especially in 
rural areas. The extent of abuse in these conditions is unknown.
    The Government acknowledged the problem of overcrowding as the main 
cause of the harsh conditions common in the prison system. According to 
government sources, approximately 45,000 inmates were held in a system 
of 148 prisons (and 83 satellite prisons) with a maximum designed 
capacity of 33,348 prisoners. Some human rights groups estimate a 
higher number of inmates--perhaps as many as 47,000. The Controller-
General of prisons estimated that two-thirds of prisoners are detainees 
awaiting trial who have not been charged (see Section 1.d.) and further 
admitted that the number of such inmates increased by 83 percent in the 
first half of the year. In May the Yobe state Attorney-General and 
Commissioner for Justice, Alhaji Audu Mohammed Lawson, announced 
publicly that 287 inmates were awaiting trial and that at least 2 
prisons, in Gashua and Potiskum, were at full capacity. Local officials 
blamed the lack of functioning police transport vehicles for the 
overcrowding since the state had no other means to transport prisoners 
to court securely.
    Several times during the year, authorities attempted to ease 
congestion in some smaller prisons. For example, in honor of the Eid-
El-Kabir holiday in March, the Governor of Kano State released 159 
prisoners, 52 of whom were pretrial detainees held without charge. 
Those released also were provided with travel funds to return to their 
homes.
    In September President Obasanjo directed the Ministry of Justice to 
create a judicial administration committee to address the questions of 
overcrowding, prison conditions, and rehabilitation.
    Throughout the year, the Government allowed both international and 
domestic NGO's occasional access to prisons; however, it did not allow 
them continuous access to all prisons. Prisoners Rehabilitation and 
Welfare Action and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
have regular access to the prisons and publish newsletters on their 
work. The Government admits that there are problems with its 
incarceration and rehabilitation programs and worked with groups such 
as these to address those problems. However, groups such as Rotary 
International report difficulties at the local level in gaining access 
to prisons and jails to do rehabilitation programs.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the Government 
rarely observed these prohibitions. Police and security forces 
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention.
    Police and security forces were empowered to make arrests without 
warrants if they believed that there was reason to suspect that a 
person had committed an offense; they often abused this power. Under 
the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedures Rules of the Constitution 
(based on those of the 1979 Constitution), police may arrest and detain 
persons for 24 hours before charging them with an offense. The law 
requires an arresting officer to inform the accused of charges at the 
time of arrest and to take the accused persons to a station for 
processing within a reasonable amount of time. By law police must 
provide suspects with the opportunity to engage counsel and post bail. 
However, police generally did not adhere to legally mandated 
procedures. Suspects routinely were detained without being informed of 
the charges, denied access to counsel and family members, and denied 
the opportunity to post bail for bailable offenses. There was no 
functioning system of bail, so many suspects were held in investigative 
detention. Numerous suspects alleged that police demanded payment 
before they were taken to court to have their cases heard. If family 
members attend court proceedings, an additional payment is demanded by 
police.
    The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights reports that 302 OPC 
members were arrested in January following clashes with the police in 
Lagos. Of those detainees, 95 were released during the year. The 
remaining detainees were not been able to obtain legal representation 
and either could not make bail or were not eligible for bail due to the 
charges brought against them.
    In March and April, police operations on Ogoniland, Rivers State 
resulted in the killing of several civilians, the destruction of 
buildings, and the arrest of several Ogoni activists (see Section 
1.a.).
    In May, alleged perpetrators of rioting between Christians and 
Muslims in Kaduna state were detained, but eventually were released 
without standing trial (see Section 5).
    Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem. According to 
the Constitution, persons charged with offenses have the right to an 
expeditious trial; however, in practice this right was not respected 
(see Section 1.c.). Serious backlogs, endemic corruption, and undue 
political influence continued to hamper the judicial system (see 
Section 1.e.). Estimates of the percentage of pretrial detainees held 
without charge in the prison population range from 33 to 65 percent of 
the estimated 44-47,000 detainees (see Section 1.c.). Many prisons held 
200 to 300 percent more persons than they were designed to hold, and 
many of the pretrial detainees held without charge had been detained 
for periods far longer than the maximum allowable sentence for the 
crimes for which they were being held. Police cited their inability to 
securely transport detainees to trial on their scheduled trial dates as 
one reason why so many of the detainees were denied a trial.
    Persons who happen to be in the vicinity of a crime when it is 
committed normally are held for interrogation for periods ranging from 
a few hours to several months. After their release, those detained 
frequently are asked to return repeatedly for further questioning. 
Police and members of the NDLEA continued the practice of placing 
relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without criminal 
charge to induce suspects to surrender to arrest, although this was 
done much less often than under the Abacha regime (see Section 1.f.). 
There were reports that Imo state prison officials work with some 
pretrial detainees to blackmail those who knowingly or unknowingly 
purchased stolen goods from the detainees. These persons, usually 
prominent individuals residing in larger cities such as Abuja and 
Lagos, are remanded to Imo state custody and told that they will be 
prosecuted also for the transfer of stolen goods; however, if they pay 
a bribe, they are released as is the pretrial detainee who colluded 
with the prison officials.
    On a number of occasions security forces beat and detained 
journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    Students in general are no longer singled out for arrest because of 
political activities; however, on October 1, police arrested two 
student leaders, Philip Suaib and Olusegun Oluwole, of the National 
Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) for disrupting Independence Day 
activities. The students claim that they were only passing out 
pamphlets critical of the Government's education policy. The two 
students were released from custody the following day without formal 
charge. Many students have been detained for allegedly taking part in 
cult or criminal activities on university campuses.
    On March 23, police in Gombe arrested 19 reportedly peaceful 
persons for unlawful assembly (see Section 2.c.).
    There were unconfirmed reports that members of the armed forces 
beat and raped members of ethnic minorities.
    No information on political detainees emerged during the year.
    In July 1999 Abacha's presidential security officer who is widely 
believed to have orchestrated killings, torture, and hundreds of 
extrajudicial detentions brought suit against the Federal Government 
because he was detained without being charged with a crime (see Section 
1.a.). The suit later was dropped.
    Samaila Gwarzo, the national security advisor to Abacha, was placed 
under house arrest for 18 months without any charges being brought.
    The 1999 Constitution prohibits the expulsion of citizens, and the 
Government does not use forced exile. Many citizens who had lived 
abroad due to fear of persecution under previous military regimes 
continued to return to the country during the year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary remained 
subject to executive and legislative branch pressure, was influenced by 
political leaders at both the state and federal levels, and suffered 
from corruption and inefficiency. For example, all suspects arrested 
following the February violence in Kaduna were released allegedly on 
orders from the Government (see Section 2.c.). Understaffing, 
underfunding, inefficiency, and corruption continued to prevent the 
judiciary from functioning adequately. Citizens encountered long delays 
and frequent requests from judicial officials for small bribes.
    Under the Constitution, the regular court system is composed of 
federal and state trial courts, state appeals courts, the Federal Court 
of Appeal, and the Federal Supreme Court. There also are Shari'a 
(Islamic) and customary (traditional) courts of appeal for each state 
and for the federal capital territory (Abuja). Courts of the first 
instance include magistrate or district courts, customary or 
traditional courts, Shari'a courts, and for some specified cases, the 
state high courts. The nature of the case usually determines which 
court has jurisdiction. In principle customary and Shari'a courts have 
jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant agree. However, in 
practice fear of legal costs, delays, and distance to alternative 
venues encouraged many litigants to choose the customary and Shari'a 
courts over the regular venues. Shari'a courts have begun to function 
in nine northern states and have carried out at least one sentence of 
amputation (see Section 1.c.). The proposed expansion of Shari'a law in 
Kaduna and other states led to widespread rioting and violence.
    Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 months of 
arraignment for most categories of crimes. Understaffing of the 
judiciary, inefficient administrative procedures, petty extortion, 
bureaucratic inertia, poor communication between police and prison 
officials, and inadequate transportation continued to result in 
considerable delays, often stretching to several years, in bringing 
suspects to trial (see Section 1.d.).
    Trials in the regular court system are public and generally respect 
constitutionally protected individual rights, including a presumption 
of innocence, the right to be present, to confront witnesses, to 
present evidence, and to be represented by legal counsel. However, 
there is a widespread perception that judges easily are bribed or 
``settled,'' and that litigants cannot rely on the courts to render 
impartial judgements. Most prisoners are poor and cannot afford to pay 
the costs associated with moving their trials forward, and as a result 
they remain in prison. Wealthier defendants employ numerous delaying 
tactics and in many cases used financial inducements to persuade judges 
to grant numerous continuances. This, and similar practices, clogged 
the court calendar and prevented trials from starting.
    Some courts are understaffed. Judges frequently fail to appear for 
trials, often because they are pursuing other means of income. In 
addition court officials often lack the proper equipment, training, and 
motivation to perform their duties, again due in no small part to their 
inadequate compensation. For example, a Grand Khadi (judge) in the 
Sokoto state Shari'a court system was asked to resign because he had 
contracted to obtain new law books, which duplicated books already 
donated and in the court's possession, allegedly for personal gain.
    There are no legal provisions barring women or other groups from 
testifying in civil court or giving their testimony less weight; 
however, the testimony of women and non-Muslims is usually accorded 
less weight in Shari'a courts (see Section 5).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the 
Saro-Wiwa family continued to petition President Obasanjo, the Minister 
of Justice, and the Oputa Human Rights panel to reverse the verdict of 
the Auta Tribunal that convicted Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni-9 in October 
1995. At year's end, the Government had not responded to the 2 year old 
appeal to clear the names of Saro-wiwa and the Ogoni activists, who 
were executed by the regime of Sani Abacha in November 1995.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary interference with 
privacy, family, home, or correspondence; however, although government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, authorities continued 
at times to infringe on these rights.
    Police and security forces continued the practice of placing 
relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without criminal 
charge to induce suspects to surrender to arrest, although this was 
done much less frequently than under previous military regimes. There 
were calls by human rights groups for the police to end the practice.
    Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of members of the 
armed forces looting property, destroying buildings, and driving 
persons away from their homes.
    Although the expanded Shari'a laws technically do not apply to 
Christians, the Christian minority, especially in Zamfara and Sokoto 
states, was subjected to many of the social provisions of the law, such 
as the separation of the sexes in public transportation vehicles (a law 
that was repealed after only 2 weeks), and in health facilities, the 
segregation by gender of school children, and bans on the selling of 
alcohol (see Section 2.c.).
    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respected these rights; however, there were problems in some areas.
    Although there is a large and vibrant private domestic press that 
is frequently critical of the Government, the Government also owns or 
controls many publications.
    On May 26, 1999, in the last days of Abubakar regime, Decree 60 was 
signed into law and created the Nigerian Press Council which was 
charged with the enforcement of professional ethics and the sanctioning 
of journalists who violated these ethics. The Nigerian Press Council 
immediately was criticized by the media as ``an undisguised instrument 
of censorship and an unacceptable interference with the freedom of the 
press.'' Decree 60 attempted to put control of the practice of 
journalism into the hands of a body of journalists who were appointed 
by and received payment from the Government. In 1999 the NUJ, the 
professional association of all Nigerian journalists, and the Newspaper 
Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) rejected the creation of the 
Press Council. The NPAN called the decree unconstitutional and a 
violation of press freedom, because there were already enough laws 
concerning the operation of the press. The decree, which virtually made 
members of the council employees of the Government, also contained a 
number of provisions inimical to the operation of a free press. Among 
other provisions, Decree 60 gave the Press Council the power to 
accredit and register journalists and the power to suspend journalists 
from practicing. Decree 60 required that publications be registered by 
the council annually through a system entitled ``Documentation of 
Newspapers.'' In applying for registration, publishers were expected to 
submit their mission statements and objectives and could be denied 
registration if their objectives failed to satisfy the Council. The 
penalties for practicing without meeting the Council's standards were a 
fine of $2,500 (250,000 naira) or imprisonment for a term not to exceed 
3 years. The decree also empowered the Council to approve a code of 
professional and ethical conduct to guide the press and to ensure 
compliance by journalists. Under the decree, publishers were expected 
to send a report of the performance of their publications to the 
Council; failure to do so was an offense that carried a fine of $1,000 
(100,000 naira). The Nigerian Press Council continued after Obasanjo's 
inauguration, and in 1999 former Minister of Information Dapo Sarumi 
expressed the view of the new civilian Government that the council 
would continue to operate, and said, ``It is in line with journalists' 
demands.'' The council had not yet begun operating at year's end; 
however, it remained on the books in principle, and many journalists 
believe that the existence of such a decree is a significant limitation 
on freedom of the press.
    During the year there were a few cases of threats against and 
attacks on the press. In January police beat, arrested and detained 
Igha Oghole, a journalist with Radio Benue, Makurdi, after he insisted 
on conducting a scheduled interview with the police commissioner rather 
than interviewing his subordinate.
    In March 50 armed policemen entered the International Press Center 
(IPC) in Ogba, Lagos and arrested 4 journalists who they held for 5 
hours and then released without charge. The police subsequently claimed 
that the attack was not directed at journalists but was to find members 
of a militant faction of the OPC, who had engaged in battles with the 
police (see Sections 1.a., 1.c. and 1.d.). The police claimed that they 
were acting on information that militant members of the OPC were 
planning to address a press conference at the center.
    In March members of the NPF seized most of the print run of the 
March 4 edition of the Kaduna-based newspaper Today as well as its 
Hausa language affiliate newspaper, Ayaqu, and sealed off their 
offices. The police justified their action on the grounds that the 
publications carried headlines that could have engendered violence in 
the Shari'a dispute (see Section 2.c.).
    On April 4, an armed detachment of SSS sealed off for several hours 
the premises of Leaders and Company, the publishers of This Day 
newspaper in order to search the grounds for what the Government 
described as ``subversive and incriminating documents'' and to arrest 
the editor-in-chief, Nduka Obaigbena. Obaigbena was not on the premises 
at the time and was not arrested. The charges against him were dropped 
1 week later, but Obaigbena was told to cease investigations of 
Obasanjo's national security adviser, Aliyu Gusau (see Section 1.d.). 
In August police and security agents again sealed off the premises of 
This Day newspaper and ordered the staff to leave the premises.
    State governments also have threatened and detained journalists who 
have criticized their policies. According to the country's Media Rights 
Agenda, since May 1999 there were nine cases of arrests and detentions 
of journalists and vendors; state security personnel were the 
perpetrators in all of these incidents. In March Ebonyi state police 
detained two journalists with the Ebonyi Times, Emmanuel Okike-ogah and 
Ogbonaya Okorie, for publishing what the State Government described as 
``seditious articles in an unregistered newspaper.'' The articles 
claimed that the governor of Ebonyi State had bribed state legislators 
into approving a list of commissioners. Also in March, police in Aba, 
Abia state, arrested and detained Ademola Adegbamigbe of The News 
magazine, and a professional photographer who Adegbamigbe had hired to 
assist him, while covering the civil violence following the 
introduction of Shari'a law in the north (see Section 2.c.). On March 2 
in Kaduna state, police raided the offices of the Nigerian Tribune in 
Ibadan after the publication of an article on Islamic law, and Zamfara 
state seized copies of the Nigerian Tribune, the Guardian, and Vanguard 
after they published articles critical on Shari'a law (see Section 
2.c.).
    In January Abuja FCT police accompanied Yusuf Mamman, an Alliance 
for Democracy (AD) faction leader, to the AD headquarters in Abuja to 
prevent a rival faction leader, Adamu Song, from holding a press 
conference. Police attempted to seize the videocamera of an Africa 
Independence Television cameraman and the digital camera of a This Day 
newspaperman. Mamman asked police to arrest Song for ``invading'' AD 
offices; however, they failed to do so following the press conference. 
Police routinely are involved in political disputes under the guise of 
breach of the peace or assault. Nothing was ever done about the 
potentially improper use of the police in this case.
    There are two national, government-owned daily newspapers in 
English, the New Nigerian and the Daily Times. The New Nigerian 
publishes an additional Hausa edition. Several states own daily or 
weekly newspapers that also are published in English. They tend to be 
poorly produced, have limited circulation, and require large state 
subsidies to continue operating. Several private newspapers and 
magazines have begun publication since the inauguration of the civilian 
government. Five major daily newspapers, one newsmagazine, and several 
sensational evening newspapers and tabloid publications had begun 
publication at year's end.
    Because newspapers and television are relatively expensive and 
literacy is not universal, radio remains the most important medium of 
mass communication and information. There is a national radio 
broadcaster, the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, which broadcasts 
in English, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and other languages. Fifty-one state 
radio stations broadcast in English and local languages. For many 
years, the Government prohibited nationwide private radio broadcasting, 
but the Abacha regime granted broadcasting rights to local and regional 
private radio stations in 1994. There were six private radio stations 
operating at the beginning of the year. Several of these stations 
continue to struggle with financial difficulties, including Raypower 
FM, which ceased operations in September. No new private radio licenses 
were issued during the year by the National Broadcasting Commission 
(NBC), the body responsible for the deregulation and monitoring of the 
broadcast media. Ten applications pending from 1999 were still awaiting 
NBC approval at year's end.
    The National Television Station, NTA, is federally owned, while 30 
states also operate television stations. There are nine privately owned 
television stations that broadcast domestic news and political 
commentary. There are two private satellite television services. The 
1993 Press Law requires local television stations to limit programming 
from other countries to 40 percent. The 1993 Press Law also restricts 
the foreign content of satellite broadcasting to 20 percent, but the 
Government does not restrict access to, or reception of, international 
cable or satellite television. The Government did not restrict Internet 
access, although unreliable and costly digital telephone service 
limited access and hindered service providers. All Internet service 
providers were privately owned.
    In October 1999, the NBC, in cooperation with the Information 
Ministry, revoked the licenses of 20 private radio and television 
broadcasters for nonpayment of license fees. The Director General of 
NBC cited Decree 38 of 1992, which mandates the commission to revoke a 
license where the prescribed fee was not paid on the due date. Several 
major domestic broadcasters as well as affiliates of international 
broadcasters such as Voice of America and the British Broadcasting 
Corporation were among those affected. They were reported to owe a 
total of $745,000 (70 million naira). All 20 of the broadcasters paid 
the delinquent fees and continued broadcasting.
    While private television and radio broadcasters remained 
economically viable on advertising revenues alone, despite the 
restrictions that the Government imposed on them, governmentsponsored 
broadcasters complained that government funding and advertising were 
inadequate for their needs.
    Journalists and editors of state media reportedly no longer fear 
suspension for their editorial decisions, although some selfcensorship 
lingered. State broadcasters and journalists remain important tools for 
civilian governors; these officials use the state-owned media to 
showcase the state's accomplishments and to stress the extent to which 
their states are in political accord with the Government.
    Since the May 1999 elections, foreign journalists who sought to 
enter the country to cover political developments generally have been 
able to obtain visas, and many of the obstacles that previously 
frustrated foreign journalists were removed. Officials within the 
Ministry of Information became more accommodating to requests from 
foreign journalists.
    Throughout the Abacha regime there was no academic freedom for 
students or academic staff; however, under Obasanjo's government, 
concrete steps have been taken to address the problems in the education 
sector and to restore academic freedom. In May 1999, Obasanjo approved 
the establishment of four new private universities, but the quality of 
secondary education continued to deteriorate. However, student groups 
alleged that numerous strikes, inadequate facilities, and the rise of 
cultism (or gangs) on campuses continue to hamper educational progress. 
On several occasions during the year, protests by students resulted in 
harassment and arrest by police forces and in one incident, the killing 
of a student (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). For example, in October 
protests during the country's Independence Day celebrations resulted in 
the arrests of 2 students in Lagos (see Section 1.d.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1999 
Constitution provides citizens with the right to assemble freely; and 
the Government generally respected this right, although some limits 
remained.
    Throughout the year, the Government nominally required organizers 
of outdoor public functions to apply for permits, although both 
government authorities and those assembling often ignored this 
requirement. The Government retained legal provisions banning 
gatherings whose political, ethnic, or religious content might lead to 
unrest. Open-air religious services away from places of worship 
remained prohibited in most states due to religious tensions in various 
parts of the country. For example, the Kogi state government banned 
open air preaching and public processions beginning on March 2, but it 
did so in consultation with a number of religious and traditional 
groups, and local governments. Also in March, the Kaduna state 
government banned processions, rallies, demonstrations, and meetings in 
public places in order to prevent repetition of the violence that 
followed the establishment of Shari'a law in February (see Sections 
1.a. and 2.c.).
    In late February, the Enugu police halted in mid-session a 
conference on the history of Biafra that was attended by many eastern-
based ethnic groups, including those of Igbo, Ibibio, Oron, and Ikot 
Ebere ethnicity due to concerns that the conference could fuel to 
existing ethnic violence. On March 1, the Assistant Commissioner of 
Police, Francis Ihechere, was quoted in the Guardian newspaper as 
stating that the Government had prohibited gatherings of more than four 
persons. In March Gombe state announced that it had prosecuted and 
convicted 19 people for unlawful assembly during the Shari'a crisis. 
The police claimed that the assembly would lead to a breach of the 
peace and that they were protecting other citizen's constitutional 
rights to peace and security. The defendants were sentenced to either 6 
months'' imprisonment or a $10 (1,000 naira) fine. On September 3, the 
Lagos police denied a permit to the Committee of Concerned Citizens 
(CCC), a southern-based interest group comprised primarily of Christian 
elder statesmen, who wished to hold a 2-day workshop on the adoption of 
Shari'a law. Police claimed that they knew of plans to disrupt the 
meeting and were denying the permit to protect the committee and 
prospective workshop attendees.
    The Constitution provides for the right to associate freely with 
other persons in political parties, trade unions, or special interest 
associations, and the Government generally respected this right in 
practice; however, there were exceptions. In July Lagos state police 
used tear gas to disperse a demonstration by striking public sector 
workers. One person died from the violence (see Section 6.a.). On April 
13, Lagos State police prevented approximately 1,000 members of the 
Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra from 
staging a rally and raising the Biafran flag.
    c.Freedom of Religion
    The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, including 
freedom to change one's religion or belief, and freedom to manifest and 
propagate one's religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and 
observance; however, the Government restricted these rights in practice 
in certain respects. The status of respect for religious freedom 
deteriorated during the year due to the implementation of an expanded 
version of Shari'a law in several northern states, which challenged 
constitutional protections for religious freedom and sparked 
interreligious violence.
    The Constitution prohibits state and local governments from 
adopting an official religion; however, it also provides that states 
may elect to use Islamic (Shari'a) customary law and courts. About half 
of the population is Muslim, about 40 percent Christian, and about 10 
percent practice traditional indigenous religion or no religion. Since 
independence, the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts has been limited to 
family or personal law cases involving Muslims, or to civil disputes 
between Muslims and non-Muslims who consent to the courts' 
jurisdiction. However, the Constitution states that a Shari'a court of 
appeal may exercise ``such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon 
it by the law of the State.'' Some states have interpreted this 
language as granting them the right to expand the jurisdiction of 
existing Shari'a courts to include criminal matters. Several Christians 
have alleged that, with the adoption of an expanded Shari'a law in 
several states and the continued use of state funds to fund the 
construction of mosques, teaching of Alkalis (Muslim judges), and 
pilgrimages to Mecca (Hajj), Islam has been adopted as the de facto 
state religion of several northern states. However, state funds also 
are used to fund Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem. In general states 
with a clear Christian or Muslim majority explicitly favor the majority 
faith. The Constitution also provides that the Federal Government is to 
establish a Federal Shari'a Court of Appeal and Final Court of Appeal; 
however, the Government had not yet established such courts by year's 
end.
    The Government continued to enforce a ban on the existence of 
religious organizations on campuses of primary schools, although 
individual students retain the right to practice their religion in 
recognized places of worship. Many states allow the teaching of Koranic 
or Biblical knowledge in primary and secondary schools; however, in 
almost all states with religious minorities, there are reports that 
students are forced to take classes that violate their religious 
principles. Islam is a mandatory part of the curriculum in public 
schools in Zamfara and other northern states, to the exclusion of 
Christianity. State authorities claim that students are permitted to 
decline to attend these classes or to request a teacher of their own 
religion to provide alternative instruction. In practice the dominant 
religion of the state is taught in the school, and students cannot use 
these other mechanisms. There are reports that Christianity is taught 
in the same manner in Enugu and Edo states, and that Muslim students 
cannot access Koranic teaching in the public schools.
    The law prohibits religious discrimination; however, reports were 
common that government officials discriminated against persons 
practicing a religion different from their own, notably in hiring or 
awarding contracts. Christians in the northern, predominantly Muslim 
part of the country accused local government officials of attempting to 
use zoning regulations to stop or slow the establishment of non-Muslim, 
usually Christian, churches. Typically, a small section of a city was 
unofficially segregated for nonMuslims to build their places of 
worship. In several cases, citizens in these enclaves reported that 
they were discriminated against by not receiving police protection or 
waste removal services.
    Purdah continued in parts of the country leading to continued 
restrictions on the freedom of movement of women (see Section 5).
    In October 1999, the governor of Zamfara state signed into law two 
bills aimed at instituting Islamic Shari'a law in his state. 
Implementation of the law began on January 22. Zamfara's law adopted 
traditional Shari'a in its entirety, with the exception that apostasy 
was not criminalized. Following Zamfara's lead, several northern states 
began to implement varying forms of expanded Shari'a; by year's end 9 
states had adopted variations of Shari'a law `` Sokoto, Niger, Kano, 
Kebbi, Jigawa, Yobe, Zamfara, Katsina, and Kaduna states. Previously, 
Shari'a law had been practiced in the north in the areas of personal 
law, only if both litigants agreed to settle their disputes in Shari'a 
courts. Elements of Shari'a also had been present in the northern penal 
code, which had been applicable in the north since independence.
    As the result of nationwide violence in February and March related 
to the expansion of Shari'a laws (see Section 5), several northern 
state governments banned open air preaching and public religious 
processions. The Kogi state government enacted such a ban on March 1, 
and the Kaduna State government followed shortly thereafter, enacting a 
ban on all forms of ``processions, rallies, demonstrations, and 
meetings in public places.'' On March 23, Gombe state officials 
arrested 19 reportedly peaceful persons for ``unlawful assembly capable 
of causing a breach of peace in the state.'' Such bans were viewed as 
necessary public safety measures after the death of approximately 1,500 
persons. However, large outdoor religious gatherings continued to be 
quite common, especially in the southern part of the country.
    On February 29, in response to the nationwide violence (see Section 
5), President Obasanjo convened a meeting of the Nigerian Council of 
State, a consultative body consisting of the President and Vice 
President, all past heads of state and past chief justices, all 
governors, the Attorney General, and the President of the Senate and 
Speaker of the House. The result of the meeting was an agreement that 
northern governors would halt initiatives to expand Shari'a laws and 
return to the northern Nigerian Penal Code; however, a few states 
continued to expand their Shari'a laws. Niger state declared that it 
would expand Shari'a laws on the same day as the Council of State 
meeting, and the amputation of the cow thief's right hand in Zamfara 
state occurred on March 23 (see Section 1.c.).
    Although the expanded Shari'a laws technically do not apply to 
Christians, the Christian minority, especially in Zamfara state, was 
subjected to many of the social provisions of the law, such as the 
separation of the sexes in public transportation vehicles (a law that 
was repealed after only 2 weeks) and bans on the selling of alcohol. 
Niger State also enforced a ban on selling alcohol. However, the 
federal Government has disregarded the ban on alcohol sales in military 
installations. All Muslims were subjected to the new Shari'a provisions 
in the states that enacted them, which, according to many legal 
scholars, constitute an abridgement of their freedom of religion and 
conscience. The implementation of Shari'a law has been challenged 
constitutionally. For example, in May an international human rights 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), Huri-Laws, took the Zamfara state 
government to court, challenging the constitutionality of Zamfara's 
expanded Shari'a penal code. The case was ongoing at year's end. No 
other cases had reached the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Shari'a 
courts have begun to execute sentences of amputation, at least in 
Zamfara state (see Section 1.c.).
    In September, Lagos police denied the CCC a permit to hold a 
workshop on the adoption of Shari'a law (see Section 2.b.).
    Although distribution of religious publications remained generally 
unrestricted, the Government continued to enforce lightly a ban on 
published religious advertisements. There were reports by Christians in 
Zamfara State that the state government restricted the distribution of 
religious (Christian) literature. The Right Reverend Samson Bala, First 
Bishop of Zamfara, Gusau diocese, said that the state radio station had 
``closed its doors to Christians.'' Commercials and paid advertisements 
containing Christian literature are not accepted, he said, and only 
Islamic religious programs are aired.
    Following violence in relation to the expansion of Shari'a laws in 
Kaduna in February, several northern state governments banned any type 
of proselytizing, in spite of the fact that it is permitted by the 
Constitution. Missionaries reported that law enforcement officials 
harassed them when they proselytized outside of majority Christian 
neighborhoods. Proselytizing did not appear to be restricted in the 
southern part of the country.
    The Federal Government continued to settle property claims by 
Muslim Brotherhood leader Ibrahim El-Zakzaky for compensation for his 
home and mosque, which were razed by law enforcement in 1997. All 96 of 
the Muslim Brotherhood followers jailed under the previous regime were 
released during the year.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution entitles citizens to 
move freely throughout the country and reside where they wish, and in 
general, the Government respected this right; however, police 
occasionally restricted this right by setting up roadblocks and 
checkpoints where security and law enforcement officials routinely 
engaged in extortion, violence, and excessive use of force (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). For example, the Governor of Niger State 
allegedly instructed state police on March 1 to install roadblocks to 
prevent southerners from returning to their homes. The southerners, 
particularly Igbo traders, were attempting to return home because they 
feared violent reprisals in response to the deaths of Hausas in Aba and 
Owerri (see Section 1.a.).
    Clashes between the Ife and Modakeke ethnic groups resulted in a 
dusk-to-dawn curfew following the deaths of as many as 50 persons (see 
Sections 1.a. and 5). In June youths set up roadblocks outside of the 
Osun state town of Ife and killed passengers who were not members of 
the same ethnic group (see Section 1.a.).
    The Constitution also prohibits the denial of exit or entry to any 
citizen, and the Government generally respected this law; however, the 
law also provides that women are required to obtain permission from a 
male family member before having an application for a passport 
processed. Some men take their wives' and children's passports and 
other identification documents with them while traveling abroad to 
prevent their family from leaving the country (see Section 5).
    Prominent human rights and prodemocracy activists who fled the 
country during the regime of General Sani Abacha continued to return to 
the country as did many economic refugees. There were no reports that 
the Government denied passports to political figures or journalists or 
interrogated citizens who were issued visas to foreign countries; 
however, there have been sporadic reports that persons still were 
questioned upon entry or exit to the country at Murtala Muhammed 
international airport. These persons, all of whom were opponents of the 
Abacha regime, were identified in immigration computer systems as 
individuals to be questioned by immigration or security officers. For 
example, Dr. Olua Kamalu, deputy president of MOSOP, reported that the 
SSS seized his passport on July 25. Dr. Kamalu was planning a trip to 
Ghana to attend a visa interview at a foreign embassy.
    During periods of civil unrest, numerous persons were displaced 
temporarily from their villages. Thousands of persons, both Christian 
and Muslim, were displaced internally following the Kaduna riots in 
February and in May. A large number of Muslim families left the city of 
Onitsha due to continued ethnic and religious tension in nearby Aba, 
Abia State. Hundreds of persons voluntarily left other states 
throughout the country in anticipation of violent reprisals following 
interfaith and interethnic clashes in Kaduna and Onitsha (see Section 
2.c.). Typically, only the head of household returned to areas of 
unrest after authorities regained control. Most returnees remained 
apprehensive about continuing to work in these areas and returned only 
to finish business contracts or to sell their homes in order to arrange 
a more organized departure.
    A few hundred residents of the Odi village, razed by soldiers in 
1999, have returned to the area; however the federal Government has not 
provided them with assistance to reconstruct their village (see Section 
1.a.).
    The law contains provisions for the granting of refugee and asylum 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperated 
with the Lagos office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies in assisting refugees through 
the National Commission for Refugees and its Federal Commissioner. The 
Eligibility Committee established under Decree 52 of 1989, which 
governs the granting of refugee status, asylum, and resettlement, 
reviews refugee and resettlement applications. A representative from 
the UNHCR participates in this committee. The issue of the provision of 
first asylum has not arisen since the establishment of the National 
Commission for Refugees under Decree 52.
    At year's end, there were 6,933 recognized refugees: 13 from 
Angola; 23 from Benin; 4 from Cameroon; 1,703 from Sierra Leone; 3,194 
from Chad; 74 from Sudan; 1,561 from Liberia; 69 from Cote d'Ivoire; 
and 292 from other countries. The Government also resettled in the 
country 3 Cameroonians, 3 Chadians, 5 Sudanese, 13 Liberians, and 17 
persons from other countries.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
Change Their Government
    In 1998 and 1999 citizens had the opportunity to exercise their 
right to change their government. General Abdulsalami Abubakar oversaw 
a transition to civilian rule that included elections for local 
governments (in December 1998), state governors and assemblies (in 
January 1999), and national legislators and the president (in February 
1999). Voter apathy and widespread fraud marred the legislative 
elections; however, the turnout increased for the presidential race, 
which proceeded peacefully with reports of only a few violent 
incidents. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 
certified former President Olusegun Obasanjo's victory over Chief Olu 
Falae with a reported 62 percent of the votes.
    Irregularities occurred at each stage of the electoral process, 
particularly the presidential nominating convention and election where, 
for example, large sums of money were offered by both political camps 
to delegates to vote against political opponents. During the 
presidential election, international observers and foreign diplomats 
witnessed serious irregularities in procedures. All three parties 
engaged in the local purchase of false ballots and fraudulent tally 
sheets so that there were vast discrepancies between what observers saw 
and inflated tallies in some areas. In addition there were 
administrative problems such as late delivery of voting materials at a 
large number of polling stations. Those areas with the worst problems 
were the southern tier of states in the Niger Delta region, several 
states in Igboland, and a handful of north central states. The 
production of ``ghost votes'' in these states amounted to as much as 70 
or 80 percent of the total reported votes. Although all parties engaged 
in attempts to rig the vote, the PDP machine in the Delta and Igboland 
was responsible for the worst excesses. These votes may have added an 
estimated 15 percent to Obasanjo's total figure; however, observers 
believe that even if they were thrown out, he still would have 
maintained roughly a 15 percent lead over Falae's total. International 
observers confirmed the results and stated that, despite widespread 
fraud, Obasanjo's victory reflected the will of most voters. Although 
Falae initially protested the election results, eventually he dropped 
his legal challenge. INEC issued a report on the conduct of the 
election in July 1999 that documented the fraud. Obasanjo, 109 
senators, 360 members of the House of the National Assembly, and 36 
governors and state assemblies assumed office on May 29, 1999. The 
President, Vice President, and other national and state officials serve 
4-year terms. The next state and national elections are scheduled for 
2003, while local government elections are scheduled for 2002. INEC is 
working with several international electoral assistance organizations 
to help improve the process in 2003; however, no INEC officials have 
faced disciplinary action as result of their involvement in corrupt 
activities in the 1999 election.
    The Constitution outlaws the seizure of the government by force and 
contains provisions for the removal of the President, Vice President, 
ministers, legislators, and state government officials for gross 
misconduct or medical reasons. In November 1999, Senate President Evan 
Enwerem was removed after another credentials scandal. His replacement, 
Chuba Okadigbo, was removed in August after an internal Senate 
investigation on contracting procedures resulted in his indictment. 
Several other public officials were subjected to close scrutiny by the 
press, public, and legislative investigators.
    The political system remains in transition. The three branches of 
the new government acted independently during the Administration's 
first year in office. Despite his party's substantial majority in the 
legislature, the President was not able to exercise authority without 
legislative oversight and inclusiveness. The Senate and the House of 
Representatives took the screening of government ministers, 
ambassadorial appointments, budget review, and other executive 
initiatives seriously and amended the Government's budget request, 
anticorruption commission bill, and various personnel procedures. They 
also rejected several ministerial and ambassadorial appointments. 
Obasanjo created several commissions to investigate past government 
contracts and human rights abuses, which were overwhelmed with 
applications to present evidence of wrongdoing (see Section 4). 
However, the judicial branch remained weakened by years of neglect and 
politicization.
    Abubakar's military Government, which consulted with a selected 
group of constitutional and legal experts around the country to revise 
the 1979 and 1995 Constitutions, promulgated the 1999 Constitution on 
May 5, 1999. The constitution-writing process was criticized for not 
being open to enough participants and for not being subjected to wider 
debate on the country's federal structure, revenue allocation and 
power-sharing formulas, and minority ethnic groups' rights. Complaints 
about the Constitution persisted and there were continued calls for a 
national conference, mainly from the southwest.
    Although the Constitution allows the free formation of political 
parties, only three parties were registered with the INEC. The 
Constitution requires parties to have membership in two-thirds of the 
country's 36 states. In anticipation of the 2003 election INEC began 
preparing a draft electoral law for the National Assembly to consider 
in the next legislative session. Public forums were held during the 
year in all 36 states and the federal capital territory of Abuja to 
solicit citizens'' views on the draft law. Over 10,000 citizens 
participated in these public fora; however, the draft law was not 
subject to much public debate outside of this exercise. The new law is 
designed to specify the requirements of party formation and 
registration.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
there were no legal impediments to political participation or voting by 
women. Men continued to dominate the political arena. NGO's continued 
to protest the underrepresentation of women in the political process, 
and women were underrepresented in the new civilian government. Only 6 
women were appointed as ministers out of a total of 56 positions. There 
were 3 women among the Senate's 109 members, and only 12 women were 
elected to the 360-member House of Representatives. Women's rights 
groups pushed local, state, and the Federal Government (and local 
levels as well) to adopt a 30 percent affirmative action program; 
however, these efforts were unsuccessful.
    There are no legal impediments to participation in government by 
members of any ethnic group. The Constitution requires that government 
appointments reflect the country's ``federal character.'' However, 
there are more than 250 ethnic groups, and it is difficult to insure 
representation of every group in the Government. The federal- and 
state-level ministers generally are selected to represent the country's 
regional, ethnic, and religious makeup. President Obasanjo attempted to 
create an ethnically inclusive Government. The 56-member Cabinet and 
109 ambassadorial slots were allocated to an equal number of candidates 
from each state to achieve a regional balance. Despite this effort, 
northerners and southeasterners criticized the Government for favoring 
westerners or ethnic Yorubas, while the southwesterners criticized the 
Government for relying too heavily on northern and southeastern 
appointments.
    Middle-belt and Christian officers dominate the military hierarchy. 
In June 1999, Obasanjo retired all military officers who held political 
office, which meant that a disproportionate number of northern Hausa 
officers--who dominated the upper ranks under the previous military 
regimes--left the service.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
    The Government permitted local human rights groups to operate and 
did not interfere with their activities; nor did it detain, intimidate, 
or harass their members. Criticisms of the Government's past human 
rights record were abundant in various media. High-level government 
officials noted that the human rights community assisted in the 
advancement of democracy. In June President Obasanjo, along with a 
number of cabinet members and National Assembly members, met with a 
number of prominent human rights representatives for discussions.
    The Catholic Secretariat, a local sectarian interest group, 
continued to hold a monthly open forum in Lagos on various subjects 
relating to past and present human rights issues. Discussion panels 
have included a number of NGO's, media, and religious leaders. Each 
session ended with recommendations to the Government on how best to 
resolve these issues. The Government had not responded to any of these 
recommendations at year's end.
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is active, with 
offices in Abuja and Lagos under the direction of a regional delegate. 
Its primary human rights activities during the year involved the 
training of prison officials on human rights, sanitation, and prisoner 
health.
    The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was established by 
Decree 22 in 1995 and tasked with monitoring and protecting human 
rights in the country, enjoyed greater recognition by and coordination 
with NGO's, and was moving slowly toward establishing its credibility 
as an independent monitoring body. The NHRC is chaired by retired 
Justice Uche Omo and includes 15 other members. The NHRC is represented 
in some states by state-level affiliates. The NHRC is supposed to work 
closely with NGO's that are devoted to human rights issues. Since its 
inception, the NHRC has been denied adequate funding to do its job 
properly. At year's end, the NHRC had created a strategic work plan 
through 2002, and was in the process of developing a national action 
plan to be deposited with the UNCHR.
    The HRVIP, commonly known as the Oputa panel, is a one-time panel 
that was established in June 1999 by President Obasanjo to investigate 
human rights abuses dating to 1966 and the time of the first military 
coup. The Oputa panel can recommend courses of action to the justice 
system for perpetrators of past abuses, something the NHRC does not do. 
According to Justice Oputa, the chair, the panel's primary goal is to 
provide the country with a systematic examination of past human rights 
abuses to develop a national consensus on the boundaries of acceptable 
behavior by government entities as well as individuals. The panel will 
hear individual cases to establish patterns of abuses. The most common 
cases involved allegations of unlawful arrest, detention, and torture. 
The panel will also hear cases in which the rights of groups were 
violated. On October 23, the commission began a series of public 
hearings across the country to investigate the claims of over 10,000 
petitioners.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
Language, or Social Status
    The 1999 Constitution provides citizens with the right to freedom 
from discrimination based on ``community, place of origin, ethnic 
group, sex, religion, or political opinion.'' However, customary and 
religious discrimination against women persisted, occasional religious 
violence was a problem, social discrimination on the basis of both 
religion and ethnicity remained widespread, and ethnic and regional 
tensions continued to contribute to serious violence both between 
groups of citizens and between citizens and the security forces.
    Women.--Reports of spousal abuse are common, especially those of 
wife beating. Police normally do not intervene in domestic disputes, 
which seldom are discussed publicly. The Penal Code permits husbands to 
use physical means to chastise their wives as long as it does not 
result in ``grievous harm,'' which is defined as loss of sight, 
hearing, power of speech, facial disfigurement, or other life 
threatening injuries. A women's rights group has estimated that spousal 
abuse occurs in 20 percent of adult relationships. In more traditional 
areas of the country, courts and police are reluctant to intervene to 
protect women who accuse their husbands formally if the level of 
alleged abuse does not exceed customary norms in the areas. Rape and 
sexual harassment continue to be problems. Prostitution is rampant, 
particularly in urban areas. A number of states, including most 
northern states which have begun the enforcement of Shari'a law, have 
begun to enforce existing laws or to introduce new laws to combat 
prostitution. Katsina, Jigawa, and Edo states have recently 
criminalized prostitution but it is not illegal in Lagos State; 
however, authorities can use statutes that outlaw pandering as a 
justification for arresting prostitutes (See Section 6.c). The adoption 
of Shari'a-based legal systems by northern states has led to the strong 
enforcement of laws against prostitution for both adults and children 
(see Section 2.c.). Southern states, like Edo, also are criminalizing 
prostitution and raising the legal age for marriage from 16 to 18. 
There is an active market for trafficking in women to Europe, and 
elsewhere (see Section 6.f.). In some parts of the country, women 
continue to be harassed for social and religious reasons. Purdah, the 
Islamic practice of keeping girls and women in seclusion from men 
outside the family, continued in parts of the far north.
    Women experience considerable discrimination as well as physical 
abuse. There are no laws barring women from particular fields of 
employment; however women often experience discrimination because the 
Government tolerates customary and religious practices that adversely 
affect them. The Nigerian NGO's Coalition expressed concern about 
continued discrimination against women in the private sector, 
particularly in access to employment, promotion to higher professional 
positions, and in salary inequality. There are credible reports that 
several businesses operate with a ``get pregnant, get fired'' policy. 
Women remain underrepresented in the formal sector but play an active 
and vital role in the country's important informal economy. While the 
number of women employed in the business sector increases every year, 
women do not receive equal pay for equal work and often find it 
extremely difficult to acquire commercial credit or to obtain tax 
deductions or rebates as heads of households. Unmarried women in 
particular endure many forms of discrimination.
    While some women have made considerable individual progress, both 
in the academic and business world, women remain underprivileged. 
Although women are not barred legally from owning land, under some 
customary land tenure systems only men can own land, and women can gain 
access to land only through marriage or family. In addition many 
customary practices do not recognize a women's right to inherit her 
husband's property, and many widows were rendered destitute when their 
in-laws take virtually all of the deceased husband's property. Widows 
are subjected to unfavorable conditions as a result of discriminatory 
traditional customs and economic deprivation. ``Confinement'' is the 
most common rite of deprivation to which widows are subjected, and it 
occurs predominately in eastern Nigeria. Confined widows are under 
restrictions for as long as 1 year and usually are required to shave 
their heads and dress in black garments. In other areas, a widow is 
considered a part of her husband's property, to be ``inherited'' by his 
family. Polygyny continues to be practiced widely among all ethnic 
groups and among Christians as well as Muslims and practitioners of 
traditional persuasions. Women are required by law to obtain permission 
from a male family member to get a passport (see Section 2.d.). The 
testimony of women is not equal to that of men in Shari'a courts. If 
one woman testifies, a second woman must also to provide testimony to 
equal the weight of the testimony of one man.
    A number of states--Zamfara, Niger, Katsina, Jigawa, Sokoto, Kano, 
and Yobe--have adopted Islamic (Shari'a) law in varying degrees. In 
Zamfara state, local governments are instituting laws that will require 
the separation of Muslim men and women in transportation, health care, 
and primary educational services (see Section 2.c.). Separate 
transportation and health facilities for men and women already had 
begun to be implemented. A woman was pulled from a motorcycle and 
injured by vigilantes for breaking the new rule requiring separate 
transportation for women in a local government area of Zamfara State. 
The woman was not a Muslim. In September an unmarried 17-year-old woman 
was sentenced to 180 lashes for fornication and false testimony (see 
Section 1.c.).
    A national network of women's rights NGO's described the 
Government's 1998 report on the implementation of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) for 
the period 1986-94 as ``inaccurate'' in its positive portrayal of the 
status of women. The NGO Coalition for a Shadow Report on the 
Implementation of CEDAW (NGO CEDAW Coalition) issued its alternative 
report in March 1999, which was critical of the Government's failure to 
remove legal impediments and social discrimination faced by women. 
During the year, there reportedly was not much progress made to rectify 
the problems described in the NGO report.
    Children.--Public schools continued to be inadequate, and limited 
facilities precluded access to education for many children. The 
Constitution's general provisions call for the Government, ``when 
practical,'' to provide free, compulsory, and universal primary 
education; however, despite the President's commitment to compulsory 
education, compulsory primary education rarely was provided, 
particularly in the north (see Section 6.d.). Girls are discriminated 
against in access to education for social and economic reasons. The 
literacy rate for males is 58 percent but only 41 percent for females. 
Rural girls are even more disadvantaged than their urban counterparts. 
Only 42 percent of rural girls are enrolled in school compared with 72 
percent of urban girls. In the north, Muslim communities favor boys 
over girls in deciding which children to enroll in secondary and 
elementary schools. In the south, economic hardship also restricts many 
families' ability to send girls to school and, instead, they are 
directed into commercial activities such as trading and street vending. 
While the Government increased spending on children's health in recent 
years, it seldom enforced even the inadequate laws designed to protect 
the rights of children.
    Cases of child abuse, abandoned infants, child prostitution, and 
physically harmful child labor practices remained common throughout the 
country (see Sections 6.c and 6.d.). Although the law stipulates that 
``no child shall be ordered to be imprisoned,'' juvenile offenders are 
incarcerated routinely along with adult criminals. The Government only 
occasionally criticized child abuse and neglect, and it made little 
effort to stop customary practices harmful to children, such as the 
sale of young girls into marriage (see Section 6.f.). There were 
credible reports that poor families sell their daughters into marriage 
as a means of supplementing their income. Young girls often are forced 
into marriage as soon as they reach puberty, regardless of age, in 
order to prevent the ``indecency'' associated with premarital sex.
    A number of states have adopted Islamic (Shari'a) law in varying 
degrees. While most schools in the north traditionally have separated 
children by gender, it is now required by law in Zamfara, Sokoto, and 
Kebbi state schools (see Section 2.c.).
    There was evidence of trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
    The Government publicly opposes Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), 
which is widely condemned by international health experts as damaging 
to both physical and psychological health; however, it has taken no 
legal action to curb the practice. There are no federal laws banning 
FGM. Because of the considerable problems that anti-FGM groups faced at 
the federal level, most are refocusing their energies to combat FGM at 
the state and local government area (LGA) level. Edo State banned FGM 
in October. Ogun, Cross River, Osun, Rivers, and Bayelsa states banned 
FGM during the year. However, the punishments imposed are minimal, in 
Edo state the punishment is a $10.00 (1,000 Naira) fine and 6 months 
imprisonment. In addition once a state legislature criminalizes FGM, 
NGO's have found that they must convince the LGA authorities that state 
laws are applicable in their districts.
    The Women's Centre for Peace and Development (WOPED) estimated that 
at least 50 percent of women are mutilated. Studies conducted by the 
U.N. Development Systems and the World Health Organization estimated 
the FGM rate at approximately 60 percent among the nation's female 
population. However, according to local experts, the actual prevalence 
may be as high as 100 percent in some ethnic conclaves in the south. 
While practiced in all parts of the country, FGM is more predominant in 
the southern and eastern zones. Women from Northern states are less 
likely to be mutilated; however, those affected are more likely to 
undergo the severe type of FGM known as infibulation. WOPED believes 
that the practice is perpetuated because of a cultural belief that 
uncircumcised women are promiscuous, unclean, unsuitable for marriage, 
physically undesirable, or potential health risks to themselves and 
their children, especially during childbirth. The National Association 
of Nigerian Nurses and Midwives, The Nigerian Women's Association, and 
the Nigerian Medical Association worked to eradicate the practice and 
to train health care workers on the medical effects of FGM; however, 
contact with health care workers remains limited. Nevertheless, most 
observers agree that the number of females who are currently subjected 
to FGM is declining.
    Indigenous forms of FGM vary from the simple removal of the 
clitoral hood or labia minora to excision of the clitoris and the most 
dangerous form, infibulation. The age at which females are subjected to 
the practice varies from the first week of life until after a woman 
delivers her first child. The Ministry of Health, women's groups, and 
many NGO's sponsored public awareness projects to educate communities 
about the health hazards of FGM. The press repeatedly criticized the 
practice.
    People with Disabilities.--While the Government called for private 
business to institute policies that ensured fair treatment for the 
disabled, it did not enact any laws requiring greater accessibility to 
buildings or public transportation, nor did if formulate any policy 
specifically ensuring the right of the disabled to work.
    Religious Minorities.--The law prohibits religious discrimination; 
however private businesses frequently are guilty of informal religious 
discrimination in their hiring practices and purchasing patterns.
    Religious differences often correspond to regional and ethnic 
differences. For example, the northern region is overwhelmingly Muslim 
as are the large Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups of the region. Many 
southern ethnic groups are predominantly Christian. Consequently, at 
times it is difficult to distinguish religious discrimination and 
tension from ethnic and regional discrimination and tension, which are 
pervasive. Religious tensions underscored what were predominantly 
ethnic confrontations throughout the year.
    When Kaduna state announced plans to implement Shari'a law, the 
large Christian minority in the state protested on February 21, leading 
to several days of violent confrontations. Estimates of the number of 
persons killed range from 1,000 to 1,500; many churches and mosques 
were burned. Many Christians in the north, fearing continued violence, 
returned to their historic homelands in the southeast.
    On February 28, when the bodies of the victims from the Kaduna 
violence were returned home to the southeast, reciprocal violence 
erupted in Aba, Abia state, and, to a lesser extent, in the neighboring 
towns of Owerri, Imo state, and Onitsha, Anambra state. This violence 
was characterized by attacks on the minority Muslim Hausas by the 
majority Igbos. Estimates of the number of persons killed range from 
400 to 500. Many of the Hausas were victimized due to their ethnic 
identity rather than their religious beliefs.
    In addition to the violence related to the expansion of Shari'a law 
in Kaduna, Aba, Owerri, and Onitsha, there was civil unrest on March 7 
in Sokoto following a pro-Shari'a rally by university students. 
Although there were no confirmed deaths, at least one church was burned 
and two others were vandalized. Local Christians sought refuge in 
military barracks, but they returned to their homes once calm was 
restored.
    On March 27, at least one person was killed and several were 
injured in Borno State when a long-festering argument over the location 
of a church escalated into violence between Muslims and Christians. The 
church was burned down.
    On May 22 and 23, rioting erupted in Nayari, Kaduna state after 
Christian residents found the body of a person whom they believed to 
have been a Christian killed by Muslims. Christians retaliated against 
Muslims and almost completely destroyed all Muslim residences and 
businesses, causing most Muslim residents to flee. Press reports 
indicated that as many as 200 persons were killed, although this total 
could not be confirmed. The exact cause of the outbreak remains 
unclear, although some observers believe that the violence was 
organized and preplanned by Kaduna Christians in order to prevent 
Muslims from returning to the neighborhood to rebuild their community 
following the violence related to the expansion of Shari'a laws in 
February (see Section 2.c.). Some alleged perpetrators were detained, 
but eventually were released without standing trial.
    In September Christians attacked Muslims in the Bambam community in 
southern Gombe State. The attackers, protesting against the arrival of 
the state's Shari'a committee, killed 18 persons and burned a number of 
buildings including places of worship for both Muslims and Christians, 
businesses, and at least 20 residences.
    Sporadic incidents of attacks on individual religious leaders were 
reported, but the nature and perpetrators of the attacks varied (see 
Section 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of 
about 120 million is ethnically diverse, and consists of more than 250 
groups, many of which speak distinct primary languages and are 
concentrated geographically. There is no majority ethnic group. The 
three largest ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Yoruba 
of the southwest, and the Igbos of the southeast, together make up 
about two-thirds of the population. The Ijaw of the South Delta area, 
the fourth largest group, claim a population of 12 million, roughly the 
same as the Kanuri population in the far northeast and Tiv population 
in the south. Because of the lack of reliable statistics, it is 
difficult to determine the populations of the various ethnic groups.
    The Constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination by the Government. 
In addition the Constitution mandates that the composition of the 
federal, state, and local governments and their agencies, as well as 
the conduct of their affairs, reflect the diverse character of the 
country in order to promote national unity and loyalty. This provision 
was designed as a safeguard against domination of the Government by 
persons from a few states or ethnic and sectional groups. These 
provisions were included in response to previous domination of the 
Government and the armed forces by northerners and Muslims. The 
Government of Olusegun Obasanjo was an example of this diversity. 
Obasanjo is a Yoruba from the southwest, the Vice President is a 
northerner, and the Senate President is an Igbo. The Government also 
attempted to balance key positions and deputy positions among the 
different regions and ethnic groups. For example, the Minister of 
Defense is from one of the middlebelt states, while his deputy is a 
southwestern Yoruba. The Senate used its oversight role to reject many 
of Obasanjo's ambassadorial appointments and insisted on three nominees 
from each state for each appointment. The political parties also 
engaged in ``zoning,'' the practice of rotating positions within the 
party among the different regions and ethnicities to ensure that each 
region and ethnicity is given adequate representation. Nonetheless, 
claims of marginalization by members of southern minority groups and 
Igbos continued. The ethnic groups of the Niger Delta, in particular, 
continued their calls for high-level representation on petroleum issues 
and within the security forces. Northern Muslims, who lost previously 
held positions within the military hierarchy, accused the Obasanjo 
Government of favoring southerners. Traditional linkages continued to 
impose considerable pressure on individual government officials to 
favor their own ethnic groups for important positions and patronage.
    Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is widely 
practiced by members of all ethnic groups and is evident in private 
sector hiring patterns, de facto ethnic segregation of urban 
neighborhoods, and a continuing paucity of marriages across major 
ethnic and regional lines. There is a long history of tension among the 
diverse ethnic groups (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
    Clashes between the Ife and the Modakeke ethnic groups, both 
composed of Yoruba speakers and located in Osun state, increased from 
March to May, prompting a dusk-to-dawn curfew following the deaths of 
as many as 50 persons and much property destruction. Youths from both 
sides reportedly stopped vehicles at roadblocks to determine the ethnic 
status of passengers and shot those not of the same ethnic background. 
In the east, over 150 persons were killed in border disputes between 
Cross River and Akwa Ibom states. A clash between rival groups for the 
throne of the Owo in Ondo state resulted in the deaths of at least five 
persons and the destruction of a number of homes and businesses, 
resulting in another dusk to dawn curfew. In all of these inter-
religious and interethnic clashes, the police were accused of favoring 
sides based on their own religious or ethnic identity.
    The competing aspirations and tensions among the smaller ethnic 
groups related to the control and powers of subnational governments 
occasionally erupted into violence. Clashes occurred between rival 
ethnic groups in Delta, Rivers, Benue, Cross River, Bayelsa, Osun, 
Kaduna, Nassarawa, and Taraba states, often resulting in fatalities 
(see Section 1.a.).
    There were unconfirmed reports that members of the armed forces 
beat and raped members of ethnic minorities (see Section 1.c.).
    Other ethnic minorities, particularly in Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, 
and Akwa Ibom states, have echoed the Ogoni ethnic group's claims of 
environmental degradation and government indifference to their 
development in the Delta. Groups such as the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo, 
and Isoko continued to express their unhappiness about their perceived 
economic exploitation and the environmental destruction of their 
homelands, and incidents of ethnic conflict and confrontation with 
government forces increased in the delta area, particularly after the 
Ijaw Youth Council issued the Kaiama Declaration in December 1998 (see 
Section 1.a.). Other ethnic groups saw the Kaiama Declaration, which 
terms the entire Delta the property of the Ijaw, as threatening their 
rights. Disparate organizations of youths from a variety of ethnic 
groups continued to take oil company personnel hostage in the delta 
region (see Section 1.b.). In August Ijaw youth took 250 persons 
hostage in a Mallard Bay facility during a protest for more contracting 
jobs. As a result of this ongoing violence, many oil companies 
continued to employ local police, and in some cases military troops, to 
protect their facilities and personnel. Local youths claimed that these 
``militias'' engaged in extrajudicial killings and other human rights 
abuses, in some cases with the support of foreign oil companies (see 
Section 1.a.).
    In late October, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), an 
entity proposed in 1999 to increase government resources committed to 
the area and grant more local autonomy over expenditure of these 
resources, began operations. The 19 members of the commission come from 
both oil producing and non-producing states, ostensibly to provide a 
balanced representation of interests. The National Assembly must 
authorize a separate budgetary appropriation in order for the NDDC to 
begin the bulk of its work. The commissioners are scheduled to begin 
consultations in the Delta region in early 2001.
    The Government continued its investigation into all contracts 
previously awarded under the auspices of the Oil and Minerals Producing 
Areas Development Commission. This commission, established in 1992 
during the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, widely was regarded as 
corrupt and ineffective in improving the conditions of Niger Delta 
residents.
    In February the Enugu police halted a conference on the history of 
Biafra (see Section 2.b.)
    Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides all 
citizens with the right to assemble freely and associate with other 
persons, and to form or belong to any trade union or other association 
for the protection of their interests; however, several statutory 
restrictions on the right of association and on trade unions remained 
in effect despite repeals of parts of the military-era antilabor 
decrees. Only a single central labor federation (the Nigerian Labour 
Congress) is permitted, and the Government recognizes only 29 trade 
unions. Trade unions must be registered formally by the Federal 
Government, and a minimum of 50 workers is required to form a trade 
union. Nonmanagement senior staff are prevented from joining trade 
unions, and senior staff associations are denied a seat on the National 
Labor Advisory Council. The ILO Committee of Experts has repeatedly 
cited several of these restrictions; however, the Government had not 
addressed these problems by year's end.
    Workers, except members of the armed forces and employees 
designated as essential by the Government, may join trade unions. 
Essential workers include members of the armed forces and government 
employees in the police, customs, immigration, prisons, federal mint, 
central bank, and telecommunications sectors. Employees working in a 
designated export-processing zone may not join a union until 10 years 
after the start-up of the enterprise (see Section 6.b.).
    According to figures provided by the Nigerian Labour Congress, 
total union membership is approximately 4 million. Less than 10 percent 
of the total work force belongs to unions. With the exception of a 
small number of workers engaged in commercial food processing, the 
agricultural sector, which employs the bulk of the work force, is not 
unionized. The informal sector and small and medium enterprises remain 
mostly nonunionized.
    Since 1978 the Government has mandated a single trade union 
structure with service and industrial unions grouped under the NLC. The 
trade union movement is composed of two groups consisting of junior and 
senior staff workers. The single trade union structure and segregation 
of junior from senior staff were intended to dilute the bargaining 
strength of workers. Junior staff workers--primarily blue-collar 
workers--are organized into 29 industrial unions with a membership of 
approximately 4 million persons and are affiliated with the NLC. 
Twenty-one unions make up the Senior Staff Consultative Association of 
Nigeria (SESCAN), which has a membership of approximately 400,000 to 
600,000. SESCAN--which is composed primarily of white-collar workers--
has not been officially sanctioned by the Government, is prohibited 
from affiliating with the NLC, and is not seated on the National Labor 
Advisory Council. In 1999 SESCAN continued, without success to lay the 
legal and political groundwork to achieve government recognition, which 
will require legislation.
    In August the Government decertified the maritime workers union on 
the grounds that the union had not scheduled internal elections in 
accordance with its charter's requirement. In September the Government 
issued directives requiring maritime workers to register with specific 
contracting firms. As a result this historically powerful union was 
weakened; however, it continued to challenge the Government's action 
during the year.
    Workers have the right to strike; however, certain essential 
workers are required to provide advance notice of a strike. Essential 
services include banking, postal services, transportation, 
firefighting, public health, and utilities.
    There were several strikes throughout the year. The most important 
strike occurred in June, following a government decision to increase 
fuel prices by 50 percent. The NLC called a general strike that was 
widely observed, resulting in significant economic disruption. 
Following negotiations, the fuel price increase largely was eliminated. 
The strike action damaged relations between the NLC and the Government 
(see Section 2.b.). The oil worker unions National Union of Petroleum 
and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (Pengassan) successfully went on 
strike in September over wages in order to force oil marketing 
companies to negotiate. The oil workers' wage demands were triggered in 
part by the Government's announcement of public sector salary increases 
in May. The oil worker unions also called wildcat strikes over issues 
including the firing of one company's tanker truck drivers who sought 
to affiliate with NUPENG, and, the raiding of a NUPENG office during 
civil unrest in the Delta. Academic and teacher unions went on strike 
several times during the year over nonpayment of wages and poor working 
conditions, as did doctors in Ibadan.
    In July Lagos public sector workers went on strike to protest the 
state government's refusal to pay a higher minimum wage. On July 5, the 
protests turned violent when police used tear gas to disperse workers 
demonstrating outside of the Lagos State Secretariat complex. One 
person reportedly died in the violence, although the reason for the 
death was unclear. A compromise package offered by the state was 
accepted by the workers; however, the local union leadership continued 
to press for more pay at year's end.
    There are no laws prohibiting retribution against strikers and 
strike leaders, but strikers who believe that they are victims of 
unfair retribution may submit their cases to the Industrial Arbitration 
Panel (IAP) with prior approval of the Labor Ministry. The IAP's 
decisions are binding on all parties but may be appealed to the 
Nigerian Industrial Court (NIC). Union representatives have described 
the arbitration process as cumbersome and time consuming, and as an 
ineffective deterrent to retribution against strikers.
    The NLC and labor unions are free to affiliate with international 
bodies; however, prior approval from the Minister is required. The NLC 
has affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor laws 
provide for both the right to organize and the right to bargain 
collectively between management and trade unions. Collective bargaining 
occurs throughout the public sector and the organized private sector. 
Complaints of antiunion discrimination may be brought to the Ministry 
of Labor for mediation and conciliation. The Labor Minister may refer 
unresolved disputes to the IAP and the NIC (see Section 6.a.). Union 
officials have questioned the independence of the NIC in view of its 
refusal in previous years to resolve various disputes stemming from the 
Government's failure to fulfill contract provisions for public sector 
employees. Union leaders also have criticized the arbitration system's 
dependence on the Labor Minister's referrals. The previous Labor 
Minister made no referrals to the IAP. The IAP and NIC were active 
during the year, following the Government's appointment of new members 
to these bodies. The Ministry referred to the IAP and NIC a highprofile 
case involving the wages of Lagos state workers. Those bodies decided 
in favor of the employer.
    Under the law, a worker under a collective bargaining agreement may 
not participate in a strike unless his representative has complied with 
the requirements of the Trade Disputes Act, which include provisions 
for mandatory mediation and for referring the labor dispute to the 
Government. The Act allows the Government discretion to refer the 
matter to a labor conciliator, arbitration panel, board of inquiry, or 
the National Industrial Court. The Act also forbids any employer from 
granting a general wage increase to its workers without prior approval 
by the Government. However, in practice the Act does not appear to be 
enforced effectively; strikes, including in the public sector, are 
widespread (see Section 1.a.) and private sector wage increases 
generally are not submitted to the Government for prior approval. The 
Government retains broad authority over labor matters and often 
intervenes in disputes seen to challenge key political or economic 
objectives.
    In 1999 the Government directed each state administration to 
establish its own salary structure on the basis of its ability to pay 
and with reference to the national minimum wage (see Section 6.e.). The 
Government's decision was taken without consultation with the civil 
service unions. Several state governments have argued that they are 
unable to pay the approximately $65 (6,500 naira) monthly minimum wage 
to their employees (see Section 6.e.). An important case involving 
Lagos state, the largest public sector employer outside the Federal 
Government, was dismissed as unready for adjudication by the NIC. Other 
states are pursuing pay concessions, layoffs, the elimination of 
``ghost'' workers, or a combination of all three actions to meet the 
new wage scale.
    An export-processing zone (EPZ) remains under development in 
Calabar, Cross River State, while a second EPZ is planned for Port 
Harcourt, Rivers State. Workers and employers in such zones are subject 
to national labor laws, which provide for a 10-year amnesty on trade 
unions in EPZ's from the startup of an enterprise. The ILO has 
commented that this prohibition and a 10-year prohibition on strikes 
and lockouts is incompatible with Convention 87 (on freedom of 
association and protection of the right to organize). The 1992 Export 
Processing Zones Decree has been criticized by the ILO for not allowing 
any unauthorized person to enter any EPZ.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1974 Labor 
Decree and the 1999 Constitution prohibit forced or compulsory labor; 
however, trafficking in women and children for purposes of forced 
prostitution and forced labor is a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). 
In addition, forced labor has been used in ``Environmental Saturday'' 
community clean-up projects that continued until Obasanjo abolished 
them in July 1999. ``Environmental Saturday'' was observed the last 
Saturday of every month in Lagos and was purportedly a community-based 
clean-up effort. However, uniformed ``sanitation police'' had the power 
(and regularly exercised it) to invade citizens'' homes and force them 
to clean the areas surrounding their homes until the police deemed them 
clean. Widespread harassment of citizens by police was reported on 
``Environmental Saturdays.''
    Although employment of persons under 18 years of age generally is 
prohibited, except for agriculture and domestic work, the Government 
does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children. 
There were occasional reports of forced child labor, including child 
slavery rings operating between Nigeria and neighboring countries where 
children are imported to work as domestic servants (see Sections 5 and 
6.f.). The reports suggest that Nigerian children are exported to other 
African countries for domestic and agricultural work, and that children 
from neighboring countries are imported to work as domestic servants.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children 
less than 15 years of age in commerce and industry and restricts other 
child labor to home-based agricultural or domestic work. The law 
further stipulates that children may not be employed in agricultural or 
domestic work for more than 8 hours per day. The Decree allows the 
apprenticeship of youths at the age 13 under specific conditions.
    Primary education is compulsory until grade 6, although this 
requirement rarely is enforced. Studies indicate declining school 
enrollment due to continuing deterioration of public schools and to 
increased economic pressures on families. The lack of sufficient 
primary school infrastructure and high school fees has ended some 
families' access to education, forcing them to place children in the 
labor market. Growing economic difficulties have led to a substantial 
increase in the use of children in commercial activities aimed at 
enhancing family incomes which tend to be meager. The ILO estimates 
that upward of 12 million children ages 10-14 (25 percent of all 
children) are employed in some capacity. The use of children as 
beggars, hawkers, and bus conductors is widespread in urban areas. The 
use of children as domestic servants is common. According to an ILO 
statement in 1998, the incidence of trafficking in children for forced 
prostitution also is growing (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    Private and government initiatives to stem the growing incidence of 
child employment continue but have not been effective. UNICEF operated 
a program in Kaduna that sought to remove young girls from the streets 
where they hawked petty goods and relocate them to an informal 
educational setting. UNICEF reported that despite the narrow focus on 
young girls, the program only began to address the problem during the 
year. In conjunction with the ILO, the Government formulated a national 
program of action in support of child rights, survival, protection, 
development, and participation. In August a formal agreement 
establishing the program was signed by the ILO and the Labor Ministry; 
however, the program had not shown any results by year's end due to 
logistical problems and changing personnel in the Ministry.
    The Labor Ministry has an inspections department whose major 
responsibilities include enforcement of legal provisions relating to 
conditions of work and protection of workers. However, there are less 
than 50 inspectors for the entire country, and the Ministry conducts 
inspections only in the formal business sector where the incidence of 
child labor is not significant.
    The 1974 Labor Decree and the 1999 Constitution prohibit forced or 
compulsory labor, a prohibition that extends to children, although they 
are not mentioned specifically in the laws; however, there continue to 
be cases of trafficking in children as indentured servants or for 
criminal activities such as prostitution (see Sections 5, 6.c and 
6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1974 Labor Decree set a 
minimum wage, which is reviewed on an ad hoc basis. In April the 
minimum wage was reviewed and increased, along with the public sector 
wage scale.
    In May the minimum wage increased to $75 (7,500 naira) per month 
for federal workers and $55 to $65 (5000 to 6500 naira) per month for 
state employees. Private employers in the formal sector track the 
public sector wage scale. Along with the many allowances that are paid, 
this boost in the minimum wage appears sufficient to support a decent 
standard of living. However, many government agencies were slow to pay 
the new wage scale, and all federal salaries were frozen for 3 months 
during the summer, pending a census of government employees. ``Ghost 
workers'' (who appear on the employment rolls but not on the job) 
remained a significant problem that was not addressed fully during the 
year. As in 1998, the Government decided to increase federal salaries 
without adequate consultations with state governments, whose employees 
demanded similar wages; as a result, several state governments 
maintained that they could not afford to pay this wage. The issue of 
the minimum wage caused several labor disruptions throughout the year, 
and remains unresolved in several states.
    The 1974 Labor Decree called for a 40-hour workweek, prescribed 2 
to 4 weeks annual leave, and stipulated that workers must be paid extra 
for hours worked over the legal limit. The Decree also stated that 
employees who work on Sundays and statutory public holidays must be 
paid a full day's pay in addition to their normal wages. There is no 
law prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime.
    The 1974 Labor Decree sets out general health and safety 
provisions, some of which are aimed specifically at young or female 
workers. While it requires that the factory inspectorate of the 
Ministry of Labor and Employment inspect factories for compliance with 
health and safety standards, this agency is greatly understaffed, lacks 
basic resources and training, and consequently neglects safety 
oversight of many enterprises, particularly construction sites and 
other nonfactory work. The Decree also requires employers to compensate 
injured workers and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial 
accidents. The Labor Ministry, which is charged with enforcement of 
these laws, has been largely ineffective in identifying violators. The 
Government has failed to act on various ILO recommendations since 1991 
to update its moribund program on inspection and accident reporting. 
The Labor Decree does not provide workers with the right to remove 
themselves from dangerous work situations without loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law makes trafficking in persons a 
crime. There is an active and growing market for trafficking in women 
and children to Europe. The full nature and scope of the trade remained 
unknown, but immigration and police officials throughout Europe 
reported a steady flow of women entrapped and sold into prostitution in 
Europe, particularly the Netherlands, Italy, and the Czech Republic. 
Italian authorities deported several hundred sex workers to Nigeria 
during the year. Other European countries deported similar numbers. 
Nigerian Interpol claimed that women usually entered the sex trade 
independently, were not controlled by syndicates, and were economically 
motivated. However, Human Rights Watch recently reported that according 
women's rights organizations, hundreds of women migrated to Europe in 
response to job offers as domestic workers or waitresses. Upon arrival, 
many were forced into prostitution in order to pay off debts. In 
addition, there is evidence that Nigerian crime syndicates may use 
indebtedness, threats of beatings and rape, physical injury to the 
victim's family, arrest, and deportation to persuade those forced into 
sex work from attempting to escape. The police reported that the 
women's families often condoned their entry into the trade. In 1999 
there was at least one documented case of the trafficking in children 
to work as indentured servants in the United States.
    The ILO reported that, based on a nationwide survey of child 
trafficking, approximately 19 percent of school children and 40 percent 
of street children have been trafficked for forced labor. The economic 
strategies that underlie child trafficking may be reflected in the fact 
that families who employ them also pay their school fees. Child 
traffickers also take advantage of a cultural tradition of 
``fostering'' under which it is culturally accepted to send one's child 
to live and work with a family in an urban center for educational and 
employment purposes. Often the children in these situations only work 
and do not get any formal education. They are forced to serve as 
domestics or to become street hawkers selling nuts, fruits, or other 
items. There were credible reports that poor families sell their 
daughters into marriage as a means of supplementing their income (see 
Section 5).
    According to reports from the media and the ILO, there is an active 
trade in child laborers, some of whom are exported to Cameroon, Gabon, 
Benin, and Equatorial Guinea to work in agricultural enterprises, 
others of whom are coerced into prostitution. Authorities also have 
identified a trade route for traffickers of children for labor through 
Katsina and Sokoto to the Middle East and East Africa. The eastern part 
of the country and some southern states such as Cross River and Akwa 
Ibom have been the focus of trafficking of children for labor and, in 
some cases, human sacrifice. The country remains a destination point 
for the trafficking of Togolese children to serve as domestic or 
agricultural workers.
    The Government is investigating allegations of the collusion of 
customs officials in trafficking. Some of the returnees have alleged 
that immigration officials actively connive with syndicates; however, 
there were no arrests of immigration officials for trafficking offenses 
during the year.
    The Assistant Inspector General of Police is investigating 
allegations of the collusion of customs officials in trafficking.
    There is government and societal acknowledgement that trafficking 
in women is a continuing problem, particularly to Western Europe. 
Police attempts to stem the trafficking of persons include extended 
jail sentences and public humiliation; however, such actions focused 
primarily on victims. Traffickers were not punished. Awareness 
campaigns, often conducted by NGO's and others, only recently have 
begun to generate widespread attention. For example, in September the 
Edo state governor and his wife, who heads a local NGO knows as the 
Idia Renaissance, used the passage of new legislation banning 
prostitution and related activities to raise awareness of the 
trafficking problem. Also in September, President Obasanjo's wife 
assisted a Catholic charity in distributing new passports to sex 
workers stranded in Italy. However, there are no reliable statistics to 
determine if these campaigns were effective in reducing incidences of 
trafficking. The development of a reliable statistical base for 
assessing the child trafficking problem began under ILO auspices.
                               __________

                                 RWANDA

    The largely Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took power 
following the civil war and genocide of 1994, is the principal 
political force and controls the Government of National Unity. On March 
23, President Pasteur Bizimungu, who had been President since 1994, 
tendered his resignation. In accordance with the 1993 Arusha Accords, 
the RPF submitted two candidates to the National Assembly, which 
elected former Vice President and Minister of Defense General Paul 
Kagame, who was sworn in as President on April 22. The leadership 
transition took place without incident and was the first nonviolent 
presidential change in the country's history. President Kagame did not 
name a Vice President, but named a new Minister of Defense, Colonel 
Emmanuel Habyarimana, shortly after taking office. On February 28, 
Prime Minister Pierre Celestin Rwigema resigned and in accordance with 
the Arusha accords, on March 8, he was replaced by Bernard Makuza. The 
Prime Minister runs the Government on a daily basis and is responsible 
for relations with the National Assembly, which is influenced by the 
executive branch. In January the former Speaker of the Assembly, Joseph 
Seberenzi, was forced from office due to a political party power 
struggle. In 1994 the parties agreed to suspend party activity below 
the national level for the duration of the transition period, which 
originally was scheduled to end in July 1999. However, in June 1999, 
the Government announced the extension of the transition period for 
another 4 years. While March 1999 local elections for community 
development committees were held, commune level elections were 
postponed until 2001 due to legislative, logistical, and financial 
problems. The judiciary suffers from a lack of resources, inefficiency, 
and some corruption.
    The Minister of Defense is responsible for external security and 
military defense; the Minister of Internal Security is responsible for 
civilian security matters as well as supervision of the prisons and the 
national police. The new civilian Rwandan National Police (RNP) 
replaced the gendarmerie and the communal police. The security 
apparatus consists of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the police. 
A volunteer force of armed civilian local defense units with limited 
arrest powers also works throughout the country. The security situation 
in the northwest remained calm. There were numerous and widespread 
unconfirmed reports that armed bands of Rwandan Hutus posing as 
Interahamwe fighters committed abuses in the DRC. The Rwandan army 
allegedly recruited these groups in order ostensibly to demonstrate the 
need for a continued Rwandan military presence in the areas they 
controlled. Members of the security forces committed serious human 
rights abuses, although to a lesser extent than in the previous year.
    The country is very poor, and 70 percent of the population lives in 
poverty. The 1994 genocide destroyed the country's social fabric, human 
resource base, institutional capacity, and economic and social 
infrastructure. A 2-year drought has led to food shortages and famine 
in some parts of the country. Per capita annual income is $252. 
Subsistence agriculture employs more than 90 percent of the labor 
force. The principal exports are coffee and tea. Small-scale commercial 
activities are increasing, but the industrial and tourism base remains 
limited.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and the 
Government continued to be responsible for numerous, serious abuses; 
however, there were some improvements in a few areas. Citizens do not 
have the right to change their government. The security forces 
committed extrajudicial killings within the country; there also were 
many reports, some of which were credible, that Rwandan army units 
operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) committed 
deliberate extrajudicial killings and other serious abuses. Some deaths 
in custody were due to mistreatment or abuse by corrupt officials. 
There were allegations of a small number of disappearances. Security 
forces beat suspects, and there were some reports of torture. Prison 
conditions remained harsh and life threatening and prisoners died from 
starvation, curable diseases, or abuse. Most of the prisoners housed in 
jails and local detention centers (cachots) are accused of 
participating in the 1994 genocide; many have been detained for up to 6 
years without being charged. Arbitrary arrest and detention, and 
prolonged pretrial detention remained problems. The Government took 
steps to prosecute and punish some human rights abusers. The judiciary 
is subject to executive influence and does not always ensure due 
process or expeditious trials. Genocide trials continued at a slow 
pace. The Government released approximately 3,000 detainees whose files 
were incomplete, who were acquitted, or who were ill or elderly. The 
Government restricted freedom of the press, and limited freedom of 
assembly and association. The Government imposed some restrictions on 
freedom of religion. The Government limited freedom of movement. 
Security forces generally did not harass refugees who returned from 
neighboring countries. The Government was hostile toward some 
nongovernmental human rights organizations. Violence and discrimination 
against women were problems, as was discrimination based on indigenous 
and ethnic status. There were reports that prisoners were hired out for 
labor in private homes and businesses. Child labor persists, 
particularly in the agricultural sector.
    Insurgents tied to those responsible for the 1994 genocide 
committed several killings.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The RPA continued to 
commit extrajudicial killings inside the country, although fewer than 
the previous year, due to its success in largely suppressing the 
insurgency in the northwest, as it pushed Hutu rebels including the 
former Rwandan armed forces (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe militia inside 
the territory of the DRC. Security in the northwest remained calm. 
However, there were credible reports that RPA forces committed 
extrajudicial killings in the DRC.
    On March 5, three men reportedly in military uniform shot and 
killed Assiel Kabera, an advisor to then-President Bizimungu, outside 
his house. The Government maintains that Kabera's killing was related 
to a family dispute involving Antoinnette Kagagu, who was killed the 
week before outside her home. In February Kagagu was acquitted of the 
1998 murder of her husband and Kabera reportedly was involved in a 
dispute over custody of her children. No one was arrested or charged in 
Kabera's murder by year's end; however, the Government stated that an 
investigation was ongoing.
    Human rights organizations claim that several incidents of alleged 
attacks by rebels led to counterattacks by security forces. In late 
December 1999, there were reports that soldiers illegally detained a 
man from Gisenyi and four others in a ditch for 6 weeks (see Section 
1.d.). When the men escaped in mid-February, allegedly after having 
been told they were to be killed the next day, RPA soldiers recaptured 
one, shot him, and left him for dead. When the soldiers discovered the 
man still was alive, they told residents they were transporting him to 
the hospital, but beat the man to death instead. There also were 
reports that in early January, security forces beat to death Jean 
Damascene Gatabazi, an alleged bandit. During the year, the Government 
began to provide to human rights organizations, and even other 
governments, systematic replies and rebuttals to allegations of human 
rights abuses. It also increased measures to arrest alleged offenders 
from the security services; according to the Government, 27 soldiers 
were arrested and detained on charges of murder, manslaughter, or armed 
robbery in the DRC. Others were arrested on charges of offenses 
committed in Rwanda. According to the Government, all of those arrested 
were awaiting trial in military prisons at year's end.
    The improvement in the security situation in the northwest led to a 
corresponding decline in alleged reprisals by the RPA; however, there 
were reports of incursions and murders by armed infiltrators in the 
northwest, some of whom were ex-FAR or Interahamwe.
    The National Demining Office (NDO), an independent unit of the RPA, 
reported three deaths from landmine or unexploded ordnance explosions 
in July; numerous persons were injured (see Section 1.c.). These mines 
are believed to be left over from the 199094 conflict between the 
former government and the RPA.
    Harsh prison conditions contributed to the deaths of approximately 
1,100 inmates during the year. Some deaths in custody were due to abuse 
by corrupt prison officials (see Section 1.c.).
    Since the start of the current war in the DRC in August 1998, RPA 
troops have participated on the side of the Congolese rebel movement 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) against the DRC 
Government. In July 1999, all parties involved in the war in the DRC 
signed the Lusaka Agreement, which included a cease-fire; however, all 
parties, including RPA soldiers, repeatedly participated in battles 
after the declaration.
    There were allegations of human rights violations during fighting 
between RPA and Ugandan army troops in Kisangani, DRC, in May and June, 
which resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, over 1,700 persons 
injured (see Section 1.c.), and 60,000 displaced persons (see Section 
2.d.). The most severe of these clashes occurred from June 5 to 11, 
during which time both forces shelled the city with artillery and 
mortar fire, destroying homes and much of the city's infrastructure. 
Credible sources claim that RPA and Ugandan troops raped many women and 
shot persons during extensive fighting in the city. Humanitarian 
organizations report that approximately 700 Congolese civilians were 
killed during the fighting. Many died from injuries because they were 
unable to get medical attention; transportation to hospitals during the 
fighting often was unavailable. Many displaced persons remained at a 
camp outside of the city for several months because they feared to 
return to their homes. There was widespread reporting throughout the 
year of killings and other human rights abuses by both pro-DRC and 
anti-DRC government forces, including the RPA, in the conflict in the 
DRC. Verification of these reports was extremely difficult, 
particularly those emanating from remote areas and those affected by 
active combat, primarily in eastern DRC. Independent observers often 
found access difficult due to hazardous security conditions and 
frequent impediments imposed by authorities. Both pro- and anti-DRC 
Government forces extensively used propaganda disseminated via local 
media, including charges leveled against opposing forces, further 
complicating efforts to obtain accurate information regarding such 
events.
    The Government admits that human rights abuses have occurred in 
territory under RPA/RCD control, but claims that these were acts 
committed by individuals, not by the military as an institution. On 
January 29, in Bunia, a Rwandan soldier reportedly summarily executed a 
Congolese rebel soldier based on the suspicion that the Congolese 
soldier was passing information to an opposing rebel group. On February 
5, RCD and RPA soldiers reportedly attacked the village of Kilambo, 
North Kivu Province. The rebels allegedly tied up men, raped their 
wives in front of them (see Section 1.c.), and then killed 30 persons. 
From March 6 to 8, RPA forces reportedly made repeated attacks on the 
village of Kilambo in Masisi, North Kivu Province, and allegedly 
executed numerous persons suspected of collaborating with the 
Interahamwe. For example, the RPA reportedly killed two men known as 
Kapalata and Mamboleo, Samuel Kanyomo, a woman named Suzana, and her 
three children. On June 23, in Walikale, DRC, RPA Captain Alexis Rugira 
and other RPA soldiers, stole Baligizi Mufungizi's bicycle and killed 
him. Captain Rugira, Lt. Gapfunsi, S/Maj. Rutabana, and two privates 
were arrested and were in pretrial detention awaiting prosecution by 
the military tribunal at year's end. On September 1, RPA Captain Peter 
Kabanda and other RPA soldiers allegedly killed 67 unarmed civilians in 
Masisi, North Kivu, DRC. The captain and the other RPA soldiers were 
arrested for acting contrary to operational orders and for failing to 
differentiate between the enemy and unarmed civilians. The soldiers 
were in detention awaiting prosecution for murder before the military 
tribunal at year's end. There were other reports of extrajudicial 
killings committed either by elements of the RCD, which the RPA 
materially supported and in some respects often directed, or in which 
direct involvement by RPA soldiers was not clear to persons who found 
it difficult to distinguish between RCD and RPA forces. Some of these 
reports of RPA killings surfaced in Kinshasa, DRC, media directly or 
indirectly controlled by the DRC Government; however, other such 
reports emerged through international religious or humanitarian 
organizations and were based on the accounts of multiple witnesses or 
photographic or other evidence. The reported extrajudicial killings of 
civilians by RCD and Rwandan forces in the DRC often reportedly were 
committed in reprisal for guerrilla attacks on RCD or Rwandan forces.
    There were unconfirmed reports that Rwandan and Ugandan forces used 
landmines during the fighting in Kisangani; however, the number of 
resulting deaths and injuries is unknown.
    There was no investigation nor action taken in the January 1999 
case in which the RPA killed two infiltrators in Gitarama prefecture. 
There was no investigation nor action taken in the February 1999 case 
in which the RPA killed four insurgents in Ruhengeri, and put the body 
of one on display at the Nyarutovu internally displaced persons (IDP) 
camp. There was no investigation nor action taken in the May 1999 case 
in which the army reportedly killed 49 persons, mostly women and 
children, after they fled into Volcanoes National Park.
    Although the Government has arrested and investigated several 
soldiers for their roles in human rights violations committed in DRC 
territory since the start of the current war in 1998, none of those in 
custody listed in the Government's report had been brought to trial by 
year's end. The RPA and RCD claimed that they continue to investigate 
the RCD commanders believed to be responsible for the January 1999 
massacre in Makobola, DRC; in that incident 37 civilians allegedly were 
killed in revenge for the killing of RCD soldiers by Mai-Mai forces. 
One suspect was arrested, but allegedly escaped from detention and fled 
to Uganda. The Government claims the Interahamwe militia, not the RCD, 
killed Roman Catholic Father Kakuja in November 1999. RCD forces 
allegedly killed six militiamen in pursuit of the priest's attackers. 
During the year, there were numerous reports that RCD forces, 
participating with or supported by the RPA, buried 15 women alive at 
Mwenga in December 1999. However, the Government denied these charges 
and claims that 3 women, not 15, were only badly beaten by civilians 
who accused the women of witchcraft. According to the Government, the 
women were rescued from mob justice by RCD troops, but later died from 
their injuries. In December 1999, the RCD/RPA arrested the RCD 
commander, but he escaped from jail on February 5 along with 32 other 
detainees.
    Domestic courts continued adjudicating cases arising from the 1994 
genocide (see Section 1.c.). On June 14, following a 19-month trial, 
the Court of First Instance acquitted of all genocide charges Roman 
Catholic Bishop Augustin Misago, the highest-ranking Catholic clergyman 
and the first Bishop to be charged with genocide. The Government has 
filed an appeal, which was pending at year's end. In August two group 
trials were held by the Court of First Instance in Cyangugu prefecture 
resulting in numerous convictions, for which sentences, including death 
and life imprisonment were handed down. On October 25, the Ruhengeri 
Court of Appeals overturned the convictions of Edouard Nturiye and 
Francois Kayiranga, two Catholic priests who were sentenced to death in 
1998 on genocide charges.
    In June 1999 in the DRC, Rwandan prosecutorial police arrested and 
transferred to Kigali former Radio Milles Collines broadcaster Valerie 
Bemeriki on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. She 
allegedly incited persons to kill during the 1994 genocide with her 
inflammatory radio broadcasts. Bemeriki remained in detention pending 
trial at year's end.
    The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), based in 
Arusha, Tanzania, also prosecuted genocide suspects (see Section 4). On 
January 27, Alfred Musema was sentenced to life imprisonment for 
genocide and crimes against humanity, including rape. On March 31, the 
ICTR Appeals Chamber ruled that JeanBosco Barayagwiza, former officer 
in the foreign ministry and a member of the Radio Television Libre des 
Mille Collines planning committee, remain in ICTR custody to be tried 
for genocide and crimes against humanity (see Section 4). A joint trial 
broadcast by the media, including Barayagwiza, began on September 18 
and was ongoing at year's end. On October 19, the ICTR denied former 
Prime Minister Jean Kambanda's appeal against a life sentence for 
genocide; he immediately was remanded to begin his sentence. Kambanda 
had challenged his 1998 sentence on various grounds. The joint trial 
against former Minister of Family and Women's Affairs Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko and other former government officials was placed on the 
schedule for April 2001.
    A number of ICTR cases were ongoing at year's end. The genocide 
trial against former mayor Ignace Bagilishema continued during the 
year. Former Information Minister Eliezer Niyitegeka, former Health 
Minister Casimir Bizimungu, and a number of former ministers remained 
in detention awaiting trial in Arusha. Major Francois-Xavier 
Nzuwonemey, former Reconnaissance Battalion Commander, and Lt. Colonel 
Tharcisse Muvunyi, both of whom were transferred to Arusha during the 
year, were in detention pending trial at year's end (see Section 4). 
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a preacher who was extradited to Arusha in 
March, remained in detention pending trial for allegedly inciting the 
massacre of hundreds of Tutsi seeking refuge in his church (see Section 
4). Bernard Ntuyahaga, a former army major, who feared he would be 
deported to Rwanda to face trial, turned himself in to the ICTR seeking 
to be a protected witness; however, he was released from ICTR custody 
and subsequently was arrested by Tanzanian authorities on immigration 
violations. In November former army captain Innocent Sagahutu was 
transferred from Denmark to Arusha. Sagahutu and Ntuyahaga are accused 
of murdering the former Prime Minister and 10 Belgian peacekeepers 
assigned to protect her in 1994. Ntuyahaga remains in a Tanzanian jail 
awaiting a ruling on Belgium's and Rwanda's extradition requests. 
Sagahutu remained in detention pending a joint military trial by the 
ICTR for 12 counts of complicity in the 1994 genocide.
    Lightly armed civilian local defense units (LDU's) exist, but are 
not professional security forces. During the year, soldiers and LDU 
members allegedly killed civilians on several occasions when they 
mistook the civilians for infiltrators from the Congo. There were 
reports that individual LDU members or demobilized soldiers were 
responsible for the shooting and killing of some civilians. Most 
killings apparently were the result of personal quarrels, thievery, or 
drunkenness. There was no investigation nor action taken in the August 
1999 case in which members of an LDU shot and killed a woman in the 
Nkamira transit camp.
    In June approximately 12 bodies, some headless or without clothes, 
were seen floating in the Akagera River, but it is unclear who the 
persons were or how they were killed.
    b. Disappearance.--Based on interviews with residents of Kibungo 
prefecture, local and international human rights organizations alleged 
that some Hutu residents, mostly boys and small business owners, 
disappeared from their homes or from prisons (see Section 1.c.).
    There were sporadic, unconfirmed reports that persons arrested and 
detained in areas of the DRC controlled by anti-DRC government forces 
were transferred to Rwanda and remained unaccounted for by year's end. 
For example, on May 15, RPA soldiers reportedly arrested Ainakafota, 
the director of the BolongoBas office of Friends of Nelson Mandela for 
Human Rights (ANMDH) in Orientale Province, DRC, and two other staff 
members of the human rights NGO, on suspicions of spying. The ANMDH and 
family members have not been able to locate Ainakafota or the staff 
members since their arrest; inquiries to Rwandan officials concerning 
their whereabouts have produced no results.
    In the DRC, RPA and Ugandan troops, in addition to RCD rebels, 
reportedly abducted many young women from the villages they raided. 
These night raids on villages became so frequent that in many parts of 
the Kivu Provinces peasants slept in their fields.
    There were no developments regarding several refugees returning 
from the DRC in 1999 who registered at a transit center, but failed to 
arrive in their home communes.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The fundamental law prohibits torture; however, a 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) credibly reported that beatings at 
the time of arrest are common, and some released detainees reported 
that they had been tortured. There were Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch reports in April that accused the RPA of forcibly 
returning to the country and mistreating former soldiers and others 
alleged to have helped political opponents leave the country, or 
believed to support the former King. For example, there were reports 
that four men arrested in Burundi and Tanzania under false pretenses 
were detained and tortured by RPA soldiers after being forcibly 
repatriated to the country; however, the National Commission for Human 
Rights (NCHR) and the men's families visited the men in detention and 
reported that the men did not appear to have been tortured. In June the 
Government refuted such claims in a written response to Human Rights 
Watch. There were reports that at least three of the men was released 
by year's end.
    On August 11, three soldiers harassed and beat the wife of Vales 
Kwitegetse, a journalist with the governmentcontrolled newspaper Imvaho 
(see Section 2.a.).
    The NDO reported that 22 persons were injured from landmine or 
unexploded ordnance explosions during the year; 3 persons also were 
killed (see Section 1.a.).
    During the year, there were numerous credible reports that RCD 
forces, participating with or supported by the RPA, beat, tortured, and 
then buried alive 15 women at Mwenga, DRC, in December 1999 (see 
Section 1.a.). However, the Government denied these charges and claims 
that 3 women, not 15, were beaten severely by civilians who accused the 
women of witchcraft.
    There were reports that Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers allegedly 
raped women during extensive fighting in Kisangani in May and June (see 
Section 1.a.). Rwandan troops and RCD rebels also reportedly engaged in 
the rape of women in public places and often in the presence of their 
families. A woman raped in this manner generally is forced out of her 
village, and must leave her husband and children behind.
    On February 5, RCD and RPA soldiers reportedly attacked the village 
of Kilambo, North Kivu Province. The rebels allegedly tied up men, 
raped their wives in front of them, and then killed 30 persons (see 
Section 1.a.).
    There were reports that both Rwandan and Ugandan forces used 
landmines during the fighting in Kisangani (see Section 1.a.).
    The RPA continues to dismiss soldiers for indiscipline and criminal 
offenses.
    At least one international NGO has complained that government 
security forces have harassed some of its informants (see Section 4).
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports during the year 
from a domestic human rights group that detainees interviewed for its 
reports showed wounds resulting from mistreatment.
    There was no investigation nor action taken against the police who 
reportedly beat and arrested six university students who, along with 
other students, were marching to the Prime Minister's office in August 
1999.
    Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has registered approximately 110,000 
prisoners detained on genocide-related or security-related charges and 
estimates that an additional 5,000 prisoners are detained on charges 
unrelated to the genocide; however, the Ministry of Justice routinely 
refers to the prison population as 130,000. The prison population has 
remained stable since early 1998. The ICRC feeds inmates in the 19 main 
prisons and also provides additional expertise and logistical and 
material support to improve conditions for inmates. Overcrowding is a 
chronic problem, and sanitary conditions are extremely poor. The ICRC 
does not believe that prison conditions have improved with the 1999 
transfer of prison administration to the Ministry of Internal Affairs; 
however, conditions in the cachots have improved. The Government does 
not provide adequate food or medical treatment. On some occasions 
during the year, the Government was unable to provide any food; in June 
a food shortage was remedied with supplies from the ICRC. Harsh prison 
conditions and malnutrition contributed to the deaths of numerous 
inmates. Some deaths in custody were due to abuse by officials. Most of 
the approximately 1,100 deaths during the year were the result of 
curable diseases, suspected HIV/AIDS, or the cumulative effects of 
severe overcrowding. The Ministry continued to dismiss prison 
officials, some of whom subsequently were jailed on corruption charges. 
Women are detained separately from men; however, hundreds of children 
were incarcerated with adults throughout the prison system (see Section 
5).
    There were reports that some Hutu residents, mostly boys and small 
business owners, disappeared from their homes or from prisons (see 
Section 1.b.).
    The ICRC, human rights organizations, diplomats, and journalists 
have regular access to the prisons. The ICRC continued its visits to 
communal jails and military-supervised jails.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The fundamental law 
provides legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention; 
however, authorities rarely observed them in practice, and security 
forces continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. The justice 
system collapsed during the war and genocide of 1994. With help from 
the international community it is being rebuilt slowly and is beginning 
to function more normally. The Government does not have the capacity to 
ensure that provisions in the Constitution are enforced or that due 
process protections are observed.
    In December 1999, there were reports that soldiers illegally 
detained a man from Gisenyi and four others in a ditch for 6 weeks (see 
Section 1.a.).
    On April 22 in the DRC, security forces arrested civil society 
activist Bruno Bahati as he returned from the National Consultations, 
and reportedly kept him in detention in both Rwanda and the Kivu 
Provinces until August (see Section 2.d.). Rwandan authorities freed 
Bahati following international criticism.
    In late July, security forces detained several members of the taxi 
drivers union, ATRACO, who staged a protest and peaceful demonstration 
against the union's leader for internal reasons (see Section 6.a.); it 
was unknown whether the protest was legal.
    In general the law requires that authorities investigate, then 
obtain a judicial warrant before arresting a suspect. The police may 
detain persons for up to 48 hours without a warrant; formal charges 
must be brought within 5 days of arrest. These provisions are 
disregarded widely. The law permits preventive detention if authorities 
believe that public safety is threatened or that the accused might 
flee. There is no bail, but the authorities may release a suspect 
pending trial if they are satisfied that there is no risk that the 
person may flee or become a threat to public safety.
    Over 95 percent of the approximately 115,000 individuals presently 
incarcerated are awaiting trial on genocide charges. Some have been in 
jail since 1994. The Government does not have the capacity to process 
cases within a reasonable time frame. In March 1997, the Government, 
with extensive assistance from donors, established mobile groups whose 
mandate is to establish or complete files, which indicate the basis for 
charges, for all prisoners. While these groups have handled more than 
60,000 cases, approximately 18,000 prisoners remain without files. In 
1999 the National Assembly amended the law to permit the continued 
detention of genocide suspects through mid-2001.
    On April 21, former chairman of the Mouvement Democratique 
Republicain (MDR) political party Bonaventure Ubalijoro was released 
provisionally for humanitarian reasons after 13 months in prison 
without charges. He had been arrested in March 1999, allegedly for 
embezzlement, but there were rumors that Ubalijoro was arrested for his 
presumed involvement in the death of a dozen prisoners in the 1960's 
while he was Minister of Internal Security.
    Despite some problems with reprisals in communities that had not 
been sufficiently sensitized to receiving released prisoners, the 
Government continued to release prisoners who were elderly, ill, 
without files, acquitted, or sentenced to terms outside of prison. 
Prisoners without files were presented to their villages to allow 
villagers to make complaints against the prisoners or to confirm that 
there was no reason to detain them. As of December, 480 suspects were 
presented to the public in this process, called the Gisovu Project, and 
of these, 226 were released. Many of the nearly 3,000 detainees 
released were those without case files. Rearrests because of community 
criticism were rare. This change was attributed to improved enforcement 
by the Ministry of Justice of the laws governing arrest and to 
recognition of the fact that the existing prison caseload is already 
more than the system can handle. In 1999 in Kibuye prefecture, judicial 
officials delayed the release of 1,000 genocide suspects who have no 
case files due to fear that the community had not been sensitized 
sufficiently to receive the suspects peacefully.
    During the year, international human rights organizations were 
granted access to military detention facilities where civilians 
sometimes are detained.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The fundamental law provides for 
an independent judiciary; however, the Government did not respect this 
provision fully; the judiciary is subject to executive influence and 
also suffers from inefficiency, a lack of resources, and some 
corruption. There were occasional reports of bribery of officials, 
ranging from clerks to judges. The 12-member Anti-Corruption Commission 
charged with fighting corruption in the judiciary continued to make 
progress. It is chaired by the Minister of Justice and charged with 
investigating all activities involving corruption and educating 
citizens on methods that can be used to fight corruption. Several 
magistrates and prosecutors were suspended or dismissed on corruption 
charges during the year. There were reports that some magistrates were 
removed from office from May through August following ``not guilty'' 
verdicts of suspects alleged to have participated in the 1994 genocide. 
There also were credible reports that a few magistrates were removed 
from offices on false charges of genocide.
    The fundamental law provides for a system of communal courts, 
appeals courts, and a Supreme Court of six justices. The President 
nominates two candidates for each Supreme Court seat, and the National 
Assembly may choose one or reject both; however, the latter is not 
known to have happened.
    The law provides for public trials with the right to a defense, but 
not at public expense. The shortage of lawyers and the abject poverty 
of most defendants make it difficult for many defendants to obtain 
representation. International NGO's such as Avocats Sans Frontiers (ASF 
or Lawyers Without Borders) provide defense and counsel some of those 
in need, but it is estimated that less than 50 percent of prisoners 
have defense counsel. Lawyers from ASF rarely accept individual cases 
and assist mostly in group trials; numerous individuals represent 
themselves without legal assistance. During the year, new judges, 
prosecutors, and judicial defenders were sworn in and assigned to 
courts throughout the country. Over 100 judicial defenders trained by a 
foreign NGO began their work. However, the Government does not have 
sufficient prosecutors, judges, or courtrooms to hold trials within a 
reasonable time. The judiciary is focused on resolving the enormous 
genocide caseload of some 110,000 prisoners. The Government increased 
its use of group trials as one method of reducing the caseload. It also 
embarked on a nationwide campaign to explain gacaca, a grassroots 
participatory form of justice aimed at prosecuting genocide suspects, 
ahead of its expected enactment. On June 13, the former Secretary 
General in the Ministry of Justice, Aloysie Cyanzayire, was elected 
President of the sixth chamber of the Supreme Court, which will oversee 
the implementation of gacaca. The gacaca bill had not become law by 
year's end, but it is estimated that gacaca trials may begin in 2001. 
According to the draft gacaca law, lawyers will not to be permitted to 
participate officially in gacaca proceedings, and gacaca ``judges'' are 
to be elected by their communities.
    By year's end, approximately 3,343 persons had been judged on 
genocide-related charges, most following group trials. According to a 
detailed study by LIPRODHOR, a local human rights organization, between 
January and September, 1,588 persons were judged. Of the 585 persons 
judged on genocide-related charges between January and March, 58 
received the death penalty; 124 were sentenced to life in prison; 248 
received various prison terms; 75 received other penalties; and 80 were 
acquitted. The vast majority of trials met international standards. The 
military tribunals conducted no trials during the first quarter of the 
year. LIPRODHOR also actively monitors trials and interviews released 
prisoners. No public executions occurred.
    A portion of the Organic Genocide Law is designed to encourage 
confessions in exchange for reduced sentences for the vast majority of 
those involved in the genocide. As a result of efforts by the 
Government, international donors, and NGO's to advertise widely the 
confession provisions, over 20,000 prisoners had confessed since the 
law was implemented in 1996. However, only a small number of 
confessions were processed due to the lengthy administrative review and 
hearing, and the lack of officials to process the confessions through 
the system.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and 
authorities generally respected these prohibitions.
    Forced conscription has been practiced by the RPA, particularly 
after the RPA entered the conflict in the DRC. Citizens who served in 
the military may be recalled to compulsory duty at any time.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The fundamental law provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted 
freedom of the press in practice, despite some improvements. Some 
journalists were critical of the Government and generally were not 
harassed. Other journalists, including one foreign journalist, claimed 
that the Government intimidated journalists whose reporting was 
contrary to official views. Most journalists practice selfcensorship 
due to fear of government reprisals.
    On September 2, Vales Kwitegetse, a journalist with the government-
controlled newspaper Imvaho, fled to Uganda after military officers 
threatened his life and beat his wife (see Section 1.c.). Kwitegetse 
was investigating a story about corruption involving the chief of the 
Government's antismuggling unit.
    In September 1999, Helena Nyirabikali, a female journalist who 
worked for the state-owned weekly newspaper Imvaho for over 15 years, 
was arrested on genocide charges. She was transferred to a hospital 
during the year where she died from a heart-related illness.
    In February 1999, John Mugabi, editor of the monthly newspaper 
Newsline, was detained on libel charges after he refused to reveal the 
source(s) for an article he had written. Mugabi was released 
provisionally in May 1999. Several conditions were placed on his 
freedom of movement and travel; however, although those conditions were 
not lifted, he faced no restrictions during the year, and was able to 
travel outside of the country.
    All associations, including the Rwandan Journalists Association 
(ARJ), and all NGO's, must register and apply for a license under the 
NGO legislation that the National Assembly passed in 1999; however, 
this legislation had not become law by year's end. In June the 
Government required all NGO's to reregister and temporary permits were 
awarded pending implementation of the new law. Without a license, the 
Association legally may not act on behalf of its members nor apply for 
assistance from NGO's or other donors. The Government did not act on 
the application of any NGO for a license; however, the Government gave 
temporary permits to NGO's, including the ARJ, in order for them to 
operate legally until the new law is implemented and it can receive a 
license.
    Media sources are limited. There are several privately owned 
newspapers, which publish weekly in English, French, or Kinyarwanda. 
There is no daily newspaper. The Government owns the only national 
radio station and the only television station, which has 5 hours of 
programming per day. The government-controlled radio station, Radio 
Rwanda, is widely listened to and each Sunday broadcasts a call-in 
program, which discusses and debates controversial subjects. Radio 
Rwanda journalists are civil servants of the National Office of 
Information (ORINFOR). The British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts 
on FM from Kigali in several languages. The German broadcasting service 
Deutsche Welle also broadcasts from Kigali.
    The government-owned telecommunications company is the sole 
Internet service provider; however, during the year, several licenses 
were granted to private companies that plan to provide Internet 
services in the future.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The fundamental 
law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the authorities 
limited this right in practice. They legally may require advance notice 
for outdoor rallies, demonstrations, and meetings; authorities 
generally prohibit nighttime meetings.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government limited this right in practice. Private organizations are 
required to register but, with few exceptions (see Section 2.a.), the 
Government generally grants licenses without undue delay. All unions 
must register with the Government (see Section 6.a.).
    The National Revolutionary Movement for Democracy and Development 
(MRND), and the Coalition for Defense of the Republic (CDR), both 
implicated in planning and executing the 1994 genocide, are banned by 
law.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, it imposes some restrictions. There is no state religion.
    The Government requires nonprofit organizations, including 
religious groups, to register with the Ministry of Justice in order to 
acquire ``juridical existence.'' This registration generally is routine 
and not burdensome. Relevant legislation makes no provision for tax-
exempt status for such organizations. Failure to register leaves an 
organization unable to legally conclude agreements with other 
organizations, including agreements to receive assistance.
    There were no reports that government officials barred from office 
persons who refused for religious reasons to take the oath of office; 
such an incident occurred during the 1999 election. The law provides 
for small fines and imprisonment for up to 6 months for anyone who 
interferes with a religious ceremony or with a minister in the exercise 
of his profession.
    The Government forbids religious meetings at night on the grounds 
that insurgents formerly used the guise of nighttime ``religious 
meetings'' to assemble their supporters before attacking nearby 
targets.
    Local officials on several occasions briefly detained persons who, 
on religious grounds, refused to participate in nighttime security 
patrols or cooperate in other government programs. Among the detainees 
were adherents of ``Temperance'' and ``Abagorozi,'' both said to be 
offshoots of the Adventist Church and Jehovah's Witnesses. The 
Government harassed, arrested, and detained some members of Jehovah's 
Witnesses during the first 6 months of the year. Despite these 
accusations, there does not appear to be a pattern of systemic 
government discrimination against any particular religious group.
    After the doomsday cult-related deaths in Uganda in March, the 
Government cautioned local officials to be alert to similar cults in 
Rwanda. In April local officials detained nine leaders and members of a 
religious organization called ``The Evangelic Ministry in Africa and 
the World'' in Byumba prefecture, near the border with Uganda. This 
organization had convinced a number of persons to leave work or school 
and surrender their material possessions in expectation of an imminent 
second coming of Christ.
    Several members of the clergy of various faiths, notably 
Catholicism, have faced charges of genocide in both Rwandan courts and 
the ICTR. In June a Rwandan Court found Roman Catholic Bishop Augustin 
Misago not guilty of all charges related to his actions during the 1994 
genocide. He was released soon after the decision was announced. On 
October 25, two Catholic priests were released when their 1998 
convictions on genocide charges were overturned upon appeal (see 
Section 1.a.).
    Catholic officials have charged that the Government is prejudiced 
against the Church. Catholic officials also have criticized the 
determination of the Government to maintain some massacre sites in 
churches as memorials to the genocide, rather than returning the 
buildings to the Church.
    Numerous human rights groups reported that RPA and Ugandan troops 
in the DRC, as well as various rebel factions, targeted Catholic clergy 
for abuse. Abuses reportedly took the form of attacks on missions, 
killings of priests, the rape of nuns, and the burning of churches. 
Credible reports indicate that occupying troops and their rebel allies 
deliberately targeted Catholic churches as a means of both intimidating 
the local population and in revenge for the Church's perceived role in 
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
    On February 11, RCD/Goma rebel forces operating in DRC prevented 
the Archbishop of Bukavu, Emmanuel Kataliko, from returning to his 
diocese. Rebels alleged that the Archbishop's Christmas message urged 
harassment of Tutsis in eastern DRC. A number of sources in eastern DRC 
indicate that the decision to exile Kataliko to the town of Bunia was 
made by officials of the Government of Rwanda. Archbishop Kataliko was 
allowed to return to Bukavu, DRC, in September; however, on October 3, 
the Archbishop died of an apparent heart attack while in Rome.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights; however, the Government limited them in practice. Citizens must 
show identification when requested. Travel authorization is not needed 
and citizens can move or settle temporarily anywhere without a 
residence permit. However, citizens must obtain a new national 
identification card when making a permanent move to a new commune.
    Rebel and Rwandan authorities used threats and intimidation to 
prevent several dozen Congolese who had traveled from eastern DRC from 
returning after attending the National Consultations. This action 
resulted in civil society members from eastern DRC being stranded in 
Kinshasa for weeks, and sometimes months, after the National 
Consultations. On April 22, security forces arrested civil society 
activist Bruno Bahati as he returned from the National Consultations, 
and reportedly kept him in detention in both Rwanda and the Kivu 
Provinces until August. Rwandan authorities freed Bahati following 
international criticism (see Section 1.d.).
    Over 600,000 persons were displaced in the northwest in late 1998 
and moved into villages, called umudugudus, as a result of insurgent 
activities and government military operations to halt them. During late 
1998 and the first half of 1999, the displaced persons were moved into 
183 villages under the Government's policy of villagization. Although 
the Government claimed that the move to villages was voluntary, some 
observers believe that many persons were compelled to move by 
government authorities; others may have relocated out fear of 
government security forces or insurgents. The Government no longer 
compels these persons to remain in the villages; however, restrictions 
on where persons can build houses forces some to remain in the 
villages. One NGO estimates that over 90 percent of the population of 
Kibungo prefecture and 60 percent of Umutara prefecture were living in 
villages; however, other sources dispute those percentages.
    The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylum 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Constitution recognizes 
the right to asylum ``under conditions determined by law;'' however, 
there is no law in place to recognize refugees. The Government 
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and provided first asylum to a number of refugees. The vast 
majority were Congolese refugees who fled their country during unrest 
in 1996. Approximately 500 Burundians still are awaiting compensation 
for their property seized in 1997 when the Government revoked their 
refugee status, granted in the 1970's.
    Over 80,000 Rwandan refugees remain in the DRC, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Burundi, Malawi, Zambia, Angola, Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Togo, and Benin. However, due to the conflict 
in the DRC, many refugees have returned to the country. The average 
weekly rate of return of refugees from northeast DRC was approximately 
400.
    There were reports of persons from Kibungo prefecture seeking 
refuge in Tanzania during the year, at least in part due to drought 
conditions. Other persons in the region left after men or boys in their 
families reportedly disappeared (see Section 1.b.). With the 
replacement of the Kibungo prefect and other local leaders in August, 
the flow of refugees into Tanzania from Kibungo decreased 
significantly. By September approximately 60 refugees per week returned 
from Tanzania.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government by 
democratic means. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the dominant 
political force in the country. Following the genocide of 1994, 
political parties agreed to form a government of national unity based 
on the 1992-93 Arusha Accords. This agreement laid the basis for the 
apportionment of ministries and other offices. The RPF brought 
representatives of four opposition parties into the Government after 
its military victory in 1994, but none of the officials was elected. 
Political parties also agreed to suspend political activities for a 
period of 5 years, during which time the transition to elected 
government was to have been completed. This 5year period was scheduled 
to end in July 1999; however, the Government announced in June 1999 the 
extension of the transition period by 4 additional years. The 
announcement did not mention political party activities; however, the 
parties continue to observe the suspension. Other political parties 
alleged that the RPF actively promoted itself regionally and at the 
communal level, while prohibiting other political parties from doing 
the same. A National Assembly is functioning, with nine political 
entities represented, including the RPA. The political bureaus or 
executive committees of their respective parties chose assembly 
members, known as deputies. For the first time in 1999, the ``political 
forum,'' an informal grouping of senior members of each of the 
political parties represented in parliament, dismissed 21 deputies for 
misconduct, alleged corruption, or incompetence. The parliamentary 
commissions of inquiry investigated allegations of corruption and other 
alleged misdeeds of ministers. Some of the inquiries resulted in the 
sanctioning and resignation of ministers.
    The central Government appoints officials at the commune and 
prefecture levels. The Government announced that planned communal 
elections, the first since 1968, would be postponed until 2001 due to 
legislative, logistical, and financial difficulties. Political parties 
will not participate in the communal elections. In March 1999, the 
Government held elections for local development committees at the cell 
level (the smallest geographic jurisdiction) and sectors (the 
nextlargest jurisdiction). Some of the committees were very active; 
they proposed, selected, and implemented development projects financed 
by the limited resources available to them.
    The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, charged with 
educating the public on such issues as ethnic understanding, peace 
building, history, and civics, is active. The National Constitution 
Commission, charged with the preparation of a new Constitution, was 
established and its 12 members appointed in November.
    No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in 
political life; however, women remain underrepresented in politics and 
in the Government. The Constitution was revised to increase the number 
of seats in the assembly from 70 to 74, including 2 seats for female 
representatives; however, the women were not sworn in by year's end. 
Prior to the increase in seats, there were 18 female assembly members 
and 3 female cabinet members. The Batwa ethnic group also is largely 
underrepresented in government and politics.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A variety of domestic human rights groups operate without 
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 
human rights violations. However, none has the resources to conduct 
extensive human rights monitoring. Local NGO activities often are 
limited to receiving and compiling reports from citizens about human 
rights abuses and conducting selective investigations. Reports are 
published occasionally; statements criticizing specific incidents are 
more common. Only one or two local human rights NGO's are viewed as 
strictly impartial.
    The Government was critical of the reports by some international 
human rights NGO's, and was hostile towards those whose reporting was 
perceived as biased and inaccurate. In June the Government produced 
point-by-point refutations to the accusations contained in the Human 
Rights Watch report published in April, calling into question the 
authors' motives. At least one international NGO has complained that 
government security forces have harassed some of its informants (see 
Section 1.c.).
    The National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) hosted several 
human rights seminars during the year. The Government allows the 
commission to operate independently and without undue influence. The 
NCHR intervened in some cases of human rights abuses on behalf of 
citizens. For example, following a request from family members, the 
NCHR raised with the Government the case of four men arrested in 
Burundi and Tanzania and forcibly repatriated to the country (see 
Section 1.c.).
    The ICRC operates normally and is active in visiting prisons.
    The ICTR, based in Arusha, Tanzania, continued to prosecute 
genocide suspects during the year (see Section 1.a.). Cooperation 
between the Government and the ICTR improved following the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber's March 31 decision that Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza remain in ICTR 
custody to be tried for genocide and crimes against humanity; his trial 
began on September 18 (see Section 1.a.). The judges revised their 
decision on the basis of the chief prosecutor's introduction of 
additional facts. The ICTR operates under an agreement signed in 1999, 
which clarified some aspects of protection measures, but concentrated 
largely on the ICTR staff's privileges and immunities. During the year, 
the Government of Swaziland signed an agreement with the ICTR to accept 
prisoners convicted by the ICTR; the Governments of Mali and Benin 
signed similar agreements in 1999. The Government of Italy also agreed 
to house Georges Riuggiu, the only non-Rwandan in ICTR custody; 
however, the implementation of this agreement had not occurred by 
year's end. On February 6, in London, Lt. Colonel Tharcisse Muvunyi was 
arrested and transferred to Arusha on genocide charges. On May 23, 
Major Francois-Xavier Nzuwonemey, former Reconnaissance Battalion 
Commander, was transferred from France to Arusha. In March Elizaphan 
Ntakirutimana was extradited to Arusha for trial.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides that all citizens are equal before the 
law, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, origin, 
ethnicity, clan, sex, opinion, religion, or social standing; however, 
the Government provides only limited enforcement of these provisions.
    Women.--Violence against women is common. Wife beating and domestic 
violence occur frequently. Cases normally are handled within the 
context of the extended family and rarely come before the courts.
    Numerous suspects have been tried and convicted for crimes of 
violence against women and girls. In April Aman Bazambanza was found 
guilty in a 15 suspect group trial of raping 2 young girls in Kigali 
rural prefecture; the court sentenced 10 of the suspects to 20 years in 
prison and 4 others to 10 years. The lengthy sentences for rape were 
the first such sentences in the justice system. Several other rape 
trials were held throughout the country in which perpetrators received 
the maximum sentences under the law.
    Despite constitutional provisions, women continue to face 
discrimination. Women traditionally perform most of the subsistence 
farming and play a limited role in the modern sector; however, a number 
of women run small and medium-sized enterprises or are executives. 
Women have limited opportunities for education, employment, and 
promotion. The 1992 Family Code generally improved the legal position 
of women in matters relating to marriage, divorce, and child custody 
but does not meet the constitutional commitment to gender equality. For 
example, the code formally designates men as heads of households. Civil 
society groups and human rights NGO's provided training on women's 
rights under the matrimonial regimes and inheritance law, which came 
into effect at the end of 1999. The law allows women to inherit 
property from their husbands and fathers and allows couples to choose 
the type of property rights they wish to adopt (i.e., joint ownership, 
community property, etc.).
    The Ministry of Gender and Women in Development is charged with 
handling issues of particular concern to women. The Minister is an 
active advocate for women's rights. Since the 1994 genocide a large 
number of women's groups has emerged. These organizations are extremely 
active in promoting women's issues, particularly problems faced by 
widows, orphaned girls, and households headed by children, and 
addressing social and cultural barriers to the equality of women.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and 
welfare. It attempts to provide education and health care to every 
child. Over 85 percent of the children who were separated from or lost 
their parents during the 1994 genocide and the massive repatriation in 
1996 have been reunited with family members or placed in foster homes. 
At an August conference on children's rights hosted by UNICEF, the 
Government asked for the immediate return of approximately 30,000 
children living abroad; it claims that most were taken without the 
consent of their parents during the genocide. Many of the children 
abroad have been adopted. In November the Government asked that 41 
children adopted in Italy be repatriated; discussions between the 
Governments of Rwanda and Italy continued at year's end.
    All families must pay school fees to enroll a child. The Government 
routinely waived fees for orphans. UNICEF estimates that over 60,000 
children age 18 or younger head households in the country. The 
Government worked closely with local and international NGO's to secure 
assistance for children in such situations. The Government regularly 
held sessions with local officials to sensitize them to the needs of 
households headed by children and emphasized the additional 
responsibility officials bear in connection with this group.
    The public schools lack essential and basic supplies and cannot 
accommodate all children of primary school age. A UNICEF study reports 
that 400,000 school-aged children were unable to go to school in 1999. 
Private schools often are too distant or too expensive to serve as an 
alternative for many children. Entry to secondary school is by 
examination. According to the 1996 study conducted by the Government 
and the U.N. Population Fund, 59.6 percent of the population age six 
and over had primary education, but only 48 percent of the whole 
population is literate; 52 percent of men are literate compared to 45 
percent of women. Only 3.9 percent of citizens had completed secondary 
school and only 0.2 percent had an university education. The highest 
percentage of those with no education is in the 30andover age group, 
indicating a trend toward increased educational levels in recent years.
    Although the Penal Code prohibits the imprisonment of children with 
adults, the ICRC reported that 185 children, most of whom are age 2 or 
younger, are incarcerated with their mothers. In 1999 the ICRC reported 
that approximately 570 children who were under the age of 14 at the 
time of their arrest are incarcerated on genocide-related charges; some 
25 children under the age of 14 currently are incarcerated.
    On February 1, local authorities again arrested 1,300 street 
children and ordered them to return to their communes of origin or face 
the penalties for vagabondage and other crimes attributed to them. Many 
returned to street again a short time later.
    In the DRC, RPA and Ugandan troops, in addition to RCD rebels, 
reportedly abducted many young women from the villages they raided. 
These night raids on villages became so frequent that in many parts of 
the Kivu Provinces rural peasants slept in their fields.
    People with Disabilities.--Although there are no laws restricting 
persons with disabilities from employment, education, or other state 
services, in practice few disabled persons have access to education or 
employment. No laws or provisions mandate access to public facilities.
    Indigenous People.--With the removal of ethnic labels from 
identification cards in 1996, the Batwa are no longer designated 
officially as an ``ethnic group.'' Less than 1 percent of the 
population is considered Batwa. The Batwa, survivors of the Twa (Pygmy) 
tribes of the mountainous forest areas bordering the DRC, exist on the 
margins of society and continued to be treated as inferior citizens by 
both the Hutu and Tutsi groups. There are seven Batwa organizations 
focused on the protection of their interests, access to land, housing, 
and education, and eradication of discrimination against them; however, 
they have been unable to protect their interests. Few Batwa have access 
to the education system, resulting in their minimal representation in 
government institutions. There is no reliable information on specific 
human rights abuses perpetrated against the Batwa population since the 
1994 upheaval. There is one Batwa representative on the National 
Commission for Human Rights.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Before April 1994, an estimated 
85 percent of citizens were Hutu, 14 percent were Tutsi, and 1 percent 
were Batwa (Twa). However, Hutus and Tutsis are not clearly distinct 
groups, since the two have intermarried for generations. The 1994 mass 
killings and migrations probably affected the ethnic composition of the 
population, but the extent and nature of the changes are unknown.
    Large-scale interethnic violence in the country between Hutus and 
Tutsis has erupted on three occasions since independence in 1962, 
resulting on each occasion in tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths. 
The most recent and severe outbreak of such violence, in 1994, involved 
genocidal killing of much of the Tutsi population under the direction a 
Hutu-dominated government and implemented in large part by Hutu-
dominated armed forces (now the ex-FAR) and Interahamwe militia; that 
genocide ended later the same year when a predominately Tutsi militia, 
operating out of Uganda and occupied Rwandan territory, overthrew that 
government and established the current Government. The Government has 
called for national reconciliation and committed itself to abolishing 
policies of the former government that had created and deepened ethnic 
cleavages. It eliminated references to ethnic origin from the national 
identity card. The Government has not addressed statutorily the problem 
of ethnic quotas in education, training, and government employment, but 
discrimination against the Tutsi minority in education, training, and 
government employment effectively ceased with the change of government 
in 1994. Some Hutu organizations and individuals accuse the Government 
of favoring Tutsis, particularly English-speaking Tutsis, in government 
employment, admission to professional schooling, recruitment into or 
promotion within the army, and other matters. Some organizations also 
complain that in hiring, the government favors English-speaking Tutsis 
over French-speaking Tutsis.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to create professional associations and labor unions, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. The labor 
movement has been hampered in practice due to the massive disruptions 
caused by the 1994 genocide. Unions have been continued to regroup and 
assert themselves.
    Union membership is voluntary and open to all salaried workers, 
including public sector employees. There are no restrictions on the 
right of association, but all unions must register with the Ministry of 
Justice for official recognition. There are no known cases in which the 
Government denied recognition. The law prohibits unions from having 
political affiliations, but in practice this is not always respected. 
Union activists complain that employers threaten to fire employees who 
attempt to organize or join unions.
    Organized labor represents only a small part of the work force. 
More than 90 percent of workers are engaged in small-scale subsistence 
farming. About 7 percent work in the modern (wage) sector, including 
both public and private industrial production, and about 75 percent of 
those active in the modern sector are members of labor unions.
    Until 1991 the Central Union of Rwandan Workers (CESTRAR) was the 
only authorized trade union organization. With the political reforms 
introduced in the 1991 Constitution, the CESTRAR officially became 
independent of the Government and the later-outlawed MRND political 
party. Unions outside the CESTRAR have been registered.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for 
public service workers. A union's executive committee must approve a 
strike, and a union must try to resolve its differences first with 
management according to steps prescribed by the Ministry of Public 
Service and Labor. Members of the taxi drivers union, ATRACO, staged a 
protest and peaceful demonstration against the union's leader for 
internal reasons in late July; security forces detained several persons 
(see Section 1.d.).
    Labor organizations may affiliate with international labor bodies. 
The CESTRAR is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Union 
Unity and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for collective bargaining, although only the 
CESTRAR had an established collective bargaining agreement with the 
Government. In practice since most union members are in the public 
sector, the Government is involved intimately in the collective 
bargaining process (see Section 6.e.).
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and there were reports 
during the year that some employers threatened their employees who 
wished to join unions. No formal mechanisms exist to resolve complaints 
involving discrimination against unions.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced labor; however, prisoners are assigned to work details, which 
generally involved rebuilding houses, clearing land, or other public 
maintenance duties. Prisoners also can be hired to perform work on 
private residences and businesses. It is unclear how much revenue the 
prisoners are given in return for their work.
    Although the law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded 
labor by children, such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age For 
Employment.--Except for subsistence agriculture, the law prohibits 
children under age 18 from working without their parents' or guardians' 
authorization, and they generally may not work at night. The minimum 
age for full employment is 18 years, and 14 years for apprenticeships, 
providing that the child has completed primary school. The Ministry of 
Public Service and Labor has not enforced child labor laws effectively; 
however, in July the Ministry of Public Service and Labor and the 
Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs, in collaboration with 
UNICEF, announced a national program aimed at educating children about 
their rights. It is rare to see child labor outside the agricultural 
sector.
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by 
children; however, such practices are not known to occur (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Public Service 
and Labor sets minimum wages in the small modern sector. The 
Government, the main employer, effectively sets most other wage rates 
as well. There is no single minimum wage; minimum wages vary according 
to the nature of the job. The minimum wages paid are insufficient to 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family and in 
practice, workers accept less than the minimum wage. Often families 
supplement their incomes by working in small business or subsistence 
agriculture.
    Officially, government offices and private sector entities have a 
40hour workweek. The law controls hours of work and occupational health 
and safety standards in the modern wage sector, but labor inspectors 
from the Ministry of Public Service and Labor enforce them only 
loosely. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                         SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

    The Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe is a multiparty 
democracy. The Government is composed of an executive branch and a 
unicameral legislature (the National Assembly). The President appoints 
the Prime Minister, who in turn appoints the ministers of the 
Government. Miguel Trovoada, leader of the Independent Democratic 
Alliance (ADI), was reelected President in 1996 for a second 5-year 
term in an election deemed generally free and fair by international 
observers, despite allegations of an unconstitutional modification of 
the voter lists between the first and second rounds. In the November 
1998 legislative elections, the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome 
and Principe (MLSTP) won an outright majority with 31 of 55 seats, and 
holds all 10 seats in the Cabinet. The judiciary is generally 
independent; however, it is subject at times to influence and 
manipulation.
    The Minister of National Defense, Security, and Internal Order 
supervises the military services and the police. Many members of the 
military are part-time farmers or fishermen. After a military mutiny in 
1995, the Government and international donors have dedicated resources 
to improving soldiers' living conditions. No defense expenditures have 
been used for lethal weapons since the advent of multiparty democracy 
in 1990.
    The economy is based on the export of a single product, cocoa, 
produced in an archaic, state-run system of plantations called 
``rocas.'' The Government has privatized some of the state-held land 
but had limited success in privatizing state-owned enterprises. The 
Government has not been successful in its efforts at structural 
adjustment, and the economy continued to face serious difficulties. 
While the inflation rate held at 10 percent during the year and the 
currency stabilized, the country remained highly dependent on foreign 
aid, and external debt is six times gross domestic product. Per capita 
income is less than $330 per year, and economic growth is slow. 
Unemployment, although difficult to quantify, remained very high.
    The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens; 
however, there were problems in a few areas. The principal human rights 
problems continued to be harsh prison conditions, an inefficient 
judicial system, violence and discrimination against women, and 
outdated plantation labor practices that limit worker rights.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        from:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or cruel and inhuman 
punishment, and the Government respects these prohibitions in practice. 
There were no reports of violations during arrests or interrogations.
    Prison conditions are harsh but not life threatening. Facilities 
are overcrowded, and food is inadequate. Women and men are held 
separately, and juveniles are separated from adults.
    Human rights monitors are not known to have requested permission to 
make prison visits; it is believed that the Government would permit 
such visits if requested.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
respects these prohibitions in practice.
    Exile is not used as a punishment. All those exiled under the one-
party regime of 1975 to 1990 remain free to return, and several 
prominent politicians have done so.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respect the independence of 
the judiciary in principle; however, the judicial system is subject to 
influence and manipulation. The judiciary has returned verdicts against 
both the President and the Government. The Government has important 
powers relating to the judiciary, including setting salaries for judges 
and all ministerial employees in accordance with standard government 
salary guidelines. Government salaries are extremely low, and the 
authorities are concerned that judges may be tempted to accept bribes.
    The legal system is based on Portuguese and customary law, with the 
Supreme Court at the apex.
    The Constitution provides for the right to fair public trial, the 
right of appeal, and the right to legal representation. However, in 
practice the judicial infrastructure suffers from severe budgetary 
constraints, inadequate facilities, and a shortage of trained judges 
and lawyers, causing long delays in bringing cases to court and greatly 
hindering investigations in criminal cases.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the integrity of the 
person and the right to privacy of home, correspondence, and private 
communication, and the Government respects these provisions in 
practice. The Government does not engage in intrusive practices, such 
as surveillance of persons or the monitoring of communications. The 
judicial police are responsible for criminal investigations and must 
obtain authorization from the Ministry of Justice to conduct searches.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and the Government 
generally respects these rights in practice. Two government-run and six 
independent newspapers and newsletters are published sporadically, 
usually on a monthly or bimonthly basis.
    Television and radio are state operated. While there are no 
independent local stations, no laws forbid them. The Voice of America, 
Radio International Portugal, and Radio France International 
rebroadcast locally. The law grants all opposition parties access to 
the state-run media, including a minimum of 3 minutes per month on 
television.
    All parties freely distribute newsletters and press releases 
stating their views and criticizing the Government, the President, and 
one another. There were no reports of government censorship or threats 
of censorship from any group, nor any reports of efforts by national 
security forces to suppress criticism.
    The Government does not restrict access to or the use of e-mail, 
the Internet, or satellite telephones. However, the only domestic 
Internet service provider is a joint venture in which the Government's 
Post and Telecommunications Office is a partner, and the cost of 
Internet access remains high; consequently, access remains limited in 
practice.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. The Government requires that requests for 
authorization for large-scale events be filed 48 hours in advance, but 
it generally grants the appropriate permits.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    Domestic law contains no specific provisions for granting asylee or 
refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Regarding 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the authorities 
traditionally have welcomed those seeking refuge or asylum. No requests 
for first asylum were reported during the year, but in theory the 
Government would be prepared to grant such requests.
    There were no reports that persons were forced to return to a 
country where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens exercised this right for the first time in 1991 in free 
and fair presidential and legislative elections, and subsequently in 
the 1994 and 1998 legislative elections, and the 1996 presidential 
elections. These elections resulted in the peaceful transfer of power 
between political party coalitions. Voter participation exceeded 80 
percent in these elections. International observers noted that the 1998 
legislative elections were free and transparent. Each of the three 
principal political parties has significant representation in the 
unicameral National Assembly. Elections are by secret ballot on the 
basis of universal suffrage for citizens 18 years of age or older. In 
the 1998 legislative elections, the MLSTP won an outright majority with 
31 out of 55 seats and filled all 10 Cabinet positions.
    The Constitution provides for the election of the President, who as 
Head of State names the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister appoints 
members of the Government.
    There are no restrictions in law or in practice on the 
participation of women in politics; however, women are underrepresented 
in politics and government. Women hold 4 of 55 seats in the National 
Assembly, 1 of 12 seats in the Cabinet, and 3 of 4 seats on the Supreme 
Court.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A small number of local human rights groups have formed since 1991 
and operate without restriction or governmental interference. There 
were no known requests by international human rights groups to visit 
the country.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for the equality of all citizens 
regardless of sex, race, racial origin, political tendency, creed, or 
philosophic conviction; however, the Government has not sought actively 
to enforce these provisions.
    Women.--While the extent of the problem is unknown, violence 
against women occurs, and medical professionals and officials reported 
firsthand experience in dealing with violence, including rape. They 
also reported that although women have the right to legal recourse--
including against spouses--many were reluctant to bring legal action or 
were ignorant of their rights under the law. Traditional beliefs and 
practices also inhibit women from taking domestic disputes outside the 
family.
    While the Constitution stipulates that women and men have equal 
political, economic, and social rights, and while many women have 
access to opportunities in education, business, and government, in 
practice women still encounter significant societal discrimination. 
Traditional beliefs concerning the division of labor between men and 
women leave women with much of the hard work in agriculture, with most 
child-rearing responsibilities, and with less access to education and 
to professions. According to a 1991 study, female literacy is 
approximately 62 percent, while male literacy is approximately 85 
percent.
    Children.--A number of government and donor-funded programs were 
established to improve conditions for children, notably an ongoing 
malaria control project and purchase of school and medical equipment. 
There has been improvement in maternity and infant care, in nutrition, 
and in access to basic health services, especially in urban areas. 
Mistreatment of children was not widespread; however, there were few 
social protections for orphans and abandoned children.
    Education is free and universal; there are no differences between 
the treatment of girls and boys in regard to education. Education is 
compulsory through sixth grade, irrespective of the age of the student.
    People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate access to 
buildings, transportation, or services for persons with disabilities. 
There are no reports of discrimination against the disabled.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom 
of association and the right to strike. Few unions exist in the very 
small modern wage sector; however, independent cooperatives have taken 
advantage of the government land distribution program to attract 
workers and in many cases to improve production and incomes 
significantly. Public sector employees still make up the great majority 
of wage earners. Strikes are legal, including those by government 
employees and other essential workers. There were frequent strikes 
during the year by civil servants seeking an increase in the minimum 
wage, while the Government sought to reduce expenses. However, in 
November the Government reached agreement with the strikers. There are 
no laws or regulations that prohibit employers from retaliating against 
strikers; however, there were no reports of retaliation.
    No restrictions bar trade unions from joining federations or 
affiliating with international bodies, but none have done so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides that workers may organize and bargain 
collectively; however, due to its role as the principal employer in the 
wage sector, the Government remains the key interlocutor for labor on 
all matters, including wages. There are no laws prohibiting antiunion 
discrimination, but there were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor, and it is not known to occur. The Government 
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and such practices are 
not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Employers in the modern wage sector generally respect the 
legally mandated minimum employment age of 18 years. The Ministry of 
Justice and Labor is responsible for enforcing this law. Children are 
engaged in labor in subsistence agriculture, on plantations, and in 
informal commerce, sometimes from an early age. The Government 
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and the prohibition is 
respected in practice (see Section 6.c.). The Ministry of Labor is 
responsible for enforcing the prohibition against forced and bonded 
labor by children.
    The Government has not taken action on ILO Convention 182 on the 
worst forms of child labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Working conditions on many of 
the state-owned plantations--the largest wage employment sector--are 
extremely bad. There is no legally mandated minimum wage. The average 
salary for plantation workers does not provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family, and the real value of their pay is 
eroded constantly by high rates of inflation. In principle workers and 
their families are provided free (but inadequate) housing, rudimentary 
education for their children, and health care, as well as the privilege 
of reduced prices and credit at the ``company store.'' These 
arrangements are intended to subsidize food and clothing. However, 
corruption is widespread, and international lending institutions have 
criticized the Government for ineffective administration of these 
subsidies. Workers often are forced to pay higher prices on the 
parallel market to obtain the goods theoretically provided at a 
discount as part of their compensation.
    The Government, with foreign donor assistance, privatized or 
redistributed the land in many state-run plantations in an effort to 
improve work, pay, and living conditions. While the program has 
redistributed some land, not all of the newly privatized plantations 
were successful, particularly because the world price for cocoa 
dropped.
    The legal workweek is 40 hours with 48 consecutive hours mandated 
for a rest period, a norm respected in the modern wage sector. The 1979 
Social Security Law prescribes basic occupational health and safety 
standards. Inspectors from the Ministry of Justice and Labor are 
responsible for enforcement of these standards, but their efforts are 
ineffective. Employees have the right under the law to leave unsafe 
working conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                SENEGAL

    Senegal is a moderately decentralized republic dominated by a 
strong presidency. In March opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, backed by 
a coalition of opposition parties, defeated President Abdou Diouf, 
whose Socialist Party had dominated political life for the past 40 
years, in an election considered to be both free and fair and marred 
only by reports of sporadic pre-election violence and minor procedural 
irregularities. The post election transition period was markedly free 
from violence and characterized by good conduct on the part of all 
candidates. In 1998 the Government amended the Constitution to create a 
second legislative chamber, a Senate, to which the President appoints 
one-fifth of the members, and an electoral college consisting largely 
of elected local and regional government officials chooses most of the 
others. In protest against this electoral system, most of the 
opposition parties boycotted the first senatorial elections held by the 
Government in January 1999. The ruling Socialist Party won all seats in 
this election, and the Government formally inaugurated the Senate in 
February 1999. In May 1998, the PS won 50 percent of votes cast and 93 
of 140 seats in elections for an expanded National Assembly. Unlike 
previous elections, these were supervised by a National Election 
Observatory (ONEL), independent of the Government. Although the 
elections were marred by violence and by persistent flaws in the 
electoral system, observers concluded that they were generally free, 
fair, and transparent. The Government continued to implement 
decentralized regional and local administrations. Sporadic fighting 
continued in the Casamance area in the southern part of the country 
between the Government and the secessionist Movement of Democratic 
Forces in the Casamance (MFDC). On December 16, the Government and the 
MFDC, joined by representatives from both the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, 
met in Zinguinchor to start a new round of peace talks. The prospects 
for success of these talks were still unclear by year's end. The 
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, it is 
subject in practice to government influence and pressure.
    The armed forces are professional and generally disciplined. They 
traditionally remain aloof from politics and are firmly under civilian 
control. The paramilitary gendarmerie and the police are less 
professional and less disciplined. Some members of the security forces, 
the gendarmerie, and the police continued to commit serious human 
rights abuses.
    The country is predominantly agricultural with about 70 percent of 
the labor force engaged in farming. Recorded gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita is estimated at about $600, but this excludes a large 
informal economy. Since the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, the 
Government has implemented a series of economic policy reforms to 
enhance competitiveness by dismantling monopolies, liberalizing 
markets, and privatizing several state-owned industries. Recorded GDP 
per capita has grown at an average rate of between 2 and 3 percent per 
year since 1995. Exports account for about one-third of recorded GDP, 
and are led by fish and fish products, phosphates and fertilizers, 
tourism, and peanuts. The Government continued to receive external 
assistance from international financial institutions and other sources, 
and such assistance represents approximately 32 percent of the national 
budget.
    The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in 
some areas; however, its human rights record was marked by serious 
problems in other areas. Free and fair presidential elections in March, 
in which the opposition candidate won, ended the Socialist Party's 
domination of political life; however, the previous Government's 1998 
creation of a second legislative chamber, in which no members are 
elected directly by the citizenry and one-fifth of the members are 
appointed by the President, reduced the ability of citizens to change 
their Government and increased the presidency's domination of the 
State. Government forces reportedly were responsible for extrajudicial 
killings, including some civilian deaths. Police tortured and beat 
suspects during questioning and arbitrarily arrested and detained 
persons.
    Prison conditions are poor, and lengthy pretrial detention is a 
problem. The Government rarely tries or punishes members of the 
military, gendarmerie, or police for human rights abuses. The judiciary 
is subject to government influence and pressure and suffers from low 
salaries and insufficient resources. In the past, the police sometimes 
infringed on citizens'' privacy rights. At times the Government limited 
freedom of the press. There were some instances in which the Government 
limited freedom of assembly. In April the Government announced the 
establishment of a Human Rights Office in the President's office to 
investigate complaints filed by individuals regarding human rights 
violations. The office had not begun to function by year's end, 
although it reportedly received numerous letters. Domestic violence and 
discrimination against women, female genital mutilation, and child 
labor remained problems. Mob violence also is a problem.
    Rebel MFDC forces reportedly were responsible for killings, 
torture, and rape.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political killings by government officials; 
however, government forces reportedly were responsible for 
extrajudicial killings, including some civilian deaths. After a period 
of calm during 1999, the incidence of violence in the Casamance region 
increased during the year and resulted in some deaths. During the year, 
the press continued to report on frequent small arms attacks, raids, 
ambushes and clashes with military forces by suspected MFDC gunmen, 
with continuing military and civilian fatalities.
    While there were no new reported cases of death caused by civilian 
law enforcement authorities this year, cases from previous years 
remained unsolved.
    No investigation or other action was taken in the April 1999 case 
in which security forces shot a young man mistaken for a rebel.
    In February 1998, police officers from the Thiaroye station in 
Dakar arrested and beat a young man after he tried to flee during an 
identity verification check. The young man died before receiving 
medical care, and the authorities listed the cause of death as natural. 
With the help of the African Assembly for the Defense of Human rights 
(RADDHO), a local human rights organization, the family of the deceased 
filed a legal complaint. According to RADDHO, in August 1999 the Dakar 
regional court supported the finding of ``death from natural causes'' 
and closed the case.
    In December 1997, a child was shot and killed in the Hann area of 
Dakar when police opened fire on a group that was demonstrating against 
an eviction order. With the help of RADDHO, the family of the deceased 
filed a legal complaint in December 1998 which was still pending at 
year's end.
    On many occasions vigilante groups and mobs lynched suspected 
thieves. This type of mob violence generally remains unpunished. 
However, on October 18, a mob in Medina killed a man suspected of 
having committed a burglary in the area. Members of the household 
allegedly robbed by the man and some of their neighbors were charged 
with manslaughter and tried on November 15 by the regional court in 
Dakar. On November 30, the court sentenced the accused to 6 months in 
prison.
    On April 11, a group of suspected MFDC gunmen attacked a military 
post in Sare Wali, about 19 miles from the provincial capital of Kolda 
close to the border with Guinea-Bissau, killing 3 government soldiers. 
According to official sources, government forces killed 15 rebels 
during the incident. In a separate incident on April 11 suspected MFDC 
gunmen attacked the village of Fanda, during which they killed one 
government soldier, harassed civilians and stole property. According to 
official press sources, government security forces killed several MFDC 
gunmen during the attack.
    There were at least two reports of deaths caused by the use of 
landmines by suspected MFDC rebels in the Casamance region. The 
incidents reportedly occurred in May in the Niomone and Cap Skirring 
areas, with eight civilian deaths reported in the Niomone area and two 
in the Skirring area.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances during the year.
    In 1999 there were several credible reports of disappearances in 
connection with the conflict in the Casamance. In its 1999 annual 
report, RADDHO accused security forces of responsibility for the 
disappearance of seven civilians in June, and 3 suspected rebels in 
April of that year (see Section 1.d.). These persons remained 
unaccounted for at year's end.
    In September a group of Casamance professionals helped family 
members of two missing persons, Alexis Etienne Diatta and Jean Diandy, 
file legal complaints against security forces for abduction. The 
families of both Diatta and Diandy reported the disappearances to 
civilian authorities, who were unsuccessful in finding either person. 
Government investigations into both disappearances reportedly are 
underway.
    RADDHO alleged that government security forces abducted two 
civilians in September and December 1998 respectively. Their 
whereabouts remain unknown.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There are credible reports that police and gendarmes often 
beat suspects during questioning and pretrial detention, in spite of 
constitutional prohibitions against such treatment. The press 
repeatedly reported instances of torture perpetrated by police, usually 
beatings, and the problem remained a serious public concern.
    According to human rights activists from Guinea-Bissau, in June 
Senegalese security officials arrested four Guinea Bissauan citizens 
from the border village of Kuntima in northern GuineaBissau. The four 
reportedly were suspected of involvement in attacks by armed robbers 
from Guinea-Bissau, or by MFDC separatist rebels. Human rights 
activists alleged that security forces tortured the suspects while they 
were detained in a jail in the city of Kolda. The suspects were 
released later that month.
    Despite stronger legal provisions against torture put in place in 
1997, those cases that are pursued often take years before a final 
judgment is reached. Government action to resolve the October 1998 case 
of alleged rough, abusive, and inhuman treatment of RADDHO's Casamance 
regional office head, Ankilling Diabone, by security forces remained 
pending during the year. According to RADDHO, the Government opened an 
investigation that it could not complete without interviewing Diabone, 
who went to France and has declined to return.
    According to credible press reports, on May 5 suspected MFDC 
separatist rebels brutalized and raped four women abducted from a farm 
in Sanoun, close to the Guinea-Bissau border. The women were released 
the following day.
    On June 21 suspected MFDC rebels attacked the village of Sare 
Kambi, and stole property. During the attack gunmen beat up a man and 
abducted his two wives. The rebels reportedly were attacking villages 
in the border area in retaliation for their alleged cooperation with 
government security forces.
    On July 4, a panel of judges in the Court of Criminal Appeals 
dropped charges of torture and complicity in crimes against humanity 
made against former Chadian president Hissen Habre, arguing that the 
court has no jurisdiction in the case. Attorneys representing the 
coalition of human rights organizations that initiated the lawsuit 
appealed the decision before the Court of Final Appeals, and the case 
was pending at year's end.
    Prison conditions are poor. Prisons remain overcrowded, and food 
and health care are inadequate. However, there have been no reports of 
deaths in prison as a result of these conditions.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors. Local human rights groups such as RADDHO, the National 
Organization for Human Rights (ONDH), and the International Prison 
Observatory occasionally visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the authorities at 
times arbitrarily arrest and detain persons.
    The law specifies that warrants, issued by judges, are required for 
arrests; however, laws also grant the police broad powers to detain 
prisoners for lengthy periods. Police officers may hold without charge 
a person suspected of a crime for 48 hours after arrest and for up to 
96 hours if ordered by a public prosecutor. This period may be doubled 
in the case of crimes against the security of the State. The prosecutor 
decides whether to forward the case to an investigating judge who may 
open an investigation. At this point, the suspects are charged 
preliminarily and may be held or released on their own recognizance. 
There is a system of bail, but it rarely is used. During the initial 48 
hours of detention the accused has no access to family or an attorney, 
but has the right to demand a medical exam. Government-sponsored 
legislation passed in January 1999 enhanced the rights of the accused 
by according the right to an attorney after this initial period of 
detention. Previously this right was accorded only after formal charges 
were filed. The accused may be held in custody for 6 months, and the 
investigating magistrate can certify that an additional 6-month 
extension is required. Such extensions may be reviewed by a court on 
appeal. The new legislation also gave judges the right to order release 
pending trial without the prosecutor's consent.
    Police rarely are prosecuted for violations of arrest and detention 
procedures, and the authorities may detain a prisoner for long periods 
of time while they investigate and build a case against a suspect. The 
authorities routinely hold prisoners in custody unless and until a 
court demands their release. Despite the 6-month limitation on 
detention, the time between the charging phase and trial averages 2 
years. In a 1998 effort to improve the administration of justice the 
Government recruited 48 law school graduates to be trained as 
magistrates over a 2year period. In 1999 approximately 90 graduated 
judges were assigned to different courts nationwide, which allowed for 
the opening of judicial districts in all 30 administrative districts 
and access to the judicial system by citizens in the countryside.
    According to human rights activists from Guinea-Bissau, in June 
Senegalese security officials arrested and detained four GuineaBissauan 
citizens from the border village of Kuntima in Northern Guinea-Bissau 
(see Section 1.c.)
    Following fighting in the Casamance in late April 1999, the 
military rounded up 15 persons with Diola names on suspicion of 
involvement with the MFDC. All but three of these prisoners were 
released within 4 days; however, those three remained unaccounted for 
at year's end.
    In January 1999, the National Assembly passed legislation to 
eliminate the law that held ``acts or maneuvers aimed at casting 
discredit on government institutions'' as criminal offenses punishable 
by imprisonment of 3 to 5 years and a fine of up to $2,500 (1.5 million 
CFA francs). Legal experts considered this provision to be a legal 
instrument that the Government could use to jail political dissenters. 
On a few occasions in the past the Government had jailed opposition 
leaders under this provision, apparently on the basis of their 
political activities.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a 
judiciary independent of the executive, the legislature, and the armed 
forces; however, in practice it is subject to government influence and 
pressure. Magistrates are vulnerable to outside pressures due to low 
pay, poor working conditions, and family and political ties. Also, the 
Minister of Justice and subordinate authorities have extensive 
authority to influence judicial procedures by keeping the accused in 
pretrial detention.
    The legal system is based on French civil law and is composed of 
ordinary courts and a number of higher and special courts, including 
the three created in May 1992 to replace the Supreme Court: The Council 
of State; the Constitutional Council; and the Court of Final Appeal. 
These courts remain understaffed, and many of the special courts, 
including one to deal with unlawful enrichment and others to try 
government officials for treason and malfeasance, are dormant. Muslims 
have the right to choose customary law or civil law for certain civil 
cases, such as those concerning inheritance and divorce. However, 
customary law decisions are rendered by civil court judges. There is a 
separate system of military courts for members of the armed forces and 
the gendarmerie. The right of appeal exists in all courts except 
military courts and the special Unlawful Enrichment Court. Military 
courts may try civilians only if they are involved in violations of 
military law committed by military personnel.
    In principle the accused is innocent until proven guilty, and when 
brought to trial it is the State's burden to prove that the accused is 
guilty of the charges. Trials are public, and defendants have the right 
to be present in court, to confront witnesses, to present evidence, and 
to have an attorney. However, some defendants are denied legal 
assistance at public expense due to a lack of funding. Evidentiary 
hearings may be closed to the public and the press, but the defendant 
and counsel have access to all evidence presented and may introduce 
their own evidence before the investigating judge decides to refer the 
case to the prosecutor for trial. A panel of judges presides over 
ordinary courts for both civil and criminal cases; in criminal cases 
citizens also serve on the panel.
    The Minister of Justice has taken steps to eliminate the backlog of 
cases in the judiciary system. In December the Government adopted 
legislation for the appointment of judges in charge of monitoring the 
implementation of court decisions and for the establishment of 
alternative justice mechanisms, including a ``maison de la justice'' to 
be staffed by voluntary jurists--usually retired judges or attorneys.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary invasion of the 
home, and there was little government interference in the private lives 
of citizens. The law requires search warrants, and only judges may 
issue them. In past years, during high profile or politically charged 
investigations, police often proceeded without the required search 
warrants; however, there were no reports of this during the year.
    There were no reports that government officials monitored mail or 
telephone communications without judicial authorization.
    MFDC rebels sought to collect supplies and money from civilians. On 
June 25 suspected MFDC separatist rebels attacked and stole civilian 
property in the villages of Sare Manfaly, Sare Ansou, Sare Yero Oussou, 
close to the border with Guinea-Bissau. In a separate violent attack 
launched on June 28, gunmen stole civilian property and set fire to 
village food supplies and seed stocks.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice; however, at times it imposed some 
limits on these rights. Laws prohibit the press from the expression of 
views that ``discredit'' the State, incite the population to disorder, 
or disseminate ``false news.'' A criminal case against three Sud 
Communication journalists for defamation was pending at year's end.
    On July 27, the Government filed a lawsuit against the publisher of 
the independent weekly paper Le Temoin and one of its reporters, on 
charges of publishing false news. The charges were made in connection 
with a story published by the newspaper a few weeks earlier, in which 
the newspaper claimed that President Wade had yelled at Mauritanian 
President Ould Taya during a telephone conversation. A few weeks 
earlier, the publisher of Le Temoin was interrogated twice by internal 
security officials. The lawsuit was pending at year's end.
    On August 23, the Government charged the publisher and the 
Casamance correspondent of the independent daily newspaper Le Matin 
with publishing false news and undermining the morale of the armed 
forces and of the populace, and with compromising the State's internal 
security. The Government also charged the publisher of Le Matin with 
insulting the head of state. In a radio interview following the 
announcement of the Government's decision to file a lawsuit against Le 
Matin, the publisher of Le Matin criticized the Government's action. On 
August 26, after meeting with the publisher and owner of Le Matin, 
President Wade withdrew all of the lawsuits that he had filed against 
both Le Matin and Le Temoin.
    On December 13, the Government issued a general warning to the 
national press that the dissemination of communications from the MFDC 
would be considered attempts to derail the Casamance peace process and 
would be prosecuted under the penal code. On the same day, the 
publisher and managing editor of the newspaper Le Populaire were 
summoned and interrogated for 7 hours by the criminal investigation 
division after the newspaper published a review of the 19-year old 
Casamance conflict. On December 16, they were arrested and then 
released on the same day after being charged with ``disseminating false 
news and undermining public security.'' Their cases were pending at 
year's end.
    A broad spectrum of thought and opinion is available to the public 
through regularly published magazines and newspapers, including foreign 
publications. Political and economic views expressed in the independent 
press often are critical of the Government and its programs. While 
publishers are required to register prior to starting publication, the 
Government routinely approves such registrations.
    Radio, being relatively inexpensive, remained the most important 
medium of mass information and the main source of news for citizens 
outside urban areas. Six privately owned radio stations broadcast 
within the country; of these, citizens own five. There are also three 
international stations that rebroadcast within the country. All of the 
locally owned stations broadcast national news and political 
commentary. Some of them often were critical of the Government; no 
harassment was reported.
    A government monopoly controls local television, an important 
source of news. While there are no privately owned domestic television 
stations, French-owned pay television is available but offers no local 
news.
    In August 1999 the Government investigated an incident in which 
some followers of a local Islamic leader belonging to the Mouride 
Brotherhood set fire to the bedroom of the local correspondent of a 
Dakar-based daily newspaper. The case was closed without arrests or 
criminal charges that same month.
    At year's end, at least 10 Internet service providers operated in 
the country. The Government did not restrict access to the Internet. A 
personal account with unlimited access time cost about $18 (10,000 CFA 
francs) per month. Several cybercafes in the capital city, Dakar, 
provided short-term access to the Internet that was used by many 
persons unable to afford personal accounts.
    Academic freedom generally is respected; however, student meetings 
on part of the campus of the University of Dakar are banned informally 
(see Section 2.b.), ostensibly to prevent militant student groups from 
disrupting classes and studies. In March 1999, on two occasions, police 
forcibly dispersed, and destroyed the property of, students 
demonstrating on the campus of Dakar University in favor of increased 
scholarships (see Section 2.b.). In December 1999, police personnel 
also forcibly dispersed similar protests by students demanding 
immediate payment of scholarships (see Section 2.b.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and while the Government 
generally respected this provision in practice, there were a few 
instances in which the Government limited this right. The Government 
requires prior authorization for public demonstrations, which it 
usually grants. Meetings by students on the academic campus of the 
University of Dakar are banned informally, but this prohibition does 
not extend to the dormitory areas of the campus. In March and December 
1999, police officials forcibly dispersed two unauthorized student 
demonstrations.
    While in past years, the Government frequently denied authorization 
or forcibly dispersed peaceful marches by the opposition, there were 
significantly fewer such incidents during the year. In January the 
Government authorized a peaceful march by the Front for Election 
Transparency (FRTE), a group composed of representatives of all 
opposition parties and formed for the purposes of the march, to protest 
alleged irregularities in the electoral process, including the 
importation of voter cards from Israel. Prominent opposition leaders 
and thousands of their supporters joined the march to the Ministry of 
the Interior (MOI) where march leaders formally delivered their 
platform to the Minister. However, on November 15, the Government, 
citing security concerns, banned a political rally called by the Front 
for Patriotic Alliance, a minor political party.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the 
Government generally respects this provision in practice. Citizens who 
wish to form associations must register with the MOI. Business-related 
associations register with the Ministry of Commerce. By law and in 
practice, the MOI must register such groups as long as the objectives 
of the association are stated clearly and they do not violate the law.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    Any group--religious or other--that wants to form an association 
with legal status must register with the MOI in accordance with the 
civil and commercial code. Registration, which generally is granted, 
enables an association to conduct business, including owning property, 
establishing a bank account, and receiving financial contributions from 
any private source. Registered religious groups, like all registered 
nonprofit organizations, also are exempt from many forms of taxation. 
The Minister must have a legal basis for refusing registration. There 
were no reports of any applications for such registration being delayed 
or denied during the period covered by this report.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. Some 
public employees, including teachers, are required by law to obtain 
government approval before departing the country, although this is not 
regularly enforced in practice.
    At times, usually during sweeps for MFDC rebels, the security 
forces temporarily restricted access to the Casamance region or areas 
within it. The security forces also regularly maintained checkpoints in 
the Ziguinchor region to screen for MFDC rebels and arms transports. 
Security forces generally allowed travelers to proceed after checking 
documents and searching vehicles. In late July and early August, 
citizens in the Kolda and Ziguinchor regions closed the border with 
Guinea-Bissau for several days to protest the Government's failure to 
provide adequate security.
    Following several violent attacks perpetrated by suspected MFDC 
separatists from neighboring Guinea Bissau, more than 2,600 civilians 
from the rural communities of Tankato Escale and Sare Yoba, including 
women, elderly people and children, fled from their homes and sought 
refuge in the region of Kolda, where they received government 
resettlement assistance.
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee or asylee status 
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Since 1989 as a 
country of first asylum, Senegal has hosted Mauritanian refugees. The 
Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organizations in providing assistance for refugees. The UNHCR reported 
no significant protection problems for these refugees. While no formal 
repatriation agreement exists with the UNHCR, the two governments have 
cooperated to permit repatriation for several years. As a result, the 
UNHCR terminated its assistance programs for Mauritanian refugees at 
the end of 1998, although it continued to provide protection services. 
Mauritanian refugees generally live in dispersed locations along the 
length of the Senegal-Mauritania border and are allowed free movement 
within Senegal. However, most of these refugees are unable to obtain 
current refugee documents from the authorities and sometimes encounter 
administrative difficulties when using their expired refugee 
application receipts issued in 1989. Due to the lack of a formal and 
supervised repatriation, and in the absence of an up-to-date 
registration program, the exact number of remaining Mauritanian 
refugees is difficult to establish. The UNHCR estimates that under 
30,000 remain in the country.
    Several hundred Guinea-Bissauan refugees chose to remain in 
Senegal, living with relatives or on their own.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the constitutional right to change their Government 
through periodic multiparty elections, and they exercised this right 
during the February/March presidential election that ended the 
Socialist Party's 40-year domination of political power. After 26 years 
in opposition, Abdoulaye Wade, backed by a coalition of opposition 
parties, defeated incumbent President Abdou Diouf in what was 
considered to be a free and fair election, which was marred only by 
reports of sporadic preelection violence and minor procedural 
irregularities. A new draft constitution, originally scheduled for a 
popular referendum in November, was postponed; a referendum is 
scheduled to take place in 2001. However, the previous Government's 
1998 creation of a second legislative chamber, in which no members are 
directly elected by the citizenry and one-fifth of the members are 
appointed by the President, reduced the ability of citizens to change 
their Government and increased the presidency's domination of the 
State.
    In 1998 the National Assembly passed legislation proposed by the 
Government to increase its membership from 120 to 140 in order to 
equalize the number of deputies elected by simple majority vote in the 
districts and by proportional representation nationwide. There are 56 
legally registered parties.
    Also in 1998, the National Assembly passed a bill that created a 
second legislative chamber, a 60-member Senate. Forty-five of its 
members are elected by an electoral college on the basis of dual 
proportional and majority systems and regional slates. The electoral 
college has 13,920 members consisting of elected local government 
officials and members of the National Assembly. The President appoints 
12 members of the Senate, and the remaining 3 are elected from slates 
representing several associations of expatriate citizens. Most major 
opposition parties decided to boycott the first Senate election held in 
January 1999 under this electoral system because the ruling party's 
domination of elected local and regional offices gave opposition 
parties little chance of winning Senate seats. With the exception of 2 
minor party members who filled appointed seats, the Senate, inaugurated 
in February, was made up entirely of PS members until the March 
Presidential elections, after which 6 PS senators defected to the PDS.
    In 1997 the Government created the National Observatory of 
Elections to supervise and oversee elections. The ONEL was established 
as a temporary, independent oversight body empowered to order 
bureaucrats to obey the law and to take legal action against 
individuals and parties who violated it. The MOI remains responsible 
for the actual organization and implementation of the elections, which 
is done through a directorate of elections. The ONEL significantly 
improved the level of transparency of the May 1998 National Assembly 
elections and the February/March presidential election, despite 
persistent flaws in the system. In July the Prime Minister announced 
the Government's intention to transform the ONEL into a permanent 
independent electoral commission; however, this had not occurred by 
year's end.
    The period prior to the March elections was marked by some 
violence. In February during the election campaign, suspected PDS 
militants in Saint Louis set fire to the office of the proDiouf PLS 
party, a spin-off of the PDS party. The incident followed a clash 
between activists from both parties. During the same month, opposition 
activists in Rufisque set fire to the house of the Socialist Party 
mayor following a clash between supporters of the opposition candidate 
Abdoulaye Wade and those of then-President Diouf.
    The electoral process was marked by minor irregularities such as 
the illegal issuance of birth certificates to Socialist party 
supporters in Keur Madiabel by a judge in the district court in 
Kaolack. Following a complaint filed by the ONEL, the documents were 
cancelled. ONEL also noted that national identity card applications 
were processed illegally in some instances. Access to personal 
identification cards was an important issue in the election, since they 
are necessary to vote.
    Elections are held by balloting that is described officially as 
secret but may permit voters to leave the polling place with evidence 
of how they voted. At polling places on election day, registered 
citizens receive a package of ballot papers, one for each candidate. 
Each citizen votes by depositing into a sealed ballot box, alone inside 
a closed booth, an envelope containing one of these ballots. In the 
same booth, a trash receptacle is provided in which the voter may 
privately dispose of the unused ballots; however, polling officials 
cannot readily ensure that this is done. Nevertheless, despite apparent 
potential for abuse, this balloting system has not been the subject of 
complaints or reports of abuse in recent elections.
    Women are underrepresented in the political process. While there 
are no legal impediments to their participation in government and 
politics, cultural and educational factors hamper them. In addition 
political parties often rank women low on party lists, making it 
difficult for them to be elected to the National Assembly or to be 
appointed ministers. Only 5 of the 29 ministers in the President's 
Cabinet are women, and there are only 2 women in the 19-member Economic 
and Social Council, the Government's policymaking body. During 1999, a 
woman, Marieme Wane Ly, formed and headed a political party for the 
first time. Only 18 female deputies hold seats in the 140-member 
National Assembly. There are only 10 women in the 60-seat Senate. 
Women's lower representation reflects not only a disparity in education 
(see Section 5) but also cultural factors.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and 
receptive to their views.
    In 1997 the Government enacted a law to strengthen the National 
Committee on Human Rights. The Committee includes members from the 
Government and civic organizations, including private human rights 
groups. It may, on its own initiative, investigate human rights abuses, 
including torture; however, it did not investigate any cases of abuse 
during the year.
    In July a panel of judges dropped charges of torture and complicity 
in crimes against humanity that the Government brought against former 
Chadian President Hissen Habre (see Section 1.c.)

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``men and women shall be equal in 
law'' and prohibits discrimination based on race, religion, sex, class, 
or language. However, discrimination against women is pervasive, and 
the Government frequently does not enforce antidiscrimination laws.
    Women.--There are credible reports that violence against women, 
usually wife beating, is common. According to a study funded by the 
Canadian Center for International Research and Development (CECI) 
focusing on the capital Dakar and on the city of Kaolack, 87 percent of 
515 women interviewed had suffered from some form of domestic violence. 
The study also showed that domestic violence was more widespread in 
Dakar than in Kaolack. Police usually do not intervene in domestic 
disputes, and most people are reluctant to go outside the family for 
redress. In contrast, the law and society view rape as a very serious 
crime, and the law stipulates that persons convicted of rape may be 
imprisoned for up to 10 years. If the victim is a minor, her age is 
considered an aggravating circumstance. Rape trials often result in 
convictions. In January 1999, the Government passed legislation 
amending the criminal law to make sexual harassment a crime punishable 
by imprisonment of up to 3 years and a fine of $650 (500,000 CFA 
francs). The legislation also increased the potential fine for domestic 
violence to $650 (500,000 CFA francs) and the length of imprisonment 
for domestic violence to 5 years. Several women's groups have formed to 
address this problem.
    Despite constitutional protections, women face extensive societal 
discrimination, especially in rural areas where Islamic and traditional 
customs, including polygyny, and Islamic rules of inheritance are 
strongest, and women generally are confined to traditional roles. By 
law women have the right to choose when and whom they marry; however, 
in some areas, traditional practice can restrict a woman's choice. The 
minimum age of consent to marry is 21 for males and 16 for females. 
Under certain conditions, a judge may grant a special dispensation to a 
person under age. The law is not enforced in some communities, where 
marriages occasionally are arranged. Under family law, women may or may 
not consent to polygynous unions when contracting a marriage; however, 
once in polygynous unions women do not have the right of notification 
or approval prior to a subsequent marriage. In the countryside, women 
perform much of the subsistence farming and child rearing and have 
limited educational opportunities. Although the Government has 
committed itself to equalizing male and female primary school 
enrollment, there is still much social discrimination against women in 
educational opportunities. Only 23 percent of females over 15 years of 
age are literate, while the rate for males over age 15 is 43 percent.
    It is estimated that only 20 percent of women are engaged in paid 
employment. Moreover, traditional practices make it difficult for women 
to obtain bank credit. Due to the fact that legally men are considered 
heads of household, women pay higher taxes than men for equal wages and 
employers pay child allowances to men and not women. Women usually 
marry young (the majority by age 16 in rural areas) and average 5.7 
live births (down from 7 in 1995). About half of all women live in 
polygynous unions.
    In urban areas, women encounter somewhat less discrimination and 
are active in government, political life, the legal profession, and 
business. About 14 percent of lawyers are women. Urban women are more 
likely to take advantage of the Government's efforts to increase 
respect for women's legal rights to divorce, alimony, and child 
support, and to seek education and employment. In general urban women 
receive equal pay for equal work.
    Children.--The Ministry of Family, Social Action, and National 
Solidarity, established in 1990 (formerly the Ministry of Women, 
Children, and the Family, and renamed in 1998), is responsible for 
promoting children's welfare. Numerous organizations assist the 
Ministry in support of children's rights, including the Ministry of 
Health, which maintained a nationwide effort focusing on child 
survival. The Government continues to increase the number of classrooms 
and encourage more children, particularly females, to enter and stay in 
school. The law requires that children attend school until age 12, but 
this is not enforced due to a shortage of schools. Organized street 
begging by children who are Koranic students results in a significant 
interruption of their education, and many children work in their 
family's fields (see Section 6.d.).
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is not practiced by the country's largest ethnic 
group, the Wolofs (representing 43 percent of the population), but it 
is performed on girls belonging to some other ethnic groups. 
Infibulation, the most extreme and dangerous form of FGM, is practiced 
by members of the Toucouleur and Peulh ethnic groups, particularly 
those in rural areas. Unsubstantiated recent studies estimate that 
between 5 and 20 percent of girls are mutilated.
    In January 1999 the Government passed legislation banning FGM. The 
law made FGM a criminal offense, carrying a jail term ranging from 6 
months to 5 years for persons directly practicing FGM or ordering it to 
be carried out on a third person. Most human rights organizations 
considered the law to be a decisive step towards greater protection of 
women. However, a few women's rights activists criticized the new 
legislation because they perceived it as being dictated by Western 
donors. A few Muslim religious leaders also criticized the law because 
they consider FGM to be a religious practice. While the Government 
sponsors programs to educate women regarding the dangers of FGM, other 
critics of the new law contended that these programs should have been 
more widespread prior to implementation of the ban.
    On April 7, inhabitants of 26 villages on the Sine Saloum Islands 
publicly announced their decision to ban the practice of FGM in their 
communities. The decision was the result of an educational campaign 
initiated by the Government with the assistance of a number of 
international and domestic NGO's. Since July 1997, approximately 172 
villages nationwide have banned FGM among their inhabitants.
    In January 1999, the Government passed a law mandating longer jail 
terms of up to 10 years for convicted pedophiles.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no laws that mandate 
accessibility for the disabled, and in practice most persons with 
disabilities are generally unable to participate in many occupations 
due to physical barriers and a lack of equipment and training 
opportunities that would make such participation possible.
    On June 29, the Council of State (the country's highest 
administrative court) ruled on an antidiscrimination lawsuit filed in 
October 1999 by the National Association of Disabled People (ANHMS) 
against the regional educational board in the eastern province of 
Tambacounda. The board had refused to hire a physically disabled 
candidate who had passed a recruitment test, on the grounds that 
physically disabled persons are not qualified for the job of teaching. 
The court overruled the board's decision on the grounds that a physical 
disability did not represent a valid legal ground for barring a person 
from teaching.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is ethnically 
diverse. The largest ethnic groups are the Wolof (more than 40 percent 
of the country's population), the Pular (also called Peuhl or Fulani, 
nearly 25 percent), and the Serer (more than 15 percent). Other smaller 
groups include the Diola, Mandingo, and Soninke. Each group has its own 
primary language although French and Wolof are widely used as secondary 
languages. While general regions of origin can be identified for most 
ethnic groups, these regional separations are no longer distinct.
    In most of the country, ethnic and regional tensions have not 
contributed significantly to recent human rights abuses, and opposition 
to the Government generally has taken the form of nonviolent political 
parties that have not had readily identifiable ethnic or regional 
bases. This has not been true in the Casamance region, the part of the 
country to the south of The Gambia. Casamance is substantially less 
arid, less Islamic, and less Wolof than the rest of the country. 
Resentment on the part of Casamance groups, including the Diola, of 
domination by northerners, including the Wolof, reportedly has 
contributed significantly to the secessionist MFDC rebellion in the 
Casamance region, which began in 1982 and has continued to give rise to 
many human rights abuses (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.). Flaws in 
the country's first local and regional elections, held in 1996, have 
reduced the effectiveness of the Government's ongoing decentralization 
program.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code 
provide all workers with the right of association, and they are free to 
form or join unions; however, the Labor Code requires the Minister of 
the Interior to give prior authorization before a trade union can exist 
legally.
    The International Labor Organization (ILO) continued to call on the 
Government to ensure that trade unions are not subject to dissolution 
by administrative authority and to amend the law, which accords power 
to the Minister of Interior to approve the formation of unions. Any 
group of workers in the same occupation, similar trades, or the same 
professions may form a union. While the Ministry does not always grant 
initial recognition to a union, once it gives recognition, it virtually 
never withdraws it. However, the Government may disband a union if its 
activities deviate from its charter. The Labor Code does not apply to 
the informal and agricultural sectors where most persons work.
    Although they represent a small percentage of the working 
population, unions wield significant political influence because of 
their ability to disrupt vital sectors of the economy. The small 
industrial component of the total work force of 4 million is almost 
totally unionized. The only union in the agrarian sector is one 
representing workers at a privately owned sugar company. Some farmers 
are organized into the National Farming Association, an advocacy 
organization.
    The National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS), the 
largest union organization, has close ties to the Socialist Party, and 
several members hold Socialist Party seats in the Assembly. While 
ostensibly an independent organization, the umbrella CNTS consistently 
supported government policies during the Diouf administration.
    The rival to the CNTS is the National Union of Autonomous Labor 
Unions of Senegal (UNSAS). The UNSAS is a federation of strategically 
important unions such as those formed by electrical workers, 
telecommunication workers, teachers, water technicians, and hospital, 
railroad, and sugar workers.
    The Constitution and the Labor Code provide for the right to 
strike, but with restrictions. Unions representing members of the civil 
service must notify the Government of their intent to strike no less 
than 1 month in advance, and private sector unions must make a similar 
notification 3 days in advance. The Government or the employer can use 
the time to seek a settlement to the dispute but cannot stop the 
strike.
    There were no illegal strikes during the year.
    The Labor Code permits unions to affiliate with international 
bodies. The CNTS is active in regional and international labor 
organizations and is the dominant Senegalese member of the Organization 
of African Trade Union Unity.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides unions with the right to organize and to bargain collectively, 
and these rights are protected in practice. There are also legal 
prohibitions governing discrimination by employers against union 
members and organizers. Employers found guilty of antiunion 
discrimination are required to reinstate workers. There were no known 
instances in which workers were prevented from exercising the right to 
organize and bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor (MOL) can 
intervene in disputes between labor and management if requested, and it 
plays a mediation role in the private and state enterprise sectors.
    Labor laws apply to all industrial firms including those in the 
Dakar industrial free trade zone.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--There were no 
reports of forced or bonded labor, which is prohibited by law. The 
Constitution prohibits child labor of all kinds, including forced and 
bonded labor, and the Government enforces this ban in the formal 
sector. There were no reports that forced or bonded labor by children 
takes place in the informal or agricultural sectors.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution bans child labor of all kinds, and the 
Government enforces this ban in the formal sector, which is under the 
purview of the labor law. However, instead of attending school, many 
children work in their family's fields.
    In 1998 the country began a 3-year program of action for the 
elimination of child labor, the International Program for the 
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), which is scheduled for completion in 
2001. Under the law, the minimum age for employment is 16 years for 
apprenticeships and 18 years for all other types of work. In June the 
legislature ratified ILO Convention 132 To Eliminate the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor; it is scheduled to take effect in 2001. Inspectors from 
the MOL closely monitor and enforce minimum age restrictions within the 
small formal wage sector, which includes state-owned corporations, 
large private enterprises, and cooperatives. However, children under 
the minimum age frequently work in the much larger traditional or 
informal sectors, such as family farms in rural areas or in small 
businesses, where the Government does not enforce minimum age and other 
workplace regulations. On June 1, Senegal ratified ILO Convention 182, 
outlawing the worst forms of child labor.
    The Constitution prohibits child labor of all kinds, including 
forced and bonded labor, and there is no evidence that forced or bonded 
child labor takes place in the informal or agricultural sectors (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Legislation mandating a monthly 
minimum wage has been in force since the country's independence in 
1960. The Ministries of Labor and Finance determine wage rates after 
negotiating with the unions and management councils. The minimum wage 
is $0.37 (223.7 CFA francs) per hour. This wage still is not adequate 
to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    Within the formal sector, the law mandates a standard workweek of 
40 to 48 hours for most occupations, with at least one 24hour rest 
period and 1 month per year of annual leave; enrollment in government 
systems for social security and retirement; safety standards; and a 
variety of other measures. These regulations are incorporated into the 
Labor Code and are supervised by inspectors from the MOL. However, 
enforcement is uneven, especially outside the formal sector.
    There is no explicit legal protection for workers who file 
complaints about unsafe conditions. While there are legal regulations 
concerning workplace safety, government officials often do not enforce 
them. In theory workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe 
working conditions, but in practice the right seldom is exercised in 
circumstances of high unemployment and a slow legal system.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons; however, there were reports from Portugal that women from 
Senegal were trafficked there for purposes of forced prostitution.
                               __________

                               SEYCHELLES

    President France Albert Rene and the Seychelles People's 
Progressive Front (SPPF) have governed since a 1977 military coup. In 
the 1990's, the SPPF guided the country's return to a multiparty 
political system, which culminated in 1993 in the country's first free 
and fair presidential and parliamentary elections since 1977. President 
Rene and the SPPF won in 1993 and again in 1998 elections, which were 
judged by international and national observers to have been free and 
fair despite the fact that President Rene and the SPPF dominated the 
election. In 1998 Rene was reelected president with 67 percent of the 
ballots cast. The SPPF won 30 of the 34 National Assembly seats, 24 by 
direct election and 6 by proportional representation. The President and 
the SPPF dominate the country through a pervasive system of political 
patronage and control over government jobs, contracts, and resources. 
The judiciary is subject to executive interference.
    The President has complete control over the security apparatus, 
which includes a national guard force, the army, the Presidential 
Protection Unit, the coast guard, the marines, and the police. There is 
also an armed paramilitary Police Mobile Unit. Security forces on 
occasion were responsible for some human rights abuses.
    The economy provides the country's 80,410 residents with an average 
per capita income of more than $6,800 per year. The Government provides 
generally adequate social services. The Government in recent years has 
diversified the economy by increasing the revenues received from 
fishing rights and investing in the fish processing sector with foreign 
joint partners in order to move the economy away from its heavy 
reliance on tourism. Manufacturing now has surpassed tourism as the 
most important economic activity; however, no significant new 
investments were made during the year. Overall growth remained 
sluggish, largely due to shortages of foreign exchange and the 
pervasive presence of inefficient state enterprises. There was no 
progress toward privatization during the year. The country's 
application to join the World Trade Organization has forced it to 
consider reforming its trade and foreign exchange regimes; however, it 
has made few substantive changes to date.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. President Rene, 
whose party dominates the legislature, continued to wield power 
virtually unchecked. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained 
citizens; however, such actions were limited to detention during the 
weekend in order to avoid compliance with the Constitution's 24-hour 
``charge or release'' provision. The Government failed to investigate 
or punish those involved in the violations of citizens'' human rights 
during a law enforcement crackdown in 1998. The judiciary is 
inefficient, lacks resources, and is subject to executive influence. 
Violence against women increased and child abuse remained a problem. 
Discrimination against foreign workers also was a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly forbids torture; however, while 
there were no reported instances of the use of torture by the army, 
there was a report that police beat a man while he was in police 
custody in March on the island of La Digue. The family of the detainee 
sued the Commissioner of Police and the three police officers on duty 
at the time for $4,386 (SR 25,000) in damages. Police were 
investigating the claim at year's end; however, no action had been 
taken.
    The Government has failed to investigate or punish those members of 
the security forces who allegedly tortured suspects in custody in 1998. 
Several cases that were brought against the Government and the army by 
individuals who claimed to have been detained illegally and tortured in 
1998 remained pending. In two cases, the Government accepted liability, 
but the question of damages remained pending. In two other cases, the 
Government continued to contest both its liability and its 
responsibility for damages. In November 1999, a citizen fled to another 
country and sought refugee status, claiming that members of the 
security forces harassed him because they believed that he maintained 
documentation of human rights abuses by the security forces. The 
citizen was granted asylum in another country in January.
    Conditions at the Long Island prison, the only such facility in the 
country, remained Spartan. With approximately 166 inmates, the prison 
was considered overcrowded; approximately 32 prisoners were released 
during the last 3 months of the year to alleviate overcrowding. 
Prisoners have access to medical care. Family members were allowed 
monthly visits, and prisoners have access to reading but not writing 
materials. Men are held separately from women, and juveniles are held 
separately from adults. There were no reports of abuse of women or 
juveniles by guards or other inmates.
    There is no regular system of independent monitoring of prisons; 
however, local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) 
were allowed to visit. At least one visit was conducted during the 
year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides that persons arrested must be brought before a magistrate 
within 24 hours with allowances made for boat travel from distant 
islands. The law provides for detention without charge for up to 7 days 
if authorized by court order. Defense attorneys assert that extended 
periods of detention under harsh conditions are used to extort 
confessions from suspects. In some instances, the police continued to 
detain individuals on a Friday or Saturday in order to allow for a 
longer period of detention without charge, thereby avoiding compliance 
with the Constitution's 24-hour ``charge or release'' provision. The 
police released such persons on a Monday before the court could rule on 
a writ of habeas corpus.
    Detainees have the right of access to legal counsel, but security 
forces, in hopes of eliciting a confession or other information, 
sometimes withhold this right. Free counsel is provided to the 
indigent. Bail is available for most offenses.
    Several persons have brought civil cases against the police for 
unlawful arrest or entry, with limited success. The military's Chief of 
Staff was subpoenaed in November 1998 to appear in court to answer 
charges of contempt of the Supreme Court concerning the continued 
illegal detention of a man who had been ordered released by the court. 
This case and several others, involving claims for damages related to 
illegal detention and torture, were settled out of court during the 
year (see Section 1.c.).
    The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government does not employ 
it. Following the 1977 coup, a number of persons went into voluntary 
exile, and others were released from prison with the condition that 
they leave the country immediately. A number of these former exiles who 
returned to the country were able to reacquire their property; however, 
several claims remained in the court system at year's end.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, it is inefficient, lacks resources, and 
is subject to executive interference.
    The judicial system includes magistrates' courts, the Supreme 
Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Court of Appeal.
    Depending on the gravity of the offense, criminal cases are heard 
by magistrates' court or the Supreme Court. A jury is used in cases 
involving murder or treason. Trials are public, and the accused is 
considered innocent until proven guilty. Defendants have the right to 
counsel, to be present at their trial, to confront witnesses, and to 
appeal. The Constitutional Court convenes weekly or as necessary to 
consider constitutional issues only. The Court of Appeal convenes three 
times per year for 2 weeks in April, August, and October to consider 
appeals from the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court only.
    Defendants generally have the right to a fair trial. All judges are 
appointed for 7 years and can be reappointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the Constitutional Appointment Committee. All sitting 
judges were hired from other Commonwealth countries, including 
Mauritius, India, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and Zambia; none are citizens, 
with the exception of the Chief Justice, who is a naturalized citizen. 
The Seychelles Bar Association has criticized the Government for not 
advertising domestically that judicial positions are available, since 
30 citizens practice law either domestically or abroad. Some observers 
criticized expatriate judges for a perceived lack of sensitivity on 
issues such as human rights. Legal organs of the Government, such as 
the Attorney General's Office and the Ombudsman, are reluctant to 
pursue charges of wrongdoing or abuse of power against senior 
officials.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy and 
freedom from arbitrary searches. The law requires a warrant for police 
searches, and the authorities generally respected this requirement in 
practice. While in 1998 soldiers reportedly forcibly entered homes, and 
seized and detained citizens, no such incidents were reported during 
the year. The law requires that all electronic surveillance be 
justified on the grounds of preventing a serious crime and be approved 
by a judge. The Government maintained telephone surveillance of some 
political figures.
    Some members of opposition parties claimed that they lost their 
government jobs because of their political beliefs and are at a 
disadvantage when applying for government licenses and loans.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, it also provides for 
restrictions on speech ``for protecting the reputation, rights, and 
freedoms of private lives of persons'' and ``in the interest of 
defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public 
health,'' and as a result both freedom of speech and of the press are 
constrained by the ease with which civil lawsuits can be filed to 
penalize journalists for alleged libel. In February the National 
Assembly passed the Broadcasting and Telecommunication Bill, which 
allows the Minister of Information Technology to prohibit the broadcast 
of any material believed to be against the ``national interest'' or 
``objectionable;'' however, the bill was not used against journalists 
or the media during the year. The legislation also requires 
telecommunications companies to submit subscriber information to the 
Government. In most instances, citizens speak freely, including in 
Parliament.
    The Government has a near monopoly in the media, owning the only 
television and radio stations, the most important means for reaching 
the public, and the only daily newspaper, the Nation. The official 
media adhere closely to the Government's position on policy issues and 
give the opposition and news adverse to the Government only limited 
attention. While both opposition parties publish an assortment of 
newsletters and magazines, only one significant opposition newspaper, 
the weekly Regar, is in circulation. Government officials have sued 
Regar for libel nine times in the last 5 years. The most recent suit, 
in which the Minister of Agriculture and Marine Resources sued Regar in 
1999 for taking pictures of the house he was constructing, was settled 
out of court in October. The Minister dropped the suit in exchange for 
Regar's agreement not to publish the photos.
    In January the Government sued Regar's editor and publisher for 
contempt for failing to turn over to authorities a letter published by 
the paper. Regar officials argued that providing officials with the 
letter would violate their right to keep sources confidential. The 
Supreme Court dismissed the charge in April; however, the Attorney 
General's office sought a court order to obtain a copy of the letter. 
In August a judge ruled that the matter would be heard in the 
Constitutional Court; however, by year's end, no action had been taken.
    In February 1999, the National Assembly again rejected a motion 
presented by the leader of the opposition to reduce the license fee for 
a private radio or television station from $151,200 (SR 800,000) per 
year to that of a newspaper publishing license, $760 (SR 4,000) plus a 
bank guarantee of $19,000 (SR 100,000). The motion was refused. The 
high fees were a deterrent to the establishment of private radio and 
television.
    In November 1999, the opposition party filed suit with the 
Constitutional Court and claimed that the appointment of 8 civil 
servants and the President's wife to the 10-member board of the 
Seychelles Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) violated the constitutional 
requirement that state-owned media be managed by a body independent of 
the government. In August the court agreed to hear the case; however, 
no decision was reached by year's end.
    The Internet was available in the country, and the Government 
permitted access to it without restriction.
    Academic freedom is limited due to the fact that one cannot reach 
senior positions in the academic bureaucracy without demonstrating at 
least nominal loyalty to the SPPF. There are no universities; secondary 
school teacher appointments largely are apolitical. The Government 
controls access to the Polytechnic, the most advanced learning 
institution.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the 
Government respected these rights in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.
    The Government has not demonstrated favoritism toward one religion 
over another in the past, but in May the opposition Seychelles National 
Party (SNP), which is led by an Anglican minister, claimed that the 
Government gave a grant of $164,000 (SR 900,000) to the Baha'i faith in 
1999, following its incorporation. According to the SNP, this grant has 
not been offered to other faiths that have been established recently in 
the country. The Government has not responded to the SNP's claim.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement, and there was no known abridgment of domestic or 
international travel; however, although it was not used to refuse a 
passport application, the 1991 Passport Act allows the Government to 
deny passports to any citizen if the Minister of Defense finds that 
such denial is ``in the national interest.'' While the resident 
departure tax of $95 (SR 500) is payable in local currency, government 
foreign exchange regulations and the foreign exchange shortage hinder 
many citizens from being able to afford foreign travel, although they 
might have sufficient means in local currency. According to a law in 
effect since May 1999, citizens cannot possess any foreign exchange 
unless in possession of a receipt from a licensed foreign exchange 
vendor. In addition banks provided only $95 (SR 500) to a maximum $200 
(SR 1,146) to those departing the country because of the extreme 
foreign exchange shortage.
    The law contains provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. As there have been no recent 
refugee cases, there were no reports of government cooperation with the 
UNHCR; however, there are no indications that the Government would not 
cooperate.
    There were no known requests for asylum, and there are no refugees 
in the country. The issue of first asylum did not arise during the 
year. The Immigration Act does not discuss asylum. There are no known 
instances of persons being forcibly deported to a country where they 
feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens exercised the right to change their government in the 1993 
and 1998 National Assembly and presidential elections, which were 
judged by international and national observers to have been free and 
fair, despite the fact that President Rene and the SPPF dominated the 
elections. Suffrage is universal.
    A joint Commonwealth and Francophone observer group for the 1998 
elections noted that the elections took place on a more level playing 
field than in 1993. The group's principal criticism was that the 
Government adopted a program of accelerated means-testing for social 
benefits during the final week of the campaign and approved a number of 
new applications in an attempt to increase political support. The group 
urged an improvement in the effective separation of state and party 
political functions.
    The President's SPPF party continued to utilize its political 
resources and those of the Government to develop a nationwide 
organization that extends to the village level. The opposition parties 
have been unable to match the SPPF's organization and patronage, in 
part because of financial limitations. In 1999 the Government 
substantially reduced funding for political parties in the budget, from 
$1.8 million (SR 9.5 million) per year to $95,000 (SR 500,000). In this 
year's budget, the SPPF was allocated $54,202 (SR 308,952), the 
Seychelles National Party (SNP) $22,889 (SR 130,470), and the 
Democratic Party $10,628 (SR 60,578).
    In the March 1998 parliamentary elections, the SNP--then known as 
the United Opposition--won one directly elected seat and two 
proportionally elected seats, thereby becoming the leading opposition 
party. Former Prime Minister James Mancham's Democratic Party won only 
one proportional seat, and Mancham lost the role of leader of the 
opposition to the SNP's Wavel Ramkalawan. Ramkalawan has played 
effectively the role of chief government critic as leader of the 
opposition.
    In May the National Assembly amended the Constitution to allow the 
President to call presidential elections separately from National 
Assembly elections at any time after the first year of his 5-year term 
in office.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in 
politics; however, women are underrepresented in government and 
politics. Women hold 3 of the 12 ministerial positions and 8 of the 34 
seats in the National Assembly, 6 by direct election and 2 by 
proportional election. There are no legal restrictions on the 
participation of minority groups in politics; however, they are 
underrepresented. All members of the Cabinet are members of the SPPF.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Two private human rights related organizations, the first of their 
kind in the country, were launched in December 1998. The Friends for a 
Democratic Society pledged to focus on raising awareness of individual 
rights in a democracy, but has thus far proved to be an inactive 
organization. In April 1999, the Center for Rights and Development 
(CEFRAD) published a 5-year action plan that stresses respect for human 
rights, participation in a civil society, and sensible approaches to 
development. CEFRAD also established ties with other national and 
international NGO's. Historically, both the churches and some NGO's 
have been strong voices for human rights and democratization, and the 
Government has not interfered with their activities. There were no 
known requests by international human rights groups to visit the 
country.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution affirms the right to be free from all types of 
discrimination, but it does not prohibit discrimination based on these 
factors specifically. Nevertheless, in practice there is no overt 
discrimination in housing, employment, education, or other social 
services based on race, sex, ethnicity, nationality, or religious 
identification.
    Women.--Violence against women, particularly wife beating, remains 
a problem and increased during the year. Police seldom intervene in 
domestic disputes, unless the dispute involves a weapon or major 
assault. The few cases that reach a prosecutor often are dismissed, or, 
if a case reaches court, the perpetrator usually is given only a light 
sentence. Rape, spousal rape, and domestic abuse are criminal offenses. 
As of September 30, the Probation Services recorded 100 domestic 
violence cases against women, an increase from the previous year. A 
survey of six church parishes conducted in 1999 by the Association for 
the Promotion of Solid Humane Families, an NGO, revealed that 25 
percent of those surveyed stated that they have been victims of 
domestic violence, confirming the general belief that the problem is 
more widespread than official statistics indicate. Participants in the 
NGO survey stated that alcohol was one of the main causes of domestic 
violence. There was growing societal concern about domestic violence 
and increased recognition of the need to address it. During the year, 
local NGO's sponsored awareness campaigns and training programs for 
women and girls.
    The society is largely matriarchal, with 75 percent of births out-
of-wedlock in 1998. There were no reports of societal discrimination 
against unwed mothers, and fathers are required by law to support their 
children. The age of consent was lowered from 16 to 14 in 1993, and 13 
percent of all births in 1998 occurred to women under 20 years of age. 
Girls are not allowed to attend school when they are pregnant, and many 
do not return to school after the birth of a child. There is no 
officially sanctioned discrimination in employment, and women are well-
represented in business. Inheritance laws do not discriminate against 
women.
    Children.--Children have legal protection from labor and physical 
abuse, and they are required to attend school. Free public education is 
available through the secondary level until age 18. Since January 1999, 
parents contributed up to two-thirds of the cost of postsecondary 
education and training based on their income for both in country and 
overseas schools. Children are encouraged to attend school to the tenth 
grade. According to government figures, all children between the ages 
of 6 and 16 attend school, and the enrollment of boys and girls is 
roughly equal. In 1995 the Government created an institutional 
framework for aiding children, and, in 1998, the National Assembly 
established an 18-member family tribunal to hear and determine all 
matters relating to the care, custody, access, and maintenance of 
children; only paternity cases remain under the courts. The tribunal 
became operational in November 1998 after the Minister of Employment 
and Social Affairs appointed the members. During the year, 2,461 cases 
were presented to the tribunal. Of these 95 dealt with child abuse; the 
tribunal started hearing child abuse cases in May.
    Sexual abuse of young girls, usually in low-income families, is a 
serious problem. Although only 20 cases of sexual abuse were reported 
as of October, Ministry of Health data and press reports indicate that 
there are a significant number of rapes committed against girls under 
the age of 15. Very few child abuse cases actually are prosecuted in 
court. The strongest public advocate for young victims is not the 
Government but a semiautonomous agency, the National Council for 
Children. There is criticism that the police fail to investigate 
vigorously charges of child abuse.
    There were no reports of child prostitution or child pornography.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate 
against persons with disabilities in housing, jobs, or education; 
however, there is no legislation providing for access to public 
buildings, transportation, or government services.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The education gap between 
Creoles and citizens of white or Asian origin continued to narrow. The 
Government is attempting to reduce this gap through universal access to 
public education. Creoles are well-integrated into society, business, 
and politics.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Under the 1993 Industrial Relations 
Act (IRA), workers have the right to form and join unions of their 
choosing. Police, military, prison, and fire-fighting personnel may not 
unionize. Under the act, the former government-controlled union, the 
National Workers Union, lost its monopoly position. Between 15 and 20 
percent of the workforce is unionized.
    There are two unions: One dominated by the SPPF, the Seychelles 
Federation of Workers Union (SFWU), and one independent, the Seychelles 
Workers Union (SWU). Another independent union, the Public Service 
Union, was disbanded in 1997 after repeated discrimination against the 
union's office holders, according to one independent unionist. An 
attempt in 1999 to organize an independent union incorporating 
employees from both governmental ministries and government-owned 
entities was thwarted by government legal action in the same year.
    Workers are not permitted to strike.
    Unions can affiliate freely with international bodies. While the 
Government did not invite the SWU to join the delegation attending the 
1999 annual meeting of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the 
SWU participated with the SFWU in an ILO seminar held in June.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The IRA 
provides workers with the right to engage in collective bargaining; 
however, in practice free collective bargaining normally does not take 
place. The Government has the right to review and approve all 
collective bargaining agreements in the public and private sectors. 
There is little flexibility in setting wages. In the public sector, 
which employs 57 percent of the labor force, the Government sets 
mandatory wage scales for employees. Wages in the private sector 
generally are set by the employer in individual agreements with the 
employee, but in the few larger businesses, wage scales are subject to 
the Government's right of review and approval. Private employers 
historically have paid higher wages than the Government in order to 
attract qualified workers. However, economic problems during the year 
led to continued downward pressures on wages.
    The 1987 and 1995 Employment Acts constitute the basic labor law. 
They authorize the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs to 
establish and enforce employment terms, conditions, and benefits. 
Workers frequently have obtained recourse against their employers 
through the ministry.
    While the law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers 
against union members, there was widespread discrimination against the 
members of the independent public sector union, the Public Service 
Union, before it was disbanded in 1997.
    There are 20 companies that participate in an export processing 
zone known as the Seychelles International Zone (SITZ). The SITZ is 
bound only by the Seychelles Trade Zone Act and is not obliged to 
adhere to property, tax, business, immigration, and labor laws, 
including the Employment Act. In 1999 one of the companies based in the 
SITZ, Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT), discharged workers who had come from 
Madagascar. IOT claimed that the workers were engaging in prostitution, 
and they were returned to Madagascar. The workers alleged that they 
were being mistreated and were not receiving their salaries.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to exist. Following its 
ratification of ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor, 
the Government considered forced or bonded labor by children to be 
illegal. There have been no reports of forced or bonded labor by 
children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Article 31 of the Constitution states that the minimum age 
for employment is 15, ``subject to exceptions for children who are 
employed part time in light work prescribed by law without harm to 
their health, morals, or education.'' It is a criminal offense 
punishable by a fine of $1,130 (SR 6,000) to employ a child under the 
age of 15.
    Children are encouraged to attend school until the 10th grade. The 
National Youth Service was disbanded in January 1999 and replaced with 
a noncompulsory fifth year of secondary school. After completing 
secondary school, students can go to the Polytechnic School for 
Vocational Training, abroad for university studies, or to 
apprenticeship or short-term work programs. Children in the latter 
program receive a training stipend, which is below the minimum wage. 
The Government enforces child labor laws through inspections by the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs.
    On September 28, the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the 
worst forms of child labor. The Ministry of Employment and Social 
Services was responsible for investigating abuses of child labor. The 
Ministry reported that it handled such complaints within its general 
budget and staffing; however, at year's end, there was no information 
on the number of cases investigated.
    Following ratification of ILO Convention 182, the Government 
prohibited forced and bonded labor by children, and such practices are 
not known to occur.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The complicated minimum wage 
scale is regulated administratively by the Government; it covers the 
public and state-owned sectors and differentiates among various job 
classifications. The Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs enforces 
minimum wage regulations. The official minimum wage is $360 (SR 1,900) 
per month. Trade unions contend that government entities pay some 
workers less than the legal minimum wage. Even with the free public 
services that are available, primarily health care and education, 
independent labor unions dispute that a single salary at the low end of 
the pay scale provides a worker and family with a minimum decent 
standard of living.
    In recent years, there has been a growing trend in government 
policy to admit foreign workers, primarily from China, India, the 
Philippines, and Madagascar, to work in the construction and commercial 
fishing sectors, because few citizens choose to work in these sectors. 
Although it is difficult to determine the living and working conditions 
of these workers, there is evidence that the labor laws are flouted 
routinely with the Government's knowledge and acquiescence. These 
workers are paid lower wages and forced to work longer hours than 
citizens.
    In March about 100 Indian construction workers stopped working to 
protest their inability to send their earnings home to their families. 
Most of the workers were employed by a government-affiliated 
construction company, which reportedly agreed to permit the workers to 
repatriate most of their earnings; however, the workers claimed that 
they were allowed to repatriate less than a third of their salaries and 
only if they worked 7 days a week. In April half of the workers 
returned to India after authorities informed them that their contracts 
had expired. The remaining workers also returned to India in April when 
it became clear that their demands would not be met.
    The legal maximum workweek varies from 45 to 52 hours, depending on 
the economic sector, while government employees work shorter hours. 
Each full-time worker is entitled to a half-hour break per day and a 
minimum of 21 days of paid annual leave. Workers are permitted to work 
overtime up to 60 additional hours per month. The Government generally 
enforces these regulations. Foreign workers do not enjoy the same legal 
protections.
    The Government issued comprehensive occupational health and safety 
regulations in 1991. The Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs has 
formal responsibility for enforcing these regulations; however, the 
Ministry of Health seeks a role in this area. An ILO team, which 
visited in early 1995, found serious deficiencies in the management and 
effectiveness of government monitoring and enforcement efforts. 
Occupational injuries are most common in the construction, marine, and 
port industries. A worker who removes himself from a potentially 
dangerous situation on the job is considered to have resigned. Safety 
and health inspectors rarely visit job sites. Two work-related deaths 
were reported officially during the year.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, through, or within the country.
                               __________

                              SIERRA LEONE

    Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected 
president and a unicameral legislature; however, due to continuing 
civil conflict, the democratically elected government did not control 
the whole country effectively at any time during the year. This 
situation continued despite a cease-fire that went into effect on May 
24, 1999, and the July 7, 1999 signing of a peace accord by the 
Government and insurgents led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 
who have fought successive governments since 1991. The President's 
party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, has held a majority in the 
Parliament since the 1996 elections. In May 1997, a group of army 
officers, which called itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC), overthrew the elected government in a coup, driving it into 
exile in Guinea. The AFRC then invited the RUF to join the junta. The 
RUF/AFRC junta then was driven out of Freetown by forces of the 
Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), composed mainly of units from the armed forces of Nigeria, in 
February 1998. The Government was restored to power in March 1998, but 
fighting between government and rebels continued. Government-insurgent 
fighting, albeit on a significantly reduced scale, continued after the 
July 1999 Lome Accord, which included the RUF in a power-sharing 
arrangement in the Government. Following the signing of the Lome 
Agreement, many RUF leaders and fighters moved into Freetown.
    In 1999 the U.N. Security Council approved a peacekeeping 
operation, the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and approved 
strength increases several times during the year. ECOMOG completely 
withdrew its forces from the country in April. During the year, there 
were several armed clashes between government forces and rebel forces, 
including the RUF. In the first half of the year, tensions rose between 
the Government and the RUF, and in a series of separate incidents in a 
10-day period from late April to early May, more than 700 U.N. 
peacekeepers were taken hostage by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were 
killed in these incidents and at other times during the year. In May 
RUF leader Foday Sankoh was arrested after demonstrators were killed 
outside of his residence, and he remained in government custody at 
year's end. In November the Government and the RUF signed the Abuja 
Agreement, which included a 30-day cease-fire that largely still was 
being observed at year's end; however, the RUF did not respect other 
terms agreed to in the Abuja Agreement, including disarming and 
allowing peacekeepers into the part of the country under their control. 
At year's end, the RUF still controlled almost two-thirds of the 
country. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program 
called for in the Lome Accord includes provisions to protect the human 
rights of the former combatants. Prior to May, nearly 25,000 ex-
combatants of an estimated 45,000 had disarmed and entered the 
demobilization process. With the de facto withdrawal by the RUF from 
observance of the Lome Accord in May, many of the demobilized 
combatants rearmed and rejoined either the RUF or the West Side Boys, a 
splinter group of the ex-SLA. The officially independent judiciary 
functioned only in part of the country but demonstrated substantial 
independence in practice.
    Among the Government's security forces, the police officially had 
primary responsibility for internal order; however, due to the 
continuing insurgency, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the Civil Defense 
Forces (CDF), and ECOMOG shared de facto responsibility with the police 
in security matters until the April withdrawal of ECOMOG troops from 
the country when UNAMSIL assumed responsibility. The CDF were 
traditional hunting societies loyal to paramount chiefs--traditional 
leaders with administrative and judicial powers--which formed into 
independent militias under a national structure. The Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which staged a 1997 military coup, no 
longer exists. During the year, SLA units were reorganized and began 
undergoing a training program provided with the assistance of a foreign 
government; the program was ongoing at year's end. While government, 
ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL forces committed serious human rights abuses, the 
incidences of abuses were significantly less than during the previous 
year.
    Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country, with a market-based 
economy and a per capita income of less than $150 per year. Only an 
estimated 15 percent of adults are literate. Although the country is 
rich in natural resources and minerals (particularly diamonds, gold, 
rutile, and bauxite) and has large areas of fertile land suitable for 
farming, the 9-year insurgency brought mineral extraction and 
agricultural production almost to a standstill, except for illicit 
diamond mining. There is little manufacturing, and there are few 
exports; approximately 70 percent of the Government's budget comes from 
foreign assistance. Years of fighting, corruption, and mismanagement 
have resulted in a crumbling infrastructure.
    The Government's human rights record was poor in several areas; 
while there were significant improvements in some areas, serious 
problems remained. Poorly trained or poorly led members of government 
forces and international forces committed most serious abuses. There 
were reports that government and ECOMOG forces operating in support of 
the Government committed extrajudicial killings and reportedly 
summarily executed suspected rebels and their collaborators. 
Government, ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL forces at times beat noncombatants; 
however, there were fewer reports of human rights violations involving 
the SLA in the latter half of the year due to training and 
reorganization. Prison and jail conditions remained harsh and sometimes 
life threatening. Government and ECOMOG forces continued to 
occasionally arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. Prolonged detention 
and long delays in trials, due to the inability of the judicial system 
to function in some parts of the country and during some parts of the 
year, remained problems. Government security forces on a few occasions 
harassed, arrested, and beat some journalists and used libel laws 
against journalists; however, the Government took significant steps to 
end the restrictions on press freedom from the previous year. Violence 
and discrimination against women and prostitution remained problems. 
CDF units continued to induct child soldiers. Female genital mutilation 
continued to be a widespread practice. Discrimination against ethnic 
minorities persists. There was some forced labor in rural areas. Child 
labor persists.
    During the year, an ex-SLA splinter group called the West Side Boys 
and RUF rebels committed numerous serious abuses, including killings, 
abductions, deliberate mutilations, and rape. Rebel forces abducted 
civilians, missionaries, aid workers from nongovernmental agencies, and 
U.N. personnel; ambushed humanitarian relief convoys; raided refugee 
sites; and extorted and stole food. The RUF forces continued the 
longstanding practice of abducting villagers (including women and 
children) and using them as forced laborers, child soldiers, and sex 
slaves. Rebel atrocities prompted the internal displacement of hundreds 
of thousands of civilians over the past several years; however, such 
displacement was reduced significantly during the year. As many as half 
a million persons fled in past years to neighboring countries to escape 
the civil conflict and remained outside the country on their own or in 
refugee camps, primarily in Guinea and Liberia.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were reports 
that both government forces and ECOMOG forces operating in support of 
the Government committed extrajudicial killings. There were reports in 
the first half of the year that both SLA and CDF forces summarily 
executed suspected rebels and rebel collaborators; however, because of 
the insecurity in most of the country, it was difficult to gather 
detailed information on abuses or to corroborate reports. There also 
were reports in the first quarter of the year that ECOMOG soldiers 
summarily executed suspected rebels. There were no reports of 
extrajudicial killings after July by the newly trained and reorganized 
SLA units or CDF forces.
    There is credible evidence that on several occasions throughout the 
year a government helicopter gunship fired on possible RUF positions 
within urban areas, including one market area, causing many civilian 
deaths (see Sections 1.g. and 2.d.). For example, there were reports 
that on July 9, the SLA attacked suspected rebel positions in Bunumbu 
with a gunship and killed a number of civilians, along with several RUF 
rebels. In attacks in May and June, there were reports that a gunship 
killed 27 persons and wounded 50 persons in the towns of Makeni, 
Magburaka, and Kambia.
    On July 17, there was an unconfirmed report that CDF soldiers 
executed a RUF fighter who allegedly had been trying to surrender.
    There were reports that ECOMOG soldiers committed human rights 
abuses, including killings, during the first quarter of the year. In 
January an ECOMOG soldier reportedly stabbed a civilian in a market 
without provocation; the man later died from his injuries. On April 28, 
ECOMOG personnel shot and killed one exSLA soldier and wounded another 
during an argument over a stolen vehicle; a riot ensued, and several 
persons were injured.
    There were credible reports that the RUF and ex-SLA rebels 
committed a substantial number of summary executions of civilians in 
rebelheld areas throughout the country. However, because of the 
insecurity, access to rebel areas has been difficult, and in most cases 
the identities of the victims were difficult to establish. There were 
credible reports of persons being tortured or killed for attempting to 
flee RUF-occupied areas (see Section 2.d.).
    On May 8, RUF rebels shot and killed at least 20 demonstrators 
outside of Foday Sankoh's residence in Freetown, including a 
journalist, and injured at least 80 others (see Sections 2.a. and 
2.b.).
    In a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late 
April to early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage 
by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents and at 
other times during the year.
    On May 25, RUF rebels shot and killed two journalists, Kurt Schork 
of Reuters and Miguel Gil Moreno of Associated Press Television Network 
and injured two others during an attack on a SLA patrol. There were 
reports that on June 15, rebels attacked Port Loko; reportedly there 
were 15 casualties, and 10 rebels were captured. In August there were 
unconfirmed reports that suspected RUF rebels killed 9 civilians and 
abducted 15 others in an attack on the village of Folloh.
    Some victims of rebel kidnap attempts also were killed (see Section 
1.b.).
    There were unconfirmed reports that RUF rebels also summarily 
executed other RUF rebels. For example, on February 4, RUF rebels 
stopped UNAMSIL vehicles and relieved the soldiers of their weapons. 
There were unconfirmed reports that the rebels may have been executed 
by other RUF rebels for disobeying orders not to interfere with UNAMSIL 
vehicles.
    Over the course of the decade-long conflict, rebel mutilations 
caused hundreds if not thousands of deaths; however, there were fewer 
reports of mutilations during the year.
    At the beginning of November, the Guinean army bombed several 
villages in the northern part of the country in a bombing campaign 
against rebels from Sierra Leone and Liberia. In December Guinean 
troops attacked Rosint village in the northern part of the country, 
killed several civilians, abducted over 50 persons, and burned over 30 
houses.
    b. Disappearance.--The RUF and West Side Boys continued to detain 
illegally individuals as part of a wide-scale harassment and terror 
campaign against the civilian population in certain areas of the 
country where they operated. Ex-SLA and RUF forces also continued the 
longstanding practice of kidnaping children, women, and men and 
compelling them to work as slave labor (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 
6.f.). Women also were forced to act as sexual slaves. Unlike in the 
previous year, there were no confirmed reports that rebels kidnaped 
persons to use them as shields to prevent government attacks. The 
United Nations estimates that rebel forces abducted some 20,000 persons 
throughout the country during the 1991-1999 period. Only about 1,400 of 
them have been released and have gone through a formal reintegration 
process; most of those released were children. Many others have 
escaped, but the U.N. believes that many of those abducted still remain 
prisoners despite the Lome Accord's directive that all captives and 
prisoners of war be released.
    On January 18, RUF rebels abducted a group of four aid workers from 
CARITAS and their driver, held them for several hours, and accused them 
of being spies. On January 31, armed rebels detained some UNAMSIL 
soldiers for several hours and relieved them of their weapons. There 
were reports that in February rebels attacked a bus near Masiaka and 
abducted 11 persons. On March 7, RUF rebels abducted five humanitarian 
workers but released them the following day.
    In a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late 
April to early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage 
by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents. By 
August 1, all of the peacekeepers had been rescued or released.
    On July 24, West Side Boys rebels reportedly abducted 18 passengers 
during a bus attack. At the end of July, the West Side Boys attacked a 
group of foreign workers and detained one person. On August 25, the 
West Side Boys abducted 11 foreign soldiers and 1 SLA officer. Five 
soldiers were released several days later; the remaining hostages were 
rescued during a mission that resulted in the death of a British 
paratrooper, injuries to 11 foreign soldiers, the deaths of 25 rebels, 
and the capture of 18 other rebels. In August there were unconfirmed 
reports that suspected RUF rebels killed 9 civilians and abducted 15 
others in an attack on the village of Folloh.
    There were reports that at the beginning of June, pro-government 
militiamen released approximately 140 children, many of whom were ex-
soldiers, to the U.N. Children's Fund.
    According to the U.N. Children's Fund, as of December approximately 
4,000 children registered as missing during the war had yet to be 
located. Rebels released a number of child soldiers during the year. 
For example, in January ex-SLA rebels released approximately 150 
children.
    In addition to demanding ransom payments for civilians they 
abducted, in past years, rebel forces targeted Roman Catholic priests 
and nuns, largely on the assumption that the Church would pay ransom 
for their return and because troops from ECOMOG used their missionary 
radio network in support of the Government (see Section 2.c.).
    There were reports that Guinean troops abducted persons from Sierra 
Leone after attacks by RUF and Guinean dissidents.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were 
credible reports that government entities, including the SLA, the CDF, 
and ECOMOG forces occasionally tortured, beat, and otherwise abused 
noncombatants suspected of being rebels. According to human rights 
observers, the conduct of the SLA improved during the second half of 
the year after training and reorganization.
    There were reports that attacks during the year by a government 
helicopter gunship on possible RUF positions in urban areas caused 
civilian and rebel injuries and deaths (see Section 1.a.). For example, 
there were reports that in attacks in May and June, a gunship killed 27 
persons and wounded 50 persons in the towns of Makeni, Magburaka, and 
Kambia.
    Reports of abuses by the CDF continued to rise throughout the year. 
There was an increase in the number of rapes committed by CDF forces, 
which in past years reportedly had not engaged in rape. For example, in 
July some CDF members raped three women that they accused of 
transporting goods to rebel-held areas. There were reports that on 
October 10, four CDF members beat and detained a journalist and 
released him after 2 days (see Section 2.a.).
    There were reports that CDF forces manned roadblocks and bridges 
and routinely extorted large sums of money from travelers. Drivers 
often were subjected to abuse, including beatings, when they were 
unable to pay. For example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that on 
August 15, CDF forces severely beat two truck drivers and detained one 
of them for several hours because they could not produce the requested 
bribe.
    On April 28, ECOMOG personnel killed one exSLA soldier and wounded 
another during an argument over a stolen vehicle; a riot ensued, and 
several persons were injured (see Section 1.a.).
    There were reports that UNAMSIL soldiers committed human rights 
abuses against suspected rebels in May. An investigation was ordered by 
UNAMSIL; however, no further information was available by year's end.
    On May 17, British paratroopers reportedly injured at least one 
civilian during a confrontation with RUF rebels at Lungi Lo.
    On February 4, ex-SLA rebels allegedly became angry after not 
receiving the payment promised to them for disarming and began throwing 
stones at vehicles. The rebels robbed several passengers and pulled at 
least one person from a vehicle and beat him.
    RUF and ex-SLA combatants such as the West Side Boys also committed 
numerous abuses against civilians during the year. On February 24, 
foreign observers visited 15 RUF combatants who were being held by 
their RUF colleagues for having tried to join the disarmament process 
and who were severely beaten. On March 8, rebels abducted Aaron Kargbo 
and Aruna Sherrif, both Adventist Development and Relief Agency staff 
members, and left them in critical condition on the side of a road. In 
a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late April to 
early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage by RUF 
rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents. On May 8, RUF 
rebels injured at least 80 demonstrators outside of Foday Sankoh's 
residence in Freetown and killed at least 20 others (see Sections 2.a. 
and 2.b.). On July 24, the West Side Boys attacked a bus, injuring 
three passengers.
    RUF forces and ex-SLA combatants such as the West Side Boys 
continued to use rape as a terror tactic against women. There were many 
credible reports of gang rapes and that groups of women were raped.
    During the year, although there were fewer reports of deliberate 
mutilation, including the chopping off of hands, arms, ears, and legs; 
attempted and successful decapitations; and severe cuts with machetes 
by the RUF, there was no indication that the practice was discontinued 
completely. U.N. officials and humanitarian organizations estimated 
that hundreds if not thousands of individuals, including children, had 
one or both limbs amputated over the decade-long conflict. During the 
overall course of the conflict, it has been estimated that for every 
one of those wounded who eventually succeeded in securing medical aid, 
at least three or four died en route from their wounds, shock, the 
hazards of the journey, or from lack of adequate medical assistance. 
There were credible reports that the RUF continued the practice of 
carving the initials ``RUF'' into the skin of civilians it abducted.
    There were reports of injuries sustained in RUF-held areas that 
were attributed to landmines; however, observers believe that they were 
caused by unexploded ordnances.
    On October 7, there were reports that relatives of the Minister of 
Transport and Communication beat a journalist, Mustapha Bai Attila (see 
Section 2.a.). No police or judicial action was taken against the 
individuals.
    Prison and police lockup facilities conditions generally are harsh; 
at best they are Spartan, and at worst life threatening. The Pademba 
Road maximum security prison, which was designed for 325 prisoners, 
routinely houses hundreds more. Diet and medical care were inadequate, 
and only a handful of toilets were available for use. Male and female 
quarters were separate. Adults and juveniles were incarcerated 
together; however, there were no reports of the abuse of juveniles in 
prison. Convicted felons, those in the middle of the judicial process, 
and those who had not yet been charged formally also were incarcerated 
together. Other prison facilities were equally rudimentary, and 
conditions in the holding cells in police offices were extremely poor.
    The Government generally has permitted prison visits; however, the 
Government did not allow the International Committee for the Red Cross 
(ICRC), U.N. human rights officials, and other observers to visit the 
prisons, assess conditions, and see inmates between May and August. 
UNAMSIL human rights officials were permitted to visit Pademba Road 
Prison in August; during their visit they found 30 minors, 13 of whom 
were suspected RUF child combatants, incarcerated with adults. The ICRC 
declined to visit Pademba Road Prison because the Government would not 
accept ICRC conditions, including private visits with prisoners.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Government and ECOMOG 
forces continued at times to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. 
Although the Constitution and the law provide for a speedy trial, in 
practice the lack of judicial officers and facilities often produced 
long delays in the judicial process. Due to the civil conflict, the 
judicial system did not function in some parts of the country at any 
time during the year and functioned in other parts of the country only 
during part of the year. Many criminal suspects were held for months 
before their cases were examined or formal charges were filed.
    In May officers from the Criminal Investigation Department arrested 
editor Abdul Kouyateh for endangering state security by requesting an 
interview with Foday Sankoh; he was released on October 11 (see Section 
2.a.).
    The CDF, which does not have arrest and detention authorities, in 
particular was criticized for having arrested and detained prisoners. 
On August 15, HRW reported that CDF forces severely beat two truck 
drivers and detained one of them for several hours because they could 
not produce the requested bribe. On October 10, four CDF members beat 
and abducted a journalist after he published an article about the 
Kamajors, one of the ethnic groups in the CDF, and the SLA, but 
released him after 2 days.
    There were credible reports that ECOMOG forces detained civilians 
fleeing rebel-held territory and subjected them to harsh treatment in 
the belief they were rebel collaborators (see Section 1.c.).
    It was reported that a large number of RUF rebels were held in 
detention without charge throughout the country. Over a hundred 
suspected RUF in detention were released in August; however, many 
others still were believed to be held, including suspected child 
combatants (see Section 1.d.). For example, on April 8, there was a 
skirmish between RUF rebels and UNAMSIL, and there were reports that at 
least one RUF member was detained. At the end of July, 23 suspected RUF 
women and girls were arrested and detained at the Lungi police station.
    As of December 1, 568 persons were detained in Pademba Road Prison, 
including 22 women and 13 children. A total of 291 persons, mostly RUF 
members and supporters of other armed groups, remained in detention 
without charge at year's end under emergency powers declared by the 
Government. Reportedly these detainees have been held incommunicado, 
have not been informed of their legal status, and do not have access to 
legal advice.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice; however, the judiciary functioned only in part of the 
country, but demonstrated substantial independence in practice when it 
did function.
    The judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, appeals courts, 
and a high court whose justices are chosen by the Head of State. Local 
courts administer traditional law with lay judges; appeals from these 
lower courts move to the superior courts.
    Although there often are lengthy delays between arrests, the 
impositions of charges, and judicial proceedings, trials are usually 
free and fair; however, there is evidence that corruption has 
influenced some cases. Traditional justice systems continued to 
supplement the central government judiciary extensively in cases 
involving family law, inheritance, and land tenure, especially in rural 
areas.
    The right of appeal from a court-martial to the Court of Appeal was 
deleted from the Armed Forces Act of 1961 by the Royal Sierra Leone 
Military Forces Act of 1971; however, in July Parliament approved the 
Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, which 
reinstated the right of members of the armed forces to appeal a 
sentence handed by a court-martial to the Court of Appeal.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution and law prohibit such practices, and 
government authorities generally respected these prohibitions.
    Throughout the year, there were numerous instances in which rebel 
forces invaded, looted, and destroyed private property and terrorized 
civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
    The kidnaping and forced conscription of children into rebel forces 
were serious problems (see Sections 1.b., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). For years 
rebels have kidnaped young boys and girls to augment their forces and 
at times forced them to abduct other children. Frequently commanders 
also had boys act as bodyguards. The RUF utilized ``Small Boy Units'' 
(SBU's) and ``Small Girl Units'' (SGU's), which served in combat.
    There were reports that Guinean troops destroyed private property 
and burned homes (see Section 1.a.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--There were reports that Government, UNAMSIL, and 
ECOMOG troops, which continued to perform a peacekeeping role in the 
country until April, committed some human rights abuses against RUF 
collaborators and suspected rebels. There were reports that a 
government helicopter gunship reportedly fired on possible RUF 
positions within urban areas, causing rebel and civilian casualties and 
contributing to the displacement of some of the population from RUF-
held areas (see Section 1.a.).
    The CDF continued to accept, train, and induct children into its 
ranks despite having pledged in June 1999 to stop the practice.
    RUF rebel forces and West Side Boys routinely committed numerous 
serious abuses, and sought to coerce, intimidate, and terrorize those 
who either refused to cooperate with them or supported the Government. 
While these abuses continued during the year, reports were 
significantly lower than in previous years. In large parts of the 
country outside the effective control of the Government, these groups 
kidnaped children and women to work for them and men to carry 
equipment; raped women as a means of punishment and to inspire fear and 
cooperation; and forcibly inducted children into their ranks under 
penalty of their own mutilation or death (see Sections 1.c., 1.f., and 
5). They forced individuals to commit atrocities under penalty of their 
own mutilation or death; harassed peacekeepers; and seized 
peacekeepers'' weapons. The RUF continued its practice of amputations 
and mutilations, although at a greatly reduced rate from the past year 
(see Section 1.c.). There were reports of injuries from unexploded 
ordnances laid by RUF rebels (see Section 1.c.).
    Relief organizations suspended activities in parts of the country 
at several times during the year due to increased fighting and the 
obstruction of access by rebels. For example, in early March, Medecins 
Sans Frontieres (MSF) suspended activities in parts of the country due 
to the hostage taking by rebels and other instances of looting, 
threats, detention of staff, and extortion (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., 
1.d., and 1.f.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press
    The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; 
however, Government security forces on a few occasions harassed, 
arrested, and beat some journalists and used libel laws against 
journalists. The Government took some steps to end the restrictions of 
the previous year. The written press and radio reported freely on 
security matters, corruption, and political affairs generally without 
interference.
    On February 16, authorities arrested the managing editor of Rolyc 
Newspaper, Ayodele Lukobi Johnson, and reporter Ayodele Walters charged 
them with ``sedition, libel, and publishing false news'' after they 
published a negative article about President Kabbah. In May officers 
from the Criminal Investigation Department arrested Abdul Kouyateh, the 
acting editor of the private Freetown weekly Wisdom Newspaper, for 
endangering state security by requesting an interview with Foday 
Sankoh. He was released on October 11.
    On October 7, relatives of the Minister of Transport and 
Communication beat Mustapha Bai Attila, a blind reporter from the radio 
station Voice of the Handicapped, who on several occasions had exposed 
corruption at the parastatal company Sierratel.
    Joseph Mboka, a journalist who was detained in May 1999, was 
released after 2 weeks. Emmanuel Sanossi, a journalist from Cameroon 
who was detained in August 1999, was released after several weeks.
    On October 10, four CDF members beat and detained a journalist for 
the Standard Times newspaper after he published an article about the 
SLA and the Kamajors, one of the ethnic groups in the CDF. He was 
released 2 days later.
    Over 50 newspapers were published in Freetown alone, covering a 
wide spectrum of interests. Most of the newspapers were independent of 
the Government, and several were associated with opposition political 
parties. The number of newspapers fluctuated weekly; many contained 
sensational, undocumented stories and repeated items carried by other 
newspapers. Newspapers openly and routinely criticized the Government 
and its officials, as well as the rebel forces.
    Due to low levels of literacy and the relatively high cost of 
newspapers and television, radio remained the most important medium of 
public information. Several government and private radio and television 
stations broadcast; both featured domestic news coverage and political 
commentary.
    The parastatal Sierratel communications company provided Internet 
access in Freetown, although the condition of its telephone lines often 
made Internet connectivity problematic.
    On May 8, a local journalist was killed by RUF rebel gunfire during 
a demonstration outside of Foday Sankoh's residence. At least one other 
journalist was injured and another threatened during the incident (see 
Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). On May 25, rebels shot and killed two 
journalists and wounded two others during an attack on a SLA patrol 
(see Section 1.a.).
    The Government generally respected academic freedom. All 
institutions of higher learning were open during most of the year; 
however, infrastructure destroyed during the conflict has not yet been 
restored fully.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally 
respected this right in practice. While in general the Government did 
not deny requests to use public areas for meetings or demonstrations, 
many of which took place throughout the year, the Government did not 
allow RUF meetings and rallies because of the declared State of 
Emergency, which was enacted in February 1998 following the ousting of 
the AFRC and was renewed in August 1999.
    On May 8, 8,000 to 9,000 persons, including doctors, lawyers, 
teachers, petty traders, union leaders, and others marched through 
Freetown and demonstrated outside Foday Sankoh's residence in Freetown 
to protest the behavior of the RUF, the detention of hundreds of U.N. 
peacekeeping troops, and Foday Sankoh. Peacekeepers fired into the air 
but were unable to keep the demonstrators from continuing toward 
Sankoh's house. RUF members opened fire on the demonstrators, killing 
at least 20 persons and injuring at least 80 others.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respected this right in practice. There were numerous civic, 
philanthropic, and social organizations, and the registration system 
was routine and apparently nonpolitical. No known restrictions were 
applied to the formation or organization of the 18 opposition political 
parties and 60 registered civic action nongovernmental organizations 
(see Section 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.
    In the past, rebel forces have attacked both churches and mosques 
and targeted Christian and Muslim religious leaders. In addition to 
demanding ransom payments for civilians they abducted, in the past, 
rebel forces have targeted Roman Catholic priests and nuns, largely on 
the assumption that the Church would pay ransom for their return and 
because troops from ECOMOG used their missionary radio network in 
support of the Government. On March 8, rebels abducted Aaron Kargbo and 
Aruna Sherrif, both Adventist Development and Relief Agency staff 
members and left them in critical condition on the side of a road. On 
July 21, rebels from the West Side Boys abducted 4 church workers 
allegedly because they feared an attack by the Government and released 
them after 10 days. On September 7, RUF insurgents abducted two 
missionary priests, Father Victor Mosele and Father Franco Manganello, 
in Pamalap, Guinea, and brought them to Sierra Leone. The priests were 
not mistreated and were allowed some freedom of movement; they later 
escaped.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation
    The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government 
generally respected them in practice; however, according to occasional 
reports, government troops manning roadblocks attempted to extort food 
or money from travelers (see Section 1.c.). Citizens were required to 
get a police clearance within 72 hours before international travel, but 
such clearances were issued nonrestrictively; the Government did not 
attempt to limit citizens' departure or return for political or 
discriminatory reasons.
    RUF rebels and West Side Boys also manned roadblocks to extort 
money and goods from travelers.
    More than an estimated 1 million citizens--almost one-quarter of 
the population--still either are displaced internally or have fled the 
country to escape the continuing insurgency. Reported attacks by a 
government helicopter gunship on possible RUF positions within urban 
areas contributed to the exodus of the population from RUF-held areas 
(see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.). More than 500,000 persons remain 
in refugee camps in Guinea and Liberia; others remain in The Gambia, 
Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, and other African nations, while still others are 
in countries outside of Africa.
    There were reports that due to the exodus of a large number of 
persons from RUFoccupied areas, the RUF attempted to terrorize the 
remaining population to prevent them from leaving. There are credible 
reports of persons being tortured or killed for attempting to flee (see 
Section 1.a.).
    At year's end, thousands of Sierra Leoneans returned to the country 
from Guinea because of attacks and ill treatment by RUF forces and 
Guinean forces. Some of these internally displaced persons (IDP's) were 
housed in camps, but many live in Freetown. The large influx of IDP's 
and the lack of resources caused tension between local residents and 
the returning IDP's. In one instance in November, a fight broke out 
between the IDP's and local residents at an IDP camp in Bo. At least 13 
persons were injured seriously.
    There is no formal process for granting political asylum or refugee 
status. The Government cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other organizations on repatriation matters and continued 
to provide first asylum to over 5,000 Liberians who fled to Sierra 
Leone because of conflict in their home country in earlier years. There 
were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they 
feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their 
government, and the 1996 elections won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his 
Sierra Leone People's Party were the first free and fair multiparty 
elections in the country in 30 years. Several political parties were 
represented in the unicameral legislature and in the cabinet. Locally 
elected councils and a traditional chieftancy system control local 
government. Preparations for local elections, which were to have taken 
place in 1999, were postponed in accordance with the 1991 Constitution 
because of continued fighting. The July 1999 Lome Accords included the 
RUF in a power-sharing arrangement in the Government, and in July 1999, 
the Parliament ratified a bill allowing the RUF to transform itself 
into a political party. Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, was offered and 
accepted the chairmanship of the Commission for the Management of 
Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development with the 
status of vice president. In November 1999, the Revolutionary United 
Front Party (RUFP) received a provisional registration certificate from 
the interim National Election Commission. In May the RUF broke away 
from its agreements under the Lome Accord, returned to insurgency, and 
ceased to interact in a political capacity.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 
relatively few women in senior government positions: Only 2 of the 18 
cabinet positions were filled by women, and of the 80 members of the 
unicameral legislature, only 7 were female.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated 
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. Government officials were generally 
cooperative and responsive to their views; however, due to insecurity 
caused by the rebel insurgency, the activities of human rights monitors 
were limited to government-held areas. Representatives of various local 
and international NGO's, foreign diplomats, the ICRC, and U.N. human 
rights officers were able to monitor trials and to visit prisons and 
custodial facilities during most of the year; however, between May and 
August the Government did not allow the ICRC, U.N. human rights 
officials, or other observers to visit prisons to assess conditions or 
meet with inmates (see Section 1.c.). The ICRC declined to visit 
Pademba Road Prison because the Government would not accept ICRC 
conditions, including private visits with prisoners.
    On February 22, Parliament approved the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) Bill which would create a TRC to provide a forum for 
publicly airing the grievances of victims and the confessions of 
perpetrators from the civil war; however, the Commission had not been 
established by year's end.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women and 
provides for protection against discrimination on the basis of race and 
ethnicity, except for the long-time prohibition against citizenship for 
persons with a non-African father. This provision effectively blocks 
citizenship for much of the sizable Lebanese community and for other 
persons with non-African fathers.
    Women.--Violence against women, especially wife beating, is common. 
The police are unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in 
cases involving severe injury or death. Domestic violence is not 
recognized as a societal problem; however, rape is recognized as a 
societal problem and is punishable by up to 14 years'' imprisonment. 
There is a significant amount of prostitution: Many women, especially 
those displaced from their homes and with few resources, resort to 
prostitution as a means to secure income for themselves and their 
children. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic (see Sections 1.c. 
and 1.g.) and forced women and girls to act as sexual slaves (see 
Sections 1.b., 6.c., and 6.f.). There are almost no medical or 
psychological services for women who were raped after they were 
abducted.
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for women; however, in 
practice women face both legal and societal discrimination. In 
particular their rights and status under traditional law vary 
significantly depending upon the ethnic group to which they belong. The 
Temne and Limba tribes of the north afford greater rights to women to 
inherit property than does the Mende tribe, which gives preference to 
male heirs and unmarried daughters. However, in the Temne tribe, women 
cannot become paramount chiefs. In the south, the Mende tribe has a 
number of female paramount chiefs. Women are nevertheless very active 
in civic organizations and NGO's, were instrumental in pressuring the 
previous government to allow free and fair multiparty elections in 
1996, and were vocal representatives of civil society during the peace 
talks in Lome in 1999.
    Women do not have equal access to education, economic 
opportunities, health facilities, or social freedoms. In rural areas, 
women perform much of the subsistence farming and have little 
opportunity for formal education. Women are very active in civic and 
philanthropic organizations, and a significant number are employed as 
civil servants.
    Children.--Although the Government is committed to improving 
children's education and welfare, it lacks the means to provide basic 
education and health services for them. The law requires school 
attendance through primary school; however, schools, clinics, and 
hospitals throughout the country were looted and destroyed during the 
9-year insurgency, and most have not been rebuilt. A large number of 
children receive little or no formal education. Schools are financed 
largely by formal and informal fees, but many families cannot afford to 
pay them. The average educational level for girls is markedly below 
that of boys, and only 6 percent of women are literate. At the 
university level, male students predominate. The Ministry of Social 
Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs has primary responsibility for 
children's issues.
    Up to an estimated 5,000 child soldiers at a time served alongside 
adults on both sides during the civil conflict, but in greater numbers 
on the RUF side; some observers place the number at almost double that 
figure. The recruitment of children for military service by the CDF 
remained a problem, and there is credible evidence that the CDF forces 
continued to accept children as volunteer soldiers.
    The kidnaping and forced conscription of children into rebel forces 
were serious problems (see Sections 1.b., 1.f., 6.c., and 6.f.). For 
years rebels kidnaped young boys and girls to augment their forces and 
to abduct other children. Girls are forced to perform as sexual slaves 
(see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). In some cases rebel forces have 
forced these children to commit atrocities involving family members. 
However, even children who escape and wish to leave the ranks sometimes 
are rejected by their families and communities because of their 
perceived involvement in rebel activities.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is widely practiced among all levels of society, 
although with varying frequency. The less severe form of excision is 
practiced. Some estimates, including by UNICEF, of the percentage of 
women and girls who undergo the practice range as high as 80 to 90 
percent; however, local groups believe that this figure is overstated. 
FGM is practiced on girls as young as 5 years old. No law prohibits 
FGM. A number of NGO's are working to inform the public about the 
harmful health effects of FGM and to eradicate it; however, an active 
resistance by secret societies countered the wellpublicized 
international efforts against FGM.
    People with Disabilities.--Public facility access and 
discrimination against the disabled are not considered to be public 
policy issues. No laws mandate accessibility to buildings or provide 
for other assistance for the disabled. Although a few private agencies 
and organizations attempted to train the disabled in useful work, there 
was no government policy or program directed particularly at the 
disabled. There does not appear to be outright discrimination against 
the disabled in housing or education. However, given the high rate of 
general unemployment, work opportunities for the disabled are few.
    Some of the many individuals who were maimed in the fighting, or 
had their limbs amputated by rebel forces, are receiving special 
assistance from various local and international humanitarian 
organizations. Such programs involve reconstructive surgery, 
prostheses, and vocational training to help them acquire new work 
skills. The Lome Accord also called for the creation of a special fund 
to implement a program for rehabilitation of war victims, although the 
fund had not yet been established by year's end. Attention to amputees 
increased the access of others with disabilities to health care and 
treatment.
    National/Ethnic/Racial Minorities
    The country's population is ethnically diverse and consists of at 
least 13 ethnic groups. These groups generally all speak distinct 
primary languages and are concentrated outside urban areas. However, 
all ethnic groups use Krio as a second language, little ethnic 
segregation is apparent in urban areas, and interethnic marriage is 
common. The two largest ethnic groups are the Temne in the northern 
part of the country and the Mende in the southern part; each of these 
groups is estimated to make up about 30 percent of the population.
    Ethnic loyalty remained an important factor in government, the 
armed forces, and business. Complaints of corruption within ethnic 
groups and ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts, 
military commissions, and promotions were common. There did not appear 
to be a strong correspondence between ethnic or regional and political 
cleavages. Ethnic differences also did not appear to contribute 
appreciably to the RUF rebellion, the 1997 coup, or the civil conflict. 
No ethnic or regional base of voluntary popular support for the rebels 
was identifiable, and they controlled territory by terror and coercion 
rather than by popular consent.
    Residents of non-African descent face institutionalized political 
restrictions. The Constitution restricts citizenship to persons of 
patrilineal Negro-African descent. This constitutional restriction 
effectively denies citizenship to many long-term residents, notably the 
Lebanese community.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of association, and in practice workers had the right to join 
independent trade unions of their choice. About 60 percent of the 
workers in urban areas, including government workers, are unionized, 
but attempts to organize agricultural workers and mineworkers have met 
with little success. All labor unions by custom join the Sierra Leone 
Labor Congress (SLLC), but such membership is voluntary. Police and 
members of the armed services are prohibited from joining unions. There 
are no reliable statistics on union membership, but the membership 
numbers have declined as a percentage of all workers because of the 
virtual collapse of the small manufacturing sector.
    The Trade Union Act provides that any five persons may form a trade 
union by applying to the registrar of trade unions, who has statutory 
powers under the act to approve the creation of trade unions. The 
registrar may reject applications for several reasons, including an 
insufficient number of members, proposed representation in an industry 
already served by an existing union, or incomplete documentation. If 
the registrar rejects an application, the decision may be appealed in 
the ordinary courts, but applicants seldom take such action.
    Workers have the right to strike, although the Government can 
require 21 days' notice. No strikes were reported during the year. No 
laws prohibit retaliation against strikers, even a lawful strike. An 
employee fired for union activities may file a complaint with a labor 
tribunal and seek reinstatement. Complaints of discrimination against 
trade unions are made to a tribunal.
    Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate 
internationally. The SLLC is a member of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1971 
Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act provides the legal 
framework for collective bargaining. Collective bargaining must take 
place in trade group negotiating councils, each of which has an equal 
number of employer and worker representatives. Most enterprises are 
covered by collective bargaining agreements on wages and working 
conditions. The SLLC provides assistance to unions in preparations for 
negotiations; in case of a deadlock the government may intervene. The 
Industrial Court for Settlement of Industrial Disputes, as required by 
Section 44 of the 1971 Act, was created and began hearing cases during 
the year.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that performed by 
children; however, forced labor remains a problem. Under the Chiefdom's 
Council Act, individual chiefs may impose compulsory labor and may 
require members of their villages to contribute to the improvement of 
common areas. This practice exists only in rural areas. There is no 
penalty for noncompliance. There were reports of some compulsory labor, 
possibly including labor by children in rural areas.
    Ex-SLA and RUF rebels forcibly impressed young boys and girls into 
their ranks and forced them into involuntary servitude and to perform 
as sexual slaves. Many became fighters with the rebel forces. Women 
were also forced to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 5, and 
6.f.).
    Rebel forces also forced civilians, including children, to labor as 
porters and as workers in diamond fields under their control despite 
the signing of the peace accord in July 1999.
    d. Status of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The 
minimum age for employment is officially 18 years, although children 
between the ages of 12 and 18 years may be employed in certain 
nonhazardous occupations, provided they have their parents'' consent. 
In practice this law is not enforced because there is no government 
entity charged with the task. Children routinely assist in family 
businesses and work as petty vendors. In rural areas, children work 
seasonally on family subsistence farms.
    Because the adult unemployment rate remains high, few children are 
involved in the industrial sector. Foreign employers have hired 
children to work as domestics overseas at extremely low wages and in 
poor conditions. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation is responsible for reviewing overseas work applications to 
see that no one under the age of 14 is employed for this purpose.
    The law requires school attendance through primary school; however, 
there is a shortage of schools and teachers (see Section 5). Many 
children consequently enter the work force with few skills and with 
limited, if any, literacy.
    The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor.
    The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that 
by children; however, such practices exist (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 
6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A 1997 law set the minimum wage 
at approximately $12 (21,000 Leones) per month; it has not been 
adjusted since then. The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most workers support 
an extended family, often including relatives who have been displaced 
by the insurgency in the countryside, and it is common to pool incomes 
and to supplement wages with subsistence farming.
    The Government's suggested workweek is 38 hours, but most workweeks 
for those who are employed exceed that figure.
    Although the Government sets health and safety standards, it lacks 
the funding to enforce them properly. Trade unions provide the only 
protection for workers who file complaints about working conditions. 
Initially a union makes a formal complaint about a hazardous working 
condition. If this complaint is rejected, the union may issue a 21-day 
strike notice. If workers remove themselves from dangerous work 
situations without making a formal complaint, they risk being fired.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were reports that rebel forces kidnaped young boys 
and girls, forcibly impressed them, and forced the children to serve 
them and to perform as sexual slaves (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Women 
also were forced to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 5, and 
6.c.). Rebel forces also forced civilians, including children, to work 
as porters and in diamond fields (see Section 6.c.). The Government is 
attempting to combat this practice through its efforts to compel the 
RUF to disarm and demobilize.
                               __________

                                SOMALIA 

    Somalia \1\ has been without a central government since its last 
president, dictator Mohamed Siad Barre, fled the country in 1991. 
Subsequent fighting among rival faction leaders resulted in the 
killing, dislocation, and starvation of thousands of persons and led 
the United Nations to intervene militarily in 1992. Following the U.N. 
intervention, periodic attempts at national reconciliation were made, 
but they did not succeed. In September 1999, during a speech before the 
U.N. General Assembly, Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh 
announced an initiative on Somalia to facilitate reconciliation under 
the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development. In 
March formal reconciliation efforts began with a series of small focus 
group meetings of various elements of Somali society in Djibouti. In 
May in Arta, Djibouti, delegates representing all clans and a wide 
spectrum of Somali society were selected for a ``Conference for 
National Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia.'' The Conference opened 
on June 15 with more than 900 delegates, including representatives of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). In July the Conference adopted a 
charter for a 3-year Transitional National Administration and selected 
a 245-member Transitional Assembly, which included members of Somali 
minority groups and 25 women. On August 26, the assembly elected 
Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as Transitional President, and he was sworn in 
on August 28. Ali Khalif Gallayr was named Prime Minister in October, 
and on October 20, the Prime Minister appointed the 25-member Cabinet. 
Administrations in the northwest (Somaliland) and northeast (Puntland) 
areas of the country do not recognize the results of the Djibouti 
Conference, nor do several Mogadishu-based factional leaders. Serious 
interclan fighting occurred in part of the country, notably in the 
central regions of Hiran and Middle Shabelle, and the southern regions 
of Gedo and Lower Shabelle. Hussein Aideed is the leader of the Somali 
National Alliance (SNA), which ceased to assert that it was the 
government of the entire country following the Djibouti Conference. 
Unlike in the previous year, there were no skirmishes between the SNA 
and other militias. No group controls more than a fraction of the 
country's territory. There is no national judicial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\  The United States does not have diplomatic representation in 
Somalia. This report draws in part on non-U.S. Government sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Leaders in the northeast proclaimed the formation of the 
``Puntland'' state in July 1998. Puntland's leader publicly announced 
that he did not plan to break away from the remainder of the country, 
but the Puntland Administration did not participate in the Djibouti 
Conference or recognize the Transitional National Administration that 
emerged from it. In the northwest, the ``Republic of Somaliland'' 
continued to proclaim its independence within the borders of former 
British Somaliland, which had obtained independence from Britain in 
1960 before joining the former Italian-ruled Somalia. Somaliland has 
sought unsuccessfully international recognition since 1991. 
Somaliland's government includes a parliament, a functioning civil 
court system, executive departments organized as ministries, six 
regional governors, and municipal authorities in major towns. The ban 
in Puntland on all political parties remained in place; however, in 
June the Somaliland ban on political parties was lifted.
    After the withdrawal of the last U.N. peacekeepers in 1995, clan 
and factional militias, in some cases supplemented by local police 
forces established with U.N. help in the early 1990's, continued to 
function with varying degrees of effectiveness. Repeated intervention 
by Ethiopian troops helped to maintain order in Gedo region, a base of 
support for a local radical Islamic group called Al'Ittihad. In 
Somaliland over 60 percent of the budget was allocated to maintaining a 
militia and police force composed of former troops. In September a 
Somaliland presidential decree, citing national security concerns, in 
the wake of the conclusion of the Djibouti conference, arrogated 
special powers to the police and the military. Also in September, the 
Transitional Government began recruiting for a new 4,000-officer police 
force to restore order in Mogadishu. In November the Transitional 
Government requested former soldiers to register and enroll in training 
camps to form a national army. Over 10,000 former soldiers were 
enlisted by year's end. Police and militia committed numerous human 
rights abuses throughout the country.
    The country is very poor with a market-based economy in which most 
of the work force is employed as subsistence farmers,
    agro-pastoralists, or pastoralists. The principal exports are 
livestock and charcoal; there is very little industry. Insecurity and 
bad weather continued to affect the country's already extremely poor 
economic situation. The country's economic problems caused a serious 
lack of employment opportunities and led to pockets of malnutrition in 
southern areas of the country.
    The human rights situation is poor, and serious human rights abuses 
continued throughout the year. Citizens' right to change their 
government is circumscribed by the absence of an established central 
authority. Many civilian citizens were killed in factional fighting, 
especially in the Gedo, Hiran, Lower Shabelle, and Middle Shabelle 
regions. In Somaliland and Puntland, police used lethal force while 
disrupting demonstrations. The use of landmines, reportedly by the 
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), resulted in several deaths. Kidnaping 
remained a problem. There were some reports of the use of torture by 
Somaliland and Puntland Administrations and militias. Prison conditions 
are harsh and life threatening. Arbitrary arrest and detention remained 
problems. Somaliland authorities detained a number of persons for 
participation in the Djibouti Conference. The judicial system relied in 
most regions on some combination of traditional and customary justice, 
Shari'a (Islamic) law, and the pre-1991 Penal Code; there were 
occasional reports of harsh physical punishments by Islamic Shari'a 
courts, including public whippings and stonings. Citizens' privacy 
rights were limited. There were restrictions on the freedoms of the 
press, assembly, association, and religion. There were restrictions on 
freedom of movement. There were numerous attacks on international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Violence against women and 
discrimination against women remained problems. The abuse of children, 
including the nearly universal practice of female genital mutilation 
(FGM) remained a problem. Abuse and discrimination against ethnic 
minorities in the various clan regions continued. There is no effective 
system for the protection of worker rights, and there were isolated 
areas where local gunmen forced minority group members to work for 
them. Child labor and trafficking also were problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political violence 
and banditry have been endemic since the revolt against Siad Barre, who 
fled the capital in January 1991. Since that time, tens of thousands of 
persons, mostly noncombatants, have died in interfactional and 
interclan fighting. Although reliable statistics were not available, 
numerous persons were killed during the year. On January 7, militia of 
the Matan Abdulle, an Abgal sub-clan, killed five persons and injured 
six in an attack on a bus in North Mogadishu. Observers believe that 
the probable target of the attack was businessman Mohamed Hassan Ali, 
alias ``Maqarre,'' who was killed in the attack. On January 31, 
fighting between the Mohammed Zuber and Aulihyan sub-clans began in 
Doble (Lower Juba region) and lasted for several days; numerous persons 
were killed and hundreds injured. On February 4 in Lower Shabelle, 
fighting between the Islamic Court Militias and the Rahanweyn 
Resistance Army resulted in the deaths of approximately 15 persons and 
injuries to 10 others. On March 14, fierce fighting near the village of 
Buulo Fulaay between fighters from the Rahanweyn Resistance Army and 
militias from the Rahanweyn Salvation Army and the Digil Salvation Army 
resulted in the deaths of over 30 persons and injuries to numerous 
others. On March 19 in the village of Harardere (Mudug region), 
fighting between militias of the Abgal Wa'aysle sub-clan and the Habr 
Gedr Ayer resulted in the deaths of five persons. On March 20 near Bulo 
Burti (Hiran region), fighting between 2 Dir sub-clans resulted in the 
deaths of at least 20 persons and injuries to 10 others. On April 10, 
the Samawada Rehabilitation and Development Organization (SAREDO), a 
local NGO, accused the Islamic Court militias in Merka, Lower Shabelle, 
of killing one of its guards, Abukar Ali Ismail. The militias 
reportedly killed Ismail after he refused their order to disarm. On May 
20, in Buulo Waambo, Kurtunwaarey District, Jiiddo clan militia killed 
seven members of the Garre clan, reportedly in retaliation for the 
earlier killing of two Jiiddo clan members in Hilowgey village by the 
Garre clan. Between May 26 and 28, in Guri Ceel District, Galgadud 
region, fighting between the Habr Gedr and Galjeel clans resulted in 
the deaths of 13 persons. On June 9, two members of warlord Mohamed 
Said Hersi ``Morgan's'' militia murdered Jama Habeb, the commander of 
the militia, reportedly because of internal conflict within the 
militia. On June 22 in Qoryoley district, fighting between militias of 
the Garre and Jiiddo clans resulted in the deaths of over 30 persons; 
the clashes began after a Garre clansman killed a Jiiddo clansman. On 
July 7, fighting between militia loyal to SNA Commander Hussein Aideed 
and residents of southwest Mogadishu resulted in the deaths of seven 
persons; the fighting erupted when residents refused to pay a tax 
levied by the SNA. On July 26 in Lower Shabelle, renewed fighting 
between the Jiiddo and Garre clans killed numerous persons. On August 4 
in the village of Kabsuuma, Lower Shabelle region, following the 
alleged rape of a Galjeel girl, fighting between militias of the 
Galjeel and Bimal clans resulted in the deaths of at least 9 persons 
and injuries to 10 others. On August 8, a revenge killing sparked 
fighting between the Hawadle and the Galjeel clans that left one person 
dead and several injured. On August 11 in Belet Weyne (Hiran district), 
fighting between the Hawadle and Galjeel, allegedly resulting from a 
dispute over the distribution of relief food resulted in the deaths of 
11 persons and injuries to 20 others. There were no investigations into 
any of these incidents, nor was any action taken against militia 
responsible for abuses; however, local mediation efforts took place in 
some incidents, which resolved some cases.
    Although many civilians died as a result of fighting during the 
year, politically motivated extrajudicial murder was uncommon; however, 
in the latter part of the year, acts of violence, including several 
killings, increased against supporters or members of the Transitional 
Government. In October in Mogadishu, unidentified men shot and killed 
Yusuf Tallan, a former army general under the Barre regime and a 
delegate to the Djibouti conference. He was shot after he refused to 
get into a vehicle with the men. The killing was linked to warlord 
Osman Atto because of Atto's business deals in the north and the 
possibility of a deal between Somaliland President Egal and Atto in 
order to destablize the south. General Galal, chairman of the National 
Security Committee, also was linked to the killing; there was suspicion 
that he might have killed Tallan in order to prevent Tallan from 
becoming head of the National Security Committee. Tallan had been named 
as the head of a committee to oversee demobilization of the country's 
militias. In December the President announced that the police had 
arrested Tallan's alleged killers with foreign assistance; however, 
there has been no independent confirmation of this claim. The alleged 
killers were not known to have been charged or tried by year's end. On 
November 12, two unidentified men shot and killed Hasan Ahmed Elmi, 
also known as Hasan Jaale, a member of the Transitional National 
Assembly; he was killed in front of his wife and children at his home 
in Mogadishu. Observers believe that the attack may have been in 
retaliation for the recent killing of a Daud clan member by the 
Galje'el clan, of which Elmi was a member. An investigation into the 
killing was conducted; however, it was inconclusive. On November 17, 40 
militiamen ambushed a convoy carrying a member of the Transitional 
Assembly, killing at least 7 persons and injuring at least 9 others. 
Local mediation occurred and the case was closed.
    On at least two occasions police in Somaliland and Puntland used 
lethal force while disrupting demonstrations. On March 30, police in 
Puntland killed two persons while forcibly dispersing a demonstration 
in Bosasso (see Section 2.b.) and arrested several others (see Section 
1.d.). On November 11 in Hargeisa, police forcibly dispersed a crowd 
blocking the main road to the airport (see Section 2.b.); more than 60 
protesters were arrested (see Section 1.d.) and 2 persons were killed. 
There was no investigation nor action taken in these cases by year's 
end.
    There were a number of attacks on humanitarian and NGO workers by 
militia and other groups (see Section 4). On January 2 in Balad 
District, Abgal militia opened fire on a vehicle transporting three 
staff members from the NGO, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 
Everywhere (CARE) members (see Section 4). Shucayb Mohamed Hussein, a 
CARE engineer, was killed in the attack. On January 28 near the village 
of Buqdah, approximately 60 armed gunmen attacked another CARE convoy, 
killing 5 convoy security guards and 4 villagers (see Section 4). On 
January 29 in the town of Sablale, unidentified persons attacked the 
office of ACCORD, an international NGO, killing two persons (see 
Section 4). In response to this attack, ACCORD suspended its Polio 
Eradication Campaign. No investigation was made into the incident; 
however, the local community mobilized the Islamic Shari'a courts. A 
gunman was apprehended and his vehicle was towed to Merka.
    There were occasional reports of the use of harsh physical 
punishments by the five Islamic Shari'a courts in Mogadishu, which are 
aligned with different subclans, including public whippings and stoning 
(see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.). The courts generally refrained from 
administering the stricter Islamic punishments, like amputation, but 
their militias administered summary punishments, including executions, 
in the city and its environs. For example, in June an Islamic Court in 
Buulo village, Lower Shabelle, sentenced Nuurto Muhammad Ali to death 
by stoning after she was discovered to have three husbands (see Section 
1.c.).
    On March 11, a firing squad in Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, executed a 
man, Hassan Ahmed, accused of murdering a woman on February 27. Ahmed 
was executed after the Mohammand Musa subclan of Abgal clan, which both 
Ahmed and the women were members of, decided that he should be put to 
death. On April 24, South Mogadishu's Shirkole Islamic Court executed 
Farhan Muhammad Jama, who was accused of killing businessman Ahmad 
Muhammad Ali after the Saleban subclan of the Habr Gidr clan, which 
both men were members of, decided that he should be put to death.
    Numerous extrajudicial killings during the year centered on 
conflicts over land or livestock. For example, on October 22 near the 
town of Qoryoley, fighting over land between Jiiddo clans and local 
farmers from other clans killed at least 10 persons and injured 15 
others.
    In October in Bosasso, an unidentified person threw a grenade into 
a temporary shelter for persons traveling to Yemen, killing two persons 
and injuring five others.
    Landmines laid by different groups, particularly the RRA and 
possibly the SNA, caused several deaths and injuries during the year. 
On January 20 in the Hiran region, a landmine exploded, killing at 
least six persons. On January 30 in the Hiran region, landmines and gun 
battles killed 21 persons. On January 30 near El Ali, five escorts of a 
food convoy were killed when their vehicle hit a mine. Also on January 
30, an aid convoy hit a landmine while crossing the Shabelle River for 
the Bakool Region. The Abgal clan reportedly planted the landmine; 10 
persons were killed and 8 others injured. On February 5, landmines 
destroyed three ``technicals,'' combat vehicles, belonging to the 
Islamic Court militias near the village of Buulo Warbo, west of 
Qoryoley, Lower Shabelle. The explosions killed three persons and 
injured five others.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports of attacks 
within Ethiopian territory by armed groups opposed to the Government of 
Ethiopia, supported by Eritrea, operating out of Somalia. Aideed and 
the SNA reconciled with Ethiopia, and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 
was disarmed and expelled from the country.
    No action is known to have been taken against the persons 
responsible for the following 1999 killings: The February 1999 killing 
of Dr. Singh Bohgal; the March 1999 killing of a foreign religious 
worker; the July 1999 killing of Osman Jeyte; the August 1999 killing 
of one person during a demonstration at the Ismail Jumale Center for 
Human Rights; the September 1999 killing of a senior UNICEF official; 
and the September 1999 killing of businessman Haji Abdullahi.
    No investigation was conducted into a 1998 attack by militia 
fighters on a World Food Program Convoy that killed two persons.
    The investigation into the 1997 killing of a Portuguese doctor 
still was pending at year's end.
    On November 24, an appeals court in Rome convicted Hashi Omar 
Hassan, a Somali, of the 1994 murder of two Italian journalists in 
Mogadishu (see Section 2.a.). The court sentenced Hassan to life in 
prison.
    In 1997 a War Crimes Commission in Hargeisa in Somaliland began 
investigating the killings in 1988 of at least 2,000 local residents, 
including women and children, by Siad Barre's troops. Heavy rains in 
1997 revealed numerous mass graves in the Hargeisa area. During the 
year, the War Crimes Commission continued to record eyewitness accounts 
and other evidence.
    On September 23, approximately 30 Ethiopian soldiers attacked Haji 
Salah village in Somaliland, killed two persons, and confiscated radio 
equipment. Somaliland President Egal wrote a letter to the Ethiopian 
Government and asked for an explanation for the attack.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no known reports of unresolved 
politically motivated disappearances, although cases easily might have 
been concealed among the thousands of refugees and displaced persons.
    Kidnaping remained a problem, particularly for relief workers and 
critics of faction leaders. On July 12 in Bosasso, Mohammed Deq, editor 
of the Puntland newspaper ``Sahan,'' was abducted by a group of men in 
military uniform from the Puntland Criminal Investigation Division 
(CID) while standing in front of the CID headquarters (see Section 
2.a.); he was released later that day. On May 29 in Bosasso, 
unidentified gunmen reportedly broke into the newspaper's offices and 
assaulted Deq (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). On July 26, technicals and 
Sa'ad militia attacked the compound of Action Against Hunger (ACF), an 
international NGO, in south Mogadishu. Militiamen kidnaped two foreign 
ACF employees and detained them until September 18.
    There have been no developments in the February 1999 kidnaping case 
of two OLF officials from Ethiopia and a senior Al'Ittihad official.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Transitional National Charter, adopted in July, but 
not implemented by year's end, prohibits torture, and the Puntland 
Charter prohibits torture ``unless sentenced by Islamic Shari'a courts 
in accordance with Islamic law;'' however, there were some reports of 
the use of torture by the Puntland and Somaliland administrations and 
by warring militiamen against each other or against civilians. 
Observers believe that many incidents of torture were unreported.
    Although reliable statistics were not available, a large number of 
persons were injured as a result of interfactional and interclan 
fighting (see Section 1.a.).
    On May 29 in Bosasso, unidentified gunmen reportedly broke into the 
offices of the Puntland newspaper ``Sahan'' and assaulted Editor 
Mohammed Deq (see Sections 1.f. and 2.a.); on July 12 in Bosasso, Deq 
was abducted briefly (see Section 1.b.).
    On September 10 in Borama, Somaliland police used small arms and 
guns to forcibly disperse a demonstration in support of the Djibouti 
reconciliation process (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). Police reportedly 
injured several persons.
    In the latter part of the year, acts of violence, including several 
killings, increased against supporters or members of the Transitional 
Government (see Section 1.a.). For example, on November 17, 40 
militiamen ambushed a convoy carrying Ahmed Duale Gelle ``Haf,'' a 
member of the Transitional Assembly, and killed 7 persons and injured 
12 others. Elders of the attackers' and Haf's subclan later met at 
Haf's home. They agreed that some government security forces should be 
posted where the attack took place.
    There were a number of attacks on humanitarian and NGO workers by 
militia and other groups, which resulted in killings and injuries (see 
Sections 1.a. and 4).
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no bomb explosions in 
Hargeisa, Somaliland. In December 1999, there was an explosion at the 
U.N. Development Program office in Hargeisa. Somaliland police 
attributed the bombing to disgruntled persons who had failed to get 
jobs with various international organizations, and reported that a 
number of persons had been arrested in connection with the bombings; 
however, no action had been taken against them by year's end.
    There were occasional reports of the use of harsh physical 
punishments by Islamic Shari'a courts, including public whippings and 
stoning (see Section 1.e.).
    In February representatives of the local Islamic Court militias 
flogged Omar Dini, a reporter for the Mogadishu-based newspaper 
``Qaran,'' allegedly for an anti-Islamic article he had written (see 
Sections 2.a. and 2.c.). In June an Islamic Court in Buulo village, 
Lower Shabelle, sentenced Nuurto Muhammad Ali to death by stoning after 
she was discovered to have three husbands (see Section 1.a.). The 
execution was suspended until after Ali, who was pregnant, gave birth; 
however, she was not executed by year's end. The same court sentenced 
Dalmar Mahmud Ahmad to a punishment of one hundred lashes for adultery 
on April 8.
    As during past years, labor disputes sometimes led to the use of 
force (see Section 6.b.). For example, the Habr Gibr clan used force 
against the Digil and Biyamal clans in Lower Shabelle during the year.
    There were no reported attacks within Ethiopia by armed opposition 
groups operating out of Somalia (see Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions varied by region. Conditions at the south 
Mogadishu prison controlled by the Aideed forces continued to improve 
because of visits by international organizations; however, conditions 
at the north Mogadishu prison of the Shari'a court system remained 
harsh and life threatening. Hareryale, a prison established by the 
Murursade subclan at the border between north and south Mogadishu 
reportedly holds hundreds of prisoners, including many children. 
Conditions at Hareryale are described as overcrowded and poor. 
Juveniles share cells with adult prisoners and there is a high 
incidence of tuberculosis. Similar conditions exist at Shirkole prison, 
an Islamic Court militia-run prison in south Mogadishu and at a north 
Mogadishu prison for Abgal clan prisoners run by warlord Musa Sudi. A 
local NGO that visited the central prison in Hargeisa, Somaliland, 
documented a shortage of medicine, widespread tuberculosis, and 
juveniles sharing cells with adults. In May there was an outbreak of 
diarrhea in Burao prison, Somaliland, resulting in the death of one 
prison guard. According to an international observer, men and women 
were housed separately in the Puntland prison in Bosasso; this is the 
case in other prisons as well. Abuse by guards reportedly was common in 
many prisons. Conditions in other prisons reportedly were less severe, 
according to international relief agencies. The detainees' clans 
generally pay the costs of detention. In many areas, prisoners are able 
to receive food from family members or from relief agencies. Ethnic 
minorities make up a disproportionately large percentage of the prison 
population.
    The Jumale Center for Human Rights visited prisons in Mogadishu 
during the year. The Puntland administration permits prison visits by 
independent monitors, and in April an international observer visited 
the Bosasso, Puntland, prison. Somaliland authorities permit prison 
visits by independent monitors, and such visits occurred during the 
year. In August a local NGO visited Hargeisa, Somaliland, central 
prison.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In the absence of 
constitutional or other legal protections, various factions and armed 
bandits continued to engage in arbitrary detention, including the 
holding of relief workers. On July 11, a group of men seized a foreign-
registered cargo ship off the coast of Puntland and demanded a ransom.
    In March Somaliland authorities detained three men for 2 days for 
sending a letter in support of the Djibouti reconciliation conference 
to the President of Somaliland.
    On March 20 in the town of Galkayo, the Mudug (Puntland) region 
security committee detained five persons demonstrating in support of 
the Djibouti reconciliation process (see Section 2.b.). The 
demonstrators were released on March 28. On March 30, police in 
Puntland killed two persons and arrested and detained for a few days 
several others while forcibly dispersing a demonstration in Bosasso 
(see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
    On September 10 in Borama, Somaliland police arrested five persons 
after forcibly dispersing a demonstration in support of the Djibouti 
reconciliation process (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    Somaliland authorities detained a number of persons for 
participating in the Djibouti reconciliation conference. On February 
28, Somaliland authorities detained for several days without charge 
four members of the Habr Awal sub-clan in Hargeisa for attempting to 
participate in the Djibouti reconciliation conference process. In March 
Somaliland police detained for several days without charge two men in 
Hargeisa for protesting against alleged pollution by a petroleum 
company in the town of Berbera (see Section 2.b.). On March 21, 
Somaliland authorities detained for several days 20 delegates to the 
Djibouti Conference as they attempted to cross the SomalilandDjibouti 
border (see Section 2.d.). In May in Borama, Somaliland authorities 
detained one person for participating in the Djibouti reconciliation 
conference; he was released in late June. On May 12 in Hargeisa, 
Somaliland officials arrested Abdi Hashi, a Mogadishu-based scholar, 
for taking part in a conference of intellectuals in Djibouti. On August 
30, Puntland President Abdullahi Yussuf decreed the arrest of any 
person returning to Puntland from Arta, Djibouti (see Section 3). On 
September 4, Somaliland authorities arrested and charged with treason 
Garad Abshir Garad Salah, Transitional National Administration 
representative and elected member of the Transitional Assembly, for his 
participation in the Djibouti conference (see Section 1.e.). Salah was 
sentenced to 7 years in prison for treason; however, he was released on 
October 4. On October 4 in Bosasso, Puntland police arrested and 
detained Bile Mahmud Qabowsadeh, editor of local newspaper ``Yool,'' 
after he returned from the Djibouti conference (see Section 2.a.). In 
November the Somaliland Administration arrested Sultan Mohamed 
Abdulkadir when he returned to the country from Djibouti. On November 
11 in Hargeisa, police forcibly dispersed a crowd protesting his 
arrest; more than 60 protesters were arrested and two persons were 
killed (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
    Somaliland authorities detained some foreigners for proselytizing. 
For example, on February 3 in Somaliland, nine Ethiopians allegedly 
were detained for engaging in Christian missionary activities (see 
Section 2.c.). In May 1999, seven Christian Ethiopians were arrested in 
Somaliland, allegedly for attempting to proselytize; they remained in 
detention at year's end (see Section 2.c.).
    On November 5 in Baidoa, RRA soldiers forcibly abducted and 
detained more than 12 local elders believed to support the Transitional 
Government; however, they were released by year's end.
    Authorities in Somaliland, Puntland, and in areas of the south 
detained both local and foreign journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    There were no reports of lengthy pretrial detention in violation of 
the pre-1991 Penal Code in Somaliland or Puntland.
    None of the factions used forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is no national judicial 
system.
    The Transitional Charter, adopted in July, provides for an 
independent judiciary, and for a High Commission of Justice, a Supreme 
Court, a Court of Appeal, and courts of first reference; however, the 
Charter had not been implemented by year's end. Some regions have 
established local courts that depend on the predominant local clan and 
associated faction for their authority. The judiciary in most regions 
relies on some combination of traditional and customary law, Shari'a 
law, the penal code of the pre-1991 Siad Barre Government, or some 
combination of the three. For example, in Bosasso and Afmadow criminals 
are turned over to the families of their victims, which then exact 
blood compensation in keeping with local tradition. Under the system of 
customary justice, clans often hold whole opposing clans or sub-clans 
responsible for alleged violations by individuals. Islamic Shari'a 
courts continued to operate in several regions of the country, filling 
the vacuum created by the absence of normal government authority. 
Islamic Shari'a courts traditionally ruled in cases of civil and family 
law, but extended their jurisdiction to criminal proceedings in some 
regions beginning in 1994. There were occasional reports of the use of 
harsh physical punishments by Islamic Shari'a courts, including public 
whippings and stoning. In Berbera courts apply a combination of Shari'a 
law and the former penal code. In south Mogadishu, a segment of north 
Mogadishu, the Lower Shabelle, and parts of the Gedo and Hiran regions, 
court decisions are based on a combination of Shari'a and customary 
law. Only three of the five Islamic Shari'a courts in Mogadishu 
continued to function during the year, those belonging to the Ayr, 
Saleban, and Murursade clans. The other two courts, belonging to the 
Sarur and Duduble clans, do not function. They are aligned with 
different subclans, raising doubts about their independence. The courts 
generally refrained from administering the stricter Islamic 
punishments, like amputation, but their militias administered summary 
punishments, including executions. In April Somaliland adopted a new 
constitution based on democratic principles, but continued to use the 
pre-1991 Penal Code. The constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary; however, the judiciary is not independent in practice. A 
U.N. report issued in January again noted a serious lack of trained 
judges and of legal documentation in Somaliland, which caused problems 
in the administration of justice. The Puntland Charter implemented in 
May 1998, provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary 
is not independent in practice. The Puntland Charter also provides for 
a Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and courts of first reference. In 
Puntland clan elders resolve the majority of cases using traditional 
methods; however, those with no clan representation in Puntland are 
subject to the Administration's judicial system.
    The Transitional Charter, which was not implemented by year's end, 
provides for the right to be represented by an attorney. The right to 
representation by an attorney and the right to appeal do not exist in 
those areas that apply traditional and customary judicial practices or 
Shari'a law. These rights more often are respected in regions that 
continue to apply the former Government's penal code, such as 
Somaliland and Puntland.
    There was one known political prisoner in the country. On September 
4, Somaliland authorities arrested and charged with treason Garad 
Abshir Garad Salah, Transitional National Administration representative 
and elected member of the Transitional Assembly, for his participation 
in the Djibouti conference. On September 16, the Berbera Court 
sentenced Salah to 7 years in prison for treason. President Egal 
pardoned Salah to reduce political tensions and Salah was released on 
October 4.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not 
implemented by year's end, provides for the sanctity of private 
property and privacy; however, looting and forced entry into private 
property continued in Mogadishu, although on a smaller scale that in 
the previous year. The Puntland Charter recognizes the right to private 
property; however, authorities did not respect this right on at least 
one occasion. On May 29 in Bosasso, unidentified gunmen reportedly 
broke into the offices of the Puntland newspaper ``Sahan'' and 
assaulted Editor Mohammed Deq (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., and 2.a.).
    Most properties that were occupied forcibly during militia 
campaigns in 1992-93, notably in Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle, 
remained in the hands of persons other than their prewar owners.
    Approximately 300,000 persons, or 40 percent of the population, 
have been displaced internally as a result of interfactional and 
interclan fighting.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Transitional Charter, adopted 
in July, provides for freedom of the press; however, the charter was 
not implemented by year's end and there were incidents of harassment, 
arrest, and detention of journalists in all areas of the country, 
including Puntland and Somaliland. The Puntland Charter provides for 
freedom of the press ``as long as they respect the law;'' however, this 
right is not respected in practice. The Somaliland constitution also 
provides for freedom of the press, but this right is restricted in 
practice. The print media consist largely of short, photocopied 
dailies, published in the larger cities and often linked to one of the 
factions. Several of these newspapers nominally are independent and are 
critical of the faction leaders.
    Somaliland has two independent daily newspapers, one government 
daily, and an independent English-language weekly. Treatment of 
journalists in Somaliland reportedly continued to improve during the 
year.
    In February Somaliland authorities detained for 4 hours the 
publisher of the daily newspaper Jamhuriya and of the weekly The 
Republic for printing a letter critical of Somaliland courts.
    In February representatives of the local Islamic Court Militias 
flogged Omar Dini, a reporter for the Mogadishu-based newspaper 
``Qaran,'' allegedly for an anti-Islamic article he had written (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.c.).
    On March 13 in south Mogadishu, the Hararyale Islamic Court in 
Wardhigley District arrested Mohammed Ali Salad, a reporter for the 
Mogadishu-based newspaper ``Qaran,'' allegedly because he wrote 
articles critical of deforestation caused by the activities of charcoal 
exporters. He was detained at the Hararyale Islamic Court in Wardigley 
District for several days before being released in late March.
    On May 29 in Bosasso, unidentified gunmen reportedly broke into the 
offices of the Puntland newspaper ``Sahan'' and assaulted Editor 
Mohammed Deq (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). On July 12 in Bosasso, 
Puntland, CID agents abducted and briefly detained Deq while standing 
in front of Criminal Investigation Division headquarters (see Section 
1.b.).
    On August 21, Islamic Court Militias detained Ahmed Abd Al-Rahman 
Dhalbaaq, the editor of the Merka, Lower Shabelle, bi-monthly newspaper 
``Gaim,'' allegedly for reporting on a decrease in security in the 
town. He was released on bail pending trial later that day. It was not 
known whether his trial occurred by year's end.
    On October 4 in Bosasso, Puntland police arrested and detained Bile 
Mahmud Qabowsadeh, editor of local newspaper ``Yool,'' after he 
returned from the Djibouti conference (see Section 1.d.).
    In late October, Puntland authorities fired sheikh Abdi Rahman 
Bulbul, the head of religious programs at Galkayo Radio, because they 
believed him to be a supporter of the Transitional Government.
    On November 24, an appeals court in Rome convicted Hashi Omar 
Hassan, a Somali, of the 1994 murder of two Italian journalists in 
Mogadishu. The court sentenced Hassan to life in prison.
    In 1999 in Puntland, the regional administration arrested Abulkadir 
Ali and Mohamed Deq of the newspaper Sahan, and Ahmed Mohamed Ali of 
the newspaper Riyaq, reportedly for writing articles critical of the 
Government. They remained in detention at year's end.
    Most citizens obtain news from foreign news broadcasts, chiefly the 
British Broadcasting Corporation, which transmits a daily Somali-
language program. The major faction leaders in Mogadishu, as well as 
the authorities of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, operate 
small radio stations.
    There are restrictions on academic freedom; academics operate under 
restrictions similar to those imposed on members of the media. There is 
no organized higher education system in most of the country. There is a 
university one north Mogadishu and another university in Somaliland.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There is no 
mention of freedom of peaceful assembly in the Transitional Charter, 
nor is there legal protection for freedom of assembly, and although 
citizens are free to assemble in public, the lack of security 
effectively limits this right in many parts of the country. On August 
30, Puntland President Abdullahi Yussuf ordered regional governors to 
ban all antigovernment demonstrations. Demonstrations occurred 
throughout the country during the year; however, authorities in 
Somaliland, Puntland, and the south sometimes forcibly dispersed 
demonstrations and used excessive force in some instances (see Sections 
1.a. and 1.c.).
    In March in Hargeisa, Somaliland police detained for several days 
two men for protesting against alleged pollution by a petroleum company 
in the town of Berbera. On March 20 in the town of Galkayo, the Mudug 
(Puntland) region security committee detained five persons 
demonstrating in support of the Djibouti reconciliation process (see 
Section 1.d.). The demonstrators were released on March 28. On March 
29, Puntland police fired shots to disperse a demonstration in Gardo, 
Bari region, against the Puntland President; however, there were no 
reported injuries. On March 30 in Bosasso, Puntland police killed two 
persons while forcibly dispersing a demonstration in support of the 
Djibouti conference and against President Yusuf (see Section 1.a.) and 
arrested several other participants (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). On 
September 10 in Borama, Somaliland police forcibly dispersed a 
demonstration in support of the Djibouti reconciliation process. 
Several persons reportedly were injured in the clash and five persons 
were arrested (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). On November 1, security men 
guarding the Lafweyn Hotel in Mogadishu shot at a group of 
demonstrators protesting against the Transitional Government's 
recruitment of police forces in front of the hotel. There were no 
reported injuries. On November 11 in Hargeisa, police forcibly 
dispersed a crowd blocking the main road to the airport. More than 60 
protesters were arrested and 2 persons were killed (see Sections 1.a. 
and 1.d.). The crowd was protesting the Somaliland Administration's 
arrest of Sultan Mohamed Abdulkadir when he returned from Djibouti (see 
Section 1.d.).
    There were a number of peaceful demonstrations that occurred during 
the year without interference by authorities. For example, on June 15, 
members of a conservative Mosque protested against alleged Christian 
proselytizing by teachers at schools funded by the Coordinating 
Committee of the Organization for Voluntary Service (COSV) (see 
Sections 2.c. and 4). On October 17, hundreds of persons in the Bay and 
Bakol regions demonstrated against Hassan Mohamed Nur Shargudud, leader 
of the RRA, following his statements that he would no longer recognize 
the Transitional Government.
    The Puntland Charter provides for freedom of association; however, 
the Puntland Administration banned all political parties for 3 years, 
beginning in August 1998. The Somaliland constitution provides for 
freedom of association. In June the Somaliland parliament approved 
legislation governing the formation of political parties (see Section 
3). The law limits to three the number of political parties allowed to 
contest general elections. An ad hoc commission, nominated by the 
President and approved by the House of Representatives, will be 
responsible for considering applications. Approved parties that win 
twenty percent of the next Somaliland elections will be permitted to 
operate.
    Professional groups and local NGO's operate as security conditions 
permit.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--There is no national constitution and no 
legal provision for the protection of religious freedom, and there were 
some limits on religious freedom.
    The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not implemented by 
year's end, establishes Islam as the national religion. There is no 
central government, but some local administrations, including the 
Republic of Somaliland and Puntland, have made Islam the official 
religion in their regions. The judiciary in most regions relies on some 
combination of traditional and customary law (Xeer), Shari'a law, the 
Penal Code of the pre-1991 Siad Barre Government, or some combination 
of the three. There are three Islamic Shari'a courts operating in 
Mogadishu, which are aligned with different subclans, raising doubts 
about their independence (see Section 1.e.). These courts generally 
refrained from administering the stricter Islamic punishments, such as 
amputation, but their militias administered summary punishments, 
including executions, in the city and its environs (see Section 1.a.). 
There were occasional reports of the use of harsh physical punishments 
by Islamic Shari'a courts including public whipping and stoning (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    In March 1999, the Minister of Religion in Somaliland issued a list 
of instructions and definitions on religious practices. Under the new 
rules, religious schools and places of worship are required to obtain 
the Ministry of Religion's permission to operate. The Ministry must 
approve entry visas for religious groups, and certain unspecified 
doctrines are prohibited.
    Local tradition and past law make it a crime to proselytize for any 
religion except Islam. Proselytizing for any religion except Islam is 
prohibited by law in Puntland and Somaliland. Christian-based 
international relief organizations generally operate without 
interference, as long as they refrain from proselytizing. On February 3 
in Somaliland, nine Ethiopians allegedly were detained for 1 month for 
engaging in Christian missionary activities (see Section 1.d.); all 
nine were deported following their release. Seven Christian Ethiopians 
arrested in Somaliland in May 1999, for allegedly attempting to 
proselytize, remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    In February representatives of the local Islamic Court militias 
flogged Omar Dini, a reporter for the Mogadishu-based newspaper 
``Qaran,'' allegedly for an anti-Islamic article he had written (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Transitional Charter, adopted in 
July but not implemented by year's end, and the Puntland Charter 
guarantee freedom of movement; however, this right continued to be 
restricted in some parts of the country. Checkpoints manned by 
militiamen loyal to one clan or faction inhibit passage by other 
groups. In the absence of a recognized national government, most 
citizens do not have the documents needed for international travel.
    The Somaliland and Puntland administrations impeded the travel of 
participants in the Djibouti Conference. Numerous persons were arrested 
and detained for attempting to attend the conference (see Section 
1.d.). On August 26, the Puntland Administration attempted to prohibit 
flights from landing at Bosasso Airport in an effort to restrict the 
movements of participants to and from the Djibouti Conference. On 
August 30, Puntland President Abdullahi Yussuf decreed the arrest of 
any person returning to Puntland from Arta, Djibouti (see Section 
1.d.). In September the Puntland Administration reportedly denied entry 
to 12 Egyptian doctors and 30 Egyptian teachers who arrived at the 
Bosasso airport from Arta; they were allowed to enter the country at a 
later date. There were reports that some clan leaders sent armed 
militia to assist in the entry of some persons into the country in 
defiance of President Yussuf's decree.
    As security conditions continued to improve in many parts of the 
country, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's) returned to 
their homes. Approximately 10,000 Somali refugees were returned from 
Ethiopia under the auspices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) during the year, and unlike in the previous year, there were no 
interruptions in the repatriation process. Despite sporadic harassment, 
including the theft of UNHCR food packages by militiamen and attacks on 
World Food Program convoys, repatriation generally took place without 
incident. Approximately 9,000 refugees had returned to Somaliland by 
year's end. However, despite the relative stability in many parts of 
the country, many citizens continued to flee to neighboring countries, 
often for economic reasons. Most migrants left from the northeast and 
traveled via boat to Yemen. There were reports that hundreds of such 
migrants drowned in accidents at sea during the year.
    There are approximately 300,000 internally displaced persons in the 
country, representing approximately 4 percent of the population.
    The U.N. estimates that approximately 500,000 Somalis are living as 
refugees in neighboring countries, including approximately 125,000 in 
Kenya at year's end, down from more than 400,000 at the height of the 
humanitarian crisis in 1992. There were 170,000 Somali refugees in 
Ethiopia and 22,600 Somali refugees in Djibouti at year's end.
    As there is no functioning central government, there is no policy 
of first asylum nor are there any laws with provisions for the granting 
of refugee or asylee status. A small number of Ethiopian refugees 
remained in the country, mostly in the northeast near Bosasso. The 
authorities in Somaliland have cooperated with the UNHCR and other 
humanitarian assistance organizations in assisting refugees. There were 
no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to 
refugee status.
    In October in Bosasso, an unidentified person threw a grenade into 
a temporary shelter for persons traveling to Yemen, killing two persons 
and injuring five others.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    In the absence of a fully functioning national government, citizens 
cannot exercise this right. In most regions, local clan leaders 
function as de facto rulers. Although many such groups derive their 
authority from the traditional deference given clan elders, most face 
opposition of varying strength from political factions and radical 
Islamic groups.
    In the Republic of Somaliland, the existence of which was endorsed 
by clan elders in 1991 and 1993, a clan conference led to a peace 
accord early in 1997. This accord demobilized militia groups, 
established a constitution and bicameral parliament with proportional 
clan representation, and elected a president and vice president from a 
slate of candidates. The Hargeisa authorities have established 
functioning administrative institutions in virtually all the territory 
they claim, which equals the boundaries of the Somaliland state that 
achieved international recognition in 1960. In June the Somaliland 
parliament approved legislation governing the formation of political 
parties (see Section 2.b.). Parties approved by an ad hoc commission 
that win 20 percent of the next Somaliland elections will be permitted 
to operate. Regional elections are scheduled for 2002 in Somaliland.
    In March 1998, Puntland was established as a regional government 
during a consultative conference with delegates from six regions, 
including traditional community elders, the leadership of political 
organizations, members of legislative assemblies, regional 
administrators, and civil society representatives. Representatives of 
Puntland-based subclans chose Abdullahi Yussuf as President. Puntland 
has a single chamber quasi-legislative branch known as the Council of 
Elders, which plays a largely consultative role. Political parties are 
banned in Puntland. Regional elections are scheduled for 2001 in 
Puntland.
    In May in Arta, Djibouti, delegates representing all clans and a 
wide spectrum of Somali society were selected for a ``Conference for 
National Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia,'' which opened on June 15 
with more than 900 delegates. In July the Conference adopted a charter 
for a 3-year Transitional National Administration and selected a 245-
member Transitional Assembly, which included 24 members of Somali 
minority groups and 25 women. On August 26, the assembly elected 
Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as Transitional President, and he was sworn in 
on August 28. Ali Khalif Gallayr was named Prime Minister in October, 
and on October 20, the Prime Minister appointed the 25-member Cabinet. 
The Somaliland and Puntland Administrations do not recognize the 
results of the Djibouti Conference, nor do several Mogadishu-based 
factional leaders.
    The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not implemented by 
year's end, provides for universal suffrage. Both of the Puntland and 
Somaliland Administrations provide for universal suffrage.
    Women as a group remained seriously underrepresented in regional 
government and politics, and no women held prominent public positions; 
however, several women were important behindthescenes figures in the 
various factions. There only are five female representatives out of a 
total of 69 representatives in the Puntland Parliament. Women played a 
prominent role in the Djibouti Conference. In the Transitional National 
Assembly women were allocated 25 seats out of a total of 245 seats. 
Minorities were allocated 24 seats in the Transitional National 
Assembly during the Djibouti conference.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several local human rights groups were active during the year, 
including the Mogadishu-based Ismail Jumale Center for Human Rights and 
the Hargeisa-based Horn of Africa Human Rights Watch Committee. The 
Ismail Jumale Center investigated the causes of conflict in the 
Mogadishu area, supported the Djibouti Reconciliation process, 
conducted effective human rights monitoring, protested the treatment of 
prisoners before the Islamic Shari'a courts, and organized periodic 
demonstrations for peace. The Horn of Africa Human Rights Watch 
Committee monitored human rights in Somaliland. Women's NGO's also 
played an important role in galvanizing support in the country for the 
Djibouti Initiative.
    In Hargeisa in Somaliland, local NGO's continued to operate freely 
and without harassment during the year.
    Numerous international organizations operated in the country during 
the year, including the Red Cross, CARE, the Halo Trust, Save the 
Children, and various other demining agencies. The Somaliland and 
Puntland administrations permitted visits by U.N. human rights 
representatives during the year. Sporadic security problems complicated 
the work of some local and international organizations, especially in 
the South. There were reported incidents of harassment against NGO's, 
including attacks on aid convoys and airplanes, which disrupted food 
distribution and U.N. flights into and out of the country (see Sections 
1.b. and 1.c.). A number of humanitarian workers were killed in such 
attacks and one NGO suspended its programs as a result (see Section 
1.a.).
    On September 18, eight Islamic Court Militia gunmen attacked a 
World Health Organization (WHO) compound in Merca. Although they shot 
over 200 rounds of ammunition at the building, there were no injuries.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not implemented by 
year's end, contains provisions that prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of sex and national origin; however, societal discrimination and 
violence against women and widespread abuse of children continued to be 
serious problems. The 1997 Somaliland Constitution also contains 
provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex and 
national origin; however, these rights were not respected in practice.
    Women.--Violence against women exists, although there are no 
reliable statistics on its prevalence. Women suffered 
disproportionately in the civil war and in the strife that followed. 
Rape is commonly practiced in inter-clan conflicts. Laws prohibiting 
rape exist; however, they are not enforced. A statistically 
insignificant number of rapes were prosecuted during the year. Unlike 
in the previous year, there were no reports that fighters loyal to 
Hussein Aideed routinely raped women in southern Qoryoley district.
    Women are subordinated systematically in the country's 
overwhelmingly patriarchal culture. Polygyny is permitted, but 
polyandry is not. Under laws issued by the former government, female 
children could inherit property, but only half the amount to which 
their brothers were entitled. Similarly, according to the Shari'a and 
Somali tradition of blood compensation, those found guilty in the death 
of a woman must pay only half as much to the aggrieved family as they 
would if the victim were a man.
    Several women's groups in Hargeisa (Somaliland), Mogadishu, Bosasso 
(Puntland), and Merka (Lower Shabelle) actively promote equal rights 
for women and advocate the inclusion of women in responsible government 
positions. Women's groups played a prominent role in the Djibouti 
Conference.
    Trafficking in women for the purposes of sexual exploitation was a 
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Children.--Children remain among the chief victims of the 
continuing violence. Boys as young as 14 or 15 years of age have 
participated in militia attacks, and many youths are members of the 
marauding gangs known as ``morian,'' ``parasites,'' or ``maggots.'' 
Even in areas with relative security, the lack of resources has limited 
the opportunity for children to attend school. There are three 
secondary schools in Somaliland and more than three secondary schools 
in Mogadishu; however, only 10 percent of those few children who enter 
primary school graduate from secondary school. Parents generally pay 
fees for their children's education. Schools at all levels lack 
textbooks, laboratory equipment, and running water. Teachers are 
trained poorly and paid poorly. Approximately 10 to 20 percent of the 
school-age population attends school; more boys than girls are enrolled 
in school. The literacy rate is less than 25 percent. In 1999 the 
Somaliland authorities drafted guidelines for a national education 
policy; however, no action on such a policy was taken by year's end.
    Medical care is rudimentary, and only a small percentage of 
children have access to adequate medical facilities.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international experts as damaging to both physical and psychological 
health, is a near-universal practice. Estimates place the percentage of 
women who have been subjected to FGM at 98 percent. The majority of 
women are subjected to infibulation, the most harmful form of FGM. The 
practice was illegal prior to 1991, when the Siad Barre Government 
collapsed, and in Somaliland it remains illegal under the Penal Code 
(see Section 1.e.); however, the law is not enforced. In November 1999, 
Puntland authorities passed legislation banning FGM in northeastern 
areas of the country; however, in practice the law is not enforced 
strictly. While U.N. agencies and NGO's have made intensive efforts to 
educate persons about the danger of FGM, no reliable statistics are 
available on the success of their programs.
    People with Disabilities.--In the absence of a functioning state, 
no one is in a position to address systematically the needs of those 
with disabilities. There are several local NGO's in Somaliland that 
provide services to the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Non-Sunni Muslims often are viewed with 
suspicion by members of the Sunni majority. There is strong social 
pressure to respect Islamic traditions, especially in enclaves 
controlled by radical Islamists, such as Luuq in the Gedo region and 
Dobley and Kulbiyow in such Lower Jubba region. There was an increase 
in religious intolerance among Muslims by Al'Ittihad, a local radical 
Islamic group, which is an affiliate of the international Al'Ittihad 
group. There reportedly have been mosque takeovers in Puntland and 
Lower Shabelle. On June 15 in Merca, members of a conservative Mosque 
protested against alleged Christian proselytizing by teachers at 
schools funded by COSV, an Italian NGO (see Section 2.b.). During the 
march, three members of Merca's ``Shura'' or council threw a grenade 
into the offices of COSV. There were no reported injuries; staff 
members were evacuated, and COSV programs were suspended for 2 weeks.
    There was a continued influx of foreign Muslim teachers into the 
country to teach in new private Koranic schools. These schools are 
inexpensive and provide basic education; however, there were reports 
that these schools required the veiling of small girls and other 
conservative Islamic practices not normally found in the local culture.
    There is a small, low-profile Christian community. Christians, as 
well as other non-Muslims, who proclaim their religion sometimes face 
societal harassment.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--More than 80 percent of 
citizens share a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomadic-
influenced culture. The largest minority group consists of ``Bantu'' 
Somalis, who are descended from slaves brought to the country about 300 
years ago. In most areas, members of groups other than the predominant 
clan are excluded from effective participation in governing 
institutions and are subject to discrimination in employment, judicial 
proceedings, and access to public services.
    Members of minority groups are subjected to harassment, 
intimidation, and abuse by armed gunmen of all affiliations.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Constitution provided 
workers with the right to form unions, but the civil war and factional 
fighting negated this provision and shattered the single labor 
confederation, the then government-controlled General Federation of 
Somali Trade Unions. In view of the extent of the country's political 
and economic breakdown and the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms, 
trade unions could not function freely.
    The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not implemented by 
year's end, the Puntland Charter, and the Somaliland Constitution 
established the right of freedom of association, but no unions or 
employer organizations yet exist.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Wages and work 
requirements in the traditional culture are established largely by ad 
hoc bartering, based on supply, demand, and the influence of the clan 
from which the worker originates. As during past years, labor disputes 
sometimes led to the use of force (see Section 1.c.). For example, the 
Habr Gibr clan used force against the Digil and Biyamal clans in Lower 
Shabelle during the year.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The pre-1991 Penal 
Code prohibits forced labor; however, local clan militias generally 
forced members of minority groups to work on banana plantations without 
compensation. Trafficking in women for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation was a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The pre-1991 
labor code prohibits child labor, including forced or bonded labor by 
children; however, child labor occurs, and there are child soldiers 
(see Sections 5 and 6.d.). Trafficking in children for forced labor is 
a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The pre-1991 labor code prohibits child labor, including 
forced or bonded labor by children; however, child labor occurs, and 
there are child soldiers (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Formal employment 
of children was rare, but youths commonly are employed in herding, 
agriculture, and household labor from an early age. The lack of 
educational opportunities and severely depressed economic conditions 
contribute to child labor. There were reports that trafficking in 
children for forced labor is a serious problem.
    The country did not ratify ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of 
child labor by year's end.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no organized effort by 
any of the factions or de facto regional administrations to monitor 
acceptable conditions of work during the year.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The pre-1991 Penal Code prohibits 
trafficking; however, there were some reports of trafficking during the 
year. In July Djibouti law enforcement authorities arrested members of 
a group that was smuggling Somali women to such destinations as Lebanon 
and Syria to work in brothels (see Section 5). The number of women 
being trafficked from Somalia appears to be small. There were reports 
that trafficking in children for forced labor is a serious problem (see 
Sections 5 and 6.d.).
                               __________

                              SOUTH AFRICA

    South Africa is a multiparty parliamentary democracy in which 
constitutional power is shared between the President and the 
Parliament. The Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces. President Thabo Mbeki leads the African 
National Congress (ANC) party, which holds 266 seats in the 400-seat 
National Assembly. The Parliament was elected in free and fair 
elections in June 1999; the Parliament, in turn, elected the President. 
The country continued to consolidate the democratic transformation 
initiated by the 1994 elections. The Government includes ministers from 
the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) but is dominated by the 
ANC. The Democratic Party (DP) is the official opposition in the 
National Assembly. The judiciary, including the Constitutional Court, 
is independent.
    The South African Police Service (SAPS) has primary responsibility 
for internal security, although the Government continues to call on the 
South African National Defense Force (SANDF) to provide support for the 
SAPS in internal security situations. The SAPS continued its major 
restructuring and transformation from a primarily public order security 
force to a more accountable, community service-oriented police force; 
however, it remained understaffed, overworked, and undertrained. The 
SANDF and the SAPS border control and policing unit share 
responsibility for external security. The Government continued to train 
and deploy the new Special Directorate of Investigations (SDI), dubbed 
``the Scorpions,'' to coordinate efforts against organized crime. Some 
members of these forces committed human rights abuses.
    The economy continues to undergo important fundamental changes as 
the Government attempts to shift towards the manufacturing and services 
sectors and away from a focus on mining and commodities exports. The 
gross domestic product is $130 billion, of which manufacturing accounts 
for 18 percent, services 43 percent, and mining 6 percent. Agriculture, 
although only 4 percent of the gross national product, is an important 
source of export earnings. Since the fall of apartheid, foreign 
investors have used the country as a base of operations for economic 
expansion into the Sub-Saharan region. The economy is driven largely by 
market forces, although a lack of competition still exists in some 
sectors. For example, banking and mining remain tightly controlled by a 
handful of powerful corporations. Although a privatization program is 
underway, the State continues to hold majority stakes in the 
telecommunications, transport, and power sectors. The Government's 
Growth, Employment, and Redistribution macroeconomic program largely 
has been successful in controlling inflation and instilling discipline 
in government spending. Ownership of wealth remains highly skewed along 
racial lines. The disparity between skilled and unskilled workers is 
considerable, as is the income distribution gap between white and 
black, and urban and rural citizens. Official unemployment is 
approximately 23 percent, although figures are debated widely. A 
significant number of citizens, particularly blacks, are employed in 
the largely retail-oriented informal sector. The numerous social and 
economic problems that developed largely during the apartheid era are 
expected to persist for many years.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, serious problems remain in several areas. Some 
members of the security forces committed killings due to use of 
excessive force, and there were deaths in police custody. In addition 
to killings by security forces, there were an estimated 166 politically 
motivated or extrajudicial killings during the first 10 months of the 
year. The Government took action to investigate and punish some of 
those involved and to prevent future abuses. Political violence 
remained a problem; however, it was reduced from 1999 levels, both in 
KwaZulu-Natal and countrywide. Some members of the security forces were 
responsible for torture, excessive use of force during arrest, and 
other physical abuse. The Government took action to investigate and 
punish some of those involved. Prisons are seriously overcrowded. The 
judiciary is overburdened, and lengthy delays in trials and prolonged 
pretrial detention are problems. Violence against women and children, 
and discrimination against women and the disabled remained serious 
problems. Child labor, including forced child labor, is a problem. 
Vigilante violence and mob justice increased during the year. 
Trafficking in persons is a problem.
    The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), created to 
investigate apartheid-era human rights abuses, make recommendations for 
reparations for victims, and grant amnesty for full disclosure of 
politically motivated crimes, continued its work on a large backlog of 
amnesty and restitution applications following the release of its 1998 
report.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of The Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police use of lethal 
force during apprehensions resulted in numerous deaths, and deaths in 
police custody also remain a problem. The Government took action to 
investigate and punish some of those involved and to prevent future 
abuses. The Government's Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) 
investigates deaths in police custody and deaths as a result of police 
action. The ICD reported 511 deaths as a result of police action in the 
last 8 months of the year, including 186 that occurred while in police 
custody. These figures represent an increase in the monthly rate of 
deaths as a result of police action, compared with the estimated 450 
deaths as a result of police action that occurred in the first 10 
months of 1999. The ICD's report lists the subcategories under deaths 
in police custody, which include natural causes, suicide, injuries in 
custody, injuries prior to custody, and possible negligence. The ICD 
experienced greater cooperation from the police than in the previous 
year.
    On April 10, police in Barkly East in the Eastern Cape province 
arrested six teenagers for a local burglary. In the course of the 
arrest, they dragged two of the boys behind their police vehicle, 
killing a 14 year-old boy. Three police officers were charged with 
murder, assault and related crimes; their trials were postponed until 
March 2001. The police officers were released on bail and suspended 
from duty pending their trials.
    On July 30, SAPS members claiming to be searching homes for illegal 
weapons shot and killed an ANC Member of Parliament, Bheki Mkhize, in 
his parents' home in Mahlabathini. There was no indication that the 
officers had a warrant or that they attempted to search other homes in 
the area. Three officers were charged in the killing; they were 
released on bail in August, and an investigation into the matter was 
ongoing at year's end. ANC spokesmen alleged that the police were 
committing murders for the IFP, the ANC's political rival. There was in 
fact a consistent pattern of attacks and killings between members of 
both parties prior to the June 1999 elections.
    The TRC continued to consider throughout the year amnesty 
applications involving apartheid era violence and killings (see Section 
4). During the year, a number of applicants were granted amnesty, 
including Eugene de Kock, the principal of the apartheid government's 
Vlakplaas unit (although he remains in custody for other crimes); 
police officers who killed antiapartheid activist Stanza Bopape; and 
the IFP members involved in a massacre in Boipatong. On September 7, 
the TRC granted 11 ANC guards amnesty for their participation in the 
1994 killing of 8 IFP demonstrators (see Section 4). The application of 
Ferdie Barnard of the Civil Cooperation Bureau remained pending at 
year's end.
    Racial tensions in the military between white commanding officers 
and their black subordinates resulted in several killings during the 
year. In 1999 a black lieutenant killed six white officers at an army 
base in Tempe before he was shot and killed. In December 1999, The 
Ministry of Defense announced the formation of a commission of inquiry 
into the shootings and into racism within the SANDF in general; the 
final report had not yet been released by year's end. On July 10, a 
black platoon commander murdered his white company commander at an army 
base near Phalaborwa. On September 19, a black navy seaman shot and 
killed his white commanding officer at Simons Town naval base. 
Investigations into these killings were ongoing at year's end, but the 
Defense Minister stated publicly that racism was likely a motivating 
factor in the cases.
    The South Africa Institute for Race Relations, a nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) concerned with political and extrajudicial killings, 
reported 166 politically motivated killings during the first 10 months 
of the year, most of which occurred in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, 
compared with 286 for the same period in 1999.
    In 1999 7 persons were arrested for the 1999 murder of the general 
secretary of the United Democratic Movement (UDM), Sifiso Nkabinde, and 
5 persons were arrested for a retaliatory attack after the murder in 
which 11 persons associated with the ANC were killed and several others 
were wounded. Seven suspects in the Nkabinde killing went on trial in 
March, and five were convicted in October. The trial of the five 
suspects in custody for the retaliatory attack is scheduled for March 
2001. In November 1999, prominent Zulu leader and ANC member Prince 
Cyril Zulu, was killed by unknown persons. It is not known whether this 
was a politically motivated killing; a suspect was apprehended, but the 
trial had not begun by year's end.
    The trial of Dr. Wouter Basson was ongoing at year's end. Basson 
was the head of the chemical warfare program under the former apartheid 
regime, and faces 61 charges including 30 counts of murder, fraud, and 
narcotics trafficking. During his trial, it was revealed that the 
former apartheid regime was involved in the murders of hundreds of 
members of the Namibian Liberation Movement between 1980 and 1987. The 
trial was ongoing at year's end.
    There was no further action on the March 1999 killing in Cape Town 
of one ANC member and four UDM members.
    A peace process continued between the IFP and the ANC, the two 
parties most closely associated with the political violence in KwaZulu-
Natal. In May 1999, a special bilateral IFP-ANC Peace Committee signed 
a provincial code of conduct for peace, which was still in effect 
during the year. Although violence in KwaZulu-Natal remained higher 
than in other provinces, resulting in dozens of deaths during the year, 
including the killings of several ANC and local IFP leaders, there was 
an improved level of overall tolerance attributable to the IFP-ANC 
peace process, as well as an increased police presence. However, the 
committee established to enforce the provincial code of conduct 
received complaints regarding the intimidation of party members, 
primarily rural members. Some rural areas in KwaZulu-Natal that 
previously had experienced violence remained tense, although the 
overall level of violence continued to decrease. Factional and 
intraparty rivalry in the Nongoma area continued to cause deaths, and 
the authorities had limited success in solving the killings. The Public 
Order Policing Unit from Durban was moderately effective in calming 
tensions, but investigations continued to be handled by local 
authorities. There are several theories to explain the violence in 
KwaZulu-Natal, including a legacy of ``warlordism'' that fuels 
interparty conflict, and the actions of criminal elements involved in a 
Mafia-like illegal trade in drugs, arms, and wildlife. Some observers 
have blamed an undefined ``third force,'' which allegedly combines 
criminal and conservative elements determined to undermine the new 
political order. Observers warn that the fact that the province has not 
yet been demilitarized and disarmed promotes the area's violence.
    Violence in Richmond was reduced significantly during the year due 
largely to the replacement in 1998 of the regular police force in the 
area with a special, larger ``public order police'' force.
    There were reports that five persons were killed in an incident 
that may have been politically motivated during the December 5 local 
elections in the East Rand area of Johannesburg. Nine suspects were 
arrested, and eight were charged with the killings. Although it is not 
known if the shooting was politically motivated, the shooting occurred 
near a polling place in an area with a history of interparty violence. 
Three of the eight suspects were charged with murder; they were denied 
bail and were being held in pretrial detention at year's end. Charges 
against two suspects were dropped; the other three suspects were 
charged with reckless endangerment while using a weapon and released on 
bail. A trial date had not been announced at year's end.
    Taxi drivers in crime-ridden neighborhoods were responsible for a 
continuing series of attacks on rivals. Conflict between taxi companies 
led to gun battles and other street violence, and resulted in the 
deaths and injuries of bystanders in several cities. In Cape Town, taxi 
owners were believed to have instigated attacks and shootings of 
drivers working for the Golden Arrow bus company. Four drivers were 
killed and several other persons, including passengers, were injured in 
a series of attacks. In September one person pled guilty to the bus 
drivers'' murders and was sentenced to 75 years in prison. No arrests 
were made in connection with the taxi violence in Cape Town that 
occurred in 1999.
    Vigilante action and mob justice increased during the year. In 
Northern and Mpumalanga provinces, a vigilante group called Mapogo A 
Mathamaga has grown in membership and has opened offices in at least 
nine cities, including Pretoria. Mapogo members attacked and tortured, 
including beating with clubs and whips, suspected criminals, 
particularly targeting those they suspected of property crimes against 
their members. In November the Director of Public Prosecutions created 
a task team to investigate more than 200 cases attributed to Mapogo 
members in the Northern and Mpumalanga provinces, which included the 
crimes of kidnaping, murder, assault, and intimidation. In Eastern 
Cape, the Umfela Ndawonye group also killed and attacked suspected 
criminals in vigilante violence. People Against Gangsters and Drugs 
(PAGAD), an Islamic-oriented, communitybased organization calling for 
stronger action against crime and drugs, continued to be suspected of 
acts of intimidation and violence against drug dealers and gang 
leaders, and against critics of its violent vigilantism. In September a 
PAGAD G-force (murder squad) member testified in court that in January 
he had been ordered by PAGAD leadership to attack a gang stronghold and 
kill gang members and drug dealers. The Minister of Justice and 
Minister of Safety and Security publicly charged that PAGAD G-force 
cells and members of Qibla, an Islamic-based political organization 
whose membership may share affiliation with PAGAD, were responsible for 
urban terror incidents in Cape Town throughout the year. These attacks 
included nine bombings (see Section 1.c.) that caused serious injuries 
but no deaths. No organization has claimed responsibility for the 
incidents. Authorities based their accusations against PAGAD on 
circumstantial evidence regarding attacks linked to PAGAD members' 
trials, including violence directed against particular courts and 
police officers, intimidation of witnesses, and the September murder of 
a regional court magistrate who was hearing PAGAD cases. Since November 
1998, there have been 16 convictions and 14 acquittals of PAGAD 
members. Pending cases include 13 charges of murder, 63 charges of 
attempted murder, 10 charges for possession of explosives, and 18 
charges for illegal possession of firearms. In December hundreds of 
cases were pending against PAGAD members in Western Cape courts, 
including 40 cases in which bail was denied to the accused. The Muslim 
community protested the infrequent availability of bail and staged 
periodic small-scale protests, criticizing the treatment of suspects as 
unfair compared with the judicial treatment of non-Muslims (see Section 
2.c.). There were three sets of murder trials pending at year's end: 
Ebrahim Jeneker, Abdulla Maansdorp, and Ismail Maansdorp; Moegamat Zain 
Cornelson and Anees Adams; and Moegamat Isaacs. In August Ebrahim 
Jeneker and Ismail Edwards, alleged PAGAD members, were charged with 
the killing of a police captain who had been investigating PAGAD; the 
trial was pending at year's end.
    Murders of farm families in rural parts of the country have 
received considerable media attention, but data on numbers of attacks 
have not been available since the SAPS declared an embargo on crime 
statistics in July (see Section 2.a.). AgriSA, an organization formed 
in October 1998 to represent farmers' interests, reported 804 attacks 
on farms and small holdings during the year, usually by black 
assailants, which resulted in 119 killings of farm owners, most of whom 
were white. There is widespread concern among white farmers that they 
are being targeted for racial and political reasons, although no 
evidence exists that the murders are part of an organized political 
conspiracy.
    There were incidents of abuse and killings of black farm laborers 
by their white employers. NGO's claim that rural police and courts 
refuse to arrest or prosecute whites in many incidents. During the 
year, the HRC launched an investigation into allegations of abuse of 
black farmworkers, local justice system prejudice against farmworkers, 
and violence against white farm owners. The HRC report was not released 
by year's end (see Section 4).
    In December two guards were shot to death in Cape Town in what 
police believe was a strike-related attack (see Section 1.c. and 6.a.).
    In the Northern province, where traditional beliefs regarding 
witchcraft remain strong, there were occasional reports of attacks on 
persons accused of witchcraft by their rural communities. Some 
survivors of attacks and their families were driven from their villages 
and were living in ``witch villages'' for safety. The Ministry of 
Safety and Security with the assistance of the quasigovernmental 
Commission on Gender Equality and traditional leaders, instituted 
programs to end violence against suspected practitioners of witchcraft. 
Traditional leaders cooperated with the programs and reported threats 
against persons suspected of witchcraft to the police. There reportedly 
were some prosecutions, although statistics were not available by 
year's end. Government officials claimed a decrease in attacks as a 
result of the programs; however, because of the embargo on crime 
statistics by the SAPS (see Section 2.a.) precise data were not 
available. There were reports of only one witchcraft related murder 
since 1997, compared with more than 500 between 1990 and 1995.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances caused by government authorities or agents.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution's Bill of Rights prohibits torture and 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and provides for the right to 
be free from all forms of violence from either public or private 
sources; however, some members of the police beat, raped, tortured, and 
otherwise abused suspects and detainees. Some incidents of torture and 
ill-treatment by the police and SANDF occurred during interrogation, 
arrest, detention and searches of persons'' homes. The ICD reported 19 
cases of torture and 9 cases of rape perpetrated by security forces 
between April and December; the Government investigated these 
allegations and prosecuted some offenders.
    On April 10, police in Barkly East in Eastern Cape province dragged 
two boys behind a police vehicle during the course of making an arrest, 
killing a 14-year-old boy (see Section 1.a.). Three police officers 
were charged with murder, assault, and related crimes. The trial was 
postponed until March 2001; the officers were released on bail and 
suspended from duty.
    In May some COSATU members reportedly clashed with police during a 
COSATU strike, and police used tear gas after the crowd reportedly 
threw stones (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
    On November 7, a video filmed in 1998 was broadcast on national 
television showing six white police officers beating and torturing 
three black illegal immigrants with vicious dogs while yelling racial 
insults. The officers were arrested and charged with assault and 
attempted murder, and suspended from duty; the investigation was 
ongoing at year's end. Several similar cases were reported to the ICD 
after the broadcast of the video. For example, in August police of the 
North Rand Dog Unit allegedly took seven Mozambican immigrants to a 
deserted field near Springs, ordered them out of the police vehicle, 
and attacked them with police dogs. After receiving medical treatment 
and being detained for several days in a police jail, the victims were 
taken to the Lindela Repatriation Centre and returned to Mozambique. 
Another Mozambican immigrant reported that a similar incident took 
place in October in the West Rand area. The ICD was investigating the 
incidents at year's end.
    Incidents of police harassment and attacks against foreigners 
increased. Some state hospitals routinely refused treatment to indigent 
foreigners, despite regulations that required such treatment.
    There were reports of police abuse of detainees awaiting 
deportation (see Section 2.d.). In December after a 2-year 
investigation, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) released a report 
assessing conditions at the Lindela Repatriation Centre, the largest 
detention facility for undocumented immigrants in the country. The 
report described abuses against detainees, which included long 
detentions, poor living conditions, xenophobia, abuse and corruption by 
officials, and sexual abuse of women. In December the HRC reported that 
the Department of Home Affairs had not responded to its 
recommendations, and, although the contractor operating the facility 
had improved conditions, Home Affairs officials continued to assault 
detainees and subject them to degrading treatment. On November 28, 
approximately 300 refugees demonstrated in front of the Department of 
Home Affairs to protest its refusal to process asylum applications for 
those applicants without certain documents. Some of the refugees 
alleged that Home Affairs employees assaulted them and requested 
bribes. The HRC sued the Department of Home Affairs to compel the 
processing of all applications by asylum seekers, as required by the 
1998 Refugees Act; the case still was pending at year's end (see 
Section 2.d.).
    Two officers who were filmed by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation as they beat suspected criminals in a 1999 documentary were 
fined and given suspended prison sentences on July 10.
    In 1998 police at a Guguletu police station severely beat a Cape 
Town journalist, Thabo Mabaso, after he went to the station to report a 
traffic accident. The officers responsible were initially suspended, 
then reinstated and transferred to another police station pending their 
trial. On July 7, nine officers were charged for the beating. On August 
30, six of the officers were acquitted; three were convicted and 
sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 5 years.
    The Government made efforts to address abuses with an official 
antitorture policy and training programs for police and SANDF officers. 
Broad efforts to reform police practices continued to reduce abuses, 
and the ICD investigates reports of police misconduct and corruption 
(see Section 1.a.). In November 1999, the SAPS Training Division 
initiated a human rights program; by September 15, over 15,000 of the 
estimated 90,000 targeted officers had undergone training. The largest 
number of officers have been trained in the Western Cape province, and 
officials credited the training with an increase in police disciplinary 
actions in the province.
    The SAPS continued to undergo sweeping, mostly positive changes, 
including the institution of reforms designed to create partnerships 
between local police forces and the communities that they serve. 
Resignations and retirements of senior police officials have permitted 
the infusion of new personnel at senior levels, from both inside and 
outside the SAPS; these appointments also have served to promote 
affirmative action within the SAPS. However, the SAPS has been left 
with deficiencies in midlevel leadership, and institutional memory that 
have been harmful to its overall performance. The SAPS continued to be 
understaffed, overworked, and undertrained.
    There was a consistent pattern of attacks and killings between ANC 
and IFP members in the province of KwaZulu Natal; however, the level of 
violence diminished during the year (see Section 1.a.).
    There were a number of bombings during the year, which resulted in 
numerous casualties, including 9 pipe and car bomb explosions in Cape 
Town, for which no organization claimed responsibility (see Section 
1.a.). This represents a decline from the 80 bomb explosions that 
occurred in 1999. Since November 1998, 16 PAGAD members were convicted 
and 14 were acquitted in connection with urban terror attacks (see 
Section 1.a.). In July D. Essop and R. Shaik were sentenced to 7 years 
in prison for possession of a pipe bomb.
    There were incidents of abuse, including killings, of black farm 
laborers by their white employers, and NGO's claim that rural police 
and courts refuse to arrest whites in many incidents (see Section 
1.a.).
    There were a few illegal strikes that resulted in some worker 
violence, in particular incidents of intimidation and threats of 
violence by striking workers against nonstriking and replacement 
workers. In December during a legal strike of security guards, strikers 
used intimidation and violence against nonstriking and replacement 
guards and also against journalists covering the strike. Nonstriking 
security guards were harassed by groups of strikers while taking public 
transportation; the groups stripped them, forced them to lay down in 
dirt, and beat them. Two guards were shot to death in December in Cape 
Town in what police believe was a strike-related attack (see Section 
1.a. and 6.a.).
    Conflict between warring taxi companies led to gun battles and 
other street violence, and resulted in the deaths and injuries of 
bystanders in several cities (see Section 1.a.).
    Vigilante action and mob justice resulted in attacks on suspected 
criminals and drug dealers, some of whom were tortured (see Section 
1.a.).
    Xenophobia is a growing problem. Xenophobia was expressed in 
institutional and social interactions with foreigners, particularly 
those from other African countries. There were a number of violent 
attacks on foreigners, including refugees and asylum seekers. Many of 
those attacked were hawkers and street vendors. Foreigners faced harsh 
reactions from antiimmigrant groups such as the Unemployed Masses of 
South Africa, which criticized immigrants for job losses, and in August 
demonstrated against employers who hired noncitizen workers. NGO's 
continued to encourage the Government to give equal access to health, 
education, and legal protection to foreigners. The U.N. High Commission 
on Refugees (UNHCR), the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs, and 
the Human Rights Commission (HRC) continued their ``Roll Back 
Xenophobia'' campaign to raise public awareness of the situation and 
rights of refugees and the difference between refugees and economic 
migrants. The campaign has produced publications and organized several 
public relations events.
    Three suspects were arrested for a series of bombings in January 
1997, including a mosque in Rustenberg that injured two persons; the 
trial concluded during the year, but the sentence was not announced by 
year's end (see Section 5).
    Prison conditions do not always meet the country's minimum legal 
requirements. Food, especially for prisoners with HIV/AIDS and other 
medical problems, frequently is of poor quality and quantity. NGO's 
reported that prison employees steal food from prisoners. Although 
prisoners generally have access to health care, prison officials 
sometimes withheld prescribed treatment as punishment. Severe 
overcrowding in some prisons led to poor health; as many as 75 inmates 
may occupy a cell designed to hold 40 inmates. The Department of 
Correctional Services (DCS), which manages prisons, reported that in 
July there were 169,0000 prisoners in facilities designed to hold only 
101,000. In September 8,262 prisoners awaiting trial but unable to post 
bail due to poverty were released in an effort to reduce overcrowding. 
There were abuses of prisoners, including physical and sexual assaults 
by prison employees and other prisoners. Press reports indicated that 
detainees awaiting trial contracted HIV/AIDS through rape. Male and 
female prisoners are held separately; however, female prison wards are 
often on the same grounds as male wards, and Amnesty International 
reported rapes of women by other prisoners.
    Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 18 accused of serious crimes, 
including murder or rape, sometimes are placed in pretrial detention in 
prisons with adult offenders (see Section 5). DCS statistics from May 
documented that there were 27,638 youth offenders (prisoners under age 
21), 4,253 of whom were 17 years of age or younger. Juveniles normally 
are not housed with adults; however, in August 200 juveniles under 18 
years of age awaiting trial were transferred to secure care centers 
after it was discovered that they were detained with adult prisoners 
and receiving insufficient medical attention at Pollsmoor Prison near 
Cape Town. There were credible reports that youths from juvenile wards 
were sold to adult prisoners for purposes of rape. In June a 17-year-
old prisoner died in Johannesburg prison after being repeatedly raped 
by adult prisoners.
    In 1997 the Government commissioned the first of several planned 
``C-MAX'' prisons in Pretoria. C-MAX prisons are designed to hold the 
country's most dangerous criminals. Human rights groups have raised 
serious concerns regarding C-MAX facilities, including the Government's 
criteria for transferring prisoners from other prisons to a C-MAX 
facility and the restrictive, solitary conditions of the prisons 
themselves. No additional CMAX prisons were opened by year's end, but a 
new prison based on the C-MAX model was under construction and 
scheduled to begin operations in April 2001.
    Parliament passed legislation in late 1998 to restructure the 
prison service and bring prison law in line with the Constitution. 
Parts of the Correctional Services Act went into effect in 1998; 
although additional sections relating to the treatment of prisoners 
went into effect during the year, sections on parole board policy were 
not yet implemented. The parole boards still are staffed by lower 
ranking DCS employees, to which NGO's have attributed the low number of 
parole decisions and an exacerbation of the overcrowding conditions in 
prisons.
    A Judicial Inspectorate for prisons began operations during 1999, 
and a number of civilian prison visitors were appointed throughout the 
country. Visits were conducted during the year; however, most visitors 
were not trained in legal matters. Those who received some training 
from NGO's generally were more successful in encouraging compliance 
with regulations on inmate treatment.
    The Government generally permits independent monitoring of prison 
conditions, including visits by human rights organizations; however, 
only those organizations that are able to send legal practitioners are 
allowed to visit prisons. Other prisoners'' rights organizations 
routinely are denied access.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Bill of Rights 
prohibits detention without trial, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice. It also provides that every detained 
person has the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for the 
detention; to be advised promptly of the right to remain silent and the 
consequences of waiving that right; to be charged within 48 hours of 
arrest; to be detained in conditions of human dignity; to consult with 
legal counsel at every stage of the legal process; to communicate with 
relatives, medical practitioners, and religious counselors; and to be 
released (with or without bail) unless the interests of justice require 
otherwise.
    Courts and police generally respected these rights; however, there 
was a continuing problem with bringing detainees to trial 
expeditiously. According to the HRC, prisoners wait on average for 6 
months to be tried in the regional courts and 6 months to 1 year in the 
high courts; however, in extreme cases detention may extend up to 2 
years. This problem primarily is the result of an understaffed, 
underfunded, and overburdened judiciary (both magistrates and 
prosecutors), with more cases than can be handled efficiently (see 
Section 1.e.). Human rights groups, judges, and judicial scholars 
continued to express concern about the Criminal Procedure Second 
Amendment Act of 1997, which mandates minimum jail sentences and 
prohibits bail in certain cases, thus raising concern about judicial 
independence and civil liberties.
    There were reports that authorities abused detainees awaiting 
deportation. In December the HRC reported that immigrants in Lindela 
Repatriation Centre experienced long detentions and abuse (see Sections 
1.c. and 2.d.).
    There were no reports of forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent and impartial judiciary subject only to the Constitution 
and the law, and the Government respects this provision in practice.
    Under the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the highest 
court for interpreting and deciding constitutional issues, while the 
Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court for interpreting and 
deciding other legal matters. Generally magistrates' courts and high 
courts are the courts of original jurisdiction in criminal cases.
    Judges and magistrates hear criminal cases; the jury system was 
abolished in 1969. The presiding judge or magistrate determines guilt 
or innocence. The 1998 Magistrates Court Amendment Act made it 
compulsory to have a panel of lay assessors hear cases along with a 
magistrate in cases involving murder, rape, robbery, indecent assault, 
and assault leading to serious bodily harm. The two assessors may 
overrule magistrates on questions of fact. Magistrates also are 
required to use their discretion in using assessors in an advisory 
capacity in bail applications and sentencing. The Office of the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions (the so-called super Attorney 
General) exercises national control over prosecution policy and applies 
a consistent national policy for the prosecution of offenses. There are 
nine provincial directors and offices to coordinate and streamline 
prosecutions.
    The Bill of Rights provides for due process, including the right to 
a fair, public trial within a reasonable time after being charged, and 
the right to appeal to a higher court. It also gives detainees the 
right to state-funded legal counsel when ``substantial injustice would 
otherwise result.'' In practice the law functions as intended; however, 
a general lack of information on the part of accused persons regarding 
their rights to legal representation and the Government's inability to 
pay the cost of those services are continuing problems. There were 
serious backlogs in the numbers of cases that have gone to trial. In 
July the National Prosecuting Authority reported that there were 
approximately 140,000 cases awaiting hearings. There was public concern 
about the capacity of the criminal justice system to deal with the high 
level of crime, as well as the continuing political violence in 
KwaZulu-Natal and elsewhere. The resurgence of vigilante justice 
substantiates this concern (see Section 1.a.).
    Some human rights groups expressed concern with parts of laws 
passed in 1997 that provided minimum sentencing guidelines and refusal 
of bail for certain serious offenses, stating that they would harm 
judicial independence and limit civil liberties. The law mandating 
minimum sentences came into force in 1998. The new bail law was upheld 
by the Constitutional Court in 1999. In December the South African Law 
Commission submitted a report to the Minister of Justice on the effects 
of minimum sentencing laws. The report showed that there remained 
disparities in the application of the sentencing guidelines, mostly at 
the regional level. Courts have the authority to depart from the 
guidelines if ``substantial and compelling circumstances'' justify it. 
Some human rights groups continued to have concerns about the effects 
of the minimum sentencing laws. The new laws have affected prison 
overcrowding by imposing an increased number of long-term prison 
sentences.
    The Government and legal bodies have acted to redress historic 
racial and gender imbalances in the judiciary and the bar. The ranks of 
judges, magistrates, senior counsels, and attorneys are more reflective 
of society, although they still fall far short of a representative 
composition. The majority of judges of the Constitutional and High 
Courts remain white and male. Magistrates courts continue to face large 
case loads and a shortage of resources.
    The TRC continued to investigate apartheid-era gross human rights 
abuses committed between 1960 and 1994, to grant amnesty to 
perpetrators of a broad range of politically motivated crimes, and to 
recommend compensation for victims of human rights abuses (see Section 
4).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
    On January 25, Parliament passed the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act. Although the purpose of the act was to increase 
transparency, opposition parties and human rights NGO's objected to it 
because it includes a broadly-defined provision that enables the 
Government to access individuals'' personal information.
    On July 30, SAPS members, claiming to be searching homes for 
illegal weapons, shot and killed an ANC Member of Parliament, Bheki 
Mkhize, in his parents' home in Mahlabathini; the officers reportedly 
did not have a warrant to enter the home (see Section 1.a.).
    In 1994 the Redistribution of Land Rights Act established the 
Constitutional Land Court and the Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights. The Land Court's mission is to settle cases previously screened 
and evaluated by the Commission. Claims only can be filed for land 
dispossessions following the promulgation of the Natives Land Act of 
1913, although this does not include dispossessions that occurred in 
1913, the year of the Government's most significant land redistribution 
in favor of whites. The various forms of compensation offered to 
claimants are the return of the original land, a deed to another piece 
of land, financial remuneration, or preferential access to government 
housing. A deadline of December 31, 1998 was set for receiving claims. 
There is no deadline for completion of the claim settlements, and the 
pace at which cases are moving is slow. By the December 1998 deadline, 
the Commission had received 67,531 claims; some claims represent 
several households. The Commission is scheduled to determine which 
claims are valid by the end of 2001. At year's end, 8,288 claims had 
been settled, allotting land or money to 20,473 households. A provision 
passed by Parliament in late 1997, allowed the Ministry of Land Affairs 
to offer settlements without first going to court, and has expedited 
the resolution process.
    In May following land reform disturbances in a neighboring country 
during the year, the media reported on a series of farm occupations by 
landless farm workers in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. Subsequent 
information showed that there was no organized effort to seize land, 
and the occupations were by either longtime squatters or claimants 
frustrated by long delays from the Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights. On May 10, President Mbeki stated before Parliament that the 
Government would not tolerate land seizures.
    There were reports of persons accused of witchcraft being driven 
from their villages in rural communities (see Section 1.c.).
    There are three known villages in the Northern Province in which 
persons accused of witchcraft and their families were offered unused 
land by traditional leaders. The villages have no running water or 
electricity. Although some persons accused of witchcraft returned to 
their homes, many persons remained in the villages and requested 
government assistance for schools and basic infrastructure.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice; however, these rights can be limited by law in some 
circumstances. Several apartheid-era laws that remain in force pose a 
potential threat to media independence. In addition, the Constitution 
bans the advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender, or 
religion that constitutes incitement to cause harm. Nevertheless, the 
press criticizes both the Government and the opposition.
    Several laws remain in effect that permit the Government to 
restrict the publication of information about the police, the national 
defense forces, prisons, and mental institutions. While these laws have 
not been employed often, journalists perceive them to be a threat to 
constitutional free press rights. The Criminal Procedure Act may be 
used to compel reporters to reveal their sources. In June 1999, the 
South African National Editors' Forum (SANEF) launched a media campaign 
to compel changes to legislation that restricts the free flow of 
information. In July 1999, SANEF and the Government reached an informal 
agreement to introduce safeguards to prevent the use of the Criminal 
Procedure Act against journalists; however, in September 1999 the 
Provincial Director of Public Prosecutions decided to invoke a section 
of the Criminal Procedure Act against an unnamed person. The Act 
reportedly was not invoked officially by year's end. The SANEF 
continued to push without success for a formal amendment of the Act 
that would ensure this agreement.
    In June the National Police Commissioner announced that the 
Government would withhold the release of current crime statistics and 
other information to the public, on the grounds that crime statistics 
could not be verified and statisticsgathering methods were inaccurate. 
He stated that the embargo was temporary but did not set a date for it 
to be lifted. Judge Willem Heath stated that his anticorruption unit 
also would reduce the amount of information given to the public 
regarding the progress of his special investigations.
    The Government used both legislative and structural means to 
encourage greater diversity in the media. The media offer a broad range 
of news, opinion, and analysis. Coverage of news and expression of 
opinion is vigorous. High-ranking government officials on occasion have 
reacted sharply to media criticism of government programs and problems, 
and have at times accused journalists, particularly black journalists 
and editors, of disloyalty. Some journalists express concern that the 
Government would like to control the media. A larger number of 
journalists believe that the Government's sensitivity to criticism 
causes self-censorship in the media.
    In October police officers raided the offices of the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Reuters, the Associated Press, and the 
Mail & Guardian newspaper. Police confiscated material for use in the 
trial of PAGAD national coordinator Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim and three 
others in the killing of Rashaad Staggie (see Section 1.a.). On July 5, 
there were reports that government officials harassed two journalists 
who were covering a government staff protest. Officials temporarily 
confiscated a camera, notebook and documents, but later returned them.
    All newspapers are owned by conglomerates. In early September, 50 
percent of the Natal Witness Publishing Company was sold to the 
conglomerate Nasionale Pers (Naspers). This sale reflected the growing 
dominance of the newspaper market by a few companies that feature 
strong infrastructure and capital investment. One of the prominent 
companies, New Africa Media, is a black-owned consortium that controls 
the country's leading black-oriented newspaper, The Sowetan, as well as 
a major white-oriented publishing business, Times Media Limited. The 
Sowetan has the largest daily circulation in the country.
    Print media reaches only about 20 percent of the population due to 
illiteracy, the lack of newspapers in rural areas, and the cost of 
newspapers. The majority of the population receive the news through 
radio broadcasts.
    The government-owned SABC, a limited liability company, continues 
to own and control the majority of the television and radio outlets. In 
April the SABC was scheduled to be split into two operational units: a 
public broadcasting company and a commercial entity. However, the 
restructuring had not yet occurred by year's end, and the process is 
expected to take more than a year. At present the SABC is managed by 
black executives, provides broadcasting in the country's main African 
languages, and offers news coverage of the Government and the leading 
opposition parties. The SABC maintains editorial independence from the 
Government, although the balance between editorial independence and 
national interest remains a delicate issue with governmental officials; 
critics allege that top officials are chosen for political reasons 
without regard for media expertise or relevant experience. In February 
the outgoing SABC Board Chairman, Paulus Zulu, raised the concern that 
the SABC was ``dictated to from above'' when making editorial 
decisions.
    The first commercial television station, E-TV, has been 
broadcasting for over 2 years. Although E-TV's signal reaches 75 
percent of the population, E-TV's share is consistently only about 10 
percent of viewers. Most of E-TV's schedule consists of newscasts and 
foreign-produced programs; the government is encouraging E-TV to meet 
its licensing conditions, which would require programming to include at 
least 30 percent local content. Majority ownership of E-TV is held by 
Midi Television, a black-owned consortium composed of a number of South 
African associations and syndicates representing workers, women, and 
disabled persons.
    In addition to E-TV, the SABC competes with two pay-per-view 
broadcasters, M-NET (encoded UHF transmissions) and MultiChoice (direct 
from satellite broadcasts); several commercial radio broadcasters; and 
a large number of low-power, not-for-profit community radio stations. 
Government broadcast regulators have issued more than 100 community 
radio licenses since 1994; many of the 80 stations continue to 
experience financing and personnel retention problems. Nevertheless, 
community radio provides radio access for the first time to thousands 
of historically marginalized citizens, providing special event 
information and news tailored for specific interest groups.
    Internet access is unrestricted for persons with the ability to pay 
for the service. The number of Internet users doubled during the year. 
All major newspapers maintain Internet sites, most of which are updated 
daily with the latest news and features.
    In August the Human Rights Commission (HRC) published the finding 
of its investigation into racism in the media. The investigation 
examined selected publications over a limited period, looking at the 
issue of subliminal racism and the disproportionate representation of 
whites in media ownership and newsroom staffing. The Commission's 
report concluded that: ``To the extent that expressions in the media 
reflect a persistent pattern of racist expressions and content of 
writing that could have been avoided, the media can be characterized as 
racist institutions.'' The report recommended workshops and conferences 
to sensitize journalists to the risk of racial prejudice in their 
reporting. This suggestion was supported by the SANEF and the Freedom 
of Expression Institute (FXI); however, both organizations were less 
receptive to the Commission's recommendation that a single regulatory 
authority be established for the media. Although the proposed authority 
would be funded and under the control of the media, SANEF and FXI 
assert that radio and television require different controls than 
newspapers. They are concerned that the Government's alleged attempts 
to silence expressions of dissent could eventually be codified into 
law.
    A ruling by the Supreme Court in 1998 decreed that journalists who 
could prove that they had taken all the steps necessary to verify that 
the information they obtained was genuine and that the articles 
published as a consequence were reasonable and not negligent would not 
be liable for defamation. Media freedom advocates noted the ruling as 
an important change in the allocation of the burden of proof from the 
media to the plaintiff.
    There are several government agencies with media-related 
responsibilities. Under the South African Communications Regulatory 
Authority Bill passed in May, the IBA and the South African 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) were merged to form the 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). Under the 
new regulations, ICASA has less independence from the Ministry of 
Telecommunications than was previously granted to the IBA. Additionally 
the Minister of Telecommunications has a direct role in the awarding of 
telecommunication-service licenses. This role came under scrutiny 
during the extended bidding process for the third cellular license in 
the country after unsuccessful bidders for the cellular license alleged 
that the regulator unfairly recommended one bidder for the contract; 
they sued to have the decision's basis reviewed, but the case was not 
resolved by year's end. The Government Board of Censors reviews and 
passes judgment on written and graphic materials published in or 
imported into the country. The Board has the power to edit or ban 
books, magazines, movies, and videos. It regularly exercises that 
power, although with restraint. The Government Communications and 
Information Service (GCIS) was created in 1998 to coordinate and 
facilitate communications with the citizenry through its Directorate 
for Media Diversity and Development, which began operations in 1999.
    In December during a legal strike of security guards, strikers used 
intimidation and violence against journalists covering the strike (see 
Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 6.a.).
    There are no official restrictions on academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice. On May 9, police used tear gas while dispersing 
a COSATU strike after the crowd reportedly threw stones (see Section 
6.a.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    The Constitution states that religious instruction at public 
schools is permitted so long as it is voluntary and religions are 
treated equally. Many public schools have dropped religious instruction 
in practice. In schools that do administer religious instruction, 
students have the right not to attend the religious instruction, and 
school authorities respect this right in practice. The current syllabus 
allows local boards to decide whether to include religious instruction 
in their schools. There are some private religious schools in which 
religious instruction is required.
    Members of PAGAD complained that they were the targets of police 
brutality (see Section 1.a.). There was no indication that police 
targeted PAGAD members for investigation because of their religious 
affiliation.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice.
    The law contains provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1998 the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces passed the Refugees Act--
framework legislation that codified the country's obligations under the 
U.N. Convention and its Protocol. The Act's regulations, which 
delineate actual government procedures and responsibilities, became 
effective in April. The Refugees Act stipulates that no person shall be 
expelled, extradited, or returned to any other country if they face 
persecution due to race, religion, or political affiliation, or when 
``his or her life, physical safety, or freedom would be threatened.'' 
The act also stipulates that designated refugees lose their status if 
they voluntarily return to their country of origin, take citizenship of 
another country, or if the circumstances that caused their flight from 
the country of origin change. However, the act stipulates that in order 
to renew their temporary residency permits, asylum seekers must return 
to the town in which they originally lodged their application to be 
recognized as refugees. Permits that are lost, stolen, or destroyed are 
not renewed. If found without a valid permit, asylum seekers are 
subject to arrest, detention, and deportation.
    The UNHCR is assisting the Government in processing asylum 
applications. The regulations implementing the Refugees Act require the 
Department of Home Affairs to interview asylum seekers within 14 days 
of entry and to determine their status within 180 days of the 
interview; however, asylum application are not efficiently processed by 
the Department of Home Affairs due to poor management and insufficient 
resources. There were interview delays of up to 3 months, followed by a 
6-month adjudication period, and under new procedures, applicants are 
prohibited from working or attending school until asylum is granted. 
Human rights groups have criticized the Department of Home Affairs for 
not following the provisions of the act. New applicants for asylum and 
NGO's assisting refugees reported abuse and assaults by immigration 
authorities and requests for bribes to process applications for permits 
to remain in the country (see Section 1.c.). On November 28, 
approximately 300 refugees demonstrated in front of the Department of 
Home Affairs to protest its refusal to process asylum applications for 
those refugees without passports. Some of the refugees alleged that 
Home Affairs employees assaulted them and requested bribes.
    The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first 
asylum, granting applicants the right to work and study. The Department 
of Home Affairs reported that as of November, 61,120 persons had 
applied for asylum since 1994. Of this number, 14,735 were granted 
asylum and refugee status, 24,177 were refused, and 16,053 were 
awaiting a decision. The majority of recognized refugees came from 
Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola; there also 
were refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, and the Republic of the Congo.
    The majority of illegal immigrants come from Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe. Illegal immigrants are processed for deportation at a central 
facility, and sent back to Mozambique and Zimbabwe by weekly trains. 
Inadequate security on the trains allows many deportees to jump from 
the train en route, perpetuating the illegal immigration problem. 
Despite numerous procedural safeguards, efforts to combat a growing 
illegal immigration problem occasionally resulted in the wrongful 
deportation of aliens legally in the country. However, there were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared 
persecution. There were credible reports of overcrowded, unhygienic 
detention facilities; beatings by security personnel in detention 
centers; and the theft of money and personal possessions from refugees 
by security personnel.
    In December after a 2-year investigation, the HRC released a report 
assessing the conditions at the Lindela Repatriation Centre, the 
largest detention facility for undocumented immigrants in the country. 
The report described abuses against detainees, which included long 
detentions, poor conditions, xenophobia, abuse and corruption by 
officials, and sexual abuse of women. In December the HRC reported that 
the Department of Home Affairs had not responded to its 
recommendations, and although the contractor operating the facility had 
improved conditions, Home Affairs officials continued to assault 
detainees and subject them to degrading treatment.
    Xenophobia led to a number of violent attacks on foreigners (see 
Section 1.c.).
    On November 7, a video taped in 1998 was broadcast on national 
television showing six white police officers beating and torturing 
three black illegal immigrants with dogs (see Section 1.c.).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic free and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage. In June 1999 national elections were held that observers 
deemed to be free and fair. There was an improved level of overall 
tolerance during the campaigning and voting period compared with the 
1994 elections, attributable to IFP-ANC talks, as well as an increased 
police presence. Complaints primarily concerned posters being removed 
or defaced, individuals being threatened because of political 
affiliation, and other incidents of intimidation.
    The new Constitution went into effect in February 1997. Under its 
terms, the country retains a bicameral parliament, an executive state 
presidency, and an independent judiciary, including a constitutional 
court.
    The 400-member National Assembly was retained under the 
Constitution. A National Council of Provinces (NCOP), consisting of six 
permanent and four rotating delegates from each of the nine provinces, 
functions as the second chamber of Parliament. The NCOP, created to 
give a greater voice to provincial interests, must approve legislation 
that involves shared national and provincial competencies according to 
a schedule in the Constitution. An 18-member Council of Traditional 
Leaders, which the Constitution accords an advisory role in matters of 
traditional law and authority, was inaugurated in 1997.
    Two parties, the ANC and the IFP, continued to share executive 
power, although the ANC dominated the Government and gained in 
parliamentary strength in the 1999 elections. The ANC fills 24 of the 
27 ministerial positions. In 1999 the ANC leader, Thabo Mbeki, 
succeeded Nelson Mandela as President and Head of State. As a result of 
the 1999 national elections, the Democratic Party (DP) replaced the New 
National Party (NNP) as the official opposition in the National 
Assembly. In June the DP and NNP, along with the Federal Alliance (FA), 
formed the Democratic Alliance, which is expected to consolidate into a 
single party as soon as electoral laws permit them to do so. The 
National Assembly also includes the UDM, the African Christian 
Democratic Party, the Pan Africanist Congress, the United Christian 
Democratic Party, the Freedom Front, the Afrikaner Unity Movement, the 
Azanian People's Organization, and the Minority Front.
    Traditional leaders expressed concern over the redrawing of 
municipal boundaries in anticipation of nationwide municipal elections 
that were held on December 5. These leaders traditionally have held all 
of their subjects'' agricultural land in trust for their subjects and 
have controlled many aspects of social and cultural life in rural 
areas. They claimed that the new demarcations split and diminished 
their hereditary status and power bases. They also complained that new 
municipal structures and legislatures denied them voting rights in 
local councils, which control development funds for local communities. 
Although some chiefs advocated a boycott of the December elections, 
most decided to participate based on an agreement with the Government 
to negotiate compromise legislation. Negotiations continued 
intermittently after the December elections; however, there was no 
agreement on legislation by year's end. There were very few reports of 
violence or irregularities during the December 5 local elections; 
however, in the East Rand area of Johannesburg, there were reports that 
five persons were killed in two incidents of violence that may have 
been politically motivated (see Section 1.a.).
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in 
government; however, women are underrepresented in government and 
politics. Of the 400 National Assembly members, 119 are women, while in 
the NCOP, 17 of the 54 permanent delegates are women. Women occupy 
three of four parliamentary presiding officer positions (speaker and 
deputy speaker of the National Assembly, and chair of the NCOP). Women 
hold 8 of 27 ministerial positions, as well as 8 of 13 deputy 
ministerial slots.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operate without government restriction, 
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. 
Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their 
views. Many organizations participate in governmental bodies that seek 
to gather public input and to fashion policies related to human rights.
    The government-created HRC is tasked with promoting the observance 
of fundamental human rights at all levels of government and throughout 
the general population. The HRC also has the power to conduct 
investigations, issue subpoenas, and hear testimony under oath. While 
commissioners were named in late 1995, the HRC's powers were not 
determined formally until May 1996. Following the August release of its 
report on the 1999 investigation into racism in the media, opposition 
parties again questioned the HRC's broad interpretation of its mandate 
and the impartiality of the Commission. During the year, the HRC began 
an investigation into allegations of abuse of black farmworkers, local 
justice system prejudice against farmworkers, and violence against 
white farm owners. The HRC report was not released by year's end.
    The Office of the Public Protector investigates abuse and 
mismanagement by the Government, and acts as an office of last resort 
to which citizens report unfair treatment by government organizations. 
Such complaints generally take the form of concerns over lost pension 
checks or unfair hiring practices. The office handles an increasing 
number of complaints but is hampered by severe resource constraints.
    Under its 1995 enabling legislation, the TRC was empowered to 
investigate apartheid-era gross human rights abuses committed between 
1960 and 1994, to grant amnesty to perpetrators of a broad range of 
politically motivated crimes, and to recommend compensation for victims 
of human rights abuses. Due to the volume of work, the TRC's original 
2-year mandate was extended to allow the continuation of amnesty 
hearings, and the TRC continued to operate freely throughout its 5th 
year. Its five-volume report was released in 1998, and a codicil is to 
be added upon completion of the amnesty process. In its report, the TRC 
found that apartheid was a crime against humanity, that the former 
apartheid regime was responsible for most of the human rights abuses 
during the era of its rule, and that the ANC and other liberation 
movements also committed abuses during their armed struggle. Following 
a court challenge in 1998, findings on former State President F.W. De 
Klerk were excised from the report, pending a hearing that has been 
postponed indefinitely.
    By January 1999, 7,112 amnesty applications had been filed with the 
TRC; no new applications have been accepted since 1997. By September 
287 cases remained outstanding, 136 of which remained unheard. An 
estimated 80 to 90 percent of all applications were from persons 
already incarcerated. In October 1999, the TRC began amnesty hearings 
on 10 former members of the Umkhonoto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the 
ANC, for their role in a series of 1986 bar bombings; the case was 
still pending at year's end. The killers of ANC activist Ruth First 
were granted amnesty, although relatives of First and other victims 
challenged the decision in court. During the year, the TRC granted 
amnesty to a number of other persons, including Eugene de Kock, the 
principal of the apartheid government Vlakplaas unit (although he 
remains in custody for other crimes); police officers who killed 
antiapartheid activist Stanza Bopape; and the IFP members involved in a 
massacre at Boipatong. The TRC still is considering former Minister of 
Law and Order Adrian Vlok's amnesty applications for several offenses. 
On September 7, the TRC granted 11 ANC guards amnesty for their 
participation in the 1994 killing of 8 IFP demonstrators.
    The TRC report called for a reconciliation summit to be scheduled 
in 1999, but had not received a formal response from the Government by 
year's end. The TRC also called for increased counseling services for 
victims of trauma, and consideration of a mechanism for restitution, 
such as a wealth tax. Victims'' groups such as Khulumani called for the 
Government to set aside $870 million (6 billion rands) for reparation 
funding according to the TRC formulas. The Government did not approve 
the TRC's recommendations for an overall payment formula for 
reparations, which include monetary compensation as well as community 
support and legal and symbolic reparations, by year's end. The 
Government had not resolved any of these matters by year's end; 
however, the processing of emergency financial reparation applications 
from eligible victims continued, with approximately $4.4 million (35 
million rands) paid by year's end. During the year, interim assistance 
was given to those considered to be in the greatest financial 
difficulty. The TRC officially expressed concern regarding delays in 
implementing reparation measures, along with doubt about the level of 
government support for reparation funding.
    In 1999 the Director of Public Prosecutions stated that his office 
had established a special unit to set up a process for proceeding 
against those persons who had failed to ask for amnesty or to whom 
amnesty had been denied. The unit would establish uniform criteria on 
which cases should be prosecuted; the criteria would include the 
strength of evidence available as well as the ``implications for 
national reconciliation.'' The case against Dr. Basson is the first 
case pursued by this unit to go to trial (see Section 1.a.).

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, 
religion, disability, ethnic or social origin, color, age, culture, 
language, sex, pregnancy, or marital status. Legal recourse is 
available to those who believe that they have been discriminated 
against; however, entrenched attitudes and practices, as well as 
limited resources, limit the practical effect of these protections.
    Women.--There is an extremely high rate of violence against women, 
including rape, assault and battery, and domestic violence. Police 
reported that the rate of reported rapes was 48.9 per 100,000 persons 
for the first 5 months of the year. The rate for 1999 was 47.5 per 
100,000. The actual population figure and numbers of reported rapes 
were not published. According to a victims'' survey study by Statistics 
South Africa, a government-related organization, only 47 percent of 
sexual crimes committed in 1998 were reported to the police. Women's 
groups estimate the reporting rate to be even lower. Entrenched 
patriarchal attitudes towards women are a significant factor in 
underreporting. Abused women have difficulty getting their cases 
prosecuted effectively and also often are treated poorly by doctors, 
police, and judges.
    The 1998 Domestic Violence Act defines victims of domestic 
violence, facilitates the serving of protection orders on abusers, 
provides places of safety for victims, allows police to seize firearms 
at the scene and arrest abusers without a warrant, and compels medical, 
educational, and other practitioners working with children to report 
abuse immediately. The 1993 Prevention of Family Violence Act defines 
marital rape as a criminal offense, and it allows women to obtain 
injunctions against their abusive husbands and partners in a simpler, 
less expensive, and more effective manner than under previous 
legislation. However, the implementation process is inadequate, as some 
police are reluctant to enforce the act. As a consequence, a limited 
number of women filed complaints under the law, despite government and 
NGO efforts to increase public awareness of it. At year's end, the 
parliamentary monitoring committee on women's affairs was completing 
consultations with NGO's and local and national government officials 
regarding defects in the domestic violence laws, preparing a report for 
the relevant ministries on how the legislation can be modified to 
ensure more effective implementation, and focusing on efforts to ensure 
that the budget oversight process included greater emphasis on the 
effects of government programs on women. While some progress was made, 
the number of shelters for battered women remained insufficient. The 
SAPS continued to operate 46 Family Violence, Child Protection, and 
Sexual Offenses units, which deal specifically with these issues and 
which are intended, in part, to increase victims' confidence in the 
police, thereby leading to increased reporting of such crimes. However, 
these units often were hampered by a lack of training among officers. 
During the year, the Government began a training program for these 
units.
    Female immigrants and asylum seekers were sexually abused during 
detention. The Lindela Repatriation Centre, the largest facility for 
the detention of undocumented immigrants in the country, has no special 
facilities for women, and although male and female detainees resided in 
separate sections of the Centre, they often used common facilities (see 
Section 2.d.).
    Discrimination against women remains a serious problem despite 
legal and constitutional protections, particularly in areas such as 
wages, extension of credit, and access to land. Progress was made in 
bringing customary law in line with constitutional provisions. The 1998 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Bill recognizes customary marriages, 
both monogamous and polygynous, but it does not address religious 
marriages, which are not recognized by the law. However, the bill was 
not implemented by year's end. The bill includes a number of safeguards 
for women and children, including requiring a minimum age of 18 and the 
consent of both spouses to enter into such marriages and a court decree 
to dissolve them. The bill also addresses inequities of property 
arrangements under some customary laws. The 1998 Maintenance Bill, the 
final section of which was enacted into law during the year, tightens 
procedures for child support payments and improves the ability of 
caregivers, most of whom are women, to collect maintenance payments 
from partners. Other legislation, such as the Employment Equity Act, 
which includes both antidiscrimination and affirmative action 
provisions, and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, address 
discrimination against women in the workplace. The legislation 
reportedly has resulted in an improvement in the numbers of women in 
professional and technical positions, although it has not had as much 
effect at the management level. The 1997 Interim Protection of Informal 
Land Act protects persons who have insecure and informal rights and 
interests in land; many women are in this category.
    Polygyny continues to be practiced by several ethnic groups. 
Exacting a bride price (``lobola'') also is a traditional practice of 
some ethnic groups.
    Recent studies have shown a connection between women and the 
likelihood of poverty. A women's NGO reported that femaleheaded 
households have a 50 percent higher incidence of poverty than male-
headed households; that a high proportion of working women live in poor 
households; and that 61 percent of the elderly poor are women.
    A number of governmental and nongovernmental organizations monitor 
and promote women's rights. The Office on the Status of Women, located 
in the Deputy President's office, coordinates departmental gender 
desks, which develop strategies to ensure integration of gender 
concerns in policy and planning. The Commission on Gender Equality 
(CGE), a constitutionally mandated body, is authorized to investigate 
allegations of gender discrimination and make recommendations to 
Parliament on any legislation affecting women. As with some of the 
other statutory watchdog bodies, the CGE continued to be hampered by a 
lack of funding. There were reports that women are trafficked into the 
country for forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Constitution stipulates that children have the right 
``to security, education, basic nutrition, and basic health and social 
services.'' The Government remains committed to providing these 
services and has made some progress toward developing the mechanisms 
for delivering them, including improvements in the provision of 
education and a campaign against child abuse. However, the demand for 
such services far outstrips the resources available.
    The 1996 Schools Act and the National Education Policy Act provide 
greater educational opportunities for disadvantaged children--
traditionally black children--through a uniform system for the 
organization, governance, and funding of schools. It mandates 
compulsory education from ages 7 to 15 and ensures that children cannot 
be refused admission to public schools due to a lack of funds. 
According to the Department of Education, approximately 90 percent of 7 
to 15-year-olds and 83 percent of 16 to 19-year-olds are enrolled in 
school. The school funding formula, based on norms and standards tied 
to physical resources and performance, devotes 60 percent of 
nonpersonnel resources toward the 40 percent most needy schools. Each 
of the nine provincial departments of education has responsibility for 
the schools in their provinces, which has resulted in the uneven 
distribution of educational facilities. The disparity has affected the 
areas of Eastern Cape, the Northern Province, and KwaZulu-Natal most 
severely. The availability and quality of primary schooling still is a 
problem, especially in rural areas where schools may not be easily 
accessible or children may have to work (see Section 6.d.). To address 
this problem, the Government continued to build some new schools, 
introduce basic skills development and prevocational training into the 
curriculum and, in some cases, develop plans to provide food for 
disadvantaged children.
    Student populations on university campuses are becoming more 
representative of the general population, with previously allwhite 
universities reaching out to recruit students from black and colored 
communities. The enrollment of black students had risen to 41 percent 
in 1999 at the nation's top five universities.
    Social programs known as ``Presidential Initiatives,'' which were 
included in the Government's Reconstruction and Development Program, 
continued to receive government support. These initiatives offer free 
health care to pregnant women and to children under 6 years of age and 
provide nutritious meals for primary school children.
    In December 1999, a Cape Town High Court heard a case brought by 
residents of a squatter camp petitioning for government-provided 
housing. The court ruled that the children in squatter camps have a 
constitutional right to housing and, thus, are entitled to state-
provided shelter. The court also ruled that the children have a 
constitutional right to family and therefore, have the right to be 
accompanied by their family members in the state-provided shelter. The 
Constitutional Court, the country's highest court, held hearings on the 
case in May, and ruled that the Government had failed to carry out its 
obligation to provide housing, but did not rule specifically on the 
constitutional rights of children to housing.
    Violence against children remains widespread. While there has been 
increased attention to the problem by the Government, the public, and 
the media, a lack of coordinated and comprehensive strategies to deal 
with violence crimes continues to impede the delivery of needed 
services to young victims. Reports of child rape have increased 
significantly, as have reports that men are committing rape due to a 
growing myth that having sexual intercourse with a virgin can cure HIV/
AIDS.
    Traditional circumcision rituals still are practiced on teenage 
boys in rural areas of the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal and resulted 
in the hospitalization, mutilation, or death of several boys and young 
men. The provincial department of health reported at least 18 deaths, 5 
mutilations, and 42 hospitalizations during the summer initiation 
season that began in September. In December provincial health 
authorities began to regulate the practice by requiring the presence of 
trained medical personnel during the rituals.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, still is practiced in some rural areas of the 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, although it is not thought to be 
widespread. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act of 2000 specifically prohibits FGM as unfair 
discrimination; however, that provision had not been implemented by 
year's end.
    Child prostitution is on the rise, primarily in Cape Town, Durban, 
and Johannesburg. There reportedly has been an increase in the number 
of children who live on the streets, and observers believe that this 
circumstance has contributed to the growing number of child 
prostitutes. The child sex industry increasingly has become organized, 
with children either being forced into prostitution or exploited by 
their parents to earn money for the family (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., 
and 6.f.). The 1999 Child Care Amendment Bill, which was implemented in 
January, prohibits the commercial sexual exploitation of children.
    Parliament passed legislation in 1995 prohibiting the detention of 
unconvicted juveniles in prisons, police cells, or lock-ups. A 1996 law 
gave courts limited discretion to detain in prison 14 to 18-year-old 
children who were awaiting trial for serious crimes such as murder or 
rape. The measure was expected to be temporary pending the 
establishment of ``places of safety,'' also called ``secure care 
centers,'' for the detention of juveniles. However, due to delays in 
the establishment of such centers, provisions of the 1996 law lapsed. 
Amid concerns that dangerous juvenile offenders were being released to 
return to the streets, additional legislation was passed in 1998 to 
regulate limited pretrial detention of juvenile offenders accused of 
serious crimes. The law states that any child under the age of 14 must 
be released within 24 hours into the custody of a parent or guardian 
when possible. In August 200 juveniles awaiting trial were transferred 
to secure care centers after it was discovered that they were being 
held with adult prisoners and receiving insufficient medical attention 
at Pollsmoor prison near Cape Town (see Section 1.c.). Immigrant 
children detained in the Lindela Repatriation Centre received the same 
general treatment as adult detainees, were not provided with separate 
sleeping facilities from adults, and were not always provided with food 
and clothing by the facility (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
    There were reports that children were trafficked for forced 
prostitution and forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of disability. Society is increasingly open 
to the concept of persons with disabilities as a minority whose civil 
rights must be protected. The Government attempts to ensure that all 
government-funded projects take account of the needs of disabled 
citizens. However, in practice government and private sector 
discrimination against the disabled in employment still exists. 
According to an NGO, the Affirmative Action Monitor, fewer than two-
thirds of companies target the disabled as part of their affirmative 
action programs. The law mandates access to buildings for the disabled, 
but such regulations rarely are enforced, and public awareness of them 
remains minimal. The Employment Equity Act requires private firms with 
more than 50 workers to create an affirmative action plan with 
provisions for achieving employment equity for the disabled. The 
National Environmental Accessibility Program, an NGO comprising 
disabled consumers as well as service providers, has established a 
presence in all nine provinces to lobby for compliance with the 
regulations and to sue offending property owners when necessary.
    Religious Minorities.--Relations between the various religious 
communities generally are amicable. However, there is a concern among 
some Christians about the perceived growing influence of political 
Islam. Reports of violence perpetrated by PAGAD have fueled these 
concerns.
    PAGAD portrays itself as a community organization opposed to crime, 
gangsterism, and drugs; however, it is known for its violent 
vigilantism (see Section 1.a.). PAGAD is a multifaith movement, 
although its orientation is Islamic and the vast majority of its 
members are Muslim. PAGAD is most active in the Western Cape, but also 
has branches elsewhere in the country. Surveys indicated that some two-
thirds of Muslims supported PAGAD soon after its inception in 1995, but 
that figure has dropped significantly since. While PAGAD continues to 
lose support when it is linked to violent acts, it gains sympathy when 
high-profile incidents occur that are perceived by the Muslim community 
to have been acts of discrimination against Muslims.
    There were occasional reports of killings linked to the continued 
practice of witchcraft in some rural areas (see Section 1.a.). In the 
Northern Province, where traditional beliefs regarding witchcraft 
remain strong, officials reported dozens of killings of persons 
suspected of witchcraft. The Government has instituted educational 
programs to prevent such actions.
    In December 1998, a synagogue in Wynberg was bombed. Four suspects 
were arrested, and their trials were scheduled to be heard in 2001.
    In January 1997, a mosque in Rustenberg was damaged in a series of 
bombings that also struck a post office and a liquor store. In 
September Pieter Nel, Christian Harmse, and Pierre Jacobs, believed by 
authorities to be affiliated with the right wing Afrikaaner 
Weerstandsbeweging group, were convicted on charges that included 
attempted murder, possession of explosives, and sabotage, and were 
sentenced in September to prison terms ranging from 16 to 19 years.
    Indigenous People.--The Constitution provides for the recognition 
of ``the institution, status, and role of traditional leadership,'' and 
requires the courts to ``apply customary law when that is applicable, 
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals 
with customary law.''
    The Constitution further permits legislation for the establishment 
of provincial houses of traditional leaders and a National Council of 
Traditional Leaders to deal with matters relating to traditional 
leadership, the role of traditional leaders, indigenous and customary 
law, and the customs of communities that observe a system of customary 
law. Six provinces have established houses of traditional leaders. 
Under the terms of the Constitution and implementing legislation, the 
National Council of Traditional Leaders was inaugurated in 1997. The 
Council is to advise the Government on matters related to traditional 
authorities and customary law. However, much work remains to be done to 
integrate traditional leadership and customary law into the formal 
legal and administrative system. No agreement had been reached by 
year's end (see Section 3).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution and Bill of 
Rights prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic or social 
origin, or culture. The Government continued efforts to reorganize and 
redesign the educational, housing, and health care systems to benefit 
all racial and ethnic groups in society more equally. The Employment 
Equity Act of 1998 prohibits discrimination on 19 grounds and requires 
companies with 50 or more employees to ensure that previously 
disadvantaged groups--defined as blacks, women, and the disabled--are 
adequately represented at all levels of the workforce. By December all 
such companies were required to submit affirmative action plans to the 
Department of Labor. In October the Minister of Labor stated that 
senior management positions in 2,170 large employers (those with 150 or 
more employees) that reported on time and in the correct format 
reported 28 percent blacks and 24 percent women in those positions. 
This result indicated no significant change from baseline figures 
recorded in 1998. Blacks and women comprise 79 percent and 40 percent, 
respectively, of the economically active population. The employers 
cited a lack of training and development, poor recruitment processes, 
and an antagonistic corporate culture as the main impediments to 
affirmative action. No figures are available on the disabled. The armed 
forces have struggled with the process of integrating blacks into the 
predominantly white officer corps (see Section 1.a).
    Xenophobia led to a number of violent attacks on foreigners (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
    The continued killings of mostly white farm owners by black 
assailants created concern among white farmers that they were being 
targeted for racial and political reasons (see Section 1.a.). There 
also were reports that white employers abused and killed black farm 
laborers, but avoided penalty due to collusion with the authorities 
(see Section 1.a.).
    On August 30, the Government sponsored a 3-day National Conference 
on Racism in Johannesburg, which was organized by the HRC, NGO's, and 
government representatives. Approximately 1,000 citizens and 20 
international visitors attended.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom 
of association and the right to strike, and these rights are given 
statutory effect in the 1996 Labor Relations Act (LRA). All workers in 
the private sector are entitled to join a union. Workers in the public 
sector, with the exception of members of the National Intelligence 
Agency and the Secret Service, also are entitled to join a union. In 
1999 the Constitutional Court struck down the prohibition on members of 
the National Defense Force joining a union, although they still may not 
strike. No employee may be fired or discriminated against because of 
membership in or advocacy of a trade union. Union membership in the 
private sector has continued to decline steadily in the last few years 
as a result of job layoffs and declining employment, including in 
sectors that have been heavily unionized, such as mining. However, some 
public sector unions have experienced growth. Total union membership is 
approximately 3.3 million persons, nearly 35 percent of those employed 
in the wage economy.
    The largest trade union federation, COSATU, is aligned formally 
with the African National Congress and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP). Several ANC members of Parliament and of the Cabinet have 
a COSATU leadership background, and the current premier of Gauteng, the 
country's richest province, is a former COSATU general secretary. 
COSATU's largest rival, the Federation of Unions of South Africa 
(FEDUSA), is an apolitical, multiracial federation that was formed in 
1997 by merging several smaller worker organizations. A relatively 
minor labor federation, the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), 
is independent of any political grouping. Some unions do not belong to 
any federation.
    The LRA is designed to create an industrial relations regime that 
is stable and recognizes that basic worker rights need to be protected. 
The act, which applies to both the public and private sectors, protects 
workers against unfair dismissal, recognizes their right to form trade 
unions, provides for the right to strike, and establishes a simple set 
of procedures that protect striking workers from the threat of 
dismissal. Essentially, for a strike to proceed, all that is required 
is that a dispute be referred for conciliation. There is no time limit 
on conciliation efforts; however, if conciliation fails to resolve the 
dispute, or lasts more than 30 days, a trade union is entitled to 
advise an employer of intent to strike so long as it gives 48-hours 
notice to a private sector employer or 7-days notice to a state 
employer. Organized labor also has the right to engage in 
``socioeconomic protest,'' whereby workers can demonstrate, without 
fear of losing their jobs, in furtherance of broader social issues. The 
LRA also allows employers to hire replacement labor for striking 
employees, but only after giving 7 days' notice to the striking trade 
union. Employers have the right to lock out workers if certain 
conditions are met.
    The LRA applies to public as well as private sector workers. Public 
sector employees, with the exception of essential services and the 
three components of the security services, also have the right to 
strike. Strikes by workers in essential services, for example, police 
and hospital workers, are prohibited. If disputes between workers in 
essential services and their employers cannot be resolved though 
collective bargaining or conciliation, they are referred to 
arbitration.
    COSATU held a 1-day nationwide general strike on May 10 which was 
the culmination of a 3 1/2 ``rolling mass action,'' consisting of 
lunchtime demonstrations and successive provincial-level strikes 
building up to the general strike, to protest job losses throughout the 
economy. Some COSATU members reportedly clashed with police during the 
strike, and police used tear gas after the crowd reportedly threw 
stones. There were a few illegal strikes that resulted in some worker 
violence, including a strike against a Volkswagen manufacturing 
facility in Eastern Cape in January and an illegal strike of municipal 
workers in Johannesburg in July (see Section 1.c.).
    There were incidents of intimidation and threats of violence by 
striking workers against nonstriking and replacement workers. In 
December during a legal strike of security guards, strikers used 
intimidation and violence against nonstriking and replacement guards 
and also journalists covering the strike. Nonstriking security guards 
were harassed and beaten by groups of strikers while taking public 
transportation. Two guards were shot to death in Cape Town in what 
police believe was a strikerelated attack (see Section 1.a.).
    The Government does not restrict union affiliation with regional or 
international labor organizations. COSATU, FEDUSA, and NACTU are 
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU).
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law defines 
and protects the rights to organize and bargain collectively. The 
Government does not interfere with union organizing and generally has 
not interfered in the collective bargaining process. The LRA 
statutorily provides for ``organizational rights,'' such as trade union 
access to work sites, deductions for trade union dues, and leave for 
trade union officials, which strengthens the ability of trade unions to 
organize workers.
    Union participation as an equal partner with business and 
government in the National Economic Development and Labor Council, a 
tripartite negotiating forum, ensures a direct voice for labor in the 
formulation of economic, social, and labor policy.
    The LRA allows for the establishment of workplace forums that are 
intended to promote broad-based consultation between management and 
labor over issues such as work organization, corporate downsizing, and 
changes in production processes. The forums, in order to receive 
statutory protection, can be established by trade unions only in 
businesses with more than 100 employees. Although trade unions in a few 
factories have established workplace forums, the intent of the law is 
to build wide support within the trade union movement and business for 
such cooperative workplace relationships.
    Although 1994 labor laws protected farm workers, the 
COSATUaffiliated South African Agricultural, Plantation and Allied 
Workers'' Union (SAAPAWU), and the NACTU-affiliated National Union of 
Farmworkers have encountered difficulties trying to organize farm 
workers, because union organizers are considered trespassers on private 
property. There were many incidents of physical abuse of farm workers, 
non-payment of wages, and other forms of arbitrary treatment (see 
Section 1.a.). During the year, the Department of Labor conducted a 
survey on the prevailing conditions in the agricultural sector, which 
was ongoing at year's end.
    To further reduce the adversarial nature of labor relations, the 
LRA also created a Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and 
Arbitration (CCMA). Since its inception in 1996, the CCMA has resolved 
successfully many disputes referred to it and remains critical to the 
emergence of a less confrontational business climate. The CCMA also 
gradually is beginning to play an interventionist role by becoming 
involved in disputes before they deteriorate into full-fledged strikes 
or lockouts. A labor court and a labor appeals court are other 
important creations of the LRA. The labor court has jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes that the CCMA is unable to mediate to the satisfaction 
of both parties. Notwithstanding the existence of the CCMA and 
specialist courts for labor disputes, the aim of industrial relations 
is to minimize the need for judicial intervention in labor relations, 
leaving it to the contending parties to resolve disputes whenever 
possible.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor by 
adults is illegal under the Constitution; however, there were reports 
that smugglers used the country as a transit and destination point for 
trafficking in persons for the purposes of forced prostitution and 
forced labor (see Section 6.f.). The Constitution prohibits forced 
child labor; however, there were reports that children were trafficked, 
forced into prostitution, or exploited by their parents to earn money 
for their families (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). A 1999 survey conducted 
by Statistics South Africa reported that up to 2,000 children work to 
pay off outstanding debts to employers or obligations to their 
landlords (see Section 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 makes it a 
criminal offense to employ a child under 15 years of age. It is a 
criminal offense to employ a child between 15 and 18 years of age if 
such employment ``places at risk the child's well-being, education, 
physical or mental health, or spiritual, moral or social development.'' 
This policy is enforced effectively in the formal nonagricultural 
sector and less effectively in other sectors by Department of Labor 
inspectors, who are required to ensure that all of their inspections 
address child labor problems. The inspectors attempt to resolve any 
problems by counseling employers, child workers, and parents, and by 
cooperating with the Departments of Welfare and Education. Criminal 
prosecution is reserved for ``extreme circumstances,'' and there have 
been no prosecutions to date.
    Many children, especially in the rural areas of the former 
``homelands'' where electricity and running water are rare, are 
expected to help with household chores and school maintenance. 
According to a survey conducted by Statistics South Africa in 1999, 45 
percent of children between ages 5 and 17 worked for 1 hour or more per 
week in an economic activity, 5 hours or more per week in school labor, 
or 7 hours or more in household chores. The most common economic 
activity in which children participated was gathering wood and water 
for domestic use, which occupied 4.5 million of the 13.4 million 
children between the ages of 5 to 17 years for 1 hour or more per week. 
Of the 2 million children who spent at least 1 hour per week in 
activities for pay, profit, or family economic gain, 59 percent were 
involved in agriculture and 33 percent in trade. A survey noted that of 
the 13.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17, 17.8 percent 
were engaged in subsistence farming, 5.3 percent in services, 0.4 
percent in manufacturing, 0.1 percent in transport, 0.1 percent in 
informal finance, and 0.05 percent in construction and mining.
    Child laborers from Zimbabwe and Mozambique work in the country on 
commercial farms, for the taxi industry, or as domestic servants.
    Child prostitution is a growing problem in metropolitan areas (see 
Section 5). NGO's estimate that there are 10,000 children working as 
prostitutes in Johannesburg and at least 1,000 in Cape Town. Along 
trucking routes child prostitutes are sought after because of the 
belief that they are more likely to be disease-free or that, if they 
are virgins, sex with them cures diseases such as HIV/AIDS (see Section 
5). The Government previously had established a task force to develop a 
plan of action to combat the sexual exploitation of children, and has 
created training courses for the police force and the judiciary 
regarding the problem.
    The Government has stated that it is committed to abolishing child 
labor through new legislation and improving the enforcement of current 
child labor laws. In 1998 the Department of Labor established a Child 
Labor Inter-sectoral Group (CLIG) composed of representatives of trade 
unions, employers' organizations, NGO's, and officials of the 
Departments of Labor, Welfare, and Education. The CLIG debates policy 
options and ensures coordination of initiatives between these different 
groups.
    Following the Government's ratification of International Labor 
Organization Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor in June, 
the Department of Labor began provincial consultations in order to 
develop and complete a comprehensive program of action to implement the 
convention.
    The Constitution prohibits children under the age of 18 from 
participating in armed conflict. The minimum age for military 
recruitment is 17 years.
    Forced or bonded labor by children is illegal under the 
Constitution; however, there were reports that children were 
trafficked, forced into prostitution, and that some children work in 
conditions that amount to bondage (see Sections 5, 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legally mandated 
national minimum wage. Unionized workers in the formal sector of the 
economy set wage rates on an industry-by-industry basis through annual 
negotiations with employer organizations. Such wages generally are 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. In those sectors in which workers are not organized 
sufficiently to engage in the collective bargaining process, the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act, which went into effect in 1998, gives the 
Minister of Labor the authority to set wages, including, for the first 
time, for farm laborers and domestic workers. However, income 
disparities between skilled and unskilled workers and the income 
distribution gap between rural and urban workers mean that many workers 
are unable to provide a decent standard of living for themselves and 
their families.
    The Basic Conditions of Employment Act standardizes time-and-a-half 
pay for overtime, establishes a 45-hour workweek, and authorizes 4 
months of maternity leave for women. A ministerial determination 
exempted businesses employing fewer than 10 persons from certain 
provisions of the act concerning overtime and leave.
    Occupational health and safety issues are a top priority of trade 
unions, especially in the mining and heavy manufacturing industries. 
Although attention to these issues has increased significantly, 
including passage in 1993 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 
the country's industrial and mining processes are dangerous and 
sometimes deadly. Government attempts to reduce mining fatalities 
culminated in the 1996 Mine Health and Safety Act, which went into 
effect in January 1997. The act provides for the right of mine 
employees to remove themselves from work deemed dangerous to health or 
safety. Moreover, it establishes a tripartite mine health and safety 
council and an inspectorate of mine health and safety, which is tasked 
with enforcing the act and monitoring compliance with its provisions. 
The act specifically makes it an offense for a company to discriminate 
against an employee who asserts a right granted by the act (for 
example, to leave a hazardous work site) and requires mine owners to 
file annual reports that provide statistics on health and safety 
incidents for each mine being worked.
    There are no laws or regulations in other industries that permit 
workers to remove themselves from work situations deemed dangerous to 
their health or safety without risking loss of employment; however, the 
Protected Disclosures Act protects employees from retaliation who, with 
``reasonable belief that the health or safety of an individual has 
been, is being, or is likely to be endangered,'' disclose dangerous 
workplace conditions to the appropriate authorities.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Alien Control Act prohibits 
trafficking in persons; however, the country is a transit and 
destination point for the trafficking of persons from Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Thailand, and other countries for forced prostitution and 
forced labor. Women and children reportedly are lured into the country 
by international organized crime syndicates with the promise of jobs 
and decent wages, and then forced to work as prostitutes, in some cases 
to pay off debts to those who smuggled them into the country. Women 
from Thailand, China, and Russia were trafficked into the country for 
prostitution by Chinese and South African organized crime syndicates. 
While many of these women come willingly, some claim that they were 
tricked into coming, or that they were forced to continue working as 
prostitutes until they had paid off the cost of their transport.
    The country is also a transit point for trafficking operations 
between developing countries and Europe, the United States, and Canada. 
Migrants from foreign countries, particularly China, India, the Middle 
East, Eastern European countries, and other African countries, are 
lured to the country with accounts of money and jobs in the West. Once 
in the country they are provided with documentation and accommodation 
before being moved on to final destinations, where they are forced into 
prostitution, drug dealing, or other criminal activity, or forced to 
work in factories as virtual slaves until they pay off the debt of 
their travel expenses. Traffickers apparently have identified the 
country as one in which temporary entry permission often is granted, 
fraudulent documents are easy to obtain, and direct flight and shipping 
routes are available to most countries in the developed world.
    The Government made efforts to address the trafficking problem with 
investigations and arrests by the police. These efforts are hampered by 
police corruption, lack of training, and understaffing. In February 
police discovered prostitutes from Thailand, Bulgaria, Russia, the 
Czech Republic, Romania, and Zambia at a brothel near Johannesburg, and 
arrested the owner. Some of the women were returned to their home 
countries, and the case against the owner was ongoing at year's end. 
The courts generally deal with trafficking through deportations and 
fines, rather than exacting criminal penalties.
                               __________

                                 SUDAN

    The 1989 military coup that overthrew Sudan's democratically 
elected government brought to power Lieutenant General Omar Hassan Al-
Bashir and his National Salvation Revolution Command Council (RCC). 
Bashir and the RCC suspended the 1985 Constitution, abrogated press 
freedom, and disbanded all political parties and trade unions. In 1993 
the RCC dissolved itself and appointed Bashir President. Presidential 
and parliamentary elections were held in December. All major opposition 
parties boycotted the elections, and there were allegations of official 
interference and electoral fraud. Bashir was elected to another 5-year 
term, and the National Congress/National Islamic Front (NC/NIF) won 340 
out of 360 seats in Parliament in the deeply flawed process. Despite 
the adoption of a new Constitution through a referendum in June 1998, 
the Government continued to restrict most civil liberties. Since 1989 
real power has rested with the NIF, founded by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, 
who became Speaker of the National Assembly in 1996. In November 1998, 
the NIF renamed itself the National Congress (NC); NIF/NC members and 
supporters continue to hold key positions in the Government, security 
forces, judiciary, academic institutions, and the media. In December 
1999, Bashir declared a 3-month state of emergency, dismissed Turabi, 
and disbanded Parliament 2 days before it was to vote on a bill 
introduced by pro-Turabi legislators to reduce Bashir's presidential 
powers. On March 12, the state of emergency, which suspends basic civil 
liberties including freedom of expression and association, was extended 
until the end of the year, and in late December it was extended for 
another year. In May Bashir expelled Turabi from the NC, which prompted 
Turabi to create a new political party, the Popular National Congress 
Party (PNCP). The judiciary is subject to government influence.
    The civil war, which is estimated to have resulted in the death of 
2 million persons, continued into its 18th year. The principal 
insurgent faction is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the 
political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA 
remains the principal military force in the insurgency. In April 1997, 
the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army, which broke away from the 
SPLA in 1991, and several smaller southern factions concluded a peace 
agreement with the Government. However, the SPLM/SPLA and most 
independent analysts regard the 1997 agreement as a tactical government 
effort to enlist southerners on the Government's side. The 1997 
agreement remains largely unimplemented, and there was significant 
fighting between pro-government and antigovernment elements who had 
signed the 1997 agreement during the year. In December 1999, Rieck 
Machar, a Southern leader who had signed the agreement, broke away from 
the Government and in January formed a new rebel movement, the Sudan 
People's Democratic Front (SPDF). The SPLM/SPLA and its northern allies 
in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) carried out military 
offensives in limited areas along the borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea 
and in large parts of the south during the year. As in 1999, neither 
side appears to have the ability to win the war militarily; although 
oil revenues allowed the Government to invest increasingly in military 
hardware. There was no significant progress toward peace during the 
year. Government and SPLM/SPLA delegations met with mediators from the 
Kenyabased Peace Secretariat four times during the year and 
participated in Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)-
mediated peace talks. The Bahr El Ghazal humanitarian cease-fire, which 
began in July 1998, was extended by both the Government and the SPLM 
several times in 1999, and in August 1999, the Government offered a 
comprehensive ceasefire, which in October 1999 it extended through 
January 15. However, the Government continued its bombing campaign 
during this period. The SPLM similarly extended its cease-fire through 
the same dates, but effectively limited its offer to the humanitarian 
cease-fire as agreed to in Bahr El Ghazal. In June the SPLA launched an 
offensive in Bahr El Ghazal and fighting between the Government and the 
SPLM resumed, marking the end of the humanitarian cease-fire.
    In addition to the regular police and the Sudan People's Armed 
Forces, the Government maintains an external security force, an 
internal security force, a militia known as the Popular Defense Forces 
(PDF), and a number of police forces, including the Public Order Police 
(POP), whose mission includes enforcing proper social behavior, 
including restrictions on alcohol and ``immodest dress.'' The Popular 
Police Force, which was made up of nominees from neighborhood popular 
committees for surveillance and services, was disbanded during the 
year. Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human 
rights abuses.
    Civil war, economic mismanagement, over 4 million internally 
displaced persons (IDP's) in a country of an estimated 27.5 million 
persons, and, to a lesser extent, the refugee influx from neighboring 
countries have devastated the country's mostly agricultural economy. 
Approximately 80 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture. 
Exports of gum Arabic, livestock, and meat accounted for more than 50 
percent of export earnings. Private investment in the oil sector led to 
significant increases in oil production during the year. Reforms 
beginning in the early 1990's aimed at privatizing state-run firms and 
stimulating private investment failed to revive a moribund economy that 
maintains massive military expenditures and a large foreign debt of 
approximately $21.5 billion. Per capita national income is estimated at 
$900 per year.
    The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor, and 
although there were some improvements in a few areas, it continued to 
commit numerous, serious abuses. Citizens do not have the ability to 
change their government peacefully. Government security forces were 
responsible for extrajudicial killings, and there were reports of 
Government responsibility for disappearances. Government security 
forces regularly beat, harassed, arbitrarily arrested and detained, and 
detained incommunicado opponents or suspected opponents of the 
Government with impunity, and there were a few reports of torture. 
Security forces beat refugees, reportedly raped women abducted during 
raids, and reportedly on occasion harassed and detained persons on the 
basis of their religion. Prison conditions remained harsh and life-
threatening, prolonged detention is a problem, and the judiciary 
continued to be subservient to the Government. The authorities do not 
ensure due process, and the military forces summarily tried and 
punished citizens. The Government continues to infringe on citizens'' 
privacy rights. The Government still does not fully apply the laws of 
war to the southern insurgency, has taken few prisoners of war (POW's), 
and does not cooperate with the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) regarding POW's. Cooperation with U.N.-sponsored relief 
operations was poor. In 1999 the Government for the first time allowed 
U.N. teams to perform humanitarian assessments in the Nuba Mountains on 
two occasions, and in July the Government permitted an initial U.N. 
flight into the Nuba Mountains. Government forces continued to obstruct 
the flow of humanitarian assistance. Problems with relief flights in 
the south centered on the Government's frequent denials of aircraft 
clearances to the U.N.'s Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), particularly 
for Western Upper Nile.
    Restrictions on press freedom continued as the Government 
repeatedly suspended publications that criticized or disagreed with the 
government line, and detained journalists. Moreover, all journalists 
continued to practice self-censorship. The Government continued to 
restrict severely freedom of assembly, association, religion, and 
movement. In the context of the Islamization and Arabization drive, 
government pressure including forced Islamization--on non-Muslims 
remained strong. Fears of Arabization and Islamization and the 
imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) fueled support for the civil war 
throughout the country. Violence and discrimination against women and 
abuse of children remained problems. Prostitution is a growing problem, 
and female genital mutilation (FGM) is widespread. Discrimination and 
violence against religious minorities persisted, as did discrimination 
against ethnic minorities and government restrictions on worker rights. 
Child labor is widespread. Slavery and trafficking in persons remained 
problems. Government security forces were responsible for forced labor 
(including forced child labor), slavery, and the forced conscription of 
children.
    Insurgent groups continued to commit numerous, serious abuses. The 
SPLM/SPLA continued to violate citizens'' rights, despite its claim 
that it was implementing a 1994 decision to assert civil authority in 
areas that it controls, and in many cases, has controlled for many 
years. The SPLM/SPLA was responsible for extrajudicial killings, 
beatings, rape, arbitrary detention, and forced conscription. SPLM/SPLA 
officials were guilty of, or complicit in, theft of property of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and U.N. agencies operating in 
the south. The ICRC reported in 1996 that the SPLA had begun to observe 
some basic laws of war; it takes prisoners on the battlefield and 
permits ICRC visits to some of them. However, the SPLA has not allowed 
the ICRC to visit prisoners accused by the insurgent group of treason 
or other crimes.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were reports 
of extrajudicial killings. In their attacks on insurgent forces, 
government troops killed a large number of civilians (see Section 
1.g.). For example, at the beginning of November during an NDA attack 
on Kassala, 52 civilians and soldiers were killed during fighting 
between government and NDA troops (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). The 
Government suspended NGO operations in the area until the hostilities 
ended several days later. Government forces and allied militia pursued 
a scorched earth policy aimed at removing populations from around the 
newly built oil pipeline and other oil production facilities, which 
reportedly resulted in some deaths (see Section 1.g.). On numerous 
occasions, the Government bombed civilian facilities resulting in a 
number of civilian deaths, including children (see Section 1.g.). 
Explosions by government-laid landmines resulted in some deaths (see 
Section 1.g.). There were reports that during raids and attacks on 
civilian settlements, government forces killed a number of persons, and 
there were reports that persons abducted during those raids at times 
were killed (see Sections 1.b. and 6.c.). In early June in Gumriak, an 
attack by government air and ground forces in the vicinity of a 
Catholic mission reportedly resulted in the deaths of 32 persons, 
including women and children.
    In February the Government's PDF allegedly attacked several 
villages in eastern Aweil and Twic counties, northern Bahr El Ghazal, 
killed 16 civilians, abducted over 300 women and children, stole 
cattle, and looted and burned villages. In November there were 
unconfirmed reports that the PDF attacked the village of Guong Nowh, 
killed several persons, abducted 24 persons, and stole cattle.
    In September security forces in several cities in the north used 
tear gas and live ammunition to forcibly disperse some demonstrations; 
several persons were killed, and a number of persons were injured 
severely (see Section 2.b.).
    There was no action taken in the 1999 case of Abdallah Chol, Hassan 
Abu Adhan, and Gladino (Sam) Okieny, who died as a result of torture 
while in the custody of military intelligence personnel.
    University of Khartoum law student Mohamed Abdelsalaam Babeker was 
found dead in 1998 after being arrested by NIF security forces; an 
autopsy indicated that the cause of death was a brain hemorrhage 
allegedly caused by a head wound. A case was filed against an unknown 
person, and the police reportedly conducted an investigation; however, 
they did not release their findings by year's end.
    There was no investigation into the January 1998 reports of 
reprisal killings of Dinka men by government forces.
    Insurgent forces reportedly committed political and other 
extrajudicial killings, particularly in areas of active conflict; 
however, details generally were unavailable. There were reports that in 
July and August in the Western Upper Nile, SPLA forces and SPDF forces 
killed at least 50 civilians and abducted more than 20 women and 
children in intraethnic fighting.
    Rebel forces killed a large number of civilians during their 
attacks on government forces (see Section 1.g.). Insurgent forces laid 
landmines indiscriminately on roads and paths that killed and maimed 
both soldiers and civilians (see Section 1.g.). Prisoners reportedly 
have died while in SPLA custody due to poor prison conditions (see 
Section 1.c.). There are reliable reports that rebel forces that 
captured villages along the border with Ethiopia in 1997 carried lists 
used to identify leading government figures whom they killed summarily.
    In January two relief workers were killed in an attack by 
unidentified assailants. Also in January, rebels believed to be from 
the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacked a humanitarian 
vehicle, killing eight aid workers. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported 
that the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), an NDA member, committed abuses 
against its soldiers accused of spying or defecting to another rebel 
group, including summary executions, torture, and detention of 
prisoners in a pit in the ground. SAF denied the allegations.
    Sometime before March 30, 1999, a local Red Crescent worker and 
three government officials who accompanied an ICRC team near the town 
of Kong in the south were killed while in the custody of the SPLA under 
circumstances that remain unclear. The SPLM alleges that the four were 
killed in crossfire during a rescue attempt. The SPLM neither arranged 
for the return of the bodies nor permitted an independent 
investigation, and there was no further action on this case by year's 
end.
    Interethnic and intraethnic tensions continued into the early part 
of the year resulting in numerous deaths. In the first half of the 
year, ongoing fighting between ethnic Dinkas and Didingas in the New 
Cush and Chukudum areas in Eastern Equatoria led to a number of deaths 
(see Section 5). Tensions eased with the departure of some Dinka to Bor 
County in May and June, and a dialog on a lasting resolution to the 
interethnic tensions continued during the year.
    On December 8, supporters of the outlawed Takfeer and Hijra group 
killed 26 persons and injured 40 others at a Sunna mosque in Omdurman 
(see Section 5).
    b. Disappearance.--There were continued allegations that the 
Government was responsible for the arrest and subsequent disappearance 
of persons suspected of supporting rebels in government-controlled 
zones in the south and the Nuba Mountains. Persons arrested by 
government security forces often were held for long periods of time in 
unknown locations without access to lawyers or family members.
    There were reports that during raids on civilian settlements, 
government forces abducted persons, including women and children (see 
Sections 1.g. and 6.c.). In the last 15 years, between 5,000 and 15,000 
Dinka women and children have been abducted; between 10,000 and 12,000 
persons, most of whom are Dinka, remained abducted at year's end. 
Observers believe that some of the abductees were sold into slavery, 
while others were used as forced labor or drafted into the military. In 
some cases, observers believe that the abductees escaped or eventually 
were released or ransomed, and that in other cases some were killed. In 
February the Government's PDF forces allegedly attacked several 
villages in eastern Aweil and Twic counties, northern Bahr El Ghazal, 
abducted over 300 women and children, killed 16 civilians, stole 
cattle, and looted and burned villages. In November there were 
unconfirmed reports that the PDF attacked the village of Guong Nowh, 
abducted 24 persons, killed several persons, and stole cattle.
    HRW reported that Islamic student militias operating under the 
protection of security forces abducted and tortured a number of student 
activists.
    In February a U.N. plane flew three commanders of a progovernment 
militia to another location where they attended a meeting with 
commanders of an anti-government militia; the pilots claim they did not 
know the identity of these passengers. When they returned, the pro-
government militia detained the two pilots, a U.N. worker, and a 
Sudanese relief worker for 1 week.
    There were reports that in July and August in the Western Upper 
Nile, SPLA and SPDF forces abducted over 20 women and children and 
killed at least 50 civilians during intraethnic fighting.
    Approximately 3,000 Ugandan children have been abducted and forced 
to become soldiers or sex slaves for the LRA, a Ugandan armed 
opposition group in the south, which is actively supported by the 
Government (see Section 5).
    There also were reports of periodic intertribal abductions of women 
and children in the Eastern Upper Nile (see Section 5).
    In 1996 the Government established the Special Commission to 
Investigate Slavery and Disappearances in response to a resolution 
passed by the 1995 U.N. General Assembly. The Commission technically 
still is functioning but has yet to produce a final report. In May 
1998, the Government formed the Committee for the Eradication of the 
Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWAC). The Committee and UNICEF 
jointly sponsored a workshop on abductions in July 1999, during which 
the committee recognized abduction as a problem that the Government 
could and should address. The committee formed mechanisms to identify 
and return abductees. Several high-ranking Government officials 
participated in the activities of the committee. These mechanisms 
resulted in the identification and release of approximately 300 
individuals who were returned to their homes during the year. An 
additional 1,200 have been identified; however, the Government's 
refusal to allow flights into SPLA territory prevented their return. In 
addition the Government did not record the identity of the abductors in 
these cases and chose not to prosecute the abductors.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The 1999 Constitution prohibits torture; however, 
government security forces continued to beat and harass suspected 
opponents and others. In 1997 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture 
described torture as a fairly extensive problem; however, during the 
year, reports of torture were infrequent. Members of the security 
forces rarely, if ever, are held accountable for such abuses.
    Security forces beat and otherwise abused youths and student 
leaders and others whom were deemed to be opponents of the Government.
    There continued to be reports that security forces used ``ghost 
houses,'' places where security forces tortured and detained government 
opponents incommunicado under harsh conditions for an indeterminate 
time with no supervision by the courts or other independent authorities 
with power to release the detainees; however, reports of the use of 
``ghost houses'' ceased during the latter half of the year.
    There continued to be reports that security forces harassed and at 
times used threats and violence against persons on the basis of their 
religious beliefs and activities (see Section 2.c.). For example, in 
June police in Hilla Kuku beat a Catholic seminarian on the neck and 
wrist with a stick after he refused to remove a wooden cross that he 
was wearing (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    Security forces used excessive force, including beatings, tear gas, 
and firing of live ammunition to disperse unapproved demonstrations 
(see Section 2.b.). For example, in February security forces detained 
and beat two students for political activity (see Section 1.d.). 
Several times in September police used tear gas, batons, and live 
ammunition to disperse demonstrators and in some instances, beat or 
otherwise injured numerous individuals (see Section 2.b.). In May 
security forces raided Alnasr Technology College twice; they arrested, 
beat, and injured students, and fired bullets in the air to disperse a 
student protest on education issues. Security and police forces used 
sticks and tear gas in an attack on Juba University in Khartoum in 
June, arresting and detaining over 120 students. Refugees also were 
subjected to beatings and mistreatment (see Section 2.d.). HRW reported 
that Islamic student militias operating under the protection of 
security forces abducted and tortured a number of student activists.
    Government forces were responsible for injuring many civilians 
during attacks on insurgent forces, during raids on civilian 
settlements, and while bombing civilian targets (see Section 1.g.). 
There were reports that persons abducted during those raids were 
subjected to torture and rape (see Section 6.c.). In November during an 
NDA attack on government forces in Kassala, government soldiers 
detained and severely beat a foreign International Red Cross worker 
(see Sections 1.d. and 1.g.). He was held incommunicado for two days 
and then released. Explosions of government-laid landmines resulted in 
a number of injuries (see Section 1.g.). Soldiers were responsible for 
raping women (see Section 1.g.).
    In accordance with Shari'a (Islamic) law, the Criminal Act provides 
for physical punishments including flogging, amputation, stonings, and 
crucifixion--the public display of a body after execution. In a 1999 
case involving ethnic clashes in the Darfur region in the west (see 
Section 5), an emergency court sentenced 10 persons to hanging and 
subsequent crucifixion. These sentences had not been carried out by 
year's end. During the year, there were six reported cases of 
amputations of limbs as punishment under Shari'a law for aggravated 
cases of theft.
    The Government's ``scorched earth'' policy in the area surrounding 
the oil fields in Upper Nile resulted in a number of serious injuries 
(see Section 1.g.).
    There was no investigation into, nor action taken, in the 1999 case 
in which prison officials tortured a convicted bank robber so severely 
while in detention that he was blinded.
    Insurgent forces were responsible for a number of civilian injuries 
and for raping women (see Section 1.g.). Landmines laid 
indiscriminately in years past on roads and paths killed and maimed 
both soldiers and civilians (see Section 1.g.). There are credible 
reports of beatings and other punishment of prisoners by the SPLA 
rebels.
    HRW reported that the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), an NDA member, 
committed abuses against its soldiers accused of spying or defecting to 
another rebel group, including torture, summary executions, and the 
detention of prisoners in a pit in the ground. SAF denied these 
allegations.
    There were numerous injuries as a result of religious tensions. For 
example, on December 8, supporters of the outlawed Takfeer and Hijra 
group killed 26 persons and injured 40 others at a Sunna mosque in 
Omdurman (see Section 5).
    Conditions in government prisons remain harsh, overcrowded, and 
life threatening. Built before the country's 1956 independence, most 
prisons are maintained poorly, and many lack basic facilities such as 
toilets or showers. Health care is primitive, and food is inadequate. 
Minors often are held with adults. There was a report in 1999 that 16 
children who were living with their imprisoned mothers died of 
diseases. Female prisoners are housed separately from men; rape in 
prison reportedly is rare. Prison officials arbitrarily denied family 
visits. High-ranking political prisoners reportedly often enjoy better 
conditions than other prisoners do.
    The Government does not permit regular visits to prisons by human 
rights monitors. No independent domestic human rights organizations 
monitor prison conditions.
    Prisoners reportedly have died while in SPLA custody due to poor 
prison conditions. The SPLM allowed the ICRC to visit some POW's during 
the year and released some prisoners due to poor health.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The 1999 Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention without charge; however, the 
Government continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention in practice. 
Under the Constitution and the criminal code, an individual may be 
detained for 3 days without charge, which can be extended for 30 days 
by order of the Director of Security and another 30 days by the 
Director of Security with the approval of the prosecuting attorney. 
Under the amended National Security Act, which was approved on December 
15 by the Council of Ministers and subsequently made law by 
presidential decree and supercedes the criminal code when an individual 
is accused of violating national security, an individual may be 
detained for 3 months without charge, renewable by the Director of 
Security for another 3 months. During the state of emergency, the 
Government is not constrained by the National Security Act and can 
detain individuals indefinitely without judicial review, which 
reportedly it has done. During the year, the Government used the state 
of emergency to detain over 100 individuals.
    The law allows for bail, except for those accused of crimes 
punishable by death or life imprisonment. In theory the Government 
provides legal counsel for indigent persons in such cases; however, 
reports continue that defendants do not always receive this right, and 
that counsel in some cases only may advise the defendant and may not 
address the court. In some cases, courts have refused to allow certain 
lawyers to represent defendants.
    Authorities continued to detain political opponents of the 
Government during the year. The NGO Sudanese Human Rights Group (SHRG) 
reported several cases of this, including: A political activist who was 
detained in Atbara for several days in January; two students who were 
detained and beaten because of political activities in February; a 
lawyer and leading member of the National Democratic Alliance to 
Restore Democracy (NARD) who was arrested and detained in March; Dr. 
Tobi Madot, Chairperson of the Democratic Forces Front (JAD) who was 
detained in March; four students at the University of Sudan who were 
detained for 4 days in April for union activities (see Section 6.a.); 
Sid Ahmed Al-Hussein, deputy secretary-general of the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), who was detained on several occasions in April; 
six members of the Communist Party who were detained in May; five 
students in Omdurman who were detained in June; leading members of the 
DUP and UMMA parties who were arrested and detained in June in Sennar 
City; a lawyer who was arrested for political activities in August in 
Khartoum; and a leading DUP member was arrested in September in 
Khartoum. Over 150 members of Hassan al-Turabi's PNCP were detained 
after allegedly participating in demonstrations against the Government 
in September and October. In general the Government detains persons for 
a few days before releasing them without charge or trial; however, 
detentions of PNCP and NDA members generally were much longer. There 
were unconfirmed reports that security forces tortured, detained 
without charge, and held incommunicado the members of PNCP. Human 
rights activist Ghazi Suleiman also was detained several times during 
the year. In addition to detentions, government security forces 
frequently harassed political opponents by summoning them for 
questioning, forcing them to remain during the day without questioning, 
and then ordering them to return the following day. This process 
sometimes continued for days.
    In December government forces broke up a meeting of NDA 
representatives with a foreign diplomat, detained the diplomat briefly, 
eventually expelled the diplomat from the country, and arrested seven 
NDA representatives. In the following weeks, human rights activist 
Ghazi Suleiman and Ali Mahmoud Hassanein, head of the opposition 
Democratic Unionist Party, opposition lawyers for the NDA, were 
arrested by the Government (see Section 2.b.). After approximately 6 
weeks in detention, the Government charged the NDA representatives with 
treason and sedition. There was no trial by year's end. The lawyers 
were not charged and remained in detention at year's end.
    A number of journalists were arrested and detained during the year 
(see Section 2.a.).
    In May security forces raided Alnasr Technology College twice; they 
arrested, beat, and injured students, and fired bullets in the air to 
disperse the students'' protest on education issues (see Section 2.a.). 
Security and police forces used sticks and tear gas in an attack on 
Juba University in Khartoum in June, arresting and detaining over 120 
students.
    In November during an NDA attack on government forces in Kassala, 
government soldiers detained and severely beat a foreign International 
Red Cross worker (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). He was held 
incommunicado for 2 days and then released.
    Security forces detained persons because of their religious beliefs 
and activities; however, such detentions decreased in the latter half 
of the year (see Section 2.c.). For example, in June police in Hilla 
Kuku detained and beat a Catholic seminarian after he refused to remove 
a wooden cross that he was wearing; he later was released (see Sections 
1.c. and 2.c.). Generally detentions based nominally on religion were 
of limited duration; because the practice of religion is not 
technically illegal, detainees could not be held formally on grounds 
indefinitely. However, the Government resorted to accusing, at times 
falsely, those arrested for religious reasons of other crimes, 
including common crimes and national security crimes, which resulted in 
prolonged detention. In May President Bashir ordered that all women in 
prison for violations of the Public Order Law be released and rescinded 
the prohibition on the brewing of alcohol; 563 women were released (see 
Section 2.c.). Despite the fact it is legal to brew alcohol, police 
continued to arrest southern women, and reportedly the police demand 
bribes in exchange for releasing the women.
    In December the Government arrested and detained 65 leading members 
of the Takfeer and Hijra group following an attack on a rival group's 
worshippers; most of the individuals remained in detention and had not 
been tried as of year's end (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
    In September security forces detained numerous persons while 
forcibly dispersing demonstrations in several cities in the north (see 
Section 2.b.). In September security forces also briefly detained 25 
women who participated in a National Democratic Women's Association 
demonstration against the governor of Khartoum's decree prohibiting 
women from working in hotels, restaurants, and gas stations (see 
Sections 2.b. and 5). In October police arrested and detained four 
students at a rally at the University of Khartoum (see Section 2.b.).
    Persons arrested by government security forces often were held for 
long periods of time in unknown locations without access to lawyers or 
family members.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent 
and is largely subservient to the Government. The Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, formerly elected by sitting judges, is nominated by a 
Judiciary Committee and appointed by the President. As the senior judge 
in the judicial service, the Chief Justice also controls the judiciary. 
On occasion some courts display a degree of independence. Appeals 
courts on several occasions overturned decisions of lower courts in 
political cases, particularly public order courts.
    The judicial system includes four types of courts: Regular courts, 
both criminal and civil; special mixed security courts; military 
courts; and tribal courts in rural areas to resolve disputes over land 
and water rights and family matters. In November 1998, Parliament 
passed a bill to form a constitutional court, which was implemented in 
December 1998. The President appointed the court's seven members at the 
end of 1998. Within the regular court system there are civil and 
criminal courts, appeals courts, and the Supreme Court. Public order 
courts, which heard only minor public order issues, were suspended, and 
public order cases were heard in criminal courts.
    The 1999 Constitution provides for fair and prompt trials; however, 
it has not resulted in changes in practice. The 1991 Criminal Act 
governs criminal cases, and the 1983 Civil Transactions Act applies in 
most civil cases. Military trials, which sometimes are secret and 
brief, do not provide procedural safeguards, sometimes have taken place 
with no advocate or counsel permitted, and do not provide an effective 
appeal from a death sentence. Other than for clemency, witnesses may be 
permitted to appear at military trials.
    Trials in regular courts nominally meet international standards of 
legal protections. For example, the accused normally have the right to 
counsel, and the courts are required to provide free legal counsel for 
indigent defendants accused of crimes punishable by death or life 
imprisonment. However, in practice these legal protections are applied 
unevenly. Persons arrested by government security forces often were 
held for long periods of time in unknown locations without access to 
their lawyers or family members.
    In 1989 the Special Courts Act created special three-person 
security courts to deal with a wide range of offenses, including 
violations of constitutional decrees, emergency regulations, some 
sections of the Penal Code, as well as drug and currency offenses. 
Special courts, on which both military and civilian judges sit, handle 
most security-related cases. Attorneys may advise defendants as 
``friends of the court'' but normally may not address the court. 
Lawyers complain that they sometimes are granted access to court 
documents too late to prepare an effective defense. Sentences usually 
are severe and implemented at once; however, death sentences are 
referred to the Chief Justice and the Head of State. Defendants may 
file appellate briefs with the Chief Justice.
    The Government dissolved the respected Sudanese Bar Association in 
1989 and reinstated it with an NIF-controlled leadership in 1997. In 
1997 elections for the leadership of the Bar Association, an NIF-
associated group won overwhelmingly amid accusations of blatant fraud. 
Lawyers who wish to practice must maintain membership in the Bar 
Association. The Government continued to harass and detain members of 
the legal profession whom it views as political opponents.
    The Government officially exempts the 10 southern states, whose 
population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the Criminal Act; 
however, the act permits the possible future application of Shari'a law 
in the south, if the State assemblies so decide. No reports cited 
court-ordered Hudood punishments, other than lashings, in government-
controlled areas of the south. Fear of the imposition of Shari'a law 
remained a key problem in the rebellion.
    Parts of the south and the Nuba Mountains fell outside effective 
judicial procedures and other governmental functions. According to 
credible reports, government units summarily tried and punished those 
accused of crimes, especially for offenses against civil order.
    Magistrates in SPLM/SPLA-held areas follow a penal code roughly 
based on the 1925 Penal Code. In rural areas outside effective SPLM 
control, tribal chiefs apply customary laws. In 1996 the SPLM 
proclaimed a civilian structure to eliminate the conduct of secret and 
essentially political trials such as those conducted by military 
commanders in previous years. The SPLM has a judicial system of county 
magistrates, county judges, regional judges, and a court of appeals. 
While officials have been appointed for most of these positions, the 
court system did not function in many areas due to lack of 
infrastructure, communications, funding, and an effective police force. 
Some cases were heard at the magistrate and county levels. The SPLM 
recognizes traditional courts or ``Courts of Elders,'' which usually 
hear matters of personal affairs such as marriages and dowries, and 
base their decisions on traditional and customary law. Local chiefs 
usually preside over traditional courts. Traditional courts are 
particularly active in Bahr El Ghazal. The SPLM process of conducting a 
needs assessment for the courts continued during the year.
    There are political prisoners in the country, although the 
Government maintains that it holds none. The Government usually charges 
political prisoners with a crime, allowing the Government to deny their 
status as political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The 1999 Constitution provides for the inviolability 
of communication and privacy; however, the Government routinely 
interferes with its citizens'' privacy. Security forces frequently 
conducted night searches without warrants, and they targeted persons 
suspected of political crimes. During demonstrations in September (see 
Section 2.b.), riot police reportedly broke into private homes to 
search for demonstrators. Some residents of Khartoum filed lawsuits 
against the riot police for violating their privacy and damaging 
property in the aftermath of September 1999 riots; the suits eventually 
were dismissed as lacking jurisdiction. In the north, security forces 
also targeted persons suspected of making alcoholic beverages, which 
are illegal.
    Security personnel routinely opened and read mail and monitored 
telephones. The Government continued to restrict the ownership of 
satellite dishes by private citizens through use of its licensing 
requirement.
    A Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim, but a Muslim woman cannot 
marry a non-Muslim, unless he converts to Islam (see Section 5); 
however, this prohibition is not observed or enforced universally, 
particularly in the south and among Nubans. NonMuslims may adopt only 
non-Muslim children; no such restrictions apply to Muslim parents.
    Various government bodies have decreed on different occasions that 
women must dress according to modest Islamic standards (see Sections 
2.c. and 5). Enforcement of female dress standards by the Public Order 
Police continues, but was reduced greatly during the year. There were 
no reports of corporal punishment to enforce public order during the 
year; enforcement generally took the form of verbal admonishment by 
security forces.
    Non-Muslim prison inmates were pressured to convert to Islam, as 
were PDF trainees, children in government-controlled camps for vagrant 
minors, and persons in government-controlled peace camps (see Sections 
1.g. and 2.c.).
    Government forces pursued a scorched earth policy aimed at removing 
populations from around the newly built oil pipeline and other oil 
production facilities, which resulted in deaths and serious injuries 
(see Section 1.c.).
    The Government continued to raze some squatter dwellings; however, 
the practice decreased greatly during the year.
    A wide network of government informants conducted pervasive 
surveillance in schools, universities, markets, workplaces, and 
neighborhoods. However, government-instituted neighborhood ``popular 
committees''--ostensibly a mechanism for political mobilization--which 
served as a means for monitoring households'' activities were 
disbanded.
    The Government continued to dismiss military personnel summarily as 
well as civilian government employees whose loyalty it considered 
suspect. The government committee set up in 1995 to review cases of 
persons summarily dismissed since the 1989 coup continued to function 
in theory; however, it has released no results since May 1996.
    Government armed forces burned and looted villages and stole cattle 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
    The Government continued to conscript citizens forcibly, including 
high school age children (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    As a result of the prolonged war, approximately 4 million persons 
are displaced internally (see Section 2.d.).
    The insurgent SPLM/SPLA generally is not known to interfere with 
privacy, family, home, or correspondence in areas that it controls, 
although correspondence is difficult in war zones; however, rebel 
factions continued to conscript citizens forcibly including high school 
age children (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    There were unconfirmed reports that the SPLA forcibly recruited 
Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in their forces.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Since the civil war resumed in 1983, an estimated 
2 million persons have been killed, and 4 million displaced internally 
as a result of fighting between the Government and insurgents in the 
south, interethnic fighting, and famine. The civil war continued 
despite limited cease-fires, and all sides involved in the fighting 
were responsible for violations of humanitarian norms. At year's end, 
the Government controlled virtually all of the northern two-thirds of 
the country but was limited to garrison towns in the south. In June the 
SPLA launched an offensive in Bahr El Ghazal, fighting resumed between 
the SPLA and government forces, and the humanitarian cease-fire broke 
down. During the year, government bombings continued, often killing or 
injuring innocent civilians and destroying homes, schools, and 
hospitals. Some Government bombing intentionally was directed at 
civilian targets; most bombing was indiscriminate and resulted in 
deaths and injuries or destruction of property. In early February, 
government bombs struck a school in the Nuba Mountains, killing 15 
persons and wounding 17 others. On March 4, a government bombardment of 
the town of Yirol damaged the compound of Irish NGO Concern, killing 2 
persons and wounding 11 others. On March 14, government forces bombed 
the Diocese of Torit hospital, killing one person and injuring seven 
others. In early July in Rumbek, a young girl and a pregnant woman were 
killed and 23 persons were injured when bombs hit an open area between 
the Catholic and Episcopal churches and a market place. On July 15, the 
Government bombed the town of Chelkou and damaged an ICRC airstrip, an 
ICRC plane, and relief station, and injured an ICRC employee. In mid-
September on two different occasions, government bombs killed 11 
persons in Narus and Ikotos, and the Diocese of Torit Clinic was 
destroyed. On November 21, government forces bombed Yei; 19 persons 
were killed and 45 others were injured. In November government forces 
also bombed the towns of Polit Abur and Ikotos, killing 8 persons and 
seriously injuring 32 others.
    The Government also conducted bombing raids that targeted NGO's and 
often impeded the flow of humanitarian assistance to the south. On 
March 1, the Government bombed a hospital run by the NGO Samaritan's 
Purse in Lui in Western Equatoria. Norwegian People's Aid reported that 
on April 16, government forces dropped bombs near a child feeding 
compound. On July 28, in Akhuem in northern Bahr El Ghazal, several 
bombs landed close to a Doctors Without Borders plane and near its 
health center, prompting the medical team to evacuate the area. On 
August 7, government planes bombed an airstrip in Mapel where an OLS 
plane was parked. On August 9, government aircraft again bombed Mapel 
endangering U.N. personnel and facilities. On October 12, bombs were 
dropped on the towns of Ikotos and Parajok in Eastern Equatoria, which, 
according to relief workers, occurred during a food distribution and 
injured at least seven persons, including four persons seriously. On 
October 23, relief workers reported that 23 bombs were dropped on the 
town of Nimjule in 2 separate attacks during a 12-day cease-fire to 
allow for a U.N. polio vaccination campaign. No one was injured, 
although a nursery and several houses were destroyed.
    The Government and government-allied militia carried out raids and 
attacks on civilian settlements particularly in Bahr El Ghazal. These 
raids were accompanied by killings, abductions, rapes, the burning and 
looting of villages, the theft of cattle, and significant displacement 
of civilian populations. However, the Government pledged to end this 
practice, and there were fewer reports of such raids during the year 
(see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., and 6.c.).
    The Government and government-associated forces have implemented a 
scorched earth policy along parts of the oil pipeline and around some 
key oil facilities. These forces have injured persons seriously, 
destroyed villages, and driven out inhabitants in order to create an 
uninhabited security zone.
    Victims of government bombings, and of the civil war in general, 
often flee to government-controlled peace camps. Some NGO's reported 
that persons in the peace camps were subject to forced labor and at 
times pressured to convert to Islam (see Section 2.c.).
    Government forces routinely kill rebel soldiers captured in battle. 
Only a small group of prisoners captured before the 1989 coup and a few 
soldiers taken in the east in 1998 and during the year reportedly are 
held as POW's in governmentcontrolled areas. The Government does not 
concede that it holds POW's. It has not responded to ICRC inquiries 
about POW's and has refused the ICRC access to POW's.
    Government forces in the south raped women and forcibly conscripted 
men and boys (see Sections 1.f. and 6.c.). Government forces routinely 
displaced, killed, and injured civilians, and destroyed clinics and 
dwellings intentionally during their offensive operations. At the 
beginning of November, during an NDA attack on Kassala, 52 civilians 
and soldiers were killed during fighting between government and NDA 
troops.
    In addition to bombings that have made humanitarian assistance 
difficult, the Government routinely has denied flight clearances. The 
Government banned all relief flights to Western Upper Nile and Eastern 
Equatoria during the year. In July the Government informed OLS that it 
would require 7 days notice for all relief flights (previously 48 hours 
notice was required), thus reducing OLS's flexibility. Until 1999 the 
Government had not permitted U.N. humanitarian assistance to Blue Nile. 
In June 1999 and September 1999, U.N. teams conducted humanitarian 
assessment visits to rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains, and in 
October 1999, the U.N. conducted a humanitarian assessment in 
government-held areas of the Nuba Mountains. During the year, the 
Government on two occasions permitted polio eradication teams to visit 
the Nuba Mountains but denied access for other humanitarian assistance.
    During a March 1999 visit by the U.N. Special Representative for 
Children and Armed Conflict, both the Government and SPLM/SPLA agreed 
to stop using anti-personnel mines. However, in the early part of the 
year, a government militia raided a relief center at Mading and placed 
landmines in an NGO compound forcing the permanent evacuation of the 
center. Reportedly the SPLA continued to lay landmines in Eastern 
Equatoria for defense purposes. Injuries continued to occur during the 
year from landmines previously laid by the Government to protect 
garrison towns and from landmines laid by the SPLA and its allies 
during the course of the war.
    Northern Muslim opposition groups under the 1995 NDA umbrella 
structure, which includes the SPLA, took military action against the 
Government. The NDA attacked government garrisons, the oil pipeline, 
and strategic points near the Ethiopian and Eritrean borders.
    There were reports that in July and August in the Western Upper 
Nile region rebel SPLA and SPDF forces killed at least 50 civilians and 
abducted over 20 women and children in intraethnic fighting (see 
Section 5). In Kerial and Koch, soldiers burned huts and looted food 
and other household goods, and several chiefs reported that their 
villagers were forced to relocate.
    The SPLA has taken a number of prisoners over the years. The SPLA 
often cooperates with ICRC and allows regular visits to prisoners. The 
SPLA released a limited number of POW's for health reasons during the 
year. Prisoners reportedly have died while in SPLA custody due to 
extremely poor prison conditions.
    There are credible reports of SPLA taxation and occasional 
diversion of relief supplies. The SPLM leadership repeatedly has 
committed itself to eliminating these problems; however, in practice it 
appears unable to impose consistently those commitments on its 
representatives in the field. There were reports that the Sudan Relief 
and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) diverted humanitarian food to the 
SPLA.
    Insurgent forces in the south forcibly conscripted men and boys and 
reportedly raped women (see Sections 1.f. and 6.c.). Insurgent forces 
also routinely displaced, killed, and injured civilians, and destroyed 
clinics and dwellings intentionally.
    In March the SPLM/SPLA expelled 11 NGO's, which handled 75 percent 
of NGO-provided humanitarian aid entering the south, for refusing to 
sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on NGO activities that had 
been under negotiation for several years. Several other NGO's that 
refused to sign left the area before the deadline. All but a few of the 
NGO's that were expelled or left before the deadline returned to the 
southern part of the country and later in the year signed the MOU (see 
Section 2.b.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1999 Constitution provides for 
freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of the press ``as 
regulated by law;'' however, the Government severely restricts freedom 
of speech and of the press. Government detentions of journalists, 
intimidation, surveillance, and suspensions of newspapers continued to 
inhibit open, public discussion of political issues. Journalists 
practice self-censorship.
    As a result of a limited easing of press restrictions that the 
Government began in 1997, some lively discussions of domestic and 
foreign policy were published in the press. Nonetheless, the Government 
still exercised control of news reporting, particularly of political 
topics, the war, and criticism of the Government, through the National 
Press Council and security forces. The National Press Council applies 
the Press law and is directly responsible to the President. It is 
charged with licensing newspapers, setting press policy, and responding 
to complaints. In the event of a complaint, it can give a newspaper a 
warning or suspend it for up to 15 days. It also can suspend a 
newspaper indefinitely and suspend journalists for up to 2 weeks. The 
National Press Council consists of 21 members: 7 selected by the 
President; 5 from the National Assembly; 7 directly elected by 
journalists from the Journalists'' Union; and 2 selected by the 
Journalists'' Union leadership. In February President Bashir fired five 
members of the National Press Council because they had been selected by 
the dissolved National Assembly (see Section 3). Observers believe the 
Journalist's Union is government-controlled. The National Press Council 
was active in suspending journalists and newspapers during the year.
    The Government restricted freedom of the press through detention of 
journalists and editors (see Section 1.d.), the confiscation of already 
printed editions, prepublication censorship, and pressure, which 
resulted in self-censorship.
    In March security forces arrested and detained Kamal Hassan 
Bakheit, Chief Editor of ``Al Sahafa'' and four of the paper's 
journalists for publishing poetry calling on Egypt to rescue the 
country from ``the unjust war'' and writing an article supportive of 
the NDA. In May security forces arrested Idris Hassan, Chief Editor, 
and El Badawi Yousif, Editing Director of ``Al Rai AlAam'' newspaper 
for ``crimes against the state'' involving alleged false accusations 
and insults to public servants executing judicial proceedings. They 
were released after 1 day, and those editions of the newspaper were 
confiscated. In August security forces arrested Osman Mirghani, 
journalist for ``Al Rai Al-Aam'' for an article criticizing government 
education policy. In August security forces also arrested Alwola Burhi 
Kaidani, journalist for ``Al-Rai Al Akhar'' for an ``anti-government'' 
article.
    In July the National Press Council suspended an independent Arabic 
daily Al-Rai Al-Aam for 1 day following the publication of an article 
critical of the police.
    The editor in chief of the newspaper Al-Rai al-Akher, who was 
arrested in June 1999, and the editors in chief of two other 
newspapers, Elsharee Elsyasi and Al-Ousbou, who reportedly were 
arrested at the same time all were released after a few days.
    All journalists, even in the privately owned Arabic daily press, 
continued to practice self-censorship. There are 11 daily newspapers 
and one English newspaper, which generally represents the viewpoint of 
southerners. Of the Arabic papers, one is government-controlled, 
several generally reflect the Government's viewpoint, and several are 
independent. A wide variety of Arabic and English publications are 
available; however, they are subject to censorship.
    Radio and television are controlled directly by the Government and 
are required to reflect government policies. Television has a permanent 
military censor to ensure that the news reflects official views. There 
are no privately owned television or radio stations, although one 
television cable company is jointly owned by the Government and private 
investors.
    The Government often charged that the international, and 
particularly the Western, media have an anti-Sudan and antiIslam bias.
    In spite of the restrictions on ownership of satellite dishes, 
citizens have access to foreign electronic media; the Government does 
not jam foreign radio signals. In addition to domestic and satellite 
television services, there is a pay cable network, which directly 
rebroadcasts uncensored Cable News Network (CNN), the British 
Broadcasting Company (BBC), the London-based, Saudiowned Middle East 
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), DubaiTV, Kuwait-TV, and a variety of 
other foreign programming.
    Uncensored Internet access is available through two Internet 
service providers.
    Rebel movements have provided relatively few opportunities for 
journalists to report on their activities.
    Academic freedom is restricted. In public universities, the 
Government appoints the vice-chancellors who are responsible for 
running the institutions. While many professors'' lecture and write in 
opposition to the Government, they must exercise selfcensorship. 
Private universities are not subject to direct government control; 
however, professors also exercise selfcensorship.
    Security forces detained, and at times, beat student activists (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In May security forces raided Alnasr 
Technology College twice; they arrested, beat, and injured students, 
and fired bullets in the air in an effort to disperse a student protest 
on education issues. On a few occasions, security forces forcibly 
dispersed student demonstrations, killing and injuring some students 
(see Section 2.b.).
    The Government officially requires that young men between the ages 
of 17 and 19 enter military service to be able to receive a certificate 
on leaving secondary school, which is a requirement for entry into a 
university (see Section 5). This decree effectively broadened the 
conscription base.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The declaration 
of the state of emergency and of martial law on June 30, 1989, 
effectively eliminated the right of assembly, and the Government 
continued to severely restrict this freedom. The authorities permitted 
only government-authorized gatherings and routinely denied permission 
for or disrupted gatherings they view as politically oriented. Islamic 
orders associated with opposition political parties, particularly the 
Ansar and Khatimia, regularly have been denied permission to hold large 
public gatherings. In June the Independent Students Congress group of 
Sennar University organized an unapproved political rally at the 
University. Armed troops intervened and fired automatic weapons on the 
campus; the troops killed a student, seriously injured another, and 
approximately 20 students were hospitalized. In September demonstrators 
in several cities in the northern part of the country protested poor 
economic conditions, lack of water and electricity, government failure 
to pay teacher salaries, and compulsory military conscription. Claiming 
that the demonstrations threatened to become violent, police and 
security forces used tear gas and live ammunition to disperse 
demonstrators; the security forces killed several persons, and detained 
and beat numerous individuals. The individuals later were released. 
Also in September, the National Democratic Women's Association, which 
is associated with the NDA, held a peaceful demonstration against the 
Khartoum governor's decree banning women from working in public places. 
Riot police dispersed the protesters using tear gas; numerous women 
were injured, and security forces arrested and later released more than 
25 women. In September and October, over 150 members of Hassan al-
Turabi's PNCP were detained after allegedly participating in 
demonstrations against the Government (see Section 1.d.). In October 
police used batons and tear gas to break up a rally and protest held by 
the PNCP and Islamic students at the University of Khartoum; students 
allegedly fired shots at the police, pelted them with stones, and used 
Molotov cocktails. Six policemen were injured, and four students were 
arrested but later were released.
    In December government forces broke up a meeting of NDA 
representatives with a foreign diplomat, detained the diplomat briefly, 
and eventually expelled him from the country; they also arrested seven 
NDA representatives. After approximately 6 weeks of detention, the 
Government charged the NDA representatives with treason and sedition. 
There was no trial by year's end. In the following weeks, human rights 
activist Ghazi Suleiman and Ali Mahmoud Hassanein, head of the 
opposition Democratic Unionist Party, opposition lawyers for the NDA, 
were arrested by the Government (see Section 1.d.). The lawyers were 
not charged and remained in detention at year's end. Following the 
incident, the Government announced restrictions on diplomatic, 
international, and regional organizations'' contact with any Sudanese 
political organizations, including the NDA, that it considered to be 
waging war against it. The Government stated it would restrict travel 
into rebelcontrolled areas without prior written permission from the 
Ministry of External Affairs; however, this restriction was not 
enforced during the year.
    The Government severely restricted freedom of association. In 
December 1998, implementing legislation linked to the new Constitution 
that in theory would allow the existence of political parties passed 
into law. As a result, there are now 20 officially registered political 
parties; however, the legislation includes restrictions that 
effectively prohibit traditional political parties if they are linked 
to armed opposition to the Government. Observers believe that the 
Government controls professional associations.
    In March the SPLA implemented a MOU drafted in August 1999 that was 
the subject of negotiation between the SPLM, NGO's, and donors. It 
included items such as: Increased SPLA control over NGO interaction 
with local communities; SPLA control over the planning and distribution 
of humanitarian assistance; a requirement to work ``in accordance with 
SPLA objectives'' rather than solely humanitarian principles; the 
payment of ``security fees;'' and additional fees for services, 
including charges for the landing of aircraft carrying humanitarian aid 
and for NGO movement within SPLA-held areas. In March the SPLA expelled 
11 NGO's, which handled 75 percent of NGO-provided humanitarian aid 
entering southern Sudan, for refusing to sign the MOU; several NGO's 
who refused to sign the memorandum left the area before the deadline 
(see Section 1.g.). Most NGO's returned by year's end, and most NGO's 
that provide assistance to the south reported that the MOU had little 
or no effect on their operations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The 1999 Constitution provides for freedom 
of religion; however, the Government severely restricts this right in 
practice. The Government treats Islam as the state religion and has 
declared that Islam must inspire the country's laws, institutions, and 
policies. The Constitution states that ``Shari'a and custom are the 
sources of legislation.''
    Religious organizations are subject to the 1994 Societies 
Registration Act, which replaced the controversial 1962 Missionary 
Societies Act. The act theoretically allows churches to engage in a 
wider range of activities than did the Missionary Act, but churches are 
subject to the restrictions placed on nonreligious corporations. 
Religious groups, like all other organizations, must be registered in 
order to be recognized or to gather legally. The Government also 
requires that houses of worship be approved. Registered religious 
groups are exempt from most taxes. Nonregistered religious groups, on 
the other hand, find it impossible to construct a place of worship or 
to assemble legally. Registration reportedly is very difficult to 
obtain in practice, and the Government does not treat all groups 
equally in the approval of such registrations and licenses.
    Muslims may proselytize freely in the government-controlled areas, 
but non-Muslims are forbidden to proselytize. Foreign missionaries and 
religiously oriented organizations continue to be harassed by 
authorities; however, there were fewer reports of harassment in the 
second half of the year. On occasion requests by foreign missionaries 
and religiously oriented organizations for work permits and residence 
visas were delayed or denied. The Government refused to renew visas of 
several long-term Catholic missionaries, forcing them to leave the 
country and reapply with no assurances that the visas will be granted 
again. The Government generally is least restrictive of Christian 
groups that historically have had a presence in the country, including 
Copts, Roman Catholics, and Greek Orthodox, and is more restrictive of 
newer arrivals.
    Although the Government considers itself an Islamic government, 
restrictions often are placed on the religious freedoms of Muslims, 
particularly against those orders linked to opposition to the 
Government. Islamic orders such as the Ansar and the Khatimia regularly 
are denied permission to hold large public gatherings (see Section 
2.b.).
    The Government permits non-Muslims to participate in services in 
existing and otherwise authorized places of worship; the Government 
continued to deny permission for the construction of Roman Catholic 
churches, although some other Christian groups have received 
permission. However, the Government permitted some makeshift structures 
to be used.
    There is a longstanding dispute between the Episcopal Church and 
the Government. In September 1999, the Episcopal Church stated that the 
Government had moved to seize a portion of the property on which church 
offices in Omdurman stand. A government-run health care center had 
operated on the site since 1973. The Church claims that it has a 
freehold title to the land, while the Government claims that it is a 
leasehold. The Church claims that the courts will not act independently 
of the Government in the case. The case still is unresolved. In 
December 1999, police injured five persons in a clash in northwest 
Khartoum over an Episcopal Church school. Local authorities claim that 
the school was built without a proper permit. Despite a court ruling in 
favor of the Church, the school eventually was taken over by the 
Government and reopened as a Government school.
    Government authorities, using soldiers for security, reportedly 
have razed approximately 30 religious buildings with bulldozers since 
1990. In June 1999, local press reports indicated that an agreement had 
been signed between the Human Rights Committee of the National Assembly 
and the Minister of Engineering Affairs of Khartoum State not to remove 
schools or houses of worship during slum demolitions unless adequate 
alternative sites were found. In October 1999, the First Vice President 
directed that the demolition of churches and other Christian facilities 
in Khartoum be suspended and that a committee be formed under the 
Second Vice President to review the issue; the committee was formed and 
began operations during the year. During the year, no religious schools 
or houses of worship were razed. The Government was trying to take over 
the unused part of a Christian cemetery in Khartoum in order to build 
shops; the dispute was not resolved by year's end.
    The Government requires instruction in Islam in public schools in 
the north. In public schools in areas in which Muslims are not a 
majority, students have a choice of studying Islam or Christianity; 
however, Christian courses are not offered in the majority of public 
schools, ostensibly due to a lack of teachers or Christian students, 
and, in practice this means that many Christian students attend Islamic 
courses.
    Children who have been abandoned or whose parentage is 
unknownregardless of presumed religious origin--are considered Muslims 
and can be adopted only by Muslims. Non-Muslims may adopt only other 
non-Muslim children. No equivalent restriction is placed on adoption by 
Muslims of orphans, or other abandoned children. These children are 
considered by the State to be both Sudanese citizens and Muslims, and 
therefore can be adopted only by Muslims. In accordance with Islamic 
law, Muslim adopted children do not take the name of their adoptive 
parents and are not automatic heirs to their property.
    Various government bodies have decreed on different occasions that 
women must dress according to modest Islamic standards. This, at the 
least, entails wearing a head covering. For example, in January 1999, 
the governor of Khartoum State announced that women in public places 
and government offices and female students and teachers would be 
required to conform to what is deemed an Islamic dress code. However, 
none of these decrees have been the subject of legislation, and 
enforcement of the dress code regulations was uneven. During the year, 
dress code enforcement was relaxed and, when it occurred, generally 
consisted of verbal admonishment by security forces. In September the 
Governor of Khartoum State issued a decree forbidding women from 
working in businesses that serve the public such as hotels, 
restaurants, and gas stations, defending the ban as necessary under 
Shari'a law to protect the dignity of women (see Section 5). At year's 
end, the decree was before the Constitutional Court pending a decision 
on appeal.
    While non-Muslims may convert to Islam, the 1991 Criminal Act makes 
apostasy (which includes conversion to another religion) by Muslims 
punishable by death.
    Authorities continued to restrict the activities of Christians, 
followers of traditional indigenous beliefs, and other nonMuslims, and 
there continued to be reports that security forces harassed and 
arrested persons for religious beliefs and activities (see Section 
1.d.).
    There were reports that police in Hilla Kuku harassed members of 
the Catholic Church. In June a Catholic seminarian reported that police 
stopped him at the bus station in Hilla Kuku and ordered him to remove 
a wooden cross that he was wearing. When he refused, the police took 
him to a police station, detained him, and beat him on the neck and 
wrist with a stick. After 3 hours of interrogation, they returned the 
cross and released him. In July at the same bus station, a Catholic 
worker was abducted by unidentified men, reportedly security personnel, 
and taken to an unidentified house. He was kept in a chair, with his 
hands tied behind his back, and questioned about church activities. He 
was released after dark but warned not to discuss the incident.
    The Government officially exempts the 10 southern states, whose 
population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the Criminal Act, which 
permits physical punishments based on Shari'a (Islamic law). In June 
approximately 100 Christian secondary school students were not allowed 
to continue compulsory military service because they left their duties 
to pray; it was unclear if these students were abused because they were 
Christian. Without successfully completing military service, they will 
not be allowed to enter the university.
    PDF trainees, including non-Muslims, are indoctrinated in the 
Islamic faith. In prisons and juvenile detention facilities, government 
officials and government-supported Islamic NGO's pressured and offered 
inducements to non-Muslim inmates to convert. Some persons in the 
government-controlled camps for internally displaced persons reportedly 
were subject to forced labor and at times pressured to convert to Islam 
(see Section 1.f.). Children, including non-Muslim children, in camps 
for vagrant minors are required to study the Koran, and there is 
pressure on non-Muslims to convert to Islam (see Section 5). There are 
credible reports that some boys in vagrant camps and juvenile homes 
have undergone forced circumcision. Some children from Christian and 
other non-Muslim families, captured and sold into slavery, were 
converted forcibly to Islam.
    The Government bombed villages in the Nuba Mountains and other 
southern rebel-held areas, at times striking hospitals, schools, 
mosques, Christian churches, and religious services (see Section 1.g.). 
For example, on February 8, government forces bombed a Catholic school 
in the Nuba Mountains killing at least 14 children and 1 teacher, and 
wounding 14 other persons. Government officials described the incident 
as a legitimate bombing. On March 14, government forces bombed the 
Diocese of Torit hospital, killing 1 person and injuring 7 others. In 
September government forces dropped 12 bombs on a Catholic mission, 
injuring 6 persons and destroying a medical dispensary.
    In June a group of 12 armed police entered the priests'' residence 
of the Catholic Comboni College secondary school with a warrant to 
search for illegal immigrants and foreign currency. The rooms of two 
priests and a medicine storeroom were searched. The police did not 
arrest anyone, and spoke with one priest. Police took a camera, a file 
of newspaper cuttings, five boxes of slides, a corrector tape, three 
floppy disks, and a bottle of whiskey. The items were accounted for at 
the time and returned 2 days later. A mobile telephone and cash are 
believed to have disappeared, but were not listed among the items taken 
by police during the search. No charges were filed in the case. The 
Catholic Comboni College has a religiously and ethnically mixed student 
body and generally operates without interference or harassment.
    There were some areas in which the Government took steps that 
improved religious freedom somewhat, including releasing religious 
prisoners and detainees, relaxing enforcement of public order laws, 
releasing women imprisoned under the public order law, and easing 
restrictions on religious visitors and gatherings. For example, during 
the year, the Archbishop of Canterbury visited the country as did 
German evangelist Reinhard Bonnke. Open air services in Khartoum were 
attended by tens of thousands of persons. Catholic Church 
representatives said thousands of persons routinely attended jubilee 
festivities in governmentheld areas without interference or harassment.
    In rebel-controlled areas, Christians, Muslims, and followers of 
traditional indigenous beliefs generally worship freely, although it 
appears that many of the region's Muslim residents have departed 
voluntarily over the years. The SPLM officially favors secular 
government; however, the SPLM is dominated by Christians, and local 
SPLM authorities often have a very close relationship with local 
Christian religious authorities.
    Government and SPLM/SPLA delegations participated in four rounds of 
IGAD-mediated peace talks in Kenya during the year. The delegations 
continued discussions of the role of religion in national affairs 
without resolution. The Government continues to insist that Shari'a or 
Islamic law form the basis of a unified state while southerners insist 
on a secular state.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The 1999 Constitution provides for 
freedom of movement and residence, including exit from and entry into 
the country; however, the Government restricted these rights in 
practice. The Government denied exit visas to some categories of 
persons, including policemen and physicians. The Government also 
maintains lists of political figures and other citizens who are not 
permitted to travel abroad.
    Women may not travel abroad without permission of their husbands or 
male guardians. Some former political detainees have been forbidden to 
travel outside Khartoum. Movement generally was unhindered for other 
citizens outside the war zones, but travelers who failed to produce an 
identity card at checkpoints risked arrest. Foreigners needed permits, 
which were often difficult to obtain and sometimes were refused, for 
domestic travel outside of Khartoum; however, foreign diplomats can 
travel to many locations under government escort. Foreigners must 
register with the police on entering the country, seek permission to 
move from one location to another, and reregister at each new location 
within 3 days of arrival. Foreign NGO staffs sometimes had problems 
obtaining entry visas or work or travel permits once they had entered 
the country. In December the Government announced restrictions on 
travel by diplomatic, international, and regional organizations and 
others into rebelcontrolled areas without prior written permission from 
the Ministry of External Affairs; however, this restriction was not 
enforced during the year.
    Insurgent movements also require that foreign NGO personnel obtain 
permission before traveling to areas that they control, although they 
generally granted such permission. NGO workers who have worked in 
government-held territory encountered problems receiving permission to 
work or travel in insurgentheld territory. In March the SPLA drew up a 
Memorandum of Understanding for NGO's to sign that restricted much of 
their work in the southern part of the country and, as a result, many 
NGO's left the country (see Section 1.g.).
    Tens of thousands of persons, largely southerners and westerners 
displaced by famine and civil war, continue to live in squatter slums 
in the Khartoum area. The Khartoum State government plans to upgrade 
conditions in some camps, requiring the movement of populations to 
other areas so that roads may be built or enlarged and services 
established. The state government is in contact with foreign NGO's and 
U.N. agencies concerning this effort.
    Approximately 380,000 Sudanese are refugees in neighboring 
countries. Refugees have fled to Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic. Up 
to 4 million persons are displaced internally due to the civil war.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylum 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperated 
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian assistance organizations and accorded refugees generally 
good treatment. The UNHCR estimated that there were approximately 
400,000 refugees, primarily from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, Uganda, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. Approximately 150,000 
refugees are in camps, and the rest are scattered in urban areas 
throughout the country. The Government provides first asylum, although 
no statistics were available for the year.
    In April the Government signed an agreement with the Government of 
Eritrea to repatriate longtime Eritrean refugees in Sudan; however, it 
was not implemented because of the conflict between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia.
    In August the UNHCR signed an agreement with the Government of 
Sudan and the Government of Ethiopia to repatriate pre-1991 Ethiopian 
refugees to their homeland by the end of the year; however, only some 
of the Ethiopian refugees were repatriated by year's end.
    There were some reports of the mistreatment of refugees, including 
beatings and arbitrary arrests by government officials. Refugees could 
not become resident aliens or citizens, regardless of their length of 
stay. The Government allowed a large number of refugees to work.
    There were unconfirmed reports that the SPLA forcibly recruited 
Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in their forces.
    There were no reports that the Government forcibly returned persons 
to a country where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens had no genuine opportunity to change their government 
peacefully. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 
December and there were allegations of serious irregularities; 
including official interference, electoral fraud, inadequate 
opportunities for all voters to register, and inadequate election 
monitoring. All major opposition parties boycotted the election. Bashir 
was elected to another 5-year term, and the NC/NIF won 340 out of 360 
seats in Parliament in the deeply flawed process.
    In December 1999, President Bashir declared a 3-month state of 
emergency, dismissed the speaker of the National Assembly, Dr. Turabi, 
and disbanded Parliament 2 days before it was to vote on a bill 
introduced by pro-Turabi legislators to reduce Bashir's presidential 
powers. Bashir suspended the Parliament on the grounds that it was 
necessary for the unity of the country. The State of Emergency remained 
in effect throughout the year and was extended through next year. The 
new Parliament elected in December is expected to take office in 
February 2001.
    The Constitution, which provides in theory for a wide range of 
rights, was passed by referendum in June 1998, and was implemented 
early in 1999. There was widespread skepticism about the Government's 
claims that the constitutional referendum passed with 96.7 percent 
approval and 91.9 percent participation. Critics of the new 
Constitution charged that it neither was drafted nor passed with truly 
national participation. Some critics also objected to the statement 
that ``Islamic law'' would be among ``the prevalent sources of law'' in 
regard to amending the Constitution (see Section 5). The new 
Constitution has resulted in few changes in practice.
    In 1989 the National Salvation Revolution Command Council (RCC) 
abolished all political parties and detained the major party leaders 
for a short period. In 1990 the RCC rejected both multiparty and one 
party systems and, 2 years later, established an entirely government-
appointed Transitional National Assembly, based on a Libyan-style 
political structure with ascending levels of nonpartisan assemblies. 
The essentially powerless appointed legislature was replaced following 
the 1996 elections by an elected National Assembly. In December 1998, 
implementing legislation linked to the new Constitution passed a law 
that would allow the restricted existence of political parties. As a 
result, there are 20 officially registered political parties; however, 
the legislation included restrictions that effectively prohibit 
traditional political parties if they are linked to armed opposition to 
the Government. The Government continued routinely to deny permission 
for and disrupt gatherings that it viewed as politically oriented (see 
Section 2.b.). Security forces arrested, detained, and on occasion, 
beat political opponents during the year (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    The federal system of government was instituted in 1995 and slowly 
is developing a structure of 26 states, which the Government considers 
a possible inducement to the insurgents for accommodation through a 
principle of regional autonomy; however, southerners are 
underrepresented in the Government. This underrepresentation remained a 
key obstacle to ending the rebellion.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
they have the right to vote. There is one female Minister, who serves 
as a government advisor; one female State Minister, who serves on the 
Council of Ministers and is the former head of the legislative 
committee of Khartoum State; and there is one female Supreme Court 
judge.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Due to government restrictions on freedom of association (see 
Section 2.b.), there is only one independent domestic human rights 
organizations--the Sudan Human Rights Organization. There is one local 
NGO that addresses health concerns related to the practice of female 
genital mutilation (FGM) and other ``traditional'' practices (see 
Section 5). During the year, the Government conducted bombing raids 
that targeted NGO's and often impeded their activities in the south 
(see Section 1.g.).
    Government-supported Islamic NGO's pressured imprisoned nonMuslims 
to convert to Islam. There were reports that Christian NGO's used their 
services to pressure persons to convert to Christianity during the 
year.
    The Human Rights Advisory Council, a government body whose 
rapporteur is the Solicitor General for Public Law, continued its role 
in addressing human rights problems within the Government. The Council 
is composed of representatives of human rights offices in 22 government 
ministries and agencies. While the council is charged with 
investigating human rights complaints, its effectiveness was hampered 
by lack of cooperation on the part of some of the ministry and agency 
offices. In May 1998, the Government formed the CEAWAC, which in turn 
formed mechanisms to identify and return abductees (see Sections 1.b. 
and 6.f.).
    In September 1998, the U.N. named a new Special Rapporteur on 
Sudan, Leonardo Franco. Franco visited the country in February and 
filed a report with the UNHCR and the U.N. General Assembly.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1999 Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
or religious creed; however, discrimination against women and ethnic 
minorities continued. Mechanisms for social redress, especially with 
respect to violence against women and children, are weak. The 1992 
General Education Act stipulates equal opportunity in education for the 
disabled.
    Women.--Violence against women continued to be a problem, although, 
because reliable statistics do not exist, the extent is unknown. Many 
women are reluctant to file formal complaints against such abuse, 
although it is a legal ground for divorce. The police normally do not 
intervene in domestic disputes. Displaced women from the south were 
vulnerable to harassment, rape, and sexual abuse. The Government does 
not address the problem of violence against women, nor is it discussed 
publicly. The punishment for rape under the Criminal Act varies from 
100 lashes to 10 years imprisonment to death. In most cases, 
convictions are not announced; however, observers believe that 
sentences often are less than the maximum provided for by law. 
Prostitution is a growing problem, although there is no sex tourism 
industry. There are no specific laws regarding sexual harassment.
    Some aspects of the law, including certain provisions of Islamic 
law as interpreted and applied by the Government, and many traditional 
practices, discriminate against women. Gender segregation is common in 
social settings. In accordance with Islamic law, a Muslim woman has the 
right to hold and dispose of her own property without interference. 
Women are ensured inheritance from their parents; however, a daughter 
inherits half the share of a son, and a widow inherits a smaller 
percent than do her children. It is much easier for men to initiate 
legal divorce proceedings than for women. These rules only apply to 
Muslims and not to those of other faiths, for whom religious or tribal 
laws apply. Although a Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim, a Muslim 
woman cannot marry a non-Muslim unless he converts to Islam; however, 
this prohibition is not observed or enforced in areas of the south not 
controlled by the Government, nor among Nubans. Women cannot travel 
abroad without the permission of their husbands or male guardians (see 
Section 2.d.); however, this prohibition is not enforced strictly for 
women affiliated with the NCP.
    A number of government directives require that women in public 
places and government offices and female students and teachers conform 
to what the Government deemed an Islamic dress code. This, at the 
least, entailed wearing a head covering. However, enforcement of the 
dress code regulations has been uneven. During the year, dress code 
enforcement was relaxed and, when it occurred, generally consisted of 
verbal admonishment by security forces. In May a presidential decree 
released 563 women who were in prison for violating the Public Order 
Law. Most were southerners who had been convicted of illegally making 
and selling alcohol in Khartoum. Subsequent to the decree, police 
continued to arrest numerous women for the same violation and 
reportedly the police demand bribes in exchange for releasing the 
women.
    Women generally are not discriminated against in the pursuit of 
employment; however, in September the Governor of Khartoum State issued 
a decree forbidding women from working in businesses that serve the 
public, including hotels, restaurants, and gas stations. The Governor 
defended the ban as necessary to protect the dignity of women and to 
adhere to Shari'a law. Within a week, the Constitutional Court 
suspended the ruling, and the case was pending appeal at year's end.
    Women enjoy equal access to education. Approximately 50 percent of 
university students are women, in part because men are conscripted for 
war.
    There are credible reports that government and government-
associated forces abducted and sold women for work as domestic servants 
and concubines (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Children.--Education is compulsory through grade eight, although 
local inability to pay teachers'' salaries reportedly has resulted in 
declining attendance. In the northern part of the country, boys and 
girls generally have equal access to education, although many families 
with restricted income choose to send sons and not daughters to school. 
Girls do not have equal access to education in the south. The male 
literacy rate is 57.7 percent, and the female literacy rate is 34.6 
percent; however, this rate is for the country as a whole; the literacy 
rate in the south reportedly is lower due to a lack of schools in many 
areas.
    A considerable number of children suffered serious abuse, including 
abduction, enslavement, and forced conscription in the war zones (see 
Sections 1.f., 6.c., and 6.f.). There continued to be credible reports 
that government and government-associated forces abducted children for 
purposes of forced labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    The Government forcibly conscripted young men and boys into the 
military forces to fight in the civil war. Conscription frequently was 
carried out by government authorities who raided buses and other public 
places to seize young men. The Government officially requires that 
young men between the ages of 17 and 19 years enter military service to 
be able to receive a certificate on leaving secondary school. Such a 
certificate is a requirement for entry into a university, and the 
decree effectively broadened the conscription base. There are credible 
reports that the government-controlled militia leader, Paulino Matip, 
forcibly conscripted boys as young as 10 years of age to serve as 
soldiers. In October the SPLA pledged to demobilize child soldiers from 
its forces, and during the year, 116 boys were removed from the army 
and placed in school. There are credible reports that child soldiers 
continued to serve in the SPLA.
    The Government operated camps for vagrant children. Police 
typically send homeless children who have committed crimes to these 
camps, where they are detained for indefinite periods. Health care and 
schooling at the camps generally are poor, and basic living conditions 
often are primitive. All of the children in the camps, including non-
Muslims, must study the Koran, and there is pressure on non-Muslims to 
convert to Islam (see Section 2.c.). There were reports that boys in 
these camps and in homes for delinquent youths were forced to undergo 
circumcision. Teenagers in the camps often are conscripted into the PDF 
(see Section 1.f.).
    During the last 10 years, thousands of children were abducted by 
the government-supported LRA, a Ugandan armed opposition group with 
bases in the southern part of the country (see Section 6.f.). The LRA 
forced many of the boys to become soldiers and the girls to become sex 
slaves. In December 1999, the Governments of both countries agreed to 
stop supporting each other's rebel armies and to return abductees. 
Subsequently, the Government assisted in repatriating a small number of 
individuals who had escaped from the LRA. In September both Governments 
agreed at the Winnipeg International Conference on War Affected 
Children to work for the speedy release and repatriation of LRA 
captives; however, implementation has proved problematic due to a lack 
of cooperation on the part of the LRA.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is widespread, especially in the north. An 
estimated 90 percent or more of females in the north have been 
subjected to FGM, with consequences that have included severe urinary 
problems, infections, and even death. Infibulation, the most severe 
type of FGM, is also the most common type. Usually it is performed on 
girls between the ages of 4 and 7 by traditional practitioners in 
improvised, unsanitary conditions, causing severe pain, trauma, and 
risk of infection to the child. No form of FGM is illegal under the 
Criminal Code; however, the health law forbids doctors and midwives 
from performing infibulation. Women displaced from the south to the 
north reportedly are imposing FGM increasingly on their daughters, even 
if they themselves have not been subjected to it. A small but growing 
number of urban, educated families are abandoning the practice 
completely. A larger number of families, in a compromise with 
tradition, have adopted the least severe form of FGM, Sunna, as an 
alternative to infibulation. The Government neither arrested nor 
prosecuted any persons for violating the health law against 
infibulation. The Government does not support FGM, and recently it has 
introduced information about FGM in some public education curriculums. 
One local NGO is working to eradicate FGM.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate 
against disabled persons but has not enacted any special legislation 
for the disabled, such as mandating accessibility to public buildings 
and transportation for the disabled. The 1992 General Education Act 
requires equal educational opportunities for the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Muslims predominate in the north, but are in 
the minority in the south, where most citizens practice traditional 
indigenous religions or Christianity. There are from 1 to 2 million 
displaced southerners in the north who largely practice traditional 
indigenous religions or Christianity. About 500,000 Coptic Christians 
live in the north. Traditionally there have been amicable relations 
between the various religious communities, although in previous years 
there were a small number of clashes.
    There are reliable reports that Islamic NGO's in war zones withhold 
food and other services from the needy unless they convert to Islam. 
There were reports that Christian NGO's used their services to pressure 
persons to convert to Christianity during the year.
    Non-Muslims legally are free to adhere to and practice their 
faiths; however, in practice the Government's treatment of Islam as the 
state religion creates an atmosphere in which non-Muslims are treated 
as second class citizens (see Section 2.c.). In government-controlled 
areas of the south, there continued to be credible evidence of 
prejudice in favor of Muslims and an unwritten policy of Islamization 
of public institutions, despite an official policy of local autonomy 
and federalism. In the past, some non-Muslims lost their jobs in the 
civil service, the judiciary, and other professions. Few non-Muslim 
university graduates found government jobs. Some non-Muslim businessmen 
complained of petty harassment and discrimination in the awarding of 
government contracts and trade licenses. There also were reports that 
Muslims receive preferential treatment for the limited services 
provided by the Government, including access to medical care.
    On December 8, supporters of the outlawed Takfeer and Hijra Muslim 
groups attacked a rival group's worshippers at a Sunna mosque in 
Omdurman during Ramadam prayers, killing 26 persons and injuring 40 
others. The Government arrested and detained 65 leading members of the 
Takfeer and Hijra group; most of the individuals remained in detention 
and had not been tried as of year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The estimated population of 
27.5 million is a multiethnic mix of over 500 Arab and African tribes 
with scores of languages and dialects. Northern Muslims, who form a 
majority of approximately 16 million persons, traditionally have 
dominated the Government. The southern ethnic groups fighting the civil 
war (largely followers of traditional indigenous religions or 
Christians) total approximately 6 million and seek independence, or 
some form of regional self-determination, from the north.
    The Muslim majority and the NIF/NC-dominated Government continued 
to discriminate against ethnic minorities in almost every aspect of 
society. Citizens in Arabic-speaking areas who do not speak Arabic 
experienced discrimination in education, employment, and other areas. 
The use of Arabic as the language of instruction in higher education 
discriminated against nonArabs. For university admission, students 
completing high school are required to pass examinations in four 
subjects: English language; mathematics; Arabic language; and religious 
studies. Even at the university level, examinations in all subjects 
except English language were in the Arabic language, placing nonnative 
speakers of Arabic at a disadvantage.
    There were reports that in July and August in the Western Upper 
Nile, predominantly Nuer SPLA forces and predominately Nuer SPDF forces 
killed at least 50 civilians and abducted more than 20 women and 
children in intraethnic fighting.
    There also were periodic reports of intertribal abductions of women 
and children in the south, primarily in the Eastern Upper Nile. The 
abductions are part of traditional warfare in which the victor takes 
women and children as a bounty and frequently tries to absorb them into 
their own tribe.
    In March 1999, at a grassroots peace conference in Wunlit, Bahr El 
Ghazal, representatives of the Nuer and Dinka tribes signed a peace 
covenant. The Dinka and the Nuer are the two largest tribes and had 
been on opposite sides of the war since 1991. The Wunlit accord 
provided concrete mechanisms for peace, including a cease-fire, an 
amnesty, the exchange of abducted women and children, and monitoring 
mechanisms. The Wunlit accord greatly reduced conflict between the 
Dinka and Nuer tribes during the year. Thousands of Nuer IDP's have 
fled into Dinka lands from Upper Nile, and generally they were well 
received.
    A similar attempt in April and May in Lilirr to broker peace on the 
East Bank among various ethnic groups, including Dinka, Nuer, and Murle 
clans was less successful, and some of the conflicts between these 
groups continued.
    Although details generally were unavailable, there were credible 
reports of civilian casualties as a result of ongoing fighting between 
ethnic Dinkas and Didingas in the New Cush and Chukudum areas in 
eastern Equatoria (see Section 1.a.). Interethnic tensions in the first 
half of the year resulted in some deaths. Interethnic tensions eased in 
May and June with the departure of some Dinka to Bor County as part of 
a relocation program to return them to their homes after having been 
displaced by the war.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The RCC abolished the pre-1989 labor 
unions, closed union offices, froze union assets, forbade strikes, and 
prescribed severe punishments, including the death penalty, for 
violations of its labor decrees. Several unions functioned during the 
year, including the government-controlled Sudan Workers'' Trade Union 
Federation (SWTUF); however, there were no independent unions. The 
Government dismissed many labor leaders from their jobs or detained 
them, although most of those arrested during the year were freed by 
year's end. For example, in April security forces detained four 
students at the University of Sudan for 4 days for union activities. 
The 1999 Constitution provides for the right of association for 
economic and trade union purposes; however, it has resulted in no 
changes in practice.
    The SWTUF is the leading blue-collar labor organization with about 
800,000 members. In 1992 local union elections were held after a delay 
to permit the government-controlled steering committees to arrange the 
outcomes. The elections resulted in government-approved slates of 
candidates voted into office by prearranged acclamation. In 1997 
largely the same leadership was reelected.
    There were some teacher strikes during the year, some lasting 
several months, to protest the government's failure to pay salaries. 
During some of the strikes, police and security forces used tear gas 
and live ammunition to disperse demonstrators; the security forces 
killed several persons, and detained and beat numerous individuals (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    Unions remained free to form federations and affiliate with 
international bodies, such as the African Workers'' Union and the Arab 
Workers'' Union.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1989 RCC 
constitutional decree temporarily suspended the right to organize and 
bargain collectively. Although these rights were restored to labor 
organizing committees in 1996, government control of the steering 
committees meant in practice that the Government dominates the process 
of setting wages and working conditions. The continued absence of labor 
legislation allowing for union meetings, the filing of grievances, and 
other union activity greatly reduced the value of these formal rights. 
Although local union officials have raised some grievances with 
employers, few carried them to the Government. The law does not 
prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers. The 1999 Constitution 
provides for the right of organization for economic or trade union 
purposes; however, it resulted in no changes in practice.
    A tripartite committee comprising representatives of the 
Government, labor unions, and business sets wages. Specialized labor 
courts adjudicate standard labor disputes; however, the Ministry of 
Labor has the authority to refer a dispute to compulsory arbitration.
    In 1993 the Government created two export processing zones (EPZ's); 
it later established a third at Khartoum International Airport. During 
the year, only the EPZ at Khartoum International Airport was open. The 
labor laws do not apply in the EPZ's.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1999 
Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however, slavery 
persists, particularly affecting women and children. The taking of 
slaves, particularly in the war zones, and their transport to parts of 
central and northern Sudan continued.
    There have been frequent and credible reports that Baggara raiders, 
supported by government troops, took women and children as slaves 
during raids in Bahr El Ghazal state. The Government did not take any 
action to halt these practices and continued to support some Baggara 
tribal militias. The majority of the victims were abducted in violent 
raids on settlements carried out by government-affiliated militias 
accompanying and guarding troop trains to the southern garrison town of 
Wau. During the raids, the militias, which frequently are not paid by 
the Government for their services, exact their own remuneration by 
abducting women and children, looting villages, and stealing cattle to 
take back to the north. Civilians often were killed and villages were 
destroyed. The Government has pledged to end this practice, and there 
were fewer reports of such raids during the year (see Sections 1.b. and 
1.g.). Following the raids, there were credible reports of practices 
such as the sale and purchase of children, some in alleged slave 
markets, and the rape of women. Abductees frequently are forced to herd 
cattle, work in the fields, fetch water, dig wells, and do housework. 
Abductees are subjected to torture and rape, and at times, are killed. 
These practices all have a pronounced racial aspect, as the victims are 
exclusively black southerners and members of indigenous tribes of the 
Nuba Mountains.
    The Government long has denied slavery but acknowledges that 
abductions occur. The Government also denies involvement or complicity 
in slavery, and states that hostage taking often accompanies tribal 
warfare, particularly in war zones not under government control. 
However, in 1998 the Government formed the Committee to Eliminate the 
Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWAC) and pledged to end the 
practice of hostage-taking. Since the creation of CEAWAC, reports of 
abductions and slavery have been less frequent. However, during the 
year the Government refused to approve flight clearances for the 
transfers of the abductees, which has prevented additional 
reunifications, and the Government did not record the identity of the 
abductors or forced labor owners and chose not to prosecute them.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the 
Government does not enforce it effectively. There continued to be 
credible reports that government or government-associated forces took 
children as slaves.
    Both the Government and rebel factions continued to conscript men 
and boys forcibly into the fighting forces (see Sections 1.f. and 5). 
Conscripts face significant hardship and abuse in military service. The 
rebel factions continued to force southern men to work as laborers or 
porters.
    Approximately 3,000 Ugandan children have been forced to become 
soldiers or sex slaves for the LRA, a Ugandan armed opposition group in 
the south, which is actively supported by the Government (see Section 
5).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for workers is 18 years; however, 
the law is not enforced in practice. Children as young as 11 or 12 
years of age worked in a number of factories, particularly outside the 
capital, including the factories at Um Ruwaba that produce edible oils. 
In addition severe poverty has produced widespread child labor in the 
informal, unregulated economy. In rural areas, children traditionally 
assist their families with agricultural work from a very young age. The 
1999 Constitution provides that the State protect children from 
exploitation; however, it resulted in no changes in practice.
    Child labor exists in SPLM/SPLA-held areas, particularly in the 
agricultural sectors. Child labor in such areas is exacerbated by lack 
of schools, extreme poverty, and the lack of an effective legal minimum 
age for workers.
    The Government does not adhere to the ILO Convention 182 on the 
worst forms of child labor and has not taken any action to investigate 
abuses or protect child workers.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the 
Government does not enforce it effectively, and there were credible 
reports that children are taken as slaves (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legislated minimum wage is 
enforced by the Ministry of Labor, which maintains field offices in 
most major cities. Employers generally respect the minimum wage. 
Workers who are denied the minimum wage may file a grievance with the 
local Ministry of Labor field office, which then is required to 
investigate and take appropriate action if there has been a violation 
of the law. In January 1999, the minimum wage theoretically was raised 
from approximately $9 (24,000 Sudanese pounds) per month to 
approximately $11 (3,000 Sudanese dinars or 30,000 Sudanese pounds) per 
month; however, most government offices continue to pay the old rate. 
The Sudanese Workers Trade Union Federation requested the Minister of 
Finance to execute the increase retroactively, and the Minister 
promised to increase the minimum wage when submitting the next 
Government budget; however, such an increase of the minimum wage had 
not occurred by year's end. The current minimum wage is insufficient to 
provide a decent standard of living for an average worker and family.
    The workweek is limited by law to six 8-hour days, with a day of 
rest on Friday, which generally is respected.
    Legal foreign workers have the same labor rights as domestic 
workers. Illegal workers have no such protections and, as a result, 
typically work for lower wages in worse conditions than legal workers.
    Although the laws prescribe health and safety standards, working 
conditions generally were poor, and enforcement by the Ministry of 
Labor is minimal. The law does not address the right of workers to 
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons, the 1999 Constitution specifically 
prohibits slavery and forced labor; however, slavery persists, 
particularly affecting women and children (see Sections 5 and 6.c). The 
taking of slaves, particularly in war zones, and their transport to 
parts of central and northern Sudan, continued. Credible reports 
persist of practices such as the sale and purchase of children, some in 
alleged slave markets. Libyans have been implicated in the purchase of 
Sudanese slaves, particularly women and children who were captured by 
government troops. During the year, there were occasional reports of 
abductions of women and children by government and government-
associated forces who sold women for domestic servants.
    There were unconfirmed reports that the SPLA forcibly recruited 
Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in their forces.
    There are credible reports that intertribal abductions of women and 
children continued in the southern part of the country.
    During the past 10 years, approximately 3,000 Ugandan children were 
kidnaped by the LRA, taken to southern Sudan, and forced to become sex 
slaves or soldiers. The Government actively supported the LRA. There 
were also reports in previous years that the LRA had sold and traded 
some children, mostly girls, or provided them as gifts, to arms dealers 
in Sudan. In December 1999, the Government agreed to cease supporting 
the LRA. During the year, there were talks between both Governments 
aimed at repatriation of the abductees (see Section 5).
    While the Government has pledged to end abduction and slavery, and 
the creation of the CEAWAC in May 1998 (see Section 1.b.) has resulted 
in the return of approximately 300 abducted individuals, 10,000 to 
12,000 slaves remain in captivity at year's end. During the year, the 
Government's refusal to approve flight clearances for the transfers of 
the abductees prevented additional reunifications. Furthermore, the 
Government did not record the identity of the abductors or forced labor 
owners, and chose not to prosecute them.
                               __________

                               SWAZILAND

    Swaziland is governed as a modified traditional monarchy with 
executive, legislative, and limited judicial powers ultimately vested 
in the King (Mswati III). The King rules according to unwritten law and 
custom, in conjunction with a partially elected parliament and an 
accompanying structure of published laws and implementing agencies. 
Despite a professed intention to alter the current system, the steps 
taken by the King toward reform have resulted in little progress. 
Parliamentary and municipal elections were held in 1998 and introduced 
increased representative government; however, political power continues 
to rest largely with the King and his circle of traditional advisors, 
including the Queen Mother. The 1968 Constitution was suspended by the 
present King's father in 1973. Based upon the 1973 decree, the King has 
the authority to issue decrees that carry the force of law, and 
exercised this authority with the introduction of the 1998 
Administrative Order. The 1973 decree also bans political parties, 
meetings, and processions except in local ``Tinkhundla'' administrative 
centers or as authorized by the police. There are public demands to 
lift the 1973 decree. The judiciary is generally independent; however, 
the King has certain judicial powers. In addition, the judiciary's 
independence was occasionally challenged by individuals in high 
positions, including the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
and the traditional governor of the royal family, who have made 
attempts to influence or overturn some court decisions. The Chief 
Justice of the High Court (a South African citizen appointed by the 
King) has resisted pressure to yield any powers to those outside the 
judiciary.
    Both the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force and the Royal Swaziland 
Police operate under civilian control and are responsible for external 
and internal security. Some communities, questioning the ability of 
National Police to deal with enforcement at the community level, have 
formed community police. Reports of conflicts between national and 
community police have subsided. Members of both the National Police and 
the community police committed some human rights abuses.
    Swaziland has a free market economy, with relatively little 
government intervention. The majority of citizens are engaged in 
subsistence agriculture, although a relatively diversified industrial 
sector now accounts for the largest component of the formal economy. 
The economy relies heavily on the export sector, especially on the wood 
pulp, soft drink concentrate, and sugar industries, which are composed 
primarily of large firms with mostly foreign ownership. The country 
depends heavily on South Africa from which it receives almost all of 
its imports and to which it sends the majority of its exports. A quasi-
parastatal organization established by royal charter maintains large 
investments in major sectors of the economy, including industry, 
agriculture, and services. This parastatal normally requires 
partnership with foreign investors and international development 
agencies.
    The Government's human rights record was generally poor, and there 
continued to be serious human rights problems. Citizens still are not 
able to change their government. Police continued to torture and beat 
some suspects. The Government generally failed to prosecute or 
otherwise discipline officers who committed abuses. Prison conditions 
meet minimum international standards; however, government remand 
centers are overcrowded. The Government continued to use a nonbailable 
offense provision. The Government infringed on citizen's privacy 
rights. The Government continued to limit freedom of speech and of the 
press, restraints continued on news coverage by government-owned 
broadcast houses, and all media practiced some self-censorship, 
although journalists spoke out on key issues. There has been slow 
progress in the drafting of a media policy to replace the proposed 
media council bill. The Government restricted freedom of assembly and 
association and retained prohibitions on political activity, although 
numerous political groupings operated openly and voiced opinions 
critical of the Government, which received prominent press coverage. 
However, the police on occasion harassed political activists. Police 
forcibly dispersed a community prayer service alleged to be a political 
activity. There are some limits on freedom of movement. Legal and 
cultural discrimination and violence against women, as well as abuse of 
children, remained problems. Some societal discrimination against mixed 
race and white citizens persisted. The Government restricted workers'' 
rights. In June the King signed the Industrial Relations Act 2000 (IRA) 
into law and it became effective on August 25; the act was amended in 
November, and the amended act remedies many of the inequities in the 
1996 labor law.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government agents. Three bombings took 
place between August and November 1998, apparently timed to coincide 
with major state events; one of the bombings killed one person. 
Although a previously unknown group claimed responsibility for the 
bombings, the existence of the group was unconfirmed and the 
perpetrators remained unidentified and their motives unknown.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There were credible reports by criminal defendants that 
the security forces used torture during interrogation. Police sometimes 
beat criminal suspects and occasionally used the ``tube'' style of 
interrogation, in which police suffocate suspects through the use of a 
rubber tube around the face and mouth. The Government generally failed 
to prosecute or otherwise discipline police officers for such abuses. 
An internal complaints and discipline unit investigates reports of 
human rights abuses by the police, but no independent body has the 
authority to investigate police abuses. However, courts have 
invalidated confessions induced through physical abuse; for example, in 
September 1998, the High Court awarded a former prisoner approximately 
$7,000 (42,000 emalangeni) in damages for cruel and unusual punishment 
suffered while incarcerated in 1992-94.
    On September 9, police used force to disperse worshippers, injuring 
more than 60 persons (see Section 2.c.).
    Overcrowding and generally poor prison conditions were alleviated 
markedly through the opening of new institutions including a modern 
correctional facility for women. In 1998 foreign diplomats and 
representatives of international agencies toured the prisons, including 
maximum-security institutions, and reported favorably on improved 
medical care, nutrition, sanitation, and vocational training. The use 
of nonbailable provisions led to less favorable conditions, including 
continued overcrowding in government remand centers where suspects are 
held during pretrial detention and often are released for time served 
after being sentenced (see Section 1.d.). Women and juveniles are held 
in separate prison facilities.
    The Government routinely has permitted prison visits by diplomats, 
journalists, human rights monitors, and representatives of 
international organizations, and some prison visits by journalists and 
political figures occurred during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law requires 
warrants for arrests in most circumstances, except when police observe 
a crime being committed or have reason to believe that a suspect may 
flee. Detainees may consult with a lawyer of their choice and must be 
charged with the violation of a statute within a reasonable time, 
usually 48 hours, or, in remote areas, as soon as the judicial officer 
appears. The authorities generally respected these rights in practice.
    In September police detained without charges two members of the 
banned political party SWAYOCO for a few hours after they raided the 
home of opposition leader Zodwa Mkhonta (see Section 2.b.).
    On November 10, the president of the banned political party PUDEMO, 
Masuku, was arrested on charges of sedition; on November 15 he was 
released on bail, and his trial was pending at year's end.
    In September 1999, an editor of an independent newspaper was 
arrested for criminal defamation after reporting that the King's latest 
fiancee was a high-school dropout (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government continued to limit the provisions for bail for 
crimes appearing in the Nonbailable Offenses Order, which became 
effective in 1993 and was strengthened by Parliament in 1994. The Order 
currently lists 11 offenses. The mere charge of the underlying offense, 
without any evidentiary showing that the suspect is involved, is 
sufficient to employ the nonbailable provision. The Minister of Justice 
may amend the list by his own executive act.
    In November there were reports that the Government was considering 
reinstating the practice of detaining persons for up to 2 months 
without formal charges, a policy that had been used in the country 
under the predecessor to King Mswati III; however, the Government 
denied these reports, and such a policy was not implemented by year's 
end.
    The Government does not use forced exile. There are no barriers to 
prevent the return of dissidents.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is generally 
independent; however, the King has certain judicial powers. In 
addition, the judiciary's independence was occasionally challenged by 
individuals in high positions, including the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs and the traditional governor of the royal 
family, who have made attempts to influence or overturn some court 
decisions. The Chief Justice of the High Court (a South African citizen 
appointed by the King) has resisted pressure to yield any powers to 
those outside the judiciary. However, the Government ignored a ruling 
on September 5 by the Chief Justice that prohibited the eviction of two 
Swazi chiefs. On October 5, the Chief Justice rescinded the injunction 
against the eviction after the Attorney General gave him an affidavit 
stating that the King had decreed the evictions and that the High Court 
had no jurisdiction over the case (see Section 3). The case was 
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled on December 14 that the 
Chief Justice's original ruling was correct.
    Judicial powers are vested in a dual system, one independent and 
based on Western law, the other based on a system of national courts 
that follows unwritten traditional law and custom. In treason and 
sedition cases, the King can circumvent the regular judiciary by 
appointing a special tribunal, which may adopt rules and procedures 
different from those applied in the High Court; however, this power was 
used last in 1987.
    The Western judiciary consists of the Court of Appeals (composed 
entirely of expatriate, usually South African, judges), the High Court, 
and magistrate courts, all of which are independent of executive and 
military control and free from intimidation from outside forces. The 
expatriate judges, often distinguished members of their respective 
bars, serve on the basis of 2-year renewable contracts. Local judges 
serve indefinitely on good behavior. In magistrate courts, defendants 
are entitled to counsel at their own expense. Court-appointed counsel 
is provided in capital cases or when difficult points of law are at 
issue. There are well-defined appeal procedures up to the Court of 
Appeals, the highest judicial body. A lack of an independent court 
budget, lack of trained manpower, inadequate levels of salary 
remuneration, and managing case work remain problems for the judiciary.
    Most citizens who encounter the legal system do so through the 
traditional courts. The authorities may bring ethnic Swazis to these 
courts for minor offenses and violations of traditional law and custom. 
In traditional courts, defendants are not permitted formal legal 
counsel but may speak on their own behalf and be assisted by informal 
advisers. Sentences are subject to review by traditional authorities 
and can be appealed to the High Court and the Court of Appeals. The 
public prosecutor legally has the authority to determine which court 
should hear a case, but in practice the police usually make the 
determination. Accused persons have the right to transfer their cases 
from the traditional courts. Delays in trials are common.
    In November 1998, the King issued an administrative order that 
strengthened the judicial powers of traditional chiefs appointed by the 
King. The order provides for chiefs'' courts with limited civil and 
criminal jurisdiction and authorizes the imposition of fines up to 
approximately $50 (300 emalangeni), and prison sentences of up to 3 
months. Accused persons are required to appear in person without 
representation by a legal practitioner or advocate. However, chiefs'' 
courts only are empowered to administer customary law ``insofar as it 
is not repugnant to natural justice or morality,'' or inconsistent with 
the provisions of any law in force. The order provides that defendants 
may appeal decisions of the chief's court to regional appeal courts and 
to the higher courts of appeal. Appeals in criminal matters can be 
taken to the Judicial Commissioner as a last resort, and the High Court 
is the court of last resort for civil matters. Human rights 
organizations and the press expressed serious concern over issuance of 
the 1998 administrative order.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires a warrant from a magistrate before 
police may search homes or other premises, and police generally respect 
this requirement in practice; however, police officers with the rank of 
subinspector or higher have the right to conduct a search without a 
warrant if they believe that evidence might be lost through the delay 
in obtaining a warrant. Searches without warrants occur occasionally.
    There were occurrences of physical surveillance by the police on 
members of labor unions and banned political groups.
    On October 13, the Operation Support Service Unit (OSSU) of the 
Royal Swaziland Police (RSP) and the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force 
(USDF) evicted from their residences and relocated two Swazi chiefs, 
members of their families, and supporters who opposed the imposition of 
a prince in the chiefs'' positions. Reportedly 200 villagers who were 
supporters of the chiefs were scattered throughout the country; some 
were moved to an open field where they sought temporary shelter 
unsuccessfully. Some families were allowed to return to their 
residences after apologizing to Prince Maguga and recognizing him as 
their chief.
    There were reports that in September police entered a private home 
and arrested two SWAYOCO members (see Section 2.b.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government limits freedom of 
speech and of the press through a continuing formal ban on political 
parties and occasional harassment of journalists. The Government also 
has discouraged critical news coverage of the royal family, and 
journalists practice self-censorship in regard to the immediate royal 
family and national security policy.
    During the October 13 eviction of two Swazi chiefs from their 
residences by the Government, some journalists were harassed, and a 
Swazi television journalist was arrested and detained for 4 hours after 
the police confiscated his tape recording and accused him of operating 
as an informant for a foreign government (see Sections 1.f. and 3).
    In September 1999, an editor of an independent newspaper was 
arrested for criminal defamation after reporting that the King's latest 
fiancee, now one of his wives, was a high-school dropout. After being 
released on bail, the editor was fired from his job. In response to the 
scandal, the Ministry of Public Service drafted antidefamation 
statutes, which were pending approval by the Attorney General and 
Parliament in 1999; however, there was no further action on them during 
the year. In February the authorities closed the Government-owned 
newspaper, Swazi Observer, due to alleged financial problems; many 
observers considered this a final response to the negative press 
reports regarding the King's fiancee. Some observers also considered 
the newspaper closure to be a response to the refusal of the newspaper 
to reveal the sources of several stories, including a report on the 
police raid of a SWAYOCO meeting (see Section 2.b.).
    In general both government-owned and independent newspapers covered 
a wide variety of sensitive topics and criticized government 
corruption, inefficiency, and waste, frequently using harsh invectives. 
However, the Government uses the same media to rebut such allegations. 
With some exceptions, the Government continued to withhold its 
advertising from the country's only independently-owned daily 
newspaper. The Prime Minister's office distributes a free weekly 
circular reporting on government policy and activities.
    The Government has a monopoly over television and radio 
programming. There are two government-owned radio stations. There is 
one independent station, but it only broadcasts religious programs. The 
government-owned television and radio stations--the most influential 
media in reaching the public--generally followed official policy 
positions. Government broadcast facilities retransmit Voice of America 
and British Broadcasting Corporation news programs in their entirety.
    Private companies and church groups own several newsletters, 
magazines, and one radio station that broadcasts throughout the region, 
but these generally avoid political controversy. The Christian 
Broadcasting Company radio station is allowed to operate despite the 
fact that it is government policy not to permit private broadcasters to 
operate in the country.
    The practice of self-censorship and the prohibition of political 
gatherings limit academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
restricts freedom of assembly. King Sobhuza's 1973 decree prohibits 
meetings of a political nature, processions, or demonstrations in any 
public place without the consent of the Commissioner of Police. The 
authorities did not routinely grant permission to hold such meetings, 
and on at least one occasion in September, police disrupted meetings 
organized by pro-democracy activists under the authority of the 1973 
decree. There were also reports that police raided a gathering of 
SWAYOCO members and beat and arrested two SWAYOCO members in September 
(see Section 1.d.).
    Several traditional forums exist for the expression of opinion, 
including community meetings, national councils, and direct dialog with 
area chiefs. However, these local channels are not meant as a vehicle 
for political change; they often depend on the whims of leaders and are 
not consistently effective channels for expressing political dissent. 
In addition there was a report that a chief threatened to evict 
families from ancestral land if they included members of a banned 
political party.
    On October 23, members of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions 
(SFTU) and the Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT) 
marched to the Prime Minister's office to present a petition denouncing 
the eviction of two chiefs from their residences (see Sections 1.f. and 
3). On October 24, students from the University of Swaziland and 
William Pitcher Teachers'' College, along with opposition leaders, also 
marched to present a petition regarding the evictions but were denied 
entry by police in riot gear and blockades. After several hours, the 
police threatened forcible removal, and the protesters dispersed. It 
was reported that at least 18 students were injured (see Sections 1.c 
and 3).
    The Government restricts freedom of association. King Sobhuza's 
1973 decree prohibits political parties.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--There are no formal constitutional 
provisions for freedom of religion; however, the Government generally 
respects freedom of religion in practice. Followers of all religious 
faiths are generally free to worship without government interference or 
restriction; however, police cancelled two prayer meetings on August 26 
and September 3 on the grounds that they had political overtones. In 
addition, on September 9, police used force to disperse a community 
prayer service just as an opposition leader rose to address the 
meeting. Two individuals were wounded by rubber bullets and 60 persons 
were treated for minor injuries that occurred after police fired tear 
gas canisters into the crowd.
    New religious groups or churches are expected to register with the 
Government upon organizing in the country. Government permission is 
required for the construction of new religious buildings. Non-Christian 
groups sometimes experience minor delays in obtaining permits from the 
Government.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens may travel and work freely 
within the country; however, under traditional law, a married woman 
requires her husband's permission to apply for a passport, and an 
unmarried woman requires the permission of a close male relative. A 
citizenship law passed in 1992 removed several ambiguities relating to 
citizenship and nominally enabled nonethnic Swazis to obtain passports 
and citizenship documents. However, individuals seeking these documents 
sometimes experienced lengthy processing delays, in part due to 
occasional prejudice that mixed-race and white Swazis are not real 
Swazis. Political dissenters often have their citizenship questioned 
and can experience difficulty in obtaining travel documents.
    The Government treats several thousand ethnic Swazis living across 
the border with South Africa as virtually indistinguishable from local 
Swazis and routinely grants them travel and citizenship documents.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates 
fully with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as 
the various nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) involved in the care 
of refugees. According to the UNHCR, there are an estimated 1,000 
refugees in the country, the majority coming from the Great Lakes 
region and Angola. The issue of provision of first asylum has not 
arisen in recent years.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens are not able to exercise this right. The King retains 
ultimate executive and legislative authority, and political parties are 
prohibited. Passage of legislation by Parliament requires the King's 
assent to become law, which he is not obliged to give. When Parliament 
is not in session, the King may legislate by decree under his residual 
emergency powers. The King chooses the Prime Minister and, in 
consultation with the Prime Minister, also chooses the Cabinet, many 
senior civil servants, and the heads of government offices.
    Citizens elect most members of the lower house of parliament. 
Parliamentary elections were held by secret ballot in October 1998 for 
53 of the 55 elected seats in the 65-seat lower house (the King 
appoints the remaining 10 members), and a by-election was held in 
December 1998 for 1 of the 2 remaining constituencies. The final 
remaining constituency held its by-election in October 1999. The 
continuing ban on political parties and restrictions on political 
activity prompted some political groupings and trade unions to call for 
a boycott of the 1998 elections by their members. Members of the 
Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) who participated in the 
electoral process were threatened with disciplinary measures by the 
labor federation. Election officials reported that approximately 
200,000 of the 400,000 eligible citizens registered for the 
parliamentary elections, and that approximately 120,000 citizens voted, 
although critics questioned that figure.
    There was no formal international observer presence during the 1998 
elections, but there was intensive coverage by local and foreign media, 
and resident diplomats were granted accreditation to observe the 
proceedings freely. Candidates or their representatives also were 
allowed to monitor the elections. Election procedures generally were 
carried out in an orderly fashion. However, the decision to open 
polling stations for further voting a week after the election because 
of torrential rains led to irregularities, including persons being 
found with multiple copies of registration certificates. Alleged 
irregularities led to legal challenges in four constituencies, and the 
High Court overturned the result in one constituency as a result. 
Opposition political groupings remained highly critical of the entire 
electoral process, due to the continuing formal ban on organized 
political party activity.
    In the days leading up to the 1998 elections, the police searched 
dozens of homes, including those of trade union leaders and opposition 
political figures ostensibly in response to some of the bombing 
incidents that occurred between August and November 1998 (see Section 
1.a.). No one was arrested or detained.
    As provided under law, the House of Assembly nominated 10 members 
from the public at large to serve in the upper house or Senate. The 
King appointed the additional 20 Senate members. The Cabinet of 
Ministers, sworn in on November 20, 1998, included only three elected 
Members of Parliament, with the balance drawn from appointed members of 
the House and Senate.
    Elections were held by secret ballot without major difficulties in 
August 1998 to select new municipal councils in 11 cities and towns 
across the country. Approximately 70 percent of all eligible voters 
registered to vote, but only 22 percent of registered voters actually 
cast ballots. Citizens voted largely without interference or 
intimidation, except for scattered incidents in Mbabane where 
representatives of PUDEMO opposed to participation in the election 
attempted to deter voting activities.
    Pressure has been building for several years to modernize the 
political system, and both the King and the Government recognize that 
there is a need for political reform, including the drafting of a new 
constitution and, specifically, a bill of rights. In 1996 the King 
appointed a 30-member Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), with the 
stated purpose of examining the suspended 1968 Constitution, carrying 
out civic education, determining citizens'' wishes regarding a future 
system of government, and making appropriate recommendations on a new 
constitution. The CRC compiled a constitutional framework, including 
portions of the 1968 Constitution still in force, the 1973 decree as 
currently amended, and the 1992 Establishment of Parliament Order. The 
CRC distributed this framework nationwide as a starting point for 
discussion. However, the CRC made very limited progress due to members 
resigning to protest the Commission's terms of reference, and multiple 
internal disputes. At year's end, the CRC had 22 members after four 
members resigned and four died during the year. Observers criticized 
the independence of the CRC because the majority of its members are 
traditionalists. In addition the Government prohibited media coverage 
and group submissions. In October, after several extensions of its 
deadline, the CRC submitted a draft report to the King; however, the 
report was not released to the public by year's end, and it is not 
scheduled for release until 2001.
    On at least one occasion in September police disrupted meetings 
held by pro-democracy activists, and in February police raided a 
SWAYOCO meeting (see Section 2.b.).
    On October 13, the Operation Support Service Unit (OSSU) of the 
Royal Swaziland Police (RSP) and the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force 
(USDF) evicted from their residences and relocated two Swazi chiefs, 
members of their families and supporters. Although the Chief Justice 
issued a ruling against the eviction order on September 5, the Chief 
Justice subsequently rescinded it after the Attorney General presented 
an affidavit stating that the King had decreed the evictions (see 
Sections 1.e., 1.f., 2.a., and 2.b). The case was appealed to the Court 
of Appeals, which ruled on December 14 that the Chief Justice's 
original ruling was correct. The two chiefs and some of their 
supporters sought asylum in a neighboring country. The 1998 
Administrative Order was cited by the Minister of Home Affairs as a 
justification for ousting the two chieftains and imposing upon the 
communities Prince Maguga Dlamini of the royal family as the new chief 
despite the fact that custom implies that chieftancy is hereditary. 
Several communities organized prayer meetings where they questioned the 
validity of the order.
    Human rights organizations, church groups, labor unions, and other 
NGO's conducted their own active programs of constitutional and human 
rights civic education. In May the National Democratic Institute, in 
conjunction with the country's Council of Churches, organized a 3-day 
constitutional conference that was well-supported and well-received by 
these groups as well as the Government.
    Women generally have full legal rights to participate in the 
political process; however, women are underrepresented in the 
Government and politics. There are 4 women in the 65-member House of 
Assembly formed after the October 1998 elections, 4 women in the 30-
seat Senate, and 2 women among the 16 ministers in the Cabinet. A woman 
serves as Secretary to the Cabinet and the head of the civil service. 
Three women serve as principal secretaries, the most senior civil 
service rank in the ministries. There are 3 women on the 30-person 
Constitutional Review Commission. However, in accordance with societal 
practice, widows in mourning (for periods that can vary from 6 months 
to 3 years) are prevented from appearing in certain public places and 
from being near the King and, as a result, can be excluded from voting 
or running for office.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government permits domestic human rights groups to operate. 
Human rights groups often have spoken out on a number of occasions, 
criticizing the lack of accountability and transparency in government 
circles. There were no visits by international human rights 
organizations, although foreign diplomats and local representatives of 
international agencies were invited to tour correctional facilities 
(see Section 1.c.). The Government solicited and obtained expert 
assistance from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1997 to 
form a tripartite committee charged with redrafting national industrial 
relations legislation, and in October requested the assistance of the 
ILO to bring the 2000 IRA into conformity with international labor 
standards (see Section 6). In November an ILO team traveled to the 
country to provide technical assistance in drafting a final, amended 
version of the 2000 IRA.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1980 Employment Act forbids employers to discriminate on the 
basis of race, religion, sex, or political affiliation. Under the act, 
employees may bring suit against employers for discrimination, and 
there also are provisions for criminal prosecutions; however, there is 
no record of any suits or prosecutions. The act reportedly has been 
used on occasion to bring moral suasion to bear against employers. 
Legal and cultural discrimination against women remains a problem. 
Mixed race citizens sometimes experience societal discrimination.
    Women.--Violence against women, particularly wife beating, is 
frequent, despite traditional strictures against this practice. Women 
have the right to charge their husbands with assault under both the 
Western and the traditional legal systems, and urban women frequently 
do so, usually in extreme cases when intervention by extended family 
members fails to end such violence. Rural women often have no 
alternative but to suffer in silence if family intervention does not 
succeed, because the traditional courts can be unsympathetic to 
``unruly'' or ``disobedient'' women and are less likely than the modern 
courts to convict men for wife beating. Rape is also common and is 
regarded by many men as a minor offense, while women are inhibited from 
reporting such crimes by a sense of shame and helplessness, especially 
when incest is involved. Even in the modern courts, sentences 
frequently amount to no more than several months in jail, a fine, or 
both. The Legal Code provides some legal protection from sexual 
harassment, but its provisions are vague and largely ineffective. 
Several NGO's provide support for victims of abuse or discrimination.
    Women occupy a subordinate role in society. In both civil and 
traditional marriages, wives are treated as minors legally, although 
those who marry under civil law may be accorded the legal status of 
adults, if stipulated in a signed prenuptial agreement. A woman 
generally requires her husband's permission to borrow money, open a 
bank account, obtain a passport, leave the country, gain access to 
land, and, in some cases, take a job. An unmarried woman requires a 
close male relative's permission to obtain a passport (see Section 
2.d). Despite the 1980 Employment Act that required equal pay for equal 
work, men's average wage rates by skill category usually exceed those 
of women.
    The dualistic nature of the legal system complicates the issue of 
women's rights. Since traditional marriage is governed by uncodified 
law and custom, women's rights often are unclear and change according 
to where and by whom they are interpreted. Couples often marry in both 
civil and traditional ceremonies, creating problems in determining 
which set of rules applies to the marriage and to subsequent questions 
of child custody and inheritance in the event of divorce or death. In 
traditional marriages, a man may take more than one wife. A man who 
marries a woman under civil law legally may not have more than one 
wife, although in practice this restriction sometimes is ignored. 
Traditional marriages consider children to belong to the father and to 
his family if the couple divorces. Children born out of wedlock are 
viewed as belonging to the mother. Under the 1992 Citizenship Act, a 
woman does not pass citizenship automatically to her children. 
Inheritances are passed through male children only.
    Changing socioeconomic conditions, urbanization, and the increasing 
prominence of female leaders in government and civic organizations are 
breaking down barriers to equality. Women routinely execute contracts 
and enter into a variety of transactions in their own names. The 
Government has committed itself to various women's initiatives, and the 
Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates women's issues. For example, the 
Government established a task force to address domestic gender issues 
and has held workshops for journalists in 1998 on gender sensitivity, 
while the Ministry of Education has launched an initiative to promote 
gender sensitization of school curriculums.
    Children.--The Government is concerned with the rights and welfare 
of children, and a number of laws directly address children's issues. 
The Government does not provide free, compulsory education for 
children. The Government pays teachers' salaries while student fees pay 
for books and the buildings' fund. Supplemental money sometimes must be 
raised for building upkeep, including teachers' housing. However, the 
country has a 99 percent primary school enrollment rate. A government 
task force educates the public on children's issues.
    Child abuse is a problem. Children convicted of crimes sometimes 
are caned as punishment. There is a growing number of street children 
in Mbabane and Manzini. The law provides protection to children under 
16 years from sexual exploitation and sets the age of sexual consent at 
16 years (see Section 6.d.); however, female children sometimes suffer 
sexual abuse, including by family members.
    People with Disabilities.--The Ministry of Home Affairs has called 
for equal treatment of the disabled; however, there are no laws that 
protect the rights of the disabled or that mandate accessibility for 
the disabled to buildings, transportation, or government services. A 
government task force was established in 1997 to address issues 
affecting persons with disabilities, and in December 1998 the Minister 
of Health and Social Welfare announced that a bill giving preferential 
treatment to disabled persons for building access and other needs was 
in the final stages of preparation for submission to the Parliament. 
The bill has yet to be introduced in Parliament; however, all new 
government buildings under construction include improvements for the 
disabled, including accessibility ramps.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1996 IRA permitted workers in all 
elements of the economy, including the public sector, to join unions 
and allowed unions to associate freely in the context of traditional 
trade union concerns; however, it imposed criminal penalties for union 
activity outside core union concerns, specifically on social or 
political issues, and provided that the Government could suspend or 
close down unions that focused too much on such noncore labor matters. 
It prohibited trade union federations (but not individual unions) or 
their officers from engaging in any act that ``causes or incites'' the 
slowdown or cessation of work or economic activity, or from acting in 
any way that might be construed as a ``restraint of trade,'' with 5 
years' imprisonment the maximum penalty for such violations. Employers 
faced equivalent penalties for unauthorized lockouts. The 1996 IRA 
confined unions and employer organizations to single industries, and 
did not permit organization across economic and industrial sectors, 
contrary to ILO Convention 87. On August 25, the Industrial Relations 
Act, signed into law in June by King Mswati III, came into effect and 
replaced the 1996 Industrial Relations Act. It was expected that the 
new act would improve many of the past inequities in the 1996 labor law 
and bring the country into full conformity with international labor 
conventions. The act had been endorsed by employees and employers, and 
passed both houses of Parliament; however, the Swaziland National 
Council (SNC), an appointed body of traditional advisors to the King, 
made several amendments to the legislation which Parliament then 
approved, before the King signed the act that inhibit the right of 
association. However, the Government, with technical assistance from 
the ILO, revised the controversial amendments in the act, and the 
amended act was passed by Parliament and signed by the King in 
November. The final, amended 2000 IRA remedies many of the inequities 
of the 1996 IRA and provides that an employee who is not engaged in an 
essential service has the right to participate in a peaceful protest 
action to promote socio-economic interests.
    The main trade union federation is the Swaziland Federation of 
Trade Unions (SFTU). A second trade union federation is the Swaziland 
Federation of Labor, which broke away from the SFTU in 1993 and gained 
formal recognition from the Government in 1994.
    Unions are free to draw up their own constitutions within the 
framework of the 2000 IRA, as under the 1996 IRA. The 2000 act 
specifies a number of provisions that must be addressed in a 
constitution, including the election of officers by secret ballot. The 
Labor Commissioner must approve the union constitution, and can strike 
out or amend provisions that violate the law. The Government may 
suspend unions that fail to maintain proper registration with the Labor 
Commissioner without recourse to judicial review (under the 1996 act it 
could dissolve such unions). There is no collusion between the 
Government and business in relation to worker rights. The Labor 
Commissioner may reinstate unions quickly, once they have met all the 
legal requirements of the 2000 act.
    The 2000 IRA, like the 1996 IRA, details the steps to be followed 
when disputes arise, including the definition of a legal or illegal 
strike. The final, amended 2000 IRA shortened the notice that an 
organization or federation is required to give before it commences a 
protest action from 3 weeks to 2 weeks. The act empowers the Government 
to mediate employment disputes and grievances through the Labor 
Advisory Board. When disputes arise, the Government often intervenes to 
try to reduce the chances of a strike, which may not be called legally 
until all avenues of negotiation have been exhausted, and a secret 
ballot of union members has been conducted. The 2000 law prohibits 
strikes in ``essential'' services, which include police and security 
forces, correctional services, fire fighting, health, and many civil 
service positions. The 1996 law had included other occupations such as 
electricity, water, sanitation, telephone, telegraph, and broadcasting 
under the ``essential services'' category.
    In recent years, there have been a number of strikes, usually over 
wages and benefits, or the dismissal of fellow workers. Approximately 
32 state television employees were dismissed in November 1999 after 
striking for higher wages and better working conditions. On September 
14, the Minister of Public Service and Information ordered the 
reinstatement of the employees; however, on September 20 he withdrew 
the order, citing lack of jurisdiction over the matter. On September 28 
and 29, the SFTU and Swaziland Federation of Labor (SFL) called a 
nationwide strike to protest the controversial clauses in the 2000 IRA; 
however, a last minute court order declared the strike illegal and 
discouraged many workers from participating. There were reports that 
riot police and soldiers were dispatched to the potential strike site 
and set up road blocks between the town of Manzini and the capital. 
Unionists alleged that police shot at a group of workers in Manzini, 
but there were no reports of arrests or injuries.
    Although the Government maintained that all outstanding issues 
already had been addressed, the SFTU continued to press for action on 
the 27 demands it presented in 1994, including calls for fundamental 
political change. These demands addressed a wide range of issues, 
including recognition of affirmative action, a national uniform minimum 
wage, an end to discrimination against women, the provision of better 
housing for workers, inclusion of worker representatives in 
constitutional discussions, and the lifting of the 1973 Decree that 
suspended the Constitution and outlawed political parties.
    The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) had noted discrepancies between 
the 1996 IRA and ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and ILO 
Convention 98 on the right to organize and bargain collectively. The 
COE concerns included the powers accorded government officials to 
control union activity and the strictures on the ability of workers to 
form unions and associate with other unions at home and abroad. 
Although the COE was expected to highlight any discrepancies between 
the 2000 IRA and the ILO conventions at its November-December meeting, 
the Government's revisions of the act in November, with ILO assistance, 
precluded that review.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 2000 IRA, 
like the 1996 IRA, provides for the right to organize and bargain 
collectively and outlaws antiunion discrimination. Collective 
bargaining is widespread; approximately 80 percent of the formal 
private sector is unionized. The law obliges employers to recognize a 
union when it achieves over 50 percent membership among employees. 
Employers must allow representatives of legally recognized unions to 
conduct union activities on company time. The Industrial Court may 
refuse to register collective bargaining agreements in the event of 
nonobservance of any requirement of the 2000 IRA. The 1996 IRA 
prohibited trade union federations or their officers, but not 
individual unions, from inciting any slowdown of work or economic 
activity or acting in any way that might be construed as a restraint of 
trade. It provided equivalent penalties to employers in the case of 
unauthorized lockouts. The 2000 IRA entitles works councils, which are 
to be established in factories with 25 or more employees in the absence 
of a trade union, to negotiate terms and conditions of work, wages, and 
welfare.
    Disputes were referred to the Labor Commissioner and the Industrial 
Court, if necessary. Although many employers resisted recognition and 
forced the issue to the Industrial Court, the Court generally ruled in 
favor of the unions in these cases. In the case of unfair dismissal, 
the court could order reinstatement and compensation for the employee, 
as well as fine the employer. Union leaders made credible charges that 
management in various industries dismissed workers for union activity. 
The Government sometimes instigated such dismissals. The 2000 act 
provides for disputes to be referred to the Conciliation, Mediation, 
and Arbitration Committee (CMAC). The Deputy Labor Commissioner chairs 
the CMAC.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced labor, including by children, and the Government generally 
enforces this prohibition effectively; however, the SFTU cited the 1998 
Administrative Order as a form of forced labor, because it reinforces 
the tradition of residents doing traditional tasks for chiefs and 
allows the chiefs to fine their subjects for failing to carry out the 
manual labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1980 Employment Act prohibits the hiring of a child 
below the age of 15 in an industrial undertaking, except in cases where 
only family members are employed in the firm, or in technical schools 
where children are working under the supervision of a teacher or other 
authorized person. Legislation limits the number of night hours that 
can be worked on schooldays, and limits children's work-hours overall 
to 6 per day or 33 per week. Employment of children in the formal 
sector is not customary; however, children below the minimum age 
frequently are employed in the agricultural sector, particularly in the 
eastern cotton-growing region. Children also are employed as domestic 
workers, and as herd boys in rural areas. The Ministry of Labor is 
responsible for enforcement, but its effectiveness is limited by 
personnel shortages. The law prohibits prostitution and child 
pornography. The age of protection against sexual exploitation and the 
age of sexual consent is 16 years; however, there were reports that 
Mozambican girls worked as prostitutes in the country.
    The law prohibits forced labor, including by children, and the 
Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legally mandated 
sliding scale of minimum wages depending on the type of work performed. 
These minimum wages generally provide a worker and family with a decent 
standard of living. The minimum monthly wage for a domestic worker is 
approximately $30 (180 emalangeni), for an unskilled worker $47 (280 
emalangeni), and for a skilled worker $75 (450 emalangeni).
    Labor, management, and government representatives have negotiated a 
maximum 48-hour workweek in the industrial sector, except for security 
guards who work up to six 12-hour shifts per week. The Employment Act 
and the Wages Act entitle all workers to 1 day of rest per week. Most 
workers receive a minimum of 12 days annual leave. The Labor 
Commissioner enforces standards in the formal sector. There are 
extensive provisions allowing workers to seek redress for alleged 
wrongful dismissal; these provisions frequently are brought into play. 
There also are penalties for employers who conduct unauthorized 
lockouts.
    Extensive legislation protects worker health and safety. The 
Government sets safety standards for industrial operations, and it 
encourages private companies to develop accident prevention programs. 
Recent growth in industrial production has necessitated more government 
action on safety issues. However, the Labor Commissioner's office has 
conducted few safety inspections in recent years because of staffing 
deficiencies. Workers have no formal statutory rights to remove 
themselves from dangerous work places without jeopardizing their jobs; 
nor do any collective bargaining agreements address the matter.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, although there are laws prohibiting procurement, including 
by coercion and within and across borders, for the purposes of 
prostitution, and, unlike in the previous year, there were no reports 
that women and children were trafficked for sexual exploitation during 
the year.
                               __________

                                TANZANIA

    The United Republic of Tanzania amended its Constitution in 1992 to 
become a multiparty state. On October 29, the country conducted its 
second multiparty national elections for president and parliament. On 
the mainland, international observers concluded that the elections were 
free and fair and conducted peacefully. The incumbent President of the 
mainland, Benjamin Mkapa, was reelected with 71 percent of the vote, 
and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party made significant gains 
in its majority in Parliament, winning 167 out of 181 seats. In the 
October elections, opposition candidates gained 11 seats in 6 of the 19 
mainland regions, giving them a total of 14 seats in Parliament in 8 
out of 20 regions. In the 5 administrative regions of Zanzibar, the 
opposition Civic United Front (CUF) won 16 seats. The islands of 
Zanzibar are integrated into the United Republic's governmental and 
party structure; however, the Zanzibar Government, which has its own 
president and parliament, exercises considerable autonomy. In October 
presidential and parliamentary elections took place in Zanzibar; 
however, the vote was marred by irregularities, voter intimidation, and 
politically-motivated violence. Votes were cancelled in 16 
constituencies, and new votes were held on November 5. The CUF 
boycotted the revotes in protest. The ruling CCM party won a majority 
of 34 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 seats in the 
National Assembly. The national judiciary is formally independent but 
suffers from corruption, inefficiency, and executive interference.
    The police have primary responsibility for maintaining law and 
order. They formerly were supported by citizens'' anticrime groups and 
patrols known as ``Sungusungu.'' The Sungusungu remain active in rural 
areas, but have virtually disappeared from urban areas. There are also 
Sungusungu groups composed of refugees in most refugee camps that act 
as quasi-official security forces. The military is composed of the 
Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF). The People's Militia Field 
Force (FFU) is a division of the national police force. Security forces 
regularly committed human rights abuses.
    Agriculture provides 85 percent of employment. Cotton, coffee, 
cashews, sisal, tea, and gemstones account for most export earnings. 
The industrial sector is small. Economic reforms undertaken since 1986, 
including liberalization of agricultural policy, the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, the rescheduling of foreign debt payments, and 
the freeing of the currency exchange rate, helped to stimulate economic 
growth, as has the decline in the rate of inflation. In 1999 the gross 
domestic product (GDP) was $8,019 million. The GDP growth rate was 4 
percent and per capita GDP equaled $252 for the first quarter of the 
year. While the Government has attempted to improve its fiscal 
management, pervasive corruption constrains economic progress.
    The Government's human rights record was poor; while there were 
improvements in a few areas, there continued to be serious problems. 
Citizens' right to change their government in Zanzibar continued to be 
circumscribed severely by abuses of and limitations on civil liberties. 
Police continued to harass and intimidate members and supporters of the 
political opposition before and after the October elections. Security 
forces committed extrajudicial killings and beat and otherwise 
mistreated suspects. The police in Zanzibar attacked and beat 
civilians, and there were reports that police in Zanzibar used torture, 
including floggings. Police also beat demonstrators. Prison conditions 
remained harsh and life threatening. Arbitrary arrest and detention and 
prolonged detention remained problems. The inefficient and corrupt 
judicial system often did not provide expeditious and fair trials. 
Pervasive corruption, which was documented in the Warioba Commission's 
1997 report, continued to have a broad impact on human rights. The 
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and limited freedom of 
speech and of the press, and freedom of assembly and association. 
Significant resentment and hostility led to attacks on some refugees. 
The Government obstructed the formation of domestic human rights 
groups. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious 
problems. Abuse of children, female genital mutilation (FGM), and child 
prostitution were problems. The Government continued to infringe on 
workers' rights and child labor persisted. There were some instances of 
forced labor. Mob justice remained severe and widespread.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, the authorities were 
responsible for a number of extrajudicial killings. Security forces 
used excessive force while dispersing demonstrations and political 
meetings on the mainland, which resulted in some deaths (see Section 
2.b.). In May FFU officers in Iringa were accused of beating a man to 
death for not paying a ``development levy;'' no further information was 
available on the case at year's end. In July police killed a prisoner 
while he was in remand. No further information was available on the 
case at year's end.
    In February 1999, two police and two FFU officers were accused of 
beating to death a prisoner in detention. No further action was taken 
against those responsible by year's end.
    In October 1999, in retaliation for a theft, TPDF soldiers in 
Dodoma attacked a village, killing one civilian. No further action was 
taken against those responsible by year's end.
    In February 1999, members of the quasi-official citizens'' 
anticrime group known as Sungusungu killed five persons accused of 
murdering witches in Shinyanga. The case still was under investigation 
by local authorities, and no further action was taken by year's end.
    Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening. A prisoner in 
Moshi Prison died in July. Although the police denied responsibility, 
the autopsy showed the body was beaten badly and possibly strangled. 
The Government had not undertaken an investigation into the incident by 
year's end (see Section 1.c.).
    In 1998 police opened fire on protestors who rioted in Mwembechai 
when police attempted to disperse a crowd of Muslims protesting the 
arrest of a popular Muslim leader, killing three persons and wounding 
several others. Subsequently, 23 Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) 
demanded parliamentary discussion of police brutality in connection 
with the incident, but the National Assembly Speaker denied the 
request, saying that it was an internal police matter. No further 
action was taken in connection with the matter during the year.
    There were no developments in the 1993 police killing of a member 
of the opposition party Civic United Front (CUF) on the island of 
Pemba. After a lengthy investigation, the authorities charged the 
policeman who fired the shots with involuntary manslaughter; the 
officer remains free on bail. Nearly 8 years after the event, the case 
still has not gone to trial. Observers believe that the case will never 
be tried.
    Instances of mob justice against suspected criminals continued to 
claim dozens of lives. Throughout the year, the media reported numerous 
incidents in which mobs killed suspected thieves, who were stoned, 
lynched, beaten to death, or doused with gasoline and set on fire. Such 
events are so common that they often are grouped together in newspapers 
with reporting on car accidents and other mishaps. Many instances never 
are reported. The widespread belief in witchcraft has led, in some 
instances, to the killing of alleged witches by their ``victims,'' 
aggrieved relatives, or mobs. The Government estimated in 1998 that in 
the Mwanza region alone at least 50 persons are killed every year by 
those who believe them to be witches. Government officials criticized 
these practices and some arrests were made; however, most perpetrators 
of witch killing or mob justice elude arrest, and the Government did 
not take preventive measures during the year.
    On October 6, 21 persons were beaten to death and 50 injured in a 
clash over a theft between ethnic Sonje and Maasai groups (see Section 
5).
    There was continuing concern over violence allegedly perpetrated by 
some Burundian and Rwandan refugees, although such violence has 
diminished since 1999 (see Section 1.c.). Local officials complained 
that refugees committed killings and robberies. In a well-publicized 
case, Burundian refugees were accused of killing a local schoolteacher 
in May 1999, and in a reprisal attack, a group of men raped 
approximately 50 refugee women (see Section 1.c.).
    On August 7, 1998, terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassy in Dar Es 
Salaam, killing 11 persons and injuring more than 85 others. The 
Government cooperated with international efforts to apprehend the 
suspects; one suspect was arrested in 1999, and the trial was scheduled 
for early 2001.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment; however, the police regularly threaten, 
mistreat, or occasionally beat suspected criminals during and after 
their apprehension and interrogation. Police also use the same means to 
obtain information about suspects from family members not in custody 
(see Section 1.f.). There were reports that police in Zanzibar use 
torture. Police and security forces used beatings and other forms of 
physical abuse regularly by police and security forces to disperse 
large gatherings and as a form of public punishment. Although 
government officials usually criticize these practices, the Government 
seldom prosecutes police for such abuses.
    Incidents of police brutality occurred during the year. Repeated 
reports indicate that the police used torture, including beatings and 
floggings, in Zanzibar, notably on the island of Pemba. Both the 
Zanzibar and Union Governments have denied these charges, and no action 
was taken against those responsible for abuses. There were numerous 
reports that police randomly beat pedestrians, bicyclists, and 
automobile drivers that they had stopped at intersections. For example, 
in April CUF supporters severely beat and injured two police officers 
who sought to break up an indoor opposition meeting (see Sections 1.d. 
and 2.b.). In response, the police in the following 2 weeks randomly 
attacked and beat pedestrians and passers-by on the streets of Stone 
Town. In April the Union Inspector General Omari Mahita, said publicly 
that the show of force was needed to restore respect for the police 
force in Zanzibar. Beginning on April 6 and continuing throughout the 
month, there were credible reports of police brutality in Zanzibar. On 
April 12, there were reports that police officers marched through Stone 
Town and indiscriminately beat passers-by, including children, with 
batons and rifle butts. Several persons received injuries that required 
medical treatment, including a 13-year-old girl with a fractured elbow.
    Credible evidence indicates that police seriously injured children 
as young as 7 years of age and elderly residents, in some cases 
inflicting limb fractures and facial scars. There also was credible 
evidence that during this period, police officers shot and injured a 
bicyclist and threw him into a ditch. Several diplomatic missions 
formally criticized the Government for these abuses. The Government had 
not investigated the incident nor punished the responsible officers by 
year's end.
    On January 19, police used tear gas to disperse riots that began 
when hundreds of CUF supporters were not allowed to observe the trial 
of 18 CUF supporters accused of treason (see Section 1.d.). The 
incident lasted for 4 hours, and approximately 70 persons were injured, 
including some police officers (see Sections 1.e. and 3). Several 
persons were arrested and detained during the incident.
    In early October, eight members of the FFU reportedly beat a man 
after they took him into custody (see Section 1.d.).
    On October 11, police shot and injured six CUF supporters at a 
CUFsponsored election rally at a party office in Zanzibar (see Sections 
2.b. and 3). Members of the TPDF who arrived after the shootings 
criticized the FFU for not following correct procedures; however, the 
police had not investigated the incident nor punished the responsible 
officers by year's end.
    On October 28, police beat a man during a CUF meeting after he 
reportedly did not move his food stand quickly enough for the police 
(see Section 2.b.).
    On October 29, Fortunatus Masha, an opposition candidate who was 
vice-chairman of his party was beaten and injured by police in Mwanza 
district during an altercation at a ballot counting center over 
possible ballot rigging in favor of the CCM party.
    On October 30, police used excessive force and beat both 
demonstrators and bystanders during rallies and demonstrations in the 
Darajani district of Stone Town in Zanzibar (see Sections 2.b. and 3). 
FFU officers beat and shot demonstrators, who were chanting 
antigovernment slogans, resulting in a number of injuries and arrests. 
On October 30, police also used tear gas, rubber bullets, and live 
ammunition against CUF opposition activists in Zanzibar, injuring six 
persons. There also were reports that police beat with truncheons and 
rifle butts at least 15 persons whom they had forcibly removed from 
shops.
    On October 29, police injured several persons whom they arrested at 
a CUF office in Pemba (see Section 1.d.).
    After the elections, police reportedly beat persons for violating a 
7 p.m. curfew imposed in Wete, Pemba (see Section 1.f.).
    On November 1, a group of CCM members reportedly beat several CUF 
officials in Stone Town in Zanzibar as police watched without 
intervening.
    In November police reportedly broke the jaw of a detainee (see 
Section 1.d.).
    There were reports of beatings and assault by police officers and 
army units in areas around roadblocks in Pemba. Police reportedly 
targeted elderly, infirm, and mentally ill persons (see Section 2.d.).
    During the repeat elections on November 5, police beat and 
reportedly tortured opposition officials in Zanzibar (see Section 3). 
There were reports that police beat and tortured opposition officials 
who they had taken at gunpoint to a beach. There were reports that 
police beat and whipped two CUF supporters, and forced them to lie in 
the street in urine.
    Pervasive corruption is a serious problem in the police force (see 
Section 1.d.). The Government took some steps during the year to 
discourage and punish such abuses. In July the police force began an 
internal investigation of a police officer in Dar Es Salaam accused of 
harassing and attempting to bribe a local businessman. The spokesperson 
for the police force stated that if the police officer was found 
guilty, the police force would take ``exemplary'' measures; however, no 
action was taken on this case by year's end.
    The People's Militia Laws, as amended by Parliament in 1989, bestow 
quasilegal status on the traditional Sungusungu neighborhood and 
village anticrime groups. Participation in these groups was compulsory 
prior to the 1995 election. In the past, these groups were criticized 
for using excessive force against criminal suspects. While largely 
moribund since 1995, the Sungusungu still exist, particularly in rural 
areas such as the Tabora, Shinyanga, and Mwanza regions. As a result of 
the President's 1997 initiative to have government law enforcement 
officials work cooperatively with Sungusungu, members of Sungusungu 
were given additional benefits on a par with those given to members of 
the police officials, including the right to arrest persons. In return 
members of Sungusungu were to be held accountable for any abuses; 
during the year, one member was prosecuted for abuses, and three others 
reportedly were sentenced to 30 years in prison for killing civilians 
in Tabora.
    On November 6, a bomb exploded at a school in Stone Town in 
Zanzibar that was being used as a polling office for the November 5 re-
run elections (see Section 3). No group had claimed responsibility by 
year's end.
    On October 6, 21 persons were beaten to death and 50 injured in a 
clash over a theft between ethnic Sonje and Maasai groups (see Section 
5).
    As a result of increased criminal activity allegedly perpetrated by 
some Burundian refugees, there is significant hostility and resentment 
against Burundian refugees. In May 1999, in Kasulu, approximately 50 
Burundian refugee women collecting firewood allegedly were attacked and 
raped by villagers in reprisal for the killing of a local teacher (see 
Sections 1.a. and 2.d.). Eleven men were arrested for the rape in 1999. 
On December 17, the case was dismissed on a technicality. The police 
appealed the magistrate's decision to the High Court in Tabora, which 
overturned the dismissal and remanded the case to the lower court for 
retrial. The retrial was pending in Kigoma at year's end.
    There was continuing concern over violence allegedly perpetrated by 
some armed Burundian and Rwandan refugees, although such violence has 
diminished since 1999. Local officials reported incidents of banditry, 
armed robbery, and violent crime, perpetrated by refugees in the areas 
surrounding refugee camps (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Women and girls in 
refugee camps suffered a high level of rape and gender abuse 
perpetrated by other refugees (see Section 5). There were also credible 
reports that some refugees engage in vigilante justice within camps, 
occasionally beating other refugees (see Section 2.d.).
    Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Government 
officials acknowledged that prisons are overcrowded, and living 
conditions are poor. The prisons were designed to hold 21,000 persons, 
but the actual prison population is estimated at 43,000 persons; an 
estimated 40 percent of this number are remandees. The Government is 
expanding prisons, but its efforts have not kept pace with the growing 
number of prisoners. Some prisoners are paroled or receive suspended 
sentences as a means of relieving overcrowding problem. The Government 
did not release statistics on the prison expansion program or on the 
exact extent of the overcrowding during the year. The daily amount of 
food allotted to prisoners is insufficient to meet their nutritional 
needs, and even this amount is not provided regularly. Convicted 
prisoners are not allowed to receive food from outside sources and 
often are moved to different prisons without notification to their 
families. In April a prisoner on remand alleged that he was held for 4 
days without being given food (see Section 1.d.).
    In 1998 the Commissioner of Prisons stated that his department 
received inadequate funds for medicine and medical supplies. Prison 
dispensaries only offer limited treatment, and friends and family 
members of prisoners generally must provide medication or the funds 
with which to purchase it. Serious diseases, such as dysentery, 
malaria, and cholera, are common and result in numerous deaths. Amnesty 
International visited the prison and reported that 18 CUF prisoners who 
were in prison on treason charges were denied adequate medical 
treatment while in the Zanzibar Central Prison (see Section 1.d.). 
However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited 
the 18 CUF prisoners and reported that they consistently were given 
better food, space, and medical treatment than other prisoners held in 
the same location. A prisoner in Moshi Prison died in July (see Section 
1.a.). Prison officials claim the death was a result of tuberculosis 
and AIDS, but the autopsy that showed the body was badly beaten. There 
are credible reports that guards beat and abuse prisoners. There were 
reports that prisoners were strip-searched in front of other prisoners. 
The Warioba Commission released in 1997 reported that wardens give 
favorable treatment to certain prisoners at the expense of others. 
Pretrial detainees are held together with those serving sentences but 
are allowed to receive food from the outside.
    The Prisons Act requires that prisoners be separated based on age 
and gender, and female prisoners are held separately from male 
prisoners in practice. Women sent to remand prison report being forced 
to sleep naked and being subjected to sexual abuse by wardens. 
Juveniles are protected under both the Prisons Act and the Young 
Persons Ordinance Act, which also requires separation according to age. 
However, there are limited resources to provide for juveniles and only 
two juvenile detention facilities in the country, and as a result 
juveniles are not always separated from adults in practice.
    Local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are permitted to 
monitor prison conditions; however, the Government has not granted 
permission to international NGO's to monitor prison conditions. The 
ICRC was permitted to visit select groups of prisoners 4 times per 
year, including the 18 CUF members arrested in Zanzibar, and combatants 
imprisoned in the western part of the country. The Government requested 
ICRC assistance with a cholera outbreak in mainland prisons during the 
year. It also invited the ICRC to monitor conditions in a small prison 
that holds special categories of refugees that are not included under 
UNHCR jurisdiction, such as combatants. The Government denied a request 
from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to visit refugees 
in prisons in Dar Es Salaam.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Criminal Procedure Code, amended in 1985, 
requires that a person arrested for a crime, other than a national 
security detainee under the Preventive Detention Act, be charged before 
a magistrate within 24 hours; however, in practice the police often 
fail to comply. During the year, authorities on the mainland and in 
Zanzibar arrested or threatened with arrest opponents of the Government 
for acts that it regarded as seditious.
    The 1985 amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code restricted the 
right to bail and imposed strict conditions on freedom of movement and 
association when bail is granted. Because of backlogs, an average case 
takes 2 to 3 years or longer to come to trial. Observers estimate that 
only approximately 5 percent of persons held in remand ultimately are 
convicted, and in many cases, those convicted already had served their 
full sentences before their trial was held. On March 10, inmates at 
Keko remand prison went on a hunger strike to press for prompt hearings 
of their cases. Court officials stated that the cases had been delayed 
because of a lack of funds.
    In April authorities held a drug suspect in Moshi in remand for 4 
days without questioning him, despite a law that requires detainees be 
questioned within 48 hours of their arrest. The detainee alleged that 
he was held without food during that time. There was no further 
information available on the case at year's end.
    In some cases, accused persons are denied the right to contact a 
lawyer or talk with family members. Bribes often determine whether bail 
is granted or even whether a case is judged as a civil or criminal 
matter. There are reports of prisoners waiting several years for trial 
because they could not pay bribes to police and court officials. The 
authorities acknowledge that some cases have been pending for several 
years.
    Under the Preventive Detention Act, the President may order the 
arrest and indefinite detention without bail of any person considered 
dangerous to the public order or national security. This act, as 
amended in 1985, requires that the Government release detainees within 
15 days of detention or inform them of the reason for their detention. 
A detainee also is allowed to challenge the grounds for detention at 
90-day intervals. The Preventive Detention Act has not been used for 
many years nor was it used during the year; however, despite a landmark 
ruling by the Court of Appeal in 1991 that the Preventive Detention Act 
could not be used to deny bail to persons not considered dangerous to 
society, the Government still has not introduced corrective 
legislation. In 1992 the Nyalali report on repressive laws, drafted by 
the president-appointed Nyalali Commission in 1992, recommended that 
the act be repealed; however, in 1998 the Government stated that there 
was no need to rewrite the Constitution or repeal any legislation, 
including the Preventative Detention Act. The Government has additional 
broad detention powers under the Regions and Regional Commissioners Act 
and Area Commissioners Act of 1962. These acts permit regional and 
district commissioners to arrest and detain for 48 hours, persons who 
may ``disturb public tranquillity.''
    Police continued to make arbitrary arrests, often as a means of 
securing money. In previous years, the police occasionally arrested 
relatives of criminal suspects and held them in custody without charge 
for as long as several years in an attempt to force suspects to 
surrender; however, there were no reports of this occurring during the 
year. Such detainees who managed to get their cases before a judge 
usually were set free; however, some were rearrested immediately when 
they left the courtroom.
    On April 1, police arrested CUF leader Seif Shariff Hamad at an 
indoor CUF meeting in Zanzibar; on April 3, he was released on bail. In 
April police launched a campaign to apprehend persons who had attacked 
police officers attempting to break up the meeting (see Section 1.c.), 
and arrested numerous persons on the streets. Police also broke into 
homes and businesses, beat persons inside, arrested and detained them, 
and charged them with loitering and breach of the peace.
    In December four persons reportedly were arrested for the November 
gasoline bombing of a primary school that housed a polling station. The 
four still were in custody at year's end.
    There were reports that at least 150 CUF members were arrested in 
the aftermath of the October 29 elections. After the new Zanzibar 
President Amani Karume took office in October, he pardoned and released 
all detainees arrested in connection with the elections.
    There were numerous arrests in Pemba after the October elections. 
On October 29, authorities reportedly arrested 12 persons in a CUF 
office in Wete, Pemba, and injured several of them during the arrest. 
An appeal was filed in November, and the case was still pending at 
year's end. In November 10 persons reportedly were arrested on charges 
of setting off gasoline explosives at a hotel in Wete, Pemba. The 10 
suspects reportedly remained in custody at year's end and were not 
granted bail. In November six persons reportedly were arrested on 
charges of attempted manslaughter of a Zanzibar Electoral commission 
officer in Wete, Pemba. Their bail reportedly was set at $875 (700,000 
shillings), which the detainees'' defense counsel argued was so high 
that it amounted to ``technically denying bail'' to the accused. In 
early November, four persons reportedly were arrested for allegedly 
setting off a bomb in Wete, Pemba. They reportedly remained in custody 
at year's end, and their case was pending.
    On the mainland, police reportedly arrested Pembans without charge 
and forcibly returned them to Pemba under police custody.
    In September an opposition Member of Parliament (M.P.) was detained 
in Songea on allegations of causing a breach of peace at a police 
station where she had gone to determine why her supporters had been 
detained. She was held in remand and released without charges.
    Several journalists were arrested and detained by police following 
the October 29 elections in Zanzibar (see Section 2.a.).
    There were reports that police at times arrested innocent persons, 
accuse them of fictitious crimes, and withdraw or reduce the charges 
upon payment of bribes. During 1999, there were several complaints that 
police regularly hide their badge numbers while on duty so that 
complainants cannot report abuses; however, there were no such 
confirmed reports during the year. The Government began to take action 
during the year to punish police for abuse of their positions. For 
example, in November the district commissioner in Songea removed a 
police official from his duties for ``ignoring ethics.'' In November 
there were also reports that two police officers were fired for 
corruption in Tabora.
    In October 1999, the authorities arrested and detained opposition 
leader Augustine Mrema for making derogatory statements about President 
Mkapa's wife and the NGO that she operates. Mrema was also charged with 
sedition for statements he made about former President Julius Nyerere. 
Although most of the charges were dropped due to insufficient evidence, 
Mrema was scheduled to be tried in February 2001 for three charges of 
sedition, based on the claim that he presented fraudulent documents to 
Parliament. In November 1999, the authorities arrested opposition 
leader Reverend Christopher Mtikila and a boy for distributing 
audiocassettes, which contained derogatory statements about Nyerere. 
The boy was released on bail, but Mtikila remained in detention. In 
February a magistrate temporarily adjourned Mtikila's sedition trial. 
In October he was charged again with sedition, detained, and prevented 
from campaigning during the last weeks before the October elections. In 
November the charges were dropped, and he was released (see Sections 
1.d., 2.a., and 3).
    In January authorities dropped the charges against Dr. Walid 
Kaborou, the Kigboma regional chairman of the Chadema Party and Chadema 
Party candidate, who had been arrested in 1999 for inciting the public 
to violence as a result of Chadema's challenge to the results of a 
local by-election. After 35 days in detention, Kaborou was released 
with no charges filed against him (see Sections 2.a. and 3).
    Since the 1995 election, police in Zanzibar, particularly on Pemba, 
regularly have detained, arrested, or harassed CUF members and 
suspected supporters. Despite orders from the Union Government's 
Inspector General of Police, officers in Zanzibar continued these 
activities. In 1997 and 1998, police arrested 18 CUF officials, 
including M.P.'s, and charged them in January with treason for 
attempting to overthrow the Zanzibar Government. Treason, which is a 
nonbailable offense, carries a mandatory death sentence. On January 19, 
the Zanzibar High Court began trial proceedings against the CUF 
officials. The first court session was marred by violence when police 
fired tear gas and used batons against supporters and family members of 
the defendants who were protesting their lack of access to the High 
Court gallery (see Section 1.c.). Fifteen persons were arrested. The 
defendants had been held without bail since November 1997. The trial 
proceeded slowly and was suspended in August, pending a defense request 
for the Court of Appeals to invalidate the treason charges. On November 
9, the High Court dismissed the case on instructions from incoming 
President Karume and released the 18 defendants.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, it suffers from executive interference, 
corruption, and inefficiency. Nevertheless, the higher courts 
increasingly have demonstrated independence from the Government. Senior 
police or government officials no longer pressure or reassign judges 
who make unpopular rulings. However, independent observers continued to 
criticize the judiciary, especially at lower levels, as corrupt and 
inefficient, and questioned the system's ability to provide a defendant 
with an expeditious and fair trial. The Warioba Commission reported in 
1997 that pervasive corruption affected the judiciary from clerks to 
magistrates. Clerks took bribes to decide whether or not to open cases 
and to hide or misdirect the files of those accused of crimes. 
Magistrates occasionally accepted bribes to determine guilt or 
innocence, pass sentences, withdraw charges, or decide appeals. In 
April the Minister of Justice acknowledged in public statements that 
problems within the judiciary include unwarranted delays in the hearing 
of cases, falsified recording of evidence in court records, bribery, 
improper use or failure to use bail, and unethical behavior on the part 
of magistrates. The Court of Appeals delayed hearing any cases from 
1999 until the backlog of cases from 1997 and 1998 have been heard (see 
Section 1.b.). Judicial ethics committees were established by statute 
in 1997 but could not begin operating until committee members were 
trained; the first training course was conducted in late 1999. The 
ethics committees were tasked with drafting recommendations to improve 
the credibility and conduct of the judiciary; however, they had not yet 
drafted a report by year's end. The committees have no mechanism to 
redress grievances or enforce decisions, and are weak and ineffective. 
The Government made some progress in addressing judicial corruption. 
During the year, several magistrates were arrested after the Chief 
Justice was presented with credible evidence of their corruption.
    The legal system is based on the British model, with modifications 
to accommodate customary and Islamic law in civil cases. Christians are 
governed by customary or statutory law in both civil and criminal 
matters. Muslims may apply either customary law or Islamic law in civil 
matters. The court system consists of primary courts, district courts, 
the High Court, and the Court of Appeal. Advocates defend clients in 
all courts, except in the primary courts. There is no trial by jury. In 
addition to judges, there are district (or resident) magistrates. The 
law also provides for commercial courts, land tribunals, housing 
tribunals, and military tribunals. Military courts do not try 
civilians, and there are no security courts. Defendants in civil and 
military courts may appeal decisions to the High Court and Court of 
Appeal. In refugee camps, Burundian mediation councils called 
abashingatahe, comprised of male refugee elders, often handle domestic 
abuse cases of Burundian refugees even though the law does not allow 
these councils to hear criminal matters.
    Zanzibar's court system generally parallels that of the mainland 
but retains Islamic courts to adjudicate Muslim family cases such as 
divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Islamic courts only adjudicate 
cases involving Muslims. Cases concerning Zanzibar constitutional 
issues are heard only in Zanzibar's courts. All other cases may be 
appealed to the national Court of Appeal.
    Criminal trials are open to the public and to the press; courts 
must give reasons on the record for holding secret proceedings. 
Criminal defendants have the right of appeal.
    Bail is set on a discretionary basis by judges based on the merits 
of each case (see Section 1.d.). However, there is no bail in murder or 
armed robbery cases.
    The code provides for a right to defense counsel. The Chief Justice 
assigns lawyers to indigent defendants charged with serious crimes such 
as murder, manslaughter, and armed robbery. There are only a few 
hundred practicing lawyers in the country, and most indigent defendants 
charged with lesser crimes do not have legal counsel.
    A separate facility for young offenders was established in 1997; 
however, the court is underutilized and many juvenile offenders still 
are tried in adult courts. In 1998 a magistrate ordered prosecutors to 
stop prosecuting juveniles in adult courts; however, because of the 
huge backlog in the country's only juvenile court, some cases continue 
to be sent through the traditional court system where they are 
processed faster because of a less significant backlog than in the 
regular civil court system.
    There were no reports of political prisoners on the mainland; 
however, 18 CUF members accused of treason were held as political 
prisoners in Zanzibar until they were released in November (see Section 
1.e.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution generally provides for these rights; 
however the Government continued to interfere with these rights. During 
the years in which Tanzania was a one-party state, the CCM penetrated 
all levels of society through local cells, varying in size from single 
family homes to large apartment buildings and containing from 10 to 200 
persons. Unpaid party officials served as 10-cell leaders with 
authority to resolve problems at the grassroots level and to report to 
authorities any suspicious behavior, event, or noncompliance with 
compulsory night patrol service in the neighborhood. The role of the 
cells has diminished considerably, particularly in areas where 
opposition parties are strong; however, the CCM remained influential. 
While in the past CCM membership was necessary for advancement in 
political and other areas, CCM membership is voluntary. Although in 
past years some government employees, particularly in Zanzibar, who 
supported opposition candidates lost their jobs, and some students were 
expelled from school because of their families' political affiliation.
    The Criminal Procedures Act of 1985 authorizes police officials, 
including the civilian anticrime groups, to issue search warrants; 
however, the act also authorizes searches of persons and premises 
without a warrant if necessary to prevent the loss or destruction of 
evidence connected with an offense or if circumstances are serious and 
urgent. In practice police and members of other security services 
rarely requested warrants and often searched private homes and business 
establishments at will. The security services reportedly monitor 
telephones and correspondence of some citizens and foreign residents.
    Although in previous years, police threatened, mistreated, 
occasionally beat, and arrested relatives of criminal suspects and 
detained them without charge in an effort to force suspects to 
surrender, there were no reports of this occurring during the year.
    In April police broke into homes and businesses in Zanzibar, 
beating and arresting those inside and destroying property (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). There were also credible eyewitness reports of 
police breaking into shops and looting in Stone Town, in the presence 
of union police officials from the mainland.
    There were reports that police and army units made nightly rounds 
in Pemba following the elections, conducting house-to-house searches 
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
    In 1999 the Government repealed the Human Resources Deployment Act 
of 1983, which allowed forced labor and forced relocation of citizens 
to ensure productive employment. The new law, the Employment Services 
Promotion Act of 1999, does not permit either forced labor or forced 
relocation (see Sections 2.d. and 6.c.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government limited 
these rights in practice. Various laws, such as the Newspaper Act and 
the Broadcasting Act, limit the media's ability to function 
effectively. Government ministers and the Registrar of Newspapers 
pressure journalists to practice self-censorship. The Government denied 
political opponents unrestricted access to the media. In August the 
Government banned the book, ``The Mwembechai Killings and the Political 
Future of Tanzania'' for being ``incendiary.'' Unlike the previous 
year, the Government did not ban any newspapers.
    On October 28, members of the FFU beat up, detained, and 
confiscated the film of a photojournalist; he was released after 
several hours of questioning.
    Except in Zanzibar, citizens generally enjoyed the right to discuss 
political alternatives freely, although there were instances in which 
the freedom of speech was restricted severely. Political parties are 
required by law to support the continuation of the Union. Opposition 
political party members and others openly criticize the Government and 
ruling party in public forums; however, persons using ``abusive 
language'' against the country's leadership may be subject to arrest, 
and the Government used this provision to detain some opposition 
figures (see Section 1.d.). For example, Reverend Christoper Mtiila was 
held on sedition charges for making comments abusive to the Government 
(see Section 1.d.).
    In June charges were dropped due to insufficient evidence against 
opposition leader Augustin Mrema, who was detained for 18 days in April 
and in 1999 for making derogatory statements about President Mkapa's 
wife and using seditious words against the late President, Julius 
Nyerere (see Section 1.d.).
    In February a magistrate temporarily adjourned the sedition trial 
of Reverend Christopher Mtikila, a leader of the Democratic Party, who 
was arrested in late 1999 for distributing audiocassettes that 
contained derogatory statements about former President Nyerere. In 
October Mtikila was detained and charged with sedition for alleging 
during a campaign speech in Singida that former President Julius Nyere 
had died of HIV/AIDS, and prohibited from campaigning during the last 
weeks before the October national elections (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
    In January Dr. Walid Kaborou, an opposition M.P. who was arrested 
for sedition in late 1999, was released after 35 days in detention. No 
charges were filed against him (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
    In Zanzibar the Government controls radio and television, and also 
implements a restrictive policy with regard to print media. In 1998 a 
Zanzibar government minister threatened three newspapers because of 
their allegedly negative reporting. Soon thereafter, amendments to the 
Zanzibar News Act further circumscribed journalists' freedom of action, 
by giving authorities greater protection for the harassment, detention, 
and interrogation of journalists. Private mainland newspapers are 
widely available in Zanzibar, and many residents can receive mainland 
television.
    On January 19, police confiscated a journalist's notebook and 
camera at a demonstration outside the courtroom where 18 CUF members 
were being tried in Zanzibar (see Section 1.d.).
    In June at a political rally in Zanzibar, a regional CCM official, 
in the presence of President Mkapa, threatened an international radio 
journalist with physical harm for allegedly broadcasting politically 
biased reports about Zanzibar.
    Several journalists were arrested and detained by police following 
the October 29 elections in Zanzibar (see Section 2.a.). For example, 
on November 1, authorities in Zanzibar arrested and detained a British 
Broadcasting Corporation correspondent for allegedly kidnaping and 
assaulting two women after he interviewed the women and broadcast their 
comments about witnessing voter fraud during the elections; he was 
released later without being charged.
    The press on the mainland is, on the whole, lively and outspoken. 
Even the government-owned newspaper regularly reports events that 
portray the Government in an unflattering light. There are 9 daily 
newspapers and 15 other newspapers in English and Kiswahili, along with 
another dozen periodicals, some of which are owned or influenced by 
political parties, both the CCM and the opposition. There is no 
official censorship, but throughout the year the Government continued 
to pressure newspapers to suppress or change articles unfavorable to it 
in some instances. In October 1999, the Government revoked the 
registration of 291 publications that had not published during the 
previous 3 years.
    Private radio and television stations broadcast in Dar Es Salaam 
and in a few other urban areas, although their activities may be 
circumscribed. The Government reportedly does not censor news reports, 
but attempts to influence their content. Some journalists, such as 
those in Zanzibar, exercise self-censorship on sensitive problems. 
Journalists who report arrests can be charged with obstructing police 
activity under the 1964 Police Act. The Parliamentary Power, 
Privileges, and Immunities Act gives the Government authority to 
prevent television cameramen from filming the swearing-in of an 
opposition Member of Parliament, and the Government occasionally did so 
during previous years; however, there were no documented cases reported 
of this occurring during the year.
    The Union Government sought to maintain some control over the 
private media with the establishment in 1997 of a code of conduct for 
journalists and a media council. With the leadership of the local 
chapter of the Media Council for Southern Africa and the Association of 
Journalists and Media Workers, journalists forced the Government to 
agree in 1995 to a voluntary code of ethics and establishment of a 
Media Council intended to preserve and expand media freedom. The 
Council was inaugurated formally in August 1997, although it began 
operating in 1995. Although it initially proved ineffectual except as a 
sounding board for complaints against the media, the Council operated 
with some effectiveness during the year. The Council received 
approximately 20 cases for adjudication during the year. The Council 
serves as an adjudicating body when journalists infringe upon the code 
of ethics and has the power to impose fines. The Council consists of 
university professors and media lawyers, in addition to Judge Joseph 
Sinde Warioba. The president of the Council, Professor Geoffrey Mmari, 
has complained publicly that the laws governing the media are outdated.
    Academic freedom generally is respected in practice. Academics, 
increasingly outspoken in their criticism of the Government, continued 
their calls for reform during the year and were particularly critical 
of the union Government's actions in response to the political 
situation in Zanzibar.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government 
limits this right in practice. Political parties that seek to hold 
rallies must give the police 48 hours' advance notice. Police have the 
authority to deny permission on public safety or security grounds or if 
the permit seeker belongs to an unregistered organization or political 
party. Authorities arrested citizens for assembling without the 
appropriate permit. For example, on June 27 authorities arrested CUF 
leaders for holding a rally without a permit in Dar es Salaam.
    Opposition parties, other than in Zanzibar, generally are able to 
hold rallies; however, CUF meetings have been banned periodically since 
1995. In Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam, CUF rallies were more restricted 
than those of other political parties. CUF rallies were banned at least 
once in Dar es Salaam and several times in Zanzibar before the October 
elections. Several rallies were prevented through indirect means as 
cutting off electricity for loudspeakers, citing ad hoc time limits, 
and scheduling the same rally times for more than one group. Security 
officials interfered with citizens'' rights to assemble peacefully on 
numerous occasions (see Section 1.d. and 3).
    Police continue to break up meetings attended by persons thought to 
be opposed to the Zanzibar Government. In Pemba security forces broke 
up gatherings and intimidated opposition party officials. On January 
19, police used tear gas indiscriminately to disperse a crowd outside a 
courthouse in Zanzibar during a riot, injuring 70 persons (see Section 
1.c.). On April 1, police officers attempted to break up a CUF meeting 
at a party branch office in Zanzibar, despite the fact that the indoor 
meeting did not require a permit. In August police used tear gas and 
bullets to disperse demonstrators in Zanzibar (see Section 1.c.). On 
October 11, police forcibly dispersed a CUFsponsored election rally at 
a party office in Zanzibar; police used tear gas and shot and injured 
six CUF supporters (see Section 1.c.). The police opened fire on the 
demonstrators after they threw stones at a police car. The activists 
were demonstrating in protest of the decision by Zanzibar election 
officials to annul the vote in 16 constituencies because of voting 
irregularities (see Section 3). Police were criticized for not 
following the correct procedures and for using excessive force to 
respond to the incident by firing shots at demonstrators. On October 
28, police and army units circled a CUF meeting in Zanzibar, and shot 
bullets into the air during the presidential candidate's speech.
    Police used excessive force during rallies and demonstrations 
protesting the October 29 elections in Zanzibar (see Section 1.c.). On 
October 30, police beat both demonstrators and bystanders during 
rallies and demonstrations in the Darajani district of Stone Town in 
Zanzibar (see Sections 2.b. and 3). FFU officers beat and shot 
demonstrators, who were chanting antigovernment slogans, resulting in a 
number of injuries and arrests (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government continued to arrest opposition politicians for 
holding meetings, distributing information, and other acts that it 
regarded as seditious (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government limits this right in practice. The Registrar of Political 
Parties has sole authority to approve or deny the registration of any 
political party and is responsible for enforcing strict regulations on 
registered or provisionally registered parties. The Constitution and 
other legal acts stipulate that citizens cannot establish new political 
parties; candidates must be members of 1 of the 13 registered political 
parties. The Electoral Law prohibits independent candidates; requires 
all standing M.P.'s to resign if they join another party; requires all 
political parties to support the union with Zanzibar; and forbids 
parties based on ethnic, regional, or religious affiliation. Parties 
granted provisional registration may hold public meetings and recruit 
members. They have 6 months to submit lists of at least 200 members in 
10 of the country's 25 regions, including 2 regions in Zanzibar, in 
order to secure full registration and to be eligible to field 
candidates for election. Unregistered parties are prohibited from 
holding meetings, recruiting members, or fielding candidates. In 
October 1999, the Registrar of Political Parties stated that the 
registration provisions were too restrictive; however, no action was 
taken during the year to reform the provisions. One new party, Chama 
Cha Demokrasia Makini, was granted provisional registration in June.
    The most prominent unregistered party is the Reverend Christopher 
Mtikila's Democratic Party, which advocates the dissolution of the 
union and the expulsion of minorities from the mainland. Despite his 
party's lack of government recognition, Mtikila was able to publicize 
his views through his legally registered church and through ongoing 
lawsuits against the Government. In spite of his criticism of the 
Government, Mtikila campaigned actively for the October general 
elections after a magistrate temporarily adjourned Mtikila's sedition 
trial to allow him to campaign (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    Under the Societies Ordinance, the Ministry of Home Affairs must 
approve any new association. The Government suspended registration of 
new NGO's in 1997, pending the enactment of new NGO legislation, which 
was scheduled for late 1997; however, such legislation was not 
introduced and details of the proposed legislation (which is viewed as 
restrictive) still were being discussed within the Government, with 
some input from NGO's, at year's end. In the interim, new applications 
for registrations were considered under the Societies Ordinance and the 
Trustees Ordinance. There were 8,250 registered NGO's as of June. 
During the year, the Government continued a general suspension of 
registration of religious NGO's on the grounds that many were being 
formed for the purpose of evading taxes (see Section 2.c.). During the 
year, the Government denied registration to eight NGO's for abusing 
their exemptions by selling for profit goods that they brought into the 
country duty-free. The Government continued to harass the National 
Women's Council for allegedly engaging in political activity contrary 
to its charter. The Government struck the organization from the 
register in 1997, but the High Court overturned this action in 1999. 
The Government appealed the case to the Court of Appeal, but the Court 
has delayed hearing any cases from 1999 until the backlog of cases from 
1997 and 1998 have been heard (see Section 1.e.). The National Women's 
Council continued to operate at year's end.
    A number of professional, business, legal, and medical associations 
only have begun to address political topics. In 1999 the Government 
denied registration to the NGO Defenders of Human Rights in Tanzania 
(see Section 4), after withholding it for more than 3 years. In 1999 
the Government also denied a youth group registration on the grounds 
that there already was a youth organization affiliated with the CCM. 
Zanzibar has a separate NGO registration policy from the mainland, 
which is less restrictive; however, there was minimal NGO activity in 
Zanzibar during the year.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice, 
subject to measures that it claims are necessary to ensure public order 
and safety. The Government does not penalize or discriminate against 
any individual on the basis of religious beliefs or practices, and it 
does not designate religion on any passports or records of vital 
statistics. However, individual government officials are alleged to 
favor persons who share the same religion in the conduct of business.
    The Government requires that religious organizations register with 
the Registrar of Societies at the Home Affairs Ministry. In order to 
register, religious organizations must have at least 10 followers and 
must provide a constitution, the resumes of their leaders, and a letter 
of recommendation from their District Commissioner. Christian groups 
also must provide letters of recommendation from the leaders of three 
registered Christian churches or from a Christian Council of a similar 
denomination. Muslim groups also must have letters from the leaders of 
three registered mosques. These additional requirements apply to other 
religious organizations in the same manner. There were no reports that 
the Government refused to register any religious groups that met 
registration criteria; however, during the year, the Government 
continued a general suspension of registration of religious NGO's on 
the grounds that many were being formed for the purpose of evading 
taxes (see Section 2.b.).
    The law prohibits preaching if it incites persons against other 
religions. Following riots in Mwembechi in 1998, triggered by the 
arrest of a popular Muslim leader, the Government charged that some 
religious leaders were inciting their adherents to violence. In August 
government officials warned religious leaders to avoid using religion 
to incite their adherents to violence during and after the October 
election campaign.
    The Government failed to respond to growing tensions between the 
Muslim and Christian communities (see Section 5). The Government 
appeared to recognize that a problem exists, but it chose not to take 
action. The Government cancelled several meetings with Muslim and 
Christian leaders aimed at improving relations between the two 
communities. Even senior Muslim officials in the Government appear 
unwilling to address the problem, aside from general criticism of those 
who would foment religious conflict.
    National and regional parole boards, constituted in 1998, were 
dissolved when it was found that they did not include Muslim members, 
and the Government named new boards in January 1999. It was disclosed 
in February 1999 that the Government was investigating reports that the 
National Muslim Council of the country was receiving millions of 
dollars from unknown sources in the Middle East and was considered a 
possible ``security risk.'' The Government had not released publicly 
the results of the investigation by year's end.
    Christians are governed by customary or statutory law in both civil 
and criminal matters. Muslims may apply either customary law or Islamic 
law in civil matters. Zanzibar's court system generally parallels the 
mainland's legal system but retains Islamic courts to adjudicate cases 
of Muslim family law, such as divorce, child custody, and inheritance 
(see Section 1.e.).
    The Government has banned religious organizations from involvement 
in politics. In July Parliament passed a law which imposes fines and 
jail time on political parties who campaign in houses of worship or 
educational facilities. In September the Muslim Council of Tanzania, a 
private organization, indefinitely closed a school in Singida for 
holding a CUF political meeting on its grounds.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--In the previous year, the Government 
imposed some limits on these rights; however, in 1999 the Government 
repealed the Human Resources Act of 1983, which allowed the arbitrary 
transfer of citizens from one district to another in order to ensure 
that all citizens were engaged in productive employment (see Section 
6.e.). The National Employment Service Act provides for training of 
youths to be selfemployed and eliminates the ability of officials to 
move residents from one location to another.
    Passports for foreign travel may be difficult to obtain, mostly due 
to bureaucratic inefficiency and officials' demands for bribes. 
Citizens can return without difficulty.
    Mainlanders are required to show identification to travel to 
Zanzibar, although the requirement is largely ignored in practice; 
however, Zanzibaris need no special identification to travel to the 
mainland. Mainlanders are not allowed to own land in the islands, 
except in partnership with foreign investors. There is no prohibition 
against mainlanders working in the islands; however, in practice few 
mainlanders are hired.
    After the October elections, a curfew was imposed on Wete of Pemba. 
Any persons observed by the police after 7 p.m. were ordered to return 
home. There were also reports of beatings by the police (see Section 
1.c.).
    Police set up six roadblocks in Pemba after the elections; there 
were reports that police beat and assaulted persons in the area (see 
Section 1.c.).
    There were reports of police harassment of Pembans on the mainland. 
Police reportedly arrested persons without charge and returned them to 
Pemba under police custody. At least 20 persons reportedly were 
returned by year's end.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and these 
provisions were respected in practice with a few exceptions. The 
Government granted prima facie refugee status to an estimated 500,000 
refugees during the year. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees. The Government traditionally has maintained 
a generous open border policy both with regard to neighboring 
countries' refugees and to persons seeking political asylum. In 1999 
the Government agreed to accept asylum applications from Rwandans who 
had been barred from seeking asylum in 1997 and 1998. During the year, 
a relatively small number of Rwandans who feared for their safety were 
granted asylum by the Government and appeals by others who petitioned 
for asylum were pending at year's end. The Government continues to 
offer first asylum to nearly 500,000 refugees from Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. There were 368,448 Burundian, 110,412 
Congolese, and 27,372 Rwandan refugees living in refugee camps in the 
country by year's end. In addition, there are at least 200,000 other 
Burundian refugees in the country who have lived in settlements since 
the early 1970's.
    The Government arrested, detained, and forcibly expelled 80 Rwandan 
and 580 Burundians during the year. Many of these refugees reportedly 
were denied the opportunity to collect their belongings or contact 
their families prior to being expelled. The refugees who were forcibly 
returned were living outside UNHCR camps and included Rwandans living 
in the country since the 1960's. The returns were ordered by the 
regional commissioner, reportedly without the involvement of higher 
government officials; however, the Ministry of Home Affairs took no 
action to reprimand the regional commissioner for the expulsions. In 
late June, the regional commissioner gave the refugees the choice of 
returning to their countries of origin or moving into UNHCR camps. The 
regional commissioner reportedly also gave the refugees the option of 
paying the required fees to become residents in the country, which were 
too expensive for the refugees to pay. In December a group of 1,500 of 
the refugees left the country for Rwanda. In February the Government 
forcibly returned two Rwandans and three Burundians to Rwanda. The 
number of Burundian refugees who were returned forcibly reportedly 
decreased after June and July, when the Government began to send 
refugees outside of refugee camps to the UNHCR rather than forcibly 
returning them to their countries of origin.
    Refugee camps in the west were plagued by food shortages, 
overcrowding, and malaria outbreaks during the year. Refugee camps were 
large and overcrowded, and the authorities restricted employment 
opportunities. Women and girls in refugee camps suffered a high level 
of rape and gender abuse perpetrated by other refugees. There were 
reports that women and girls were raped when they left the camps for 
daily tasks, such as collecting firewood. The Government does not 
adequately investigate, prosecute, or punish perpetrators of abuses in 
refugee camps. There is no mechanism within refugee camps to punish 
abusers, and most cases are not referred to local authorities. Police 
lack special training in the area of domestic abuse, and local and 
traditional courts, which both handle domestic violence cases, lack 
necessary resources. Among Burundian refugees, mediation councils 
called abashingatahe, comprised of male refugee elders, often handle 
domestic abuse cases (see Section 1.e). There were reports that some 
refugees engage in vigilante justice within camps, occasionally beating 
other refugees. There are nine camps and one long-term transit center 
for Rwandan refugees in the country.
    There is some resentment and hostility against Burundian refugees 
because of the availability of particular goods and services for 
refugees that are not available for the local population; however, 
during recent years, the UNHCR, NGO's, and international organizations 
have made many of these services available for the local population, 
thereby alleviating many tensions (see Section 1.c.).
    There was continuing concern over violence allegedly perpetrated by 
some armed Burundian and Rwandan refugees, although such violence has 
diminished since 1999. Local officials reported incidents of killings, 
banditry, armed robbery, and violent crime, perpetrated by refugees in 
the areas surrounding refugee camps (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). There 
were unconfirmed reports that the Burundian Government hired 
mercenaries to invade refugee camps, although the Burundian Government 
strongly denies these reports.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    A multiparty political system was introduced officially in 1992, 
and in 1995 for the first time in more than 30 years, citizens 
exercised their right to change their government through national 
elections for president and parliament. On October 29, the second 
multiparty national elections were held on the mainland and Zanzibar. 
On the mainland, international observers concluded that the elections 
were free and fair and conducted peacefully; however, in Zanzibar, the 
vote was marred by irregularities, voter intimidation and politically 
motivated violence. The incumbent President of the mainland, Benjamin 
Mkapa, was reelected with 71 percent of the vote. The ruling CCM party 
made significant gains in its majority in Parliament, winning 167 out 
of 181 seats. Opposition candidates gained 11 seats in 6 of the 19 
mainland regions giving them a total of 14 seats on the mainland, and 
the CUF won 15 seats in Zanzibar. The CUF continued to refuse to 
recognize the election results in Zanzibar and to demand new elections, 
and CUF elected representatives are boycotting the union and Zanzibar 
parliaments.
    In late 1996, following its loss in a by-election, the Government 
issued new directives limiting political activity and fund raising on 
the grounds of maintaining order.
    The Government continued to harass its opponents and arrested 
opposition politicians for holding meetings, distributing information, 
and other acts that it regarded as seditious (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.b.). The authorities forcibly dispersed a number of political rallies 
during the period prior to and after the October elections (see Section 
2.b.) In October police officials pulled opposition leader Augustine 
Mrema off of a platform in Kigoma during a campaign rally before he had 
finished speaking; he had a permit to speak for an additional 30 
minutes. In May 1999, Mrema had been prohibited from running for 
reelection by a High Court injunction that stated that he was 
ineligible to run because he had changed political parties, and had not 
yet been designated formally as chairman of his new party. The 
injunction against Mrema was dropped after the Court of Appeals ruled 
that the lower court had no grounds to prohibit his nomination as the 
Labor Party chairman in order to be eligible for presidential 
nominations. In October, police forced opposition leader John Cheyo to 
leave a campaign platform in Morogoro for speaking after the legal 
deadline for campaign rallies of 6 p.m. When Mr. Cheyo resisted, police 
threatened him with a police baton and physically removed him from the 
platform. On October 29, Fortunatus Masha, an opposition candidate who 
was vice-chairman of his party was beaten and injured by police in 
Mwanza district during an altercation at a ballot counting center over 
possible ballot rigging in favor of the CCM party.
    In January the authorities dropped the charges against Dr. Walid 
Kabouru, the Kigoma M.P. and the national chairman of the Chadema 
Party; he had been arrested in 1999 for inciting the public to violence 
as a result of Chadema's challenge to the results of a local by-
election. After 35 days in detention, Kabouru was released with no 
charges filed against him (see Sections 1.d.).
    On April 1, police broke into a CUF branch office in Zanzibar 
during an indoor meeting and destroyed property (see Section 1.c.).
    In August local authorities forced persons attempting to register 
to vote in Mwanza to provide documentary proof that they had paid local 
government taxes before they allowed them to register, even though 
there is no legal requirement for voters to prove payment of taxes to 
register.
    The Constitution of Zanzibar provides citizens with the right to 
change their government peacefully; however, this right was 
circumscribed severely. In June 1999, a Commonwealth-brokered agreement 
between the ruling CCM party and the opposition CUF party was signed, 
but its provisions were not implemented fully during the year. While 
both parties failed to fulfill parts of the accord, impartial observers 
agree that the Government of Salmin Amour in Zanzibar did not appear to 
act in good faith. The Zanzibar Government refused to reform its 
electoral commission, a provision that was central to the agreement, 
and the Commonwealth Agreement was not implemented during the year. In 
Zanzibar there were credible reports of irregularities during the voter 
registration process conducted in August in preparation for the October 
elections. The ruling CCM party was accused by several opposition 
parties of illegally registering mainland citizens as voters in 
Zanzibar. Some transportation operators were asked by union officials 
to transport citizens from the mainland to Zanzibar without charge. One 
operator reported that his family received threatening telephone calls 
at home for refusing to comply with the request. Shehas (village 
headmen) were responsible for validating residency requirements for 
voting in the elections. The majority of shehas were CCM members, and 
international monitors reported that in some cases they abused their 
discretion during the registration process. There also were credible 
reports that CUF supporters attempted to intimidate legally registered 
voters believed to be CCM supporters in Zanzibar. The homes of several 
long-term residents of mainland origin reportedly were stoned, and in 
August, three residences were burned down, although no one claimed 
responsibility for these actions. Subsequently, some occupants decided 
to leave Zanzibar or to send family members to the mainland until after 
the election.
    Voting irregularities during the October 29 elections included the 
late arrival and absence of ballots, and the late opening of polling 
stations. The Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) stopped balloting and 
counting throughout Zanzibar at 5:30 in the evening, even in locations 
that did not have ballot shortages. Police and some officials from the 
Zanzibar Electoral Commission were implicated in the voting 
irregularities. Police officers, accompanied by ZEC officials, seized 
ballot boxes in many constituencies, including the entire island of 
Pemba, and most of the ballot boxes were not under independent or 
opposition supervision after they were seized. Four groups of 
international election observers criticized the Zanzibar vote and 
called for a re-run election in all of the Zanzibar constituencies; 
however, the Government only announced new elections in 16 of the 50 
constituencies to be held on November 5.
    Voter turnout for the new elections was low. The opposition 
boycotted the re-run election, claiming that the elections already had 
been compromised. After the re-run, the ruling party announced that it 
had won all of the constituencies in Zanzibar and four constituencies 
on Pemba (where they previously did not hold any seats). The final 
results of the re-run election gave the ruling CCM party 34 seats in 
the 50-seat House of Representatives and 35 seats in the 50-seat 
National Assembly. CCM candidate Amani Karume was declared the new 
Zanzibari President on November 7.
    Since the 1995 elections, government security forces and CCM gangs 
have harassed and intimidated CUF members on both main Zanzibar 
islands, Pemba and Ugunja, and such incidents sharply increased in the 
3 months before the October elections. Security forces forcibly 
dispersed gatherings and intimidated, harassed, arrested and beat 
persons (see Sections 1.c., 1.d. and 2.b.). During the November 5 re-
run elections, police beat and reportedly tortured opposition officials 
(see Section 1.c.). Almost all international donors had suspended 
direct assistance to Zanzibar in response to the authorities' human 
rights abuses in 1995, and the suspension remained in effect by year's 
end.
    In November a bomb exploded at a primary school in Stone Town in 
Zanzibar at the location of a polling office for the November 5 revote 
(see Section 1.c.). In December four persons reportedly were arrested 
for the bombing; the four remained in custody at year's end (see 
Section 1.d.).
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no 
legal restrictions on the participation of women in politics and 
government. There are 61 seats in Parliament that are occupied by 
women; 12 female M.P.'s are elected members of the CCM; 47 female 
M.P.'s occupy ``Special Women'' seats which are appointed by political 
parties based on the elected percentages of the constituent seats, and 
one M.P. was nominated by President Mkapa. There is one seat in the 
House of Representatives occupied by a woman. On February 10, 
Parliament passed the 13th Amendment to the Union Constitution, which 
requires 20 percent of seats in Parliament to be occupied by women. 
President Mkapa ratified the amendment in February. Three of the 
Cabinet's 27 ministers are female.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government has obstructed the formation of local human rights 
groups. Persons seeking to register human rights NGO's, such as the 
Tanzania Human Rights Education Society, complained that the Ministry 
of Home Affairs continued to delay action on their applications (see 
Section 2.b.). This hampered their access and efforts to monitor 
violations of human rights. The Government continued to refuse 
registration of the African Human Rights and Justice Protection Network 
on the grounds that it was politically oriented (see Section 2.b.). The 
Government had withheld registration from the NGO Defenders of Human 
Rights in Tanzania for more than 3 years before finally denying it 
registration in 1999. During the year, the Government appealed a High 
Court decision ordering the reinstatement of the National Women's 
Council, an NGO that the Government had deregistered in 1997 but the 
Court had not heard the case by year's end. The National Women's 
Council continued to operate at year's end (see Section 2.b.). At 
year's end, the ICRC was awaiting a response from the Government to its 
application for accreditation as a legal entity.
    Government officials have stated that international human rights 
groups are welcome to visit the country; several human rights 
organizations operated freely in the country and report little 
government interference. Amnesty International visited during the year, 
and had discussions both within the Government and among NGO's, 
concerning the formation of a human rights commission; however, sharp 
differences on the independence of the commission were not resolved by 
year's end. In February AI lobbied parliamentarians to create an 
independent human rights commission; however, the Government refused on 
the grounds that the President's Permanent Commission of Inquiry, which 
focuses on civil servant claims against the Government, could serve in 
both capacities. On November 20, President Mkapa announced to the 
National Assembly that the Government would establish a Human Rights 
and Good Governance Committee; however, the Committee would not be 
independent from the Government.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on nationality, 
tribe, origin, political affiliation, color, or religion. 
Discrimination based on sex, age, or disability is not prohibited 
specifically by law but is discouraged publicly in official statements. 
The Government issued several statements beginning in August 
encouraging religious and ethnic tolerance during the election 
campaign. Discrimination against women and religious and ethnic 
minorities persisted. Religious and ethnic tensions in society exist.
    Women.--Violence against women remained widespread. Legal remedies 
exist in the form of assault provisions under the Criminal Code; 
however, in practice these provisions are difficult to enforce. The 
Marriage Act of 1971 makes a declaration against spousal battery, but 
does not prohibit it or provide for any punishment. Traditional customs 
that subordinate women remain strong in both urban and rural areas and 
local magistrates often upheld such practices. Women may be punished by 
their husbands for not bearing children. It is accepted for a husband 
to treat his wife as he wishes, and wife beating occurs at all levels 
of society. Cultural, family, and social pressures prevent many women 
from reporting abuses to the authorities. Nonetheless, in 1998 the 
Ministry of Home Affairs noted that an average of 10,000 cases of wife 
beating are reported annually. A local NGO, Tamwa, reports that as many 
as 6 out of 10 women are beaten by their husbands. In 1998 the Ruvuma 
regional crime officer noted that a large number of women are killed by 
their husbands or commit suicide as a result of domestic battery. 
Government officials frequently make public statements criticizing such 
abuses, but action rarely is taken against perpetrators. Police often 
have biases against pursuing domestic abuse cases and have demanded 
bribes to investigate allegations. The Sexual Offenses Special 
Provisions Bill provides for life imprisonment for persons convicted of 
rape and child molestation. Several persons were prosecuted and 
convicted for rape and battery under this law during the year. Women in 
refugee camps suffered a high level of rape and gender abuse 
perpetrated by other refugees (see Section 2.d.).
    Several NGO's provide counseling and education programs on women's 
rights problems, particularly sexual harassment and molestation.
    There is no legal protection for adult women who undergo FGM. The 
Sexual Offenses Act, which prohibits cruelty against children, only 
protects persons under 18 years of age.
    During the year, Parliament amended the Constitution to prohibit 
sexual harassment against women in the workplace by a person in 
authority. During the year, several persons were arrested under the new 
law. Male colleagues sometimes harass women seeking higher education, 
and the authorities largely have ignored the practice. Although the 
Government advocates equal rights for women in the workplace, it does 
not ensure these rights in practice. In the public sector, which 
employs 80 percent of the salaried labor force, certain statutes 
restrict women's access to some jobs or hours of employment. For 
example, in general, women may not be employed between 10 p.m. and 6 
a.m., although this restriction is usually ignored in practice (see 
Section 6.e.). While progress on women's rights has been more 
noticeable in urban areas, strong traditional norms still divide labor 
along gender lines and place women in a subordinate position. 
Discrimination against women is most acute in rural areas, where women 
are relegated to farming and raising children, and have almost no 
opportunity for wage employment. Custom and tradition often hinder 
women from owning property such as land, and may override laws that 
provide for equal treatment.
    The overall situation for women is less favorable in Zanzibar, 
which has a majority Muslim population. Although women generally are 
not discouraged from seeking employment outside the home, women there, 
and on many parts of the mainland, face discriminatory restrictions on 
inheritance and ownership of property because of concessions by the 
Government and courts to customary and Islamic law. While provisions of 
the Marriage Act provide for certain inheritance and property rights 
for women, the application of customary, Islamic, or statutory law 
depends on the lifestyle and stated intentions of the male head of 
household. Thus far, the courts have upheld discriminatory inheritance 
claims, primarily in rural areas. Under Zanzibari law, unmarried women 
under the age of 21 who become pregnant are subject to 2 years' 
imprisonment.
    Children.--Government funding of programs for children's welfare 
remained miniscule. The Government has made some constructive efforts 
to address children's welfare, including working closely with UNICEF 
and other international and local organizations to improve the well 
being of orphans and neglected children. Child labor is a problem, and 
there were reports that forced labor of children occurred (see Sections 
6.c and 6.d.). There were unconfirmed reports in previous years that 
children were trafficked to work in mines and other businesses (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). A 1998 study funded by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) reported a growth in child prostitution, including 
forced prostitution (see Section 6.c.). The Sexual Offences Special 
Provisions Act of 1998 criminalizes child prostitution and child 
pornography. The age criterion for protection from sexual exploitation 
is 18 years. Under the law, sexual intercourse with a child under 18 
years is considered rape regardless of consent; however, the law is not 
effective in practice because it is customary for girls as young as 14 
years of age to be considered adults for the purposes of sexual 
intercourse and marriage.
    The law provides for 7 years of compulsory education through the 
age of 15; however, education is no longer free on both the mainland 
and on Zanzibar. Fees are charged for books, enrollment, and uniforms, 
with the result that some children have been denied an education. In 
some cases, children were unable to attend school because poorly paid 
teachers demanded money to enroll them. The primary school dropout rate 
is between 30 and 40 percent. The literacy rate is approximately 70 
percent; however, for girls it is only 57 percent compared with 80 
percent for boys. The rate of girls' enrollment in school is lower than 
that of boys, and generally declines with each additional year of 
schooling. In some districts, there was a decline in attendance as the 
result of early marriage, often at the behest of parents. In the past, 
girls who became pregnant were expelled from school. Despite a 1996 law 
to permit pregnant girls to continue their education following 
maternity absences, the practice of forcing pregnant girls out of 
school remains in effect. Nevertheless, there have been across the 
board increases in the rate of girls' participation since 1990.
    Although the Government officially discourages female genital 
mutilation, which is widely condemned by international health experts 
as damaging to both physical and psychological health, it still is 
performed at an early age in approximately 20 of the country's 130 main 
ethnic groups. According to a 1996 health survey conducted by the 
Bureau of Statistics, FGM affects 18 percent of the female population. 
In some ethnic groups, FGM is compulsory, and in others, a woman who 
has not undergone the ritual may not be able to marry. Government data 
show this to be a problem that varies by region, with the most affected 
regions being Arusha (81 percent of women), Dodoma (68 percent), Mara 
(44 percent), Kilimanjaro (37 percent), Iringa (27 percent), Tanga/
Singida (25 percent), and Morogoro (20 percent). FGM is almost 
nonexistent in the rest of the country. There is no law that 
specifically prohibits FGM. The country's educational curriculum does 
not include instruction on FGM but the issue is covered occasionally in 
secondary schools. Government officials have called for changes in 
practices that adversely affect women, and the 1998 Sexual Offenses 
Special Provisions Bill, which prohibits cruelty against children, has 
been used as the basis for campaigns against FGM performed on girls; 
however, police do not have adequate resources to protect victims. Some 
local government officials have begun to combat the practice and have 
convicted and imprisoned some persons who performed FGM on young girls, 
although there were no reported prosecutions during the year. Seminars 
sponsored by various governmental organizations and NGO's are held 
regularly in an attempt to educate the public on the dangers of FGM and 
other traditional practices. These practices include the tradition of 
inherited wives, which critics contend contributes to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, and child marriages, which are sanctioned with parental 
consent under the Marriage Act of 1971 for girls 12 years of age or 
older. While some authorities believe that FGM is declining, a 1996 
government report has suggested that it is on the rise, especially in 
the central region. In 1998 the Dodoma Traditional Practices and 
Beliefs Committee, supported by a World Health Organization grant, 
began a program to eliminate FGM in the Dodoma region. The Ministry of 
Health began an educational campaign on FGM as part of its Safe 
Motherhood Initiative. The enforcement of policies to stop FGM remains 
difficult because some regional government officials are in favor of 
the practice or fear speaking out against it because of the power of 
traditional leaders.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate access 
to public buildings, transportation, or government services for the 
disabled. Although there is no official discrimination against the 
disabled, in practice the physically disabled effectively are 
restricted in their access to education, employment, and provision of 
other state services due to physical barriers. The Government provides 
only limited funding for special facilities and programs.
    Religious Minorities.--While Muslim-Christian relations are 
generally stable, some urban Muslim groups are sensitive to perceived 
discrimination in government hiring and law enforcement practices. The 
mainland is 60 percent Christian and 40 percent Muslim, whereas 
Zanzibar is 97 percent Muslim. The Muslim community claims to be 
disadvantaged in terms of its representation in the civil service, 
government, and parastatals, in part because both colonial and early 
post-independence administrations refused to recognize the credentials 
of traditional Muslim schools. As a result, there is broad Muslim 
resentment of certain advantages that Christians are perceived to enjoy 
in employment and educational opportunities. Muslim leaders have 
complained that the number of Muslim students invited to enroll in 
governmentrun schools still was not equal to the number of Christians. 
In turn Christians criticize what they perceive as lingering effects of 
undue favoritism accorded to Muslims in appointments, jobs, and 
scholarships by former President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a Muslim. Despite 
these perceptions, there does not appear to be a serious widespread 
problem of religious discrimination in access to employment or 
educational opportunities.
    A few leaders in the Christian and Muslim communities appear to be 
fomenting religious tension between their groups. Christian leaders 
reportedly have used the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Dar Es 
Salem and Nairobi, Kenya, as a justification to criticize Muslims.
    There are signs of increasing tension between secular and 
fundamentalist Muslims, as the latter feel that the former have sold 
out to the Government. The fundamentalist Muslims accuse the Government 
of being a Christian institution, and Muslims in power as being only 
interested in safeguarding their positions. In these circles, secular 
Muslims who drink alcohol or marry Christian women are criticized 
severely. Muslim fundamentalists attempted, unsuccessfully, to 
introduce Muslim traditional dress into the national school system. 
Fundamentalist groups also have exhorted their followers to vote only 
for Muslim candidates.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In the past, the Government 
discriminated against the Barabaig and other nomadic persons in the 
north. These ethnic groups continued to seek compensation for past 
government discrimination because of government efforts to make them 
adopt a more modern lifestyle and to restrict their access to pastoral 
lands that were turned into large government wheat farms. In 1994, 6 
Barabaig plaintiffs filed a class action suit, which included 750 
members of the Barabaig tribe, challenging their eviction by the 
National Food Corporation, a government parastatal organization. In 
1994 the High Court ruled that three of the plaintiffs had the right to 
return to their land and awarded them damages of 20,000 shillings, 
60,000 shillings, and 200,000 shillings respectively. However, the 
court found that the 3 other plaintiffs did not prove their cases and 
refused to award them compensation; the court also denied the cases of 
the 750 members of the tribe for not following correct procedures in 
filing their claim. The three plaintiffs who received compensation 
appealed the case, arguing that the compensation was not adequate. The 
other 3 plaintiffs and the 750 tribe members also appealed the denial 
of their case; the appeals were scheduled to be heard in February 2001.
    The Asian community, which is viewed unfavorably by many African 
citizens, has declined by 50 percent in the past decade to about 50,000 
persons. There are no laws or official policies that discriminate 
against Asians; however, as the Government places greater emphasis on 
market-oriented policies and privatization, public concern regarding 
the Asian minority's economic role has increased. This has led to 
demands by small, populist opposition parties for policies of 
``indigenization'' to ensure that privatization does not increase the 
Asian community's economic predominance at the expense of the country's 
African population.
    On October 6, 21 persons were beaten to death and 50 were injured 
during a clash between a group of ethnic Sonje and Maasai in the 
Mererani region. The incident began when a group of Sonje youths stole 
gemstones from a Maasai miner and other Maasai retaliated with 
violence. However, the incident appeared to be economically motivated.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Both the Constitution and the 1955 
Trade Union Ordinance provide for freedom of association for workers, 
and the Government respected this right in practice. Worker rights are 
handled separately by the Union and Zanzibar Governments. The Union 
Government enforces labor laws for the mainland and the Zanzibar 
Government enforces legislation specific to Zanzibar and Pemba islands. 
The labor law that applies to the mainland applies to both public and 
private sector workers, but restricts the right of association for 
those workers broadly defined as ``essential.'' The 1999 labor law in 
Zanzibar applies only to private sector workers and does not protect 
trade union members from anti-union discrimination.
    On July 1, the 1999 Trade Union Act abolished the umbrella 
organization, the Tanzania Federation of Trade Unions (TFTU) and 
required its 11 independent unions to separately register with the 
Registrar of Trade Unions. The act permitted workers to form unions 
voluntarily without requiring membership in an umbrella organization. 
All of the 11 unions had registered by year's end.
    The 1999 Act gives the Registrar of Trade Unions the power to 
restrict freedom of association by allowing the Registrar to interfere 
union activities. The law permits the imposition of large fines, 
imprisonment, or both for failing to register a trade union. The 
Registrar is also permitted to deregister the smaller of two trade 
unions when more than one exists in an industry and to order the 
smaller union to remove members. The Registrar can suspend a trade 
union for contravening the act or the union's own rules, suspend a 
union for 6 months on grounds of public order or security, and 
invalidate the union's international trade union affiliation if certain 
internal union procedures are not followed. The Registrar did not use 
these powers during the year.
    Overall, only about 10 to 15 percent of the country's 2 million 
wage earners are organized. Registered trade unions nominally represent 
60 percent of workers in industry and government. All workers, 
including those classified broadly as ``essential'' service workers, 
are permitted to join unions, but essential workers are not permitted 
to strike.
    There are no laws prohibiting retribution against legal strikers; 
however, workers have the legal right to strike only after complicated 
and protracted mediation and conciliation procedures leading ultimately 
to the Industrial Court, which receives direction from the Ministry of 
Labor and Youth Development. If a union is not satisfied with the 
decision of the Industrial Court, it may then conduct a legal strike. 
The mediation and conciliation procedures can prolong a dispute by 
months without resolving it. During the year, the ILO submitted to the 
Union Government a list of recommended changes to the law to bring into 
conformity with ILO standards, but the Government had not taken action 
by year's end. Frustrated workers have staged impromptu, illegal 
wildcat strikes and walkouts pending a resolution of their cases in the 
Industrial Court. The last major strike took place in 1998 at Muhimbili 
Medical Center when more than 70 percent of the doctors and nurses went 
on strike for higher pay and better working conditions. In 1998 the 
Zanzibar Government pledged to review the island's labor laws in an 
effort to improve industrial relations and minimize labor disputes; 
however, there was no progress on this issue by year's end.
    In 1998 the regional ILO representative called on the Government to 
ratify conventions on freedom of association, minimum working age, 
equal opportunity, and freedom from discrimination. In April the 
Government ratified the convention on freedom of association. The 
regional ILO office continued to call upon the Government to ratify the 
other core conventions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is protected by law but does not apply to the public sector. 
The Government sets wages for employees of the Government and state-
owned organizations administratively, although privatization and 
reductions in public sector employment have reduced such employees to 
about 5 percent of the work force.
    With the abolition of the TFTU, unions directly negotiate with the 
Association of Tanzanian Employers on behalf of private sector members. 
Collective agreements must be submitted to the Industrial Court for 
approval and may be refused registration if they do not conform with 
the Government's economic policy. The ILO has observed that these 
provisions are not in conformity with ILO Convention 98 on Collective 
Bargaining and the Right to Organize. None of the newly registered 
unions concluded new collective bargaining agreements by year's end. 
The Security of Employment Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory 
activities by an employer against union members. Employers found guilty 
of antiunion activities are required under the law to reinstate 
workers. The Warioba Commission, in its White Paper Report of 1998, 
found that bribes often determine whether a worker dismissed from his 
job actually is reinstated.
    There are no export processing zones (EPZ's) on the mainland, but 
there are three in Zanzibar. Working conditions are comparable to those 
in other areas. Labor law protections apply to EPZ workers.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however, there were reports that 
it occurred (particularly of children). In 1999 the Government repealed 
the Human Resources Deployment Act of 1983, which allowed forced labor 
and forced relocation of citizens to ensure productive employment (see 
Section 2.d.). The new law, the Employment Services Promotion Act of 
1999, does not permit either and instead promotes self-employment. 
However, in some rural areas, villagers still are obligated to work in 
the village community gardens or on small construction projects, such 
as repairing roads. The Constitution does not specifically prohibit 
forced or bonded child labor, and there were reports that it occurred. 
There were reports of children forced into prostitution by parents or 
guardians in need of extra income, and there were unconfirmed reports 
in previous years that children were trafficked to work in mines and 
other businesses (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law provides for 7 years of compulsory education 
through age 15 (see Section 5). In accordance with ILO Convention 138, 
which the Government ratified in 1999, the Government prohibits 
children under the age of 14 from working in the formal wage sector in 
both urban and rural areas, and the Government enforces this 
prohibition; however, the provision does not apply to children working 
on family farms or herding domestic livestock. The minimum age for work 
of a contractual nature in approved occupations is set at 15 years. 
Children between the ages of 12 and 15 may be employed on a daily wage 
and on a dayto-day basis, but they must have parental permission and 
return to the residence of their guardian at night. Approximately 
250,000 children engage in child labor.
    The law prohibits young persons from employment in any occupation 
that is injurious to health and that is dangerous or otherwise 
unsuitable. Young persons between the ages of 12 and 15 may be employed 
in industrial work but only between the hours of 6 a.m. and 6 p.m., 
with some exceptions. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and 
Youth Development is responsible for enforcement; however, the number 
of inspectors is inadequate to police conditions. The effectiveness of 
government enforcement reportedly has declined further with increased 
privatization.
    Approximately 3,000 to 5,000 children engage in seasonal employment 
on sisal, tea, tobacco, and coffee plantations. Children working on 
plantations generally receive lower wages than their adult 
counterparts, although they may be in comparable jobs. Work on sisal 
and tobacco plantations is particularly hazardous and detrimental to 
children. From 1,500 to 3,000 children work in unregulated gemstone 
mines. Girls often are employed as domestic servants, mostly in urban 
households sometimes under abusive and exploitative conditions. In the 
informal sector, children assist their parents in unregulated piecework 
manufacturing. Children are engaged in labor in the areas of mining, 
domestic service, fishing, commercial agriculture and prostitution.
    Several government ministries, including the Ministry of Labor and 
Youth Development, the Bureau of Statistics, and the Department of 
Information Services, have special child labor units. The Government is 
working with NGO's to establish a specific prohibition against child 
labor. In 1999 the Government drafted a National Child Labor 
Elimination policy designed to bring national law into compliance with 
international conventions, and in December 1999 the Government invited 
labor organizations and NGO's to comment on the draft law. The 
Government has worked with the ILO's International Program on the 
Elimination of Child Labor to develop a national plan of action to 
address the issue, and in April implemented a program for the 
elimination of child labor. The Government had not ratified the ILO 
Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor by year's end.
    The Constitution does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded 
child labor, and there were reports of children forced into 
prostitution by their parents or their guardians; there also were 
unconfirmed reports in previous years that children were trafficked to 
work in mines and other businesses (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legal minimum wage 
for employment in the formal sector. The legal minimum wage is 
approximately $38 (30,000 shillings) per month. Even when supplemented 
with various benefits such as housing, transport allowances, and food 
subsidies, the minimum rate is not always sufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family, and workers must 
depend on their extended family or on a second or third job. Despite 
the minimum wage, many workers, especially in the small but growing 
informal sector, are paid less.
    There is no standard legal workweek; however, a 5-day, 40-hour 
workweek is in effect for government workers. Most private employers 
retain a 6-day, 44- to 48-hour workweek. In general, women may not be 
employed between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Several laws regulate safety in the 
workplace. An Occupational Health and Safety Factory Inspection System, 
set up with the assistance of the ILO, is managed by the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Welfare and Youth Development; however, its 
effectiveness is limited. Labor standards are not enforced in the 
informal sector.
    The Employment Services Promotion Act of 1999 provides for the 
creation of a facility to promote employment by creating selfemployment 
opportunities, allows the Government to collect reliable data and 
information on vacancies for the unemployed, and facilitates employment 
with other agencies and the private sector. However, the new facility 
was not funded by year's end.
    Union officials have claimed that enforcement of labor standards is 
effective in the formal sector, but no verification studies have been 
performed. Workers may sue an employer through their union if their 
working conditions do not comply with the Ministry of Labor's health 
and environmental standards. Workers who have lodged and won such 
complaints have not faced retribution; however, workers do not have the 
right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without 
jeopardizing their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking, 
and in previous years there were unconfirmed reports that children were 
trafficked away from their families to work in mines and other business 
entities; however, there were no such reports during the year. In 1998 
there were unconfirmed reports that senior government officials were 
involved in the practice; the ILO and a visiting foreign delegation 
were unable to confirm the reports.
                               __________

                                  TOGO

    Togo is a republic dominated by President General Gnassingbe 
Eyadema, who has ruled since 1967, when he came to power in a military 
coup. Although opposition political parties were legalized following 
widespread protests in 1991, Eyadema and his Rally of the Togolese 
People (RPT), strongly backed by the armed forces, have continued to 
dominate the exercise of political power. Eyadema used his entrenched 
position to repress genuine opposition and to secure another 5-year 
term in an election held in June 1998, which, like previous multiparty 
elections, was marred by systematic fraud. Serious irregularities in 
the Government's conduct of the election strongly favored the incumbent 
and appear to have affected the outcome materially. Despite the 
Government's professed intention to move from authoritarian rule to 
democracy, institutions established ostensibly to accomplish this 
transition did not do so in practice. However, on April 5, the 
President promulgated a new Electoral Code, which was drafted by the 
RPT-controlled Government in consultation with opposition parties. The 
Electoral Code establishes an Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), 
composed of 20 members, 10 from the President's RPT party and 10 drawn 
from opposition parties. The CENI is intended to monitor, collect, 
tally, and announce the results of the next legislative elections. In 
the March 1999 legislative elections, which were boycotted by the 
opposition, the RPT won 79 of the 81 seats in the National Assembly, 
and the elections were marred by procedural problems and significant 
fraud, particularly the misrepresentation of voter turnout. In July 
1999, President Eyadema promised new legislative elections in March; 
however, such elections were not held by year's end. Eyadema and his 
supporters maintain firm control over all facets and levels of the 
country's highly centralized Government and have perpetuated the 
dominance of northern ethnic groups, including Eyadema's Kabye ethnic 
minority, throughout the public sector, especially the military. The 
executive branch continues to influence the judiciary.
    The security forces consist of the army (including the elite 
Presidential Guard), navy, air force, the Surete Nationale (including 
the national police), and the Gendarmerie. Approximately 90 percent of 
the army's officers and 70 percent of its soldiers are from the Kabye 
ethnic minority. Although the Minister of the Interior is in charge of 
the national police, and the Defense Minister has authority over most 
other security forces, all security forces effectively are controlled 
by President Eyadema. Members of the security forces continued to 
commit serious human rights abuses.
    Approximately 80 percent of the country's estimated population of 5 
million is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but there is also an 
active commercial sector. The main exports are phosphates, cotton, and 
cocoa, which are the leading sources of foreign exchange. Per capita 
gross domestic product remains less than $400 a year. Economic growth 
continues to lag behind population growth. The economy is impeded by a 
large and inefficient state-owned sector, high (although drastically 
reduced) spending on the security forces, widespread corruption, and 
lack of Government budget and fiscal discipline. Most major bilateral 
donors have suspended their aid due to the Government's weak 
democratization efforts and poor human rights record. Several 
international financial institutions also halted budgetary assistance 
to the Government.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
were a few improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. 
Citizens'' right to change their government is restricted. Unlike 
previous years, there were no confirmed reports of extrajudicial 
killings. Security forces committed beatings. The Government did not, 
in general, investigate or punish effectively those who committed 
abuses, nor did it prosecute openly those persons responsible for 
extrajudicial killings and disappearances in previous years. Prison 
conditions remained very harsh. Arbitrary arrest and detention was a 
problem, and prolonged pretrial detention was common, with prisoners 
often detained 6 to 7 months without being charged. The Government 
continued to influence the judiciary, which is understaffed and 
overburdened, and did not ensure defendants' rights to fair and 
expeditious trials. Security forces often infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights. The Government and the security forces restricted 
freedom of speech and of the press, often using investigative detention 
and criminal libel prosecutions to harass journalists and political 
opponents. Laws were passed in January allowing for an extended 
imprisonment of journalists who write articles critical of the 
Government and its officers. The Government restricted academic 
freedom. The Government restricted freedom of assembly, association, 
and movement. The National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) continued 
to be dominated by supporters of the President, and the Government 
restricted and impeded the work of independent human rights groups. 
Violence and societal discrimination against women remained a problem. 
Female genital mutilation (FGM) among some ethnic groups persisted; 
although there is a 1998 law that prohibits FGM, the Government 
enforced it rarely. Discrimination against ethnic minorities remained a 
problem. The Government limits workers' rights to collective 
bargaining. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution 
and trafficking in children for forced labor remained problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Unlike previous 
years, there were no confirmed reports of extrajudicial killings.
    On March 27, an agitator reportedly paid by the Government was 
killed on the University of Benin campus in Lome during a confrontation 
between demonstrating students and a group of false student 
demonstrators paid by the Government to disrupt the demonstration (see 
Section 2.a.).
    There were no developments in the October 1999 killing of a 
missionary in Lome. One soldier and one assailant were killed in an 
exchange of gunfire between police, military personnel, and the 
assailants.
    There were no developments or arrests in the January 1999 case in 
which gendarmes raided the Akodessewa-Kpota shantytown neighborhood in 
Lome and set fires that reportedly killed two children.
    An Amnesty International (AI) report issued in May 1999 stated that 
hundreds of bodies--presumably members of the opposition--were thrown 
into the sea around the time of the June 1998 presidential election 
(see Sections 1.b. and 4). The Government denied the charges and called 
for an international inquiry. In September the Government accepted a 
joint U.N./OAU commission to investigate allegations of hundreds of 
extrajudicial killings around the time of the 1998 presidential 
election. The U.N./OAU commission of inquiry visited the country in 
November to investigate these charges; the three-person commission met 
with the President and members of his cabinet, as well as with 
fishermen and farmers in the country and in Benin. Under the terms of 
the inquiry, the Government pledged not to retaliate against the 
witnesses. The commission is scheduled to release the results of its 
investigation in early 2001 (see Section 4).
    There was no development in the August 1998 killing of Liman 
Doumongue, Deputy Secretary General of the National Association of 
Independent Unions of Togo (UNSIT), a pro-opposition labor federation. 
In May 1999, UNSIT wrote a letter to President Eyadema requesting an 
independent investigation into the killing; however, the Government did 
not respond. The September 1998 killing of Koffi Mathieu Kegbe, a local 
activist in the opposition Action for Renewal Committee (CAR) party, 
was still under investigation at year's end. There were no developments 
in the 1998 killings of the Togolese Human Rights League founding 
member Dr. Tona Pierre Adigo and businessman Malou Borozi. There has 
been no public investigation into the June 1998 killing of the child, 
Ayele Akakpo. The Government claims that the August 1998 attack on 
Union of Forces for Change (UFC) Secretary-General Fabre's residence 
was carried out by coup plotters from Ghana.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances during the year.
    An AI report issued in May 1999 reported that hundreds of bodies--
presumably those of opposition members--were thrown into the sea around 
the time of the June 1998 presidential election (see Sections 1.a. and 
4). According to AI, the corpses were found and buried by Beninese 
fishermen. The Government strongly denied the accusations and initiated 
legal proceedings against AI in 1999; however, it has not pursued the 
charges. The independent Benin Human Rights League reported that bodies 
were dropped along the coastal waters by military aircraft, although 
other official sources in Benin denied that this event happened. In 
September a U.N./OAU commission arrived to investigate those charges 
and other alleged disappearances.
    AI also reported that on August 20, 1998, two young men, Komlan 
Edoh and Kodjo Kouni, were beaten and arrested by security forces in a 
northwest suburb of Lome, then taken to a nearby military camp, after 
which they disappeared. There were no further developments in the case 
during the year.
    There was no investigation into the mass burials of 1997 and 1998 
reportedly in the vicinity of Lome.
    There were no developments in the 1994 disappearance of David 
Bruce, a high-level Foreign Ministry employee sympathetic to the 
opposition, which remained under investigation by the Government.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and physical abuse of prisoners 
and detainees; however, security forces often beat detainees 
immediately after arresting them. Some suspects have claimed credibly 
to have been beaten, burned, or denied access to food and medical 
attention.
    Security forces harassed, intimidated, and beat journalists (see 
Section 2.a.).
    Security forces used tear gas and batons to disperse demonstrators 
forcibly (see Section 2.b.). On January 12, police forcibly dispersed 
opposition party demonstrators using tear gas and truncheons, 
inflicting minor injuries (cuts and bruises) on the demonstrators (see 
Section 2.b.). On July 6, security forces forcibly dispersed a UFC 
rally and beat several demonstrators (see Section 2.b.). Although 
several protestors were detained briefly, the Government did not press 
charges; no action was taken against the security forces.
    On February 17, students demonstrated in protest of the selection 
of the president of an independent student organization; government 
security forces dispersed the demonstrators with truncheons and tear 
gas; some students suffered cuts and bruises (see Section 2.a.).
    Impunity remains a problem, and the Government did not publicly 
prosecute any officials for these abuses.
    An Angolan diplomat accredited to Benin and Togo was arrested and 
allegedly tortured in November 1999 for allegedly attempting to kidnap 
one of Jonas Savimbi's children. The diplomat was released quickly and 
deported immediately; the Government took no action on the allegations 
of torture.
    There was neither investigation into nor action taken on the 1999 
case in which security forces reportedly tortured a human rights 
monitor. There was no investigation into nor action taken in the August 
1999 case in which five young men, who traveled from Lome to Kara to 
hold discussions on the Lome Framework Agreement, said that they were 
detained and beaten on two occasions by police, gendarmes, and military 
personnel in Kara. Authorities maintained that their wounds resulted 
when they resisted arrest. There was no investigation into nor action 
taken in the May 1999 case in which security forces allegedly beat and 
tortured Ameen Ayodele, a member of the Nigerian section of AI (see 
Section 4). There was no investigation into nor action taken in the 
March 1999 case in which security forces in Lome beat university 
student Gerard Amedjro and a female friend, allegedly after the latter 
refused to undress for them.
    Prison conditions reportedly remained very harsh, with serious 
overcrowding, poor sanitation, and unhealthy food. Lome's central 
prison, built for 350 prisoners, reportedly housed 1,500 inmates or 
more during the year. Medical facilities are inadequate, and disease 
and drug abuse are widespread. Despite these problems, for the fourth 
consecutive year there were no reported deaths of prisoners due to 
disease or inadequate medical facilities. Prison guards in the 
overcrowded civil prison of Lome charge prisoners a small fee to 
shower, use the toilet, or have a place to sleep. Prisoners reportedly 
have to pay $2.50 (CFA 1,500) to guards before being allowed to visit 
the infirmary if sick. The children of convicted adults often are 
incarcerated with the female inmates, who are housed separately from 
the male prisoners. Juvenile prisoners are held separately from adults.
    In September a local NGO, the African Center for Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Protection of Detainees (CADEPROD), began to conduct a 
census of civilian prisons funded by a foreign Government. The study 
was proceeding at year's end.
    Although some international and local private organizations have 
access to prisons for monitoring purposes, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross did not request a visit during the year. Following an 
October seminar on torture sponsored by the Togolese Human Rights 
League and attended by gendarmes, prison guards, and magistrates, the 
Justice Minister agreed to authorize a prison visit by the league's 
president accompanied by the prison director. However, after the prison 
tour on December 21, there was no change in the treatment of the 
prisoners.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain problems. The law allows authorities to hold arrested 
persons incommunicado without charge for 48 hours, with an additional 
48-hour extension in cases deemed serious or complex. In practice 
detainees can be, and often are, held without bail for lengthy periods 
with or without the approval of a judge. Family members and attorneys 
officially have access to a detainee after an initial 48- or 96-hour 
detention period; however, authorities often delay, and sometimes deny, 
access.
    Judges or senior police officials issue warrants. Although 
detainees have the right to be informed of the charges against them, 
police sometimes ignore this right. The law stipulates that a special 
judge conduct a pretrial investigation to examine the adequacy of 
evidence and decide on bail. However, a shortage of judges and other 
qualified personnel, plus official inaction, have resulted in lengthy 
pretrial detention--in some cases several years--and confinement of 
prisoners for periods exceeding the time they would have had to serve 
if they had been tried and convicted. For example, Kokou Alowou and 
Dela Atidepe were arrested in 1993, charged with armed robbery and 
manslaughter, and were still awaiting trial at year's end. An estimated 
50 percent of the prison population is pretrial detainees.
    The Government continued to use brief investigative detentions of 
less than 48 hours to harass and intimidate opposition activists and 
journalists for alleged defamation of Government officials (see Section 
2.a.). On February 24, security forces arrested seven members of the 
opposition UFC party, the day after a confrontation between UFC and RPT 
party members; no RPT members were arrested. After many delays during 
which time some of the UFC members remained in detention, they were 
tried in August; two were acquitted and five others were convicted of 
disturbing the peace and destroying public property. They received jail 
sentences of 2 to 6 months and were ordered to pay a $700 (CFA 500,000) 
fine. On July 31 and August 1, Kofi Messa Devotsu of the LTDH was 
questioned and threatened with arrest by the Minister of the Interior 
after the LTDH published a report on July 20 that was critical of human 
rights in the country (see Section 4). A number of independent 
journalists also were questioned at the same time for publishing 
articles on the LTDH report. The Government at times has resorted to 
false charges of common crimes to arrest, detain, and intimidate 
opponents.
    Members of the security forces arrested and detained journalists 
without charging them with any offense (see Section 2.a.).
    Members of the security forces detained human rights monitors and 
activists (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
    On December 23, 1999, authorities arrested Roland Comlan Kpagli, 
publisher of L'Aurore newspaper on charges of reporting false 
information (see Section 2.a.). In response to international pressure, 
he was not tried, was never charged officially, and was finally 
released on February 4. On January 28, authorities arrested Norbert 
Gbikpi-Benissan of the UNSIT teachers' union and Allagua Odegui, 
Secretary General of the FETRAN/UNSIT, for allegedly providing false 
information to Kpagli for the article that prompted his arrest. 
International pressure resulted in their release within a month.
    In November 1999, security forces arrested and allegedly tortured 
an Angolan diplomat for allegedly attempting to kidnap one of Jonas 
Savimbis'' children (see Section 1.c.). He was released subsequently 
and immediately deported.
    The status of UFC activist Abevi Abbey, detained by security forces 
in April 1999 for distributing leaflets that urged the public to 
participate in UFC-sponsored Independence Day demonstrations, remains 
unknown. A domestic NGO believed that he had been released.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects this 
prohibition; however, several opposition and human rights workers 
remain in self-imposed exile because they fear arrest.
    For example, on March 8, several student opposition leaders were 
sentenced to 18-month jail terms for inciting riots on the campus of 
the University of Benin. Some students fled into self-imposed exile in 
Ghana before they could be arrested.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the executive branch 
continued to exert control over the judiciary. A majority of the 
members of the Supreme Council for the Magistrature are supporters of 
President Eyadema. Judges who belong to the pro-Eyadema Professional 
Association of Togo Magistrates (APMT) reportedly receive the most 
prestigious assignments, while judges who advocate an independent 
judiciary and belong to the National Association of Magistrates (ANM) 
are marginalized.
    The Constitutional Court stands at the apex of the court system. 
The civil judiciary system includes the Supreme Court, Sessions (Court 
of Assizes), and Appeals Courts. A military tribunal exists for crimes 
committed by security forces, but its proceedings are closed. In June 
1999, when President Eyadema named a new cabinet, he appointed former 
Interior Minister General Seyi Memene to replace a civilian Justice 
Minister.
    The court system remained overburdened and understaffed (see 
Section 1.d.). Magistrates, like most government employees, are not 
always paid on time. The judicial system employs both traditional law 
as well as the Napoleonic Code in trying criminal and civil cases. 
Trials are open to the public, and judicial procedures generally are 
respected. Defendants have the right to counsel and to appeal. The Bar 
Association provides attorneys for the indigent. Defendants may 
confront witnesses, present evidence, and enjoy a presumption of 
innocence. In rural areas, the village chief or council of elders may 
try minor criminal and civil cases. Those who reject the traditional 
ruling may take their cases to the regular court system, which is the 
starting point for cases in urban areas.
    Impunity for those who commit abuses, particularly those close to 
Eyadema, remains a problem.
    There were no reports of political prisoners. On March 11, 1999, 
the three remaining members of the opposition group MO5, arrested in 
1994 and sentenced in 1996 to 5 to 7 years in prison, were freed. 
Although their crime appeared to have been politically motivated, the 
state prosecutor did not apply the December 1994 general amnesty law to 
this case and they remained in prison until their release in March 
1999.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity of 
residences, the secrecy of correspondence and telecommunications, and 
prohibits searches and seizures not prescribed by law; however, 
security forces often infringed on these rights. In criminal cases, a 
judge or senior police official may authorize searches of private 
residences. In political and national security cases, the security 
forces need no prior authorization. Police conducted searches without 
warrants, searching for arms caches as well as for criminals, often 
under the guise of searching for identity cards. Armed security 
checkpoints exist throughout the country, and security forces regularly 
search vehicles, baggage, and individuals in the name of security (see 
Section 2.d.).
    In May the Government stationed security guards around the home of 
former human rights Minister Harry Olympio and restricted his 
movements, ostensibly for his own protection following an attempt to 
kill him.
    Citizens believe that the Government monitors telephones and 
correspondence, although this surveillance has not been confirmed. The 
police and Gendarmerie perform domestic intelligence functions. The 
Government maintains a system of informers on the university campus 
(see Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricts 
these rights in practice. The Government repeatedly harassed and 
intimidated print media journalists through threats, detentions, and 
criminal libel prosecutions. Police and gendarmes occasionally harassed 
newspaper vendors and confiscated issues of some opposition newspapers. 
Advertisers reportedly often were intimidated as well. Few opposition 
newspapers are distributed outside the Lome area, particularly in areas 
not known to be ruling party strongholds.
    On January 4, the National Assembly adopted an amendment to the 
1998 Press and Communication Code. Article 1 of the 1998 code declares 
that the media are free; most of the remaining 108 articles restrict 
media freedom. Article 62 makes the intentional publication of false 
information a criminal offense, punishable by fines of $900 to $1,800 
(CFA 500,000 to 1 million). Articles 90 to 98 make defamation of state 
institutions or any member of certain classes of persons, including 
government officials, a crime punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 
months and fines of up to $4,000 (CFA 2 million). Article 89 makes it a 
crime, punishable by up to 3 months in prison for a second offense, to 
``offend the honor, dignity or esteem'' of the President and other 
government leaders. The law also provides that editors and publishers, 
including legislators with parliamentary immunity, are liable for 
crimes committed through the press. The January amendment revised 
Article 89 to provide for 3- to 6-month jail terms for first offenders, 
who previously were subject only to 3-month suspended sentences. In 
practice first-time offenders were imprisoned in spite of the former 
article, which was changed to conform to practice.
    On August 10, the National Assembly passed a law further regulating 
journalism, which included a provision requiring that all journalists 
must have a journalism degree; however, there are no journalism 
programs offered in the country. Although a grandfather clause applies 
to those already active in journalism, observers believe that this law 
could be used to prevent persons seen as unsympathetic to the 
Government from becoming journalists. Although it is not necessary to 
be an accredited journalist to publish an editorial or opinion article, 
the Government may take reprisals if offended by published material, 
such as arresting or detaining the writer, or firing a civil servant.
    Despite Government interference, there is a lively press, most of 
which is heavily politicized and some of which is often highly critical 
of President Eyadema. About 16 privately owned newspapers publish with 
some regularity. The only daily newspaper, Togo-Presse, is government-
owned and controlled. A private Lome-based newspaper, Crocodile, 
publishes on a biweekly schedule.
    There is no prepublication censorship of print media in law or 
practice; however, security forces frequently threatened or detained 
print media journalists and interfered with the distribution of 
newspapers.
    On April 6, security forces seized copies of opposition newspaper 
Crocodile without explanation. Authorities seized the April 13 edition 
of L'Exile and detained editor Hippolyte Agboh after the newspaper 
published an article alleging the death of Eyadema's daughter in a 
late-night car accident. Agboh was released on June 16, just prior to 
the OAU summit in Lome; he was never charged and no further action was 
taken in the case. On June 5, security forces seized copies of the 
weekly newspaper Le Combat du Peuple. The newspaper's publisher, Lucien 
Messan, was charged with libel and fined more than $900 (CFA 600,000). 
By year's end, no journalists remained in prison.
    On July 31 and August 1, the Minister of the Interior questioned 
and threatened with arrest Kofi Messa Devotsu of the Togolese Human 
Rights League (LTDH) after the LTDH published a report on July 20 that 
was critical of human rights in the country (see Section 4). A number 
of independent journalists also were questioned at the same time for 
publishing articles on the LTDH report.
    On December 23, 1999, Roland Comlan Kpagli, editor of L'Aurore, was 
arrested for publishing false news regarding the death of a schoolgirl 
during a police response to a student demonstration. Kpagli was 
released on February 4 without being charged.
    At year's end, no further action had been taken in the case of Ame 
Kpeto, an army warrant officer who made critical statements about 
Government officials at a military assembly in 1998. In 1999 Kpeto was 
charged with slandering the honor of the army and transferred to the 
civil prison of Lome to await a civil trial.
    Since newspapers and television are relatively expensive, radio is 
the most important medium of mass communication. In addition to two 
Government-owned stations including Radio Lome, there are more than 20 
private radio stations in the country. Two of these, Radio Avenir and 
Galaxy FM, are associated with the ruling party.
    Prior to the adoption of the 1998 Press Code, the Government did 
not permit private radio stations to broadcast news programming. Some 
private radio stations began in 1999 to broadcast some domestic news, 
but they offered little of the political commentary and criticism of 
the Government that is widespread in the print media. However, Radio 
France International is heard 24 hours a day through an FM repeater and 
Africa Numero-1 also has an FM repeater in Lome. In 1999 a private 
station, Kanal FM, became a foreign affiliate and carries several hours 
of news, music, and commentary daily.
    The government-owned and controlled Television Togo is the only 
television station in Lome and in most of the country. In 1999 a small 
private television station began local broadcasts in Aneho with limited 
programming.
    The Constitution mandates equal access to state media; however, the 
official media heavily slanted their content in favor of the President 
and the Government. The High Authority for Audio-Visual and 
Communications (HAAC) is charged with providing equal access to state 
media as mandated by the Constitution. Although it is nominally 
independent, in practice it operates as an arm of the Government. It is 
dominated by Eyadema supporters and has not increased opposition access 
to the Government-controlled media. An NGO, the Togolese Media 
Observatory (OTM), was established in November 1999 with the purpose to 
protect press freedom and to improve the professionalism of 
journalists. OTM's board and membership include both government and 
private journalists. During the year, it met regularly to discuss 
journalistic ethics and professional standards.
    There were no reports that the Government restricted access to the 
Internet. There are about 15 Internet service providers in the country. 
Most Internet users are businesses rather than households. Access to 
the Internet and fax machines also is possible through many small 
stores and cafes in Lome and other cities.
    At the country's sole university, academic freedom is constrained 
by concern among professors about potential harassment by the 
Government or antiopposition militants and the lack of a faculty-
elected rector. Teachers' salaries and students' stipends rarely are 
paid on time. University faculty remained on strike over this issue 
until January, forcing classes to begin late and almost causing the 
cancellation of the school year. Opposition student groups reportedly 
are intimidated by an informer system that has led in the past to 
Government persecution. The only officially tolerated student groups, 
Haut Conseil des Movements Etudiants and Union General des Etudiants et 
Stagiares du Togo, are pro-Eyadema. An independent student organization 
(CEUB) has had longstanding unofficial recognition, and its elected 
representatives have participated on university committees. However, in 
February students complained that board members bribed by the 
Government selected the newly elected CEUB president. On February 17, 
in response students demonstrated in protest of the selection of the 
president; government security forces dispersed the demonstrators with 
truncheons and tear gas; some students suffered cuts and bruises. There 
were credible reports that the Government used paid agitators to 
disrupt student demonstrations and provide a pretext for security 
forces to disperse demonstrators and arrest students. One Government 
agitator was killed on the university campus in March during a 
demonstration (see Section 1.a.), and CEUB leader Lorempo Lamboni went 
into hiding after being charged by the Government with responsibility 
for the events leading to this death; Lamboni remained in hiding at 
year's end. On March 8, several student opposition leaders were 
sentenced to 18-month jail terms for inciting riots on the campus of 
the University of Benin. During the year, some students fled into self-
imposed exile in Ghana before they could be arrested.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides that citizens are free to assemble; however, the Government 
restricts this right in practice. Although opposition political parties 
sometimes were able to hold public meetings in Lome, authorities 
systematically interfered with the freedom of political opponents 
attempting to assemble in the central and northern regions. Government 
officials prohibited, and security forces forcibly dispersed, some 
public demonstrations critical of the Government.
    On January 12, security forces using tear gas and truncheons 
forcibly dispersed a UFC march held in Lome to protest the January 13 
Liberation Day holiday. There were credible reports that the Government 
used paid agitators to disrupt student demonstrations and provide a 
pretext for security forces to disperse demonstrators and arrest 
students. For example, on March 27, a student demonstration on the 
university campus was dispersed and a demonstrator was killed (see 
Sections 1.a. and 2.a.). On June 20, the Government banned all 
demonstrations prior to the OAU summit in early July. On July 6, 
immediately prior to the opening of the OAU ministerial meeting in 
Lome, security forces forcibly dispersed a UFC rally of approximately 
200 persons that violated the government ban on demonstrations during 
this period; security forces beat several demonstrators. The 
demonstrators were seeking release of seven UFC members arrested in 
February (see Section 1.d.).
    In December 1999, police arrested student union leaders and 
detained them for several days following a riot allegedly caused when 
security forces dispersed a student gathering at a Lome high school. 
Officials told the arrested students that they would be held 
responsible and rearrested for any demonstrations that occurred 
subsequently in Lome. They were released within a few days of their 
arrests and given 18-month suspended sentences.
    In late August 1999, in Kara authorization was denied to organizers 
of an information meeting on the July 29 Framework Agreement on 
Democratic Transition in Togo; the organizers were arrested (see 
Section 1.c.); however, they were not charged and were released within 
a few days.
    Under the Constitution, citizens have the right to organize 
associations and political parties; however, the Government restricted 
this right in practice. While political parties are able to elect 
officers and register, few opposition party offices and no pro-
opposition newspapers operate in most towns in the central and northern 
regions.
    There are many nongovernmental organizations (NGO's); they are 
required to register with the Government.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    New religious organizations are required to register with the 
Ministry of Interior, and scores of applications await adjudication; 
however, these groups appear to practice their faiths without 
hindrance. In the early 1990's, a number of new religious groups began 
to seek recognition. Cases of individuals who used religion as a cover 
for other activities also increased. At the same time, advocates for 
religious freedom demanded more tolerance and protection for persons of 
all faiths. At the urging of the Togolese Association for the Defense 
of Religious Liberty (ATDLR), which was founded in 1991, the Government 
adopted a more liberal approach to religious freedom; however, the 
Government concluded that the rise of cults and dubious religious 
associations was a problem. In 1995, the last year for which statistics 
are available, the Government recognized only 71 of the 198 groups that 
applied for official recognition during that year. It is believed that 
the others continued to operate in a clandestine fashion. These 
unregistered groups are mostly little known groups within the major 
religions.
    The Constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties 
based on religion and states explicitly that ``no political party 
should identify itself with a region, an ethnic group, or a religion,'' 
and this occurs in practice.
    In January, for the second year in a row, the Catholic Church 
declined an invitation to participate in a ``Day of National 
Liberation'' service organized by the Government. The Catholic Church 
stated that it is inappropriate to hold a worship service in a 
government building. In 1999 the Government criticized the church for 
``not contributing to national reconciliation'' but took no further 
action. In addition, under the leadership of the Archbishop of Lome, 
the Catholic Church continued to refrain from delivering political 
sermons praising President Eyadema.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights; however, the Government restricts these rights in practice. 
Armed security checkpoints and arbitrary searches of vehicles and 
individuals are common, and government security forces searched cars 
throughout the country. The lack of discipline of some soldiers manning 
roadblocks and their actions, such as frequent demands for bribes 
before allowing citizens to pass, impeded free movement within the 
country. In June the Government also declared that no old-model cars 
would be allowed on the roads during the July OAU summit. Downtown 
areas of Lome were blocked to all but official vehicles during the week 
of the Summit.
    The Government eased its strict documentation requirements for 
citizens who apply for a new passport or a renewal. In the previous 
year, applicants were asked to provide an airline ticket, business 
documents, an invitation letter, a parental authorization letter (even 
for adults), proof of study grant for students, and a husband's 
permission for a married woman (see Section 5) in addition to normal 
identity papers. In 1997 the Government transferred the Passport Office 
from the police to the Gendarmerie, which falls under the Defense 
Ministry. The Government maintains that its intent was to take passport 
issuance away from corrupt police officials. Strict passport 
application requirements and a shortage of blank passports prevented or 
significantly hindered some citizens' travel abroad. However, in 
January a new machine-readable passport was introduced; delays for 
passports are a result of 2 years' deferred demand and the 
centralization of the passport-issuing authority. A national identity 
card can also be used for travel to other member countries of the 
Economic Community of West African States.
    There is no law that provides for granting refugee or asylee status 
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    The Government provides first asylum. The Government cooperates 
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and routinely 
accepts the decision of the UNHCR office located in Lome in determining 
refugee status. The UNHCR estimated at year's end that the country 
hosts 11,208 refugees from Ghana. Another 11,000 Ghanaian refugees live 
in villages in the northern part of the country and are not assisted by 
UNHCR. The UNHCR also estimated that 1,058 Togolese refugees still 
remained outside the country at year's end.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their 
Government peacefully; however, the Government restricts this right in 
practice. In the June 1998 presidential election, as in virtually all 
previous elections since Eyadema seized power in 1967, the Government 
prevented citizens from exercising this right effectively. The Interior 
Ministry declared Eyadema the winner with 52 percent of the vote in the 
1998 election; however, serious irregularities in the Government's 
conduct of the election strongly favored the incumbent and appear to 
have affected the outcome materially.
    Although the Government did not obstruct the functioning of 
political opponents openly, the President used the strength of the 
military and his government allies to intimidate and harass citizens 
and opposition groups. The Government and the State remained highly 
centralized. President Eyadema's national Government appointed the 
officials and controlled the budgets of all subnational government 
entities including prefectures and municipalities, and influenced the 
selection of traditional chiefs.
    The second multiparty legislative elections of Eyadema's 33-year 
rule were held on March 21, 1999. However, the opposition boycotted the 
election, in which the ruling party won 79 of the 81 seats in the 
National Assembly. The two remaining seats went to candidates from 
little-known independent parties. The legislative elections were marred 
by procedural problems and significant fraud, particularly 
misrepresentation of voter turnout.
    The opposition set several conditions before it would take part in 
the 1999 legislative elections. Chief among them was a settlement of 
the dispute over the seriously flawed June 1998 presidential election 
in which the vote count was stopped and President Eyadema declared the 
winner by the Interior Minister. Under international pressure, the 
Government began preliminary discussions with the opposition which, 
according to an agreement reached in December 1998, were to be followed 
by formal negotiations, in the presence of international facilitators. 
When the parties disagreed over UFC insistence that formal negotiations 
occur outside of the country, the Government scheduled a first round of 
legislative elections on March 7, 1999 and a runoff on March 21, 1999. 
The Government argued that the mandate of the outgoing legislature 
expired in March 1999 and that elections had to be held to avoid a 
constitutional vacuum. When the opposition did not register candidates, 
the Government proposed a 2-week postponement; however, the opposition 
parties maintained their position in favor of a boycott. The elections 
proceeded and virtually the only candidates to run were those from the 
RPT.
    In February 1999, the Council of Ministers passed a decree 
requiring security forces to vote 3 days before the general population, 
and some 15,000 military, gendarmes, police, customs officials, and 
firemen voted on March 18, 1999. Opposition party members of the 
National Electoral Commission stated that the special voting procedures 
for security forces violated the Electoral Code because they occurred 
before the end of campaigning, and that the vote count occurred 72 
hours after the vote instead of immediately afterwards. According to 
the Government, about 65 percent of the population participated in the 
legislative elections while the opposition stated that the figure could 
not be more than 10 percent. The progovernment National Electoral 
Commission, absent the commission's opposition party members (who also 
boycotted the process), reported that turnout reached about 37 percent 
in the opposition stronghold of Ave, and as much as 95 percent in Kozah 
prefecture in the north, where the ruling party has greater support. 
The opposition took no part in the revision of voter rolls, the 
distribution of voter cards, the monitoring of the vote, and the 
counting of the ballots. National election observer organizations did 
not participate, and international observation was sporadic.
    The Government invited a few international observers to comment on 
the organization and management of the election; however, there were no 
independent observers present when the military voted on March 18, 
1999. Even though RPT candidates ran unopposed in most districts, there 
were reports of intimidation and evidence of fraud to boost statistics 
on voter participation in what were essentially one-party elections. 
For example, in Tchaoudjo, where voting started at 6 a.m., polling 
place officials did not allow delegates of an independent party to 
participate in the supervision work until 9 a.m.; these delegates 
watched ballot boxes being stuffed. In Agou independent party delegates 
claimed that they saw individuals voting more than 10 times. Foreign 
diplomats observed voting at close to 200 polling stations, mainly in 
and around Lome, but also in Yoto prefecture. Turnout was below the 
levels reflected in official results for most of these locations.
    On April 9, 1999, the Constitutional Court confirmed that of the 
2,412,027 registered voters, 1,592,661 voted, for a turnout of 66 
percent. The court rejected a dozen complaints and annulled the results 
in two districts; however, new elections were never held in these 
districts and the districts remained unrepresented at year's end.
    The National Assembly has little authority or influence on 
President Eyadema and has limited influence on the Government. Aside 
from controlling its own programs and activities and its ability to 
request amendments, the National Assembly largely endorses the 
proposals of the President and the Government.
    After the 1999 legislative election, the Government announced that 
it would continue to pursue dialog with the opposition. In May 1999, 2 
months after the election, President Eyadema nominated a new Prime 
Minister, Eugene Koffi Adoboli, a former U.N. official who was not a 
member of the ruling party. In August the National Assembly unanimously 
passed a no-confidence vote against Adoboli and his 14-month-old 
Government; he resigned 2 days later. On August 29, the President 
appointed the former president of the National Assembly, Agbeyome 
Kodjo, a former Interior Minister and RPT supporter as the new prime 
minister. In September the National Assembly, in a secret ballot with 
just one candidate running, voted to elect former National Assembly 
first Vice President Fambare Natchaba to replace Kodjo as president of 
the National Assembly. The vote was close, 51-23, but most observers 
agreed that this was due more to a dislike of Natchaba than to a rebuke 
of the President's apparent choice for the job since the President's 
party controls all but two seats in the National Assembly.
    In June 1999, the RPT and opposition parties met in Paris, in the 
presence of facilitators representing France, Germany, the European 
Union, and La Francophonie, to agree on security measures for formal 
negotiations in Lome. In July 1999, the Government and the opposition 
began a dialog, and on July 29, 1999, all sides signed an accord called 
the ``Lome Framework Agreement,'' which included a pledge by President 
Eyadema that he would respect the Constitution and not seek another 
term as president after his current one expires in 2003. The accord 
also called for the negotiation of a legal status for opposition 
leaders, as well as for former heads of state (such as their immunity 
from prosecution for acts in office), although at year's end only the 
former had been considered. In addition the accord addressed the rights 
and duties of political parties and the media, the safe return of 
refugees, and the security of all citizens. The accord also contained a 
provision for compensating victims of political violence. The President 
also agreed to dissolve the National Assembly in March and hold new 
legislative elections, which would be supervised by an independent 
national election commission and which would use the single-ballot 
method to protect against some of the abuses of past elections. 
However, the March date passed without presidential action, and new 
legislative elections had yet to be held at year's end.
    As called for in the Lome Framework Agreement, a Joint 
Implementation Committee (JIC) began meeting on August 10, 1999 to 
implement the agreement's provisions. In December 1999, the JIC sent 
new Electoral Code legislation to the Government establishing the new 
CENI. On April 5, the President signed into law a new Electoral Code 
that established the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), which is 
composed of 10 members of the President's RPT party and 10 members of 
the opposition. Most opposition parties accepted the new Electoral 
Code. On July 22, the CENI selected Artheme Ahoomey-Zunu, a member of 
the opposition Pan-African Patriotic Convergence Party CPP (CCC PPP) to 
be its president. At year's end, the CENI was working with the 
Government to develop a budget and then to seek funding from the donor 
community for new legislative elections, tentatively projected for 
2001.
    In 1998 the National Assembly voted on a decentralization plan, but 
the plan's implementation has been slow. Administratively, the prefect, 
nominated by the Interior Minister, is the primary representative of 
the central government in each of the 30 prefecture. Some Government 
agencies have representatives in the five regions.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in 
politics or government; however, women were underrepresented in 
government and politics. Although many women are members of political 
parties, there were only 2 female ministers in the Government and 5 
female members in the 81-member National Assembly. There are no legal 
restrictions on the participation of members of ethnic minorities in 
the government; however, members of southern ethnic groups were 
underrepresented in government and politics. However, no ethnic group, 
including the President's, was overrepresented conspicuously in the 
Cabinet.

Section 4. Government Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are several domestic private human rights groups, including 
the Togolese Human Rights League (LTDH), the Center of Observation and 
Promotion of the Rule of Law (COPED), the African Center for Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Protection of Detainees (CADEPROD), and the Togolese 
Association for the Defense and Protection of Human Rights (ATDPDH). In 
general the Government allows groups to investigate alleged violations 
of human rights; however, the Government occasionally threatened or 
hindered the activities of human rights activists, and was inconsistent 
in following up on investigations of abuses. Years of government 
threats and intimidation of human rights leaders, combined with a lack 
of results from human rights initiatives, have led some human rights 
monitors to end their public activities. A Minister for the Promotion 
of Democracy and Rule of Law was appointed in 1998. In 1999 he promoted 
initiatives to establish a human rights resource center and develop a 
civic education curriculum for schools; however, in August the separate 
ministry was abolished, and human rights issues were transferred to the 
Ministry of Justice. At year's end, there was no further action on 
these problems.
    In November a joint U.N./OAU commission visited the country and 
Benin to investigate allegations that there were hundreds of 
extrajudicial killings during the period of the 1998 presidential 
elections. Many of the allegations were made in a May 1999 AI report. 
The Government vigorously disputed the report's findings and threatened 
to sue AI. In criticizing AI, the Government also noted that no 
journalist or foreign observer who monitored the June 1998 election 
reported bodies washing ashore; however, the newspaper L'Aurore in its 
August 13, 1998 edition, mentioned some bodies washing up on the 
Togolese and Beninese shores. The Government stated that the UFC and 
CDPA opposition parties directed the AI report, a charge denied by 
those groups and by AI. At the time, the Government also alleged that 
the ATDPDH collaborated with AI. The three-person U.N./OAU commission 
of inquiry met with the President and members of his cabinet, as well 
as with fishermen and farmers in the country and in Benin. Under the 
terms of the inquiry, the Government pledged not to retaliate against 
the witnesses. The commission is scheduled to release the results of 
its investigation in early 2001(see Section 1.a.).
    AI/Togo regained its official status with the Government during the 
year and operates within the country.
    In April 1999, the Ministry for the Promotion of Democracy and the 
Rule of Law, headed by Harry Octavianus Olympio, opened an information 
and documentation center on human rights. However, in June the 
President fired Olympio and accused him of staging his own attempted 
killing. He was not replaced and, at year's end, the position of 
Minister for the Promotion of Democracy and the Rule of Law was 
absorbed into the Ministry of Justice.
    On July 31 and August 1, Kofi Messa Devotsu of the LTDH was 
questioned and threatened with arrest by the Minister of the Interior 
after the LTDH published a report on July 20 critical of human rights 
in the country (see Section 2.a.).

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of ethnic 
group, regional or family origin, sex, religion, social or economic 
status, or personal, political, or other convictions; however, the 
Government does not provide effective redress for discrimination 
complaints. Discrimination against women and ethnic minorities remained 
a problem. Members of President Eyadema's Kabye ethnic group and other 
northern ethnic groups dominate much of the public sector, especially 
the military.
    Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. Although 
mechanisms for redress exist within both the traditional extended 
family and formal judicial structures, the police rarely intervene in 
domestic violence cases. Wife beating has been estimated to affect 
approximately 10 percent of married women.
    Despite a constitutional declaration of equality under the law, 
women continue to experience discrimination, especially in education, 
pension benefits, and inheritance as a consequence of traditional law. 
A husband legally may restrict his wife's freedom to work or control 
her earnings. The Government requires that a married woman have her 
husband's permission to apply for a passport (see Section 2.d.). In 
urban areas, women and girls dominate market activities and commerce. 
However, harsh economic conditions in rural areas, where most of the 
population lives, leave women with little time for activities other 
than domestic and agricultural fieldwork. Under traditional law, which 
applies to the vast majority of women, a wife has no maintenance rights 
in the event of divorce or separation and no inheritance rights upon 
the death of her husband. Polygyny is practiced.
    There is a Ministry of Feminine Promotion and Social Protection, 
which, along with independent women's groups and related NGO's, 
campaigns actively to inform women of their rights.
    There is some trafficking in young women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution or for forced labor as domestic servants (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.), but the Government reportedly exercised more vigilance 
at border crossings to counter such trafficking.
    Children.--Although the Constitution and family code laws provide 
for the protection of children's rights, in practice government 
programs often suffer from a lack of money, materials, and enforcement. 
Although the law protects children, there are many practices that 
demonstrate a pattern of discrimination against children, especially 
girls. The Government provides free education in state schools. School 
attendance is compulsory for both boys and girls until the age of 15. 
Approximately 61 percent of children aged 6 to 15 years attend school, 
mostly boys. In the age group of 6 to 15 years, approximately 89 
percent of boys and 66 percent of girls start primary school; however, 
only approximately 39 percent of boys and 13 percent of girls reach 
secondary school. Approximately 3 percent of boys and 0.6 percent of 
girls reach the university level. Literacy rates are 57 percent for 
adult men and 31 percent for adult women. About one-third of the 
national budget is spent on education.
    Orphans and other needy children receive some aid from extended 
families or private organizations but less from the State. There are 
social programs to provide free health care for poor children. There 
are few juvenile courts, and children are jailed with adults (see 
Section 1.c.). In rural areas, traditionally the best food is reserved 
for adults, principally the father.
    Female genital mutilation which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, continues to be practiced. The most commonly 
practiced form of FGM is excision, which usually is performed on girls 
a few months after birth. A 1995 survey concluded that approximately 12 
percent of all girls and women have undergone FGM; it is practiced by 
Christians and practitioners of traditional indigenous religions, and 
it is prevalent in Muslim communities. Most of the larger ethnic groups 
do not practice FGM. However, among the practicing groups rates range 
from 40 to 98 percent.
    In theory women and girls are protected from FGM by the 
Constitution, and in 1998 the Government enacted a law prohibiting the 
practice with penalties for practitioners ranging from 2 months to 5 
years imprisonment and substantial fines. There was one arrest, the 
first under the law, in 1998. Both the father of the victim and the 
practitioner were found guilty on June 28, sentenced to a year in 
prison, and fined $175 (CFA 100,000). Both were released after serving 
2 months in jail. However, the law rarely is prosecuted because most 
FGM cases occur in rural areas where neither the victims nor police 
know the law. Traditional customs often supersede the legal systems 
among certain ethnic groups.
    The Government continued to sponsor seminars to educate and 
campaign against FGM. Several NGO's, with international assistance, 
organized educational campaigns to inform women of their rights and to 
care for the victims of FGM.
    There are confirmed reports of trafficking in children, 
particularly girls, for the purpose of forced labor, which amounts at 
times to slavery (see Sections (6.c. and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate 
accessibility to public or private facilities for the disabled. 
Although the Constitution nominally obliges the Government to aid 
disabled persons and shelter them from social injustice, the Government 
provides only limited assistance in practice. There is no overt state 
discrimination against disabled persons and some hold Government 
positions. However, the disabled have no meaningful recourse against 
private sector or societal discrimination, and there is discrimination 
against the disabled in practice.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of 
more than 4 million includes members of some 40 ethnic groups that 
generally speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated 
regionally in rural areas. Major ethnic groups include the Ewe (between 
20 and 25 percent of the population), the Kabye (between 10 and 15 
percent), the Kotokoli (between 10 and 15 percent), the Moba (between 
10 to 15 percent), and the Mina (about 5 percent). The Ewe and Mina are 
the largest ethnic groups in the southern region, where abundant 
rainfall and access to the sea have been conducive to farming and 
trade; the Kabye are the largest group in the drier, landlocked, less 
populous, and less prosperous northern region.
    Although prohibited by law, societal discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity is practiced routinely by members of all ethnic groups. In 
particular discrimination against southerners by northerners and 
against northerners by southerners is evident in private sector hiring 
and buying patterns, in patterns of de facto ethnic segregation in 
urban neighborhoods, and in the relative paucity of marriages across 
the north-south ethnic divide. There are no effective impediments to 
the extension of such discrimination into the public sector, where the 
centralization of the State allows little scope for regional or ethnic 
autonomy, except through the circumscribed authority of traditional 
rulers and dispute resolution systems.
    The relative predominance in private sector commerce and 
professions by members of southern ethnic groups, and the relative 
predominance of the public sector and especially the security forces by 
members of President Eyadema's Kabye group and other northern groups, 
are sources of political tension. Political parties tend to have 
readily identifiable ethnic and regional bases: The RPT party is more 
represented among northern ethnic groups than among southern groups, 
while the reverse is true of the UFC and CAR opposition parties.
    In previous years, north-south tensions repeatedly have erupted 
into violence of a clearly interethnic character, although there were 
no reports of such violence during the year. Majority ethnic group 
members in each region have harassed and attacked members of ethnic 
groups originating from the other region, forcing them back to their 
home region. In addition due to the congruence of political divisions 
and ethnic and regional divisions, human rights abuses motivated by 
politics at times carried ethnic and regional overtones (see Section 
3).

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides most 
workers with the right to join unions and the right to strike; however, 
security forces, including firemen and policemen, do not have these 
rights; government health care workers may join unions but may not 
strike. The Constitution also prohibits discrimination against workers 
for reasons of sex, origin, beliefs, or opinions. The work force in the 
formal sector is small, involving approximately 20 percent of the total 
work force of whom from 60 to 70 percent are union members or 
supporters.
    There are several major trade union federations. These include the 
National Confederation of Togolese Workers (CNTT)--which is closely 
associated with the Government, the Labor Federation of Togolese 
Workers (CSTT), the National Union of Independent Syndicates (UNSIT), 
and the Union of Free Trade Unions.
    There is no specific law prohibiting retribution against strikers.
    On January 28, the Government arrested two trade union officials, 
Gbikpi Benissan, Secretary-General of the National Union of Independent 
Trade Unions of Togo (UNSIT) and Allagah-Kodegui, Secretary-General of 
the Democratic Organization of African Workers'' Trade Union (ODSTA). 
On January 29, an arrest warrant was issued for Beliki Akouete, 
Secretary-General of the Workers'' Trade Union Confederation of Togo 
(CSTT) and Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Organization of 
African Workers'' Trade Union (ODSTA). The Government arrested the two 
high-ranking trade union officials for ``spreading false information 
and libel,'' both of which are penalized specifically under the Code of 
Press and Communications, and not for any trade union activities. On 
February 4, the Government released the two trade union officials and 
withdrew the arrest warrant against Akouete; the judicial proceedings 
against the three persons were dropped.
    Teachers' salaries and students' stipends rarely are paid on time. 
University faculty remained on strike over this issue until January 
(see Section 2.a.).
    Federations and unions are free to associate with international 
labor groups. The CNTT and the UNSIT are affiliates of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The CSTT is an 
affiliate of the World Confederation of Labor.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
nominally provides workers with the right to organize and bargain 
collectively; however, the Government limits collective bargaining to 
producing a single nationwide agreement that must be negotiated and 
endorsed by representatives of the Government as well as of labor 
unions and employers. All formal sector employees are covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement. This agreement sets nationwide wage 
standards for all formal sector employees. The Government participates 
in this process both as a labor-management mediator and as the largest 
employer in the formal sector, managing numerous state-owned firms that 
monopolize many sectors of the formal economy. Individual groups in the 
formal sector can attempt through sector-specific or firm-specific 
collective bargaining to negotiate agreements more favorable to labor, 
but this option rarely is used.
    The Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination. The Ministry of 
Labor is charged with resolving labor-related complaints, but it does 
not always do so effectively.
    A 1989 law allows the establishment of export processing zones 
(EPZ's). Many companies have EPZ status, and more than 30 are in 
operation. The EPZ law provides exemptions from some provisions of the 
Labor Code, notably the regulations on hiring and firing. Employees of 
EPZ firms do not enjoy the same protection against antiunion 
discrimination as do other workers. In practice unions do not have free 
access to EPZ's or freedom to organize workers. During the year, the 
Government did not change the 1974 Labor Code to end the prohibition 
against foreign nationals performing administrative or management 
functions in trade unions.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not 
specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor, including that performed 
by children, and children sometimes are subjected to forced labor, 
primarily as domestic servants. The Government acknowledged that there 
is international trafficking in children, particularly girls, who are 
sold into various forms of indentured and exploitative servitude, which 
amounts at times to slavery (see Section 6.d. and 6.f.). There also is 
some trafficking in young women for the purpose of forced prostitution 
or for forced labor as domestic servants (see Sections (6.d. and 6.f.).
    In rural areas, parents sometimes put young children into domestic 
work in other households in exchange for sums as low as the equivalent 
of $25 to $35 (CFA 15,000 to 20,000).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under 
the age of 14 in any enterprise. Some types of industrial and technical 
employment require a minimum age of 18. Inspectors from the Ministry of 
Labor enforce these age requirements but only in the formal sector in 
urban areas. In both urban and rural areas, particularly in farming and 
petty trading, very young children traditionally assist in their 
families' work. Under the Constitution, school is mandatory for both 
sexes until the age of 15, but this requirement is not enforced 
strictly (see Section 5). The law does not prohibit forced and bonded 
labor by children, and children are trafficked for forced labor (see 
Section 6.c. and 6.f.). On September 19, the Government ratified ILO 
Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor. Although the 
Government ratified the convention, few resources were allotted for 
implementation and, at year's end, enforcement was weak. The Ministry 
of Social Affairs, Promotion of Women, and Protection of Children was 
assigned responsibility for implementation.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets minimum 
wages for different categories, ranging from unskilled labor through 
professional positions. Less than the official minimum wage often is 
paid in practice, mostly to less-skilled workers. Official monthly 
minimum wages range from approximately $20 to $33 (CFA 14,700 to 
23,100) per month. Many workers cannot maintain a decent standard of 
living for themselves and their families at the official minimum wages, 
and many must supplement their incomes through second jobs or 
subsistence farming. The Ministry of Labor is ostensibly responsible 
for enforcement of the minimum wage system but does not enforce the law 
in practice. The Labor Code, which regulates labor practices, requires 
equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex; however, this provision 
generally is observed only in the formal sector.
    Working hours of all employees in any enterprise, except for those 
in the agricultural sector, normally must not exceed 72 hours per week; 
at least one 24-hour rest period per week is compulsory, and workers 
must receive 30 days of paid leave each year. The law requires overtime 
compensation, and there are restrictions on excessive overtime work. 
However, the Ministry of Labor's enforcement is weak, and employers 
often ignore these provisions.
    A technical consulting committee in the Ministry of Labor sets 
workplace health and safety standards. It may levy penalties on 
employers who do not meet the standards, and employees ostensibly have 
the right to complain to labor inspectors of unhealthy or unsafe 
conditions without penalty. In practice the Ministry's enforcement of 
the various provisions of the Labor Code is limited. Large enterprises 
are obliged by law to provide medical services for their employees and 
usually attempt to respect occupational health and safety rules, but 
smaller firms often do not.
    Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from unsafe 
conditions without fear of losing their jobs; however, in practice some 
reportedly cannot do so.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, and trafficking is a problem. The country remained a source 
and transit point for trafficking in persons. There were 425 victims 
returned to the country during the year; NGO's provide some support for 
victims. One woman, who returned from Gabon after 5 years as a victim 
of trafficking, filed a suit during the year against a Gabonese 
schoolteacher living in Togo, who she accused of trafficking in 
children to work in Gabon; however, by year's end, there was no 
progress in the case.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution or 
nonconsensual labor as domestic servants exists.
    Children are trafficked to indentured and exploitative servitude, 
which amounts at times to slavery. Children often are trafficked to 
other West and Central African countries, especially Gabon and Nigeria, 
to the Middle East, or to Asia. In countries such as Cote d'Ivoire or 
Gabon, these children are extensively exploited. They are fed poorly, 
crudely clothed, and inadequately cared for, and are neither educated 
nor permitted to learn a trade. Children sometimes are trafficked 
abroad by parents misled into allowing them to depart under false 
pretenses. In 1999 authorities intercepted 750 children and arrested 21 
traffickers at the borders. During the year, the Government intercepted 
425 children. A local NGO focusing on trafficking issues estimated that 
85 percent of traffickers in the country are women. For example, in 
1999 two Ghanaian women took six children, ages 6 to 14, from the town 
of Tsevie to Cote d'Ivoire where they were to be resold for $350 to 
$530 (CFA 225,000 to 350,000) to work on plantations or as house 
servants. In 1999 police caught Beninese traffickers who were taking 39 
children, including some as young as 2 years of age, from Benin to Cote 
d'Ivoire overland through the country.
    During the year, the Government conducted public awareness 
campaigns, with the help of the U.N. Children's Fund and NGO's such as 
WAO-Afrique. WAO-Afrique obtained additional funding from a foreign 
private company to support its awareness campaigns against child 
trafficking and forced labor.
    The country is a source and transit point for child traffickers. 
There are credible reports of Nigerian women and children trafficked 
through the country to Europe (particularly Italy and the Netherlands) 
to work in forced prostitution. Since the law regarding trafficking is 
vague and imprecise, persons arrested or detained by government 
security forces for alleged trafficking ultimately are released for 
lack of evidence. The Government does not provide assistance for 
victims; however, an NGO (Terre des Hommes) assisted recovered children 
until their parents or next-of-kin could be notified. There is also a 
government funded Social Center for Abandoned Children.
                               __________

                                 UGANDA

    President Yoweri Museveni, elected to a 5-year term in 1996 under 
the 1995 Constitution, continued to dominate the Government. He has 
ruled since 1986 through the National Resistance Movement, 
legislatively reorganized and renamed as ``The Movement'' in 1995. The 
Constitution provides for a 281-member unicameral parliament and an 
autonomous, independently elected president. The 1996 presidential and 
parliamentary elections were peaceful and orderly, but election 
conditions, including restrictions on political party activities, led 
to a flawed election process. The Constitution formally extended the 
one-party movement form of government for 5 years and severely 
restricted political activities. In June a national referendum on the 
role of political parties resulted in the indefinite extension of the 
Movement form of government. The referendum process was flawed by 
restrictions on political party activities and unequal funding. The 
Parliament acted with continued independence and assertiveness during 
the year, although Movement supporters remained in control of the 
legislative branch. Parliamentarians were elected to 5-year terms in 
1996. The judiciary generally is independent, but is understaffed and 
weak; the President has extensive legal powers.
    The Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) is the key security force. 
The Constitution provides for civilian control of the UPDF, with the 
President designated as commander in chief. The UPDF remained active 
due to the continued instability in the north and west and because of 
the country's involvement in the conflict in the neighboring Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). UPDF soldiers and members of local defense 
units (LDU's) assist the police in rural areas, although the LDU's 
continued to operate without a legal mandate; LDU's operate under the 
authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Internal Security 
Organization (ISO) remained under the direct authority of the 
President. Although the ISO primarily is an intelligence-gathering 
body, its operatives occasionally detained civilians. The Directorate 
of Military Intelligence (DMI), under UPDF control, also detained 
civilians suspected of rebel and terrorist activity. The police are 
organized as a national force under the authority of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. The UPDF, police, LDU's, and the DMI all committed 
serious human rights abuses.
    The economy grew at a rate of approximately 5 percent during the 
year. Annual gross domestic product (GDP) remained at $330 per capita. 
Foreign economic assistance provides approximately 50 percent of 
government revenues. The agriculturally based economy continued to rely 
on coffee as its chief export. Foreign investment remained at 
approximately 4 percent of GDP amid chronic corruption, a troubled 
macroeconomic reform process, and continuing concerns about regional 
security in the wake of the country's intervention in the DRC. The pace 
of the privatization process increased due to the Government's 
privatization of the telecommunications system and a major parastatal, 
the Kakira Sugar Works; the Government began preparations to privatize 
all remaining parastatals. The financial sector strengthened due to 
improved lending practices and more stringent supervision by the 
central bank.
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and, although there 
were improvements in several areas, there continued to be numerous, 
serious problems. Movement domination of the political process limited 
the right of citizens to change their government. Security forces used 
excessive force, at times resulting in death, and committed or failed 
to prevent some extrajudicial killings of suspected rebels and 
civilians. Police, LDU, and DMI forces regularly beat and sometimes 
tortured suspects and other persons, often to force confessions. A 
highly publicized 1999 inquiry into police corruption uncovered 
numerous serious abuses committed by senior officers and resulted in 
the arrest of several officers on charges of extortion. There were a 
number of cases in which the Government detained and charged UPDF and 
LDU members for human rights abuses. Prison conditions remained harsh 
and life-threatening. Members of the security forces sometimes 
arbitrarily arrested and detained civilians. Authorities used 
incommunicado detention. Despite measures to improve the discipline and 
training of security forces, and despite the punishment of some 
security force officials guilty of abuses, abuses by the security 
forces at times resulted in deaths and remained a problem throughout 
the country. Prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. Poor 
judicial administration, lack of resources, a large case backlog, and 
lengthy trial delays circumscribed due process and the right to a fair 
trial. The UPDF at times infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The 
Government generally respected freedom of speech and of the press; 
however, there were some instances in which restrictions continued. The 
Government restricted freedom of assembly and association, and the 
constitutional restrictions on political activity effectively continued 
to limit these rights further; however, political parties operated with 
fewer restrictions than in previous years. There were some limits on 
freedom of movement. The Movement Secretariat, supported with 
government funds, oversaw internal organizational activity, strategy, 
and mobilization, and following the June referendum, the Government 
continued its Movement political education courses. Domestic violence 
against women, rape, and abuse of children remained serious problems. 
Discrimination against women and the disabled persisted. The Government 
worked with nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to combat the 
practice of female genital mutilation (FGM), which occurred on a 
limited basis. Violence against ethnic minorities was a problem. There 
were some limits on worker rights. Forced labor, including by children, 
occurred, and child labor was common, mostly in the informal sector. 
There were reports of trafficking in persons. Vigilante justice also 
was a problem.
    Insurgent forces committed numerous serious abuses. The Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group active in the west, killed, 
tortured, maimed, and abducted many persons, including children. The 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony and supported by the 
Government of Sudan, operated in the north from bases in southern 
Sudan. LRA attacks increased during the year, and the LRA continued to 
kill and abduct civilians, including children.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of politically motivated killings by government 
forces; however, members of the security forces and the police 
committed extrajudicial killings. In the course of official operations, 
police, UPDF, LDU, and DMI personnel sometimes used excessive force, 
resulting in deaths (see Section 1.g.). On January 19, UDPF soldiers 
killed two LRA rebels wounded in an unsuccessful attack on the Paloga 
trading center, Gulu district. By year's end, there were no reports 
that any actions were taken against the officer who ordered the 
killings. On January 28, UPDF and police in the Kampala suburb of 
Kabalagala killed six persons after they allegedly robbed bus 
passengers of money and property and shot the driver. At year's end, 
there were no reports that any actions were taken against the UPDF and 
police officers involved.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that security 
officials mistreated Muslims or that Muslims suspected of being ADF 
rebel collaborators or involved in terrorist activities died as a 
result of torture by DMI officials.
    There were allegations of human rights violations during fighting 
between UPDF and Rwandan army troops in Kisangani, DRC, in May and 
June, which resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, over 1,700 persons 
injured (see Section 1.c.), and 60,000 displaced persons (see Section 
2.d.). The most severe of these clashes occurred from June 5 to 11, 
during which time both forces shelled the city with artillery and 
mortar fire, destroying homes and much of the city's infrastructure. 
Credible sources from the DRC claim that Rwandan and Ugandan troops 
raped many women and shot persons during extensive fighting in the 
city. Humanitarian organizations reported that at least 400 Congolese 
civilians were killed during the fighting. Many persons died from 
injuries because they were unable to get medical attention; 
transportation to hospitals often was unavailable during the fighting. 
Many displaced persons remained at a camp outside of the city for 
several months because they feared to return to their homes. There was 
widespread reporting throughout the year of killings and other human 
rights abuses by both pro-DRC and anti-DRC government forces, including 
the UPDF, in the conflict in the DRC. There were reports that both 
Ugandan and Rwandan forces used landmines during the fighting in 
Kisangani; however, there were no reports of any deaths or injuries as 
a result of such landmines.
    Verification of these reports was extremely difficult, particularly 
those emanating from remote areas and those affected by active combat, 
primarily in eastern DRC. Independent observers often found access 
difficult due to hazardous security conditions and frequent impediments 
imposed by authorities. Both pro- and anti-DRC Government forces used 
propaganda disseminated via local media extensively, including 
accusations of abuse by opposing forces, further complicating efforts 
to obtain accurate information regarding such events.
    On November 8, there were reports from the DRC that UPDF soldiers 
allegedly shot and killed nine persons at a wedding party in the 
village of Kikere, near Butembo, North Kivu Province, DRC; the soldiers 
believed the village to be sympathetic to the Mai Mai. The attack 
reportedly followed violent clashes between UPDF and Mai Mai forces in 
the surrounding area. The soldiers also allegedly set fire to houses in 
the village; 11 persons burned to death within the houses.
    Throughout the year in the Ituri district in Orientale Province of 
the DRC, an area dominated by UPDF and UPDF-supported forces, fighting 
continued between members of the Lendu and Hema tribes, which 
reportedly killed thousands of persons and displaced tens of thousands 
of others. This fighting reportedly arose from a dispute about land use 
and also reportedly was manipulated by UPDF troops who charged the 
tribes fees in order to provide protection to their members. The 
Government arrested and detained two senior commanders for their 
actions during this conflict.
    On May 19, an independent judicial commission of inquiry into 
corruption in the police force that began operating in 1999 submitted 
its report to the Minister of Internal Affairs. During the course of 
the investigation, the commission uncovered incidents of killings, 
brutality, theft, and robbery by police in general, and by the Criminal 
Investigations Department (CID) in particular. The commission's 
proceedings were open to the public and received extensive press 
coverage. The report was not made public officially by year's end, 
although several newspapers carried stories about the report.
    Harsh conditions, some intentional mistreatment, and lack of 
adequate medical treatment caused many deaths in prison (see Section 
1.c.).
    Government cases against two UPDF soldiers accused of killing five 
youths in Fort Portal, Kabarole district, in 1999, still were pending 
at year's end. The 2 soldiers were on remand in Katojo prison facing 
murder charges; the 12 other soldiers involved in the incident were 
investigated and cleared of wrongdoing. At year's end, there was no 
action taken in a May 1999 case in which a police officer shot and 
killed an unarmed youth. A UPDF inquiry into an August 1999 case in 
which UPDF soldiers killed two rebel suspects in Lira was ongoing at 
year's end. There was no investigation nor action taken in a September 
1999 case in which UPDF troops opened fire on members of two Karamojong 
clans that were engaged in a gun battle which resulted in the deaths of 
hundreds of Karamojong warriors. There was no investigation into or 
action taken into two cases in July and October 1999 in which police 
beat to death prisoners in their custody.
    Police continued investigations into the January 1998 death in 
police custody of a 25-year-old suspected thief and the August 1998 
incident in which a prison official in Masaka beat to death a suspect 
on remand for defaulting on tax payments; however, it appeared unlikely 
that the cases will be closed. In February 1999, the Uganda Human 
Rights Commission (UHRC) referred for prosecution the case of three 
police officers accused of killing four robbery suspects in 1998; 
however, the Directorate for Public Prosecution's investigation was 
ongoing, and there were no prosecutions in connection with this 
incident by year's end. The LDU commander arrested in 1999 for the 
August 1998 death while in custody of two civilians in Kyankwanzi 
remained in detention awaiting trial at year's end. One police officer 
was committed to trial before the High Court for the June 1998 incident 
in which police fired on students at the Kabalega secondary school, 
killing one student. The case also was pending before the UHRC; 
however, the UHRC was scheduled to take up the case against after it is 
reviewed by the High Court.
    Investigations into the 1997 deaths by torture of Paul Kollo and 
Stephan Baryakaijika were completed, and the governmentsponsored UHRC 
heard the cases. In February the UHRC handed the cases over to the 
courts for prosecution; however, no action had taken place by year's 
end (see Section 1.c.). It was discovered during the year that the 
suspect arrested for the 1997 killing of Modesta Kabaranga, a leading 
organizer for the Democratic Party, was released in 1997; no additional 
action has taken place.
    Vigilante justice was a problem (see Sections 1.c. and 5). 
Authorities rarely prosecuted persons engaged in mob violence, which 
frequently resulted in death. Most mob attacks resulted from petty 
crimes. There were numerous instances in which mobs beat to death or 
doused with petrol and then burned to death petty theft suspects.
    Ritual murders of children remained a problem during the year (see 
Section 5).
    Between February and July, raids by Karamojong warriors on 
neighboring districts in the northeast resulted in approximately 100 
deaths. The raids were precipitated by drought during the year; 
however, the raids may have exacerbated ethnic tensions in the 
northeast (see Section 5).
    The rebel ADF committed at least 210 extrajudicial killings, 
including killings of children (see Section 1.g.). LRA attacks 
increased during the year, and the LRA was responsible for the killing 
of approximately 175 civilians, including children (see Section 1.g.). 
On June 12, LRA rebels shot Kitgum Resident District Commissioner J.B. 
Ochaya while he was traveling near Gulu; he died on July 5. The rebels 
reportedly killed seven other persons in separate incidents at the same 
site. On October 1, LRA rebels shot and killed Father Raffale Di Bari 
of the Comboni Missionary Fathers outside of Kitgum. A nun and several 
children who were traveling with Di Bari were injured.
    There were no credible reports that UNRF-II, USF/A, the Citizens 
Army for Multiparty Politics (CAMP), or Rwandan Hutu rebels were 
responsible for the death of civilians during the year (see Section 
1.g.).
    Unlike in previous years, there were no urban bombings in Kampala 
and other cities during the year; however, on October 11, 9 persons 
were killed and more than 40 were wounded in separate grenade attacks 
on 2 discos in Gulu. In October in a suburb of Kampala, there was a 
drive-by grenade attack. It was unknown whether there was a motive or 
if there were any injuries or deaths. It was unknown who was 
responsible for any of the attacks.
    The LRA and the ADF reportedly used landmines. There were several 
incidents during the year in which civilians were killed by landmines 
placed by rebels. For example, on January 21, a landmine explosion 
killed a man at Opidi, Koch, west of Gulu Town; the LRA allegedly 
planted the landmine. Several children also were killed or injured 
after stepping on landmines.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically 
motivated disappearances due to action by government forces. A number 
of Muslims, believed to be missing in 1999, were released (see Section 
1.d.).
    ADF and LRA rebels abducted civilians. Both the ADF and the LRA 
abducted civilians for training as guerrillas; most victims were 
children and young adults. NGO's estimated that the ADF abducted over 
441 persons, including children. The LRA abducted approximately 700 
persons, including young girls abducted as sex and labor slaves (see 
Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). The ADF allegedly abducted approximately 
30 Ugandan children during the year, in addition to an unknown number 
of Congolese children. An estimated 8,000 to 10,000 persons have been 
abducted by the ADF since 1986 and the LRA since 1987 (see Sections 5 
and 6.c.). While some later escaped or were rescued, UNICEF estimated 
that 5,106 children abducted by the LRA since 1987 remain missing, an 
estimated 100 to 200 children abducted by the LRA during the year 
remained unaccounted for, and approximately 30 children abducted by the 
ADF remained missing at year's end (see Section 1.g.). NGO's estimated 
that since 1996 the ADF has abducted approximately 200 Ugandan 
children, and an unknown number of Congolese children, approximately 
100 of these children remained unaccounted for at year's end. There 
have been reports in past years that Karamojong warriors have abducted 
children for similar reasons, and observers believe that some of these 
children still are being held.
    Reportedly persons whom rebel, Rwandan, or Ugandan forces allegedly 
detained sometimes were transferred to Rwanda or Uganda.
    There were reports from the DRC that UPDF and Rwandan troops, in 
addition to RCD rebels, reportedly abducted many young women from the 
villages they raided. These night raids on villages became so frequent 
that in many parts of the Kivu Provinces peasants slept in their 
fields.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits ``any form of torture, cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;'' however, security 
forces commonly beat and sometimes tortured criminal suspects, often to 
force confessions. Although UPDF forces in the north on occasion beat 
and abused civilians in the previous year, there were no reports of 
such abuse during the year.
    On February 18, a police constable in Kayunga, Mukono district, 
allegedly tortured two civilians and demanded money in order to release 
them from jail. In March a police constable was arrested. The case was 
under investigation by the Mukono district police, and the constable 
remained in detention at year's end on charges of unlawfully detaining 
civilians and disobeying orders (see Section 1.d.).
    Police at times harassed or beat journalists and opposition 
activists (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 3). On March 31, police and 
military police used batons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and live 
ammunition to disperse an unauthorized rally in Mbarara (see Section 
2.b.). Although there were reports of injuries, no one was killed. On 
April 21, police in Mbale beat Ahmed Washaki, an official of the Uganda 
People's Congress (UPC), and locked him in a toilet for allegedly 
campaigning against the referendum on political systems (see Section 
1.d.). On June 25, police beat and arrested 11 Makerere University 
students after they disrupted a referendum rally held by the President. 
They subsequently were charged with misconduct and alarming the 
President and released on bail. On October 12, the charges of 
misconduct were dropped; however, their trial for alarming the 
President was ongoing at year's end (see Section 1.d.). On September 
16, police violently dispersed a meeting of the Uganda Young Democrats 
in Gulu, which resulted in several injuries (see Section 2.b.).
    In February businessman Charles Mpunga accused Major Kakooza 
Mutale, a presidential adviser on political affairs, of detaining and 
torturing him at Mbuya military barracks in January. In July the UHRC 
tribunal ruled that there was enough evidence to proceed with a case 
against Mutale; the UHRC charged and found him guilty of torture and 
illegal imprisonment. Mutale appealed the ruling to the High Court, 
claiming that the UHRC lacked jurisdiction. His case still was pending 
at year's end, and the UHRC was waiting for the High Court's ruling 
before penalizing Mutale.
    On March 18, the UPDF arrested the UPDF reserve force commander for 
Tororo district for torturing civilians and beating two police officers 
on March 16. The commander remained in detention pending a courtmartial 
at year's end. On August 3, the UHRC tribunal summoned the commanding 
officer of the UPDF presidential protection unit, Major Dick Bugingo, 
on charges that he tortured Sergeant Godfrey Mubiru in March. Bugingo's 
case was ongoing at year's end.
    Fighting between UPDF and Rwandan army troops in Kisangani, DRC, in 
May and June resulted in over 400 civilian deaths and over 1,700 
wounded (see Section 1.a.). There were reports from the DRC that UPDF 
and Rwandan soldiers allegedly raped women during extensive fighting in 
Kisangani in May and June (see Section 1.a.). There were reports that 
both UPDF and Rwandan forces used landmines during the fighting in 
Kisangani (see Section 1.a.). There were reports that UPDF officers and 
soldiers also were involved in the first half of the year in violence 
between the Hema and Lendu tribes in northeastern DRC that resulted in 
the deaths of thousands of Congolese civilians (see Section 1.a.). The 
Government arrested and detained two senior commanders for their 
actions during this conflict.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that security 
officials mistreated Muslims or that Muslims suspected of being ADF 
rebel collaborators or involved in terrorist activities died as a 
result of torture by DMI officials.
    LDU's, which frequently lack training, often mistreat prisoners and 
detainees. For example, on July 21, police in Arua stopped a mob from 
lynching an LDU member after the LDU member hit a suspect with a baton.
    The Government investigated some cases of abuse, and tried and 
punished some offenders. In 1999 the Government launched a Judicial 
Commission of Inquiry into police corruption. The Commission probed a 
wide range of police abuses, including abuses committed by senior 
police officials. The inquiry resulted in the arrests of several police 
officers on charges of abuse, rape, extortion, and robbery, including a 
police officer accused of raping a 16yearold girl. The Commission 
presented its report to the Minister of Internal Affairs on May 19; 
however, the report had not been made public by year's end (see Section 
1.a.). In February 1999, the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative 
(FHRI), an independent local human rights organization, began an 
investigation into allegations that two policemen, Moses Lutaya and 
Ephraim Magala, were tortured by their superiors during the same month 
for stealing bananas while on duty. In February 1999, FHRI found that 
the two were tortured under the orders of the Mpigi district police 
commander. Lutaya and Magala subsequently were compensated by the Mpigi 
district administration with approximately $750 (1.26 million 
shillings) and were reinstated in their jobs. The senior officers were 
transferred; however, no additional action was taken against them.
    The police Human Rights Desk, established in 1998, received 630 new 
complaints, including allegations of excessive force, torture, assault, 
rape, and murder. Of these cases, 600 were resolved or were referred to 
the criminal or police disciplinary courts, some resulting in 
disciplinary actions, including reductions in rank, fines, halted 
promotions, and dismissals. A total of 30 cases were pending at year's 
end.
    In conjunction with the UHRC, the police force continued a training 
program for police officials to foster respect for internationally 
recognized human rights standards. The UHRC and NGO's conducted similar 
programs with UPDF officials throughout the year.
    On June 29, Kandida Lakony was released from Luzira Prison after 
serving her sentence for giving false information regarding a newspaper 
photograph (see Section 2.a.). The photograph depicted a naked woman 
being shaved forcefully by a group of men in military uniform; Lakony 
had claimed that she was the woman in the photograph and that UPDF 
soldiers in Gulu were responsible.
    There was no investigation nor action taken in the 1999 case in 
which the badly mutilated body of Patrick Ocan was found after he had 
been seen in UPDF custody. There was no investigation nor action taken 
in the October 1999 case in which police beat a man while in custody in 
Buwenge, Jinja District; the man died after being released the 
following day.
    There were no reported developments nor action taken in the 
February 1999 case in which two teenaged girls reportedly were raped by 
two LDU personnel at Kabujogera police post in Fort Portal. The accused 
were arrested pending a police investigation. There were no reported 
developments nor action taken in the August 1999 case in which an LDU 
member shot and wounded a businessman in Kisenyi, a suburb of Fort 
Portal. The LDU member reportedly was apprehended and detained by the 
UPDF.
    In January the Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence, Noble 
Mayombo, settled out of court a 1998 case in which Peter Ongodia 
charged that Mayombo illegally ordered his arrest and torture.
    In June the UHRC tribunal ruled that the former Permanent Secretary 
for Defense, Benjamin Mbonye, and Captain Sulait Mwesigye were 
responsible for the 1997 arrest and torture of a Corporal Sam Muwonge. 
The tribunal's assessment of damages was pending at year's end. The 
investigations into the 1997 deaths by torture of Paul Kollo and 
Stephan Baryakaijika were completed, and the cases were heard by the 
UHRC (see Section 1.a.). The investigation into the 1997 torture of 
Corporal Twasha Kaushera was abandoned by the UHRC after it failed to 
locate Kaushera.
    There were numerous instances in which mobs attacked suspected 
thieves and other offenders caught in the commission of crimes (see 
Section 1.a.). Often motivated by widespread distrust of the justice 
system, these mobs engaged in stonings, beatings, and other forms of 
mistreatment, such as tying suspects' wrists and ankles together behind 
their backs, stripping suspects of their clothes and parading them 
through the streets, or forcing suspects to hop painfully on the sides 
of their ankles. Vigilantes also have stripped prostitutes who dress 
``indecently'' or ``provocatively.''
    The ADF continued to maim civilians, loot, and burn private homes. 
The LRA and the ADF reportedly used landmines, which caused some deaths 
and injuries (see Section 1.a.). The LRA engaged in looting and 
destruction of private property. The ADF and LRA also abducted children 
to be guerrillas; and the LRA in particular tortured children by 
beating them, forcing them to witness atrocities, forcing them to march 
until they collapsed, and denying them adequate food, water, or shelter 
(see Section 1.g.).
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no urban bombings in 
Kampala and other cities; however, on October 11, there were 2 grenade 
attacks on separate discos in Gulu, which resulted in more than 40 
injuries (see Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Conditions 
for the estimated 5,000 inmates in local police cells and in the 162 
local prisons particularly were bad. Authority over the local prison 
system, formerly operated by the Ministry of Local Government, was 
scheduled to be transferred in 1998 to the state-funded and operated 
prison system, run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The transfer 
had not taken place by year's end due to funding problems and lack of 
enabling legislation. Both civilian and military prisons have high 
mortality rates from overcrowding, malnutrition, diseases spread by 
unsanitary conditions, and HIV/AIDS.
    No accurate estimates are available on the number of deaths in 
detention due to the harsh conditions and lack of medical care, 
although many such deaths have occurred; however, NGO's estimated that 
the mortality rate in the central prison system improved. The UHRC 
reported severely inadequate medical services, seriously unhygienic 
conditions, and a situation of ``semi-starvation'' among prisoners in 
many prisons. In March prisoners from Kanungu local administration 
prison in Rukungiri and suspects from Bushenyi police station were 
forced to exhume the bodies of persons killed in a massacre committed 
by a religious cult (see Sections 2.c. and 6.c.). Most prisoners did 
not have proper protective clothing. In May there were reports that 
prison authorities in Lira tortured four prisoners. On May 24, an UHRC 
investigator visited the prison and confirmed the abuse. The 
investigator also received complaints from female prisoners that they 
had been tortured by prison authorities. The UHRC tribunal is scheduled 
to begin hearings on the case in March 2001.
    There were no developments in the investigation into the June 1999 
death of Matia Kiwanuka Mulama, an inmate of Buikwe prison in the 
eastern part of the country, who reportedly was found dead after having 
been tortured by the chief warden.
    The harsh conditions largely resulted from the Government's 
seriously inadequate funding of prison facilities. Most of the prisons 
grow maize, millet, and vegetables, although the UHRC accused prison 
farms of overworking inmates. Prisoners received only $.0006 (1 
shilling) per day for their labor, a rate established in the early 
1960's (see Section 6.c.). Prison conditions come closest to meeting 
minimum international standards in Kampala, where prisons provide 
medical care, running water, and sanitation; however, these prisons 
also are among the most overcrowded. By one estimate, the country's 
prisons--all of which predate independence in 1962--hold about three 
times their maximum planned capacity. Although the law provides for 
access to prisoners by their families, ignorance of this right and fear 
of prison authorities often limit family visits. The UHRC reported that 
it had received allegations that officers in charge of police cells 
sometimes demanded bribes to allow visits.
    In May the President signed the Community Service Act, designed to 
reduce prison congestion by allowing minor offenders to do community 
service instead of being imprisoned; however, implementation of the act 
had not begun by year's end due to insufficient funding. On July 13, 
President Museveni pardoned and released 522 prisoners from Luzira 
prison on humanitarian grounds.
    Women have segregated wings with female staff in most, but not all, 
prisons. According to human rights advocates, rape generally is not a 
problem, although female prisoners also suffered from severely 
substandard conditions. Due to lack of space in juvenile facilities, 
juveniles often were kept in prisons with adults. The central prison 
system maintained one juvenile prison and four lower security remand 
homes. School facilities and health clinics in all 5 institutions are 
defunct; prisoners as young as age 12 perform manual labor from dawn 
until dusk. Severe overcrowding also is a problem at juvenile detention 
facilities and in women's wings. The remand home in Kampala, designed 
for 45 inmates, holds 120 children.
    The central prison system continued to work with NGO's and the 
donor community to improve prison buildings, water and sanitation 
systems, food, and uniforms. Progress has been marginal.
    Government agencies have sponsored or participated in numerous 
conferences on the justice system and prison conditions, and worked 
closely with international and domestic human rights organizations on 
prison reform efforts. There were reports that mortality rates 
decreased following these activities.
    Media access to prisons remained limited, but the Government 
permitted full access to prisons by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and local NGO's, principally the UHRC, the Foundation 
for Human Rights Initiative, and the Uganda Prisoners' Aid Foundation. 
Since 1997 UHRC has carried out numerous prison visits and reported on 
its findings publicly. Prison authorities required advance notification 
of visits, a process that often was subject to administrative delays.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Members of the security 
forces at times arrested and detained citizens arbitrarily. According 
to the Constitution, a suspect must be charged within 48 hours of 
arrest and be brought to trial or released on bail within 120 days (360 
days for a capital offense). If the case has been committed to the 
court before the expiration of this period, the Constitution does not 
limit pretrial detention. The Constitution also provides that detainees 
should be informed immediately of the reasons for their detention; 
however, in practice the authorities enforced none of these procedural 
protections. Some laws conflict with the Constitution, for example, the 
Public Order and Security Act of 1967 (the Detention Order), which 
provides for unlimited detention without charge; however, these laws 
never have been invoked formally by the Government. Legal and human 
rights groups, including the UHRC, sharply criticized the excessive 
length of detention without trial--in many cases amounting to several 
years--for alleged offenses under other laws, which both violated the 
constitutional rights of the detainees and contributed substantially to 
prison overcrowding.
    Arbitrary arrest is a problem. In March a police constable was 
arrested after he allegedly tortured two civilians and the case was 
under investigation at year's end (see Section 1.c.). In July the UHRC 
tribunal ruled that there was enough evidence to proceed with a case 
against Major Kakooza Mutale; he was charged with torture and illegal 
imprisonment after he allegedly detained and tortured a businessman at 
Mbuya military barracks in January (see Section 1.c.).
    Arbitrary mass arrests known as ``panda gari'' remained a problem. 
On January 16, over 5,000 persons were arrested and detained for 24 
hours during a joint operation conducted by mobile police and the UPDF 
in Gulu municipality. UPDF deserters were transferred to the military 
justice system, and 30 youths without identification papers were 
transferred to the police for prosecution.
    Authorities arrested several religious leaders and church members 
during the year for incidents including killings, defilement, rape, 
abduction, theft, and unlawful assembly (see Section 2.c.). Their cases 
were in various stages of prosecution at year's end.
    Police at times harassed and detained journalists and opposition 
activists (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 3). On April 21, police in 
Mbale beat Ahmed Washaki, an official of the Uganda People's Congress 
(UPC), and locked him in a toilet for allegedly campaigning against the 
referendum on political systems (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). On May 
23, two Monitor reporters were briefly detained and questioned by the 
police after writing stories that speculated about government links to 
the Kanungu cult massacre (see Section 2.a.). On June 25, police beat 
and arrested 11 Makerere University students after they disrupted a 
referendum rally held by the President. They subsequently were charged 
with misconduct and alarming the President and were released on bail. 
On October 12, the charges of misconduct were dropped; however, their 
trial for alarming the President was ongoing at year's end (see Section 
1.d.).
    The rearrest of Muslim suspects following either their release on 
bail or acquittal was not a problem during the year. On March 15, 
authorities released 56 members of the Islamic Tabliq group who were 
arrested in 1995 on treason charges (see Section 2.c.). In June 
authorities released 28 members of the Islamic Tabliq group who had 
been rearrested in 1999 after an acquittal on murder charges. Another 2 
suspects were released on November 6; however, the remaining 38 
suspects chose to stand trial. They maintained that they were innocent 
of the charges.
    The UPDF detained LRA child soldiers at Gulu military barracks for 
several months. There were reports that the military used the children 
to help find LRA landmines and arms caches (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    Although they have no legal authority to make arrests, LDU's 
continued to arrest citizens on a regular basis.
    Pretrial detainees comprise nearly three-fourths of the prison 
population. The average time in pretrial detention is between 2 to 3 
years. An estimated 14,000 of the approximately 20,000 persons being 
held in the central prisons and in the local government-run prisons are 
pretrial detainees. Congestion and delays in the legal system have 
resulted in an increasing number of detainees each year; however, the 
number of criminal cases pending before the High Court decreased from 
1,500 in 1999 to 143 cases during the year. A census of the central 
prison population conducted in 1999 indicated that at least onesixth of 
the inmates were being detained beyond constitutional limits. The UHRC 
heard several cases during the year brought by prisoners challenging 
the length of their detention, and it was investigating a complaint 
from prisoners in Bugungu in Mukono district at year's end. On February 
22, the Director of Public Prosecutions released a murder suspect who 
had spent 15 years on remand in Kumi district after withdrawing the 
charges against him. In February the Government reached an out-of-court 
settlement with Rajab Juma Rembe, who was detained in Lubiri barracks 
for 3 years in the early 1990's; in October Rembe received 
approximately $5,600 (10 million shillings) as compensation. On May 29, 
four suspects who had been held in Bushenyi local administration prison 
for over a year were released for lack of evidence.
    In November 1999, more than 400 prisoners held on charges of 
treason without trial since at least 1997 staged a protest at Luzira 
prison in Kampala. The prisoners refused to return to their cells until 
they received assurances from the director of public prosecutions that 
their cases would be brought to court; all 400 were released by year's 
end.
    In 1999 the Human Rights and Peace Center Prisons Project reported 
that 31 Congolese and Sudanese refugees were arrested in March 1997 on 
suspicion of aiding West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebels and detained 
without charge (see Section 2.d.). There were unconfirmed reports that 
authorities released the group in 1999.
    There were no reported detentions of civilians in military 
barracks, and following pressure from local NGO's and media, the 
Government closed all unofficial, unregistered places of remand in 
1999. There were reports that the DMI ordered prisoners held 
incommunicado in police station cells.
    The Constitution does not prohibit forced exile; however, the 
Government does not use exile as a means of political control. In 
January the President signed an amnesty law covering all current and 
former rebels; the amnesty was extended for 6 months in July. Some 
former rebels returned to the country during the year to take advantage 
of the amnesty. Under the terms of the amnesty act, the Government 
released some persons convicted of treason and other suspects; however, 
by year's end the Government made only made limited progress in 
implementing provisions in the act related to the repatriation and 
resettlement of former rebels.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the President has extensive legal 
powers that influence the exercise of this independence. The President 
nominates, for the approval of Parliament, members of the Judicial 
Service Commission, which makes recommendations on appointments to the 
High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. The lower 
courts remained understaffed and weak.
    The highest court is the Supreme Court, followed by (in descending 
order) the Court of Appeal (which also functions as the Constitutional 
Court for cases of first instance involving constitutional issues), the 
High Court, the Chief Magistrate's Court, and local council (LC) level 
3 (subcounty) courts, LC level 2 (parish) courts, and LC level 1 
(village) courts. A minimum of six justices may sit on the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeal or Constitutional Court. In addition 
there are a few specialized courts that deal with industrial and other 
matters. The Industrial Court (IC), which arbitrates labor disputes, is 
parallel structurally to the chief magistrate's court. There also is a 
military court system.
    Although once considered a useful innovation, the LC courts often 
are thought to be sources of injustice due to such factors as bribery 
and male dominance in rural areas. The LC courts have authority to 
settle civil disputes, including land ownership and payment of debts, 
and criminal cases involving children. These courts, often the only 
ones available to villagers, frequently exceed their authority by 
hearing criminal cases, including murder and rape. LC court decisions 
may be appealed to magistrate's courts, but often there are no records 
made at the village level, and many defendants are not aware of their 
right to appeal.
    The civilian judicial system contains procedural safeguards, 
including the granting of bail and the right of appeal to higher 
courts; however, an inadequate system of judicial administration and a 
lack of resources, resulting in a serious backlog of cases, have 
circumscribed the right to a fair trial for many years. The courts, 
like other branches of government, were impaired by a 4-year civil 
service hiring freeze, which was relaxed only somewhat in 1998. As a 
result, criminal cases may take 2 or more years to reach the courts. 
The case backlog in the High Court, which had increased every year 
since 1993, was eliminated largely by year's end. Attorneys working in 
the Office of the Public Prosecutor can be assigned several new cases 
each day. Some courts continued to observe the constitutionally 
prescribed limits on pretrial detention, but that practice was not 
widespread. All nonmilitary trials are public.
    Many defendants cannot afford legal representation. The 
Constitution requires that the Government provide an attorney for 
indigent defendants accused of capital offenses, but there is rarely 
enough money to retain adequate counsel. The Uganda Law Society 
operates legal aid clinics in four regional offices, although its 
services declined due to limited funding. It assists military 
defendants as well as civilians. The local chapter of Federacion 
Internacional de Abogadas (FIDA) and the Foundation for Human Rights 
Initiative also practice public-interest law from offices in Kampala. 
In 1999 the Law Development Center established a legal aid clinic to 
address cases involving children and those accused of petty crimes. A 
public defense service also was established in 1999, but it did not 
receive any government funding. It relied solely on donor support.
    The military court system does not assure the right to a fair 
trial. Although the accused has the right to retain legal counsel, 
military defense attorneys often are untrained and may be assigned by 
the military command, which also appoints the prosecutor and the 
adjudicating officer. The sentence passed by a military court, which 
can include the death penalty, may be appealed to the High Command but 
not to the High or Supreme Courts. A court-martial appeals process was 
established in 1997.
    The Government continued to arrest and charge persons for treason, 
especially captured rebel fighters, in numbers greater than the 
judicial system could manage. In the past, numerous human rights abuses 
were committed in connection with treason cases, including political 
detention, detention without charge, detention in unregistered and 
unofficial places of remand, and mistreatment, including torture. There 
were reports that at times such abuses continued during the year. At 
year's end, prison officials put the number of those on remand on the 
charge of treason at 226, none of whom were children. Detainees 
included members of the Islamic Tabliq group suspected of supporting 
ADF rebels. The Government released treason convicts and suspects under 
the terms of an amnesty act signed by the President in January (see 
Section 1.d.). In November 1999, more than 400 prisoners held without 
trial since at least 1997 held a protest at Luzira prison; all 400 were 
released by year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    There is one political prisoner. Bright Gabula Africa, whose death 
sentence for treason (plotting an armed coup) was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1995, remained imprisoned pending the outcome of his appeal to 
the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy, a largely 
autonomous constitutional body that recommends whether presidential 
clemency powers should be exercised in a given case.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of 
privacy, which the Government generally observes; however, there were 
some exceptions. The law requires that police have search warrants 
before entering private homes or offices, and the police generally 
observed this law in practice. Unlike in the previous year, there were 
no reports that the UPDF invaded private homes without warrants. LDU's 
arrested citizens without authority. The police sometimes searched 
vehicles without prior warrants. Prison officials routinely censored 
prisoners' mail.
    The Government required that employees in the President's office 
register their political affiliation in writing (see Section 3).
    Although fighting between government forces and the LRA continued, 
there were no reports during the year that government forces used 
threats to compel citizens to leave their homes because of the 
conflict.
    Hundreds of thousands of persons remain internally displaced as a 
result of rebel activity and raids by Karamojong warriors (see Sections 
1.g. and 2.d.).
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the Sudan 
People's Liberation Army (SPLA), supported by UPDF forces, forcibly 
recruited Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in Sudan.
    Female members of the police force are required to obtain 
permission from the police Inspector General before marrying. Male 
police officers are not subject to the same restriction (see Section 
5).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Reports of violations of humanitarian law 
increased in the north, and remained a problem in the west. While the 
number of reported violations by the Government decreased during the 
year, such violations by the LRA increased. In the north, government 
forces continued their policy of maintaining so-called protected 
villages with UPDF detachments nearby as a means of protecting 
civilians and denying support to the LRA. Although substantial NGO and 
donor community assistance has improved the overall conditions in the 
villages, conditions still remain poor. The Government failed to 
provide adequate security to the villages, which were the targets of 
rebel attacks.
    There were reports that civilians were killed and injured during 
fights between UPDF forces and rebels. On June 6, several persons were 
killed during a battle between UPDF forces and LRA rebels near Okina 
and Laguti.
    LRA attacks increased during the year, and there were numerous 
incidents of attacks on villages and displaced camps in which villagers 
were killed, injured, raped, or abducted (see Section 2.d.). In the 
north, forces of the LRA, led by Joseph Kony, continued to attack 
civilian targets, as well as refugee camps. During the year, attacks by 
the LRA resulted in approximately 175 deaths and numerous injuries and 
the destruction of homes and property. On March 5, LRA rebels attacked 
Padibe displaced camp in Kitgum, killing 12 persons, wounding 30, and 
burning 800 huts. On March 12, LRA rebels attacked Cwero protected 
village in Gulu and abducted 10 persons. On August 16, LRA rebels again 
attacked Cwero protected village, abducting one person. No new 
incidents of mutilation were reported.
    The LRA abducted approximately 700 civilians, many of whom later 
were released. The LRA continued to abduct children and, at clandestine 
bases, terrorized them into virtual slavery as guards, concubines, and 
soldiers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). In addition to being beaten, 
raped, and forced to march until exhausted, abducted children were 
forced to participate in the killing of other children who attempted to 
escape. NGO's estimated the number of abducted children still held 
captive by the LRA at 1,500; other estimates vary widely (see Sections 
1.b. and 6.f.).
    In the west and southwest, the ADF continued to attack civilian 
targets, trading centers, and private homes, resulting in hundreds of 
deaths, injuries, and abductions. The ADF killed at least 210 persons 
and abducted an estimated 30 children during the year (see Sections 
1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). Since 1996 the ADF has abducted 
approximately 200 children, approximately half of whom remained missing 
at year's end.
    Due to insecurity in northern areas of the country, the UHRC 
suspended its investigation into a 1998 incident in which UPDF forces, 
while combating suspected LRA rebels, reportedly killed 30 Acholi 
children abducted by the LRA in Ogok village, Kitgum district.
    In January the President signed a 6-month blanket amnesty for rebel 
fighters. The amnesty was renewed for 6 months in July; however, by 
year's end, the Government only had begun to implement provisions in 
the amnesty act related to the repatriation and resettlement of former 
rebels.
    There were no reports of new attacks by the WNBF, USF/A, CAMP, or 
Rwandan Hutu rebels (see Section 1.b.).
    At year's end, approximately 610,000 citizens remained displaced 
internally by violence in the north, west, and northeast, according to 
the U.N. Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (see 
Section 2.d.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respected these rights; however, there were instances in which the 
Government infringed on these rights. Police at times harassed 
journalists by holding them at police stations for several hours of 
questioning. On May 23, two Monitor reporters were briefly detained and 
questioned by the police after writing stories that speculated about 
government links to the Kanungu cult massacre (see Section 1.d.). In 
December the Government temporarily banned the regular opinion columns 
of four journalists with the government-owned New Vision newspaper due 
to past commentary critical of the Government; the columns of three of 
the journalists were reinstated 3 weeks later. The fourth journalist 
transferred to another paper.
    Three editors of the Monitor newspaper were arrested in 1999 and 
charged with sedition and publication of false news in connection with 
a case in which a woman, Kandida Lakony, claimed to have been abused by 
the UPDF (see Section 1.c.). The editors were released and their case 
was pending before the courts at year's end.
    The New Vision, a government-funded daily newspaper with a daily 
circulation of 35,000 (and up to 10 readers sharing each copy), and the 
government-controlled Radio Uganda, continued to play major roles in 
the media. These news sources were of a fairly high quality and 
sometimes included reporting critical of the Government.
    The media generally are free and outspoken, with widespread 
availability of privately owned publications. The independent Monitor 
newspaper, with a daily circulation of 22,000, consistently was 
critical of the Government. The East African, a Nairobi, Kenya-based 
weekly publication that provides extensive reporting on the country, 
continued to circulate without government hindrance.
    The Government controls one television station and Radio Uganda, 
the radio station with the largest audience. At year's end, there were 
more than 19 radio stations throughout the country. There were five 
local television stations and more than a dozen private television 
stations available via satellite. The number of independent media 
broadcast sources increased during the year. Several independent media 
outlets broadcast daily political talk shows in several languages, 
often very critical of the Government and individual officials, 
including the President. High-ranking officials often participated in 
these programs and debated issues with political opponents. There was 
no censorship of these programs.
    On February 21, two journalists from the Voice of Toro radio 
station were arrested and charged with publishing false news stemming 
from an erroneous report of a rebel attack on February 15. On October 
26, the Chief Magistrate's Court in Fort Portal dismissed the case due 
to lack of evidence.
    Newspaper, radio, and television coverage, in particular coverage 
by state-owned media, of the June referendum favored Movement 
activities. Activities by opposition parties and efforts to promote the 
multiparty system received minimal coverage by any media (see Section 
3).
    The Press and Media Law, which took effect in 1995, requires 
journalists to be licensed and to meet certain standards, including 
holding a university degree. The law provides for a Media Council that 
can suspend newspapers and deny access to state information. Government 
officials have not enforced the law since its enactment.
    Uncensored Internet access is widely available in major cities 
through three commercial service providers, although the cost for 
connectivity is prohibitive for all but the most affluent 
noninstitutional users. There also are over a dozen cyber cafes in 
Kampala and other cities, and several NGO's offer Internet access.
    A considerable degree of academic freedom exists at the two public 
and six private universities. Students and faculty have sponsored wide-
ranging political debates in open forums on campus.
    Political education and military science courses known as ``Chaka 
Mchaka'' were suspended prior to the June referendum on political 
systems but resumed in August. These courses are criticized as 
indoctrination in Movement political philosophy. There continued to be 
reports that the techniques used in some of the courses included 
intimidation and physical and mental abuse. There also were reports 
that some instructors demanded payment for the courses, and unconfirmed 
reports that persons were coerced to take them, sometimes at gunpoint.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for some degree of freedom of assembly for non-political 
groups; however, the Government restricts this right in practice. The 
Constitution bans political parties from holding national conventions, 
issuing platforms, endorsing candidates, or opening branch offices 
outside the capital, and on several occasions police disrupted or 
prevented political demonstrations and other events; although the ban 
was intended to be replaced following the referendum, new legislation 
that would regulate political party activities had not been enacted by 
year's end. The Constitution also forbids other activities that would 
interfere with the Movement system, an elastic provision that the 
Government, in the past, has interpreted adversely to the detriment of 
political groups' interests. Permits are not required; however, groups 
are required to notify the police prior to public gatherings. Police 
denied permission to hold public rallies to several non-Movement groups 
during the year.
    In February police in Bushenyi dispersed a seminar organized by the 
Free Movement, a political pressure group. On March 3, police in 
Kampala stopped a rally to campaign for a federal political system. On 
March 31, police and military police forcibly dispersed a rally in 
Mbarara held by Nasser Sebaggala, a candidate in the next presidential 
election (see Section 1.c.). On April 1, Sebaggala held another rally 
without police intervention to protest the referendum and to campaign. 
In April Sebaggala was banned from holding further rallies in accord 
with regulations banning all presidential campaign rallies until 
legislation governing the presidential elections was promulgated, which 
occurred on December 13 (see Section 3). On April 21, police beat and 
detained an UPC official for holding an unauthorized rally against the 
referendum on political systems (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 3). On 
June 3, police in Gulu prevented a meeting of the Uganda Youth 
Congress, the youth wing of the Uganda People's Congress. On June 25, 
police beat and arrested 11 Makerere University students after they 
disrupted a referendum rally held by the President. They subsequently 
were charged with misconduct and alarming the President and released on 
bail. Their case was ongoing at year's end (see Section 1.c. and 1.d.). 
On June 27, police in Tororo stopped a referendum rally organized by 
advocates for a multiparty system. On July 15, police in Kampala 
stopped a rally organized by an UPC official. On August 4, police in 
Kampala dispersed a seminar convened by the youth wing of the National 
Democrat's Forum. On September 6, police in Kampala stopped a rally 
organized by the Democratic Party (see Section 1.c.). On September 16, 
police violently dispersed a meeting of the Uganda Young Democrats in 
Gulu, which resulted in several injuries (see Section 1.c.).
    In the wake of the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten 
Commandments of God killings, local officials on several occasions 
dispersed meetings of religious groups (see Section 2.c.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice. NGO's are required to 
register with the Nongovernmental Organizations Board, which includes 
representation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as other 
ministries. The Government generally approved NGO registrations. On May 
26, the Government registered the Uganda National NGO Forum, a broad 
consortium of domestic and international NGO's that had been refused 
registration for several years.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, the Government forcibly disbanded several religious groups. 
Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that security 
officials harassed or detained Muslims. There is no state religion. 
Religious groups, like other nongovernmental organizations, must 
register with the Government. There were no reports that the Government 
refused to grant registration to any religious groups. Permits were 
necessary for the construction of facilities, including religious 
facilities. There were no reports that the Government refused to grant 
such permits to any religious organization. Mosques operated freely, 
Koranic schools were common, and Muslims occupied positions of 
authority in local and central government. Prisoners were given the 
opportunity to pray on the day appropriate to their faith. Muslim 
prisoners usually were released from work duties during the month of 
Ramadan.
    Following the March 16 murders of more than 500 Movement for the 
Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God followers and the discovery 
of mass graves of approximately 500 other persons on properties in 
Kanungu belonging to the group, the Government launched investigations 
of numerous religious groups. Three groups were disbanded forcibly, and 
one religious leader was arrested. On March 29, former Rukungiri 
assistant resident district commissioner (ARDC) Rev. Francis Mutazindwa 
was arrested for failing to act on information about the activities of 
the Kanungu cult while he was the ARDC. He was released on bond on 
April 29, pending further investigation. In December the Government 
began an investigation into the killings; the investigation is 
scheduled for completion in June 2001.
    In early April, following allegations that the church allowed 
youths to engage in sexual relationships, the deputy resident district 
commissioner closed the Revival Pentecostal Church in Nseko village, 
Kasangati. In mid-April police in Kasese district banned the activities 
of a church group based in Hima public school, Busongora. On May 19, 
the Bushenyi resident district commissioner ordered the closure of the 
Church of the Servants of the Eucharistic Hearts of Jesus and Mary, 
which allegedly was operating in the guise of a vocational school.
    On May 2, five members of the Kisaaba Redeemed Church in Kayunga, 
Mukono district, were arrested and charged with causing the death of a 
church member whom they denied medical treatment. Two remained in 
detention in Njeru prison at year's end; the other members were 
released. The case still was pending at year's end. On May 30, five 
members of the Mulungiomu Full Gospel Church in Luweero were arrested 
after reportedly telling their followers to fast and sell their 
property, the same message that had preceded the killings in Kanungu. 
At year's end, the five remained in custody at Luzira prison pending 
trial. On July 18, Wilson Bushara, leader of the World Last Message 
Warning Church, and 17 followers were arrested and charged with 
defilement, rape, abduction, and theft. On November 23, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions ordered that Bushara and his followers be 
transferred from the Buganda Magistrates' Court to Luweero where the 
offenses allegedly were committed. Their cases were pending before the 
Luweero district Magistrates' Court at year's end. On August 22, 
Patrick Bitungwabariho, a leader of the Movement for the Restoration of 
the Ten Commandments of God, appeared before court in Rukungiri 
district on charges of participating in an unlawful assembly, being 
idle and disorderly, and child neglect. Bitungwabariho remained in 
detention, and his case was ongoing at year's end.
    In the wake of the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten 
Commandments of God killings, local officials on several occasions 
dispersed meetings of religious groups. On March 12, security officials 
in Mbale dispersed hundreds of persons who had gathered for an 
evangelistic event organized by the
    Seventh-Day Adventist Church. On March 19, police in Kikinzi, 
Rukungiri district, dispersed a Seventh-Day Adventist Church baptism on 
the grounds that the church had not sought permission from the 
authorities to hold the event; however, there are no legal requirements 
that authorities must approve such church events. On March 28, police 
in Mukono dispersed a meeting of over 200 adherents of the Universal 
Apostolic Church for the Restless on the grounds that the church had 
not sought permission from the authorities to hold the event. On April 
1, police dispersed an alleged cult gathering in Kikandwa, Mubende 
district, on suspicion that Movement for the Restoration of the Ten 
Commandments of God leader Joseph Kibwetere was hiding within the 
crowd.
    Complaints by Muslim groups of government bias lessened during the 
year; however, the backlash from the death of over 1,000 citizens at 
the hands of a religious cult resulted in negative public attitudes 
towards fringe Christian groups and the Government's forcible 
disbanding of some groups. In 1998 approximately 100 Muslim men were 
detained and some were tortured, on suspicion that they supported rebel 
groups. Many of those detained were released (see Section 1.b.). There 
was no clear indication that religion was the sole factor in their 
arrests. The release of 53 Tabliq treason suspects in March and 28 in 
June resolved the issue of the whereabouts of unaccounted Muslim 
prisoners (see Section 1.d.).
    Some local governments have restricted the hours of operations of 
religious organizations that are viewed as cults, for example, 
prohibiting nighttime prayer meetings. The Government largely has 
ignored calls for these churches to be shut down and their followers 
returned to mainstream churches.
    There were reports from numerous human rights groups in the DRC 
that Rwandan troops, as well as various rebel factions, targeted 
Catholic clergy, both to intimidate the local population and in revenge 
for the Church's perceived role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. There 
also were reports from the DRC that some UPDF troops may have targeted 
clergy as well.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice, 
although there were some limits. Some local officials reportedly 
demanded payment of fees for permission to change a place of residence. 
A married woman must obtain her husband's written permission on her 
passport application if children are traveling on her passport (see 
Section 5).
    Although fighting between government forces and the LRA continued, 
there were no reports during the year that government forces used 
threats to compel citizens to leave their homes because of the 
conflict.
    Increased attacks by LRA rebels and Karamojong warriors have caused 
many Acholis to leave their homes for urban centers, displaced camps, 
and villages guarded by the UPDF (see Section 1.g.). It was estimated 
that approximately half of Gulu's population was in displacement camps 
or protected villages due to such attacks. At year's end, approximately 
610,000 citizens remained displaced internally by violence in the 
north, west, and northeast.
    There were no laws that provide for the granting of refugee and 
asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; 
however, the Government does grant such status in practice. The 
Government cooperated with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and with other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. As it has done repeatedly in past years, the Government 
continued to provide first asylum as well as land for temporary 
resettlement to citizens from neighboring countries, extending this 
practice to approximately 214,000 refugees during the year. Over 90 
percent of the refugees in the country are from southern Sudan; there 
also are small numbers of refugees from the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi.
    The Government failed to maintain adequate security in refugee 
camps during the year; large-scale attacks by rebel groups on some 
camps were reported (see Section 1.g.). For example, on July 24, LRA 
rebels attacked the Mongula refugee camp in Adjumani district killing 1 
Sudanese refugee and abducting 30 others. On August 9, LRA rebels 
attacked Acholi-pii refugee camp in Kitgum killing three Sudanese 
refugees and abducting two others. On August 16, LRA rebels again 
attacked Acholi-pii, killing three refugees and abducting a child. On 
September 3, ADF rebels attacked Kyangwali Sudanese refugee 
resettlement camp in Buhaguzi county, Hoima district killing a woman 
and her child.
    Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of the forced 
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Movement domination of the Government and the political process, 
and some restrictive constitutional provisions, limited citizens' 
effective exercise of the right to change their government. The 
President dominates the Government, and Movement supporters remained in 
control of the Parliament, although the legislature continued to 
conduct business in an independent and assertive manner during the 
year. The 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections were peaceful 
and orderly, but election conditions, including restrictions on 
political party activities, led to a flawed election process. In June a 
national referendum on the role of political parties resulted in the 
indefinite extension of the Movement form of government. The referendum 
process was flawed by restrictions on political party activities and 
unequal funding.
    The Government maintained, at government expense, the Movement 
Secretariat, an organization that roughly parallels government 
institutions and is limited to those professing support for the 
Movement. Political education and military science courses known as 
Chaka Mchaka were suspended prior to the June referendum on political 
systems, but they resumed in August (see Section 2.a.). The Government 
prohibited some non-Movement political gatherings, required that 
employees in the President's office register their political 
affiliation in writing (see Section 1.f.), and broke up numerous 
political meetings not sanctioned by the Movement (see Section 2.b.). 
The Constitution bans political parties from holding national 
conventions, issuing platforms, endorsing candidates, or opening 
offices outside of the capital. A June referendum resulted in the 
indefinite continuation of these restrictions.
    Newspaper, radio, and television coverage, in particular coverage 
by state-owned media, of the June referendum favored Movement 
activities. Activities by opposition parties and efforts to promote 
multiparty system received minimal coverage in any media (see Section 
2.d.).
    On November 28, the Parliament passed the Presidential Elections 
Bill, which governs the presidential election process; on December 13, 
the President signed the law. The law permits election campaigns to 
commence after the Electoral Commission has approved a candidate's 
nomination. The nomination review process was scheduled for January 
2001.
    Authorities at times harassed and arrested opposition politicians 
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). On April 21, police in Mbale beat and 
detained a UPC official for holding an unauthorized rally against the 
referendum on political systems (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    Universal suffrage is accorded to adults 18 years of age and older. 
The Constitution does not provide the right to vote to prisoners, and 
prisoners were not permitted to vote in the 1998 local government 
elections or in the June referendum.
    The Constitution reserves 10 seats in Parliament for members of the 
UPDF, 5 seats for representatives of persons with disabilities, 5 seats 
for youth representatives, and 3 seats for representatives of organized 
labor. Individual parliamentarians who claim non-Movement party 
affiliation participate fully in the legislature.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however, 
they play an influential role in national affairs. The Government used 
quotas in an aggressive effort to place women in positions of 
authority. Women continued to make strong contributions in Parliament 
and inside the Movement. The Vice President is a woman, as are 5 
ministers and 12 junior ministers in the President's 60-member Cabinet. 
In addition 39 of the nation's 45 districts selected a woman to fill a 
National Assembly seat reserved for women by the provisions of the 
Constitution. By-elections for female parliamentarians have not yet 
been held in six districts created in 1997. Women additionally won 6 
nonreserved seats for the 281-member Parliament in the 1996 election.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Numerous human rights groups are active. Among them are: The 
Foundation for Human Rights Initiative; a chapter of FIDA; the 
Prisoners' Aid Foundation, which monitors prison conditions; the 
National Organization for Civic Education and Election Monitoring, 
which deals with problems related to civil society and political 
rights; Human Rights Focus, based in the northern town of Gulu; the 
National Association of Women's Organizations of Uganda (NAWOU), an 
umbrella group; the International Federation of Human Rights; and the 
Human Rights and Peace Center, based at Makerere University. These 
groups operate without government restriction, investigating and 
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Hurinet, a human 
rights network and an umbrella organization for nine human rights 
organizations active in the country, also continued to be active.
    The Uganda National NGO Forum, a broad consortium of domestic and 
international NGO's that has been refused registration for several 
years, was registered on May 26 (see Section 2.b.).
    The Government allowed visits by international human rights NGO's, 
including Amnesty International and the ICRC. The Government also 
cooperated fully with the UNHCR.
    Government officials generally were cooperative and responsive to 
NGO views. They frequently attended conferences and seminars hosted by 
NGO's on social problems. The Government continued to cooperate with 
NGO's on legal and prison reforms.
    The Constitution established the UHRC as a permanent independent 
body with quasi-judicial powers. Under the Constitution, the UHRC may 
subpoena information and order the release of detainees and the payment 
of compensation for abuses. The UHRC continued to pursue suspected 
human rights abusers, including high-level officials in the Government 
and military, and expanded its operations by opening a second branch 
office in Soroti district in September. The UHRC Human Rights Tribunal 
continued to function, and the headquarters received 1,108 complaints 
during the year, including some against senior government leaders and 
military and police officials; the Soroti office received 123 
complaints and the Gulu office received 312. Of the 1,108 complaints 
received at headquarters, 654 were resolved; 202 were referred to the 
criminal courts; 344 were referred to other bodies, such as the 
Inspector General of Police, the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of 
Public Service; 27 were dismissed because they occurred before 1995; 33 
were found not to be human rights violations; and 48 were resolved 
through mediation and intervention. At year's end, 59 cases remained 
under investigation, and 395 still were pending review. Of the 123 
complaints received at the Soroti office, 16 were resolved, 27 were 
dismissed, and 80 were under investigation at year's end. The UHRC does 
not have the power to intervene in cases pending before a court. The 
UHRC inspected numerous detention facilities and publicly reported on 
its findings; on March 9, the UHRC released its 1998 report. The report 
cited abuses by security organs and condemned police corruption and 
inefficiency; it noted instances of denial of the right to assembly, 
and criticized involvement in the DRC. The President appoints the 
UHRC's eight-member board.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these factors; 
however, the Government does not enforce the law effectively in matters 
of locally or culturally accepted discrimination against women, 
children, people with disabilities, or certain ethnic groups. Race was 
not a factor in national politics. The continued instability in the 
north led to violations of the rights of some Acholi, an ethnic group 
that comprises a significant part of the population. Most violations of 
Acholi rights resulted from LRA actions.
    Women.--Violence against women, including rape, remained common. 
According to U.N. statistics, 31 percent of women have experienced 
domestic violence. There were no laws that specifically protect women 
from battery or spousal rape, although there is a general law 
concerning assault. Some men of the Karamojong ethnic group in the 
northeastern section of the country continued their cultural practice 
of claiming unmarried women as wives by raping them. Between February 
and July, Karamojong warriors raped approximately 20 women during raids 
on neighboring districts in the northeast.
    The Government continued trying to implement the Children's 
Statute, which provides extensive protection for families and children; 
however, implementation proved exceedingly difficult due to manpower 
and judicial constraints, and in reality, little was done to enforce 
the statute's provisions. Law enforcement officials, reflecting general 
public opinion, continued to view wife beating as a husband's 
prerogative and rarely intervened in cases of domestic violence. Women 
remained more likely to sue for divorce than to file assault charges 
against their husbands. These problems continued to receive increasing 
public attention. Numerous women's rights NGO's sponsored conferences, 
empowerment sessions, and training programs throughout the country. On 
September 1, the Court of Appeal upheld the death sentence imposed by 
the High Court on the husband and brotherinlaw of Renu Joshi, who was 
murdered in 1997.
    Traditional and widespread societal discrimination against women 
continued, especially in rural areas, despite constitutional provisions 
to the contrary. Many customary laws discriminate against women in the 
areas of adoption, marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In most areas, 
women may not own or inherit property, nor retain custody of their 
children under local customary law. Divorce law requires women wanting 
to prove adultery to meet stricter evidentiary standards. Polygyny is 
legal under both customary and Islamic law, and a wife has no legal 
status to prevent her husband from marrying another woman. In some 
ethnic groups, men also may ``inherit'' the widows of their deceased 
brothers. Women do most of the agricultural work but own only 7 percent 
of the agricultural land. There are limits on a married woman's ability 
to travel abroad with her children (see Section 2.d.).
    Unlike their male counterparts, female members of the police force 
are required to obtain permission from the police Inspector General 
before marrying (see Section 1.f.).
    There are active women's rights groups, including FIDA, Action for 
Development, the National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ), Akina 
Mama Wa Afrika, the Forum for Women in Democracy, and NAWOU, which 
promote greater awareness of the rights of women and children. FIDA is 
in the final year of a 3year project to draft proposed reforms of 
outdated and discriminatory laws, and the NAWJ continued to disseminate 
its guidebook on women's rights and options concerning domestic 
violence to women throughout the country.
    Although prostitution is illegal, it is known to exist; however, 
there are no credible statistics available on the incidence.
    An undetermined number of women were victims of abduction and rape 
by rebel forces (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.).
    Children.--Although it has devoted only limited funds to children's 
welfare, the Government demonstrated a commitment to improving 
children's welfare, particularly through its continuation of the 
Universal Primary Education (UPE) program. The program provides free 
education through the seventh grade for a maximum of four children per 
family, two girls and two boys; however, education is not compulsory. 
Key components of the UPE program include eliminating compulsory 
uniform requirements, providing free textbooks, eliminating fees 
imposed by schools, and the payment of Primary Leaving Examination 
(PLE) fees by the Government. Although some provisions had not yet been 
implemented fully by year's end, the UPE had increased funding for 
education, provided additional skills training for teachers, and 
reduced the textbook to student ratio. Strained finances, instability 
in some areas, infrastructure problems, and inadequate teacher training 
have prevented full implementation. Although the UPE program makes 
education more accessible financially, parents still must pay for 
school supplies and some school costs. Approximately 93 percent of 
primary school-age children are enrolled in school. Since the 
implementation of UPE, primary school enrollment has increased from 2.9 
million in 1996 to 6.5 million in 1999. Girls and boys theoretically 
have equal access to education, and lower grades are divided almost 
evenly by sex; however, the proportion of girls in higher school grades 
remains low since families traditionally have favored boys when making 
financially related educational decisions. Boys also are more likely to 
finish primary school and perform better on the PLE. In June the 
Government launched a national plan to promote the education of girls. 
Only 51 percent of adult women are literate compared with 75 percent of 
adult men. Parents' inability to afford schooling has correlated highly 
with the occurrence of child labor in rural areas (see Section 6.d.).
    The Government has not yet implemented effectively the 1996 
Children's Statute, which outlines broad protections for children. 
Government efforts to enforce the statute's provisions were hampered by 
the large proportion of the population that is below 18, manpower and 
fiscal constraints on the judiciary, and cultural norms. The law 
stipulates parents' responsibilities and provides extensive protection 
for children in a wide variety of areas, including financial support, 
foster care placement, adoption, determination of parentage, and 
treatment of children charged with offenses. It also includes concise 
provisions on the rights of the child, including a provision that a 
child shall not be made to work or take part in any activity, whether 
for pay or not, that is likely to injure the child's health, education, 
or mental, physical, or moral development. However, the Government has 
been unable to enforce prohibitions on child labor, particularly in the 
informal sector (see Section 6.d.).
    Estimates placed the number of orphaned children (children missing 
either parent are considered orphans) at up to 1.7 million. This large 
number of orphans resulted from previous civil wars, the internal 
displacement of persons, and HIV/AIDS.
    Ritual murders of children remained a problem during the year (see 
Section 5). For example, on August 17, police arrested Peter Ssempugu 
on suspicion that he beheaded a 15-year-old girl in Busiro County, 
Mpigi district, on July 20. In December a 13-year-old girl reportedly 
escaped after she was drugged and abducted for a ritual sacrifice.
    Child abuse remained a serious problem, particularly the rape of 
young girls (known locally as ``defilement''). Only a small fraction of 
these incidents is reported, especially when the perpetrator is a 
family member, neighbor, or teacher--as is often the case. During the 
year, there were 4,209 reported cases of defilement, an increase from 
2,637 in the previous year; 2,410 of the cases were investigated, and 
2,317 arrests resulted from such investigations. Increasing numbers of 
accusations reached the courts, although neither conviction nor 
punishment was common. Cases were reported frequently in newspapers, 
but a payment to the girl's parents often ended the matter. Despite 
these obstacles, an increasing number of cases were being prosecuted. 
While defilement carries a maximum sentence of death, that punishment 
has never been meted out to a convicted rapist. Defilement applies to 
all cases of sexual contact outside of marriage involving girls younger 
than 18 years of age, regardless of consent or the age of the 
perpetrator. The marriage of young girls by parental arrangement is 
common, especially in rural areas.
    Most schools use corporal punishment, although in 1997 the 
Government banned the beating of secondary school students. There were 
no developments in the June 1999 case of Peter Masanja, who died after 
a beating by the Kakungulu Memorial Islamic Institute's director, 
Hamidulah Llukwago. The Government has not released details of the 
investigation of a 1996 case in which a teacher in Masaka beat to death 
a 15-year-old student. It is unknown if the investigation has been 
completed; however, it is likely that it has been suspended.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is practiced by the Sabiny tribe, located in the 
highly rural Kapchorwa district in the east, and by the Pokot tribe 
(also known as the Upe), which spans the remote northeastern border 
with Kenya. There are approximately 10,000 Sabiny and approximately 
20,000 Upe who live in the country. Among the Sabiny, initiation 
ceremonies involving FGM have been carried out every 2 years. Such a 
ceremony was held in 1998, and an NGO based in Kapchorwa registered 965 
females who were subjected to FGM during that year. In December there 
were reports that approximately 121 Pokot girls and 621 Sabiny women 
and girls, a decrease of 223 from 1998, had been circumcised during the 
biannual ceremony. An international human rights NGO offered cattle, 
goats, and money for scholarships to Sabiny parents who do not allow 
their daughters to be circumcised during this year's ceremony. There is 
no law against the practice, but the Government and women's groups 
working with the U.N. Population Fund continued to carry out programs 
to combat the practice through education. These programs have received 
strong government support and some support from local leaders. The 
programs emphasize close cooperation with traditional authority figures 
and peer counseling. Significant press attention to these ongoing 
efforts brought public attention to the problem throughout the year.
    The Children's Statute provides that children with disabilities be 
treated and given necessary special facilities--a provision hampered in 
execution by inadequate funding.
    The legal recruitment age for military service is 18 years; 
however, in practice, some recruiters have allowed 17-year-olds to 
enlist.
    The UPDF detained LRA child soldiers at Gulu military barracks for 
several months. There were reports that the military used the children 
to help find LRA landmines and arms caches (see Sections 1.d. and 
6.c.).
    There were reports from the DRC that UPDF and Rwandan troops, in 
addition to RCD rebels, reportedly abducted many young women from the 
villages they raided. These night raids on villages became so frequent 
that in many parts of the Kivu Provinces peasants slept in their 
fields.
    The ADF and LRA abducted many children, using them as guards, 
laborers, soldiers, and, in the case of the LRA, for forced sex (see 
Sections 1.g., 6.c., and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that persons 
with disabilities have ``a right to respect and human dignity'' and 
requires that authorities take appropriate measures ``to ensure that 
they realize their full mental and physical potential;'' however, 
despite this provision, there was no statutory requirement for 
government services or facilities, such as accessibility of buildings 
for the disabled. Most buildings have one story, but in larger towns 
with multistory buildings, there often are no elevators; even where 
they do exist, they rarely are reliable. Widespread discrimination by 
society and employers limits job and educational opportunities for 
those with physical disabilities. In 1998 the Government appointed a 
Minister of State for Disabled Persons. A Department for Disabled 
Persons also exists under the Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social 
Development; however, these bodies and positions have little funding to 
undertake or support any initiatives.
    Religious Minorities.--There are amicable relations between the 
various religious communities, and no religious group actively impinges 
upon the right of others to worship. However, the backlash from the 
death of over 1,000 citizens at the hands of a religious group resulted 
in negative public attitudes towards fringe Christian groups. Some 
officials of ``mainstream'' Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim religious 
organizations have called for the closure of Christian churches that 
are viewed as cults.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Civil strife in the north led 
to the violation of the rights of members of the Acholi tribe, which is 
largely resident in the northern districts of Gulu and Kitgum. Both 
government forces and the LRA rebels--who themselves largely are 
Acholi--committed abuses. LRA fighters in particular were implicated in 
the killing and kidnaping of Acholi tribe members (see Section 1.g.), 
while the UPDF record in the north continued to improve markedly. 
Abuses were inflicted upon members of the Bakonjo tribe in the west at 
the hands of ADF rebels, including ethnic Bakonjo.
    Between February and July, raids by Karamojong warriors on 
neighboring districts in the northeast resulted in approximately 100 
deaths. The raids may have exacerbated ethnic tensions in the northeast 
(see Section 1.a.).

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of every person to join workers' associations or trade unions, 
and the law allows unionization if a majority of the work force 
supports it; however, in practice the Government respects the right to 
form unions, although it has not responded yet to a 1997 application 
for registration by the Uganda Allied Teachers' Union. Since 1993 the 
right to form unions has extended to civil servants. However, many 
``essential'' government employees are not permitted to form unions; 
these include police, army, permanent secretaries in the ministries, 
heads of departments and state-owned enterprises, school principals, 
and other management-level officials. The Government has failed to 
enforce the rights of some employees to join unions in newly privatized 
industries and factories. Organized labor has three reserved 
parliamentary seats.
    The National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU), the largest labor 
federation, includes 17 unions and is independent of the Government and 
political parties. Among its members are medical workers, including 
doctors, and the civil service union. The NOTU's influence on the 
overall economy remains small, since about 90 percent of the work force 
are peasant farmers. Even in areas in which cash crops are significant, 
unionization has remained practically nonexistent. NOTU membership has 
declined steadily from some 500,000 in the 1970's to about 100,000.
    The Constitution confirms the right to strike; however, government 
policy requires that labor and management make ``every effort'' to 
reconcile labor disputes before resorting to strike action. This 
directive presents unions with a complicated set of restrictions. If 
reconciliation does not appear to be possible, labor must submit its 
grievances and notice to strike to the Minister of Labor, who usually 
delegates the dispute to the Industrial Court (IC). In previous years, 
in the absence of verdicts from the IC, the Minister of Labor generally 
did not permit strikes, on the basis that ``every effort'' had not been 
exhausted. Frustrated laborers often went on strike anyway, protesting 
credibly that they were not paid a wage adequate to live on.
    On January 24, 3,000 workers at Century Bottling Company went on 
strike over nonpayment of salaries and poor working conditions. They 
returned to work the following day after reaching an agreement with 
management. On January 25, employees of Ugma Engineering Corporation 
went on strike over nonpayment of salaries but ended their strike after 
management agreed to pay them. On February 10, clearing and forwarding 
agents in Malaba, the main entry point for goods from Kenya, went on 
strike in protest against corruption on the part of customs officials. 
They returned to work the following day after senior revenue authority 
officials promised to address their concerns.
    Labor unions freely exercised the right to affiliate with and 
participate in regional and international labor organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, specifying 
that a workplace may be unionized if a majority of the employees 
supports doing so; however, true collective bargaining takes place only 
in the small private sector of the modern economy. In the modern 
sector, the Government is by far the largest employer (civil service 
and state-owned enterprises), and it dominates the bargaining process. 
The Government has adopted a tripartite (government-employers-labor) 
cooperative approach to setting wages and resolving labor disputes. 
Both the Government and employers may refer disputes to the IC. The law 
does not prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers; however, there 
were no reported incidents of government harassment of union officials. 
Unionization continued to be blocked effectively by some industries, 
especially in the textile, hotel, and construction sectors. Labor 
organizers complained that laws requiring a minimum of 1,000 persons in 
order to form a union hindered their activities. The Government took 
only limited action on organized labor complaints, but pointed out that 
the refusal to allow unionization is a constitutional violation. On 
February 14, 21 workers of the Nytil Picfare textile factory were 
dismissed in connection with a strike earlier in the month designed to 
unionize the work force and raise salaries. The Ministry of Labor 
subsequently entered into negotiations with Nytil Picfare to resolve 
the issue; however, the company went into receivership and negotiations 
were suspended.
    In 1999 the Uganda Textile, Garments, Leather, and Allied Union 
filed a complaint against the Government with the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) for failure to support the attempts of workers in 
the textile sector to exercise their right to freedom of association. 
The complaint still was pending at year's end.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or bonded labor, including forced or bonded labor by children; 
however, a lack of resources prevented the Government from enforcing 
this prohibition effectively. There was strong evidence that prison 
officials hired out prisoners to work on private farms and construction 
sites, where often they were overworked. Throughout the country, prison 
officials routinely augmented their meager pay with crops grown by 
prisoners on the prison grounds. Male prisoners performed arduous 
physical labor while female prisoners produced marketable handicrafts 
such as woven basketry. Juvenile prisoners perform manual labor, often 
12 hours per day (see Section 1.c.). Compensation, when paid, generally 
was very low, although the law demands that pretrial detainees must 
receive back pay for all work that they have performed once they are 
released (see Section 1.c.).
    The UPDF detained LRA child soldiers at Gulu military barracks for 
several months. There were reports that the military used the children 
to help find LRA landmines and arms caches (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
    Both the ADF and the LRA abducted civilians for training as 
guerrillas; most victims were children and young adults, whom the ADF 
and LRA terrorized into virtual slavery as guards, laborers, soldiers, 
and, in the case of the LRA, as sex slaves (see Sections 1.b., 1.g., 
and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits employers from hiring workers below the 
age of 18; however, child labor is common, especially in the informal 
sector. The Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social Development is 
charged with enforcing the law on child labor, but it has limited 
financial means to do so. Part of the problem is demographic, because 
half of the population is under 18 years of age. School fees have made 
it impossible for some parents--particularly poor farmers, the majority 
of the population--to provide their children with an education in spite 
of the Government's UPE program (see Section 5). As a result, there is 
an incentive to leave school and go into agricultural or domestic work 
in order to help meet expenses or perform the work of absent or infirm 
parents, a common situation throughout the country. The problem is 
acute particularly among the large orphan population. Nevertheless, 
according to the Ministry of Education, 93 percent of primary school 
age children are enrolled in school.
    Most working children are employed in the informal sector, often on 
the subsistence farms of extended family members or as domestic 
servants. In urban areas, children peddle small items on the streets, 
are involved in the commercial sex industry (particularly in border 
towns and in Kampala), or beg for money. Although adults do most tea 
harvesting, some children were employed in this sector as well. Some of 
the country's orphans engage in labor activities.
    It is estimated that 60 percent of all land-based trade in the 
country is informal. Smuggling is one of the larger informal 
industries, and employs large numbers of child laborers at the borders 
with Kenya and Tanzania. Children walk back and forth across the 
unguarded borders, transporting small amounts of fuel, sugar, coffee, 
or other commodities.
    Government efforts to decrease the incidence of child labor were 
boosted by a $1.5 million grant in 1998 from the ILO's International 
Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC). The IPEC program was 
launched in 1999, and, by the end of the year, it had launched projects 
to eliminate child labor in the sugar and rice-growing industries as 
well as a public awareness campaign. Government officials acknowledged 
that for the IPEC to be implemented, continued judicial and law 
enforcement reform were needed. The Ministry of Gender, Labor, and 
Social Development established a National Steering Committee on Child 
Labor and a Child Labor Unit to develop a national policy to eliminate 
child labor; however, such a policy was not developed by year's end.
    The law does not prohibit the worst forms of child labor, nor does 
the Government have a mechanism to address this problem. However, 
several human rights NGO's began programs aimed at removing children 
from hazardous work. No reports about the efficacy of these efforts 
were available at year's end. In October consultants working for the 
Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social Development reviewed four labor 
laws and created draft legislation consistent with ILO Convention 182; 
however, no action had been taken on the legislation by year's end.
    The recruitment age for military service is 18 years; however, in 
practice, some recruiters have allowed 17-year-olds to enlist (see 
Section 5).
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, a 
lack of resources prevented the Government from enforcing this 
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). The ADF and LRA abducted 
children and terrorized them into virtual slavery as guards, laborers, 
soldiers, and, in the case of the LRA, as sex slaves.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum legal wage is $3.50 
(6,000 shillings) per month, a rate set in the early 1960's. This wage 
is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. Wages continued to be determined through negotiation between 
individuals and their employers, unions, and proprietors, or through 
negotiation within the boards of directors at state-owned industries. 
Salaries usually are augmented by other benefits such as housing and 
transport allowances, which often are equal to base wages. The Ministry 
of Labor's salary scale for civil servants starts with unskilled labor 
at $44 (75,000 shillings) per month, up to supervisors at $350 (600,000 
shillings) per month, plus modest increases for years worked. All 
include provisions for paid overtime. The higher end of this wage scale 
would provide minimal standards of living for a worker and family, but 
most civil servants have great difficulty earning enough money to pay 
their children's school costs. Many civil servants and their dependents 
work in second jobs, grow their own food, or seek other ways to 
supplement their incomes. In industries that employ workers on an 
hourly basis, the normal workweek was 40 hours. Although there was no 
legal maximum workweek, a time-and-a-half rate was paid for each 
additional hour worked. Many industries pay workers by piecework, which 
avoids overtime and circumvents the prohibition on child labor. Many 
companies employ workers as ``casual laborers'' or ``contract workers'' 
in order to avoid providing benefits.
    The condition of employee housing on the tea and sugar plantations 
at the major state-owned corporations, and within military and police 
barracks, was substandard. Sanitation and water facilities often are 
lacking.
    Building codes often are not enforced. Some structures have tripled 
in height above the original foundations, leading local engineers to 
express reservations about the structural integrity of these 
workplaces. Factories generally are sound, but machinery almost always 
lacks safeguards.
    Vestiges of occupational health and safety legislation are 
contained in the outdated Factories Act of 1954 and the Employment 
Decree of 1975. In September the Government enacted the Workers' 
Compensation Act, which replaced legislation dating to 1964. The act 
significantly increased compensation, based on monthly salaries, for 
workers injured or killed at work. The Ministry of Labor's Department 
of Occupational Health is responsible for enforcement of occupational 
safety regulations; however, in practice inspections are rare, due 
primarily to lack of vehicles and funding for inspection trips. There 
were fatal accidents at several construction projects at a rate of 
approximately one per month. The limited occupational safety 
regulations under the Workers' Compensation Act do not protect workers 
who refuse to perform dangerous work from being fired, although strong 
unions in certain dangerous industries protect such workers.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons; however, there were reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country. There is strong evidence that 
prison officials hired out prisoners to work on private farms and 
construction sites, where they often were overworked (see Section 
6.c.).
    Molo Songolo, a South African child rights organization, reported 
that children were trafficked from the country to South Africa during 
the year; however, the credibility of the report is unknown. The 
children allegedly were abducted or bought from their parents by 
organized gangs from Nigeria, DRC, and Angola.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the SPLA, 
supported by UPDF forces, forcibly recruited Sudanese refugees in 
northern Uganda for service in Sudan.
    Both the ADF and the LRA abducted civilians for training as 
guerrillas; most victims were children and young adults whom the ADF 
and LRA terrorized into virtual slavery as guards, laborers, soldiers, 
and, in the case of the LRA, as sex slaves (see Sections 1.g., 5, and 
6.c.). As many as 1,500 Ugandan children abducted by the LRA were held 
in the southern part of Sudan; the Government of Sudan actively 
supports the LRA. In past years, the LRA also reportedly sold and 
traded some children, mostly girls, or provided them as gifts to arms 
dealers in Sudan.
    In December 1999, in Nairobi, Kenya, the Governments of Sudan and 
Uganda signed an accord agreeing, among other things, to cease 
supporting rebel groups and to return abductees. The Sudanese 
Government returned a number of LRA captives who had previously escaped 
LRA captivity during the year; however, the Sudanese Government did not 
free any abductees still held captive by the LRA.
    The CID is mandated to combat trafficking. The CID did not keep 
records on the magnitude of the problem, and it was unknown if its 
efforts have been effective.
                               __________

                                 ZAMBIA

    Zambia is a republic governed by a president and a unicameral 
national assembly. After two decades of one-party rule, free and fair 
multiparty elections in November 1991 resulted in the victory of the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and the election of President 
Frederick J.T. Chiluba, a former trade unionist. In November 1996 
elections, President Chiluba was reelected, and his party won 131 of 
150 seats in the National Assembly. Constitutional amendments enacted 
in May 1996 disqualified the former President, Kenneth Kaunda, the main 
opposition leader, from seeking the presidency, prompting his United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) to boycott the elections. The MMD's 
use of government resources, including the state-owned media, put the 
fairness of the elections into question, although, despite some voting 
irregularities, there was no evidence of substantial or widespread vote 
rigging or vote counting fraud. The Constitution mandates an 
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this 
provision in practice; however, the judicial system is hampered by lack 
of resources and inefficiency.
    The police, divided into regular and paramilitary units operating 
under the Ministry of Home Affairs, have primary responsibility for 
maintaining law and order. Police action was politicized in the 
delivery of authorizations for public gatherings. The Zambia 
Intelligence Security Service, under the Office of the President, is 
responsible for intelligence and internal security. Police continued to 
commit numerous, and at times serious, human rights abuses.
    The Government continued its free market economic reform program 
including privatization of the large copper parastatal. However, 
negative economic performance, including stagnation and increasing 
inflation continued. Balance of payments support by foreign donors has 
resumed as a result of greater government attention to governance 
issues and the privatization of the mines. Approximately 80 percent of 
all citizens live in extreme poverty.
    The Government's human rights record was generally poor; although 
the Government took steps to address some human rights problems, 
serious abuses continued in several areas. Citizens'' right to change 
their government was restricted in the 1996 national elections, the 
last time national elections were held. Police committed an 
extrajudicial killing. Police officers routinely beat and otherwise 
abused criminal suspects and detainees. The lack of professionalism, 
investigatory skill, and discipline in the police force remain serious 
problems, and officers who commit such abuses do so with impunity. 
Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. A government 
commission of inquiry, established in 1998 to investigate the alleged 
torture during detention of suspects in a 1997 coup attempt, completed 
its work in June and submitted its report to President Chiluba; 
however, the results of the investigation were not released to the 
public by year's end. Arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention, and long 
delays in trials remain problems. Police infringed on citizens'' 
privacy rights. The Government's record on press freedom was mixed. The 
Government infringed on freedom of the press and continued to control 
two of the country's three daily newspapers. The Government restricted 
freedom of assembly and association and in a few instances limited 
freedom of movement. Human rights and civic organizations and political 
parties continued to complain of government harassment. Violence 
against women remained widespread. Women continued to experience 
discrimination in both law and fact, including the denial of widows' 
inheritance rights. Child abuse is a problem. Discrimination against 
the disabled is a problem. Child labor is a problem in rural 
subsistence occupations and some urban occupations. There were reports 
of trafficking in persons.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government officials during the year; 
however, police committed an extrajudicial killing. In November, Kelvin 
Mushabati and Geoffrey Michelo died of suffocation after a police 
officer threw a tear gas canister into their prison cell. The police 
officer who was responsible for the killing was charged with murder; he 
remained in detention pending a trial at year's end.
    The conflict in Angola periodically led to armed attacks within the 
country's territory, which resulted in civilian deaths; at least one of 
these armed attacks was perpetrated by Angolan government soldiers. On 
April 25, Angolan government soldiers reportedly killed two civilians 
during a confrontation with Zambian troops inside Zambian territory.
    A large number of prison inmates died due to illness and harsh 
conditions (see Section 1.c.).
    On September 8, a High Court judge sentenced a Mazabuka police 
officer to three years in prison with hard labor and fined two other 
officers for the 1999 death of Bernard Chinkuli in police custody.
    In March 1999, Khondwani Musukwa died in police custody, apparently 
as a result of torture. No action was taken against the officers 
responsible for his death by year's end. In July 1999, Sailas Mabvuto 
Lungu reportedly was beaten to death by a police constable who 
suspected him of driving a stolen vehicle. The officer was in detention 
and awaiting trial at year's end. In August 1999, a pregnant woman died 
in police custody, reportedly as a result of police abuse. No action 
was taken against the officers responsible for her death by year's end.
    In May 1998, seven police officers of Mindolo police station in 
Kitwe were arrested in connection with the death in custody of Steward 
Mwantende. The police officers were arrested, tried, and in April were 
acquitted.
    In August an official inquiry into the 1998 death in detention of 
Bertha Mungazila was opened. On September 7, the inquiry was completed; 
a coroner determined that Mungazila died as a result of torture and 
called on the Inspector General of Police to arrest the officers on 
duty at the time of her arrest. On September 12, a docket against the 
three officers was opened, and the three were arraigned on manslaughter 
charges within 24 hours; the trial began in October and was ongoing at 
year's end.
    On November 3, 1999, four gunmen shot and killed Wezi Kaunda, the 
son of former President Kenneth Kaunda, during an apparent car-jacking 
in Lusaka. The Government permitted forensic specialists and a team of 
advisors from Scotland Yard to participate in an investigation in 
response to a request from the Kaunda family. Two suspects were 
arrested. During their trial, one of the suspects claimed that the MMD 
was responsible for the killing; however, a letter reportedly written 
by the suspect alleged that several UNIP officials were responsible. 
The trial was ongoing at year's end.
    In August three civilians reportedly were killed by Congolese 
rebels who had crossed into the country to steal food.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances. However, there were reports that UNITA rebels abducted 
persons, particularly young persons, for forced labor in Angola (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.)
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police 
regularly used excessive force when apprehending, interrogating, and 
detaining criminal suspects or illegal immigrants. In most instances, 
detaining officers beat suspects and generally were not disciplined or 
arrested for such acts.
    In January police arrested Shadreck Selemani on suspicion of 
involvement in the theft of roofing materials. Selemani was held 
without charge for 2 days, during which time police beat him 
repeatedly.
    In April Hendrix Mbumwai was held without charge by officers at the 
Los Angeles police station for 6 days, during which time police beat 
him.
    On August 30, police were deployed to the University of Zambia in 
response to demonstrations on the previous day that resulted in 
injuries and damage to private property. Police severely beat a number 
of students and forced them to roll in mud and sewer water and to jump 
around. At least 13 students were injured; 11 required medical 
treatment for their injuries. Although a local non-governmental 
organization (NGO) alleged that police raped five female students 
during the deployment, no female students claimed sexual abuse by 
police in the incident. Although only a small portion of the student 
population participated in the August 29 demonstrations, the police 
actions were directed against the entire student body. No action was 
taken against the officers responsible for the abuses by year's end.
    In November two detainees died of suffocation when a police officer 
threw a tear gas canister into their cell (see Section 1.a.).
    In September 1999, Dave Wanjeke, a retired soldier, was held 
without charge and tortured in police custody. In February a judge of 
the High Court criticized the Government for abusing Wanjeke's rights; 
however, there was no further action taken on this case by year's end.
    In September 1999, officers of the Emmasdale police station beat 
Benson Mwale repeatedly on the buttocks; subsequently, he required 
medical attention for severe lacerations. In September 1999, a file on 
the incident was opened by the Permanent Human Rights Commission 
(PHRC). A police spokesman stated that it would punish all officers 
involved in the incident. Later in September 1999, a ``docket of 
complaint against police'' was opened to investigate the matter. This 
docket allows the public to raise complaints against a police officer 
so that legal procedures can be initiated. The investigation was 
ongoing at year's end.
    There was no further action on the case of Cedrick Phiri, who was 
beaten by police while he was detained overnight in June 1999.
    There was no further action on the case of the young man who was 
detained and beaten in police custody at the Woodlands Police Station 
in Lusaka in March 1999.
    In response to pressure from the PHRC, foreign governments, NGO's, 
and other human rights organizations, in May 1998, the Government 
agreed to initiate an independent inquiry into the torture claims of 
seven persons detained during the October 1997 coup attempt. (Early in 
1998, one of the alleged torturers had been promoted.) In August 1998, 
the Government established a commission of inquiry made up of treason 
trial judge Japhet Banda and Lusaka principal resident magistrate 
Gertrude Chawatama. The torture inquiry began after the treason trial 
concluded on September 17, 1999. The commission completed its work and 
submitted a report to President Chiluba on June 21. By year's end the 
report had not been publicly released, and the President had not 
responded to the report.
    In 1999 the Government promised to institute measures to monitor 
and reform police operations to ensure that civil liberties are 
protected. It further directed the police, prisons, and immigration 
departments to intensify human rights training among their officers, 
which has been part of their basic training since 1997. Although the 
training of new recruits continued during the year, there was greater 
training within the police force. The Government took no action on its 
statements in 1998 that it would amend the Police Act to provide for 
the establishment of a police authority to which members of the public 
could channel complaints pertaining to police harassment and abuse.
    The lawsuit filed in 1999 by Dean Mung'omba claiming torture during 
detention in 1997 was ongoing at year's end.
    Police corruption is also a problem. There were a handful of 
unconfirmed reports that police would release prisoners in exchange for 
bribes of between $65 and $95 (200,000 to 300,000 kwacha). Citizens in 
private debt disputes often are detained by police in exchange for a 
portion of the payment owed (see Section 1.d.). Police sometimes 
committed extortion at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.) or required 
document processing ``fees'' or gas money in order to commence 
investigations. In July the Inspector General of Police instructed 
police throughout the country to reduce roadblocks by half in an effort 
to reduce the opportunity for corruption, and there was a reduction in 
the number of roadblocks by year's end. Police action was politicized 
in the delivery of authorizations for public meetings (see Section 
2.b.).
    The police investigate instances of police use of excessive force 
and have disciplined officers found to have committed human rights 
abuses. Such investigations generally are prolonged, and outcomes are 
not readily apparent. Middle ranking and senior officers are enrolled 
in human rights training seminars at the police academy. A number of 
police officers are the subject of internal investigations and 
prosecutions. Authorities arrested some police officers on such 
criminal charges as murder and robbery. For example, in November one 
police officer was arrested and charged with killing two persons (see 
Section 1.a.). Senior government officials acknowledge the problem of 
police abuse and have requested foreign donor assistance in the form of 
training for the police. In May the Government announced its intention 
to create a national forensic laboratory to provide the police with 
resources for professional investigations. In 1999 the High Court 
issued a decision banning corporal punishment in the country. The court 
system undertook efforts to ensure that this ban was upheld during the 
year. In April the Chief Administrator of the High Court publicly 
reminded magistrates of their obligation to uphold the ban on corporal 
punishment and held a meeting with prison officials to reinforce the 
ban. During the year, one magistrate attempted to sentence a defendant 
to corporal punishment, but the chief administrator of the High Court 
prevented the implementation of the sentence.
    Groups of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) deserters have entered the country and seized food and goods by 
force from villages. On at least two occasions, they have forced young 
men and women to accompany them back to Angola (see Section 6.f.).
    Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. According to 
official statistics, prisons designed to hold 6,000 prisoners held over 
12,000. This severe overcrowding, combined with poor sanitation, 
inadequate medical facilities, meager food supplies, and lack of 
potable water resulted in serious outbreaks of dysentery and other 
diseases, including tuberculosis. In a report submitted to Parliament 
in 1996, the Commissioner of Prisons said that 975 prisoners had died 
in prison between January 1991 and December 1995 due to illness and 
harsh conditions. The death rate of prison inmates remained about the 
same during the year. The Commissioner of Prisons has submitted no 
further such reports since 1996. In March 1999, the Commissioner of 
Prisons attributed the serious overcrowding in prisons to the slow pace 
at which the courts dispose of cases. The commissioner noted that some 
cases have been pending since 1991.
    In March 1999, the Magistrates and Judges'' Association of Zambia 
expressed its intention to undertake efforts to release all eligible 
detainees on bail in order to reduce prison congestion. According to 
the Association, Kamwala Remand Prison in Lusaka contained 636 inmates, 
although it had been designed to hold only 200.
    In July 1999, the PHRC announced that it would employ prison 
inspectors to ensure that inmates are kept in habitable environments. 
The PHRC submitted a request to the Ministry of Finance for funds to 
support the creation of prison inspector positions, but did not receive 
funding by year's end.
    The Government generally permits prison visits by both domestic and 
international monitors and by resident foreign diplomats. Provincial 
human rights committees periodically inspect prison conditions. A 
number of foreign diplomats conducted prison visits during the year; 
however, there were no visits by international monitors at year's end.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. Criminal suspects often are arrested on the 
basis of flimsy evidence or uncorroborated accusations. Unlike in 
previous years, there were no reports that family members or associates 
of criminal suspects were detained, interrogated, and physically abused 
by the authorities in attempts to identify or locate suspects during 
the year. In criminal cases, the law requires that a detainee be 
charged and brought before a magistrate within 24 hours. Attorneys and 
family members are allowed access to pretrial detainees. In practice 
the authorities hold most detainees for more than 1 month from 
commission of an offense to first appearance before a magistrate. In 
many cases, an additional period of 6 months elapses before a 
magistrate commits the defendant to the High Court for trial. Following 
committal, preparation of the magistrate court record for transmittal 
to the High Court takes months, or in some cases as long as a year. 
Once a case reaches the High Court for trial, court proceedings last an 
average of 6 months. Part of the reason for this delay is a shortage in 
the number of professional magistrates: out of 72 potential positions, 
only 22 are filled.
    Pretrial detention often is prolonged. Approximately 2,000 of 
12,000 detainees were awaiting trial on criminal charges in 1999. 
Approximately 1,288 of 2,251 detainees were awaiting trial in the 
Lusaka region by year's end. In some cases defendants have been 
awaiting trial for as long as 4 years. There was some progress in 
holding trials; in past years, some defendants had waited as long as 10 
years for their trials. These long delays were a result of inadequate 
resources, inefficiency, lack of trained personnel, and broad rules of 
procedure that give wide latitude to prosecutors and defense attorneys 
to request adjournments. The High Court Commissioner can release 
detainees if police fail to bring the case to trial, although that did 
not occur in any case during the year.
    Although there is a functioning bail system, overcrowded prisons 
reflect in part the large number of detainees charged with serious 
offenses for which bail is not granted. These include treason, murder, 
aggravated robbery, and violations of narcotics laws. There were no 
cases of constitutional bail. Indigent detainees and defendants rarely 
have the means to post bail. The Government's legal aid office is 
responsible for providing legal aid representation for indigent 
detainees and defendants in criminal or civil cases. In practice few 
receive assistance. The office had 9 attorneys and a budget of $183,000 
(576,000,000 kwacha) during the year to cover the entire country.
    Police stations frequently become ``debt collection centers,'' 
where police officers acting upon unofficial complaints detain debtors 
without charge, indefinitely, until they pay the complainants. In 
return the police receive a percentage of the payments (see Section 
1.c.). A police constable was convicted and sentenced to 3 years'' 
imprisonment with hard labor for abuse of office in one such case. The 
conviction, handed down in January, was in response to events that 
occurred in 1996.
    A prominent elections NGO reported that four opposition cadres were 
arrested in January for shouting anti-MMD slogans during an election 
campaign. The arrests reportedly were ordered by a deputy minister. The 
four were held for a few hours and charged with conduct likely to cause 
a breach of the peace. The case was still pending at year's end.
    In January presidential candidate Anderson Mazoka was arrested and 
detained on charges of holding an illegal meeting after he obtained a 
permit to convene an informal dinner (see Section 2.b.).
    On July 15, a Member of Parliament (M.P.) was arrested for unlawful 
assembly relating to a meeting held with constituents in his home a 
month earlier; he was released without charge (see Section 2.b.).
    On August 30, police detained approximately 300 students at a 
stadium following a demonstration the previous day (see Section 1.c.). 
The students were released after 24 hours in detention.
    In February Alfred Zulu, a prominent human rights activist was 
detained and charged with financial fraud. Some observers alleged that 
Zulu was targeted because of his human rights activities; however, 
there was no evidence to support these allegations (see Section 4).
    May 1999, Donald Phiri was taken into police custody during an 
unauthorized police search for weapons at his father's home. The search 
allegedly was intended to locate arms. Phiri's father complained that 
he was unable to determine his son's whereabouts for several days after 
he was taken into custody. Phiri was charged with murder in September 
1999; the case was ongoing at year's end.
    In August 1999, Imasiku Mutangelwa, the leader of a small 
organization known as the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF), was sought by 
police for questioning after he made statements supporting a separatist 
rebellion in Namibia. Later the same month, Mutangelwa sought asylum in 
the residence of the South African High Commissioner, but his request 
was denied. Mutangelwa subsequently was arrested and charged with 
belonging to an unlawful society. The case against him was referred by 
the Magistrate's Court to the High Court, but had not yet been heard by 
year's end.
    The authorities held in detention pending deportation approximately 
300 illegal immigrants, principally from neighboring countries. Because 
the immigration authorities lack funds for deportation, illegal 
immigrants sometimes are kept in prison for extended periods, sometimes 
for more than 5 years. There were 199 illegal immigrants being held in 
detention in Lusaka by year's end.
    The 1996 case involving the indefinite incarceration of three 
newspaper reporters on charges of contempt of the House remains 
pending. Although the High Court quashed the sentences, the Government 
has appealed the case, seeking to reinstate the detention of the 
reporters. The appeal still is pending, although two of the three 
reporters have died (See Section 2.a.).
    The Government does not use exile for political purposes; however, 
it has used deportation and the threat of deportation for political 
purposes against persons whose claims to citizenship it has refused to 
recognize. In January the Government deported Majid Ticklay after he 
wrote a letter that was published in the Post publicly urging the Asian 
community to unite behind one political party (see Section 3).
    During the year, a number of citizens remained in self-imposed 
political exile in foreign countries, including: Liberal Progressive 
Front President Dr. Roger Chongwe, in Australia; Zambia Democratic 
Congress General Secretary Azwell Banda, in South Africa; former editor 
of the defunct newspaper, Confidential, Reverend Steward Mwila, in 
South Africa; and former President Kaunda's daughter, Catherine Mwanza, 
in South Africa.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this 
provision in practice; however, the judicial system is hampered by lack 
of resources and inefficiency. The President nominates and the National 
Assembly confirms the Chief Justice and other members of the Supreme 
Court.
    The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction for all legal and 
constitutional disputes. The High Court, which holds regular sessions 
in all nine provincial capitals, has authority to hear criminal and 
civil cases and appeals from lower courts. Magistrate courts have 
original jurisdiction in some criminal and civil cases, while local, or 
customary, courts handle most civil and petty criminal cases in rural 
areas.
    Local courts employ the principles of customary law, which vary 
widely throughout the country. Lawyers are barred from participating, 
and there are few formal rules of procedure. Presiding judges, who are 
usually prominent local citizens, have great power to invoke customary 
law, render judgments regarding marriages, divorces, inheritances, 
other civil proceedings, and rule on minor criminal matters. Judgments 
often are not in accordance with the Penal Code. For example, they tend 
to discriminate against women in matters of inheritance (see Section 
5).
    Trials in magistrate courts are public, and defendants have the 
opportunity to confront their accusers and present witnesses. However, 
many defendants are too poor to retain a lawyer, and the poor state of 
the Government's legal aid department means that many citizens entitled 
to legal aid find that it is unavailable. Courts are congested and 
there are long delays in trials while the accused are in custody. The 
Magistrates and Judges'' Association made an effort to expedite the 
process of court appearances during the year by setting up a fast-track 
court that could quickly hear minor, uncomplicated cases.
    Courts continued to act independently and at times made statements 
critical of the State. In February a judge of the High Court criticized 
the Government for abusing the rights of retired soldier Dave Wanjeke. 
Wanjeke was held without charge and tortured in police custody in 
September 1999 (see Section 1.c.).
    In August the National Assembly passed a bill that amends the State 
Proceedings Act. The act currently provides that once leave to apply 
for a judicial review has been granted, there is a stay on any 
decisions by State or public officers relating to the matter. The 
amendment would not allow the start of any judicial review process to 
act as a stay on the Government's decision. Opposition parties, NGO's, 
civil society, and some members of government have expressed concern 
that the amendment would remove citizens' legal recourse in the event 
of abuse by the Government. President Chiluba did not sign the bill, 
which lapsed at year's end.
    Appeals in the cases of 59 military personnel detained during a 
1997-98 state of emergency and later sentenced to death for involvement 
in an attempted coup were ongoing at year's end.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for respect for privacy and 
the inviolability of the home; however, the authorities did not always 
respect these rights in practice. The law requires a warrant before 
police may enter a home, unless a state of emergency is in place. 
Police routinely ignored this requirement and often arrested alleged 
criminals at their homes without first having obtained an arrest 
warrant. The Constitution grants the Drug Enforcement Commission and 
the Zambian Intelligence Security Service authority to wiretap 
telephones for probable cause. In 1996 the Inspector General of Police 
admitted in open court that he had ordered the illegal wiretaps of the 
telephones at the offices of the Post, an independent daily newspaper. 
The case still was pending at year's end. There were no confirmed 
reports of wiretaps during the year; however, the opposition alleged 
that the Government wiretapped their telephones.
    In March Oswald Mutapa, a retired Assistant Commissioner of Police, 
was evicted from his house in March on orders from the Inspector 
General of Police. The eviction took place in spite of a court order 
barring eviction until a legal dispute between Mutapa and the 
Government was resolved. In June Mutapa won the court case and returned 
to his house.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that police 
detained and abused relatives and associates of suspects during the 
year.
    In May 1999, police raided the home of the president of the World 
Baptist Evangelical Association, Reverend Bwanali Phiri, without a 
warrant (see Section 1.d.). The police took Phiri's son and two tenants 
into custody. Phiri's tenants were released, but Phiri was detained for 
4 months without charge, then charged with murder. The case still is 
pending (see Section 1.d.).
    Roundups of suspected illegal aliens in the home or workplace 
continued. According to the Government's Commissioner for Refugees, 
immigration officials are empowered under the law to conduct these 
roundups without a warrant.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--While the Constitution provides 
for freedom of expression and of the press, the Penal Code lists 
various prohibited activities that may be interpreted broadly to 
restrict these freedoms, and the Government infringed on press freedom. 
Overall, the Government's record on press freedom was mixed during the 
year. Over the past several years, in response to headlines and stories 
of alleged corrupt practices on the part of government officials, the 
Government, accused officials, and other individuals have brought 
numerous libel actions against the Post newspaper. There are currently 
more than 80 cases filed over the course of the last 5 years waiting to 
be adjudicated. The number of pending libel cases did not increase 
during the year, because the journalists involved in most of them have 
left the Post.
    The law includes provisions for investigative tribunals to call as 
witnesses journalists and media managers who print allegations of 
parliamentary misconduct. Failure to cooperate with a tribunal may 
result in charges of contempt punishable by up to 6 months in jail. 
This has been criticized by the media as a clear infringement on press 
freedom and a means for parliamentarians to bypass the clogged court 
system in dealing with libel suits against the media.
    In April a correspondent for the privately owned weekly newspaper 
Monitor received a series of anonymous, threatening telephone calls 
after he published a story that stated Intelligence Chief Xavier Chungu 
had been named in a U.N. report on UNITA sanctions violations.
    There were reports of warnings by the Minister of Information 
against the media throughout the year. The press reported in February 
that the Minister warned of ``drastic action'' against the Zambian 
Independent Media Association (ZIMA) and the Inter-African Network for 
Human Rights and Development (AFRONET), and in May warned of action 
against radio stations labeled as ``political'' (see Section 4).
    In August a Radio Phoenix reporter was detained and beaten by 
members of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) while 
investigating reports of extortion by MMD cadres at the central market. 
Police conducted an investigation and arrested those suspected of 
assaulting the reporter. In response to pressure from MMD officials, 
the suspects were released in August, and the case was not resumed by 
year's end.
    In September espionage charges against 12 members of the editorial 
staff of the Independent Post newspaper were dropped. The editor still 
was required to appear in court in connection with a 1999 story 
pointing out deficiencies in the country's military preparedness in 
relation to Angola; the High Court acquitted him on December 21 (see 
Section 1.e.).
    A government appeal of a National Assembly case initiated against 
three journalists in 1996 remains pending (see Section 1.d.).
    A number of privately owned newspapers question government actions 
and policies, and these circulate without government interference. For 
the last 4 years, the leading private daily, the Post, has had an 
Internet home page that has attracted over 15,000 readers per month. 
The government-controlled Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail, two of 
the most widely circulated newspapers, also have home pages established 
in April 1996.
    The Government owns the sole television station, the Zambia 
National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). In addition to the 
government-controlled radio station, there are three church-related 
stations and one private commercial station. In February a UNESCO-
funded community radio station began operations in the town of 
Mazabuka.
    The Government exercised considerable influence over the 
government-owned media, which continued to follow the government line 
on important issues. On January 24, a radio talk show on the privately 
owned Radio Phoenix was cancelled under government pressure. The talk 
show resumed in February, with no reports of interference.
    The only commercial radio station rebroadcasts Voice of America 
(VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and South African 
Broadcasting Corporation items. Multichoice, based in South Africa, 
provides satellite and analog wireless subscribers with television 
services. These services provide broadcasts of Cable News Network, BBC 
World Sky Television, and South African Broadcasting Corporation Africa 
News. They also provide three BBC, one Radio France International, and 
VOA radio news broadcasts. Neither of the services provides local news 
coverage. A second wireless service, CASAT, began operations in 
December 1997. In 1998 Trinity Broadcasting Network, a foreign-based 
church-related television network, began 24-hour transmission from a 
rented studio at the ZNBC complex.
    Contrary to its 1991 campaign promises to privatize government-
owned mass media, the Government has declined to privatize the state-
owned and government-controlled Times of Zambia, the Zambia Daily Mail, 
and the ZNBC radio and television stations. Opposition political 
parties complain that government control of these media bodies 
effectively limits their access to such means of mass communication.
    Academic freedom is respected. University professors are permitted 
to lecture freely, conduct research, and publish their work. Late in 
1999, the Government passed the University Act, which gave greater 
power to the Minister of Education to supervise universities. An 
injunction against the act which was issued by the High Court in 
October was dissolved at the end of 1999, and the President signed the 
act into effect. Although the act gives the university council a 
mandate to address faculty concerns, the Minister of Education makes 
appointments to the council; some academics have criticized this 
provision.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government 
restricted this right in practice. The law requires rally organizers to 
notify the police 7 days in advance of a rally. The police may advise 
the organizers that the time or venue is inopportune. In practice the 
police did not interfere with most peaceful rallies whose leaders 
followed the prior notification rule and that could be described as 
politically neutral or favorable to the Government or MMD; however, 
authorities sometimes denied permission to proceed with or cancelled 
rallies planned by the political opposition, particularly during by-
election campaigns. For example, UNIP was issued a permit to carry out 
a demonstration in support of striking doctors in January. The permit 
later was cancelled by police. No reason was given for the 
cancellation.
    The Public Order Act frequently was used to prevent activities by 
opposition political parties. In June the UPND was denied permission to 
hold rallies in three areas because a deputy minister would be touring 
those areas during the same period. The Government also denied the UPND 
a series of permits during the Sesheke by-election in July, again 
because several highlevel government officials, including the 
President, would be in the area at the same time.
    Government officials publicly warned of potential ``drastic 
action'' against two NGO's, AFRONET and the Zambia Independent 
Monitoring Team (ZIMT) after those two organizations criticized the 
Government's handling of the health sector and an ongoing doctors' 
strike (see Sections 4 and 6.a.). In January authorities arrested and 
detained a United Party for National Development (UPND) presidential 
candidate, Anderson Mazoka, on charges of holding an illegal meeting. 
Mazoka had obtained a permit to convene an informal dinner for 200 
persons but police were instructed to arrest Mazoka when he addressed 
the attendees.
    On July 15, the UPND M.P. for Mazabuka was arrested for unlawful 
assembly; the arrest related to a meeting held with constituents in his 
home a month earlier. The M.P. was subsequently released without 
charge.
    On August 30, police were deployed to the University of Zambia one 
day after a student demonstration that resulted in injuries and 
property damage; police abused and detained students, including many 
who were not involved in the demonstration (see Section 1.c.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, at 
times the Government restricted this right. All organizations must 
apply formally for registration to the Registrar of Societies. In most 
cases, authorities routinely approved these applications. In 1999 the 
Government denied the application of a group of former servicemen who 
wanted to form an association. The Government argued that an 
organization for former servicemen already existed and did not permit 
the servicemen to register. There are currently 36 political parties 
and dozens of NGO's registered. The Government threatened to take 
action against those organizations that did not submit annual reports 
to the registrar of societies. In June 1999, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs deregistered more than 20 NGO's that did not comply with the 
reporting requirement. The NGO's that complied with the requirement, 
including those that frequently criticized the Government, were 
permitted to register.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Although 
a 1996 amendment to the Constitution declared the country a Christian 
nation, the Government respects the right of all faiths to worship 
freely in practice. There are governmental controls that require the 
registration of religious groups. The Government approves all 
applications for registration from religious groups without 
discrimination. There were no reports that the Government rejected any 
religious groups that attempted to register or obtain licenses.
    Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of complaints by 
the Muslim community of discrimination based on the Constitution's 
``Christian nation'' provision during the year.
    In December 1996, the Government established an office for 
religious affairs at the level of deputy minister in the President's 
Office at State House. The office is responsible for dealing with 
issues that pertain to religion and worship, and to the promotion of 
state-church understanding and interfaith dialog.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with 
the right to move freely throughout the country, to reside in any part 
of the country, and to depart and return to the country without 
restriction; however, there were instances in which authorities limited 
freedom of movement. Police roadblocks to control criminal activity 
continued, and police sometimes extorted money and goods from motorists 
(see Section 1.c.). However, in July the Inspector General of Police 
instructed police throughout the country to reduce roadblocks by half 
to facilitate travel within the country and reduce opportunities for 
corruption. The number of roadblocks throughout the country was reduced 
during the year; however, police continued to extort money from 
motorists.
    Resident doctors engaged in a strike over working conditions and 
the general state of health care in the country reportedly were barred 
from leaving the country in February. Some doctors subsequently were 
able to seek employment outside the country (see Section 6.a.).
    The conflict in Angola resulted in large numbers of internally 
displaced persons (IDP's) in March, mainly consisting of inhabitants 
from the Chavuma District, which borders Angola; however, most of the 
IDP's returned to their residences within 2 months.
    The law does not contain provisions for the granting of refugee or 
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, in practice the 
Government complies with the provisions of these documents. The U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 
approximately 250,000 refugees, mainly Angolans, in the country at 
year's end. On December 4, approximately 300 Zimbabwean and 3,000 
Congolese soldiers entered the country to escape fighting in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Most of the Congolese soldiers 
returned to the DRC; however, 117 refused to return to the DRC and were 
seeking asylum in the country at year's end. The Government cooperated 
with the UNHCR in processing applications for refugee status.
    The Government provided first asylum to approximately 35,000 new 
refugees from Angola during the year, including former UNITA soldiers 
and their families. On December 1, the Government and the UNHCR began 
transferring approximately 265 Angolan former combatants and their 
families to the Eastern Province, which is farther from the Angolan 
border. In September approximately 3,000 refugees left the Mwange 
refugee camp for the DRC; however, the majority of them returned to 
Zambia by year's end. In November and December, approximately 25,000 
Congolese refugees entered the country. The authorities held in 
detention pending deportation approximately 300 illegal immigrants, 
principally from neighboring countries. Because the immigration 
authorities lack funds for deportation, illegal immigrants sometimes 
are kept in prison for extended periods, sometimes for more than 5 
years. In December the Government disarmed and repatriated more than 
3,000 soldiers from the DRC who had entered the country. In December 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) requested that 
the Government provide access to the detained soldiers; however, the 
Government did not grant access to the ICTR before the majority of the 
refugees had returned to the DRC.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens voted in national multiparty elections in November 1996; 
however, constitutional amendments barred the best known opposition 
candidate, former president and UNIP leader, Kenneth Kaunda, and his 
deputy, senior chief Inyambo Yeta, from running for the presidency, 
thereby restricting the right of citizens to change their government. 
The amendments enacted in 1996 require both parents of presidential 
candidates to be citizens by birth and disqualify tribal chiefs from 
running for the presidency unless they resign their chieftainship.
    UNIP boycotted the 1996 elections and destroyed many party members' 
voter registration cards. Eleven political parties contested the 
presidential and National Assembly elections in 1996. The Government 
deregistered 14 opposition splinter parties for noncompliance with 
registration procedures. Approximately 50 percent of eligible voters 
registered. Of this total, almost 70 percent cast ballots. Although the 
MMD's use of government resources during campaigns, including the 
state-owned media, probably did not affect the final outcome, the 
elections' fairness nevertheless called into question. The Government's 
failure to implement a transparent voter registration process raised 
doubts among opposition parties about the Government's willingness to 
have an open electoral process. The next presidential election is 
scheduled for late 2001.
    A series of parliamentary by-elections held during the year were 
viewed by local election observers as generally representative of the 
will of the electorate; however, there were some irregularities. 
Opposition parties won a number of these by-elections. However, during 
parliamentary by-election campaigns, the MMD frequently was accused of 
using government resources to support MMD candidates. For example, in 
July the MMD used a police vehicle to transport party members during a 
campaign.
    Under the Constitution, the President wields broad authority. The 
National Assembly ratifies major appointments and theoretically has 
broad powers, but the overwhelming majority held by the MMD effectively 
precludes independent action by the legislature and limits its ability 
to provide a check on executive authority. In July the MMD expelled 
Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Ben Mwila for gross 
insubordination when he began campaigning for the presidency before the 
President himself had designated a successor. Mwila subsequently formed 
a new political party, the Republican Party. During the year, 
Parliament took steps to strengthen itself and to improve 
responsiveness to citizen concerns, although an initial attempt at a 
structured parliamentary reform program failed to garner adequate 
support from members of Parliament.
    The number of women in politics and government is increasing but 
remains small, and women are underrepresented in government. In October 
the PHRC chairperson stated that less than 10 percent of women are 
involved in the political and decision-making process. There are 14 
female members in the 150-seat Parliament; 2 of these are ministers, 
and 3 are deputy ministers. In August former ambassador Gwendoline 
Konie established a political party and announced her candidacy for 
president, making her the first woman to run for that office.
    Minorities are underrepresented in government and politics. There 
are three ethnic Asians (one is a minister) and one mixed race 
(African-European) minister.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights and civic rights organizations generally operated 
without serious government hindrance; however, in previous years the 
ZIMT, ZIMA, AFRONET, and the Foundation for Electoral Process claimed 
that official harassment, including blocking their bank accounts, 
occurred. There were reports in February that the Minister of 
Information warned of ``drastic action'' against the ZIMA and AFRONET, 
accusing the organizations of being agents of foreign sponsors (see 
Section 2.a.). It also was reported in February that a senior member of 
the MMD had threatened AFRONET and the ZIMA, and the MMD chairperson 
for information and publicly warned that the Government would withdraw 
recognition of NGO's that it deemed ``reckless and irresponsible.''
    In February Alfred Zulu, a prominent human rights activist, was 
detained and charged with financial fraud. Some observers alleged that 
Zulu was targeted because of his human rights activities; however, 
there was no evidence to support these allegations (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government continued to be receptive to criticism from human 
rights and civic organizations in general, but on occasion, government 
officials criticized efforts by human rights monitors to have 
international balance of payments support conditioned on positive human 
rights developments in the country and accused monitors of trying to 
undermine Government activities.
    Some police and immigration officers complained that the local NGO 
Legal Resources Foundation protects criminals because of its work 
defending accused persons.
    Some domestic human rights organizations, including the Law 
Association of Zambia, Women for Change, the Catholic Commission for 
Justice and Peace, and the Zambia Civic Education Association have 
continued to press for a transparent democratic electoral system. Human 
rights, development and election NGO's monitored the by-elections 
throughout the year and organized civic education activities focused on 
improving voter participation and information.
    The Government generally did not interfere with inquiries or visits 
by international human rights organizations. For example, in July Human 
Rights Watch visited the country to observe the meeting of a 
consultative group of international donors.
    In May 1997, the Government established an autonomous Permanent 
Human Rights Commission, the PHRC. A Supreme Court justice chairs the 
Commission; other members are drawn from throughout society and include 
the former head of the Foundation for Democratic Processes and a 
University of Zambia lecturer on human rights. The Commission 
interceded on behalf of persons whose rights it believed were denied by 
the Government. The Commission oversees human rights committees in all 
provincial capitals. The Commission spoke out on behalf of other 
detainees and prisoners, and the Government responded by releasing 
seriously ill prisoners in 1997 and 1998 at the Commission's request. 
The PHRC requested but did not receive funding to hire prison 
inspectors; until it obtains funding, its provincial committees are 
conducting periodic prison inspections. The Government further 
responded to the Commission's recommendation by establishing in 1998 an 
inquiry to investigate torture claims by detainees. The inquiry was 
completed in June with a report submitted to President Chiluba; the 
report was not released publicly by year's end (see Section 1.c.).

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, tribe, 
sex, place of origin, marital status, political opinion, color, or 
creed. Constitutional amendments barring native-born citizens of 
partial or full foreign ancestry from the presidency appear to violate 
the prohibition on discrimination based on place of origin. These 
amendments also prohibit traditional chiefs, who are accorded authority 
and privileges as chiefs, from running for political office unless they 
resign their chieftainships. A legal challenge to these amendments in 
1996 was unsuccessful.
    Women.--Violence against women remained a serious problem. Wife 
beating and rape were widespread. According to official statistics, 
over 4,700 rape cases were reported to the police between 1991 and 
1998. Of these, approximately 30 percent resulted in conviction and 5 
percent in acquittal. The remainder either were dismissed or remain 
unresolved. The courts normally sentence defendants convicted of rape 
to hard labor. Since many rape cases were not reported to the police, 
the actual number is considered to be much higher. Domestic assault is 
a criminal offense. Although the police established a Victim Support 
Unit (VSU) in 1997 to attend to the problem of domestic assault, in 
practice police often are reluctant to pursue reports of wife beating, 
preferring instead to broker a reconciliation. The Government and NGO's 
expressed continued concern about violence against women, and the media 
devoted considerable publicity to it during the year. The VSU handles 
problems of wife beating, mistreatment of widows by the deceased 
husband's relatives, and ``property grabbing.''
    In two separate incidents in January and February, young women 
reportedly were abducted by UNITA soldiers for forced labor in Angola 
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Both the Constitution and the law entitle women to equality with 
men in most areas; however, in practice, women are disadvantaged 
severely in formal employment and education compared with men. Married 
women who are employed often suffer from discriminatory conditions of 
service. Women have little independent access to credit facilities; in 
most cases, they remain dependent on their husbands who are required to 
co-sign for loans. As a result, few women own their own homes. However, 
some small financial institutions reportedly now allow women to sign 
independently for loans.
    Customary law and practice also place women in a subordinate status 
with respect to property, inheritance, and marriage, despite 
constitutional and legislative protections. Polygyny is permitted if 
the wife first agrees to it at the time of her wedding. Under the 
traditional customs prevalent in most ethnic groups, all rights to 
inherit property rest with the deceased man's family. The 1989 
Intestate Succession Act was designed to provide women with a share of 
the joint estate. Under the act, the children of the deceased man 
equally share 50 percent; the widow receives 20 percent; the parents 
receive 20 percent; and other relatives receive 10 percent. A 1996 
``reform'' of the act places the widow's share at 20 percent, to be 
divided equally with any other women who can prove a marital 
relationship with the deceased man, thus granting inheritance rights to 
other wives, mistresses, and concubines.
    In practice, ``property grabbing'' by the relatives of the deceased 
man remains rampant, particularly when local customary courts have 
jurisdiction. These courts often use a different law, the Local Courts 
Act, to distribute inheritances without reference to the percentages 
mandated by the Intestate Succession Act. Ignorance of the law on the 
part of victims is also a problem. As a result, many widows receive 
little or nothing from the estate. The fines that the Intestate 
Succession Act mandates for property grabbing are extremely low. An 
M.P. participating in an April workshop on the Intestate Succession Act 
noted that the act has failed to address increased cases of property 
grabbing and therefore needs to be reviewed. In November the President 
strongly criticized the practice during a public ceremony.
    In March a Lusaka magistrate's court convicted and remanded to 
custody the administrator of a deceased man's estate who evicted the 
decedent's widow and her baby 2 days after the decedent's burial.
    Children.--The Government seeks to improve the welfare of children, 
but scarce resources and ineffective implementation of social programs 
continue to affect the welfare of children adversely. The Ministry of 
Sport, Youth and Child Development, Ministry of Education, Ministry of 
Labor, and Ministry of Community Development and Social Services have 
responsibilities for improving child welfare. Education is neither 
compulsory nor free. The number of children enrolled in public schools 
at the primary levels reportedly has declined over the past few years. 
Lack of adequate educational facilities and scarcity of educational 
materials are problems. Some areas have established community schools 
that are free but have fewer resources than public schools and require 
contributions from parents. The number of girls and boys in primary 
school is approximately equal; however, fewer girls attend secondary 
school. Due to poverty, both rural and urban children often work in the 
informal sector to help families make ends meet (see Section 6.d.). The 
number of street children in Lusaka increased from 35,000 in 1991 to 
90,000 in 1998, partly because of the growing number of parents who 
have died from AIDS. Approximately 75 percent of all households are 
caring for at least one orphan and, as a result, these children face 
greater risks of child abuse, sexual abuse, and child labor; 7 percent 
of households are headed by children due to the death of both parents. 
The Government instituted programs to increase public awareness of HIV/
AIDS and was attempting to address the problem of child labor by 
establishing a child labor unit with awareness programs during the 
year. Child abuse was believed to be fairly common, but no statistics 
were available.
    The Labor Ministry and the Ministry of Development are cooperating 
in the establishment of a child labor office to address the problem of 
street children; in May the Government established the Child Labor 
Working Group. There are laws that criminalize child prostitution, 
pornography, and sexual exploitation of children under the age of 21. 
Laws against child prostitution are not effectively enforced; however, 
cases of child pornography and sexual exploitation are generally 
effectively enforced.
    People with Disabilities.--Persons with disabilities face 
significant societal discrimination in employment and education. The 
Government has taken steps to ameliorate their hardships, including 
establishing a national trust fund to provide loans to the disabled to 
help them start businesses, but its efforts are limited by scarce 
resources. The Government has not legislated or otherwise mandated 
accessibility to public buildings and services for the disabled.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of citizens to form trade unions, and approximately 60 percent of 
the 300,000 formal sector workers are unionized. Eighteen of the 
country's 19 large national unions, organized by industry or 
profession, are affiliated with the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU). The ZCTU is operated democratically and, like its constituent 
unions, is independent of any political party and the Government. The 
Mineworker's Union of Zambia and four other unions broke away from the 
ZCTU and established a rival umbrella organization in 1994. Four of 
them, including the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, since have rejoined 
the ZCTU, leaving only the Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers 
and the Primary Teachers Union of Zambia outside the Congress.
    The 1993 Industrial and Labor Relations Act (ILRA) reestablished 
the ``one union, one industry'' principle. A 1997 amendment to the act 
allows for multiplicity of trade unions as well as federations of trade 
unions. The Bankers Union of Zambia, although registered with the 
Government in 1993, has been unable to operate because the employers 
recognize the existing Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers. In 
1993 the Ndola High Court ordered the Government to register the 
Secondary School Teachers Union of Zambia (SSTUZ). The Government 
continues to argue that the Zambia National Teachers Union (ZNUT) 
represents secondary school teachers and has delayed recognition of the 
new secondary school teachers union administratively. The SSTUZ sued 
the Government over its nonregistration, prompting the Government to 
register it in 1997. However, most teachers still belong to the ZNUT. 
ZNUT lost some bargaining power when some members switched to separate 
unions for primary and secondary school teachers; however, these unions 
experienced difficulty gaining attention from the Government. Unions 
reportedly have experienced increasing fragmentation due to a shrinking 
formal sector and 1993 changes in labor laws that have decreased 
unions'' leverage. Only 11 percent of the eligible workforce was 
employed in the formal sector during the year.
    All workers have the right to strike, except those engaged in 
essential services. In addition to the Zambia Defense Force, the 
judiciary, the police, the prison service, and the Intelligence 
Security Service, the ILRA defines as essential services power, 
medical, water, sewerage, fire fighting, and certain mining occupations 
essential to safety. It permits strikes only after all other legal 
recourse has been exhausted. The result is that there has not been a 
legal strike since 1993. The ILRA prohibits employers from retribution 
against employees engaged in legal union activities. Workers engaged in 
illegal strikes do not enjoy this protection.
    In December 1999, 250 resident doctors stopped work, citing 
extremely poor working conditions and poor conditions of service. The 
Government initially suspended the striking doctors, but later decided 
to retire those who had not yet returned to work voluntarily. Over the 
course of several months, the majority decided to return to work or 
sought work outside the country.
    By a majority vote of its members, a union may decide on 
affiliation with the ZCTU or with trade unions or organizations outside 
the country. The ZCTU is a member of the International Confederation of 
Tree Trade Unions, and a Zambian citizen currently holds the presidency 
of that body. Labor leaders travel without restrictions to 
international conferences and to visit counterparts abroad.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Employers and 
unions in each industry negotiate collective bargaining agreements 
through joint councils in which there is no government involvement. 
Civil servants and teachers, as public officials, negotiate directly 
with the Government. Collective disputes are referred first to 
conciliation. If conciliation fails to resolve the dispute, the parties 
may refer the case to the Industrial Relations Court, or, in the case 
of employees, vote to strike. In practice the industry joint councils 
function effectively as collective bargaining units.
    The ILRA prohibits discrimination by employers against union 
members and organizers. An employee who believes that he has been 
penalized for union activities may, after exhausting any existing 
administrative channels for relief, file a complaint with the 
Industrial Relations Court. This court has the power to order 
appropriate redress for the aggrieved worker. The complainant may 
appeal a judgment of the Industrial Relations Court to the Supreme 
Court. In practice the Court often orders employers to reinstate 
workers found to have been victims of discrimination. This Court, like 
other courts, has inadequate resources to address all of the cases 
before it in a timely manner.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude; however, it authorizes the 
Government to call upon citizens to perform labor in specific 
instances, for example, during national emergencies or disasters. 
Moreover, the Government can require citizens to perform labor that is 
associated with traditional civil or communal obligations, as when all 
members of a village are called upon to assist in preparing for a visit 
by a traditional leader or other dignitary.
    Forced or bonded labor by children is not permitted, and in 
practice the labor authorities generally enforce the legal 
proscriptions when cases violating the law are brought to their 
attention (see Section 6.d.). However, there were reports that UNITA 
rebels abducted persons, particularly young persons, for forced labor 
in Angola (see Section 6.f.)
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment of children is 16 
years. The Labor Commissioner effectively enforces this law in the 
industrial relations sector although, because of high adult 
unemployment, there is no demand for child labor in the formal sector. 
Child labor is most concentrated in the hotel and catering industries, 
construction, farming, transportation, prostitution, and household 
work. The law is not enforced for those who work in subsistence 
agriculture, domestic service, and informal sectors, where children 
under the age of 16 often are employed. In urban areas, children 
commonly engage in street vending. The ILO estimated that 564,000 
children were in the work force during the year. Approximately 85 
percent of those children are engaged in the worst forms of child 
labor, including street begging and prostitution. The Government has 
not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor; the 
Government had formulated but not approved an action plan by year's 
end. At present, acute family poverty levels and economic factors 
result in child labor. The problem has been compounded by the HIV/AIDs 
epidemic which has produced a growing number of orphans.
    In May the Government established an interministerial working 
group, the National Steering Committee of the National Country Program 
on Child Labor, to coordinate efforts at addressing the root causes of 
child labor.
    Forced or bonded labor by children is not permitted, and the 
authorities enforce legal proscriptions if violations are brought to 
their attention; however, while in general forced or bonded labor is 
not a problem, there were reports that UNITA rebels abducted young 
persons for labor in Angola (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage for 
nonunionized workers is set at $0.02 (70.30 kwacha) per hour. Based on 
a 48-hour workweek, the legal maximum for nonunionized workers, a 
worker earning the minimum wage would receive $28 (90,000 kwacha) per 
month. The minimum wage covers nonunionized workers in categories such 
as general workers, cleaners, office orderlies, and watchmen. The 
minimum wage is insufficient to provide a worker and family with a 
decent standard of living, and most minimum wage earners supplement 
their incomes through second jobs, subsistence farming, or reliance on 
the extended family.
    With respect to unionized workers, wage scales and maximum workweek 
limits are established through collective bargaining. In practice 
almost all unionized workers receive salaries considerably higher than 
the nonunionized minimum wage. The minimum workweek for full-time 
employment is 40 hours and is, in practice, the normal workweek. The 
law requires 2 days of annual leave per month of service.
    The law also regulates minimum health standards in industry, and 
the Department of Mines is responsible for enforcement. Factory safety 
is handled by the Inspector of Factories under the Minister of Labor, 
but staffing problems chronically limit enforcement effectiveness. 
There are no legislative provisions to protect a worker who refuses to 
work on grounds of inadequate safety.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits trafficking 
of children under the age of 18, but there are no other laws 
prohibiting trafficking in persons; however, trafficking in persons is 
not a significant problem in the country, although there have been some 
reports of trafficking. In 1999 a foreign citizen was arrested for 
allegedly trying to take four young women out of the country to work as 
prostitutes. The foreign citizen was charged, but acquitted. UNITA 
deserters have abducted citizens and forced them to accompany them back 
to Angola. Two such incidents were reported in January and February in 
Western Province. Upon return to Angola, UNITA rebels forced young men 
to herd cattle which were stolen in cross border raids, and forced 
young women into labor or prostitution.
                               __________

                                ZIMBABWE

    Zimbabwe is a republic in which President Robert Mugabe and his 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) have 
dominated the executive and legislative branches of the Government and 
have restricted political choice since independence in 1980. Although 
the Constitution allows for multiple parties, opposition parties have 
been subject both to financial restrictions, which were relaxed only 
partially in 1998, and to significant intimidation and violence by the 
ruling party and government security forces. Parliamentary elections 
were held in June and were preceded by a government-sanctioned campaign 
of violence directed towards supporters and potential supporters of the 
opposition. Although most election observers agreed that the voting 
process itself generally was peaceful, there were irregularities, and 
an estimated 15 percent of voters were turned away at the polls for 
various technical reasons. During the year, the country's first viable 
opposition party emerged, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and 
won 57 out of 120 seats in the June parliamentary elections. The 
judiciary is generally independent, but the Government often refuses to 
abide by court decisions, frequently questions the authority of sitting 
judges, and threatens their removal.
    The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) are responsible for maintaining 
law and order. The Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force under the 
Defense Ministry are responsible for external security. The Central 
Intelligence Organization (CIO) under the Minister of State for 
National Security in the President's Office is responsible for internal 
and external security but does not have powers of arrest. Members of 
the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
    Of a population of approximately 12 million, nearly half live by 
subsistence agriculture and about 75 percent rely directly or 
indirectly on agriculture for their livelihood; however, there are also 
substantial mining, manufacturing, and service sectors. The country has 
abundant arable land, minerals, good infrastructure, an educated and 
disciplined work force, and a strong ecotourism sector. Its chief 
sources of hard currency are exports of tobacco, gold, ferroalloys, 
nickel, tourism, and remittances from citizens working in other 
countries. The nonfarm economy continued to be dominated by state-owned 
monopolies and suffered from mismanagement and poor governance, 
including government corruption, and from large fiscal deficits 
exacerbated by the Government's military operations since 1998 in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These conditions continued to 
contribute to accelerating price inflation, rapid currency 
depreciation, high real interest rates, and high unemployment. The 
formal sector unemployment rate exceeds 60 percent. During the year, 
per capita gross domestic product fell to $392, and according to 
government estimates, 70 percent of the population lives in poverty. 
The Government continued to face growing pressure from urban labor 
groups and rural low-income groups as the standard of living dropped. 
Widespread strikes and opposition from private businesses as well as 
labor largely frustrated government efforts to impose new taxes. 
International experts estimated that HIV/AIDS infects one-fourth of the 
adult population, killed at least 150,000 persons in the past year, and 
has created an estimated 900,000 orphans since the late 1980's.
    The Government's poor human rights record worsened significantly 
during the year, and it committed serious abuses. The Government 
provided logistical and material support to ZANU-PF members, who 
orchestrated a campaign of political violence and intimidation that 
claimed the lives of more than 31 persons. Government supporters and 
war veterans, with material support from the Government, occupied 
commercial farms, and in some cases killed, tortured, beat, abused, and 
threatened farm owners and other persons believed to be sympathetic to 
the opposition. Security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused 
persons. There were unconfirmed reports of politically motivated 
disappearances. Prison conditions remained harsh, and life threatening. 
Arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy pretrial detention remained 
problems. The judiciary is generally independent, but the Government 
often refuses to abide by court decisions, and frequently questions the 
authority of sitting judges, and threatens their removal. Infringements 
on citizens'' privacy continued. The Government embarked on a 
farreaching ``fast-track'' resettlement program whereby privately owned 
farms, which are mostly white-owned, were threatened with seizure 
without fair compensation. The Government continued to restrict press 
freedom, enforce restrictive laws against, and intimidate journalists, 
and monopolize radio broadcasting. In September the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Government's monopoly on broadcasting was unconstitutional. 
Journalists also practiced self-censorship, and the Government 
continued to restrict academic freedom. The Government restricted 
freedom of assembly. Security forces repeatedly used force to disperse 
nonviolent public meetings and demonstrations. Although the Government 
generally respected religious freedom, its retention of the colonial-
era Witchcraft Suppression Law reportedly was viewed as restrictive by 
some practitioners of traditional indigenous religions. The Government 
at times restricted freedom of movement, including erecting roadblocks 
around communal farming areas. The political process remained heavily 
tilted in favor of the ruling party, and widespread irregularities, 
fraud, and intimidation marred the June parliamentary elections. The 
Government criticized nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) of 
launching opposition political activity. Domestic violence against 
women remained widespread, and discrimination against women and the 
disabled remained problems. Abuse of children, including incidents of 
female genital mutilation (FGM), remained a problem. There were 
continuing reports of ritual murders associated with traditional 
religious practices. The President and his Government exacerbated 
widespread resentment of the economically prominent white minority. The 
Government violated worker rights. Child labor is a problem, and the 
traditional practice of offering young girls as compensatory payment in 
interfamily disputes persisted. There were reports that persons were 
trafficked from the country to South Africa for forced prostitution and 
forced labor.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports that security forces committed extrajudicial 
killings; however, in some cases army and police units provided 
transportation and other logistical support to perpetrators of 
political violence and knowingly permitted their activities.
    On July 9, at a soccer match in Harare, 12 persons were trampled to 
death after police fired tear gas into stands where opposition 
supporters were waving MDC banners and chanting antigovernment slogans. 
Five others were critically injured, one of whom later died from 
injuries. By year's end, human rights organizations were supporting 
individual legal cases against the ZRP for using excessive force in the 
incident; however, the cases had not been tried by year's end.
    In September 1999, Notice Zhakata reportedly died at Norton 
Hospital of injuries inflicted on him by police at the Kadoma police 
station, where he was detained following an arrest. According to press 
reports, police initially denied responsibility for the death, and the 
Government had not taken any action in the case by year's end.
    In late 1999, allegations surfaced that members of the armed forces 
were training Burundian Hutu militias in the DRC to conduct attacks on 
Burundian and Congolese civilians in addition to military targets. The 
Ministry of Defense denied these reports, and no credible information 
has been found to verify them.
    There were no new developments in the late 1998 case of a police 
officer who fired into a crowd of persons protesting fuel price 
increases in Mutare, killing one woman. There also were no developments 
in the February 1998 gasoline bombing case in which ZANU-PF supporters 
attacked independent Member of Parliament (M.P.) Margaret Dongo with a 
gasoline bomb at a by-election in Chitungwiza.
    Police killed eight persons during January 1998 food riots. The 
Government conducted investigations into these cases, and private legal 
actions were instituted against the police. At year's end, those cases 
still were proceeding through the courts, and police investigations 
were ongoing at year's end. In March 1999, a magistrate court issued an 
opinion in the case of a 12-year-old girl, Kudzi Ndlovu, who was shot 
in Gweru during the riot on January 20, 1998. The judge concluded that 
her death resulted from a collapse in police command and inadequate 
riot control procedures by the officers on the scene; however, due to 
the confusing and conflicting evidence about the police response in 
this case, the judge was unable to find any individual officer liable 
for this death. The magistrate court recommended that further ``private 
investigations'' be undertaken to assist the Attorney General in 
determining liability in the case. At year's end, there were no further 
developments in the case.
    The Attorney General continued to decline to prosecute the mayor of 
Chitungwiza, Joseph Macheka, for shooting to death one man and injuring 
two others who allegedly attempted to rob Macheka's liquor store during 
the January 1998 food riots. The Attorney General determined that 
Macheka was acting in self-defense and therefore, that prosecution was 
not in the public interest; the case was dropped in 1999. Legal and 
human rights critics accused the Attorney General of being influenced 
by political pressure.
    In July 1999, the ZRP's Criminal Investigation Division reportedly 
identified an unnamed official of both the ZANU-PF and the Government 
as the subject of an investigation into three ritual killings committed 
in 1997 (see Section 5). There was no further information available on 
the case at year's end.
    By year's end, the Government still had not responded formally to a 
1999 report by the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) and the Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) on atrocities committed during 
the 1982-87 Matabeleland crisis, despite the March 1999 release of a 
shortened version that was made available in local languages and 
mounting pressure from civic groups, political parties, and churches. 
The LRF and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights subsequently subpoenaed 
the Government in January to release the findings of two commissions 
that investigated the Matabeleland massacres; however, the 
AttorneyGeneral claimed that the documents were missing. In July the 
LRF petitioned the Supreme Court to force the Government to release the 
findings; the Court ruled that the President could be sued in court but 
had not heard the merits of the case by year's end. An estimated 
10,000-20,000 persons died in the Matabeleland uprising and subsequent 
Government pacification campaign.
    In the five-month period before the June parliamentary elections, 
31 deaths were reported officially as a result of political violence, 
perpetrated mainly by supporters of the ruling party. On April 15, in 
Buhera district, a group of men in a ZANU-PF vehicle pulled in front of 
a vehicle driven by MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai's campaign manager and 
eight other passengers, and forced the vehicle to stop. The men beat 
the driver and passengers with rifle butts and then set the car on 
fire. The driver and one passenger died in the attack, and two other 
passengers were reportedly hospitalized. Police later arrested two 
persons implicated in the attack, but they were released after a brief 
detention without explanation. There were no other arrests or court 
action in the case.
    There were reports that in March ZANU-PF supporters killed persons 
during a campaign of violence in Mberengwa district (see Section 1.c.).
    On April 17, a group of war veterans abducted MDC organizer and 
commercial farmer David Stevens from his farm and took him to their 
base in Murewa, where they beat him badly, and then shot and killed 
him. On September 22, after receiving an anonymous tip, police arrested 
a Marondera war veteran and charged him with murder. The suspect was 
released on bail pending a court hearing; however, the Attorney-General 
later withdrew the charges due to a lack of evidence, even though the 
suspect had been apprehended with the murder weapon and had been 
identified by a number of witnesses.
    In late April in Kariba, residents of the town observed persons 
believed to be ZANU-PF supporters throwing the bodies of Luckson 
Kanyurira and another MDC supporter out of their vehicle onto the main 
street of the town. The incident followed several days of clashes 
between opposing political party members. No one was arrested or 
charged in the case by year's end.
    On May 13, in Chipinge district, five persons beat to death Alex 
Chisasa, an army sergeant in civilian clothing. The killing occurred 
after Chisasa reportedly criticized publicly ZANU-PF's political 
strategy.
    On May 17 in Mudzi district, youths allegedly supporting ZANU-PF 
beat to death Mationa Mashaya and his son, who were local supporters of 
the United Parties opposition group. The suspects beat to death the 
senior Mashaya in the presence of his wife, and then entered the home 
of Mashaya's eldest son, Onias, dragged him outside, and severely beat 
him, breaking both his hands. Onias died the following day from his 
injuries. No arrests were made in the case by year's end.
    In June Mandishona Mutyanda, MDC ward chairman for the Kwekwe 
district, died of severe head injuries after being assaulted in a 
suburb of Kwekwe by suspected ZANU-PF supporters. No one had been 
arrested or charged in the case by year's end.
    In March 1999, police instituted a system of roadblocks to 
apprehend suspected criminals, known as ``Operation Hokoyo,'' that 
continued to be implemented periodically during the year.
    Groups composed of war veterans tortured MDC members throughout the 
June election campaign. One person died from such torture (see Section 
1.c.).
    Six white commercial farmers were killed during the year in 
violence arising from land seizures (see Section 1.f.). For example, on 
December 13, three men armed with rifles killed white farmer Henry 
Elsworth and seriously injured his son in an ambush attack outside his 
farm gate. Press reports indicated that robbery did not appear to be 
the motive for the killing and that Elsworth had received numerous 
death threats during the year.
    During the year at least five farm workers were killed in political 
violence; however, exact figures were not known. Three of the five were 
found hanged, and the police recorded their causes of death as 
suicides.
    Harsh prison conditions and a high incidence of HIV/AIDS are widely 
acknowledged to have contributed to a large number of deaths in prison; 
the Zimbabwe Prison Service documented that 1,051 prisoners died of 
HIV/AIDS-related causes during the past 3 years (see Section 1.c.).
    There were continuing reports of ritual murders and killings of 
children for body parts which were associated with traditional 
religious practices. In July 1999, Faber Chidarikire, a ZANU-PF 
official and mayor, was charged with the murder of a girl in 1987 (see 
Section 5).
    b. Disappearance.--There were unconfirmed reports of numerous 
politically motivated disappearances perpetuated by ZANU-PF supporters 
during the year, especially in the rural areas where most organized 
groups are loyal to the Government and there are few opposition 
organizations. Domestic human rights organizations believe that there 
were disappearances in rural areas that were not reported due to fear 
of retribution by pro-government factions.
    On June 19, Patrick Nabanyama, a local MDC official and polling 
agent for Bulawayo South M.P. David Coltart, was abducted by suspected 
ZANU-PF supporters from his home. On October 10, ten war veterans, 
including the chairman of the National Liberation War Veterans 
Association in Bulawayo, reportedly were detained for the kidnaping and 
remained in detention pending a trial at year's end. By year's end, 
Nabanyama had not been found.
    In June war veterans beat and abducted a journalist for The 
Independent newpaper, a foreign journalist, and her cameraman, in 
Mutoko district. The police rescued the kidnaped journalists within a 
few hours of the abduction; no charges had been filed or arrests made 
in the case by year's end.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and cruel and inhuman 
treatment; however, security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise 
abused persons.
    The ZRP showed poor training in criminal apprehension and 
interrogation, and there were unconfirmed reports of human rights 
abuses by the CIO.
    There continued to be reports of police using excessive force in 
apprehending and detaining criminal suspects.
    Security forces were involved in incidents of political violence, 
including instances of soldiers beating civilians in areas where 
persons voted for the opposition, such as Harare suburbs and Kwekwe. 
Two cases arising from beatings by soldiers following the Government's 
referendum defeat in February went to court. On June 28, army soldiers 
reportedly beat an MDC M.P. and MDC members at a political rally that 
had been authorized by police authorities (see Section 2.b.). 
Reportedly the victims were beaten with rifle butts and five were 
hospitalized for injuries. There were also reports that police fired 
tear gas into homes during the suppression of riots in October.
    There were at least 8 politically motivated rapes reportedly 
perpetrated during the year.
    On July 9 at a soccer match in Harare, five persons were injured 
and 12 persons were killed, after police fired tear gas into the stands 
during a soccer match (see Section 1.a.).
    On October 9, police reportedly used tear gas on MDC supporters who 
were gathered at an airport for the arrival of MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai.
    Security forces repeatedly used force to disperse nonviolent 
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). On October 12, police reportedly 
beat students with batons and used tear gas to break up a peaceful 
student rally (see Section 2.b.). On October 16, during food riots, 
security forces and police used excessive force to disperse 
demonstrators. Police officers, supported by army units, fired tear gas 
into crowds, and the army used helicopters to drop tear gas canisters 
over neighborhoods. Security forces reportedly beat an opposition M.P. 
and four journalists. There also were reports that journalists were 
whipped and beaten by security forces (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 2.a., 
and 2.b.).
    There were reports during the year that Government forces allegedly 
used landmines in the DRC; there was no further information available 
on the extent of injuries resulting from these landmines.
    The Government generally has not pursued actively past allegations 
of torture and has not prosecuted CIO or ZRP officers for such abuses.
    In September 1999, Notice Zhakata reportedly died at Norton 
Hospital of physical abuse inflicted by police at the Kadoma police 
station while he was detained there (see Section 1.a.).
    In March 1999, the Chitungwiza police arrested, detained for 6 
months and allegedly tortured a married couple, Joyce and Shupikai 
Karimazondo, and another person, John Mita, in response to allegations 
by a neighbor that they had killed their young domestic worker for 
ritual purposes (see Sections 2.c. and 5). In September, the 
Karimazondos and Mita were released, and the murder charge was dropped 
after the domestic worker was located alive and unharmed. The 
Magistrate Court declined the Karimazondos'' defense counsel's 
application to have the State prosecute the investigating officers for 
misconduct and unlawful detention. Mita stated that he was suing the 
Government for unlawful detention. A local organization that treats 
torture victims, the Amani Trust, began investigating these 
allegations. At year's end, these investigations and legal challenges 
still were proceeding. No further information on the case was available 
at year's end.
    In January 1999, in Harare, three men, one of whom later was 
identified as a police officer, reportedly assaulted Isodore Zindoga, 
deputy secretary general of the Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU). There was no further information available on the case at 
year's end.
    In January 1999, the military police detained and subsequently 
tortured and beat two journalists, Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto (see 
Section 2.a.). The journalists'' suit for their alleged mistreatment 
still was pending at year's end.
    In June 1999, CIO officer Richard Mutswiri Mutiti reportedly filed 
a suit with the High Court alleging that four other CIO officials had 
beaten and kicked him, doused him with a flammable petroleum 
distillate, and threatened to burn him, while detaining him without 
warrant at the Harare Central Police Station in June 1998. A CIO 
disciplinary committee reportedly recommended the firing of the four 
officials in 1998, and one reportedly resigned soon thereafter; the 
High Court was scheduled to hear the cases of the remaining three 
officers in January 2001.
    A consortium of human rights lawyers and NGO's pursued legal 
actions in 40 cases on behalf of persons who alleged that they had been 
injured by state officials during the 1998 food riots (see Section 
1.d.). Twenty of those cases were resolved in favor of the claimants, 
and in one case, the army paid compensation to the victim. In the other 
20 cases, the ZRP stated that it did not have the funds to pay damages. 
In six cases, the court ruled in favor of the police. Three other cases 
were withdrawn due to a lack of evidence, and three plaintiffs died 
before their cases could be heard. At year's end, six cases still were 
pending; of those cases, two claimants reportedly had left the country, 
and the remaining four could not be located.
    Government supporters beat suspected opposition members, commercial 
farmers, and farm laborers; on June 5, an international team of medical 
experts on a fact-finding mission found evidence of systematic physical 
and psychological torture by government supporters. Human rights groups 
have reported that war veterans and other ruling party supporters set 
up torture chambers in government-funded offices to brutalize 
opposition supporters. The names of MDC M.P. David Coltart and other 
MDC members and supporters were reportedly included on a death list 
that was circulated among ZANU-PF supporters.
    Persons perceived as supporting the opposition, including teachers, 
civil servants, health workers, and laborers in the manufacturing 
sector, were singled out for assault or intimidation. In most cases the 
national police did not halt acts of political intimidation or 
violence, arrest the perpetrators, or vigorously investigate political 
crimes. On April 15, a group of men driving a ZANU-PF vehicle stopped 
another vehicle with MDC members and beat the driver and passengers, 
killing two persons (see Section 1.a.). On April 17, a group of war 
veterans beat a commercial farmer, who was also a MDC organizer, and 
subsequently shot him to death (see Section 1.a.). On May 13, a gang 
beat to death an army sergeant after he reportedly criticized the ZANU-
PF party (see Section 1.a.). The Zimbabwe Election Support Network, a 
grouping of human rights organizations, reported that on May 16, in 
Manicaland, Eomonn Oliver, the production manager of Border Timbers 
International, was grabbed by a group wearing ZANU-PF shirts when he 
arrived at work. They beat him and forced him to sit in a pool of mud 
in front of his workers and chant ZANU-PF slogans. On May 17, a group 
of youths who allegedly were ZANU-PF supporters beat to death a 
supporter of an opposition group and his son (see Section 1.a.). In 
June an MDC ward chairman died of injuries after he was beaten by 
suspected ZANU-PF supporters (see Section 1.a.).
    In a number of rural areas, war veterans and other ZANU-PF 
supporters conducted ``pungwes,'' or forced nightly political 
gatherings. Hundreds of villagers were rounded up, driven to remote 
areas, and forced to chant ZANU-PF slogans or denounce the opposition 
until the next morning.
    There were confirmed reports that in Budirio, a suburb of Harare, 
war veteran groups frequently used a medical clinic belonging to 
National Liberation War Veterans Association leader and M.P., Dr. 
Chenjerai Hunzvi, to torture members of the MDC. At least one person, 
Chipunza, died from injuries sustained during torture there, and 
another six testified to a human rights group that they were tortured 
at this clinic. Authorities arrested 46 war veterans, but they were 
released on bail, and they are unlikely to be tried due to President 
Mugabe's decree pardoning perpetrators of political violence between 
January and July (see Sections 1.e. and 3).
    Government supporters raped suspected opposition supporters. The 
attacks targeted female farm workers and health workers (see Section 
5).
    In March a group of ZANU-PF supporters allegedly tortured MDC 
members in Bulawayo before a rally addressed by President Mugabe. In 
August police arrested two war veterans suspected of participating in 
the torture; however, charges against them were dropped as a result of 
a presidential amnesty (see Section 1.e.).
    The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, a coalition of the nine 
largest human rights organizations in the country, reported that in 
March ZANU-PF supporters in Mberengwa district abducted a local nurse 
and a teacher at night and forced them to a remote camp where other 
opposition members were being held. The two were stripped and forced to 
climb trees and jump from a height of three meters. They were beaten 
with electrical cords and sticks and threatened with firearms. 
Authorities arrested four suspects and held them on charges of 
malicious damage to property, public violence, kidnaping, and murder. 
As a result of a presidential amnesty, charges against three of the 
suspects were dropped, but the fourth suspect remained in custody for 
murder at year's end (see Section 1.e.).
    On April 1, there were violent clashes between MDC and ruling party 
supporters that resulted in at least 12 injuries. ZANU-PF supporters 
reportedly beat passers-by. Police used tear gas to disperse the groups 
(see Section 2.b.). War veterans threw stones at unarmed opposition 
members and bystanders and injured several persons. Police did not 
intervene immediately, allowing war veterans to severely beat 
bystanders.
    In June there were at least 200 reported attacks on schools by 
ruling party supporters. Teachers were dragged from classrooms, beaten, 
and stripped naked in front of their students. Health care workers also 
were targeted for assault, and nurses were raped.
    In June war veterans beat and abducted a journalist for The 
Independent newpaper, a foreign journalist, and her cameraman, in 
Mutoko district. The police rescued the kidnaped journalists within a 
few hours of the abduction; no charges had been filed or arrests made 
in the case by year's end.
    On July 16, war veterans beat Standard journalist Cengetayi Zvanya 
at a news conference at ZANU-PF headquarters; the war veterans detained 
Zvanya for two hours and then released him.
    In July the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), an umbrella 
organization of approximately 100 NGO's, called for an inquiry into the 
political violence, and a number of other human rights organizations 
released reports on the political violence associated with the June 
parliamentary elections during the year.
    In August it was reported that war veterans abducted and sexually 
abused 10 schoolchildren (see Section 5).
    On October 6, President Mugabe issued a presidential decree 
granting a general amnesty for politically motivated crimes that 
occurred between January 1 and July 31 (see Section 1.e.). The amnesty 
protects nearly all the agents of the political violence campaign and 
effectively prevents any criminal prosecutions against them.
    Prison conditions remained harsh. Extreme overcrowding, shortages 
of clothing, and poor sanitary conditions persist. Overcrowding and 
poor sanitation aggravated outbreaks of cholera, diarrhea, and HIV/
AIDS-related illnesses among the 21,133 prisoners in the country during 
the year. Government prison service authorities reviewed overcrowding 
in prisons during a 1998 workshop and concluded that exposure to HIV/
AIDS was a major cause of a large number of deaths in detention, and 
prison authorities called for more research to address this growing 
problem; some authorities argued for the early release of such 
terminally ill prisoners. There has been a significant increase in the 
number of women incarcerated, primarily due to harsh economic 
conditions. Female prisoners are held in separate cellblocks from male 
prisoners. There are an estimated 2,000 women in prison, increasingly 
for crimes of prostitution, embezzlement, fraud, petty theft, and 
abandonment of infants. Many incarcerated women are obliged to raise 
their very young children in prison if they have no one to care for 
them while they are detained. The Government established a successful 
community service sentencing program to try to alleviate prison 
overcrowding. The Legal Resource Foundation, in cooperation with the 
prison service, has established a human rights training program for 
prison officials. Officials who mistreat prisoners are punished 
routinely. Juveniles generally are held separately from adults; 
however, a local NGO reported that occasionally juveniles, particularly 
juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18 years, are held with adult 
prisoners for brief periods of time.
    The Government permits international human rights monitors to visit 
prisons; however, government procedures and requirements make it very 
difficult to do so. Permission is required from the Commissioner of 
Prisons and the Minister of Justice, which sometimes can take a month 
or longer to obtain or may not be granted. A local NGO that deals with 
prisoners'' issues was granted access on a number of occasions during 
the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, some laws 
effectively weaken this prohibition and security forces arbitrarily 
arrested and detained persons repeatedly.
    The law requires that police inform an arrested person of the 
charges against him before he is taken into custody. Warrants of arrest 
issued by the courts are required except in cases of serious crimes or 
where there is the risk of evidence disappearing. The Ministry of Home 
Affairs paid $400,000 (Z$4.5 million) in damages for wrongful arrest 
cases in 1996, the last year for which statistics were available.
    Although a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is required 
within 48 hours of an arrest (or 96 hours over a weekend), the law 
often is disregarded if a person does not have legal representation. A 
1992 amendment to the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act 
substantially reduced the power of magistrates to grant bail without 
the consent of the Attorney General or his agents. However, in 
practice, a circular issued by the Attorney General giving a general 
authority to grant bail has lessened the negative impact of the rule. 
High Court judges grant bail independently.
    Two laws dating from the British colonial era, the Official Secrets 
Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), grant the Government 
a wide range of legal powers. LOMA gives extensive powers to the 
police, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the President to prosecute 
persons for political and security crimes that are not clearly defined.
    In 1997 the Government proposed new legislation called the Public 
Order and Security Bill (POSB) to replace the LOMA. The original POSB 
was less restrictive than the LOMA only in some respects. During the 
following 2 years, the Parliament significantly amended the POSB to 
reflect the concerns of human rights and legal organizations, which had 
protested the Government's original draft as insufficiently liberal. 
Although the amended version that the Parliament sent to President 
Mugabe for his signature was similar to the LOMA in including vague 
definitions of political and security crimes, harsh penalties for 
failure to report the acts of others, and restrictions on freedom of 
assembly, speech, and association, President Mugabe declined to sign 
it, and returned it to the Parliament in early June 1999 for further 
consultation and possible amendment. There was no further action on the 
POSB in Parliament during the year (see Section 2.a.).
    On April 26, police detained an Associated Press photographer for 4 
days without charge in connection with the April 22 bombing of the 
offices of the independent Daily News (see Section 2.a.).
    On May 21, police arrested 20 MDC supporters who were preparing for 
a political rally (see Section 2.b.).
    On October 8, police detained three parliamentarians from the 
opposition MDC for allegedly inflammatory statements made at a 
political rally. The M.P.'s were detained for two nights and released 
when the Attorney-General declined to prosecute them (see Sections 
1.e., 2.a., and 2.b.). On October 9, police dispersed a demonstration 
protesting the arrest of the three parliamentarians (see Section 2.b.).
    During food riots on October 16, police detained at least 70 
persons (see Section 1.c.).
    In January 1999, military and civilian police detained and 
physically abused two journalists from The Standard and charged them 
with violating Section 50 of the LOMA (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
    In a landmark decision in April, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
section of the LOMA under which the journalists were arrested was 
unconstitutional. However, at year's end the journalists'' suit for 
their alleged mistreatment had not been concluded (see Section 2.a.).
    At the end of 1999, the Government reportedly was holding about 80 
foreigners in Harare Remand Prison who had been there for between 2 
months and 1 year without having been charged formally. Many of these 
detainees reportedly were persons from the DRC claiming to fear 
persecution by the Government of the DRC, which the Government of 
Zimbabwe was supporting militarily against insurgent forces.
    In June 1999, a CIO officer filed a suit alleging that other CIO 
officials had detained him without warrant in June 1998 (see Section 
1.c.).
    On July 2, 1999, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum released a 
follow-up report to its 1998 report on the January 1998 food riots. The 
report noted that the police claimed that a total of 3,000 persons were 
arrested during the 3 days of rioting and 2 days of clean-up. The 
overwhelming majority of those arrested were released within a 2-week 
period; the Rights Forum concluded that 70 percent of those arrested 
could not be convicted because of lack of credible charges or flawed 
arrests by the police and army. Its report also claimed that some 
persons were victims of uneven justice. For example, those arrested 
first received harsh sentences or were in remand without trial. Those 
arrested later were released quickly, because the system was 
overwhelmed.
    There were no developments in the case of the Reverend Ndabaningi 
Sithole, a former opposition M.P. and longtime rival of President 
Mugabe, who was convicted and sentenced in December 1997 to 2 years'' 
imprisonment under the LOMA for conspiring to assassinate President 
Mugabe in 1995. In January 1998, Sithole filed an appeal, and the 
sentencing judge called for a pardon. Sithole died in December while 
receiving medical treatment outside of the country.
    Prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. Detainees spend an 
average of 6 months incarcerated before their trials because of a 
critical shortage of magistrates and court interpreters.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does 
not use forced exile; however, a number of persons left the country to 
escape repression and remained in self-imposed exile at year's end.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and in practice the judiciary remained largely 
independent; however, the Government increasingly refused to abide by 
judicial decisions. In addition numerous government officials, 
including the Justice Minister and the Minister for Information and 
Publicity, repeatedly called for the resignation of Supreme Court 
justices.
    The Customary Law and Local Courts Act of 1990 created a unitary 
court system, consisting of headmen's courts, chiefs' courts, 
magistrates' courts, the High Court, and the Supreme Court. With this 
restructuring, civil and customary law cases may be heard at all levels 
of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court.
    Judges are appointed for life, and the Constitution provides that 
they can be removed from the bench only for gross misconduct, and that 
they cannot be discharged or transferred for political reasons; 
however, judges were threatened with removal at times by the 
Government. Magistrates, who are part of the civil service rather than 
the judiciary, hear the vast majority of cases and sometimes are 
subject to political pressure. Military courts deal with disciplinary 
or courtmartial proceedings. Police courts, which can sentence a police 
officer to confinement in a camp or demotion, handle disciplinary and 
misconduct cases. Trials in both these latter courts meet 
internationally accepted standards for fair trials; defendants in these 
courts have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. All levels of the 
judiciary often make rulings disliked by the Government.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and the 
judiciary rigorously enforces this right. Every defendant has the right 
to a lawyer of his choosing. However, well over 90 percent of 
defendants in magistrates' courts do not have legal representation. In 
criminal cases, an indigent defendant may apply to have the Government 
provide an attorney, but this is rarely done and rarely granted. 
However, in capital cases the Government provides an attorney for all 
defendants unable to afford one. Litigants in civil cases can request 
legal assistance from the NGO Legal Resources Foundation. The 
government-established Citizens Advice Bureau was eliminated due to 
budget constraints in 1997. All litigants are represented in the High 
Court. The Supreme Court has instructed magistrates to ensure that 
unrepresented defendants fully understand their rights and to weigh any 
mitigating circumstances in criminal cases, whether or not the accused 
presents them as part of his defense.
    The right to appeal exists in all cases and is automatic in cases 
in which the death penalty is imposed. Trials are open to the public 
except in certain security cases. Defendants enjoy a presumption of 
innocence and the right to present witnesses and question witnesses 
against them. Defendants and their attorneys generally have access to 
government-held evidence relevant to their cases. The legal system does 
not discriminate against women or minorities. However, some High Court 
judges imposed lenient sentences in some cases of rape and child sexual 
abuse, and local women's and legal organizations challenged these 
decisions.
    In April and May, the Government failed to abide by two High Court 
rulings requiring that police officials remove war veterans and other 
squatters trespassing on commercial farms. On May 17, the High Court 
ordered an end to the occupation of 500 farms by war veterans and other 
ZANU-PF supporters; however, the order was not implemented. In May the 
High Court also brought contempt of court proceedings against National 
Liberation War Veterans Association leader Chenjerai Hunzvi for failing 
to remove his followers from occupied farm properties. Hunzvi, along 
with the Government, had been ordered in April to remove thousands of 
squatters from 1,000 occupied farms. Hunzvi was found guilty of 
contempt of court and received a commuted 3month prison sentence; 
however, both Hunzvi and the Government continued to ignore the court 
orders at year's end. In August and September, police removed 
approximately 100 squatters and war veterans from farms near Harare; 
however, the Government stopped the expulsions after the police actions 
were publicized, and approximately 1,000 farms remained occupied at 
year's end.
    Members of the ruling party and the Government were increasingly 
dissatisfied with the judiciary, whose rulings often went against ZANU-
PF and the Government. In July the Supreme Court ruled that the 
President could be sued in court after the LRF sued the Government to 
release a report of two commissions that investigated the Matabeleland 
massacres (see Section 1.a.). On November 1, the Minister of State for 
Information and Publicity called for the resignation of the Supreme 
Court Chief Justice for issuing too many rulings against the 
Government.
    On November 10, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the 
Government's land resettlement policy violated constitutional rights to 
property and protection from arbitrary search and entry, and ordered a 
halt to the occupations (see Section 1.f.). On November 29, the Justice 
Minister warned the courts not to oppose the Government's land program 
(see Section 1.f.). On December 21, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Government's land acquisition program was unconstitutional, that the 
Government had persistently violated the rule of law with its land 
program, and that the political and civil rights of farmers had been 
routinely denied.
    In November war veterans raided the Supreme Court building to 
protest the Court's rulings against the Government's land resettlement 
policies. In December war veterans threatened to attack justices in 
their homes if they did not resign within 2 weeks; no such attacks 
occurred.
    The Government continued routinely to delay payment of court costs 
or judgments awarded against it. For example, the CIO continued its 
refusal to pay damages awarded by the High Court to a former opposition 
party official whom CIO agents had tortured in 1990.
    On October 6, President Mugabe issued a presidential decree 
granting a general amnesty for politically motivated crimes that 
occurred between January 1 and July 31. The pardon excluded the 
offenses of murder, robbery, rape, sexual assault, theft, and 
possession of arms, but did not exclude the charges of common assault 
and assault with the intent to commit grievous bodily harm. The pardon 
permitted the immediate release of prisoners convicted of the latter 
two offenses. The amnesty protects nearly all the agents of the 
political violence campaign and effectively prevents any criminal 
prosecutions against them. The amnesty was widely criticized by 
domestic and international human rights groups. Amnesty International 
expressed concern that it would encourage further violence in the run-
up to the presidential elections in 2002.
    The Government repeatedly has amended the Constitution in response 
to judicial rulings protective of human rights. For example, Amendment 
11 (1992) changed the Constitution to allow corporal punishment of 
minors after the Supreme Court ruled that caning of minors constituted 
cruel and inhuman punishment. Amendment 14 (1996), which denies both 
men and women the right to confer automatic residency on their foreign 
spouses, was passed in response to a 1994 Supreme Court ruling 
declaring that women should have the same rights as men to confer 
residency and citizenship on their spouses (see Section 2.d.). 
Amendments to the Constitution are not ratified by the public but are 
subject only to the ZANU-PF-dominated Parliament's approval.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary interference with 
these rights; however, the Government restricted these rights in 
practice. The Government sometimes monitors private correspondence and 
telephones, particularly international communications. In April 
Parliament passed the Postal and Telecommunications Bill that permits 
the Government to monitor and intercept e-mails entering and leaving 
the country (see Section 2.a.).
    On September 14 and September 15, police raided MDC party 
headquarters, detained MDC officials, and removed documents (see 
Section 3).
    On October 4, police searched the homes of an independent radio 
station's co-owners and others associated with the station (see Section 
2.a.).
    In October rising prices of essential commodities, including fuel 
and food, sparked riots in many of Harare's suburbs. Police conducted 
house to house searches, beat residents, severely in some cases, and 
warned them not to engage in further demonstrations, despite the fact 
that many of those threatened had not participated in the riots. On 
October 17, approximately 50 riot police entered the home of opposition 
M.P. Justin Mutendadzamera, accused him of fanning the riots, and 
severely beat him and his wife with batons on their buttocks and arms 
(see Section 1.c.).
    About one-half of the country's most productive land is owned and 
farmed by about 4,000 families belonging to the country's white 
minority. The need for land reform is accepted almost universally; 
however, there are problems with implementation of the 1992 Land 
Acquisition Act (Land Act). Under the Land Act, farmers whose lands 
have been designated for acquisition and redistribution by the State 
may appeal only the amount of compensation, not the initial decision to 
acquire their farms. Shortly after the February referendum that 
defeated the new constitution that would have permitted land seizures, 
war veterans, with Government support, began occupying commercial 
farms, and assaulted and intimidated farm workers and the predominately 
white farm owners. Approximately 1,600 farms were visited or occupied 
in the period prior to the June elections, and about 1,000 of those 
farms remained occupied at year's end.
    On April 9, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment permitting 
the seizure of land without compensation. In May President Mugabe, 
using extraordinary presidential powers, amended the Land Act to bring 
it into conformity with this amendment. In early June, the Government 
marked 841 farms for compulsory acquisition, giving those farm owners 1 
month to appeal. After the June elections, the Government began a 
``fasttrack'' resettlement program in an effort to quickly settle the 
land problem. The Government designated an additional 2,000 farms for 
seizure. Under the Government's plan, farm owners would be compensated 
over a 5-year period for improvements made to the land but not for the 
property itself. Although no farms were seized officially or their 
owners evicted by the Government, portions of approximately 1,000 
commercial farms continued to be occupied by war veterans, ZANU-PF 
supporters, and other squatters at year's end, many of whom built homes 
and planted crops on the land they occupied. In November the Supreme 
Court ruled that the land occupations violated constitutional private 
property rights and protection from arbitrary search and entry (see 
Section 1.e.) and issued a consent decree whereby the Government and 
the CFU agreed that the Government would halt its land resettlement 
activities and evict squatters from occupied land; however, the 
Government had not complied with the agreement by year's end (see 
Section 1.e.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression but allows for legislation to limit this freedom 
in the ``interest of defense, public safety, public order, state 
economic interests, public morality, and public health,'' and the 
Government restricted this right in practice. Security forces 
arbitrarily detained journalists, disobeyed court orders to release 
journalists, and refused to investigate or punish security force 
members who tortured journalists and opposition members. Journalists 
practice self-censorship.
    The Government restricted freedom of speech, particularly by 
opposition members and supporters. During the February referendum, 
eight NCA members, including two prominent MDC members, were arrested 
for violating sections of the Electoral Act that prohibit campaigning 
within 100 meters of a polling station. On February 15, a magistrate 
dismissed the case after the eight NCA members proved they were not 
within 100 meters of the polling station (see Section 2.b.).
    On April 1, police fired tear gas on NCA members during a peace 
march (see Section 2.b.). In July police officers fired tear gas into 
the stands during a soccer match after opposition supporters began 
waving MDC banners and chanting slogans. Thirteen persons were trampled 
to death in the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b). On October 8, 
three MDC M.P.'s were arrested and charged with making inflammatory 
statements at a political rally (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
    Sections 44 and 50 of the LOMA criminalize and allow the Government 
to suppress the publication of any ``subversive'' statement or ``a 
false story capable of causing alarm and despondency.'' An extremely 
broad Official Secrets Act makes it a crime to divulge any information 
acquired in the course of official duties. In addition antidefamation 
laws criminalize libel of both public and private persons alike.
    Several major daily newspapers and one local-language tabloid 
belong to the Mass Media Trust (MMT), a holding company heavily 
influenced by the ruling party. Until April 1999, the Government, 
through the MMT, controlled the only two daily newspapers at the time, 
the Chronicle and the Herald. The news coverage in these newspapers 
generally focused on the activities of government officials, neglected 
opposition parties and other antigovernment groups, and also neglected 
events or information that reflected adversely on the Government. The 
governmentcontrolled media never criticized President Mugabe. In 
addition, the Minister of Information and Publicity in the President's 
Office controls the Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News Agency wire service.
    The independent press grew substantially during the year in 
relation to the MMT-owned press. Independent newspapers that appeared 
regularly and had more than 3,000 subscribers were relatively few: one 
daily (The Daily News), three weeklies (The Financial Gazette, the 
Independent, and The Standard), and three monthlies. In 1998 a new 
privately owned consortium, Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ), 
which was 60 percent foreign-owned in 1998 but only 40 percent foreign-
owned by the end of 1999, launched five weeklies in 1999 tailored to 
community-level readership. Three of the ANZ weekly newspapers closed 
in 1999 due to financial problems arising from limited advertising 
revenue; two remained open at year's end. In April 1999, the ANZ 
launched the country's first independent daily newspaper, The Daily 
News, which has the nation's largest circulation. The circulation of 
The Daily News grew significantly before the parliamentary elections, 
and the readership of the government-controlled The Herald fell 
rapidly. The major independent newspapers continued to monitor 
government policies and open their pages to opposition critics, but 
most of them also continued to exercise some self-censorship in 
reporting due to growing government intimidation of the press and the 
continuing prospect of prosecution under criminal libel laws.
    The Government increasingly tolerated private media criticism of 
official corruption, as a number of widely publicized reports on 
malfeasance in government parastatals and ministries, notably the 
National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, appeared in both independent and MMT-
owned newspapers. The Government did not prosecute any journalists or 
newspapers in connection with these reports; in past years, government 
prosecutions for criminal libel in connection with reporting of 
government corruption had resulted in the closure of some newspapers. 
However, in other respects the Government was increasingly intolerant 
of freedom of the press, including reports perceived to be critical of 
the military, and reports on the country's involvement in the DRC.
    On February 23, authorities arrested the publisher of the 
independent newspaper, The Standard, and two of its journalists on 
charges of criminal defamation after The Standard published an article 
accusing the Government of printing the draft constitution without 
incorporating all of the public's views before the final adoption. 
Authorities also arrested a former editor and a reporter in connection 
with the article from The Standard.
    In August Bernard Masara confessed to the editorial staff of The 
Daily News that he had been hired by the CIO to kill the editor. Masara 
had not been arrested or charged by year's end.
    During the October 16-18 food riots in Harare, security forces 
reportedly beat seven journalists, when they attempted to enter a 
restricted area (see Section 1.c.).
    In February 1999, in Harare an army sergeant based at Cranborne 
Barracks reportedly seized and publicly burned 16 copies of The 
Standard; the sergeant also reportedly threatened to kill the vendor if 
he continued to sell the newspaper. The lead story in the burned issue 
concerned the construction of a new mansion for President Mugabe. In 
late February, a police spokesperson stated that the police would 
charge the sergeant with malicious injury to property.
    In January 1999, military and civilian police detained, tortured, 
beat, and otherwise abused two journalists from The Standard, Mark 
Chavunduka and Ray Choto, who reported in a story that 23 army officers 
were arrested in connection with an planned military coup. On January 
19, the Government charged the two journalists under Section 50 of the 
LOMA with ``publishing a false story capable of causing alarm or 
despondency.'' The two journalists subsequently filed suit against 
members of the security forces for damages to compensate them for the 
torture and illegal detention, and challenged the constitutionality of 
the LOMA (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In a landmark decision in April, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the section of the LOMA under which the 
journalists were arrested was unconstitutional. However, the 
journalists'' suit for their mistreatment still was pending at year's 
end.
    Supporters of the ruling party and war veterans harassed, 
intimidated, and abused journalists considered to be sympathetic to the 
opposition. On April 6, a Daily News journalist, photographer, and a 
driver, were detained for 2 hours by ZANU-PF supporters and war 
veterans on a farm outside Harare. They were threatened with death for 
allegedly supporting the opposition MDC and supporting white commercial 
farmers. The youths, armed with iron bars and golf clubs, forced them 
to remove their shoes, sit on the ground, and chant pro-ZANU-PF 
slogans, in view of the police. The youths took the journalists'' two 
cameras, national identity cards, and government-issued press cards. On 
July 22, Chengetai Zvauya, a reporter for The Standard, was detained 
and assaulted by war veterans at ZANU-PF headquarters. The war veterans 
claimed they attacked Zvauya because the independent press subjects 
them to unfair coverage.
    On April 1, war veterans reportedly singled out journalists for 
attack during a counter-demonstration against a NCA peace march; at 
least one journalist was injured (see Section 2.b.).
    On April 19, Geoff Nyarota, the editor of The Daily News, received 
a letter from an unknown organization threatening him if the newspaper 
did not desist from publishing articles critical of the Government and 
President Mugabe in particular. On April 22, a bomb exploded in an art 
gallery directly below the offices of The Daily News. On April 26, an 
Associated Press photographer was arrested in connection with the 
bombing. He was released on May 2; no charges were filed against him.
    In June war veterans beat and abducted a journalist for The 
Independent newpaper, a foreign journalist, and her cameraman, in 
Mutoko district. The police rescued the kidnaped journalists within a 
few hours of the abduction; no charges had been filed or arrests made 
in the case by year's end.
    On July 16, war veterans beat Standard journalist Cengetayi Zvanya 
at a news conference at ZANU-PF headquarters; the war veterans detained 
Zvanya for two hours and then released him.
    Books and films are subject to review by the Zimbabwe Board of 
Censors. During the year, the Board banned at least 10 films.
    Radio remained the most important medium of public communication, 
especially for the majority of the population living in rural areas. 
The Government continued to control all domestic radio broadcasting 
stations through the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation 
(ZBC), supervised by the Minister of Information and Publicity in the 
President's Office. There were credible reports that the Minister 
routinely reviewed ZBC news and repeatedly excised reports on the 
activities of groups and organizations opposed to or critical of the 
Government, including antigovernment demonstrations and the ZCTU. In 
December 1999, the ZBC, reportedly at the order of the Minister, 
stopped broadcasting a popular phone-in talk show in which citizens 
increasingly had voiced criticism of the Government.
    On September 22, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the 
Government's broadcasting monopoly. Immediately after the ruling, 
Information Minister Jonathan Moyo insisted that no private radio 
stations would be allowed to go on the air until the Government had 
drafted the necessary regulatory framework governing the entry and 
participation of private broadcasters in this sector. Despite Moyo's 
statement, Capital Radio, a private radio station, began broadcasting 
after the Supreme Court decision. On October 4, police shut down 
Capital Radio and seized its equipment, despite the issuance of a High 
Court decision earlier in the day barring the seizure. The police also 
searched the homes of the station's co-owners and others associated 
with the company, including an MDC M.P. On October 5, the High Court 
ordered the return of all equipment and the cancellation of the arrest 
warrants, and directed the Government to issue a license to Capital 
Radio within 10 days. The Government returned most of Capital Radio's 
equipment but did not issue a license to Capital Radio. On October 5, 
President Mugabe issued by decree temporary commercial broadcasting 
regulations that give the Minister of Information and Publicity the 
ultimate power to issue and deny broadcasting licenses. The Government 
claimed that the new broadcasting regulations rendered the court order 
non-binding. The Committee to Protect Journalists criticized the 
Government's action. Capital Radio is drafting an appeal to the Supreme 
Court that asserts that the temporary regulations are unconstitutional 
and requests a license in the absence of a fair hearing by the 
regulatory commission. On October 20, a legal committee of Parliament, 
in a non-binding resolution, declared the new regulations 
unconstitutional. By year's end, Capital Radio was awaiting 
Parliament's final report on the regulations before proceeding with a 
Supreme Court appeal in which it alleged that the regulations are 
discriminatory.
    The Government appeared effectively to control, although the State 
no longer owned, all domestic television broadcasting stations. The 
ZBC, under the supervision of the Minister of Information and 
Publicity, owns and operates television broadcasting facilities. 
Following a Supreme Court ruling in September 1999 that the 
Government's monopoly on telecommunications was unconstitutional 
because it interfered with the right to freedom of expression, the 
Government for the first time granted a broadcasting license to private 
television station, Joy Television (Joy TV). However, President 
Mugabe's nephew, Leo Mugabe, reportedly has financial ties to Joy TV , 
and the ZBC reportedly exercises editorial control over Joy TV's 
programming. Joy TV remained the only privately licensed television 
station, and it remained restricted to broadcasting on an available 
channel leased from the ZBC; creation of an independent transmission 
facility remained restricted under the Broadcasting Act. Joy TV is not 
permitted to broadcast local news or current affairs programming; 
however, it does broadcast BBC news reports. International television 
broadcasts were available freely through private cable and satellite 
firms.
    The NCA accused the governmentinfluenced newspaper The Chronicle 
and the ZBC of refusing to publish previously accepted advertising from 
the NCA about its proposed constitutional process due to government 
orders to ban the NCA from disseminating its alternative message on the 
constitutional process. After the NCA took the ZBC to court in 
February, the judge ordered ZBC to carry the NCA's advertisements; the 
ZBC responded by carrying the advertisements in late night timeslots 
that had few listeners.
    The Government does not restrict access to the Internet. During the 
year, there were many privately owned domestic Internet service 
providers. However, in April Parliament passed legislation that would 
permit the Government to monitor all international e-mail messages 
entering and leaving the country. It is unknown to what extent the 
security services have used this authority to intercept e-mail 
communication.
    The Government restricts academic freedom. The University of 
Zimbabwe (UZ) Amendment Act and the National Council for Higher 
Education Act restricts the independence of universities, making them 
subject to government influence, and extending the disciplinary powers 
of the university authorities against staff and students. The Ministry 
of Higher Education and Technology controls the UZ and appoints its 
Chancellor and Vice Chancellors; since 1998 the Ministry also has 
appointed the Dean of Faculty, previously elected by the faculty, and 
most members of the University Council, which previously consisted 
largely of faculty members. The 1998 expansion of the Government's 
control of the UZ, which was a subject of student protests in 1998, was 
cited as a subject of concern to the faculty in a parliamentary 
committee report in June 1999. During the year, a number of students 
were expelled, and faculty members were forced to take leave without 
pay for belonging to the MDC.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government resticted 
this right in practice. The Government enforced laws that restrict this 
right, including the LOMA, and repeatedly used force to break up 
nonviolent demonstrations by its critics. Permits are not required for 
meetings; however, the police continued to require that groups obtain 
permits for marches or demonstrations despite the 1994 Supreme Court 
ruling that struck down the part of LOMA requiring permits. Most groups 
that conducted marches did not seek permits because of the Supreme 
Court ruling.
    During the February referendum, eight NCA members, including two 
prominent MDC members, were arrested for violating sections of the 
Electoral Act that prohibit campaigning within 100 meters of a polling 
station. On February 15, a magistrate court dismissed the case, ruling 
that the NCA members were not within 100 meters of the polling station 
and that the application of the act to a national referendum violated 
the constitutional right of free assembly (see Section 2.a.).
    On April 1, war veterans and riot police violently disrupted a 
peace march in central Harare organized by the NCA. The war veterans, 
in addition to young government supporters marched from ZANU-PF 
headquarters in a counter-demonstration and attacked the NCA marchers 
with stones, crowbars, and pickaxe handles, while police fired tear gas 
into the crowd. The attackers also reportedly chased the marchers into 
neighboring shops and beat them. At least 12 persons, including one 
British journalist, were seriously injured. The war veterans reportedly 
singled out journalists for attack, and a number of innocent bystanders 
were injured as well. The police ultimately disarmed the war veterans 
and other attackers, but did not arrest or charge them. Five NCA 
marchers were arrested for disobeying police orders to disperse. The 
Minister of Home Affairs blamed the NCA marchers for organizing a 
demonstration at the same time and place as the war veterans.
    On May 7, several thousand MDC supporters attended a rally at 
Mucheke Stadium in Masvingo, despite threats of violence from ZANU-PF 
supporters. According to press reports, many persons were turned away 
by the police, who broke up groups larger than five persons and sealed 
off all roads leading into Masvingo.
    On May 13, a peaceful NCA rally was disrupted by police and 
approximately 50 war veterans. The war veterans reportedly attacked 
those attending the rally with clubs, iron bars and stones.
    On June 28, MDC members reportedly were beaten by soldiers at a 
political rally that had been authorized by the police (see Section 
1.c.).
    In July police fired tear gas into the stands during a soccer match 
after opposition supporters began chanting slogans and waving banners 
(see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.a.).
    On October 8, three MDC M.P.'s were arrested and charged with 
making inflammatory statements at a political rally (see Sections 1.d. 
and 2.a.). On October 9, police used tear gas and baton sticks to break 
up a peaceful demonstration of approximately 1,500 MDC supporters in 
Harare who had gathered outside the magistrate's court to protest the 
arrest of the three MDC parliamentarians (see Section 1.d.). At least 
seven demonstrators were injured by the police.
    On October 12, riot police broke up a student rally outside the 
University of Zimbabwe campus where a MDC M.P. was scheduled to speak. 
Police and security guards reportedly beat many of the students with 
batons and used tear gas (see Section 1.c.).
    Between October 16 and 18, security forces and police beat and used 
tear gas on demonstrators during food riots (see Section 1.c.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association for political 
and nonpolitical organizations, including a broad spectrum of economic, 
social, and professional groups, and the Government generally respected 
this right in practice. However, ZANU-PF supporters, supplied with 
government vehicles and money, killed, tortured, beat and abused those 
perceived to be political opponents (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    The formation of unions and political parties is not restricted.
    Organizations generally are free of governmental interference as 
long as their activities are viewed as nonpolitical. The Supreme Court 
ruled unconstitutional sections of the 1995 Private Voluntary 
Organizations (PVO) Act, which had allowed the Government to suspend 
the executive bodies of organizations (see Section 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, a law that reportedly criminalizes both purporting to practice 
witchcraft and accusing persons of practicing witchcraft reportedly was 
viewed as restrictive by some practitioners of indigenous religions. 
There is no state religion. The Government generally recognizes all 
religions.
    The Government does not require religious institutions to be 
registered; however, religious organizations that run schools or 
medical facilities must register those specific institutions with the 
appropriate ministry involved in regulating those areas.
    Witchcraft--widely understood to encompass attempts to harm others 
not only by magic but also by covert means of established efficacy such 
as poisons--traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases of 
which the causes were unknown. Although traditional indigenous 
religions generally include or accommodate belief in the efficacy of 
witchcraft, they generally approve of harmful witchcraft only for 
defensive or retaliatory purposes and purport to offer protection 
against it. In recent years, interest in healing through traditional 
religion and through prayer reportedly has increased as HIV/AIDS has 
infected an estimated one-quarter of the adult population, and 
affordable science-based medicines effective in treating HIV/AIDS have 
remained unavailable.
    The 1890 Witchcraft Suppression Act (WSA) reportedly criminalizes 
purporting to practice witchcraft, accusing persons of practicing 
witchcraft, hunting witches, and soliciting persons to name witches; 
penalties reportedly include imprisonment for as much as 7 years. The 
law reportedly defines witchcraft as the practice of sorcery, without 
reference to the consequences intended by the practitioner. Since 1997 
the Zimbabwe National African Traditional Healers' Association 
(ZINATHA) has proposed amendments to the 1890 law that would redefine 
witchcraft in terms of intent to cause harm including illness, injury, 
or death; however, such legislation reportedly has been opposed by 
mainstream Christian churches. The existing WSA also generally was 
supported by human rights groups; the Act has been used since 
independence primarily to protect persons, primarily women, who have 
been accused falsely of causing harm to persons or crops in rural areas 
where traditional religious practices are strong.
    There is some tension between the Government and the indigenous 
African churches because of the latter's opposition to Western medical 
practices that result in the reduction of avoidable childhood diseases 
and deaths in those communities. Some members of the indigenous 
churches believe in healing through prayer only and refuse to have 
their children vaccinated. The Ministry of Health has had limited 
success in vaccinating children in these religious communities against 
communicable childhood diseases. Human rights activists also have 
criticized these indigenous churches for their nctioning of marriages 
for underage girls.
    President Mugabe has expressed skepticism about the increasing 
membership in evangelical and indigenous churches and has indicated 
that he believes they could be subversive.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights; however, the Government at times restricted these rights in 
practice.
    On April 27, the police invoked the LOMA to set up roadblocks 
around the country to prevent the busing of political party supporters 
between districts. Permission was granted to bus supporters only to 
those rallies at which the leaders of political parties were scheduled 
to speak. The police commissioner characterized the action as a measure 
to prevent political violence; however, enforcement was limited to MDC 
supporters, which effectively limited the opposition's ability to 
campaign in ZANU-PF strongholds (see Section 3).
    On May 7, police sealed off all roads leading into Masvingo, where 
the MDC was holding a political rally (see Section 2.b.).
    In May the Government ordered 26,000 British nationals with dual 
citizenship to surrender their Zimbabwe passports after President 
Mugabe declared them ``enemies of the state.''
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Women and its 1967 Protocol. The Government generally has 
cooperated with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The 
Government generally provides first asylum; however, according to 
UNHCR, while 1,460 asylum seekers were granted refugee status in 1999, 
at least 34 persons were denied first asylum during the year. At year's 
end, there were reportedly 3,560 refugees from more than 20 countries; 
the largest groups consisted of 130 Congolese (DRC), 103 Rwandans, 102 
Burundians, and 45 Angolans.
    There were reports that foreign farm workers were threatened with 
deportation if they voted against the ZANU-PF party in the June 
parliamentary elections (see Section 3).
    In late May, two Cuban doctors who were working in the country and 
seeking asylum at two foreign diplomatic missions were arrested and 
detained at several different prisons, where security personnel tried 
to force them to sign deportation documents. After several days, they 
were flown to South Africa accompanied by security personnel who then 
attempted to return them to Cuba. After hearing the doctors'' 
protestations, the airline pilot refused to board them, and the two 
were returned to Zimbabwe and detained again. The authorities denied 
UNHCR representatives access to the doctors for several days, and 
refused to provide bedding, blankets, adequate food, or proper 
sanitation to the asylum-seekers. The asylum seekers were released on 
July 5 to the UNHCR after being held for 6 weeks. There were no other 
reports that the Government attempted to forcibly return persons to a 
country where they feared persecution.
    Some employers reportedly take advantage of illegal refugees for 
inexpensive labor (see Section 6.e.).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Although citizens have the legal right to change their Government 
democratically, in practice the political process continued to be 
tilted heavily in favor of President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party, 
which have ruled continuously since independence in 1980.
    Parliamentary elections were held in June amid widespread voter 
intimidation by the Government and ZANU-PF supporters, violence, and 
reports of vote-rigging and other irregularities. Although the election 
day generally was peaceful, the process leading up to it was neither 
free nor fair. The newly formed opposition MDC captured 57 out of the 
120 popularly elected seats. Thirty additional seats are reserved for 
presidential and tribal chief appointees, who are ZANU-PF supporters, 
which gave ZANU-PF a total of 92 seats. In the period before the June 
parliamentary elections, the Government, backed by security forces, 
implemented a systematic campaign of intimidation and physical violence 
against opposition supporters (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In April 
the Government invoked LOMA to bar the transportation of political 
supporters across constituencies (see Section 2.d.). Police also used 
LOMA to restrict public gatherings (see Section 2.b.). In many 
districts, the campaign backfired, resulting in additional votes for 
the opposition, but in others, voters stayed away from the polls out of 
fear of retribution. For example, there were reports that farm workers 
of non-Zimbabwean heritage were threatened with deportation if they 
voted against the ruling party (see Section 2.d.). There are 
institutional problems with the management and supervision of 
elections, and the overlapping mandates of the Electoral Supervisory 
Commission, the Ministry of Justice, Legal & Parliamentary Affairs, and 
the Registrar-General's Office. Although the Ministry of Justice 
technically administers the Electoral Act, the Registrar General's 
Office falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs. With an insufficient 
budget and an overburdened staff seconded from the Ministry of Justice, 
the Electoral Supervisory Commission lacks the institutional capacity 
to oversee all of the country's polling stations. Commissioners also 
lack authority to order the correction of irregularities. Despite an 
attempt to computerize the voters' roll, it contains a very large 
number of redundancies and errors, including misspellings, multiple 
entries, and names of deceased persons. These irregularities were 
highlighted during the June parliamentary elections; many votes for the 
ruling party were recorded as cast by deceased persons. International 
observers cited the need to establish an independent electoral 
commission. The Government legalized immense powers in the President 
through the Electoral Act, which institutionalized gerrymandering and 
fraudulent voters'' rolls. The Government invoked the act shortly 
before the June elections to redraw constituent boundaries in its favor 
and raise bureaucratic barriers to voter registration. Although most 
election observers agreed that the voting process itself generally was 
peaceful 15 percent of voters were prevented from voting on election 
day on technical grounds or due to incomplete or inaccurate voters'' 
rolls. Electoral officers did not operate in an open and transparent 
manner.
    In August the Supreme Court nullified on procedural grounds 
approximately 6,000 absentee ballots sent in by troops stationed in the 
DRC. The ruling llowed widespread reports that the ballots had been 
distributed by ZANU-PF to districts in which it faced narrow defeat by 
MDC candidates.
    In April Vice-President Msika announced that civil servants would 
not be permitted to act as election monitors in the parliamentary 
elections because they sympathized with the opposition. Civil servants 
have been the Government's traditional source for domestic election 
monitors. The MDC accused the Government of replacing the civil 
servants with its own supporters. International election observers were 
repeatedly denied accreditation by the Government, and most were not 
accredited until the last few days before the election due to frequent 
changes in the accreditation rules by the Government. On June 14, the 
Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) challenged in the High Court 
sections of the amended Electoral Act that reduces ESC authority to 
accredit international electoral monitors.
    The ruling party's candidates continued to benefit from the ruling 
party's control of the state-owned firms that dominate the country's 
economy, from its control of the state-monopolized broadcast media (see 
Section 2.a.), and from its monopoly on overt state grants for 
political campaigns. In 1998 the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional 
provisions of the Political Parties Finance Act (PPFA) that allocated 
state grants among political parties in proportion to the parties' 
seats already in the Parliament. In response the Government amended the 
PPFA later in 1998 to allocate campaign grants among parties in 
proportion to votes received in the last general election, with a 
minimum requirement of 5 percent. The Government was required to 
publish the amount of financing the MDC was entitled to receive 
according to its June election showing by August 24; however, it had 
not done so by year's end. The Government claimed that the MDC failed 
to submit its funding request by the deadline in June and that it is 
not entitled to state funds. In October the High Court ruled that ZANU-
PF is not authorized to spend the MDC share until the matter is 
resolved.
    In July the MDC filed a petition with the High Court to challenge 
the electoral results in 37 parliamentary constituencies, stating that 
there was sufficient evidence of intimidation, vote-rigging, and other 
irregularities to warrant the overturning of results in those 
constituencies. In October the High Court scheduled consideration of 
the petition for January 2001. On December 8, President Mugabe amended 
the Electoral Act to prohibit the nullification of the election of any 
M.P.
    On September 14 and September 15, police raided MDC party 
headquarters, detained some MDC officials (see Section 1.d.), and 
removed documents. On September 16, the High Court ruled that the 
search of the offices and seizure of documents was illegal, and the 
police returned the seized documents. In addition to the raid on MDC 
headquarters, police frequently harassed individual MDC members after 
the June elections.
    The 16 constitutional amendments since 1980 have increased greatly 
Mugabe's power relative to the legislature. Originally a prime minister 
elected by the Parliament, he has become a directly elected president. 
Constitutional Amendment 9 authorizes the President to declare 
unilaterally a state of public emergency for a period of up to 14 days. 
Amendment 10 grants the President sole power to dissolve Parliament and 
to appoint or remove a vice president and any minister or deputy 
minister. Amendment 10 also allowed the President to appoint 20 of the 
150 Members of Parliament (M.P.'s), including 12 nonconstituency M.P.'s 
and 8 provincial governors who sit in Parliament. The President also 
exerts great influence on the process by which the country's chiefs 
(traditional rulers) select 10 of their number to sit as M.P.'s. All 30 
of these M.P.'s have been consistently ZANU-PF members.
    The legislature, which traditionally has been subordinate to the 
executive branch, has a viable opposition that subjected the Government 
to calls for accountability and transparency. Parliamentary question 
time is being used to force debate and disclosure. For example, in 
September, Finance Minister Simba Makoni was forced to disclose during 
question time that the Government had spent $200 million (Z$9 billion) 
on its deployment of 12,000 troops in the DRC over the past 2 years, 
which sparked widespread criticism from the opposition and wider debate 
about the country's involvement in the DRC. In October the MDC brought 
a motion to Parliament to impeach President Mugabe for violating the 
Constitution and gross misconduct. In November the Speaker of 
Parliament appointed a special committee composed of eight ZANU-PF 
members and four MDC members to consider the charges outlined in the 
motion; the committee had not held hearings or released its findings by 
year's end.
    Since late 1997, the NCA has advocated the creation of a new 
constitution that would reduce the power of the presidency and offer 
greater protection for civil liberties. In May 1999, the President 
established the Constitutional Commission (CC), whose 400 members he 
appointed, to review the current Constitution and prepare a new draft 
to be submitted to a national referendum. The NCA was openly critical 
of the CC, asserting that it was a government-controlled entity whose 
product would not reflect the will of the populace. On December 11, 
1999, the CC released a draft constitution that would maintain a strong 
presidency. In a nationwide referendum in February voters defeated the 
new draft constitution.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Fifteen of 
the 150 M.P.'s are female, including the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, 
1 minister, and 1 deputy minister; in the previous parliament there 
were 20 female M.P.'s. Women participate in politics without legal 
restriction; however, according to local women's groups, husbands--
particularly in rural areas--commonly direct their wives to vote for 
the husband's preferred candidates. In December 1999, the ZANU-PF 
congress decided that women would be allotted one out of every three 
party positions. At the ZANU-PF congress in December, 50 new positions 
reserved for women were added to the party's 180-member Central 
Committee, which is one of the party's most powerful organs. All major 
ethnic groups are represented in Parliament and in the Government; 
however, most members of the Government and the Parliament, as well as 
most ZANU-PF officials, are affiliated with the Shona ethnic group, 
which makes up a majority of the population (see Section 5).

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Although the Government permits local civic and human rights groups 
to operate, it monitors their activities closely. National groups that 
promote human rights include the Amani Trust, the Catholic Commission 
for Justice and Peace (CCJP), the Legal Resources Foundation, Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights,the Bulawayo Legal Projects Centre (BLPC), the 
NCA, the Southern African Foundation of the Disabled, the Child and the 
Law Project, the Musasa Project, the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers 
Association, the Association of Zimbabwe Journalists, the Women's 
Action Group, Women and Law in Southern Africa, Women in Law and 
Development in Africa, Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network, 
Women and AIDS Support Network, and the Human Rights Research and 
Documentation Trust of Southern Africa.
    These NGO's worked on human rights and democracy issues including 
lobbying for revision of the Public Order and Security Bill, increasing 
poor women's access to the courts, raising awareness of the abuse of 
children, eliminating irregularities in voter rolls, preserving the 
independence of the judiciary, and eliminating torture, arbitrary 
detention and restrictions on freedom of the press and assembly. The 
Foundation for Democracy in Zimbabwe (FODEZI) was established in July 
1997 as a watchdog organization to support independent candidates. The 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum was formed in 1998 to help provide 
legal and psycho-social assistance to the victims of the food riots in 
January 1998. It has taken the lead in coordinating reports on human 
rights violations and abuses in the period prior to and following the 
June elections.
    During the year, tensions increased between the Government and 
civil society. In various public statements throughout the year, the 
Government accused NGO's of launching opposition political activity and 
threatened to clamp down on NGO's which do not comply with the PVO Act.
    In a case brought by a women's NGO, the Supreme Court ruled 
unconstitutional those sections of the 1995 Private Voluntary 
Organizations (PVO) Act, which had empowered the Minister of Social 
Welfare, Labor, and Public Service to suspend the executive body or 
``any member of the executive committee of an organization and to 
appoint persons to manage the affairs of the organization for a 
specified time.'' Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, several new 
NGO's set up their organizations as ``associations'' connected with 
established NGO's so that their executive bodies would not be subject 
to government interference.
    Amnesty International, Transparency International, and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross operate in the country. The 
Government generally does not discourage representatives of 
international human rights groups from visiting the country.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides that ``every person in Zimbabwe'' is 
entitled to fundamental rights whatever his race, tribe, place of 
origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex; however, domestic 
violence and discrimination against women, abuse of children, and 
discrimination against the disabled remained problems. There were 
continuing reports of ritual murders associated with traditional 
religious practices. The President and his Government attempted to 
exacerbate resentment of the economically prominent white minority.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women, especially wife beating, 
is common and crosses all racial and economic lines. It extends 
throughout the country and at times results in death. According to 
Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), domestic violence 
accounted for more than 60 percent of murder cases tried in the Harare 
High Court in 1998. The Musasa Project, a women's rights organization, 
established the country's first shelter for victims of domestic 
violence in Harare in 1997; it can accommodate up to 20 women at a 
time. The Musasa Project provided services to an estimated 3,147 
clients at its Harare office in 1999, 61 percent of whom were female 
victims of domestic violence; 40 percent of those who were assisted 
were minors, victims of rape or incest. The Musasa Project reports that 
54 percent of the women counseled for domestic violence have sexually 
transmitted diseases, including many with HIV/AIDS.
    There continued to be reports of rape, incest, and sexual abuse of 
women. Although the Harare press reported a slight decrease in the 
number of reported rape cases during the year, the Musasa Project 
believes that the actual number increased because of an increase in the 
number of divorced women and women escaping spousal abuse. At least 
eight cases of politically-motivated rape were reported in the pre-
election period; human rights groups estimate that the actual number of 
politically-motivated rape may be closer to 800, including incidents of 
gang rapes of young girls and elderly women and rapes of female farm 
workers and health care workers (see Section 1.c.). Women face many 
obstacles in filing reports of rape. Many police stations are not 
prepared to handle properly the investigation of such cases. In 
addition, women are reluctant to file reports because of the social 
stigma of rape. Women's groups believe the actual number of rapes is 
underreported greatly. When cases go to court, lengthy sentences for 
rape and wife beating generally are imposed. However, a ``binding 
over'' order (an order to appear in court to respond to an accusation 
of violent behavior) is issued based only on actual physical abuse and 
not on threats of violence. Courts also do not have the power to oust 
an abusive spouse from a matrimonial home. Systemic problems and lack 
of education often mean that police do not respond to women's reports 
or requests for assistance. The Ministry of Justice is considering 
draft legislation that would increase the penalties for sexual abuse, 
including rape of a spouse.
    Since independence the Government has enacted major laws aimed at 
enhancing women's rights and countering certain traditional practices 
that discriminate against women. However, women remain disadvantaged in 
society. Illiteracy, economic dependency, and prevailing social norms 
prevent rural women in particular from combating societal 
discrimination. Despite legal prohibitions, women still are vulnerable 
to entrenched customary practices, including the practice of pledging a 
young woman to marriage with a partner not of her choosing, and the 
custom of forcing a widow to marry her late husband's brother.
    The Legal Age of Majority Act (LAMA) and the Matrimonial Causes Act 
recognize women's right to own property independently of their husbands 
or fathers. While unmarried women may own property in their own names, 
women married under customary law are not allowed to own property 
jointly with their husbands. The Administration of Estates Amendment 
Act, which came into effect in October 1997, removed inheritance laws 
unfavorable to widows. Women's groups regard the act as a major step 
toward ending the unfair and unequal distribution of inherited assets 
for women. The President signed the new Inheritance Amendment into law 
in 1998; however, in February the Supreme Court upheld a magistrate 
court decision that, under customary ethnic law, a man's claim to 
family inheritance takes precedence over a woman's, regardless of the 
woman's age or seniority in the family. The Court cited Section 23 of 
the Constitution, which allows discrimination against women under 
customary law. Divorce and maintenance laws are favorable to women, but 
women generally lack awareness of their rights under the law.
    Although labor legislation prohibits discrimination in employment 
on the basis of gender, women are concentrated in the lower echelons of 
the work force and commonly face sexual harassment in the workplace. 
Research conducted by the Training and Research Support Centre (a 
Harare-based NGO) revealed that one in three working women at all 
levels were subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace, as defined 
by Zimbabwean legal experts. The 1996-1997 study was based on 
questionnaires from 528 working women.
    In August 1998, the Government denied a petition by women's groups 
that one-third of land redistributed under the land reform program be 
distributed to households headed by women, which reportedly make up 
one-third of all rural households. At a press conference in 1999, 
Joseph Msika, Vice-President and Minister of State in charge of 
resettlement, reportedly stated, ``I would have my head cut off if I 
gave women land.'' Nevertheless, during the September 1999 land 
conference, women's rights organizations lobbied the Government to 
recognize women as a special group to be considered in the Government's 
resettlement program. The Women Land Lobby Group (WLLG) criticized the 
Government for not taking into consideration the needs of women as an 
economically disadvantaged group in its ``fast-track'' resettlement 
program (see Section 1.f.). The WLLG is lobbying the Ministry of Lands, 
Agriculture & Rural Resettlement for greater consideration.
    Several active women's rights groups, including WILDAF, the Musasa 
Project, the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers' Association, the Women's Action 
Group, and the Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center and Network concentrate 
on improving women's knowledge of their legal rights, increasing their 
economic power, and combating domestic violence. Groups that focus on 
the problems of protection of women against domestic violence and 
sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS included the Women and AIDS Support 
Network and Musasa Project.
    During the July cabinet restructuring, the cabinet level position 
of Minister of State for Gender Affairs in the Office of the President 
was eliminated; however, the Government created a new Ministry of Youth 
Development, Gender and Employment. The Government gives qualified 
women access to training in the military and national service. Although 
there have been recent advances for women, they continue to occupy 
mainly administrative positions.
    There were reports that women were trafficked from the country to 
South Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section 
6.f.).
    Children.--The Government continued to demonstrate its strong 
commitment to children's rights and welfare through a system of primary 
health care and education overseen by the Ministry of Health and Child 
Welfare. The Children's Protection and Adoption Act, the Guardianship 
of Minors Act, and the Deceased Person's Maintenance Act protect the 
legal rights of minor children; however, the Government has not 
enforced these acts. While there is no compulsory education, the 
country has made considerable progress in providing education for 
children, and overall primary school attendance has increased by more 
than 4,000 percent since independence. About 93 percent of children 
reached grade 5. However, with the reintroduction of school fees in 
urban schools and rural secondary schools, enrollment has declined. 
School fees have risen sharply due to high inflation, resulting in the 
inability of many families to afford to send all of their children to 
school. The 1998 U.N. Development Program's Human Development Report 
noted that in most regions of the country, fewer girls than boys attend 
secondary schools. If a family is unable to pay tuition costs, it is 
most often female children who leave school. The literacy rate for 
women and girls over the age of 15 is estimated to be 80 percent while 
the male rate is about 90 percent. However, budget cuts and the lack of 
adequate attention to HIV/AIDS prevention are eroding the Government's 
capacity to address children's needs in these areas. International 
experts estimated that HIV/AIDS infects one-fourth of the adult 
population and killed more than 150,000 persons during 1999; it is 
estimated that the number of deaths during the year was equal to or 
higher than in 1999.Deaths from HIV/AIDS created hundreds of thousands 
of orphans. There were an estimated 150,000 orphans in 1995, 900,000 in 
1999, and 1 million during the year. This rapidly growing problem is 
expected to put a tremendous strain on both formal and traditional 
social systems. At the household level, there is an increased burden on 
the extended family, which has traditional responsibility for caring 
for orphans. Many grandparents are left to care for the young, and in 
some cases children or adolescents are heading families. Many orphans 
are sent to foster homes, where they often become victims of sexual 
abuse. At the provincial and national levels, the governments are 
saddled with increasing demands for community orphan projects, 
orphanages, health care, and school fees.
    The number of street children, with the related problems of theft, 
street violence, drug use, and violent death, also is increasing. There 
were an estimated 12,000 homeless street children in the country in 
1999, many of them the children of former Mozambican refugees or AIDS 
orphans. The number of incidents of child abuse, including incest (long 
a taboo), infanticide, child abandonment, and rape is increasing. It is 
not known whether the statistics reflect the fact that more cases are 
occurring or only that more are being reported. There are reports of 
child labor, including reports of an increased number of girls engaged 
in prostitution (see Section 6.d.). The Ministry of Justice's 
Vulnerable Witnesses Committee established victim-friendly courts (VFC) 
in 1997 to improve the judicial system's handling of child victims of 
rape and sexual abuse. According to the Musasa Project, 39 percent of 
the 3,000 persons whom it assisted at its Harare office in 1998 were 
victims of child abuse. There was a large volume of rape cases in the 
Harare VFC, which led to calls by children's rights' advocates to 
establish additional courts in surrounding areas. The criminal justice 
system has special provisions for dealing with juvenile offenders.
    In August it was reported that war veterans abducted and sexually 
abused 10 schoolchildren. The case reportedly was under investigation, 
although there was no further information available at year's end (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, rarely is performed in the country. However, 
according to press reports, the initiation rites practiced by the small 
Remba ethnic group in Midlands Province include infibulation, the most 
extreme form of FGM.
    The traditional practice of offering a young girl as compensatory 
payment in interfamily disputes continued during the year.
    Indigenous African churches that combine elements of established 
Christian beliefs with some beliefs based on traditional African 
culture and religion generally accept and promote polygyny and the 
marriage of girls at young ages; they also generally approve of healing 
only through prayer and oppose science-based medicine including the 
vaccination of children.
    There were continuing reports that children were killed for body 
parts by persons practicing healing rituals associated with traditional 
religions. Body parts from children reportedly were considered the most 
efficacious for some such purposes.
    There were reports that children were trafficked from the country 
to South Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section 
6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--President Mugabe appointed a disability 
activist to Parliament in 1995 to represent the needs of the disabled. 
The Disabled Persons Act of 1992 specifically prohibits discrimination 
against persons with disabilities in employment, admission to public 
places, or provision of services and is viewed by advocates of the 
disabled as model legislation. However, in practice, the lack of 
resources for training and education severely hampers the ability of 
disabled persons to compete for scarce jobs. The act stipulates that 
government buildings should be accessible to disabled persons; however, 
implementation of this policy has been slow. A local NGO was working on 
auditing the act and implementing the law during the year. NGO's were 
lobbying to include albinos in the definition of ``disabled'' under the 
act. Disabled persons face particularly harsh customary discrimination. 
According to traditional belief, persons with disabilities are 
considered bewitched, and reports of disabled children being hidden 
when visitors arrive are common.
    Religious Minorities.--There are generally amicable relations among 
the various religious communities. The Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, and 
Buddhist religious communities are relatively small and generally not 
in competition with Christian denominations for converts. Catholic 
Church officials say they welcome interfaith dialog with Muslims but 
believe some of the evangelical churches are hostile to Islam.
    There are at least four umbrella religious organizations primarily 
focused on interdenominational dialog among Christians, and some 
intrareligious activities. However, Muslims are not represented in any 
of these organizations, and there is no vehicle for formal Christian-
Muslim dialog. Muslims have complained of discrimination by private 
employers who refuse to allow them sufficient time to worship at their 
mosques on Fridays.
    During the February constitutional referendum, more than 150 
priests and ministers under the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe 
(EFZ) lobbied for Christianity to be enshrined in the new constitution 
as the country's sole national religion. That position was rejected, 
primarily because its opponents argued that Christianity had brought 
about colonization in Africa.
    There were reports of growing tensions between mainline Christian 
churches and practitioners of traditional indigenous religions. Leaders 
of the Christian churches reportedly opposed the repeal or modification 
of the Witchcraft Suppression Act sought by practitioners of 
traditional indigenous religions (see Section 2.c.). Several leaders of 
Christian churches reportedly denounced a perceived increase in 
``satanism'' in the country; acts of satanism allegedly included 
drinking human blood and eating human flesh.
    There were continuing reports of ritual murders associated with 
traditional religious practices, although the Government actively 
enforces the law against all kinds of murder including ritual murders. 
Gordon Chavanduka, chairman of ZINATHA, the national association of 
traditional healers, reportedly stated that black-market demand for 
human body parts used in making potions has increased greatly in recent 
years. Some observers suggested that this development may be associated 
with the spread of HIV/AIDS in the country, and the lack of affordable 
science-based medicines for treating infected persons (see Section 
2.c.). Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that persons 
killed children for body parts for healing rituals associated with 
traditional religions. In July 1999, Faber Chidarikire, a ZANU-PF 
official and mayor of the northern town of Chinhoyi, was charged with 
murdering a 13-year-old girl in 1987, but he was released on bail after 
intervention by the Attorney General; there were reports that 
Chidarikire cut off the girl's ear and excised her genitals. In 1995 an 
examination of a severed head found in Chidarikire's car in 1994 
indicated that it had been severed with a blade, not in a car accident 
as Chidarikire had maintained.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to Government 
statistics, the Shona ethnic group makes up 82 percent of the 
population, Ndebele 15 percent, whites less than 1 percent, and other 
ethnic groups 2 percent. There have been tensions both between the 
African majority and the white minority, between the Shona majority and 
the Ndebele minority, and among the various Shona subgroups.
    During the 1960's and 1970's, elements of the white minority 
rebelled against British rule and established and maintained a racially 
discriminatory apartheid regime, which was dismantled in 1980 only 
after armed insurgencies by the armed wings of ZANU and the Zimbabwe 
African People's Union (ZAPU), and economic sanctions by the 
international community. The white community remains economically 
privileged; despite government efforts at land reform, white farmers 
continued to own one-half of the country's most productive land and 
most of its major businesses at year's end (see Section 1.f.).
    Government services are provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. The 
Government has sought to expand and improve the previously ``whites 
only'' infrastructure in urban areas to provide health and social 
services to all citizens, and all schools and churches are integrated 
legally. However, social interaction between Africans and whites 
remained uncommon. Racial tensions have subsided since independence and 
remain low despite the Government's ongoing attempts to blame whites 
for the country's economic problems. On many occasions, especially 
during the campaign to amend the draft constitution, President Mugabe, 
members of his Government, and the state-controlled media attempted to 
reignite resentment of the white minority. President Mugabe accused the 
white minority of having too close ties to their ancestral countries, 
and has criticized other governments for trying to interfere with the 
``continuing liberation struggle.'' During the year, the Government 
embarked on a far-reaching ``fast-track'' resettlement program whereby 
privately-owned farms, which are mostly white-owned, were designated 
for seizure with no clear means for providing compensation. Government 
supporters and war veterans assaulted commercial farmers in their homes 
and on their property (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In a nationally 
televised address before the June election, Mugabe called white farmers 
``enemies of the state.'' On October 15, Matabeleland North Governor 
Obert Mpofu accused whites of using black citizens in an attempt to 
remove Mugabe's Government and warned of violence if whites continued 
to frustrate the ``fast-track'' resettlement effort (see Section 1.f.). 
On October 25, President Mugabe threatened to revoke his Government's 
policy of reconciliation with whites that was adopted in 1980 after the 
MDC tabled a motion in Parliament to impeach him. The President 
threatened to arrest white M.P.'s David Coltart and Michael Auret for 
drafting the impeachment motion.
    During the 1980's the Shona-dominated Government suppressed a brief 
Ndebele insurgency with a 5-year pacification campaign that killed an 
estimated 10,000-20,000 Ndebele civilians in Matabeleland, the region 
in which the Ndebele are concentrated. Although relations between the 
Shona and the Ndebele subequently have improved, the disproportionate 
number of Shona speaking teachers and headmasters in Matabeleland 
schools remained a sensitive issue. Members of the Ndebele community 
continued to criticize the Government's unequal distribution of 
national resources and the Government's failure to compensate victims 
of the 1980's Matabeleland killings.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1985 Labor Relations Act (LRA) 
provides private sector workers with freedom of association and the 
right to elect their own representatives, publish newsletters, set 
programs and policies that reflect the political and economic interests 
of labor, and form or join unions without prior authorization. The LRA 
allows for the existence of multiple unions per industry, provided that 
each is registered with the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and 
Social Welfare (MPSLSW). While the Government can deregister individual 
unions, the High Court has ruled that the LRA does not give the 
Minister the power to suspend or deregister the national umbrella labor 
confederation, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The 
Parliament did not consider the Labor Relations Amendment Bill (LRAB) 
again during the year.
    Approximately 25 percent of the formal sector work force 
(approximately 400,000 workers) belongs to the 31 unions that form the 
ZCTU. ZCTU officers are elected by delegates of affiliated trade unions 
at congresses held every 5 years; the ZCTU postponed its next congress 
until February 2001. While the Government encouraged the ZCTU's 
formation, anticipating that it would form the labor arm of ZANU-PF, it 
no longer controls the ZCTU; most of the leadership of the opposition 
MDC party came from the ZCTU. The Government and the ZCTU often have 
clashed sharply on economic policy, particularly the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Program that was implemented in 1990. The 
Government usually has not consulted either the ZCTU or employers 
before implementing policy decisions that affect the workplace. This 
lack of consultation has often resulted in reactions that disrupted 
labor relations, thereby promoting uncertainty and some strikes.
    The 1992 Labor Relations Amendment Act (LRAA) specifies that 
workers may establish independent worker committees, which exist side 
by side with unions in each plant. Worker committees also must be 
registered with the MPSLSW, which is free to refuse registration. ZCTU 
officials believe that the formation of worker committees was an 
attempt to dilute union authority, because the worker committees are 
comprised of union and nonunion workers. However, the ineffectiveness 
of worker committees demonstrated the need for the experienced worker 
representation of the established trade unions.
    It is virtually impossible to conduct legal collective job action. 
There is no right to strike in the Constitution. The 1985 LRA, the 1992 
LRAA, and the LRAB 2000 do not include mention of this issue. 
``Essential'' employees are prohibited by law from striking, and the 
Government defines all public sector workers as ``essential.'' Managers 
also are prohibited from striking, and in various industries, the 
Government defines most employees as managers; the Government also 
considers some private sector workers, such as those in the health 
sector, as essential workers. For the remaining nonessential employees 
legally to conduct a strike, over 50 percent of the company's employees 
must vote in favor of the action. Many employees are afraid to do so, 
for fear of management reprisals. However, if a majority vote is 
obtained, the dispute is referred to the concerned government agency 
for resolution. Only if the government-appointed arbitrator determines 
that a resolution is not possible is the right to strike granted. These 
governmentimposed delays prevent most employees and their unions from 
ever declaring legal strikes. However, illegal strikes or work 
stoppages have occurred within individual companies, and occasionally, 
in entire industries.
    There were minimal labor actions, such as strikes and stayaways, 
during the year. With the volatile political environment and the 
economic crisis, labor and management united in calls to address 
fundamental economic and political governance issues. In a nationwide 
stay-away on August 2, in which 80 percent of workers reportedly 
participated, the ZCTU instructed workers not to report to their jobs 
to protest the political violence and farm invasions that occurred 
before the parliamentary elections (see Sections 1.f. and 3).
    There were efforts to organize nationwide strikes by security guard 
service employees and mining sector employees; however, they failed 
because of disagreements between workers and unions, and workers 
returned to work without reaching new labor agreements in either 
sector. On August 14, after a breakdown in contract negotiations, the 
Associated Mineworkers of Zimbabwe went on strike, closing almost half 
of the 40 mines in the country for 2 weeks until the union ended the 
strike and reentered negotiations.
    During the year, workers from individual companies seeking pay 
increases called spot strikes because of the decrease in the value of 
their salaries due to inflation and currency devaluation; however, 
these strikes were sporadic and not formally sanctioned by either 
individual unions or the ZCTU.
    The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has 
criticized the labor laws for giving ``wide scope to the authorities to 
declare that a given enterprise or industry constitutes an essential 
service, and then impose a ban (on strikes) on it.'' The authority to 
reclassify a previously nonessential service as essential was not used 
during the year. In previous years, President Mugabe has issued blanket 
bans on strikes in the country in both the public and private sectors, 
and he issued a 6-month ban on all collective job actions from November 
1998 to May 1999; the ban expired in May 1999. The President did not 
issue any blanket bans on strikes during the year, but government 
officials stressed that the Government reserves the right to reimpose 
the ban at its discretion.
    The ZCTU was critical of violence during the year directed at 
agricultural workers who live and work on commercial farms, many of 
whom are members of the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers 
Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), which is affiliated with the ZCTU. On May 
8, a group of 20 armed ZANU-PF supporters beat workers at a workers 
compound and forced them to attend a political rally (see Section 
1.c.). There were reports of violence and isolated incidents of war 
veterans threatening workers for alleged MDC support.
    There are several pending ILO cases that allege violent police 
intervention against union demonstrators and inadequate investigation 
of assaults and arson against trade unionists.
    The LRA allows for the formation of multiple national federations. 
A second umbrella labor organization, the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade 
Unions (ZFTU), was launched in October 1996 with the stated purpose of 
providing an alternative to the ZCTU, and states that its goal is to 
work in collaboration with the Government, and it is openly critical of 
the ZCTU. The ZFTU's leadership and membership remained unclear, with 
key personnel changing regularly. Most observers believe that the ZFTU 
has close ties with the ZANU-PF ruling party. The ZFTU largely was 
inactive, except for occasional public statements criticizing ZCTU 
activities, and generally was not considered a viable labor 
organization.
    Public servants and their associations, the Public Service 
Association (PSA), the Zimbabwe Teachers Association (ZIMTA), and the 
Zimbabwe Nurses Association (ZINA) are not covered by the provisions of 
the LRA. Instead, their conditions of employment are provided for under 
the Constitution. Although civil servants constitutionally are barred 
from forming unions, in 1995 the ZIMTA stated its intention to 
affiliate with the ZCTU and the PSA. In 1998 the PSA affiliated itself 
with the ZCTU. During the year, a new organization, the Civil Service 
Employees Association, was formed as an umbrella organization for civil 
service employees, and requested affiliation with the ZCTU at year's 
end. This request remained pending with the ZCTU leadership at year's 
end. All public servants are deemed essential and are prohibited from 
striking.
    The ZCTU and its officials are free to associate with international 
labor organizations and do so actively. The ZCTU is affiliated with the 
ICFTU and the Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The LRA 
provides workers with the right to organize. As originally written, 
this act was silent on the right to bargain collectively. However, the 
1992 LRAA permits unions to bargain collectively over wages. Worker 
committees, which by law are not organizationally part of the unions or 
the ZCTU, are empowered to negotiate with the management of a 
particular plant on the conditions of labor and codes of conduct in the 
workplace, except for wages. Unions, employers, and individual workers 
have the right to take their grievances to the Government's Labor 
Relations Tribunal (LRT) for final adjudication. The LRT maintained a 
huge backlog of cases again during the year, with 3,383 cases pending 
by year's end, some of which have been awaiting a hearing for years. 
The backlog is attributed to staffing shortages; only one out of six 
LRT judgeships were filled by year's end.
    Collective bargaining wage negotiations take place on an industry-
wide basis between the relevant union and employer organizations 
sitting on joint employment boards or councils. Collective bargaining 
agreements apply to all workers in an industry, not just union members. 
Over 80 percent of all industries are unionized. From April to July 
each year workers and employees negotiate salary increases and other 
benefits in their respective National Employment Councils (NEC's). 
These bodies submit their agreements to the Registrar in the MPSLSW for 
approval. The Government retains the power to veto agreements that it 
believes would harm the economy. However, it does not involve itself 
directly in labor negotiations unless requested to do so by one of the 
parties. When no trade union represents a specific sector, 
representatives of the organized workers, such as the professional 
associations, meet with the employer associations, under the mediation 
of labor officers from the MPSLSW. Although companies offered wage 
increases that did not keep up with inflation during the year, workers 
and unions accepted the increases offered because of the economic 
crisis.
    Public sector wages are determined by the Salary Service Department 
of the MPSLSW, subject to the approval of an independent Public Service 
Commission (PSC). Each year PSC officials meet with PSA representatives 
to review wages and benefits. These reviews result in a recommendation 
that is forwarded to the MPSLSW. The Minister is not required by law to 
accept the recommendation and usually proposes a wages and benefits 
package that is less than the recommendation, resulting in yearly 
industrial protest actions by civil servants.
    Employees in positions designated as managerial are excluded from 
union membership and thus from the collective bargaining process. The 
ZCTU stated that the definition of manager in the 1992 LRAA was overly 
broad and criticized the Government and private sector for using it to 
exclude managers from the collective bargaining process.
    The LRA prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against 
union members. Complaints of such discrimination are referred to labor 
relations officers and may subsequently be adjudicated by the LRT. Such 
complaints are handled under the mechanism for resolving cases 
involving ``unfair labor practices.'' The determining authority may 
direct that workers fired due to antiunion discrimination should be 
reinstated, although this has yet to be utilized in practice.
    The LRAA streamlined the procedure for adjudicating disputes by 
strengthening the LRT. Labor relations officers hear a dispute; their 
decision may be appealed to regional labor relations officers, after 
which the LRT may hear the case. Ultimately, it may be appealed to the 
Supreme Court. However, with only one of six LRT judgeships appointed 
by year's end, cases from as early as 1993 remained pending with the 
LRT at year's end.
    The Export Processing Zones Act states the LRA shall not apply to 
workers in export processing zones (EPZ's). The ZCTU has negotiated 
directly with EPZ employers to allow some unions in the EPZ, although 
their number and level of activity remain low.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or bonded labor, including by children; however, the law is not 
enforced in practice. The traditional practice of offering a young girl 
as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes continued in rural 
areas (see Section 5), and there were reports that persons, 
particularly women and children, were trafficked from the country to 
South Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section 
6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law bans the employment of children under the age of 
15 and restricts employment of those between the ages of 12 and 17 to 
light work during school holidays for periods not exceeding 6 hours per 
day. Light work is defined as work not likely to prejudice a child's 
education, health, safety, rest, or social, physical, or mental 
development. All hazardous employment, overtime, and night shift work 
is banned for those under the age of 18. However, there is little to no 
enforcement of these laws. Although schooling is not compulsory, over 
90 percent of children attend school through grade 5 (see Section 5).
    Child labor is common. Children work in the agricultural sector, 
and there were reports that children worked as domestics and as car-
watchers on the streets. Child labor in the formal agricultural sector, 
such as on tea and coffee plantations, reportedly involves children 
working in the fields after school during the planting and harvesting 
seasons and full-time during school holidays. Long hours are common. 
Children often work alongside their parents, and their working 
conditions approximate those of adults. While some form of child labor 
on large commercial farms is widespread, agricultural organizations 
maintain that the labor performed is not exploitative, involuntary, 
contrary to law, or outside of cultural norms that allow children to 
engage in field work with their families. On some farms where children 
attend boarding schools, school schedules and calendars are tailored to 
allow children to work in the fields during busy farming periods. These 
children work in ``earn and learn'' schools, where a percentage of 
their wages are applied to their school fees and books. Economic 
hardship makes this arrangement a necessity for children from very poor 
families.
    The rate of HIV/AIDS infection in the country has reached about 25 
percent among the adult population, and the rate of infection appeared 
to be accelerating. As a result, more children worked in the informal 
sector to fill the income gap left by ill or deceased relatives. The 
number of children in adoptive homes or living on the streets increased 
rapidly.
    The unemployment rate continues to grow, decreasing the number of 
children employed in the formal sector. The incidence of children 
working in the informal sector has increased, however, as families, 
often headed by children need a source of income. Many children sell 
simple wares on the streets. In addition, police have reported an 
increasing number of girls under 17 engaged in prostitution. The 
deteriorating economy also is forcing more children to work. Although 
child labor in the agricultural, domestic, and informal sectors 
increasingly is discussed, the Government and NGO's have been unable to 
gather concrete data on the number of cases.
    In November 1999, Parliament ratified ILO Convention 182 on the 
worst forms of child labor, and during the year, it was incorporated 
into the Child Adoption and Protection Bill, which had not been 
implemented by year's end. In September, the Government released the 
results of an ILO-funded study on child labor in the country. The worst 
forms of child labor, such as child sweatshops and child prostitution, 
are not widely practiced in the country. The police frequently enforce 
laws against child prostitution.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the 
traditional practice of offering a young girl as compensatory payment 
in interfamily disputes continued (see Sections 5 and 6.c.), and there 
were reports that children were trafficked from the country to South 
Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The maximum legal workweek is 54 
hours, and the law prescribes a minimum of one 24-hour rest period per 
week. Working conditions are regulated by the Government on an 
industry-specific basis. The Constitution empowers the PSC to set 
conditions of employment in the public sector. The Government 
eliminated a national minimum wage as part of the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program of 1990, with the exception of agricultural and 
domestic workers. Government regulations for each of the 22 industrial 
sectors continue to specify minimum wages, hours, holidays, and 
required safety measures. In recent years, in an effort to opt out of 
the wage bargaining system, the Government mandated wage parameters for 
industries. Due to an ineffective monitoring system, many agricultural 
and domestic workers are remunerated below the minimum wage. The 
minimum wage for agricultural workers is $24 (Zim $1650) per month, and 
for domestic workers is $41 (Zim $2900).
    Minimum wages in the formal sector changed continuously as a result 
of multiple increases in salaries to offset the inflation rate. In 
almost all cases, however, wage increases did not keep pace with 
inflation, devaluations, and the increases in the prices of petroleum 
products and basic food staples. A major goal of the ZCTU during the 
year was to encourage Government to again establish a national minimum 
wage but it did not reach an agreement with the Government by year's 
end. The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for 
a worker and his family, and at least 70 percent of the population 
reportedly lives below the poverty line.
    In April civil servants were granted 60 to 90 percent pay raises, 
with the lowest paid positions receiving the largest percentage raises. 
While broadly viewed as an effort by the Government to buy the votes of 
the civil servants in the elections, these raises were also viewed as 
necessary by the ZCTU because of the traditionally low level of civil 
servant salaries. In October the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and 
Social Welfare (MPSLSW) announced a new regulation prohibiting civil 
servants from engaging in any for-profit enterprises. The Government 
alleged that many workers were operating their own for-profit 
enterprises instead of attending to official duties during the workday 
as the reason for the regulation; however, many civil servants 
contested that they needed to do so to earn a livable wage.
    According to the ZCTU, some employers take advantage of illegal 
refugees for inexpensive labor. Because the job market is worse in 
neighboring countries such as Malawi and Mozambique, the refugees are 
willing to risk arrest and work for wages below the legal minimums (see 
Section 2.d.).
    Many of the basic legal protections do not apply to the vast 
majority of farm, mine, and domestic workers. Health and safety 
standards are determined only on an industry-specific basis. Despite 
the lack of general standards, the National Social Security Authority's 
(NSSA) statistics from 1999 show a decrease in the number of 
occupational injuries and deaths. There were 139 fatal job accidents 
reported during 1999, a decrease from 1998, and 12,000 occupational 
injuries were reported in 1999. In theory, labor relations officers 
from the MPSLSW are assigned to monitor developments in each plant to 
ensure that government minimum wage policy and occupational health and 
safety regulations are observed. In practice these offices are 
understaffed, cannot afford to inspect routinely workplaces, and must 
rely on voluntary compliance and reporting by employers.
    The Government designated the Zimbabwe Occupational Safety Council 
(ZOSHC) to regulate safe work conditions. The ZOSHC is a quasi-
governmental, advisory body comprised of six representatives each from 
the Government, employers, and trade unions. The National Director of 
the ZOSHC is responsible for enforcing worker safety regulations. The 
director reports weekly to the MPSLSW on actions taken. Budgetary 
restraints and staffing shortages, as well as its status as an advisory 
council, have made the council ineffective. The NSSA continues to 
experience difficulty monitoring the thousands of work sites across the 
country; however, it has begun to enforce safety standards more 
vigorously, by closing down shops and factories in non-compliance. 
Although workers have a legal right to remove themselves from dangerous 
work situations without jeopardy to continued employment, in practice 
they risk the loss of their livelihood if they do so, and this 
situation worsened during the year.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are no laws that 
specifically address trafficking in persons, common law prohibits 
abduction and forced labor; however, there were reports that persons 
were trafficked from the country to South Africa for forced 
prostitution and forced labor. The Government has taken no actions to 
address the problem of trafficking in persons.


                       EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

                              ----------                              


                               AUSTRALIA

    Australia is a constitutional democracy with a federal 
parliamentary form of government in which citizens periodically choose 
their representatives in free and fair multiparty elections. The 
Government respects the constitutional provisions for an independent 
judiciary in practice.
    Federal and State police are under the firm control of the civilian 
authorities and carry out their functions in accordance with the law. 
There were occasional reports that police committed abuses.
    A highly developed market-based economy, which includes 
manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and services, provides most 
citizens with a high per capita income. A wide range of government 
programs offers assistance for disadvantaged citizens.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse. There were occasional reports that 
police beat or otherwise abused persons. The Government administers 
many programs to improve the socioeconomic conditions of Aborigines and 
Torres Straits Islanders, who together form about 2 percent of the 
population, and to address longstanding discrimination against them. 
Societal violence and discrimination against women are problems that 
are being addressed actively. There were some instances of forced 
labor, and trafficking in women is a limited but growing problem, which 
the Government is taking steps to address. Leaders in the ethnic and 
immigrant communities expressed concern that increased numbers of 
illegal immigrants and violence at migrant detention centers contribute 
to instances of vilification of immigrants and minorities.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government officials. However, 85 
persons died in prisons, police custody, or during police attempts to 
detain them (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits all such practices; however, there were 
occasional reports that police mistreated suspects in custody. 
Indigenous groups charge that police harassment of indigenous people is 
pervasive and that racial discrimination among police and prison 
custodians persists. Amnesty International reported several incidents 
that involved such abuses. State and territorial police forces have 
internal affairs units that investigate allegations of abuse and report 
to a civilian ombudsman.
    In 1999 the total number of deaths in custody fell by 8 to 85. Of 
these, 26 deaths occurred in police custody or during attempts by 
police to detain suspects. The remainder occurred in prison custody. Of 
the total deaths in custody, 29 persons died from hanging. Nineteen 
persons died of natural causes. Eight died as a result of injuries 
sustained while fleeing police during high-speed pursuit. Another eight 
died of other injuries. The police shot and killed six persons. Three 
persons died from self-inflicted gunshot wounds. Eleven persons died as 
a result of drug overdoses. One person died from unspecified causes. 
There were no juvenile deaths in custody during 1999. However, in 
February, a 15-year-old Aboriginal boy committed suicide in a Darwin 
detention center while serving a mandatory 28-day sentence for property 
offenses. In all cases where deadly force is used, the circumstances of 
the case are reviewed and police have been sanctioned in cases where 
abuses have been found to occur. There were no cases during the year 
for which police were disciplined for the unjustified use of force.
    Aboriginal adults represent 1.6 percent of the adult population but 
constituted approximately 20 percent of the total prison population, 
according to a March report by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
During 1999 Aborigines accounted for 19 (roughly 22 percent) of the 85 
deaths in custody. Six died in police custody or during attempts by 
police to detain them. Of the six, three died from hanging; one died of 
natural causes; and two died from injuries. Thirteen died in prison. Of 
the 13 who died in prison, 3 died from hanging; 7 died of natural 
causes; 2 died from injuries; and 1 died from a drug overdose.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    At several points during the year, there were allegations that 
staff at Woomera immigration detention center were aware of and did 
nothing to stop a male detainee from offering his 13-year-old son to 
other detainees for sex. In December a South Australia state government 
inquiry found no evidence to support these allegations; it also found 
no evidence that the boy had been sexually abused.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this 
prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    There is a well-developed system of federal and state courts, with 
the High Court at its apex. Almost all criminal trials are conducted by 
courts established under state and territorial legislation. The Federal 
Court and the High Court have very limited roles to play.
    The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent 
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    When trials are conducted in local courts, magistrates sit alone. 
In higher courts, namely the state district or county courts and the 
state or territorial supreme courts, trials are usually conducted 
before a judge and jury. The jury decides on the facts and on a verdict 
after a trial conducted by a judge.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices; government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although there is no bill of 
rights, in two decisions the High Court has indicated that freedom of 
political discourse is implied in the Constitution. The Government 
respects these rights in practice. An independent press, an effective 
judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combine to 
ensure freedom of speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of 
association is codified in the Workplace Relations Act of 1996. While 
the right to peaceful assembly is not codified in law, citizens 
exercise it without government restriction.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
Constitution prohibits the adoption of a state religion. Minority 
religions are given equal rights to land, status, and building of 
places of worship.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government encourages immigration by skilled migrants, family 
members, and refugees.
    The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There is no provision 
for first asylum. In April 1999, the Government offered temporary safe 
haven to 4,000 Kosovar refugees. On September 1, 1999, 550 East 
Timorese were given similar temporary protection. In November 1999, the 
Government changed its policy on undocumented migrants and asylum 
seekers. Previously those who claimed a fear of persecution if returned 
to their country of origin were either issued or denied protection 
visas, providing for full residence and employment rights, with no 
intermediate measures. With the change in policy, undocumented arrivals 
are issued a temporary protection visa valid for 3 years only. This 
visa does not provide for application for family reunification and 
limits access to public benefits to medical assistance only. After 3 
years, a case is reviewed, at which point a full protection visa is 
issued if the person is still unable to return home.
    Under the Migration Reform Act of 1994, asylum seekers who arrive 
at the border without prior authorization to enter the country are 
automatically detained but may be released from detention if they meet 
certain criteria--including age, ill-health, and experiences of torture 
or other trauma. The majority of asylum seekers are detained for the 
sometimes prolonged asylum adjudication process. The large number of 
asylum seekers entering the country in 1999 and during the year slowed 
the processing of protection claims while the Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs acquired additional staff and resources. 
Previously a primary decision on an application for refugee status 
could be made in an average of 6 weeks; however, the increased workload 
initially raised the average time for the primary decision to 16 weeks. 
By year's end, the average time for a primary decision had fallen. 
Those who obtained a positive primary decision were released 
immediately from detention; those who continued to pursue their cases 
remain detained until their cases were resolved or they were returned 
to their country of origin. As a result, a small number of asylum 
seekers are detained for years, while their cases are reviewed and 
appealed. The Government's 2000-01 budget, which assumes an 18-week 
period for processing claims, includes financial incentives to the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to process claims 
more quickly in order to reduce the amount of time protection seekers 
are held in detention. The detention policy has led to extensive 
litigation initiated by human rights and refugee advocacy groups, which 
charge that the sometimes-lengthy detentions violate the human rights 
of the asylum seekers. The U.N. Human Rights Committee stated in April 
1997 that Australia had violated the rights of a boat person by 
detaining him for more than 4 years while his applications to remain in 
the country were being considered. The Human Rights Committee stated 
that his detention was arbitrary and in violation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In an April 1997 report to 
Parliament, the federally funded but independent Australian Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) also criticized the 
Government's treatment of asylum seekers as breaching international 
treaty obligations. However, in 1999, the HREOC acknowledged that 
conditions in detention centers had improved since its 1997 report. 
During the year, there were two major disturbances at the Woomera 
detention center by detainees who alleged that they were being held in 
unsatisfactory conditions. The first of the disturbances was 
nonviolent, and was resolved peacefully after the Government pledged 
increased attention to the detainees' requests. However, the second 
disturbance became violent when some of the detainees set fire to 
several buildings at the detention center. Security guards used water 
cannon to restore order. The Government refused to negotiate with the 
leaders of the second disturbance, on the grounds that they had used 
violence. The Government maintains that the detainees' fundamental 
human rights are protected, and that their demands, for items such as 
satellite television, are excessive; human rights groups allege that 
detainees are abused and beaten by the guards at Woomera, but have not 
provided evidence of such mistreatment. Late in the year, the federal 
government launched an inquiry to determine whether detainees at 
Woomera had access to complaint mechanisms such as the government 
ombudsman and HREOC if they felt that they were being mistreated. At 
several points during the year, there were allegations that staff at 
Woomera were aware of and did nothing to stop a male detainee from 
offering his 13-year-old son to other detainees for sex. In December a 
South Australia state government inquiry found no evidence to support 
these allegations; it also found no evidence that the boy had been 
abused sexually.
    During the year, some Kosovar Albanians, who had been allowed to 
enter the country on a temporary basis while facing danger in Kosovo, 
were returned to Kosovo after the UNHCR, determined that it was safe 
for them to return. However, some claimed that they still feared for 
their safety and were returned involuntarily. Prior to their departure, 
these persons were given an opportunity to apply for protection under 
Australian law; some sought and were granted such protection. Others 
were granted extensions of their stay for family or health reasons.
    In 2000-01, the Government planned to accept 76,000 migrants, with 
an additional 12,000 admitted under the humanitarian program. This 
figure was to include 2,000 places for those persons already in the 
country who were granted refugee status. As in 1997-98 and 1998-99, the 
humanitarian program continues to give priority to the former 
Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and Africa. Persons admitted under the 
humanitarian program have immediate access to a wide range of 
government welfare and health benefits, including income support, 
English education, and translating and interpreting services. In 1998-
99, the Government spent approximately $4.9 million (A$7.9 million) on 
resettlement services for refugees. An additional $3.25 million (A$5 
million) was spent on other forms of refugee assistance.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage and mandatory voting. In October 1998, voters 
elected the Liberal-National Party coalition to a second 3-year term of 
office. On November 6, 1999, voters rejected a referendum to amend the 
Constitution to become a republic.
    There are no legal impediments that prevent women and indigenous 
people from holding public office; however, women are underrepresented 
in government and politics. Approximately 25 percent of federal 
parliamentarians are women, an increase from 22 percent in the last 
Parliament. Both the Government and the opposition have declared their 
intent to increase the numbers of women elected to public office.
    The deleterious effects of poor educational achievement and a 
generally inferior socioeconomic status have contributed significantly 
to the underrepresentation of Aboriginals among political leaders. One 
Aboriginal was elected to the Federal Senate in the October 1998 
elections; there were no Aboriginals in the previous Parliament.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups, of which there are a large number, operate 
without government restriction (and in some instances with government 
funding), investigating and publishing their findings on human rights 
cases. Government officials cooperate and respond to their views. The 
most significant of these is the federally funded but independent Human 
Rights and Employment Opportunity Commission (HREOC). Overall 
complaints of discrimination filed with the HREOC dropped from 1,659 in 
1998-99 to 1,317 in 1999-00, a 26 percent reduction. Approximately 43 
percent of all cases are declined because they do not fall under 
HREOC's jurisdiction and/or no discrimination has been shown, 37 
percent are resolved through conciliation, 12 percent are withdrawn 
before action can be taken, and 8 percent are referred for further 
action.
    In July the U.N. Human Rights Committee stated that Australia 
should do more to secure for indigenous Australians a stronger role in 
decisionmaking over their traditional lands and natural resources. The 
Committee urged Australia to do more to provide remedy to members of 
the ``Stolen Generation'' (see Section 5). The Committee also 
recommended review of mandatory sentencing policies (see Section 5) and 
mandatory detention of illegal arrivals (see Section 2.d.). The 
Government responded that many of the recommendations were neither 
necessary nor desirable and reiterated its belief that mandatory 
detention of illegal arrivals was consistent with its treaty 
obligations.
    In March the International Labor Organization's (ILO's) Committee 
on Freedom of Association made a series of recommendations regarding 
the country's labor laws, especially the Workplace Relations Act of 
1996 and the Trade Practices Act (see Sections 6.a. and 6.b.). The 
Government stated in response to the recommendations that the ILO's 
comments ``reflect an inadequate understanding of Australian law,'' and 
stated that the ILO failed to understand the domestic role that certain 
labor laws played. The Government rejected all of the ILO's 
recommendations.
    In August the Government announced the results of a review of its 
cooperation with U.N. human rights treaty committees. While maintaining 
its commitment to involvement with the committees, the Government, as a 
result of the review, decided to limit visits by such committees to 
cases where a ``compelling reason'' exists for the visit. In addition, 
the Government stated that it would not delay removal of unsuccessful 
asylum seekers who appealed to one of the U.N. Human Rights mechanisms; 
previously, such persons had been allowed to remain pending the 
resolution of the appeal of their cases to such U.N. bodies.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination based on these factors, and the 
Government and an independent judiciary vigorously enforce the 
prohibition.
    From July 1998 to June 1999, 37 cases of assault against gays and 
lesbians were reported in the state of New South Wales (NSW). According 
to a recent study by the Australian Institute of Criminology, 37 
murders of homosexual men were found to be hate crimes in NSW between 
1989 and 1999.
    Women.--Social analysts and commentators estimate that domestic 
violence may affect as many as one family in three or four. Wife 
beating is particularly prevalent in certain Aboriginal communities. 
The Government recognizes that domestic violence and economic 
discrimination are serious problems and the statutorily independent Sex 
Discrimination Commissioner actively addresses these and other areas of 
discrimination. A 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) study 
found that 111,000 women who were married or in a common-law 
relationship had experienced an incident of violence by their partner 
in the previous 12-month period. Almost one in four women who have been 
married or in a common-law relationship have experienced violence by a 
partner at some time during the relationship, according to the ABS 
study.
    Trafficking in East Asian women for the sex trade is a growing 
problem (see Sections 6.c and 6.f.).
    Women have equal status under the law, and the law provides for pay 
equity. There are highly organized and effective private and public 
women's rights organizations at the federal, state, and local levels. A 
federal-level Office of the Status of Women monitors women's rights. 
The federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner receives complaints and 
attempts to resolve those that are deemed valid. According to 
government statistics, sex discrimination complaints fell by 8 percent 
between 1999 and this year; 325 new cases were filed during the year. 
Of these 83 percent were filed by women and 79 percent were employment 
related. In July the Australian Bureau of Statistics estimated that the 
ratio of female to male full-time average hourly earnings was 83 
percent. However, a study released by the Australian Institute of 
Management in May was more pessimistic; it found that women were paid 
only 66 percent of their male counterparts' wages. This study also 
found that there were fewer female board members in both large and 
small companies than the previous year. Some members of opposition 
political parties have attributed the difference to changes in 
workplace laws, such as the 1996 Workplace Relations Act, which relies 
on the use of individual employment contracts that are negotiated 
privately and thus do not necessarily foster equal pay outcomes. Other 
commentators have suggested that an ``old boy's network'' can make it 
difficult for women to negotiate salaries equal to those of their male 
counterparts.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its publicly funded systems of 
education and medical care. The Government provides a minimum benefit 
of approximately 11.5 percent of the cost of childcare for each child 
to all parents, which increases to as much as 68 percent per child for 
the lowest income families.
    The federal Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission receives 
complaints regarding children and attempts to resolve those it finds 
valid. Similarly, the six states and two territories investigate 
complaints of neglect or child abuse and institute practical measures 
aimed at protecting the child when such complaints prove founded. The 
Government has enacted strict legislation aimed at restricting the 
trade in, and possession of, child pornography, and which further 
allows suspected pedophiles to be tried in Australia regardless of 
where the crime was committed. There is no societal pattern of abuse.
    The Government and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) 
have responded promptly to the problem of a small number of children 
who have been smuggled into the country, generally for the sex trade 
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The NGO End Child Prostitution, 
Pornography and Trafficking (ECPAT) has conducted an aggressive public 
education campaign to raise awareness of the issue and offer strategies 
to combat trafficking in children. ECPAT successfully lobbied the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) to conduct 
police checks of unaccompanied children entering the country to verify 
that they are not part of a trafficking operation (see Section 6.f.). 
In August, the Department of Family and Community Services released its 
``plan of action'' against the commercial sexual exploitation of 
children, which was designed to provide the basis for the development 
of a coordinated governmental response to this issue.
    In the past, the occurrence of female genital mutilation (FGM), 
which is widely criticized by international health experts as damaging 
to both physical and psychological health, was insignificant. However, 
in recent years small numbers of girls from immigrant communities in 
which FGM is practiced have been mutilated. The Government has 
implemented a national educational program on FGM, which is intended to 
combat the practice in a community health context. The program is 
designed to prevent FGM, to assist women and girls who already have 
been subjected to it, and to promote a consistent approach to the issue 
nationwide. The Government also has allocated funds for the development 
of state and territory legislation to combat FGM. All states and 
territories except Queensland and Western Australia have enacted 
legislation against FGM. Western Australia is developing legislation 
but had not passed it at year's end; Queensland has determined that its 
existing legislation on assault covered FGM. In all States and 
Territories where FGM legislation existed, it was a crime either to 
perform FGM or to remove a child from the jurisdiction to have FGM 
performed. Punishment for these crimes can include up to 7 years in 
prison.
    In 1992 the High Court ruled that the right to consent to the 
sterilization of a minor is not within the ordinary scope of parents' 
or guardians' powers, except in limited circumstances. The High Court 
ruled that the decision to undertake sterilization procedures should be 
made by an independent body. The Government made the Family Courts the 
arbiters in such cases. In 1998 the Government made it illegal for a 
physician to conduct sterilization of a minor without authorization 
from the Family Court. Physicians who performed such procedures without 
court authorization were subject to both criminal and civil action.
    People with Disabilities.--Legislation prohibits discrimination 
against disabled persons in employment, education, or other state 
services. The Disability Discrimination Commissioner promotes 
compliance with federal laws that prohibit discrimination against 
disabled persons. The Commissioner also promotes energetic 
implementation and enforcement of state laws that require equal access 
and otherwise protect the rights of disabled persons. On July 21, 1999, 
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission found that a private 
primary school had violated the federal Disability Discrimination Act 
when it refused to enroll a 7-year-old girl with spina bifida in its 
kindergarten program. An appeal of the ruling by the school was 
dismissed on May 18 by a federal court, and the girl was awarded 
financial compensation.
    No federal legislation mandates the uniform provision of 
accessibility for the disabled. It is lawful to deny employment or 
services to those with disabilities if there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the disabled person would be unable to carry out the 
work or would require the employer or service provider to furnish 
services or facilities that could not be provided reasonably.
    During the year, 445 complaints of discrimination due to disability 
were filed with the HREOC, representing a 13 percent reduction in 
complaints compared with 1999. Of these 44 percent were employment 
related and 32 percent concerned the provision of goods and services.
    Indigenous People.--The Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of race, color, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin. The Ministry for Aboriginal Affairs, in conjunction with 
the elected Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander Commission (ATSIC), 
has the main responsibility for initiating, coordinating, and 
monitoring all governmental efforts to improve the quality of life of 
indigenous people. A wide variety of government initiatives and 
programs seek to improve all aspects of Aboriginal and Torres Straits 
Islander life. In 2000-01 the Government plans to spend approximately 
$1.2 billion (A$2.3 billion) on indigenous-specific programs in areas 
such as health, housing, education, and employment. Spending on
    indigenous-specific programs is the highest on record in real terms 
and amounts to $11,440 (A$22,000) per indigenous household (in addition 
to other nonindigenous-specific federal and state assistance programs 
to which indigenous persons may be entitled).
    However, in practice indigenous Australians continue to experience 
significantly higher rates of imprisonment, inferior access to medical 
and educational institutions, greatly reduced life expectancy rates, 
elevated levels of unemployment, and general discrimination, which 
contribute to a feeling of powerlessness.
    According to the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), 
indigenous people were imprisoned nationally at 11 times the rate of 
nonindigenous people in 1998. The AIC reports that the incarceration 
rate among indigenous youth was 18.5 times that of the nonindigenous 
youth population. Over 45 percent of Aboriginal men between the ages of 
20 and 30 years have been arrested at some time in their lives. Human 
rights observers claim that socioeconomic conditions give rise to the 
common precursors of indigenous crime, for example, unemployment, 
homelessness, and boredom.
    During the year, considerable controversy arose over the mandatory 
sentencing policies of the Northern Territory and Western Australia. 
These policies set automatic prison terms for multiple convictions of 
certain crimes. For example, in the Northern Territory, adults (17 
years of age or over) convicted of property crimes of any magnitude 
must serve 14 days for the first offense, 90 days for the second 
offense, and not less than 1 year for the third offense. Juveniles (15 
to 16 years of age) may be placed in a diversionary program for their 
first property-related offense, or, if they refuse or do not qualify, 
may face a 28-day sentence for a second offense. Judges must impose 
jail sentences on juveniles for a third property offense of any 
magnitude, even for petty theft. In March 11 juveniles were being held 
in detention; the Northern Territory reported that 31 percent of the 
juvenile repeat offenders convicted between March 1997 and December 
1999 received mandatory minimum sentences of 28 days. It was not clear 
how many of those offenders received a mandatory sentence more than 
once. Human rights groups and international bodies such as the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee have criticized the mandatory sentencing 
policies, which they allege have resulted in prison terms for 
relatively minor crimes and indirectly target Aboriginals. In 
particular juvenile offenses subject to mandatory sentences were 
criticized widely after the death in February of an Aboriginal boy 
serving an automatically imposed sentence in the Northern Territory. 
Western Australia agreed to reform the system as it applies to 
juveniles in order to put more juvenile offenders into rehabilitation 
programs. On July 29, the U.N. Human Rights Committee issued an 
assessment of the country's human rights record, which was highly 
critical of mandatory sentencing. Despite the domestic and 
international pressure, the federal Government decided not to interfere 
in what it considered to be the states' prerogative, arguing that the 
laws were passed by democratically elected governments after full 
political debate, making it inappropriate for the federal government to 
intervene.
    Indigenous groups charge that police harassment of indigenous 
people, including juveniles, is pervasive and that racial 
discrimination among police and prison custodians persists. A human 
rights delegation that visited in 1996 alleged a pattern of 
mistreatment and arbitrary arrests occurring against a backdrop of 
systematic discrimination. Most of the juveniles interviewed complained 
about violence occurring after apprehension and during questioning 
about alleged offenses. In November 1998, the Queensland Government 
launched an inquiry after it was discovered that an 11-year-old 
Aboriginal boy had been held for 3 days in an adult detention center 
because no youth facility was available in that remote part of the 
state. Indigenous people believed that police systematically mistreat 
them; however, there are no government statistics to confirm this 
perception.
    The average life expectancy of an indigenous person is 20 years 
less than that of a nonindigenous person. The infant mortality rate for 
indigenous children is 2 times that of nonindigenous children. The 
maternal mortality rate for indigenous women has declined to 4 times 
that of nonindigenous women. The rates of tuberculosis and hepatitis A 
and B among indigenous people are 1.5 times that of nonindigenous 
people. The rate of leprosy among indigenous people is 4 times that of 
nonindigenous people. According to the Commonwealth Department of 
Education, Training and Youth Affairs, indigenous youth are 2.5 times 
more likely than nonindigenous youth to leave school before completing 
high school. According to the 1996 census, only about 2 percent of 
indigenous people reported having a bachelor's degree as compared with 
11 percent of other citizens. According to a study by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, indigenous unemployment was 17.6 percent in 
February, down from a high of 27.8 percent in 1994. This figure 
compared with an unemployment rate of 7.3 percent in February for 
nonindigenous workers.
    Government programs, including a $390 million (A$750 million) 
indigenous land fund and a ``Federal Social Justice Package,'' aim at 
reducing the challenges faced by indigenous Australians. In July 1998, 
after a compromise with its opponents, the Government was able to pass 
amendments to the 1993 Native Title Act. The ATSIC stated that the 
amended act provided gains for Aboriginal people but still contains 
``substantial pain'' for native title claimants. Aboriginal leaders 
were pleased by the removal of the time limit for lodging native title 
claims but expressed deep concern about the weakening of Aboriginal 
rights to negotiate with non-Aboriginal leaseholders over the 
development of rural property. Aboriginal groups continue to express 
concern that the amended act limits the future ability of Aboriginal 
people to protect their property rights. At present, 14.25 percent of 
Australian land is owned or controlled by Aboriginal people according 
to the Australian Surveying and Land Information Group. In March the 
U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
expressed serious concern that the Government's Native Title amendments 
would allow the states and territories to pass legislation containing 
provisions ``reducing further the protection of native title 
claimants.'' The CERD declared ``unsatisfactory'' the Government's 
response to concerns about the Native Title regime expressed in 1999. 
The Government responded that the laws were passed after full debate in 
a democratically elected legislature and that the states have a 
sovereign right to determine land use policy.
    On August 26, 1999, the Government, in identical motions passed by 
both Houses of the Federal Parliament, expressed public regret for past 
mistreatment of the Aboriginal minority; however, the government-
sponsored motion of reconciliation was criticized by many Aboriginal 
leaders as not going far enough. Prime Minister Howard acknowledged the 
``most blemished chapter in our national history'' and submitted a 
seven-point motion to Parliament. Howard proposed that Parliament 
express ``its deep and sincere regret'' that Aborigines had ``suffered 
injustices under the practices of past generations, and for the hurt 
and trauma that many indigenous people continue to feel.'' However, 
both Aboriginal and opposition leaders stated that only a full apology 
would be sufficient. The Government also continued to oppose an 
official apology in the specific case of the ``Stolen Generation'' of 
Aboriginal children, who were taken from their parents by the 
Government from 1910 to the early 1970's and raised by foster parents 
and orphanages. The Government's position remains that the present 
generation has no responsibility to apologize for the wrongs of a 
previous generation. In April material alleged to be a draft of a 
government report appeared in the media; it appeared to minimize the 
number of Aboriginal children taken from their families as part of the 
``Stolen Generation'' and generated considerable concern on the part of 
Aboriginal leaders and others. The Government disavowed the material. 
In August a Federal court ruled against two claims by members of the 
``Stolen Generation'' for government compensation by stating that the 
two could not prove sufficiently that they had been taken without their 
parents' consent. However, the presiding judge stressed that the ruling 
does not settle the question of compensation for ``stolen'' children as 
a whole. The ATSIC has proposed the Government establish a Reparations 
Tribunal to avoid costly future legal battles.
    Following the 1997 publication of HREOC's landmark report on the 
``Stolen Generation'' entitled ``Bringing Them Home,'' the federal 
government allocated $32.75 million (A$63 million) over 4 years to a 
comprehensive package of initiatives to facilitate family reunion and 
assist persons to cope with the trauma of separation. As of June 30, 
total spending on these programs had reached $10.7 million (A$20.5 
million).
    Following the October 1998 reelection of the Government, Prime 
Minister Howard gave Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Minister 
Philip Ruddock additional duties with regard to Aboriginal Australians 
by making him the Minister assisting the Prime Minister for 
Reconciliation. In his victory speech following reelection, Howard said 
that he would make reconciliation with Aboriginals one of his second 
term priorities. However, in February Howard stated that reconciliation 
was not achievable in the timeline set, because it is such a difficult 
issue. In June 1999, the Council on Aboriginal Reconciliation released 
its draft document of reconciliation for public comment and discussion. 
In 1991 Parliament created the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation to 
foster the reconciliation process in the country. The Council held its 
culminating national event, Corroboree 2000, in May, at which time it 
released a ``Document of Reconciliation'', which the Council intended 
to serve as a national blueprint for healing between indigenous 
citizens and the wider community. The final report was released in 
December, and it included recommendations that the federal and state 
governments set performance benchmarks and timelines for overcoming 
Aboriginal disadvantage and enact legislation to further the principles 
of legislation; that Parliament prepare legislation providing for a 
referenda on deleting a constitutional amendment on racial criteria for 
voting; and that Parliament add a new section to the Constitution 
making racial discrimination unlawful. The report also recommended that 
appropriate recognition be given to the Aboriginal people and Torres 
Strait Islanders as the original inhabitants of the land. The Council's 
mandate expired at the end of the year under legislation passed in 
1990. The Council is scheduled to be replaced by a government-funded 
independent foundation, Reconciliation Australia, which is to continue 
its work.
    In July the U.N. Human Rights Committee stated that Australia 
should do more to secure for indigenous citizens a stronger role in 
decisionmaking over their traditional lands and natural resources, and 
urged it to do more to provide a remedy for members of the ``Stolen 
Generation'' (see Section 4).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although Asians make up less 
than 5 percent of the population, they account for 40 percent of recent 
immigrants. Public opinion surveys indicated concern with the numbers 
of immigrants arriving in the country. In a 1997 Newspoll, 64 percent 
of citizens thought that the total number of migrants was ``too high,'' 
although in the same poll 78 percent thought that multiculturalism has 
been good for the country. In a February Morgan Poll, 15 percent of 
citizens listed immigration as one of the three most important issues 
for the Government to address. In a survey published in 1996 by the 
Chinese-language newspaper Sing Tao, more than half the respondents 
said that they had been abused verbally or physically in the previous 2 
months. Leaders in the ethnic and immigrant communities expressed 
concern that increased numbers of illegal arrivals, as well as violence 
at migrant detention centers, contributed to a few incidents of 
vilification of immigrants and minorities. However, according to the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, during the financial 
year ending June 30, the number of racial discrimination complaints 
fell 62 percent from the previous year. During the year, 325 such cases 
were filed, 37 percent of which involved employment or the ability to 
join a union; 19 percent of which involved provision of goods, 
services, and facilities; and 19 percent of which involved ``racial 
hatred.'' Nonnative speakers of English filed 55 percent of the 
complaints and Aboriginals and Torres Straits islanders filed 21 
percent of the complaints.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law and practice provide workers, 
including public servants, freedom of association domestically and 
internationally. Approximately 32 percent of the work force is 
unionized.
    Unions carry out their functions free from government or political 
control, but most local affiliates belong to state branches of the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP). Union members must make up at least 50 
percent of the delegates to ALP conferences, but unions do not 
participate or vote as a bloc.
    The 1996 Workplace Relations Act significantly restricted the right 
of workers to take industrial action by confining it to the period of 
bargaining, where it remains a protected action. In April 1999, a union 
in federal court successfully challenged this provision. In its 
decision, the court refused to grant an injunction against the union 
for taking industrial action outside of a bargaining period because it 
was in support of maintaining existing wages and conditions. 
Legislation that went into force in 1994 for the first time legalized 
what had always been a de facto right to strike.
    In March the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association recommended 
substantial changes to the Workplace Relations Act and the Trade 
Practices Act following an examination of complaints of antiunion 
discrimination raised by Australian and international trade unions over 
the Government's role in a 1998 labor dispute involving stevedores. 
Specifically, the ILO recommended that the Government amend the 
Workplace Relations Act to eliminate the linkage between restrictions 
on strike action and legal provisions on interference with trade and 
commerce. The ILO also criticized the Government's use of serving 
defense force personnel as replacement workers in the 1998 strike. The 
Government stated in response to the recommendations that the ILO's 
comments ``reflect an inadequate understanding of Australian law.'' The 
Government rejected all of the ILO's recommendations.
    Laws and regulations prohibit retribution against strikers and 
labor leaders, and they are effectively enforced. In practice employers 
tend to avoid legal remedies, e.g., secondary boycott injunctions, that 
are available to them in order to preserve a long-term relationship 
with their unions.
    During the year, the most notable industrial action was taken by 
iron ore miners in the Pilbara region of Western Australia against the 
multinational resources company BHP. A series of rolling strikes over a 
period of several months was taken against the company for its refusal 
to negotiate a collective agreement with workers in the mines, but 
rather to introduce individual contracts into the workplace. The unions 
eventually achieved a court injunction against BHP offering any further 
individual contracts on the grounds that the action breached industrial 
legislation. This forced the company to the bargaining table until the 
full case could be heard. The case is before the Federal Court and is 
yet to be concluded. Meanwhile, the negotiations have stalled on the 
issue of union involvement in the workplace. As in past years, there 
were many other strikes during the year.
    Unions freely may form and join federations or confederations, and 
they actively participate in international bodies. However, in March 
the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association also recommended that the 
Government take measures, including amending legislation, to ensure 
that in the future trade union organizations are entitled to maintain 
contacts with international trade union organizations and to 
participate in their legitimate activities. The Government rejected 
this recommendation.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law and 
practice provide workers with the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, and the law protects them from antiunion discrimination. 
However, in Western Australia, the 1997 Labour Relations Legislation 
Amendment Act amended several pieces of legislation, stripping workers 
of some protections against discrimination for trade union activities. 
Although workers cannot be fired for belonging to a union, the law 
permits individual employment contracts that override awards systems 
established through collective bargaining, and imposes complicated 
prestrike ballot requirements.
    The Workplace Relations Act contains curbs on union power, 
restrictions on strikes, and a new unfair-dismissal system. Several 
unions are considering challenging the law on the grounds that it 
violates the right to assembly provided for in several ILO conventions 
that Australia has signed. The primary curb on union power is the 
abolition of closed shops and union demarcations. Although unions are 
weakened, this provision could create many small and competing unions 
at individual worksites. The restrictions on strikes include heavy 
fines for labor unrest during the life of an agreement and tougher 
secondary-boycott provisions. The new unfair-dismissal system further 
limits redress and compensation claims by employees.
    The negotiation of contracts covering wages and working conditions 
is gradually shifting from the centralized system of the past. 
Previously legislation provided for the negotiation of simpler 
``enterprise agreements,'' which were negotiated by individual 
companies with their workers or with the relevant union(s). The federal 
and state governments administered centralized minimum-wage awards and 
provided quasi-judicial arbitration, supplemented by industry-wide or 
company-by-company collective bargaining. The Workplace Relations Act 
also provides for the negotiation of Australian Workplace Agreements 
(AWA's) between employers and individual workers. These agreements are 
subject to far fewer government regulations than the awards. At present 
the AWA's are required to be roughly equivalent to basic working 
conditions in the award that would apply to the sector to which the 
firm belongs. In March the ILO recommended that the Government amend 
legislation so that workplace agreements do not undermine the right to 
bargain collectively; the Government rejected this recommendation.
    There are no export processing zones. The Darwin Trade Development 
Zone, Northern Territory, attempts to increase exports via a 
geographically defined free trade zone. In practice the Darwin 
initiative is focused almost exclusively on its Asian neighbors to the 
north and west.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although there are 
no laws prohibiting it, forced labor, including forced and bonded labor 
by children, generally is not practiced; however, there were instances 
of such abuses. Trafficking in persons, particularly in women (but also 
children) for the sex trade, is a limited but growing problem (see 
Sections 5 and 6.f.). As a result of the discovery in April 1999 of 
children in several clothing sweatshops in Sydney and Melbourne, the 
Attorney General's Department is studying existing laws and considering 
whether new legislation would strengthen the Government's ability to 
combat the problem. Most cases of abuses in the past few years have 
involved members of ethnic communities from nations where child labor 
is not uncommon. The smuggling of children for work in the sex industry 
appears to be a limited but growing problem (see Sections 5, 6.d., and 
6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--There is no federally mandated minimum age of employment, 
but state-imposed compulsory educational requirements, monitored and 
enforced by state educational authorities, effectively prevent most 
children from joining the work force until they are 15 or 16 years of 
age. Federal and state governments monitor and enforce a network of 
laws, which vary from state to state, governing the minimum school-
leaving age, the minimum age to claim unemployment benefits, and the 
minimum age to engage in specified occupations.
    The law does not explicitly prohibit forced and bonded labor by 
children, but such practices generally are not known to occur, although 
there were instances of such abuses (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that an increasing number of children, 
mainly from Asia, are entering the country as sex workers. The numbers 
of children involved is unknown. Under the laws of the various states 
it is illegal for an adult to have sex with a minor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Although a formal minimum wage 
exists, it has not been relevant in wage agreements since the 1960's. 
Instead, 80 percent of workers are covered by differing minimum wage 
rates for individual trades and professions, all of which are 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family.
    Most workers are employees of incorporated organizations. For them 
a complex body of government regulations, as well as decisions of 
applicable federal or state industrial relations commissions, prescribe 
a 40-hour or shorter workweek, paid vacations, sick leave, and other 
benefits. The minimum standards for wages, working hours, and 
conditions are set by a series of ``awards'' (basic contracts for 
individual industries). Some awards specify that workers must have a 24 
or 48 hour rest break each week while others specify only the number of 
days off per number of days worked.
    Federal or state safety laws apply to every workplace.
    The 1991 Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) 
Act provides federal employees with the legal right to cease work if 
they believe that particular work activities pose an immediate threat 
to individual health or safety. Most states and territories have laws 
that grant similar rights to their employees. At a minimum, private 
sector employees have recourse to state health and safety commissions, 
which will investigate complaints and demand remedial action.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--though there is no specific provision 
in the law to prohibit trafficking in persons, legislation enacted in 
late 1999 targets criminal practices associated with trafficking; 
trafficking in persons, particularly in East Asian women for the sex 
trade, is a limited but growing problem.
    On September 21, 1999 the Criminal Code Amendment (Slavery and 
Sexual Servitude) Act came into force. The act modernizes the country's 
slavery laws, contains new offenses directed at slavery, sexual 
servitude, and deceptive recruiting, and addresses the growing and 
lucrative trade in persons for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The 
act provides for penalties of up to 25 years' imprisonment and is part 
of a federal, state, and territory package of legislation. There have 
not yet been any prosecutions under this legislation.
    Under the act, conduct that amounts to slavery, or exercising a 
power of ownership over another person, carries a maximum penalty of 25 
years' imprisonment. Where a person is engaged to provide sexual 
services and who, because of force or threats, is not free to cease or 
to leave, those responsible face penalties of up to 15 years' 
imprisonment, or 19 years if the victim is under age 18. A person who 
deceptively induces another person to provide sexual services faces a 
penalty of up to 7 years imprisonment, or 9 years if the victim is 
under age 18.
    Another government initiative was the 1994 Child Sex Tourism Act, 
which provides for the investigation and prosecution of citizens who 
travel overseas and engage in illegal sexual conduct with children.
    Prostitution is legal in many areas of the country. In these 
locations, state and local governments inspect brothels to prevent 
mistreatment of the workers and to assure compliance with health 
regulations. There have been some instances of women being forced to 
work as sex workers in the country by organized crime groups. There are 
some reports of women working in the sex industry becoming mired in 
debt or being physically forced to keep working, and some of these 
women are under pressure to accept poor working conditions, especially 
if their immigration status is irregular. However, the available 
evidence suggests that these cases are not widespread.
    The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) has 
determined that women and children from Thailand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, China, Indonesia, and South Korea have been trafficked into 
the country for purposes of prostitution. The high profit potential, 
combined with the difficulty of detection and previously low penalties 
when prosecuted, have contributed to the spread of groups engaged in 
these activities.
    While the numbers of women being brought into the country are 
relatively small (in the hundreds per year), some have been subjected 
to what is essentially indentured sexual servitude. Some women working 
in the sex industry were not aware prior to entering the country that 
this was the kind of work they would be doing. Investigations in past 
years by DIMA have found women locked in safe houses with barred 
windows, with no access to medical care or the outside world. These 
women have been lured either by the idea that they would be waitresses 
in restaurants or, in some cases, coerced to come by criminal elements 
operating in their home countries.
    Anecdotal evidence suggests that an increasing number of children, 
mainly from Asia, are entering the country as sex workers. The numbers 
of children involved is unknown. Under the laws of the various states, 
it is illegal for an adult to have sex with a minor.
    There also has been evidence, much of it anecdotal, of a growing 
problem of trafficking in women to work in sweatshops in textile, 
clothing, and footwear industries as well as in service industries, 
sometimes as bonded labor.
                               __________

                                 BRUNEI

    Brunei Darussalam, a small, wealthy monarchy located on the north 
coast of Borneo, is a sultanate ruled by the same family for 600 years. 
The 1959 Constitution provided for the first delegation of political 
power by the late Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin to an appointed council of 
state, but in 1962 the then Sultan invoked an article of the 
Constitution that allowed him to assume emergency powers for 2 years. 
These powers have been regularly renewed, most recently in July. In 
August the Foreign Minister confirmed that a review of the Constitution 
had been submitted to the Sultan for approval, and that ``an element of 
an election'' was in this report. Although not all the articles of the 
Constitution are suspended, the state of emergency places few limits on 
the Sultan's power. The Sultan also serves as Prime Minister, Minister 
of Defense, Minister of Finance, chancellor of the national university, 
superintendent general of the Royal Brunei Police Force, and leader of 
the Islamic faith.
    The police force, which has responsibility for internal security, 
reports to the Prime Minister's office, which includes an Internal 
Security Department, and is firmly under the control of civil 
authorities.
    Brunei's large oil and natural gas reserves, coupled with its small 
population, give it a very high per capita gross national product. The 
worldwide recovery in oil prices that began in 1998 has helped restore 
the country's cash flow; however, the economy still continued to feel 
the effects of the Amedeo Corporation's collapse. The corporation, 
which was owned by the Sultan's brother Jefri, is being liquidated to 
pay debts amounting to more than $6 billion.
    The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in 
several areas; however, its record was poor in other areas, 
particularly with regard to civil liberties, and problems remain. In 
practice citizens do not have the right to change their government, and 
they generally avoid political activity of any kind. Nor, 
constitutional provisions notwithstanding, do they genuinely exercise 
the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. Other human 
rights problems continued, including restriction of religious freedom 
and discrimination against women. Despite government efforts, 
occasional societal violence against women remains a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    In June 1998, an assistant superintendent of police was arrested 
and charged with the manslaughter of a Bangladeshi national. The police 
official allegedly used police premises to interrogate the Bangladeshi 
national over a personal business matter. During the interrogation, the 
police official allegedly beat and kicked the victim, who subsequently 
died of internal injuries. The police superintendent was convicted of a 
reduced charge of causing hurt, since pathologists could not conclude 
that the beating directly caused the victim's death. He was sentenced 
to 12 months in jail and ordered to pay $12,050 (B$20,000) to the 
deceased's family in compensation. The superintendent was dismissed 
from the police service.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There were no reports of police mistreatment of prisoners. 
Any report of police mistreatment of prisoners would be investigated as 
a violation of the law. In 1988 caning became mandatory punishment for 
42 drug-related and other criminal offenses and for vandalism. Since 
then, sentences of caning have been handed down and carried out in the 
presence of a doctor who monitors implementation and has the authority 
to interrupt and postpone the punishment for medical reasons. Caning 
generally is included as part of the sentencing in 80 percent of 
criminal convictions. Many convicted persons reportedly prefer caning 
to lengthy incarceration.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There is no 
overcrowding; however, there is a growing prison population, and a new 
facility to supplement the 60-year-old prison was completed in 1998. 
Prisoners receive regular medical checkups. Remand cells at police 
stations are Spartan.
    Human rights monitors are not known to have requested prison 
visits; foreign diplomats have visited prisoners. Family members also 
can visit prisoners and bring food.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for a 
prompt judicial determination of the validity of an arrest. However, 
those provisions, like the Constitution itself, may be superseded, 
either partially or wholly, through invocation of the emergency powers. 
The Internal Security Act (ISA) permits the Government to detain 
suspects without trial for renewable 2-year periods. The Government 
occasionally has used the ISA to detain persons suspected of 
antigovernment activity; however, information on the detainees is 
published only after they are released. In 1997 two former rebel 
leaders were pardoned and released, after undergoing ``religious 
indoctrination'' and swearing loyalty to the Sultan (see Section 1.e.). 
Muhamad Yasin Abdul Rahman, age 76, who played a pivotal role in the 
abortive 1962 rebellion, was detained without trial for 12 years from 
1962 to 1973, when he escaped from prison to live in exile in Malaysia. 
He returned to the country in 1997 and immediately was arrested and 
detained once more without trial. In 1999 he was released from 
detention after swearing an oath of loyalty to the Sultan and admitting 
his political ``crimes.''
    In 1998 authorities arrested several citizens under the ISA for 
distributing defamatory letters containing allegations about the royal 
family and senior government officials connected with the collapse of 
the Amedeo Group, a large holding company headed by the former Finance 
Minister and Sultan's brother, Prince Jefri. The Government warned 
citizens that it would take action against anyone involved in such 
activities. There were no known arrests for publishing or distributing 
antigovernment literature during the year.
    Under normal circumstances, a magistrate must endorse a warrant for 
arrest. Warrants are issued without this endorsement on rare occasions, 
such as when police are unable to obtain the endorsement in time to 
prevent the flight of a suspect. Police officers have broad powers to 
make arrests, without warrants, of persons caught in the physical act 
of committing a crime.
    Under the colonial-era Banishment Act of 1918, any person deemed to 
be a threat to the safety, peace, or welfare of Brunei, may be forcibly 
exiled either permanently or temporarily by the Sultan. Since 
independence, there have been no cases of banishment of citizens.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution does not 
specifically provide for an independent judiciary. However, in 1996 in 
a landmark legal decision, the appellate-level High Court ruled that 
the court has powers independent of the prosecution and ordered a 
discharge in a car theft case under review, which amounted to an 
acquittal under the Criminal Procedure Code. So far the Government has 
not challenged the court's finding that magistrates have the legal 
power to discharge and acquit a defendant, even when the prosecution 
does not request the discharge.
    The judicial system consists of five levels of courts, with final 
recourse in civil cases available through the Privy Council in London. 
In 1995 Brunei terminated appeal to the Privy Council in criminal 
cases. Procedural safeguards include the right to defense counsel, the 
right to an interpreter, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to 
confront accusers. There were no known instances of government 
interference with the judiciary and no trials of political opponents.
    The civil law, based on English common law, provides citizens with 
a fair and efficient judicial process. Shari'a (Islamic law) supersedes 
civil law in some areas, including divorce, inheritance, and some 
sexual crimes. Shari'a law is not applied to non-Muslims.
    At present there are no known political prisoners (see Section 
1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Although the law permits government intrusion into the 
privacy of individual persons, families, or homes, this rarely happens. 
There were no reports of mail having been tampered with during the 
year. The Government at times prevents the importation of foreign 
newspapers and magazines (see Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--While there are no laws 
restricting freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the Government 
used its authority to protect public safety, morals, health, and 
domestic security to restrict these freedoms. Editions of foreign 
newspapers or magazines with articles that are found objectionable, 
embarrassing, or critical of the Sultan, royal family, or government 
are not allowed into the country. Magazine articles with a Christian 
theme reportedly are censored. However, the growing use of fax 
machines, the Internet, and access to satellite transmissions make it 
increasingly difficult to keep such material from entering. The 
country's largest circulation daily newspaper, the Borneo Bulletin, 
appears to practice self-censorship in its choice of topics to avoid 
angering the Government, but it has instituted a new feature of letters 
to the editor, by which citizens some by name and some anonymously 
criticize the Government's handling of certain social, economic, and 
environmental issues. In 1997 the newspaper expanded its letters column 
to reflect the increase in letters. In July 1999, a second daily 
English-language newspaper, the News Express, began publication. It 
also features a letters page where citizens and residents express their 
views and complaints, often about government services and, 
increasingly, about government policy. The newspapers' willingness to 
publish these expressions of opinion represents a modest extension of 
press freedom. The Government on occasion has been responsive to public 
opinion on some issues concerning social or environmental problems. The 
Internal Security Department reportedly no longer tries to obtain the 
names of people who complained to the newspapers about government 
services.
    Although the only television station is government-owned, three 
Malaysian television channels are also received locally. Two satellite 
television networks are available, which offer a total of 28 different 
channels, including the Cable News Network, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation World News, and several entertainment and sports channels.
    The Government's tolerance of political criticism has not been 
tested recently because there is no organized opposition. Moreover, 
citizens generally make almost no criticism of the Government. In the 
past, the Government has not hesitated to arrest those who attempted to 
propagate unwelcome political views.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom to 
assemble for political purposes has not been tested seriously in recent 
years.
    Following a 1967 ban on political parties, the Government allowed 
two parties to form in 1985 and 1986. It disbanded one of the parties 
in 1988. Political parties are allowed but they are not to engage in 
``activities that endanger people.'' Membership is open to all 
citizens, except civil servants and security force personnel, who 
together make up 60 percent of all employed citizens.
    The remaining party, the Brunei Solidarity National Party (PPKB), 
which was inactive for several years, held an assembly in February 
1995, April 1998, and again in February 2000 (attended by about 30 
persons), reportedly with the consent of the Government. Following the 
1998 General Assembly, party leaders expressed support for the 
Government's determination to investigate the Amedeo crisis, but the 
party appeared to be largely inactive. In October 1998, the Prime 
Minister's Office rebuked PPKB President Haji Mohamed Hatta over an 
interview he gave to a regional newsmagazine. The Prime Minister's 
Office described Hatta's portrayal of Brunei as ``irresponsible, 
untrue, inaccurate, misleading, and embarrassing.'' The PPKB reportedly 
continues to be subject to internal disagreements.
    The activities of international service organizations such as 
Rotary, Kiwanis, and the Lions continued to be constrained by the 
Government, which in 1995 reminded local leaders of these organizations 
that Muslims may not be members.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that, ``The 
religion of Brunei Darussalam shall be the Muslim religion according to 
the Shafeite sect of that religion: Provided that all other religions 
may be practiced in peace and harmony by the person professing them in 
any part of Brunei Darussalam.'' However, the Government only partially 
respects these rights, as it routinely restricts the practice of non-
Islamic religions. The Government sporadically voiced alarm about 
``outsiders'' preaching radical Islamic fundamentalist or unorthodox 
beliefs. Citizens deemed to have been influenced by such preaching 
(usually students returning from overseas study) have been ``shown the 
error of their ways'' in study seminars organized by mainstream Islamic 
religious leaders. The Government seems more concerned about these so-
called Islamic ``opportunists'' than unwelcome political views. 
Moreover, the Government does not hesitate to investigate and to use 
its internal security apparatus against persons whom it considers 
purveyors of radical Islam.
    In 1991 the Government began to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
hereditary monarchy and the observance of traditional and Muslim values 
by reasserting a national ideology known as the Malayhu Islam Beraja 
(MIB) or ``Malay Muslim monarchy,'' the genesis of which reportedly 
dates to the 15th century. The Government in 1993 participated in 
issuing the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which affirms the right of all 
persons to a wide range of human rights, including freedom of religion. 
Despite this and constitutional provisions providing for the full and 
unconstrained exercise of religious freedom, the Government routinely 
restricts the practice of non-Muslim religions by: Prohibiting 
proselytizing; occasionally denying entry to foreign clergy or 
particular priests, bishops, or ministers; banning the importation of 
religious teaching materials or scriptures such as the Bible; and 
ignoring requests to expand, repair, or build new churches, temples, 
and shrines. However, in February 1998, the Government allowed the 
Catholic Church to establish the first apostolic prefecture in the 
country and to install a Bruneian of Chinese origin as the country's 
first apostolic prefect. This development constituted a modest step in 
the direction of improved religious freedom, but as yet there is no 
broad trend toward increased religious freedom.
    In September 1998, officials of the Islamic Propagation Center 
confiscated gold and other precious Buddhist and Christian icons from a 
number of goldsmiths in the capital, stating that the open display of 
these items ``offended local sensitivities.'' The confiscations were 
made under the Undesirable Publications Act, which gives the Government 
wide-ranging powers. Several days later, the goldsmiths were informed 
that they could recover their property from the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. The Government also routinely censors magazine articles on 
other faiths, blacking out or removing photographs of crucifixes and 
other Christian religious symbols.
    Since July 1998, the authorities sporadically have conducted raids 
on clubs frequented by foreign residents and foreign workers in order 
to confiscate alcohol and foodstuffs that were not prepared in 
accordance with ``halal'' requirements (the Islamic requirements for 
the slaughter of animals and the prohibition on inclusion of pork 
products in any food). These actions continue and are regarded by the 
majority of citizens as upholding Islam. In July the Government briefly 
detained for questioning local members of a small Islamic group after 
the group's members in Malaysia reportedly were involved in an arms 
theft.
    The Ministry of Education also restricted the teaching of the 
history of religion or other courses on religion in non-Islamic schools 
while requiring courses on Islam or the MIB in all schools. Only the 
Bandar Seri Begawan international schools are exempt from these 
restrictions.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts the movement of 
former political prisoners during the first year of their release. 
Otherwise the Government generally does not restrict the freedom of 
movement of its citizens, visitors, and permanent residents. Government 
employees, both citizens and foreigners working on a contractual basis, 
must apply for approval to go abroad; it is routinely granted.
    No legal provision exists for granting temporary refuge, first 
asylum, or refugee status to those seeking such refuge or asylum. Under 
the law, persons arriving without valid entry documents and means of 
support are considered illegal immigrants and are refused entry. There 
were no reported cases of individuals seeking temporary refuge during 
the year.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens are unable to change their government; Brunei is a 
monarchy and there are no established democratic processes. Under the 
continuing state of emergency, there is no parliament, and political 
authority and control rests with the ruling monarch. Individuals may 
seek to express their views or to influence government decisions and 
policies by writing letters to a local newspaper or by petitioning the 
Sultan or handing him letters when he appears in public.
    A form of popular representation lies in a traditional system of 
village chiefs who, since 1992, are elected by secret ballot by all 
adults. These leaders communicate constituents' wishes through a 
variety of channels, including periodic meetings chaired by the Home 
Affairs Minister, with several officials appointed by the Sultan. In 
1996 the Sultan officiated at the first General Assembly of the 
``mukim'' (a group of villages) and village consultative council. Over 
1,000 village chiefs from 150 villages and 35 mukim participated as 
delegates. The delegates were elected from among individual villagers, 
and the Government described the Assembly as ``a grass roots level 
political system.'' However, the Sultan appoints all the council's 
advisers. The Government insists that ordinary citizens actually use 
these councils to present their grievances and to obtain redress.
    The Sultan has an appointed Cabinet, the members of which serve as 
his principal advisors.
    The lack of representative democratic government seriously limits 
the role of both men and women in government and politics; however, 
women are making progress. In 1997 the Sultan's sister, Princess Masna, 
became the second ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and for the first time two women were appointed as permanent 
secretaries, one in the Ministry of Education and the other in the 
Ministry Culture, Youth, and Sports. The first female High Court judge 
was appointed in 1999, and in 2000 a woman was named acting director of 
the Anticorruption Bureau.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    No government or private organizations deal specifically with the 
protection of human rights. However, in 1997, for the first time, the 
Government entered into a human rights dialog with a foreign embassy 
and that dialog continues. There were no known allegations of abuses or 
requests to visit by international human rights groups.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Except for religion (see Section 2.c.), the Constitution does not 
contain specific provisions prohibiting discrimination based on the 
factors listed above.
    Women.--The extent to which spousal abuse may occur and go 
unreported is not known. In response to a perception that domestic 
violence was rising, in 1994 a special unit was established within the 
police department to investigate domestic violence complaints. Female 
officers staff the unit. Since 1995 a hot line has been in service for 
abused spouses and the public to report domestic violence. During 1999 
approximately 10 women and their children stayed at a women's shelter 
run by the Social Affairs Services unit of the Ministry of Culture. The 
Social Affairs Services unit provides counseling for women and their 
spouses. In August 1999, a photograph of a man accused of stabbing his 
wife and assaulting one of his children was published in a daily 
newspaper, a new development in the country, where privacy generally is 
guarded closely. While Islamic courts usually discourage divorce in 
domestic violence cases, there appears to be a movement away from 
encouraging wives to reconcile with flagrantly abusive spouses. Islamic 
religious authorities recognize wife beating as grounds for divorce.
    In 1999 the police recorded 91 cases of domestic abuse compared 
with 72 in 1998. The police also recorded 10 cases of rape and 10 
molestations. The criminal penalty for a minor domestic assault is 1 to 
2 weeks in jail and a fine. An assault resulting in serious injury 
would be punished by caning and a longer jail sentence. In September 
two members of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces were sentenced to 4 years' 
imprisonment and three strokes of the cane for the attempted 
molestation and sodomy of a 20-year-old deaf girl. In October 1999, a 
man convicted of assaulting his former wife with a knife and a piece of 
wood on three separate occasions, received three concurrent sentences 
of 2 years and 6 months in prison and three strokes of the cane. He 
also received a 6-month prison sentence for assaulting his 7-year-old 
daughter. Also in 1999, a man impersonating a religious inspector who 
raped and extorted money from a woman he found in a compromising 
situation with her boyfriend was sentenced to 12 years in prison and 6 
strokes of the cane.
    One area of apparent abuse involves female domestic servants. While 
the level of violence in society is low, beating of servants--or 
refusing them the right to leave the house on days off, sometimes on 
grounds that they ``might encounter the wrong company"--is less 
socially unacceptable behavior. Since most female domestics are foreign 
workers who are highly dependent on their employers, those subject to 
abuse may be unwilling or unable to bring complaints, either to the 
authorities or to their governments' embassies. However, when such 
complaints are brought, the Government generally is quick to 
investigate allegations of abuse and impose fines and punishment as 
warranted.
    In accordance with Koranic precepts, women are denied equal status 
with men in a number of important areas such as divorce, inheritance, 
and custody of children. Under the Brunei Nationality Act, citizenship 
is transmitted through males only. Female citizens who are married to 
foreigners or bear children by foreign fathers cannot transmit 
citizenship to their children, even when such children are born in the 
country. This has resulted in the creation of a sizable population of 
stateless children, estimated at more than 5,000 residents, who are 
entitled to live in the country and to be documented for travel by the 
Government, but who cannot enjoy the full privileges of citizenship, 
including the right to own land.
    Although men are eligible for permanent positions in government 
service whether or not they hold university degrees, women who do not 
have university degrees are eligible to hold government positions only 
on a month-to-month basis. While recent changes eliminated some 
previous inequities, women in month-to-month positions continue to 
receive slightly less annual leave and fewer allowances than their male 
and female counterparts in permanent positions.
    There are no separate pay scales for men and women, and in recent 
years there has been a major influx of women into the work force. Women 
serve in a wide variety of capacities in the armed forces, although 
they are not permitted to serve in combat. The number of female 
university graduates is increasing, and nearly two-thirds of Brunei 
University's entering class is female.
    Religious authorities strongly encourage Muslim women to wear the 
tudong, a traditional head covering, and many women do so. However, 
some Muslim women do not, and there is no official pressure on non-
Muslim women to do so. All female students in government-operated 
schools are required to wear the tudong; students in nongovernment 
schools are encouraged to wear it.
    In July 1999, a new Married Women's Law came into effect, improving 
significantly the rights of non-Muslim married women with respect to 
maintenance, property, and domestic violence. In November 1999, changes 
to the Islamic Family Law (in the section on Women's Position in 
Marriage and Divorce) came into effect and are expected to improve the 
marital rights of Muslim women.
    Children.--No statistics are published regarding the welfare of 
children. The strong commitment to family values within society, the 
high standard of living, and government funding for children's welfare 
provides most children a healthy and nurturing environment. Education 
is free, compulsory, and universal for 9 years. With a few exceptions 
involving small villages in extremely remote areas, nutritional 
standards are high, and poverty is almost unknown. There were 5 
reported cases of child abuse in 1999. In 1996 the High Court convicted 
a father of child abuse. The Chief Justice sentenced him to 20 years in 
prison and ordered him caned with 20 strokes of the rattan for causing 
the death of his 3-year-old daughter and grievous hurt to another 2 of 
his children.
    People with Disabilities.--No legislation mandating accessibility 
or other assistance for disabled persons has been passed. The 
Government is attempting to provide educational services for children 
with disabilities, although these efforts are not yet adequate to 
address the situation. Teachers are still being trained to deal with 
disabled children, and some children have no educational opportunities. 
A special facility with trained educators is needed to accommodate the 
disabled children who cannot be assimilated into normal classrooms, and 
the Ministry of Education is studying the problem.
    Indigenous People.--The 6 percent of the population that is 
composed of indigenous people long has been integrated into society, 
and enjoys the same rights as other citizens.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some members of non-Malay 
minorities, such as ethnic Chinese, including those born and raised in 
the country, are not automatically accorded citizenship and its 
attendant rights, and must travel abroad as stateless persons. Brunei's 
colonial-era naturalization laws are widely viewed as out of date and 
in need of reform.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are legal but must be 
registered with the Government. The three registered trade unions--one 
passive and two generally inactive--are all in the oil sector and have 
a total membership amounting to less than 5 percent of that industry's 
work force. All workers, including civil servants other than those 
serving in the military and police, may form or join trade unions. 
Unions are independent of the Government.
    The 1962 Trade Unions Act permits the formation of trade union 
federations but forbids affiliation with international labor 
organizations. An individual contract is required between an employer 
and each employee, but legal trade union activities cannot be deemed to 
violate employee contracts. Local legal experts interpret this 
provision as conferring the right to strike, but there have been no 
strikes. Brunei is not a member of the International Labor 
Organization.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Government 
has not prevented the legal registration of trade unions, nor has it 
dissolved any. The Government did not interfere with lawful union 
activity. It is illegal to refuse employment or discriminate against an 
employee on the basis of membership or nonmembership in a trade union. 
While unions are legal and easy to register, conditions are not 
conducive to the development of trade unions. There is little interest 
on the part of workers in forming trade unions, and existing unions are 
not very active. The law is silent on collective bargaining, and it 
occurs in only a few industries. There are few industries of the kind 
in which unions have traditionally developed. Also cultural tradition 
favors consensus over confrontation. Wage and benefit packages are 
based on market conditions and tend to be generous.
    There is a free trade zone in Muara Port, known as the Muara Export 
Zone (MEZ), established in May 1994.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced labor including forced and bonded labor by children, and there 
are no known cases of forced labor.
    In 1997 a foreign beauty contest winner brought suit in a foreign 
court against members of the Brunei royal family alleging that she and 
six other women were brought to Brunei in 1996 and subsequently held 
against their will for purposes of sexual exploitation. A statement by 
the royal family called the case ``frivolous and groundless.'' The 
Sultan's sovereign immunity was recognized, and the court accepted 
Prince Jefri's claim of immunity. The case was closed formally in 
December 1999.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1954 Labor Enactment Laws prohibits the employment of 
children below the age of 16. Education is free, compulsory, and 
universal through grade nine. Parental consent and approval by the 
Labor Commission is required for those below the age of 18. Female 
minors under age 18 may not work at night or on offshore oil platforms. 
The Department of Labor (DOL), which is a part of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, effectively enforces laws on the employment of children. There 
were no reports of violations of the child labor laws. Forced and 
bonded labor by children is prohibited and it is not practiced (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Skilled labor is in short 
supply, and market forces enable most citizens to command good 
salaries. There is no minimum wage. The standard workweek is Monday 
through Thursday and Saturday, with Friday and Sunday off, allowing for 
two 24-hour rest periods each week. Overtime is paid for work in excess 
of 48 hours a week, and double time is paid for work performed on legal 
holidays. Occupational health and safety standards are established by 
government regulations. The DOL inspects working conditions on a 
routine basis and in response to complaints. The DOL generally enforces 
labor regulations effectively. However, in the unskilled labor sector 
enforcement is lax, especially for foreign laborers (see Section 5). 
The DOL is empowered to close any workplace where health, safety, or 
working conditions are unsatisfactory, and it has done so in the past. 
The law permits a worker to leave a hazardous job site without 
jeopardizing his employment, but in practice this is unlikely to 
happen.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Law for the Protection of Women and 
Girls prohibits trafficking whether or not for the purpose of 
prostitution. There are occasional reports of women entering the 
country for purposes of prostitution (which is illegal), but they 
usually are deported swiftly.
                               __________

                                 BURMA

    Burma continued to be ruled by a highly authoritarian military 
regime. Repressive military governments dominated by members of the 
majority Burman ethnic group have ruled the ethnically Burman central 
regions and some ethnic-minority areas continuously since 1962, when a 
coup led by General Ne Win overthrew an elected civilian government. 
Since September 1988, when the armed forces brutally suppressed massive 
pro-democracy demonstrations, a junta composed of senior military 
officers has ruled by decree, without a constitution or legislature. 
Originally called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 
the junta reorganized itself and changed its name to the State Peace 
and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. The Government is headed by 
armed forces commander Senior General Than Shwe, although Ne Win, who 
retired from public office during the 1988 pro-democracy 
demonstrations, may continue to wield informal influence. In 1990 the 
junta permitted a relatively free election for a parliament to which it 
had promised to transfer power. Voters overwhelmingly supported anti-
government parties with the National League for Democracy (NLD), 
winning more than 60 percent of the popular vote and 80 percent of the 
parliamentary seats. Throughout the 1990's, the junta systematically 
violated human rights in the country to suppress the prodemocracy 
movement, including the NLD, and to thwart repeated efforts by the 
representatives elected in 1990 to convene. Instead, the junta convened 
a government-controlled ``National Convention'' intended to approve a 
constitution that would ensure a dominant role for the armed forces. 
Since 1995 the NLD has declined to participate in this National 
Convention, perceiving both its composition and its agenda to be 
tightly controlled by the junta. More than a dozen armed ethnic groups 
continued to rule or to exercise some governmental functions in 
peripheral ethnic minority areas under various cease-fire agreements 
negotiated with the junta between 1989 and 1995. The judiciary is not 
independent of the junta.
    Since 1988 the junta has more than doubled the size of the armed 
forces, from about 175,000 to more than 400,000 men, and has increased 
the Government's military presence throughout the country, especially 
in ethnic minority areas. The Government reinforces its firm military 
rule with a pervasive security apparatus led by the military 
intelligence organization, the Directorate of Defense Services 
Intelligence (DDSI). Control is buttressed by arbitrary restrictions on 
citizens' contacts with foreigners, surveillance of government 
employees and private citizens, harassment of political activists, 
intimidation, arrest, detention, and physical abuse. The Government 
justifies its security measures as necessary to maintain order and 
national unity. Members of the security forces committed numerous, 
serious human rights abuses.
    Burma is a poor country with a population said by its Government to 
number about 50 million. Average annual per capita income is estimated 
to be about $300. More than 3 decades of military rule and 
mismanagement have resulted in widespread poverty. Primarily an 
agricultural economy, the country also has substantial mineral, 
fishing, and timber resources. From 1988 to 1995, the Government partly 
liberalized the economy, reversing the economic contraction of the 
1980's. However, economic growth has slowed since the mid-1990's, as 
the junta has retreated from economic liberalization. Extensive state 
influence over the economy, corruption, and poor infrastructure remain 
problems.
    The Government's extremely poor human rights record and 
longstanding severe repression of its citizens continued during the 
year. Citizens continued to live subject at any time and without appeal 
to the arbitrary and sometimes brutal dictates of the military regime. 
Citizens did not have the right to change their government. There 
continued to be credible reports, particularly in ethnic minority 
areas, that security forces committed serious human rights abuses, 
including extrajudicial killings and rape. Disappearances continued, 
and members of the security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused 
prisoners and detainees. Prison conditions remained harsh and life 
threatening, but have improved slightly in some prisons after the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed access to 
prisons in May 1999. Arbitrary arrest and detention for expression of 
dissenting political views continued to be a common practice. The 
Government held Aung San Suu Kyi incommunicado twice in September, 
following attempts to travel beyond the bounds of Rangoon City and to 
Mandalay. At year's end, the Government continued to hold Aung San Suu 
Kyi in detention; it also held 48 members-elect of parliament and more 
than 1,000 NLD supporters under detention, all as part of a government 
effort to prevent the parliament elected in 1990 from convening. Since 
1962 thousands of persons have been arrested, detained, or imprisoned 
for political reasons; more than 1,800 political prisoners remained 
imprisoned at year's end. The judiciary is not independent, and there 
is no effective rule of law. During the year, the Government 
intensified its campaign to eliminate independent lawyers by 
arbitrarily arresting and sentencing them on fabricated charges. The 
Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights, and 
security forces continued to monitor citizens' movements and 
communications systematically, to search homes without warrants, and to 
relocate persons forcibly without just compensation or due process. 
During the year, those persons suspected of or charged with 
prodemocratic political activity were subjected to regular surveillance 
and harassment. Security forces continued to use excessive force to 
violate international humanitarian law in internal conflicts against 
ethnic insurgencies. The regime forcibly relocated large ethnic 
minority populations in order to deprive armed ethnic groups of 
civilian bases of support.
    The SPDC continued to restrict severely freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and association. It has pressured many thousands of members 
to resign from the NLD and closed party offices nationwide. Since 1990 
the junta frequently prevented the NLD and other prodemocracy parties 
from conducting normal political activities. The junta recognizes the 
NLD as a legal entity; however, it refuses to accept the legal 
political status of key NLD party leaders, particularly the party's 
general secretary and 1991 Nobel laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, and 
restricts her activities severely through security measures and 
threats. The Government imposed some restrictions on certain religious 
minorities. The junta continued to restrict freedom of movement and, in 
particular, foreign travel by female citizens; the junta also continued 
to restrict Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom to leave her residence or to 
receive visitors. In September Aung San Suu Kyi, actions that placed 
under house arrest when she attempted to visit an NLD party office on 
the outskirts of Rangoon, and again when she attempted to travel by 
train to Mandalay.
    During the year, the SPDC intensified its systematic use of 
coercion and intimidation to deny citizens the right to change their 
government. In September 1998, the NLD leadership organized a 10-member 
Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP) to act on behalf 
of the parliament. The junta responded by forcing several elected 
representatives to resign from the parliament, by detaining dozens of 
other elected representatives, and by pressuring constituents to sign 
statements of no confidence. One member of the CRPP also was jailed, 
and the other members of the committee were placed in detention during 
the latter part of the year. However, late in the year, with 
encouragement from U.N. Special Representative Ismail Razali, the 
Government opened contacts with Aung San Suu Kyi, which appeared to 
produce some relaxation in the restrictions on the NLD. Six of the 
NLD's 9 central committee members and 80 NLD supporters were released 
from detention, and press attacks on the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi 
ceased. In addition the NLD was able to resume some normal activities 
of a political party.
    The junta restricted freedom of religion; it maintained its 
institutionalized control over Buddhist clergy and restricted efforts 
by some Buddhist clergy to promote human rights and political freedom. 
The Government also coercively promoted Buddhism over other religions 
in some ethnic minority areas and imposed restrictions on certain 
religious minorities.
    The Government did not allow domestic human rights organizations to 
exist and remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny of its human 
rights record. Violence and societal discrimination against women 
remained problems, as did discrimination against religious and ethnic 
minorities. The Government continued to restrict worker rights, ban 
unions, and use forced labor for public works and for the support of 
military garrisons. Forced labor, including forced child labor, remains 
a serious problem. The forced use of citizens as porters by the army--
with attendant mistreatment, illness, and sometimes death-remained a 
common practice. In November the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Governing Body judged that the Government had not taken effective 
action to deal with the ``widespread and systematic'' use of forced 
labor in the country and, for the first time in its history, called on 
all ILO members to apply sanctions to Burma. Child labor also is a 
problem and varies in severity depending on the country's region. 
Trafficking in persons, particularly in women and girls to Thailand and 
China, mostly for the purposes of prostitution, remained widespread.
    Ethnic insurgent forces committed numerous abuses, including 
killings, rapes, forced labor, and the forced use of civilians as 
porters.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There continued to 
be many credible reports of extrajudicial killings by soldiers of 
noncombatant civilians, particularly in areas of ethnic insurgencies 
(see Section 1.g.).
    There were credible reports that army soldiers shot and killed at 
least 73 unarmed ethnic Shan villagers in several repeated incidents in 
Kun-Hing township, Shan State (see Section 1.g.). There were reports 
that soldiers raped and killed women and killed persons who sought to 
prevent such rapes. For example, according to local reports, on January 
11, a patrol of approximately 85 SPDC troops from the 102nd Infantry 
Battalion led by Captain Saw Hpyu beat to death 3 men and gang raped, 
then shot and killed, 2 women along the banks of the Nam Paang river, a 
tributary of the Salween river, in Kun-Hing township. On January 17, 
SPDC troops from Kun-Hing town, from the 246th Infantry Battalion led 
by Commander Than Oo, shot and killed four displaced farmers who were 
returning from their farm. In both the January 11 and 17 incidents, the 
victims were farmers whom the SLORC had relocated forcibly to the area, 
and reportedly were being interrogated about the whereabouts of nearby 
Shan soldiers. In addition there were numerous other reports of SPDC 
soldiers killing forcibly displaced persons who were unable to help 
locate Shan soldiers. There were reports in February that troops raped 
and killed three women in Shan State, and in June that soldiers in Shan 
State killed a man who tried to intervene when the soldiers raped his 
sister (see Section 1.c.). On April 2, troops from the army's 246th 
Light Infantry Division reportedly shot and killed four farmers, and on 
April 7 troops from the 72nd Infantry Battalion shot and killed three 
farmers; both incidents occurred in Kun-Hing township, Shan State.
    Brutal treatment by soldiers also caused deaths among those 
impressed as military porters. According to reports, porters who no 
longer can work often either are abandoned without medical care or 
assistance, or executed. Credible reports indicate that 14 porters 
recruited to work for the military forces in Karen State died between 
April and June, as a result of mistreatment, exhaustion, and 
malnutrition (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.). There was one unconfirmed 
report of extrajudicial killing by police and fire brigade officials 
who reportedly marched a group of drug addicts out of Hpakant in 
Sagaing Division in mid-1999, causing some to die on the road. However, 
no eyewitness evidence regarding this alleged incident ever has 
appeared.
    As in previous years, some inmates died in prisons and labor camps, 
or shortly after being released from them, due to torture or to denial 
of adequate medical care and harsh conditions (see Section 1.c.).
    The military Government also killed persons for political reasons. 
For example, according to the Chin Human Rights Organization, a local 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), on June 26, the Commander of the 
266th Light Infantry Battalion killed Zo Thang, a monitor for the NGO, 
as well as two associates, in Bung Khua village, Chin State (see 
Section 4). This alleged incident could not be confirmed.
    During the year, the Karen National Union (KNU) killed a group of 
three soldiers when they returned to their homes for leave in Karen 
State, where such soldiers apparently are vulnerable. The local army 
contingent retaliated against another nearby village by killing a 
handful of persons, including women and children.
    Some insurgent groups also committed killings. In 1999, near Three 
Pagoda's Pass in the eastern part of the country, soldiers of the KNU 
reportedly captured and killed 10 immigration officials. During the 
year, in Kayah State, elements of the Karenni National Progressive 
Party (KNPP), an insurgent group, reportedly killed several persons, 
including a monk and a mother of five (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
    b. Disappearance.--Throughout the country, as in previous years, 
private citizens and political activists continued to ``disappear'' for 
periods ranging from several hours to several weeks or more; many 
persons never have reappeared. DDSI officials usually apprehend 
individuals for questioning without the knowledge of their family 
members. In many, although not all cases, the DDSI releases them soon 
afterward. Such action usually is intended to prevent free political 
expression or assembly (see Section 2.a.). The army also continued to 
seize numerous persons for porterage or related duties, often without 
the knowledge of their family members (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.). The 
whereabouts of those persons seized by army units to serve as porters, 
as well as of prisoners transferred for labor or porterage duties, 
often remained unknown.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Members of the security forces tortured, beat, and 
otherwise abused prisoners and detainees. The Government routinely 
subjected detainees to harsh interrogation techniques designed to 
intimidate and disorient. The most common forms of mistreatment were 
sleep and food deprivation coupled with around-the-clock questioning 
under bright lights; some detainees also were kicked and beaten. During 
the year, there were credible firsthand reports that, during 
interrogations, officials place metal rods between prisoners' fingers 
and squeeze them in an attempt to injure the prisoners' hands; hot wax 
also is poured on the prisoners' backs. There continued to be credible 
reports that prisoners were forced to squat or assume stressful, 
uncomfortable, or painful positions for lengthy periods. In August 
1999, a military intelligence team placed NLD youth member Thein Lwin 
in detention. Authorities subsequently tortured Thein Lwin for 9 months 
without ever charging him with a crime.
    In late August, during the first 2 days of a 9-day political 
standoff, security forces refused to permit local residents to 
distribute food, water, or medicine to Aung San Suu Kyi and a number of 
her NLD colleagues; they also interfered with several subsequent 
provision deliveries and did not allow Aung San Suu Kyi access to her 
doctor. Aung San Suu Kyi later was placed under house arrest (see 
Sections 1.d., 2.d., and 3). Police sometimes beat NLD members during 
confrontations.
    In September five prison guards and a trustee inmate beat James 
Mawdsley with sticks; Mawdsley, a British political prisoner who was 
confined in Keng Tung until October, suffered a broken nose and two 
black eyes (see Section 1.e.).
    According to the Chin Human Rights Organization, on June 26, the 
266th Light Infantry Battalion reportedly forced a 29-year-old Chin 
farmer, a woman named Pi Sai Sung, to walk 28 miles with rags stuffed 
in her mouth and wearing only a bra and underwear. The army reportedly 
abused her in this manner because Pi Sai allegedly had had a 
relationship with a human rights field monitor whom the battalion 
killed that same day (see Section 4). However, the events of this 
alleged incident could not be confirmed.
    There continued to be many credible reports that security forces 
subjected ordinary citizens to harassment and physical abuse. The 
military forces routinely confiscate property, cash, and food, and use 
coercive and abusive recruitment methods to procure porters. Those 
persons forced into porterage or other labor faced extremely difficult 
conditions, and beatings and mistreatment that sometimes resulted in 
death (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and 6.c.). For example, the military 
requires all Rohingya farmers from a village in Northern Rakhine State 
to provide 10 days of labor a month to the military. If they arrive 
late for their duty, the local major makes them roll down a bramble-
covered hill as punishment. Numerous other Rohingya men say that all of 
the men from their village must work every 2 weeks as porters to carry 
food and ammunition to military camps near Bangladesh. The men describe 
the trek as quite dangerous, particularly when the soldiers beat them 
with bamboo canes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    For decades successive military regimes have applied a strategy of 
forced relocation against ethnic minority groups seeking autonomy; 
these forcible relocations continue, particularly alongside the Thai 
border. Thousands of villagers continue to flee or be driven from their 
homes, where they come to struggle in makeshift forest shelters without 
adequate food, security, or basic medical care--frequently in heavily 
mined areas. In a December 1999 Karen Human Rights Group report, Karen 
villagers said that the army and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army 
(DKBA), an armed ethnic group allied with the Government, frequently 
enter villages together, demanding money, food, and other favors. Those 
persons unable to deliver may be killed, beaten, subjected to forced 
labor, or raped (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., 2.d., and 6.c.). There are 
numerous reports that SPDC troops loot and confiscate property and 
possessions from forcibly relocated persons, or persons who are away 
from their homes; these materials often are used for military 
construction.
    Throughout the year, the NLD reported numerous complaints of 
extensive government mistreatment and exploitation of Kun Gyan Kone 
farmers, particularly those unable to meet government quotas (due to 
low rice yields). According to the NLD, many farmers were forced to 
sell their crops, land, and cattle for less than the market rate; some 
persons were detained, and the Government seized the property of others 
(see Section 1.d.).
    There were frequent reports that army soldiers and other army 
personnel raped women who were members of ethnic minorities, especially 
in Shan, Karenni, and Karen States. For example, according to 
www.Shanland.org, a web site organized by Shan human rights and news 
organizations, on February 23, three SPDC soldiers raped two women who 
were catching fish in a stream near Ta Khoi village. On March 13, SPDC 
troops allegedly gang raped and beat to death three women who were 
collecting firewood in the forest near the road from Murng-Ton to 
Murng-Sart township, Shan State. On March 29, a Light Infantry 
Battalion captain reportedly raped a displaced Shan woman at Naa Kawng 
Mu village, Murng Harng tract, Murng-Ton township, and threatened to 
imprison the village leaders who came to complain about it. On June 29, 
another Light Infantry Division captain allegedly raped a woman and 
shot and killed her brother who tried to intervene, at a rice farm in 
Lai-Kha township, Shan State. None of the incidents in these 
www.Shanland.org reports could be confirmed. There were many similar 
reports throughout the year.
    Members of insurgent forces also reportedly raped civilians.
    Prison conditions generally remained harsh and life threatening. 
The Government's Department of Prisons operates many facilities, 
including several labor camps. Prisoners are permitted to receive 
medicine and food from their families during 15-minute visits once 
every 2 weeks. Throughout the year, the Government transferred many 
prisoners--including NLD members--from Insein prison to prisons and 
labor camps far from Rangoon, where conditions are much harsher. There 
also were credible reports that at least a few prisoners long have been 
denied adequate medical care. Some of these prisoners died as a result. 
In July 1999, NLD member-elect of parliament Kyaw Min died of hepatitis 
contracted in prison. He had been detained from 1996 to 1998 without 
trial and was released to his family just prior to his death. Tun Zaw 
Zaw, a NLD youth leader who was released on December 31, 1999, also 
lost his sight while under detention and was detained again on 
September 14 and, again, on September 21. At year's end, he remained in 
detention in Insein Prison. In Thauntha township of Mandalay Division, 
the authorities arrested U Aung Kyaw, U Maung Nyo, U Nyo Hla, and U 
Htay Gyi for sending a letter of appeal regarding the Government's 
commandeering of private vehicles. U Aung Kyaw's request for medical 
attention was denied, and on April 30, he died of hypertension after 5 
days in jail.
    International monitoring of prisons began in May 1999, when the 
ICRC was allowed unrestricted access to all prisoners in all prisons, 
detention centers, and labor camps. Visits by the ICRC to labor camps 
began in March, and it visited six labor camps by year's end. In 
response to ICRC recommendations, the Government provided some 
prisoners with an opportunity for exercise, better food, reading 
material, and improved medical care. As of September, the ICRC had 
visited more than 35,000 prisoners in at least 30 prisons, including 
more than 1,800 political prisoners (see Section 1.e.). The ICRC also 
has begun tackling the problem of the roughly 36,000 persons in forced 
labor camps. The Government allowed the ICRC to perform its traditional 
services, such as providing medications, delivering letters to and from 
prisoners, and providing support for family visits to prisoners.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There is no provision in 
the law for judicial determination of the legality of detention, and 
the SPDC routinely used arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention. 
For example, Aung San Suu Kyi was held incommunicado twice in 
September, following her attempt to visit NLD party workers on the 
outskirts of Rangoon and her attempt to travel by train to Mandalay 
(see Sections 2.b., 2.d., and 3). Prior to being charged, detainees 
rarely have access to legal counsel or their families and political 
detainees have no opportunity to obtain release on bail. Even after 
being charged, detainees rarely have the benefit of counsel. Some 
political detainees are held incommunicado for long periods. Moreover, 
Section 10a of the Penal Code allows the authorities to extend 
sentences arbitrarily, and some political prisoners were not released 
after completing their sentences. In Mandalay 11 prisoners sentenced 
for political reasons--including Zaw Min, Ne Win, U Tin Aye Yu, U Tin 
Myint, U Tin Aye, U Khin Maung Thant, U Zarni Aung, U Thein Than Oo, U 
Kyaw Sein Maung, U Naing Myint, U Htay Nyunt--have completed their 
terms, but have not been released. Countrywide, at least 30 prisoners 
in 7 different prisons are held in similar circumstances.
    Authorities continued to detain some private citizens and political 
activists continued to ``disappear'' temporarily at the hands of 
security forces (see Section 1.b.).
    The Government repeatedly detained and deported foreign journalists 
(see Section 2.a.).
    Throughout the year, the Government continued its campaign of 
detention and intimidation against the NLD. Between April and May the 
authorities arrested scores of NLD members-elect of parliament and 
sentenced four of them to periods of between 2 and 15 years in prison. 
Than Lwin, Kyaw Shwe, Nyein Maung, and Tin Aung Lay, the four elected 
members who were held, were detained for fabricating accusations 
against township organizations, instigating threats to peace and 
stability by spreading rumors to mislead the public, and illegally 
organizing villagers. In addition U Aye Tha Aung, who represented four 
large ethnic groups in the CRPP, was arrested in April and sentenced, 
in secret, to 21 years in prison for ``trying to destroy the unity of 
the nationalities.'' Following local party elections for the NLD's 
youth and women's organizations in April, all 38 of the newly elected 
party officials were arrested and sentenced to periods in prison 
ranging from 6 months to 40 years. In addition on May 27, the NLD 
headquarter's two elderly landladies, Daw Khin Nu and Daw Chaw, were 
arrested for disturbing the peace and spent several weeks in Insein 
prison. Also in May in Taung-Dwin-Gyi township, Magwe Division, police 
detained 25 NLD youth members and transferred them to Thayet prison 
without their families' knowledge. These youth members were released, 
but only after their parents agreed to prevent their children from 
communicating with the NLD offices. On September 27, police detained 
83-year-old member-elect U Maung Maung Gyi, the senior leader at NLD 
headquarters, for 12 hours in order to ensure that he did not organize 
any celebration of the NLD's 12th anniversary.
    At year's end, the Government continued to detain without charge 48 
members-elect of parliament in 1990. Most were NLD members and most had 
been detained since September 1998, just before the NLD formed the 
CRPP. Other members-elect of parliament were released during the year. 
However, there were credible reports that many of these members-elect 
were released only after they agreed to resign from parliament, to 
withdraw their support from the CRPP, or otherwise to restrict their 
political activities.
    Throughout the year, the NLD brought complaints about extensive 
government mistreatment and exploitation of Kun Gyan Kone farmers; 
numerous farmers were held in custody for failing to meet rice quotas 
(see Section 1.c.). For example, in Karen State, armed KNPP units 
threaten farmers with death for nonpayment of taxes. If the farmer 
pays, the army then imprisons him for 3 years for ``unlawful 
association.'' According to the Karen Human Rights Group, in March army 
troops burned at least nine villages in Dweh Loh township, just 
southwest of the town of Papun, and then planted landmines in them.
    Since 1988, when the SPDC refused to recognize the results of the 
elections and pressured successful candidates to resign, some 
candidates, as well as thousands of political activists, went into 
forced exile rather than face threats.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent 
of the military junta. The junta appoints justices to the Supreme Court 
which, in turn, appoints lower court judges with the approval of the 
junta. These courts then adjudicate cases under decrees promulgated by 
the junta that effectively have the force of law.
    The court system, as inherited from the United Kingdom and 
subsequently restructured, comprises courts at the township, district, 
state, and national levels.
    Throughout the year, the Government continued to rule by decree and 
was not bound by any constitutional provisions providing for fair 
public trials or any other rights. Although remnants of the British-era 
legal system formally were in place, the court system and its operation 
remained seriously flawed, particularly in the handling of political 
cases. Unprofessional behavior by some court officials, the misuse of 
overly broad laws--including the Emergency Provisions Act of 1950, the 
Unlawful Associations Act, the Habitual Offenders Act, and the Law on 
Safeguarding the State from the Danger of Destructionists--and the 
manipulation of the courts for political ends continued to deprive 
citizens of the right to a fair trial and the rule of law. Pervasive 
corruption further serves to undermine the impartiality of the justice 
system.
    Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public 
trial and to be represented by a defense attorney, generally were 
respected in criminal cases, but not in political cases that the 
Government deemed especially sensitive. In criminal cases, defense 
attorneys generally are permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses; 
however, their primary purpose is to bargain with the judge to obtain 
the shortest possible sentence for their clients. Most court 
proceedings are open to the public. However, in political cases, trials 
are not open to the public. In political cases, defense attorneys 
appear to serve no purpose other than to perpetuate the pretense of a 
fair trial, since reliable reports indicate that senior military 
authorities dictate verdicts, regardless of the evidence or the law. In 
one case, Chein Poh, a 77-year-old highly respected and nonpolitical 
lawyer, was sentenced to 14 years in prison for allegedly distributing 
articles from foreign newspapers and magazines with antigovernment 
annotations (see Section 2.a.). Although the Government was not able to 
prove its case against him, he was given two consecutive 7-year 
sentences for the same activity. However, his actual offense was the 
fact that he is a neighbor of U Tin Oo, the vicechairman of the NLD. In 
October, following an appeal by U.N. Special Representative Razali, 
authorities released from prison U Chein Poh and five other elderly 
prisoners.
    U Chein Poh's arrest and conviction may have been part of an 
extensive government campaign to eliminate the remaining independent 
lawyers in the country who might provide advice and counsel to the NLD. 
During the year, the Government arrested and sentenced under fabricated 
charges nearly every lawyer with any perceived connection with the NLD. 
Cases include that of U Soe Han, a prominent NLD lawyer who was charged 
with having failed to inform the Government that he planned to stay 
overnight at his mother's house (see Section 1.f.). Authorities 
released U Soe Han following his wife's death. However, they rearrested 
U Soe Han in September and sentenced him, along with several other 
prominent individuals, to 21 years in prison for sending a letter to 
Senior General Than Shwe and Secretary One Khin Nyunt that urged the 
Government to release political prisoners and start a dialog with the 
NLD. Altogether, the Government jailed more than 40 lawyers during the 
year. In 1999 two prodemocracy activists were sentenced to long prison 
terms for actions that elsewhere would have been deemed innocuous. 
After two arrests in 1997 and 1998, and imprisonment for 90 days of a 
5-year prison sentence for illegal entry, a British citizen, James 
Mawdsley, was arrested for a third time in August 1999, and sentenced 
to a total of 17 years in Keng Tung prison. On October 19, he was 
released, shortly after the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
informed the Government that Mawdsley's detention violated 
international standards of human rights (see Section 1.c.). In 
September 1999, Rachel Goldwyn, a foreign citizen, was arrested after 
chaining herself to a lamppost in downtown Rangoon and singing a 
prodemocracy song. She was convicted of sedition and sentenced to 7 
years' imprisonment, but was released on appeal and left the country in 
November 1999.
    During the year, the Government allowed two visits by U.N. Special 
Envoy to Burma, Ismail Razali (see Section 4). In late December, 
shortly before an expected return Razali (scheduled for January 2001), 
the Government released several political prisoners from the list of 
aged prisoners presented by Razali during his first and second visit. 
Late in the year, the Government released 6 of the NLD's 9 central 
committee members and 80 NLD supporters from detention.
    Opposition political parties have attempted to use the courts to 
enforce their political rights, thus far without success. In 1999 the 
Supreme Court dismissed suits brought by members of the NLD's central 
executive committee (CEC) against SPDC Secretary One, and Lt. Gen. Khin 
Nyunt, the chief of military intelligence. The suits alleged that the 
military intelligence apparatus violated the rights of private 
individuals in connection with the detention of NLD members elected to 
parliament in 1990. The NLD CEC members also filed suit against other 
senior government officials for libel, fraud, and intimidation in 
connection with government-organized petitions of ``no confidence'' in 
NLD members-elect of parliament (see Sections 1.d. and 3). The hearing 
on these cases was closed to the public and, in both cases, the Supreme 
Court's verdict went against the NLD. On April 27, the Supreme Court 
dismissed an appeal by the NLD against the SPDC for illegally detaining 
and libeling memberselect of parliament. The Supreme Court ruled that a 
case could not proceed against a government official--in this case head 
of military intelligence Lt. General Khin Nyunt--if the Head of State 
did not grant permission. In September lawyers for the NLD began a suit 
against General Than Shwe and the Chairman of the Election Commission 
for failing to fulfill commitments made in regard to the transition to 
democracy.
    The ICRC estimated that there were 1,800 political prisoners in the 
country as of July, and during the year the ICRC completed visits to 
almost all of them. In addition some political prisoners remained in 
custody despite having completed their sentences (see Section 1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The military Government continued to interfere 
extensively and arbitrarily in the lives of citizens. Through its 
pervasive intelligence network and administrative procedures, the 
Government systematically monitored the travel of all citizens and 
closely monitored the activities of many citizens, particularly those 
known to be active politically. The law requires that any person who 
spends the night at a place other than his registered domicile inform 
the police in advance, and that any household that hosts a person not 
domiciled there maintain and submit to the police a guest list. 
Moreover, police routinely enter and search homes at night without 
warrants to enforce compliance with this requirement.
    In May U Soe Han, a lawyer for the NLD, was detained under this 
law, as a result of having spent the night of May 27 (the tenth 
anniversary of the 1990 general election) at his mother's house (see 
Section 1.e.). Security personnel also commonly searched private 
premises and other property without warrants in other contexts.
    Government employees generally are required to obtain advance 
permission before meeting with foreigners.
    Government employees generally are prohibited from joining or 
supporting political parties; however, this proscription is applied 
selectively. In the case of the Government's own mass mobilization 
organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, the 
Government has used coercion and intimidation to induce many persons, 
including nearly all public sector employees, both to join the union 
and to attend meetings called to criticize the NLD and NLD members-
elect of parliament (see Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 3).
    Government officials, including senior officials, continued 
repeatedly to make statements in the state-monopolized domestic media 
warning parents that authorities could hold them responsible for any 
political offenses committed by their children. The Government's 
intelligence services also monitor the movements of foreigners and 
question citizens about conversations with foreigners. In addition, in 
July 1998, the Government officially banned marriages between female 
citizens and foreigners; however, this ban has not been enforced.
    Telephone service also is controlled tightly. Security personnel 
regularly screen private correspondence and telephone calls. Government 
authorities continued generally to prevent citizens from subscribing 
directly to foreign publications or satellite television (see Section 
2.a.). In addition the Government licenses and rations all electronic 
communication devices, which are monitored closely. A decree 
promulgated by the junta in 1996 has made possession of an unregistered 
telephone, facsimile machine, or computer modem punishable by 
imprisonment (see Section 2.a.). In April an Indonesian citizen, Irawan 
Sidaria, and two local technicians were arrested under this statute for 
having installed an Inmarsat satellite telephone unit at the Asia Plaza 
Hotel in Rangoon. The communication equipment, which provided 10 
telephone lines for oversea calls, had not been licensed by the state-
owned Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications. In June Myanmar Posts and 
Telecommunications also announced that users of nonregistered cordless 
telephones in the country would face up to 3 years imprisonment or a 
fine of about $75 (30,000 Kyat), or both.
    During late 1998 and early 1999, the Government refused to allow 
Aung San Suu Kyi's terminally ill husband, Michael Aris, to travel from 
Britain to visit his wife in Rangoon. The Government stated that if 
Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to see her British husband, she could leave the 
country to visit him in the United Kingdom. The Government also 
announced that it would allow the prodemocracy leader to reenter the 
country only if it judged her visit to be nonpolitical. At about the 
same time, state-owned media and billboards and government-organized 
mass rallies called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be expelled.
    Weak private property rights and poor land ownership records 
facilitate involuntary relocations of persons by the State. The law 
does not permit private ownership of land; it recognizes only different 
categories of land use rights, many of which are not freely 
transferable. Postcolonial land laws also have revived the precolonial 
tradition that private rights to land are contingent upon the land 
being put to productive use.
    To make way for commercial or public construction and, in some 
cases, for reasons of internal security and political control, the SPDC 
has relocated forcibly citizens to ``new towns.'' Prevalent during the 
early 1990's, this practice has become much more restrictive. Persons 
relocated to new towns generally suffer from greatly reduced 
infrastructure support, and residents targeted for displacement 
generally are given no option but to move, usually on short notice (see 
Section 2.d.).
    In rural areas the military Government frequently forcibly 
relocated ethnic minority villages. This practice was particularly 
widespread in the Shan, Kayah, and Karen States and in areas of Mon 
State and Pegu Division. In these areas, thousands of villagers were 
displaced from their traditional villages and herded into secure 
settlements in strategic areas. These forced relocations often are 
accompanied by demands for forced labor to build infrastructure for 
both villagers and army units and often have generated large refugee 
flows to neighboring countries and/or to parts of the country not 
controlled by the Government (see Sections 1.c., 2.c., 2.d., 5, and 
6.c.). In some areas, the junta has replaced the original ethnic 
settlements with settlements of Burmans. This was the case in Arakan 
State in 1999 and during the year, where the Government forcibly 
relocated several largely Muslim villages, and resettled the area with 
Buddhist Burmans, who were forced to move from Dagon Township in 
Rangoon Division. In other areas, army units forced or attempted to 
force ethnic Karen to relocate to areas controlled by the DKBA (see 
Section 5).
    Military units also have routinely confiscated livestock, fuel, 
food supplies, alcoholic drinks, or money. This abuse has become 
widespread since 1997, when the junta, intent upon continuing its 
military buildup despite mounting financial problems, ordered its 
regional commanders to meet their logistical needs locally rather than 
rely on the central authorities. As a result, regional commanders have 
increased their use of forced contributions of food, labor, and 
building materials throughout the country (see Sections 1.c., 5, and 
6.c.).
    Both army and insurgent units have used forced conscription.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Since independence in 1948, the army has battled a 
series of diverse ethnic insurgencies. These ethnic insurgent groups 
have sought to gain greater autonomy or, in some cases, independence 
from the ethnic Burman-dominated State. Since 1989 15 such groups have 
concluded cease-fire agreements with the Government. Under these 
agreements, these groups have retained their own armed forces and 
perform some governmental functions within specified territories 
inhabited chiefly by members of their ethnic groups. However, other 
groups remain in active revolt. The KNU has continued to conduct 
insurgent operations in areas with significant Karen populations in the 
eastern and southern regions of the country, including not only Karen 
State, but also Mon State, Tenasserim Division, and Pegu Division. In 
Kayah State, the KNPP has resumed fighting against the Government since 
the breakdown of a cease-fire negotiated in 1995.
    In central and southern Shan State, military forces continued to 
engage the Shan State Army (SSA). The military maintained a program of 
forced relocation of villagers in that region and there were credible 
reports of army killings, rapes, and other atrocities.
    On January 30, in Kaeng-Kham village, Kun-Hing township, Shan 
State, SPDC troops reportedly shot and killed 19 unarmed villagers aged 
15 to 57 years. The villagers previously had been resettled forcibly, 
but on January 18, Lieutenant Colonel Kyaw Aye, Commander of the army's 
246th Infantry Battalion, reportedly told the villagers that the 
Government had decided that for a fee they would be permitted to 
resettle in their old village. The 66th army Infantry Battalion led by 
Captain Zaw Thein, which later encountered the villagers, confronted 
then later shot and killed the 19 persons who chose to pay a fee. The 
villagers reportedly were killed because they were found in a ``free-
fire'' zone; the safe-conduct passes were not recognized. On February 
12, 80 to 90 SPDC troops led by Captain Hla Khin, again from the 246th 
Infantry Battalion, reportedly killed 20 villagers in Kun Pu tract, 
Kun-Hing township and 5 other villagers, at a different place. The 
villagers also were among those who the SLORC had displaced forcibly in 
1996 and 1997. It is believed that these massacres were intended to 
terrorize and intimidate the villagers so that they would either go to 
relocation sites or flee to Thailand.
    According to an April report available at www.Shanland.org, on 
March 27, in Murng-Kerng town, Shan State, a group of SPDC troops from 
the 514th Light Infantry Battalion reportedly shot and killed 13 
relocated farmers (8 men and 5 women) who were clearing a plot of land 
for growing rice. The same battalion reportedly raped and killed three 
women in Kai-See township, Shan State. Neither incident could be 
independently verified or confirmed.
    In May the army's 246th Light Infantry Division and its 524th Light 
Infantry Division reportedly killed a total of 73 Shan villagers, 
including women and children, in 2 separate incidents in Kun-Hing 
township, Shan State (see Sections 1.a. and 2.d.). On August 2, the 
army's 520th Light Infantry Battalion shot and killed a family of six 
at their rice farm in Murng-Pan township, Shan State. Numerous similar 
army killings of civilians occurred throughout the year.
    Other active insurgent groups include the Chin National Front, the 
Naga National Council, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and the 
Arakan National Organization.
    Some antigovernment insurgent groups also committed serious abuses. 
Some KNU units killed civilians, in one case by blowing up a passenger 
bus with a landmine. During the year, KNPP elements reportedly killed a 
Buddhist monk, Sayador U Bandarkawthala, in Demawso township, Kayah 
State. They also were accused of gang raping and killing Ma Nyunt Tin, 
a mother of five children, in the vicinity of Soe Hlar village, Kayah 
State. SSA insurgents reportedly committed retaliatory killings, rapes, 
and other atrocities against civilians. There were credible reports 
that some insurgents used women and children as porters (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.d.). According to an unconfirmed August report available at 
www.Shanland.org, on June 2, five displaced persons from Loi-Lem 
township reportedly were killed by a landmine blast, planted by members 
of the United Wa State Army in Murng-Ton township, Shan State. At least 
one Karen insurgent group calling itself God's Army, which has split 
from the KNU and operated from a base inside the country near the 
border with Thailand, was led by child soldiers (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.d.).
    On January 24, 10 armed God's Army members seized the provincial 
hospital in Ratchaburi, Thailand, taking several hundred persons 
hostage; the next day, Thai security forces killed all 10 terrorists 
while retaking the hospital. In September 1999, five young armed Karen 
(of the same group) seized the Burmese embassy in Thailand and held 
persons of several nationalities hostage.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law allows the Government to 
restrict freedom of speech and of the press and, in practice, the junta 
continued to restrict these freedoms severely and systematically. The 
Government continued to arrest, detain, convict, and imprison many 
persons for expressing political opinions critical of the junta, and 
for distributing or possessing publications in which such opinions were 
expressed (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.). Security services also 
monitored and harassed persons believed to hold such political 
opinions. Many more persons refrained from speaking out due to fear of 
arrest, interrogation, and other forms of intimidation.
    Legal restrictions on freedom of speech, already severe since the 
early 1960's, have intensified since 1996, when the junta issued a 
decree prohibiting speeches or statements that ``undermine national 
stability,'' as well as with the drafting of alternative constitutions. 
In all regions of the country, the military Government continued to use 
force to prohibit virtually all public speech critical of it by all 
persons, including persons elected to parliament in 1990, and by 
leaders of political parties. The Government has pursued this policy 
consistently since 1990, with one exception--from late 1995 to December 
1996, the Government allowed weekly speeches by NLD leaders in front of 
Aung San Suu Kyi's residence in Rangoon.
    Many prominent writers and journalists remain in prison. In 1999 
novelist Maung Tha Ya fled the country and identified 20 prominent 
writers who then were in prison. These included novelist and journalist 
San San Nweh, who was imprisoned in 1994 for a 10-year-term for passing 
information about human rights violations to international reporters 
and U.N. observers. Government censorship boards forbade publication or 
distribution of works authored by those in prison, although the 
Government allowed former political prisoners, Ma Thida, and U Sein 
Myint (also known as U Moe Thu), to write several magazine articles 
following their release from prison.
    On May 26, the junta announced that security forces had seized 
``inflammatory'' leaflets, stickers, and calendars bearing the monk 
association's seal, and arrested Zaw Min Oo in the Bago Division. These 
published sheets allegedly were to be distributed within religious 
associations. In September the junta also sentenced Chein Poh, a highly 
respected, 77-year-old lawyer in Rangoon for allegedly distributing 
foreign publications with antiregime annotations written on the back. 
Although the regime presented no credible evidence to prove the charge, 
Chein Poh was sentenced to 14 years in prison (see Section 1.e.). 
Between April and June, the junta arrested an additional 11 persons for 
distributing antijunta leaflets and allegedly planning attacks on 
government buildings.
    The Government did not permit Aung San Suu Kyi to communicate with 
the outside world during the initial period of her house arrest. 
However, after November she was permitted to meet with selected members 
of the NLD's Central Executive Committee, U.N. Special Representative 
Ismail Razali, and representatives of the European Union, among others 
(see Sections 1.d., 2.b., 2.d., and 3).
    The Government owns and controls all daily newspapers and domestic 
radio and television broadcasting facilities. These official media 
remained propaganda organs of the junta and normally did not report 
opposing views except to criticize them. The one, partial exception was 
the Myanmar Times, an expensive English-language weekly newspaper 
targeted at the foreign community in Rangoon that was launched in 
February, and which occasionally reported on criticism of the 
Government's policies by the U.N. and other organizations.
    All privately owned publications remained subject to prepublication 
censorship by state censorship boards. Due in part to the time required 
to obtain the approval of the censors, private news periodicals 
generally are published monthly or less often. However, since 1996, the 
Government has given transferable waivers of prepublication censorship 
for weekly periodicals. As a result, weekly tabloids have proliferated; 
however, they remain subject in principle to censorship and generally 
do not report domestic political news. Most in fact are published by 
government departments. Government control encourages self-censorship.
    Imported publications remained subject in principle to 
predistribution censorship by state censorship boards, and possession 
of publications not approved by the state censorship boards remained a 
serious offense. Cases involving prodemocracy literature were punished 
regularly by imprisonment. The Government also restricted the legal 
importation of foreign news periodicals and discouraged subscriptions 
to foreign periodicals. However, a limited selection of foreign 
newspapers could be purchased at hotels and bookstores in Rangoon (see 
Section 1.f.). Prior to August these foreign newspapers and magazines 
also were censored regularly at the airport on arrival; subsequently, 
the Government's policy ceased to be enforced.
    Since 1997 the Government has issued few visas to foreign 
journalists and has held fewer than a handful of press conferences on 
political subjects. Several journalists who entered the country as 
tourists were detained and deported by the Government.
    Due to widespread poverty, limited literacy, and poor 
infrastructure, radio remained the most important medium of mass 
communication. News periodicals rarely circulated outside urban areas, 
and most villages lacked access to electrical power, except from 
generators or batteries. The junta continued to monopolize and to 
control the content of all domestic radio broadcasting tightly. Foreign 
radio broadcasts, such as those of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the Norway-based 
Democratic Voice of Burma, remained the principal sources of uncensored 
information; however, individuals were arrested for listening to these 
services. In December 1999, U Than Chaun, the owner of a coffee shop in 
Shwe-Goo Township of Kachin State was arrested and sentenced to 2 
years' imprisonment with hard labor for having the radio in his coffee 
shop tuned to Voice of America.
    The Government also continued to monopolize and to control tightly 
all domestic television broadcasting, offering only a government 
channel and an armed forces channel. In addition the Government 
continued to restrict the reception of foreign satellite television 
broadcasts through laws that made the operation of an unlicensed 
satellite television receiver a crime punishable by up to 3 years in 
prison (see Section 1.f.). The Television and Video Law makes it a 
criminal offense to publish, distribute, or possess a videotape not 
approved by a state censorship board. In 1996 the junta issued an 
amendment to that law that stiffened the penalties for distributing 
uncensored videos.
    The junta continued to restrict access to electronic media severely 
and systematically. Under a decree promulgated by the junta in 1996, 
all computers, software, and associated telecommunications devices are 
subject to government registration, and possession of unregistered 
equipment is punishable by imprisonment (see Section 1.f.).
    The Ministry of Defense continued to operate the country's only 
known Internet server and has begun to offer Internet services 
selectively to a small number of customers. However, in December 1999, 
military intelligence arrested Col. Khin Maung Lwin, who managed the 
Defense Ministry's Internet operations, and charged him with violating 
the Official Secrets Act. One email service, which is government-owned, 
is available. In December 1999, military intelligence officials closed 
down several private email services and computer training schools. The 
country's first cybercafe opened in Rangoon in 1999 but did not offer 
patrons direct access to the Internet.
    The Government continued to restrict academic freedom severely. 
University teachers and professors remain subject to the same 
restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and 
publications as other government employees. The Ministry of Higher 
Education routinely warns teachers against criticism of the Government. 
It also instructs them not to discuss politics while at work; prohibits 
them from joining or supporting political parties or engaging in 
political activity; and requires them to obtain advance ministerial 
approval for meetings with foreigners. Like all government employees, 
professors and teachers have been coerced into joining and 
participating in the activities of the Union Solidarity and Development 
Association (USDA), the Government's mass mobilization organization. 
Teachers at all levels also continued to be held responsible for the 
political activities of their students.
    In June and July, the Government reopened the remainder of the 
institutions of higher education that were closed in 1996, following 
widespread student demonstrations. This completed a process that began 
in August 1997, when primary and secondary schools reopened. With this 
latest action, all graduate and undergraduate schools have reopened. 
However, the Government has taken a number of special measures to limit 
the possibility of student unrest. Campuses have been moved to 
relatively remote areas, teachers and students have been warned that 
disturbances would be dealt with severely, and on-campus dormitories 
have been closed. This has disrupted university life severely. There is 
evidence that many students have decided to continue with self-study, 
because the universities have deteriorated to such an extent during the 
time that they were closed and have become so inaccessible.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
restricts freedom of assembly severely. It officially prohibits 
unauthorized outdoor assemblies of more than five persons; however, 
that ordinance is not enforced consistently. The 10 existing political 
parties also are required legally to request permission from the 
Government to hold meetings of their members; nevertheless, meetings 
occurred without government permission.
    The military junta continued its systematic decade-long use of 
coercion and intimidation to prevent the parliament elected in 1990 
from convening (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 3).
    The Government severely restricts freedom of association, 
particularly in regard to members of the main opposition political 
party, the NLD. While the Government has allowed the NLD to celebrate 
certain key party events with public gatherings at Aung San Suu Kyi's 
residence or the national NLD party headquarters in Rangoon, it has 
restricted the size of the gatherings and the individuals who were 
allowed to attend. For example on September 26, the NLD's 12th 
anniversary, junta forces blocked all traffic from roads surrounding 
NLD headquarters, with a heavy military intelligence and riot police 
presence for two blocks on either side of the building. It also has 
prevented NLD General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi from traveling to 
party meetings outside of Rangoon, stopping her four times in 1998 and 
once during the year.
    As in previous years, there were incidents during which security 
forces publicly beat NLD members as they attempted peaceably to 
assemble or attend meetings. On April 30, the security forces also 
detained 37 NLD members from Taun-Dwin-Gyi township, Magwe Division, 
for holding a party meeting.
    Throughout the year, government authorities in various parts of the 
country used force to prevent prodemocracy demonstrations or punish 
participants in them. Authorities detained or arrested and in many 
cases convicted and imprisoned persons suspected of planning such 
demonstrations (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). On September 21, NLD 
members gathered at Rangoon train station to see Aung San Suu Kyi off 
on her proposed trip to Mandalay; however, police arrested them and at 
year's end, they still were in custody. Approximately 100 NLD members 
were arrested at the time (see Sections 2.d. and 3).
    In 1999 the Government sometimes interfered with religious groups' 
assemblies or other outdoor gatherings; however, there were no credible 
reports of such activity during the year (see Section 2.c.).
    Since 1998, when the NLD's national leadership first organized the 
CRPP, the Government's campaign against the NLD has intensified. This 
campaign initially involved mass rallies and government-organized 
``recall'' movements against members-elect of parliament. This was 
followed by direct pressure on individual NLD members. Throughout the 
year, government media published hundreds of reports from localities 
across the country that stated that NLD members had ``voluntarily 
resigned'' from the party in groups ranging in size from fewer than 10 
to more than 1,000 persons. By year's end, the reported number of NLD 
members who voluntarily resigned numbered in the tens of thousands.
    These resignations from the NLD generally were coerced, according 
to the persons concerned. In some townships, authorities pressured NLD 
officers to resign, and then declared the local party organizations 
defunct due to a lack of recognized officers. In other localities, NLD 
officials who refused to resign from the party were arrested or 
imprisoned on fabricated charges, and/or recall motions were mounted 
against them. For example, U Tun Win, member-elect from Min Don 
township of Magwe Division, was forced to resign as a member of the 
NLD, and was sent to prison for 3 years for illegally possessing 
foreign videotapes found at his son's video rental store (see Section 
2.a.).
    Outside the capital, government pressure was particularly intense. 
In some cases, members-elect of parliament were required to register at 
police stations twice per day.
    In general the right of association existed only for organizations, 
including trade associations and professional bodies, permitted by law 
and duly registered with the Government, such as the Forest Reserve 
Environment Development and Conservation Association. The one exception 
to this general rule was the USDA, which the Government has attempted 
to develop as a nationwide political organization. Few secular 
nonprofit organizations exist, and those that do exist take special 
care to act in accordance with government policy. This group included 
nominally apolitical organizations such as the Myanmar Red Cross and 
the Myanmar Medical Association. Only 10 political parties are legally 
in existence, and most of those are moribund.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Most adherents of all religions duly 
registered with the authorities generally enjoyed freedom to worship as 
they chose; however, the Government imposed some restrictions on 
certain religious minorities. In addition in practice the Government 
systematically restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human 
rights and political freedom, and coercively promoted Buddhism over 
other religions in some ethnic minority areas.
    The most recent constitution, promulgated in 1974, permitted both 
legislative and administrative restrictions on religious freedom, 
stating that ``the national races shall enjoy the freedom to profess 
their religion . . . provided that the enjoyment of any such freedom 
does not offend the laws or the public interest.'' The Government 
requires religious organizations, like all organizations, to register 
with it. Although there is a government directive exempting ``genuine'' 
religious organizations from registration, in practice only registered 
organizations can buy or sell property or open bank accounts, which 
induces most religious organizations to register. Religious 
organizations register with the Ministry of Home Affairs with the 
endorsement of the Ministry for Religious Affairs. The State also 
provides some utilities, such as electricity, at preferential rates to 
recognized organizations.
    The Government routinely monitored religious meetings, like all 
assemblies; and it subjected religious publications, like all 
publications, to censorship and control.
    There is no official state religion; however, the Government 
continued to show preference for Theravada Buddhism, the majority 
religion. State-controlled news media frequently depict junta members 
paying homage to Buddhist monks, making donations at pagodas throughout 
the country, officiating at ceremonies to open, improve, restore, or 
maintain pagodas, and organizing ostensibly voluntary ``people's 
donations'' of money, food, and uncompensated labor to build or 
refurbish Buddhist religious shrines throughout the country. State-
owned newspapers routinely featured, as front-page banner slogans, 
quotations from the Buddhist scriptures. Buddhist doctrine remained 
part of the state-mandated curriculum in all elementary schools; 
however, individual children could opt out of instruction in Buddhism. 
The Government also funded the construction of the International 
Theravada Buddhist Missionary University in Rangoon, which opened in 
December 1998; its stated purpose is ``to share Myanmar's knowledge of 
Buddhism with the people of the world.''
    The Government also has attempted to control the Buddhist clergy, 
although the clergy have resisted this control. In October 1990, the 
military junta promulgated Order 6/90, which prohibits any organization 
of Buddhist clergy other than nine state-recognized monastic orders, 
which submit to the authority of a state-sponsored State Clergy 
Coordination Committee (``Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee''--SMNC). It 
also issued Order 7/90, which authorizes military commanders to try 
Buddhist clergy before military tribunals for ``activities inconsistent 
with and detrimental to Buddhism,'' and Order 20/90 which imposes on 
Buddhist clergy a code of conduct that is enforced by criminal 
penalties. These edicts remain in effect. The junta also has subjected 
the Buddhist clergy (``sangha'') to special restrictions on freedom of 
expression and association and, since 1995, has prohibited the 
ordination as clergy of any member of a political party.
    In 1999 the senior abbots of five monasteries around Mandalay 
protested a new order by the regional military command that forbade 
Buddhist clergy to leave their township of residence without first 
surrendering their identity cards and obtaining written permission from 
local authorities. Persons other than Buddhist clergy generally were 
not subject to such severe restrictions on movement (see Section 2.d.). 
In addition more than 100 monks have been imprisoned during the 1990's 
for supporting democracy and human rights; however, about half of these 
have been released, while others have died in prison.
    Christian and Islamic groups continued to have difficulties in 
obtaining permission to build new churches and mosques, particularly on 
prominent sites. In parts of Chin State, authorities reportedly have 
not authorized the construction of any new churches since 1997. The 
Government reportedly also has denied permission for churches to be 
built along main roads in cities such as Myitkina, the capital of 
Kachin State. In Arakan State in April, authorities reportedly detained 
12 Muslim elders for failing to demolish 3 mosques in Dodine village. 
In other areas of the country, Christian and Muslim groups that have 
sought to build small churches or mosques on side streets or in other 
inconspicuous locations usually have been able to gain official 
approval, despite a time-consuming bureaucracy.
    There also were credible reports that government officials and 
security forces compelled both Buddhists and non-Buddhists to 
contribute money, food, and uncompensated labor to build, renovate, or 
maintain Buddhist shrines or monuments. The Government calls these 
contributions voluntary donations (see Section 6.c.). There also were 
reports of forced labor being used to dismantle temples and 
monasteries. For example, on July 27, army troops from the 246th 
Infantry Division reportedly forced 54 men to dismantle several temples 
and monasteries in the forced relocation areas in Kun-Hing township; on 
August 10, the same troops again conscripted 87 workers from the same 
town, and forced them to build a shelter for the lumber and tin sheets 
taken from the dismantled monasteries.
    Since 1990 government authorities and security forces have promoted 
Buddhism over Christianity among the Chin ethnic minority of the 
western part of the country. Since 1990 government authorities and 
security forces, with assistance from monks of the Hill Regions 
Buddhist Missions, coercively have sought to induce Chins to convert to 
Theravada Buddhism and to prevent Christian Chins from proselytizing. 
This campaign, reportedly accompanied by other efforts to ``Burmanize'' 
the Chin, has involved a large increase in military units stationed in 
Chin State and other predominately Chin areas, state-sponsored 
immigration of Buddhist Burman monks from other regions, and 
construction of Buddhist monasteries and shrines in Chin communities 
with few or no Buddhists, often by means of forced ``donations'' of 
money or labor (see Section 6.c.). Government authorities repeatedly 
prohibited Christian clergy from proselytizing and beat those who 
refused to stop preaching. There also were reports of forced 
conversion.
    Since the early 1990's, security forces have torn down or forced 
villagers to tear down crosses that had been erected outside Chin 
Christian villages; these crosses often have been replaced with 
pagodas, sometimes built with forced labor. In parts of Chin State, 
authorities reportedly have not authorized the construction of any new 
churches since 1997.
    For several years, there have been reports that the Government 
sought to induce members of the Naga ethnic group in Sagaing Division 
to convert from Christianity to Buddhism by means similar to those used 
to convert members of the Chin to Buddhism. In August 1999, the first 
mass exodus of Naga religious refugees from the country occurred, as 
more than 1,000 Christians of the Naga ethnic group, from 8 different 
villages, fled the country to India. These Naga claimed that the army 
and Buddhist monks tried to convert them forcibly to Buddhism and 
closed and desecrated churches in their villages.
    Religious groups of all faiths were able to establish and maintain 
links with coreligionists in other countries and travel abroad for 
religious purposes. However, the Government closely monitored these 
activities. Foreign religious representatives usually were allowed 
visas only for short stays but in some cases were permitted to preach 
to congregations.
    The Government has not permitted permanent foreign missionary 
establishments since the mid-1960's, when it expelled nearly all 
foreign missionaries and nationalized all private schools and 
hospitals. However, some elderly nuns and priests working in the 
country since before independence in 1948 have been allowed to continue 
their work.
    Religious publications, like secular ones, remained subject to 
censorship. Translations of the Bible and the Koran into indigenous 
languages could not be imported or printed legally, although this ban 
is not enforced in many areas. According to the Chin Freedom Coalition, 
in early 1999, in Tamu township, Sagaing Division, military authorities 
confiscated 16,000 copies of the Bible printed outside the country in 
the Chin, Kachin, and Karen languages; these Bibles reportedly remained 
confiscated at year's end.
    Religious affiliation sometimes is indicated on government-issued 
identification cards that citizens and permanent residents of the 
country are required to carry at all times. There appear to be no 
consistent criteria governing whether a person's religion is indicated 
on his or her identification card. Nationals also are required to 
indicate their religions on some official application forms, such as 
passports.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts freedom of 
movement. Except for limitations in areas of insurgent activity, most 
citizens could travel freely within the country, but were required to 
notify their local government of their whereabouts (see Section 1.f.). 
Urban and rural residents also are subject to arbitrary relocation.
    The freedom of movement of opposition political leaders also has 
been curtailed strictly. Since ostensibly freeing NLD general secretary 
Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 1995, the junta has allowed her 
to travel outside the capital only once, on a visit to a monastery. On 
August 24, she was prevented from traveling to an NLD party meeting in 
Kungyangon, in the near vicinity of Rangoon, resulting in a 9-day 
roadside standoff, during which time she was denied access to her 
political followers. The standoff ended on September 2, when police 
took Aung San Suu Kyi and her companions into custody and detained them 
incommunicado at Aung San Suu Kyi's Rangoon residence until September 
14. On September 21, the military Government again prevented her from 
traveling by train to Mandalay and again detained her incommunicado in 
her house (see Sections 2.b. and 3). The SPDC similarly detained on 
both occasions other leaders of the NLD, including the Vice Chairman of 
the NLD, U Tin Oo. Since 1996 security forces also have restricted 
public movement along the street in front of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's 
residence.
    The Government carefully scrutinizes prospective travel abroad. 
This facilitates rampant corruption, as many applicants are forced to 
pay large bribes (sometimes as high as $3,000, about 1.2 million Kyat; 
the equivalent of 10 years' salary for the average citizen) to obtain 
passports. The official board that reviews passport applications has 
denied passports on political grounds. All college graduates who 
obtained a passport (except for certain government employees) are 
required to pay a special education clearance fee to reimburse the 
Government for the cost of their education. In February the Government 
issued new regulations on overseas employment passports that ultimately 
made it harder for citizens to travel overseas. Citizens who had 
emigrated legally generally were allowed to return to visit relatives. 
Some who had lived abroad illegally and had acquired foreign 
citizenship also were able to return.
    Those residents unable to meet the restrictive provisions of the 
citizenship law, such as ethnic Chinese, Arakanese, Muslims, and 
others, must obtain prior permission to travel. Since the mid-1990's, 
the Government also has restricted the issuance of passports to female 
citizens (see Section 5). In addition the Government prohibits foreign 
diplomats and foreign employees of U.N. agencies based in Rangoon from 
traveling outside the capital without advance permission.
    Restrictions on foreign travelers have been eased as part of an 
effort to promote tourism. Burmese embassies now issue tourist visas, 
valid for 1 month, within 24 hours of application. However, select 
categories of applicants, such as foreign human rights advocates, 
journalists, and political figures are denied entry visas regularly 
unless traveling under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the 
Government and for purposes approved by the Government. The Government 
also has detained and deported several journalists.
    There is a large number of internally displaced persons (IDP's) in 
the country. NGO's estimate that there could be as many as 1 million 
minority group members who the SPDC has moved forcibly from their 
villages and districts and who now live near or along the Thai border. 
NGO's also estimate that an additional 1 million IDP's also might exist 
in various other locations throughout the country; however, it is very 
difficult to confirm specific numbers of IDP's.
    For decades successive military regimes have applied a strategy of 
forced relocation against ethnic minority groups seeking autonomy; 
these forcible relocations continue, particularly alongside the Thai 
border. Thousands of villagers continue to flee or be driven from their 
homes and face numerous abuses (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.g., 2.d., 
and 6.d.). For example, according to a March www.Shanland.org report 
and other secondary sources, on January 27, SPDC troops from the 520th 
Light Infantry Battalion led by Captain Than Maung, reportedly forced 
120 households in Ho Phaai Long village, Ho Phaai Long tract, MurngPan 
township, Shan State, to relocate; in the process, troops arrested many 
villagers, looted houses, and raped numerous women. However, this 
incident could not be independently confirmed.
    Repressive government policies and the military's brutal treatment 
of ethnic insurgencies has produced hundreds of thousands of refugees 
who now primarily reside in Thailand, India, and Bangladesh. There are 
about 150,000 persons in refugee camps on Burma's borders. Of these, at 
least 122,000 Karen, Mon, and Karenni resided in refugee camps in 
Thailand. In addition there were tens of thousands of Shan refugees 
whom the Thai Government did not confine to camps. On the country's 
western border, 20,000 Rohingya Muslims remained in refugee camps in 
Bangladesh (see Section 5).
    The Government does not allow refugees or displaced persons from 
abroad to resettle or seek safe haven and has no policy to grant 
asylum. There were no reports that persons formally sought asylum in 
the country during the year. There also were no reports of the forced 
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Despite the overwhelming desire that citizens demonstrated in the 
1990 elections for a return to democracy, the regime continued to deny 
them the right to change their government.
    The military junta has waged a decade-long campaign of coercion and 
intimidation to prevent the parliament elected in 1990 from convening 
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 3.). Measures included detaining 
over 200 members-elect as ``state guests'' in 1998. Of these, at least 
45 remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    Since 1962 active duty military officers have occupied most 
important positions in both the central Government and in local 
governments. Since 1988 all state power has been held by a military 
junta. All members of the junta have been military officers on active 
duty, and the junta has placed military or recently retired military 
officers in most key senior level positions in all ministries. By 
year's end, only 13 of the 41 government Ministers were civilians.
    Following the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections, the military 
junta refused to implement the election results and disqualified, 
detained, or imprisoned many successful candidates. Many other members-
elect of parliament fled the country (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
    Rather than accept the will of citizenry as expressed in the 1990 
election, the junta convened a national convention in 1993 to draw up 
principles for a new constitution. The junta handpicked most delegates, 
and carefully orchestrated the proceedings; even limited opposition 
views were ignored. The junta tasked the convention with drafting a new 
constitution designed to provide a dominant role for the military 
services in the country's future political structure. In 1995 the NLD 
withdrew from the convention and demanded a revision in working 
procedures so as to allow debate and meaningful participation by all 
parties in formulation of a new constitution. Two days after its 
withdrawal, the NLD was expelled formally. In March 1996, the national 
convention adjourned. It has not reconvened.
    A final draft constitution never has emerged from the national 
convention. However, at the instigation of the Government, the 
convention has adopted several provisions that, if incorporated in the 
constitution, would ensure the large-scale involvement of the military 
services in all levels of government. These provisions include 
reserving 25 percent of seats in the parliament for members appointed 
by the military services and reserving key government posts for 
military personnel as well. Other provisions prohibited, among other 
things, anyone who has received any type of assistance from a foreign 
source or who is ``under acknowledgment of allegiance'' to a foreigner 
from participating in the Government. These provisions apparently were 
designed to exclude Aung San Suu Kyi, who was married to a British 
citizen.
    During the year, the military junta intensified its systematic use 
of coercion and intimidation to deny citizens the right to change their 
government. In September 1998, the NLD leadership organized a CRPP on 
the basis of written delegations of authority from a majority of the 
surviving members-elect of the 1990 parliament, in view of the junta's 
continued use of force to prevent the whole parliament from convening. 
That committee was empowered by those members-elect to act on behalf of 
the parliament until the parliament was convened. In retaliation the 
junta has launched a sustained and systematic campaign to destroy the 
NLD without formally banning it; authorities have pressured many 
thousands of NLD members and local officials to resign and closed party 
offices throughout the country. Military intelligence officials also 
detained over 200 memberselect of parliament, at least 45 of whom 
remain in detention; many were held without being charged formally (see 
Section 1.d.). Others have been released, but only after agreeing 
either to resign from the parliament or to accept their recall by 
government-managed referendums. Among its other coercive tactics, the 
Government compels citizens to participate in meetings that criticize 
NLD memberselect or call for the dissolution of the NLD (see Section 
2.b.).
    The junta's nationwide campaign in which local authorities 
pressured constituents to sign statements of no confidence in NLD 
representatives elected from their districts in 1990 appeared to have 
been cut back considerably during the year. In prior years, a majority 
of eligible voters in a number of townships had signed petitions 
expressing no confidence in NLD members-elect of parliament. These 
petitions were presented to local Multiparty Democracy General Election 
Commissions in formal ceremonies staged at mass rallies widely 
publicized by state-owned media. Both the CRPP in public statements and 
the NLD in lawsuits it filed to protest these activities (see Section 
1.e.) credibly alleged that the Government and USDA officials generally 
obtained signature of these petitions and participation in these mass 
rallies by systematic coercion and intimidation (see Section 1.e.). 
However, in contrast with previous years, very few, if any, members-
elect of parliament were recalled during the year.
    As a result of these measures, the Government's Multiparty 
Democracy General Election Commission announced in October 1999, that 
of 392 NLD members elected to parliament in 1990, only 92 remained both 
NLD members and members-elect of parliament. As for the rest, 105 had 
resigned their parliamentary status, 139 had been disqualified by the 
commission, 27 had resigned from the NLD, and 31 had died.
    In contrast with these figures, the CRPP claimed in September to 
enjoy the support of 433 of the 485 members-elect of parliament.
    Late in the year, with encouragement from U.N. Special 
Representative Ismail Razali (see Section 4), the Government initiated 
a dialog with Aung San Suu Kyi, which appeared to produce some 
relaxation in the restrictions on the NLD. In addition the NLD was able 
to resume some normal activities, and press attacks on the NLD and Aung 
San Suu Kyi ceased. However, by year's end, the dialog had not produced 
tangible results.
    Women and minorities were underrepresented in the Government and 
the top ranks of government services. They also were excluded from 
military leadership. There were no female members of the SPDC, 
ministers, or Supreme Court judges.
    Members of certain minority groups also were denied full 
citizenship and a role in government and politics (see Section 5).

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not allow domestic human rights organizations 
to exist, and it remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny of its 
human rights record. Approximately 15 nonpolitical, humanitarian, 
international NGO's continued project work. A few others established a 
provisional presence while undertaking the protracted negotiations 
necessary to set up permanent operations in the country.
    The military persecuted some human rights workers during the year. 
For example, according to the Chin Human Rights Organization, on June 
26, the Commander of the 266th Light Infantry Battalion murdered Zo 
Thang, a field monitor for the NGO, as well as two associates, in Bung 
Khua village, Chin State (see Section 1.a.). The Chin Human Rights 
Organization's mandate is to document human rights violations committed 
by the military junta in Chin State and the northwestern part of the 
country. The same battalion reportedly also arrested Pi Sai Sung, a 29-
year-old Chin farmer whom the SPDC accused of being a sexual 
acquaintance of the killed human rights officer, and abused her (see 
Section 1.c.).
    The Government continued to refuse to meet with representatives of 
the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), which repeatedly has 
criticized the Government's human rights record, and continued to deny 
the UNHRC Special Rapporteur for Burma, Rajsoomer Lallah, entry into 
the country. In his report to the UNHRC, issued on October 26, Lallah 
criticized the human rights violations committed against ethnic 
minorities as a result of the SPDC's policy of forcible relocations and 
its continued recourse to forced labor (see Sections 2.d., 5, and 
6.c.). During the year, the Government allowed two visits by U.N. 
Special Envoy to Burma, Tan Sri Dato Razali Bin Ismail (see Sections 
1.e. and 3).
    The Government's restriction on travel by foreign journalists, NGO 
staff, U.N. agency staff, and diplomats; its monitoring of the 
movements of such foreigners; its frequent interrogation of citizens 
about contacts with foreigners; its restrictions on the freedom of 
expression and association of citizens; and its practice of arresting 
citizens who passed information about government human rights abuses to 
foreigners all impeded efforts to collect or investigate information 
about human rights abuses. Reports of abuses, especially those 
committed in prisons or ethnic minority areas, often emerged months or 
years after the abuses allegedly were committed and seldom could be 
verified with certainty.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The military junta continued to rule by decree and was not bound by 
any constitutional provisions concerning discrimination.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse, 
appears to be relatively infrequent. Married couples often live in 
households with extended families, where social pressure tends to 
protect the wife from abuse.
    In general women traditionally have enjoyed a high social and 
economic status and have exercised most of the same basic rights as 
men. Consistent with traditional culture, women keep their names after 
marriage and often control family finances. However, women remained 
underrepresented in most traditional male occupations, and women 
continued to be barred effectively from a few professions, including 
the military officer corps. The burden of poverty, which is 
particularly widespread in rural areas, also fell disproportionately on 
women.
    Women do not receive consistently equal pay for equal work. Women 
legally were entitled to receive up to 26 weeks of maternity benefits; 
however, in practice these benefits often were not accorded to women. 
In an effort to combat trafficking in women, the Government also has 
begun to discourage women from marrying foreigners and to restrict 
foreign travel by women. However, it has not enforced these 
restrictions consistently (see Sections 2.d. and 6.f.).
    Prostitution is becoming an increasingly overt problem, 
particularly in some of Rangoon's ``new towns,'' which are populated 
chiefly by poor families forcibly relocated from older areas of the 
capital. The Government and at least one international NGO operate 
schools and other rehabilitation programs for former prostitutes.
    Trafficking in women for the purposes of prostitution also is a 
serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
    There are no independent women's rights organizations. The National 
Committee for Women's Affairs in the Ministry of Social Welfare is 
charged with safeguarding women's interests. The Myanmar Maternal and 
Child Welfare Association, a government-controlled agency, provided 
assistance to mothers. A professional society for businesswomen, the 
Myanmar Women Entrepreneurs' Association, which was formed in 1995, 
provided loans to new businesses and made charitable donations.
    Children.--The Government continued to neglect the education of 
children, allocating a minimal level of resources to public education. 
In response to this neglect, private institutions have begun to emerge, 
despite an official monopoly on education. Government expenditures for 
all civilian education for 1998-99 were equivalent to less than 1 
percent of recorded gross domestic product (GDP) during the year and 
have declined by more than 70 percent in real terms since 1990. 
According to government studies conducted with U.N. assistance, only 37 
percent of children finished fourth grade in urban areas and only 22 
percent did so in rural areas. Rates of school attendance and 
educational attainment decreased during the 1990's, largely due to 
increasing formal and informal school fees as the junta diverted 
expenditures from health and education to the armed forces. Teachers' 
salaries were far below subsistence wages. Increasingly, only 
relatively prosperous families could afford to send their children to 
school, even at the primary level. In some areas in the center of the 
country, where few families could afford unofficial payments to 
teachers, teachers generally no longer came to work and schools no 
longer functioned.
    Children also suffered greatly from the junta's severe and 
worsening neglect of health care.
    Private health care facilities increasingly became the provider of 
choice for the relatively prosperous. The junta has cut government 
expenditures on public health care even more sharply than it cut 
spending for education. Government expenditures for civilian health 
care in 1998-99 were equivalent to only 0.3 percent of GDP. Government 
studies sponsored by U.N. agencies in 1997 found that, on average, 131 
of 1,000 children died before reaching the age of 5 years, and that 
only 1 of 20 births in rural areas was attended by a doctor. Those same 
studies indicated that, of children under 3 years old, 37 percent were 
malnourished, and 13 percent were severely malnourished. The World 
Health Organization considers the country's health care system to be 
extremely poor.
    Child prostitution and trafficking in girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution--especially Shan girls who were sent or lured to 
Thailand--continued to be a major problem (see Section 6.f.). While 
legislation criminalizing child prostitution and child pornography 
exists, it is enforced poorly. Reports from Thailand indicated that the 
rising incidence of HIV infection there has increased the demand for 
supposedly ``safer'' younger prostitutes, many of whom come from Burma.
    The army conscripts children as young as the age of 14, especially 
orphans and street children. These children are deployed to training 
camps where they support the military combat forces. In combat areas, 
the military forces continued to force children to labor as porters, 
and often subjected them to beatings (see Sections 1.g., 6.c., and 
6.d.).
    Religious Minorities.--The great majority of the country's 
population follows Theravada Buddhism. However, there are minorities of 
Christians (mostly Baptists, as well as some Catholics and Anglicans), 
Muslims (mostly Sunni), Hindus, and practitioners of traditional 
Chinese and indigenous religions. There also are social tensions 
between the Buddhist majority and the Christian and Muslim minorities, 
largely due to government preference in practice (although not in law) 
for non-Buddhists during the period of British colonial rule and for 
Buddhists since independence.
    Non-Buddhists are discriminated against at upper levels of the 
public sector. Only one non-Buddhist served in the Government at the 
ministerial level, and the same person, a brigadier general, is the 
only non-Buddhist known to have held flag rank in the armed forces 
during the 1990's. The Government actively discourages Muslims from 
entering military service, and Christian or Muslim military officers 
who aspire to promotion beyond the middle ranks are encouraged by their 
superiors to convert to Buddhism.
    Members of the Muslim Rohingya minority in Arakan State, on the 
country's western coast, continued to experience severe legal, 
economic, and social discrimination. The Government denies citizenship 
status to most Rohingyas on the grounds that their ancestors allegedly 
did not reside in the country at the start of British colonial rule in 
1824, as required by the country's highly restrictive citizenship law. 
In 1991, and again in 1997 and 1998, tens of thousands of Rohingya fled 
from Arakan State into Bangladesh following anti-Muslim violence 
alleged (although not proven) to have involved government troops. Most 
of those refugees since have returned, although 20,000 reportedly still 
remain in Bangladesh. Rohingyas who have returned to Arakan complained 
of government restrictions on their ability to travel and to engage in 
economic activity. In addition government authorities in Arakan State 
reportedly have compelled Muslims to build Buddhist pagodas as part of 
the country's forced labor program and provide porterage, and have 
confiscated land and produce, restricted freedom of movement, and 
engaged in other abuses (see Sections 1.c., 2.d., and 6.c.). In 
addition, because the Government reserves secondary education for 
citizens only, Rohingya do not have access to state run schools beyond 
primary education, and are unable to obtain most civil service 
positions.
    There are credible reports that anti-Islamic booklets were 
distributed throughout the country by the USDA in 1999. In addition in 
March 1999 and April 2000, the Government forcibly relocated about 200 
Buddhist slum dwellers from Dagon township in Rangoon to Arakan State; 
this had the dual effect of helping to eliminate slums in Rangoon, 
while increasing the population of Buddhist citizens in Arakan State. 
According to credible reports, during the year in Rakhine State, the 
Government opened several ``model villages'' for Buddhist families 
relocated from other areas. The Rohingyas already residing in the area 
have had their land seized without compensation and were forced to 
engage in construction and maintenance, including requisitioning food 
supplies. In addition the Muslim Rohingyas often are forced to build 
Buddhist pagodas for the new arrivals (see Sections 2.c., 2.d., and 
6.c.).
    Since 1994, when the progovernment DKBA was organized, there has 
been armed conflict between the DKBA and the Christian-led KNU. This 
armed conflict between two nongovernmental Karen organizations has had 
strong religious overtones. During the mid-1990's, it reportedly was 
common DKBA practice to torture Christian villagers and kill them if 
they refused to convert to Buddhism. DKBA treatment of Christians 
reportedly improved substantially after the DKBA settled down to 
administering the regions that it had conquered. According to one 
report, in February a DKBA unit ordered villagers in Khwet Phoe village 
to destroy a local mosque after arresting and executing five villagers 
for supporting the KNU. In April residents of Kaw Kyaik village in 
Karen State protested an order from DKBA units to destroy the local 
mosque.
    In June the authorities claimed in an unconfirmed report that 28 
Karenni National Progressive Party insurgents shot and wounded a 
Catholic priest, Father Abe Lei, and took 4 other persons hostage on 
June 17. At year's end, there was no available information on what had 
happened to the hostages.
    People with Disabilities.--In principle official assistance to the 
disabled includes twothirds of pay for up to 1 year of a temporary 
disability and a tax-free stipend for permanent disability; however, in 
practice assistance is extremely limited. There is no law mandating 
accessibility to buildings, public transportation, or government 
facilities. While there are several small-scale organizations to assist 
the disabled, most disabled persons must rely on their families to 
provide for their welfare. Disabled veterans receive available benefits 
on a priority basis. Because of landmine detonations, there is a high 
rate of amputee injuries.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Wide-ranging governmental and 
societal discrimination against minorities persists.
    Animosities between the country's many ethnic minorities and the 
Burman majority, which has dominated the Government and the armed 
forces since independence, continued to fuel active insurgencies that 
resulted in many killings and other serious abuses. Some frequently 
reported abuses included killings, beatings, and rapes of Chin, Karen, 
Karenni, and Shan by mostly Burman army soldiers (see Sections 1.a., 
1.c., and 1.g.). During the 1990's, the junta has sought to pacify 
these ethnic groups by means of negotiated cease-fires, grants of 
limited autonomy, and promises of development assistance.
    The Government continued to discriminate systematically against 
non-Burmans. National identity cards and passports generally denoted 
the ethnicity of non-Burmans either explicitly or through the use of a 
personal title in the ethnic minority language rather than Burmese. 
Ethnic minority areas that were remote from active insurgent 
operations, such as the large Karen areas of Irrawaddy Division, 
experienced tighter controls on personal movement, including more 
frequent military checkpoints, closer monitoring by military 
intelligence, and larger military garrisons and hence more informal 
taxes, than comparable Burman areas.
    Ethnic minority groups generally had their own primary languages. 
However, throughout all parts of the country controlled by the 
Government, including ethnic minority areas, Burmese remained the sole 
language of instruction in all state schools. Even in ethnic minority 
areas, primary and secondary state schools did not offer any 
instruction in the local ethnic minority language even as a second 
language. There were very few domestic publications in indigenous 
minority languages. In some ethnic minority areas such as Chin State, 
there continued to be many reports that the army offered financial and 
career incentives for Burman soldiers to marry Chin women, teach them 
Burmese, and convert them to Buddhism. Throughout the 1990's, there 
were many credible reports that the junta resettled groups of Burmans 
in various ethnic minority areas. Visible evidence of this resettlement 
can be seen along the Heho-Nyaungshwe road in Shan State and along the 
Mandalay-Mogok road as it heads into Shan State.
    The ethnic minority populations continued to complain that the 
Government has not addressed their concerns adequately. Economic 
development among minorities has continued to lag, leaving many persons 
living at below subsistence levels.
    There are ethnic tensions between Burmans and nonindigenous ethnic 
populations including Indians, many of whom are Muslims, and a rapidly 
growing population of Chinese, mostly recent immigrants from Yunnan 
province who increasingly dominate the economy of the northern part of 
the country. Both groups have tended to be more commercially oriented 
and hence more prosperous and economically powerful than Burmans, and 
their members commonly have discriminated based on ethnicity in hiring, 
buying, and selling.
    Since only persons who can prove long familial links to the country 
are accorded full citizenship, nonindigenous ethnic populations (such 
as Chinese and Indians) are denied full citizenship and are excluded 
from government positions. Persons without full citizenship face 
restrictions in domestic travel (see Section 2.d.). They also are 
barred from certain advanced university programs in medicine and 
technological fields.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1926 Trade Unions Act, which 
remained in effect, permits the formation of trade unions only with the 
prior consent of the Government; however, free trade unions do not 
exist in the country, and the junta has dissolved even the government-
controlled union that existed before 1988.
    There were no strikes during the year. The last reported strike was 
in December 1997, when workers in a foreign-owned textile factory in 
Pegu staged a successful 4-day strike.
    Because of its longstanding violation of ILO Convention 87 on 
freedom of association, the 1998 ILO conference cited the Government 
for its continued failure to implement that convention and criticized 
both the lack of progress and the absence of cooperation on the part of 
the Government. In response the Government issued a press release in 
June 1999, stating that it would ``cease participation in activities 
connected with Convention 87,'' a step tantamount to withdrawal from 
the Convention.
    The Government also forbids seamen who found work on foreign 
vessels through its Seafarers' Employment Control Division from 
contacting or participating in any activities of the International 
Transport Workers' Federation.
    No unions in the country are affiliated internationally.
    In 1989 the U.S. suspended the country's eligibility for trade 
concessions under the Generalized System of Preferences program until 
steps are taken to afford its labor force internationally recognized 
worker rights.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers do not 
have the right to organize and bargain collectively. The Government's 
Central Arbitration Board, which once provided a means for settling 
major labor disputes, exists in name but, in practice, has been dormant 
since 1988. Township-level labor supervisory committees exist to 
address minor labor concerns.
    The Government unilaterally sets wages in the public sector. In the 
private sector, market forces generally set wages. However, the 
Government has pressured joint ventures not to pay salaries greater 
than those of ministers or other senior employees. Some joint ventures 
circumvented this with supplemental pay or special incentive systems. 
Foreign firms generally set wages near those of the domestic private 
sector but followed the example of joint ventures in awarding 
supplemental wages and benefits.
    There are no export processing zones (EPZ's). However, there are 
special military-owned industrial parks, such as Pyin-Ma-Bin near 
Rangoon, which attract foreign investors by offering cheaper labor than 
is available elsewhere. Another example is the 2,000-acre Hlaingthaya 
Industrial Zone in Rangoon; at least four companies are known to export 
operate on its premises (see Section 6.c.). These are tantamount to 
EPZ's in many respects.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor remains a widespread and serious problem. Although the Penal Code 
provides for the punishment of persons who impose forced labor on 
others, there are no known cases of the application of this provision. 
Throughout the country, international observers have confirmed that the 
Government routinely forces citizens to work on construction and 
maintenance projects. The law does not specifically prohibit forced and 
bonded labor by children, and forced labor by children occurs.
    During the year, the International Labor Organization took several 
unprecedented steps to address the ``widespread and systematic use'' of 
forced labor in the country. On February 28, the Director General of 
the ILO issued a report to the ILO's Governing Body that concluded that 
the Government had ignored the recommendations of the ILO Commission of 
Inquiry regarding forced labor. In June the ILO Conference suspended 
Burma, barring it from receiving ILO technical assistance or attending 
ILO meetings, due to the Government's ``flagrant and persistent failure 
to comply'' with Convention 29 on forced labor. It also passed a 
resolution that called upon the ILO Governing Body to recommend to the 
ILO's members that they review their relations with Burma and take 
appropriate measures to ensure that those relations do not perpetuate 
the system of forced labor, if the Government failed to take effective 
action to amend its practices by November. The Government did not take 
the required actions and, on November 16, the ILO Governing Body, for 
the first time in its history, voted to apply these ``Article 33'' 
sanctions. In addition to requesting that members review their 
relations with Burma, these sanctions also require the ILO to advise 
international organizations working in the country to reconsider any 
cooperation that they may be engaged with in Burma and to cease any 
activity that could have the effect of abetting the practice of forced 
or compulsory labor.
    The ILO Conference's action followed an exhaustive 1998 report by 
an ILO Special Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor in Burma, which 
concluded, based on 6,000 pages of documentation, that there was 
abundant evidence of pervasive use of forced labor in the country. The 
Special Commission of Inquiry found that women, children, and the 
elderly were required to perform forced labor; that porters often were 
sent into dangerous military situations, rarely received medical 
treatment, and almost never were compensated; that forced laborers 
frequently were beaten; and that some women performing forced labor 
were raped or otherwise abused sexually by soldiers (see Section 1.c.).
    Many detailed credible reports indicate that in recent years, 
especially in areas inhabited chiefly by members of the Chin, Karen, 
Karenni, and Shan ethnic groups, army units have increased their use of 
forced labor for logistical support purposes, including to build, 
repair, or maintain army camps and roads to them, as well as to plant 
crops, cut or gather wood, cook, clean, launder, weave baskets, fetch 
water for army units and--in the case of young women--to provide sexual 
services to soldiers. The number of reports of this practice has 
increased since 1997, when the junta required regional military 
commanders to become more self-sufficient (see Sections 1.f. and 1.g.).
    Authorities continued to impose forced labor chiefly, although not 
exclusively, on rural populations, and imposed forced labor quotas on 
villages, households, or persons directly or through village headmen. 
Government authorities often allowed households or persons to 
substitute money or food for contributions of labor for infrastructure 
projects, but widespread rural poverty obliged most households to 
contribute labor. The State allocated funds to regional and local 
authorities to pay wages to at least some of the civilians on whom it 
imposed labor obligations; however, these wages were set at levels 
below the prevailing wage, and reports indicated that local authorities 
commonly did not disburse allocated funds to workers. Especially in 
ethnic minority areas, the army often deployed soldiers to guard 
persons engaged in forced labor; there also were reports that soldiers 
often beat and occasionally killed workers (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.). Government troops also force villagers to eradicate opium poppy 
fields, after which the government seeks recognition internationally 
for its counternarcotics efforts.
    There are many examples of forced labor. Since the end of 1999, 
thousands of persons from 19 villages have been working daily to build 
the Mandalay-Lashio road. Farmers reportedly are fined $1.25 (500 Kyat) 
if they cannot provide labor. Private transport agencies also are 
forced to contribute either a car or $6.25 to $12.5 (2,500 Kyat to 
5,000 Kyat) per month. Starting in January, USDA members (acting under 
the authority of the SPDC) forced the town residents to sweep and clean 
the roads and streets in Ta-Khi-Laek town every Saturday. One person 
from each house was required to work or pay $2.25 (100 Baht in Thai 
money) to the USDA. Starting in February residents from the townships 
of Monywa, Kane, Min-Kin, and Kalewa in Sagaing Division were compelled 
to construct a new road along the Chindwin River from Monywa to Kalewa. 
Since May several villages in Mawleik Township of Sagaing Division were 
forced to provide labor for the repair of the Thet-Ke-Kyin-Homalin 
highway and of bridges along the way. Households that cannot provide 
labor are forced to pay $0.75 to $6.75 (300 Kyat to 2,700 Kyat) per 
household.
    There also were reports that the Government used forced labor to 
construct infrastructure to support tourism. In 1999 government 
officials used forced labor to build the approach road to the new 
international airport in Mandalay. Officials reportedly went door-to-
door in villages outside Mandalay, ordering each household to 
contribute either $0.75 (300 Kyat) or one person's labor to the 
project. Most households contributed labor. Government officials also 
used forced labor to prepare the historic city of Mrauk-Oo in Arakan 
State for expected tourist and important visitor arrivals. According to 
credible sources, in February the SPDC announced plans to develop the 
Karen hill town of Than Daung Gyi as a tourist ``hill resort.'' 
Immediately after the announcement, new army battalions moved in, land 
was confiscated from the town's residents and surrounding villages, and 
persons started doing forced labor on a road to the hot springs at Ker 
Weh.
    In addition since late 1998, the Government has used large amounts 
of forced labor on a project to double the country's cultivated land by 
developing 22 million acres of wetlands and virgin lands. This involved 
the establishment of ``labor villages'' to help private entrepreneurs, 
including foreign investors, to develop these wetlands. In December 
1998, government authorities instructed each village tract from 8 
townships in Sagaing Division to provide 2 villagers to work on 500 
acres of land per township for a project to reclaim about 4,000 acres 
of virgin land. In addition each household was required to give about 
$0.50 (200 Kyat) to the authorities to buy food for workers on the 
project. In 1999 officials of the military's northwest command forced 
villagers in Sagaing Division's Yinmarbin Township to provide 
uncompensated labor or else pay more than $2.50 (1,000 Kyat) per person 
to reclaim 2,000 acres of fallow land. Authorities in another township 
in Sagaing Division reportedly forced villagers to clear 1,000 acres of 
land or pay a fine of more than $8.75 (3,500 Kyat) per household. 
Authorities in Irrawaddy Division ordered residents of a village both 
to clear over 100 acres of land as part of a wetlands reclamation 
project, and to pay for equipment needed to clear the land.
    There also were credible reports that government officials and 
security forces compelled both Buddhists and non-Buddhists to 
contribute money, food, and uncompensated labor to build, renovate, or 
maintain Buddhist shrines or monuments. For example, in Wuntho Township 
of Sagaing Division, the authorities forced villagers from eight Ma-
Gyi-Bin village tracts to provide labor for building a 108-foot pagoda. 
If a household cannot provide labor, then that household is obliged to 
provide $3.50 (1,400 Kyat) plus a 2.2 pounds of rice for each worker 
that it could not provide. Five townships (Katha, Ingaw, Banmauk, 
HtiGyan, and Pin-Le-Bu) in the same area also were forced to transport 
500,000 bricks each for the pagoda. Similarly, in Twantay township, 
Rangoon Division, authorities forced villagers to guard the ancient 
Danoke Pagoda, which has been under renovation, and to gather wood, 
fetch water, and perform other tasks for soldiers involved in the 
project. In Bogalay township, Irrawaddy Division, authorities forced 
villagers to construct 32 miles of road between Pe-Chaung village and 
Kadone village for the use of Buddhist pilgrims. This work reportedly 
was done at the request of the Pe-Chaung monastery. In a predominantly 
Islamic Maungdaw District in Arakan State, authorities required 
villagers to build a Buddhist pagoda in Dail Fara (see Section 2.c.).
    There also were reports that forced labor was used to dismantle 
temples and monasteries (see Section 2.c.).
    The army continued to force citizens--including women and 
children--to work as porters in military actions against ethnic 
insurgents. This practice continued to lead to mistreatment, illness, 
and death (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.). Both the 1999 report of 
the ILO's Director General and reports by NGO's including Amnesty 
International described dozens of cases of forced porterage. According 
to local reports, in Northern Rakhine State all of the men and boys of 
a village (between the ages of 7 and 35) contribute 10 days per month 
of labor to the military. Reportedly local villages must supply males 
every 2 weeks to serve as porters and to carry food and ammunition 
toward the border with Bangladesh to military camps. Rohingyas claim 
that their group is the only one in the area whose members are forced 
to serve as porters for the army, and that the nearby model villages 
that are populated by Buddhist Burmans from the cities are exempt from 
portering, forced labor, and forced contributions of foodstuffs (see 
Sections 2.d. and 5).
    Parents routinely called upon their children to help fulfill their 
households' forced labor obligations, without government opposition 
(see Section 6.d.).
    There were numerous, detailed, and credible reports that forced 
labor, including forced child labor, was used directly in growing and 
harvesting some crops, chiefly for army units.
    Widespread forced labor, including forced child labor, continued to 
contribute materially to the construction and maintenance not only of 
irrigation facilities important to the cultivation of some export crops 
including rice, but also of roads and some railroads important for the 
transportation of exports to ports. Forced labor, including forced 
child labor, has contributed materially to the construction of 
industrial parks subsequently used largely to produce manufactured 
exports including garments. According to two eyewitness accounts, 
forced labor was used to develop the Hlaingthaya Industrial Zone in 
Rangoon (see Section 6.b.). There have been many credible reports that 
forced labor, including forced child labor, has been used widely since 
1998 to clear and drain virgin lands and wetlands for the cultivation 
of crops many of which, according to public descriptions of the 
Government's economic plans, are intended largely for export.
    In July 1998, the ILO Commission of Inquiry reported that forced 
labor had been used to dig and cultivate shrimp farms, particularly in 
Rakhine State and Sagaing Division.
    The Ministry of Home Affairs also operates forced prison labor 
camps for porterage, quarries, agriculture, livestock farms, roads and 
infrastructure, and other activities. Reportedly inmates sent to labor 
camps have sentences that range from 6 months to 10 years, and most are 
nonviolent offenders. The Government's use of prison labor reportedly 
has increased significantly in recent years. Reportedly, the prison 
labor camp system is the main recruiting ground for the military's most 
severely mistreated forced laborers (such as porters who die en route 
and civilians who are sent into mine fields). The ICRC reports that the 
mortality rate of prisoners in labor camps is much too high (see 
Section 1.c.).
    The authorities reportedly round up street children, provide them 
with military training, and forcibly conscript them (see Sections 5 and 
6.d.).
    Trafficking in women and girls to neighboring countries for the 
purpose of forced prostitution remained a serious problem (see Sections 
5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Although the law sets a minimum age of 13 for the 
employment of children, in practice the law is not enforced. In the 
past few years, child labor has become increasingly prevalent and 
visible. Working children are highly visible in cities, mostly working 
for small or family enterprises, and in family agricultural activities 
in the countryside. Children working in the urban informal sector in 
Rangoon and Mandalay often start work at young ages. Children are hired 
at lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of work. In the urban 
informal sector, child workers are found mostly in food processing, 
selling, refuse collecting, light manufacturing, and as tea shop 
attendants. According to government statistics, 6 percent of urban 
children work, but only 4 percent of those earn wages. Despite a 
compulsory education law, almost 50 percent of children never enroll in 
school, and only 40 percent of them complete the 5-year primary school 
course (see Section 5).
    The law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by 
children; while bonded labor is not practiced, forced labor by children 
occurs. The military Government not only tolerates child labor, but 
also uses children as porters in infrastructure development and in 
providing other services to military forces (see section 6.c.). There 
have been several reports that the authorities often round up orphans 
and street children in Rangoon and other cities and then give them 
military training (see Section 6.c.). In combat areas, children have 
been forced to serve as porters, where beatings and other mistreatment 
reportedly occur.
    Households tend to satisfy forced labor quotas by sending their 
least productive workers (usually children), and government authorities 
have accepted such workers in satisfaction of those quotas. Children 
often have been seen building or repairing roads and irrigation 
facilities. In recent years, there have been growing numbers of reports 
that military units in various ethnic minority areas either forced 
children to perform support services, such as fetching water, cleaning, 
cutting bamboo, or cultivating food crops, or allowed households or 
villages to use children to satisfy army orders to perform such 
services (see Sections 1.f. and 6.c.).
    Trafficking in girls to neighboring countries for the purpose of 
forced prostitution remained a serious problem (see Sections 5 and 
6.f.).
    There are credible reports that insurgents also used women and 
children as porters. Some former KNU troops known as God's Army 
reportedly are led by child soldiers.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Only government employees and 
employees of a few traditional industries were covered by minimum wage 
provisions. The minimum daily wage for salaried public employees is 
$0.25 (100 Kyats) for what is in effect a 6-hour workday. Various 
subsidies and allowances supplement this sum. Neither the minimum wage 
nor the higher wages earned even by senior government officials 
provides a worker and family with a decent standard of living. Low and 
falling real wages in the public sector have fostered widespread 
corruption. In the private sector, urban laborers earn about $0.50 per 
day (200 Kyat), while rural agricultural workers earn about half that 
rate. Some private sector workers earn substantially more; a skilled 
factory worker earns about $12 per day (4,800 Kyat).
    Surplus labor conditions, a poor economy, and lack of protection by 
the Government continue to dictate substandard conditions for workers. 
The 1964 Law on Fundamental Workers Rights and the 1951 Factories Act 
regulate working conditions. There is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-
hour workweek for employees in the public sector and a 6-day and a 44-
hour workweek for private and state enterprise employees, with overtime 
paid for additional work. The law also allows for a 24-hour rest period 
per week, and workers have 21 paid holidays per year. However, in 
practice such provisions benefited only a small portion of the 
country's labor force, since most of the labor force was engaged in 
rural agriculture.
    Numerous health and safety regulations exist, but in practice the 
Government has not made the necessary resources available to enforce 
the regulations. Although workers may in principle remove themselves 
from hazardous conditions, in practice many workers cannot expect to 
retain their jobs if they do so.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are laws--including laws 
against abduction--that prohibit some aspects of trafficking in 
persons, no law is known specifically to prohibit trafficking, and 
trafficking in women and children is a severe problem.
    Burma is a source country for thousands of women and young girls 
who are trafficked into the commercial sex industries of neighboring 
countries. There are reliable reports that many women and children in 
border areas, where the Government's control is limited, were forced or 
lured into working as prostitutes in Thailand and China. In fact, 
trafficking and exploitation near the Thailand border sometimes is 
condoned by local government officials. It is unknown how many young 
women have been induced or coerced into working as prostitutes, but a 
common practice is to lure young women to Thailand with promises of 
employment as a waitress, domestic servant, or factory worker. 
Occasionally European and Asian prostitutes can be found in Mong La in 
Special Region 4 of Shan State.
    Child prostitution of girls, especially from the Shan ethnic 
minority sent or lured to Thailand, continued to be a major problem.
    Government efforts to stop trafficking in young women are limited 
and relatively ineffective, despite sporadic arrests. There are 
regulations forbidding girls under age 25 from crossing the border 
unless accompanied by a guardian. In recent years the Government has 
made it difficult for women to obtain passports or marry foreigners in 
order to reduce the outflow of women both as victims of trafficking and 
for other reasons (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). However, most citizens 
who were forced or lured into prostitution crossed the border into 
Thailand without passports. There also is evidence of fraud. It is 
illegal to leave the country without government authorization. The 
Government has adopted the Bangkok Accord and Plan of Action Against 
Trafficking; there also is an interagency task force on trafficking.
    A number of NGO's offer poverty alleviation and education programs 
designed to counter trafficking.
                               __________

                                CAMBODIA

    Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy. Political stability, 
achieved through the coalition government formed following the 1998 
national elections, generally continued through year's end. Hun Sen of 
the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) is Prime Minister, Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh of the National United Front for a Neutral, Peaceful, 
Cooperative, and Independent Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) is President of the 
National Assembly, and Chea Sim of the CPP is President of the Senate. 
King Norodom Sihanouk remains the Constitutional monarch and Head of 
State. Most power lies within the executive branch and, although its 
influence continues to grow within the coalition structure, the 
National Assembly does not provide a significant check to executive 
power. The Khmer Rouge no longer is a political or military threat, but 
one other antigovernment group led a violent attack against the 
Government during the year. The judiciary is not independent; it 
frequently is subject to legislative and executive influence, and 
suffers from corruption.
    The National Police, an agency of the Ministry of Interior, have 
primary responsibility for internal security, but the Royal Cambodian 
Armed Forces (RCAF), including the military police, also have domestic 
security responsibilities. Government efforts to improve police and 
RCAF performance and to demobilize the military forces remained 
hampered by budgetary limitations. Members of the security forces 
committed numerous documented human rights abuses.
    Cambodia is a poor country. It has a market economy in which 
approximately 80 percent of the population of 11.7 million engage in 
subsistence farming, with rice as the principal crop. Economic 
deprivation and poor health characterize life for most citizens. Annual 
per capita gross domestic product is approximately $280. Average life 
expectancy is only approximately 50 years. Foreign aid is an important 
component of national income. The economy grew at a modest rate of 4.5 
percent during the year. The country still has difficulty in attracting 
foreign investment and mobilizing domestic savings to support economic 
development.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. The 
military forces and police were responsible for several extrajudicial 
killings and failed to stop lethal violence by citizens against 
criminal suspects; the Government rarely prosecuted the perpetrators of 
such killings, and impunity remains a problem. There was one confirmed 
report of a politically motivated killing but, unlike past years, the 
Government arrested the suspected perpetrator. There were credible 
reports that members of the security forces tortured, beat, and 
otherwise abused persons in custody, often to extract confessions. 
Prison conditions remained harsh, and the Government continued to use 
arbitrary arrest and prolonged pretrial detention. Courts prosecuted 
some members of the security forces for human rights abuses; however, 
impunity for many who commit human rights abuses remained a serious 
problem. National and local government officials generally lacked the 
political will and financial resources to act effectively against 
members of the security forces suspected of responsibility for human 
rights abuses. Democratic institutions, especially the judiciary, 
remained weak. The judiciary is subject to influence by the executive 
branch and is marred by inefficiency, a lack of training, a shortage of 
resources, and widespread corruption related to low wages. Politically 
related crimes rarely were prosecuted. Citizens without defense counsel 
often effectively were denied the right to a fair trial. Societal 
discrimination against women remained a problem. Domestic violence 
against women and abuse of children are common. Discrimination against 
the disabled is a problem. The ethnic Vietnamese minority continued to 
face widespread discrimination by the Khmer majority, and this enmity 
was exploited by the political opposition.
    Trade unions have become more numerous and active; the Government 
eased the process of union registration and improved Labor Law 
enforcement. However, enforcement of the Labor Law and regulations, 
including protections for workers' rights to organize, remained a 
problem. Forced labor in the commercial sex industry also is a problem.
    Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a serious problem.
    Mob violence, although none was ethnically directed, resulted in 
some vigilante-style killings. Land mines killed or wounded more than 
700 persons.
    Government efforts to bring senior Khmer Rouge leaders to justice 
for genocide and war crimes committed from 1975 through 1979 were 
ongoing underway at year's end.
    Prison conditions improved in some locations and there was 
increased resolution of land disputes during the year. The Government 
took disciplinary action against corrupt judges and prosecutors.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The military forces 
and police committed several extrajudicial killings that were 
nonpolitical in nature. Mob violence also resulted in several killings 
during the year. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) reported 
that there was at least one killing by a local government official that 
was at least in part politically motivated.
    In May in Kratie province at least three persons were killed by 
soldiers after attending a gathering at a military base; they were 
found dead in shallow graves, blindfolded and with their hands tied 
behind their backs. Domestic human rights groups alleged that the 
victims were disgruntled former soldiers or part of an antigovernment 
group, the Khmer Serei (Free Khmer), who had been deceived into 
surrendering to government forces. The Government claimed that the 
victims were bandits, but did not arrest any suspects in connection 
with the killings by year's end.
    Police or military forces acquiesced in or failed to prevent mob 
violence against suspected criminals, which resulted in killings. On 
July 21, an angry mob beat Song Veasna to death after he was arrested 
in Phnom Penh for stealing a motorcycle. The mob then poured gasoline 
over his body and set it on fire. At least one policeman was injured 
trying to stop the mob, but the Government took no action to arrest the 
perpetrators. On August 19, Rin Bros, an alleged serial rapist had his 
genitals cut off and was beaten to death after an angry mob overpowered 
police and forcibly removed him from police custody in Battambang 
province. The Government took no action to arrest the perpetrators.
    There was one report of ethnically motivated killings in April, 
when ethnic Vietnamese fisherman killed three government officials (see 
Section 5).
    On June 3, Pak Choeun and his wife, Doung Meas, were killed while 
staying in a shelter at their rice field in Kampot province. The 
FUNCINPEC party had recently nominated Pak Choeun as a candidate for 
the upcoming commune elections. After investigation, the Government 
arrested the chief of the local commune, who subsequently confessed to 
planning the crimes in part because of the political competition the 
victim would bring in the commune election.
    On November 24, a violent attack occurred against several 
government installations during which at least four persons were killed 
and over 1 dozen were injured (see Section 1.d.). The Cambodian Freedom 
Fighters (CFF), an antigovernment insurgency group, claimed 
responsibility for the attack. The Government subsequently arrested 
several persons with alleged ties to the CFF. At year's end, the 
Government's investigation into the CFF organization continued.
    The Government has not prosecuted most of those responsible for the 
numerous political or extrajudicial killings committed during the term 
of the previous government (from 1993 to 1998), and reported by the 
UNCHR in 1997 and 1998.
    Through November 747 civilians and military personnel were killed 
or wounded by land mines deployed by the Khmer Rouge or various 
government forces during previous conflicts. The number of such 
casualties declined by approximately 22 percent from 1999.
    Former Khmer Rouge officials Ta Mok and Kiang Kek Iev (``Duch''), 
accused of mass killings and other crimes, remained in jail. Government 
efforts continued to bring these and other senior Khmer Rouge officials 
to justice for their alleged crimes committed from 1975 through 1979 
(see Section 1.e.).
    In October the appeal of a life sentence meted out in 1999 to Nuon 
Paet, a former Khmer Rouge commander, for his role in the 1994 train 
ambush in Kampot province that resulted in the deaths of 3 foreigners 
and at least 13 citizens was denied, and he remains in custody. In 
January Chhouk Rin, another former Khmer Rouge commander allegedly 
involved in the ambush, was arrested, but he was acquitted after trial 
in July based on an amnesty provision in the law under which he was 
charged. Sam Bith, an RCAF officer also charged for his role in the 
ambush, had not been arrested by year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances. One local human rights nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) reported that the whereabouts of five persons were unknown 
following their detention during the year by local police or security 
officials in several provinces. By year's end, all remained missing, 
and government and NGO efforts to establish their whereabouts 
continued.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and physical abuse of 
prisoners; however, torture, beatings, and other forms of physical 
mistreatment of persons held in police or military custody continued to 
be a serious problem. The problem is compounded further by a climate of 
impunity, whereby perpetrators of torture and abuse frequently are 
protected from prosecution or disciplinary action by local government 
authorities, despite some central government efforts to curtail or 
eliminate violations of prisoners' rights and to address problems of 
accountability.
    There were credible reports that military and police officials used 
physical and psychological torture and severely beat criminal 
detainees, particularly during interrogation.
    According to the UNCHR, the municipal police in Phnom Penh beat or 
tortured persons routinely, although less frequently than during 
previous years. Dozens of detainees interviewed in several provinces 
reported regular beatings in police custody. One domestic human rights 
NGO received 24 formal complaints of torture and recorded 118 other 
cases of new physical assaults through year's end. There were no known 
reports of mistreatment at the Youth Rehabilitation Center during the 
year.
    There were credible reports that local authorities harassed members 
of the opposition party (see Section 2.b.). Police also injured two 
workers in labor demonstrations (see Section 6.a.).
    Prison conditions remained harsh, and government efforts to improve 
prison conditions and implement new regulations were hampered by lack 
of funds and weak enforcement. However, conditions continued to improve 
due to construction and renovation of some prison buildings, the timely 
disbursement of monthly government allocations for food and operating 
costs, and the implementation of new prison regulations that require 
the application of international standards of detention. Human rights 
organizations cited a number of serious problems, including 
overcrowding, health problems, food and water shortages, malnutrition, 
and poor security. Use of shackles and the practice of holding 
prisoners in small, dark cells continued in some prisons after escape 
attempts. Government ration allowances for purchasing prisoners' food 
remain inadequate, exacerbating their malnutrition.
    The Government continued to allow international and domestic human 
rights groups to visit prisons and prisoners and to provide human 
rights training to prison guards. However, NGO's reported occasional 
limited cooperation from provincial authorities (see Section 4).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the Government 
continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. A penal code 
drafted by the U.N. Transitional Authority for Cambodia in 1992 remains 
in effect, as does the 1993 Criminal Procedure Law. The Criminal 
Procedure Law provides for adequate protection for criminal suspects; 
however, in practice the Government sometimes ignored these provisions. 
One human rights NGO recorded 35 complaints of unlawful detention and 
arrest by police, military, or local government authorities during the 
year. In November in the immediate aftermath of an attack by an armed 
antigovernment insurgent group, the Government detained dozens of 
persons without a warrant; most were released without charge within 
hours (see Section 1.a.).
    Although lengthy detention without charge is illegal, suspects 
often are held by authorities for long periods before being charged or 
brought to trial or released. According to an August report by a 
domestic human rights NGO, at least 28 persons had been detained before 
trial in excess of the 6-month statutory maximum in Banteay Meanchey 
province, and some had been in prison up to 17 months. According to the 
UNCHR, such prolonged detention largely is a result of a growing prison 
population and the limited capacity of the court system. Accused 
persons legally are entitled to a lawyer; however, in practice they 
often have limited access to legal representation. Prisoners are held 
routinely for several days before gaining access to a lawyer or family 
members. Although there is a bail system, many prisoners, particularly 
those without legal representation, often have no opportunity to seek 
release on bail.
    There are no political detainees.
    The Government does not use forced exile, and no persons were in 
self-imposed exile during the year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the Government does not respect this 
provision in practice. The courts are subject to influence by the 
executive, and there is widespread corruption among judges, virtually 
none of whom receives a living wage.
    The court system consists of lower courts, an appeals court, and a 
Supreme Court. The Constitution also mandates a Constitutional Council, 
which is empowered to review the Constitutionality of laws, and a 
Supreme Council of Magistracy, which appoints, oversees, and 
disciplines judges. The composition of both of these bodies is viewed 
widely as biased toward the CPP, resulting in complaints by other 
political parties of its institutional dominance. There is a separate 
military court system.
    Trials are public. Defendants have the right to be present and to 
consult with an attorney, to confront and question witnesses against 
them, and to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. 
However, trials typically are perfunctory, and extensive 
crossexamination usually does not take place. The serious shortage of 
attorneys--especially outside Phnom Penhremains a significant 
impediment to broader implementation of the right to counsel in 
practice. Persons without the means to secure defense counsel often are 
effectively denied the right to a fair trial. The introduction in 1998 
into the legal system of newly trained lawyers, who often received 
supplemental training by NGO's, continued to result in significant 
improvements for those defendants provided with counsel, including a 
reduced pretrial detention period and improved access to bail.
    Defendants also are entitled by law to the presumption of innocence 
and the right of appeal. However, because of pervasive corruption, 
defendants often are expected to bribe the judge for a favorable 
verdict, thereby effectively eliminating the presumption of innocence. 
Citizens' rights to appeal sometimes are limited by the logistical 
difficulties in transferring prisoners from provincial prisons to the 
appeals court. Many appeals thus are heard in the absence of the 
defendant.
    A serious lack of resources and poor training contribute to 
corruption and inefficiency in the judicial branch, and in practice the 
Government does not ensure due process. For example, judges often have 
no legal training and often lack copies of the laws upon which they are 
expected to rule. As a result of these weaknesses, citizens often 
effectively were denied a fair trial in jurisdictions without regular 
access to defense lawyers or international judicial assistance 
programs. In April, citing deficiencies in the judicial system, the 
King signed a royal decree that established a judicial reform council 
to develop and implement judicial reform measures. In the first action 
of its kind, the Supreme Council of Magistracy investigated a number of 
complaints against court officials and took disciplinary action against 
five judges and one prosecutor during the year.
    The courts often pressure victims of crimes to accept small cash 
settlements from the accused instead of seeking prosecution. When a 
case does make its way to court, a judge sometimes determines the 
verdict before the case is heard, often on the basis of a bribe paid by 
the accuser or the defendant. Sworn, written statements from witnesses 
and the accused usually are the extent of evidence presented in trials. 
Such statements by the accused sometimes are coerced through beatings 
or threats from investigation officials, and illiterate defendants 
often are not informed of the content of written confessions that they 
are forced to sign. In cases involving military personnel, military 
officers often exert pressure on judges to have the defendant released 
without a trial.
    Legislation enacted in August 1999 removed official immunity for 
crimes committed by government authorities and has resulted in some 
successful prosecutions of police and military officials for their 
crimes. Nevertheless, court delays or corrupt practices often allow 
those accused of crimes to flee or otherwise escape prosecution, 
effectively leading to impunity for some government officials who 
commit crimes. The courts prosecuted some members of the security 
forces for human rights abuses, but immunity for those who commit human 
rights abuses remains a problem. Both national and local government 
officials generally continued to lack the political will and financial 
resources to act effectively against military or security officials 
suspected of being responsible for human rights abuses.
    There is ongoing cooperation between the Government, foreign 
government donors, and NGO's to improve the legal system, although some 
assistance programs in this area suspended in 1997 have not resumed.
    The military court system suffers from deficiencies similar to 
those of the civilian court system. Moreover, the legal distinction 
between the military and civil courts often is ignored in practice; 
several persons arrested for crimes that appear to have no connection 
with military offenses have been detained for trial by the military 
court.
    The Government and the United Nations continued working during the 
year to create a special tribunal to achieve credible justice and 
determine accountability for crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge 
regime in a fashion consistent with the Constitution and international 
standards of justice. After a series of negotiations and diplomatic 
initiatives, the Government and the U.N. reached agreement in principle 
in July on a legal and judicial framework to bring senior Khmer Rouge 
leaders to justice. The Government thereafter revised pending 
legislation creating the tribunal and completed consultations with the 
National Assembly's legislative commission in November. The draft law 
awaited National Assembly action and the King's signature at year's 
end. Ta Mok and Kiang Kek Iev (``Duch''), former officials of the Khmer 
Rouge regime, remained in legal pretrial detention at year's end.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution contains provisions protecting the 
privacy of residence and correspondence and includes a provision 
against illegal search; however, the police routinely conducted 
warrantless searches and seizures. There were no reports that the 
Government monitored private electronic communications.
    Citizens generally were free to live where they wished; however, 
there were continued reports of land disputes between residents, local 
authorities, business persons, and military officials, although their 
frequency decreased substantially from the previous year. Since the 
forced collectivization during Khmer Rouge rule and the return of 
thousands of refugees, land ownership is often unclear, and adequate 
land titles do not exist. Moreover, with the end of the Khmer Rouge 
insurgency, the rush to gain possession of former Khmer Rouge lands on 
or near potentially lucrative crossborder trade routes exacerbated the 
land ownership problem caused by lack of documentation.
    In response to the prevalence of land disputes, several provinces 
created land-dispute settlement committees chaired by one of the deputy 
provincial governors; representatives of local NGO's and the military 
forces frequently attended committee meetings. These committees 
successfully resolved numerous land disputes during the year although 
some encountered occasional difficulties in resolving disputes 
involving military officials. The Government drafted a land law with 
the help of international organizations and NGO's; however, at year's 
end, it had not been passed by the National Assembly.
    In January the Banteay Meanchey provincial court unsuccessfully 
attempted to mediate a land dispute that had arisen in 1999 after local 
military officials and other persons claimed legal title to land in the 
town of Poipet on the border with Thailand. After some of the 800 
resident families refused offers of compensation, and refused to remove 
their houses, the court ordered their eviction, and local security 
forces occupied the land and destroyed the houses. More than half were 
relocated to a nearby village; however, others continued to protest 
their eviction in a makeshift camp near the National Assembly in Phnom 
Penh at year's end.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression, press, and publication, and the Government 
generally respects these rights in practice; however, there continued 
to be some problems. The Constitution implicitly limits free speech by 
requiring that speech not adversely affect public security. The 
Constitution also declares that the King is ``inviolable.'' The Press 
Law provides journalists with a number of rights, including a 
prohibition on prepublication censorship and protection from 
imprisonment for expressing opinion. However, the Press Law also 
includes a vaguely worded prohibition on publishing articles that 
affect national security and political stability. There were no reports 
that journalists practiced selfcensorship. There were a large number of 
news items critical of the Government and included frequent 
vituperative personalized criticism of the Prime Minister, the 
President of the National Assembly, and other senior officials.
    Although limited in circulation, newspapers are a primary source of 
news and expression of political opinion. All major political parties 
have reasonable and regular access to the print media. The press 
remained somewhat partisan, but the only major newspapers that received 
substantial financial support from a political party were a few 
opposition newspapers. The number of Khmer-language newspapers remained 
roughly the same as the previous year. There are approximately 16 
Khmerlanguage newspapers published regularly. Of these, 11 are 
considered to be progovernment journals, 4 are considered to support 
the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), and one is considered to be 
antimonarchy. In addition there is one Frenchlanguage daily, one 
Englishlanguage daily, and two other English newspapers published 
regularly. Many of the Khmerlanguage newspapers frequently publish 
articles translated from the English-language newspapers.
    Most newspapers criticize the Government frequently, and Prime 
Minister Hun Sen and National Assembly President Prince Ranariddh 
frequently came under strong attack by opposition newspapers. There 
were instances of government intimidation or retribution against 
newspapers for reporting critical of the Government. In February the 
Ministry of Information warned two opposition newspapers, the Voice of 
Khmer Youth and the Khmer Conscience, that they would be suspended for 
publishing articles critical of the King and for inciting hatred 
against ethnic Vietnamese. In both cases, the newspapers avoided 
suspension after the editors published apologies consistent with the 
requirements of the Press Law. In April the Government suspended a 
weekly newspaper, Cambodia News Bulletin, for 30 days due to its 
``systematic defamation'' in publishing a series of articles critical 
of government corruption and mismanagement. In July the same newspaper 
was suspended for republishing an article first published in the South 
China Morning Post (SCMP), a Hong Kong SAR (Peoples' Republic of China) 
newspaper. The article erroneously reported that a possible successor 
to the throne was not the King's own son. The SCMP editor later 
apologized and corrected the error. In October the Government suspended 
a newspaper, Bakorng, for 30 days due to its publication of an article 
critical of the royal family and impugning the King's intelligence.
    In May the Government confiscated issues of the country's first 
pornographic magazine, Angkor Thom Sophakmogkol (Big Angkor Happiness), 
and declared it an indecent publication.
    In November the Ministry of Information approved a subdecree that 
specified professional requirements for new newspaper and magazine 
publishers, and introduced a mandatory licensing system requiring 
newspapers to renew their licenses annually and magazines to renew 
their licenses every 2 years. The subdecree was criticized by some 
journalists as a potential limitation on press freedom and as an 
invitation to self-censorship; by year's end, however, there were no 
reports that the subdecree was implemented inappropriately.
    The Government, the military forces, and political parties 
continued to dominate the broadcast media. The governmentsponsored 
television network broadcast live telecasts of National Assembly 
sessions at the initiative of Prince Ranariddh, the National Assembly 
president. According to a report by the UNCHR, the procedures for 
licensing and allocation of radio and television frequencies to the 
media were not impartial.
    In March the Government banned the radio broadcast of the playing 
of three songs that it claimed degraded women. In April the Government 
announced a ban on television programs that featured what it claimed 
were provocatively dressed women; however, no licenses were affected by 
the announcement by year's end.
    National radio and television stations regularly broadcast some 
human rights, social action, public health, and civil society 
programming produced by domestic NGO's.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally 
respected this right in practice. Numerous groups assembled peacefully, 
including workers protesting labor conditions or wages, political 
opposition activists supporting a tribunal for former senior leaders of 
the Khmer Rouge regime or criticizing flood relief efforts, students 
protesting border encroachments, prison guards rallying to demand 
higher wages, moto-taxi drivers protesting high gasoline prices, and 
various groups protesting land seizures, all without incident. On 
occasion, counterdemonstrations by other citizens who supported the 
Government disrupted the protests and sometimes resulted in scuffles 
that caused minor injuries to some participants.
    In June the national Government stated that local officials were 
responsible for the resolution of land disputes, effectively ending 
nearly all land-dispute protests at the National Assembly.
    The Government requires a permit to be obtained in advance of a 
march or demonstration. The Government often did not issue a requested 
permit, or took no action on a permit application; however, these 
actions had no practical effect since most such assemblies were held 
anyway. There were no incidents in which security forces disrupted or 
ended marches or demonstrations.
    In May disaffected members of the SRP and local police destroyed a 
memorial structure that the SRP had erected illegally in front of the 
National Assembly. In August, following diplomatic intervention, the 
structure was reestablished at an alternate site.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respected this right in practice. By year's end, 
the National Assembly had not debated or acted on a revised draft NGO 
law, which retained some registration and reporting requirements for 
domestic NGO's and associations but eliminated many provisions from 
earlier drafts that were previously opposed by the NGO community.
    The Government does not coerce or forbid membership in political 
organizations.
    There were some reports of local government interference with 
offices of the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), and a group of disaffected 
members of the opposition SRP caused minor damage to the home of SRP 
leader Sam Rainsy's in April.
    The UNCHR and domestic human rights organizations reported that 
generally members of the SRP conducted their activities freely and 
without government interference throughout the country; however, there 
were some cases in which members of the SRP complained of being 
harassed by local officials. In March charges were dismissed against 
two persons with ties to the SRP arrested for their roles in the 1998 
rocket attack against the Prime Minister's motorcade, and they were 
released from custody. A third suspect, Sok Yoeun, fled the country in 
1999 and remained in prison in Thailand pending extradition.
    Membership in the Khmer Rouge, which previously conducted an armed 
insurgency against the Government, is illegal.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
Constitution also prohibits discrimination based on religion, and 
minority religions experience little or no official discrimination. 
Buddhism is the state religion and over 95 percent of the population is 
Buddhist. Most of the remainder is made up of ethnic Cham Muslims, who 
generally are well integrated into society.
    The law requires all religious groups, including Buddhists, to 
submit applications to the Ministry of Cults and Religious Affairs in 
order to construct places of worship and to conduct religious 
activities. Religious groups have not encountered significant 
difficulties in obtaining approvals for construction of places of 
worship, but some Muslim and Christian groups report delays by some 
local officials in acknowledging that official permission has been 
granted to conduct religious meetings in homes. Such religious meetings 
generally take place unimpeded despite delay or inaction at the local 
level, and no significant constraints on religious assembly have been 
reported.
    Foreign missionary groups generally operate freely throughout the 
country and have not encountered significant difficulties in performing 
their work. However, there reportedly are some constraints on 
evangelizing by Christians at the local levelespecially in areas of new 
Christian religious activitybut these generally are resolved 
satisfactorily by intervention with provincial or central government 
authorities. Government officials have expressed appreciation for the 
work of many foreign religious groups in providing much needed 
assistance in education, rural development, and training. At the same 
time, government officials also have expressed some concern about 
foreign groups using the guise of religion to become involved in 
illegal or political affairs.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict 
domestic or international travel, although the presence of land mines 
and bandits makes travel in some areas of the country dangerous.
    Monks may move internally without restriction.
    All refugee camps at the border with Thailand were closed during 
1999 after all Cambodian refugees returned. There were no reports of 
refugees being forced by Thai authorities to return to Cambodia 
involuntarily, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), nor were there any reports of persecution or discrimination 
against those who returned from any country. Internally displaced 
persons also were allowed to resettle in other areas of the country.
    The Government allows noncitizens to apply to the UNHCR for refugee 
status. The Government continued to cooperate with the UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations to prepare for and assist in the 
resettlement of the refugees who returned from Thailand. The 
resettlement process largely was completed during the year, and UNHCR 
closed its provincial offices. The Government has not formulated a 
policy regarding asylees or first asylum, and it did not provide asylum 
during the year.
    There were no reports that the Government forced persons to return 
to a country where they feared persecution. However, the Government 
deported to Vietnam some Vietnamese citizens who were arrested for 
planning armed attacks against the government of Vietnam.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
    to Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and most citizens exercised this right by 
participating in the 1998 national elections. Suffrage is universal and 
voluntary for all citizens at the age of 18. In July 1998, in the first 
national elections since 1993, the CPP won a plurality of votes. 
However, the electoral campaign and its aftermath were marred by 
protests, voter intimidation, and partisan violence, some of it 
government-directed. Despite such incidents, the formation of the new 
Government reflected the will of the electorate. Most international and 
observer groups certified the election as acceptable.
    The coalition Government formed in late 1998 between the CPP and 
FUNCINPEC, the two parties that won the largest number of votes and 
National Assembly seats in the 1998 election, renewed political 
stability. The coalition agreement provided for roughly equal power 
sharing between the parties, with Hun Sen of the CPP as Prime Minister 
and Prince Ranariddh of FUNCINPEC as president of the National 
Assembly. The coalition agreement also provided for the creation of a 
Senate, which was formed in March 1999 with Chea Sim of the CPP as 
president. The Senate's function is to review and provide advice on the 
laws passed by the National Assembly; the National Assembly retains 
final authority over whether to modify legislation based on the 
Senate's recommendations.
    Although growing in influence, the legislature remained weak in 
comparison with the executive branch. The coalition Government 
appointed the provincial governors and their deputies, who generally 
are divided between the CPP and FUNCINPEC parties, as well as district 
officials. Commune-level officials were appointed by the previous 
government; most of these officials are appointees from the previous 
regimes, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the State of Cambodia. 
Elections for new commune councils were not held during the year as 
planned, but are expected to be held in early 2002. The Government 
completed drafts of the communal election law and commune 
administration law during the year, but the National Assembly had not 
debated and enacted the laws by year's end; the election law requires a 
preparatory period of at least 11 months between passage of the law and 
the date of the commune election.
    Traditional cultural practices inhibit the role of women in 
government, and women are underrepresented in government and politics. 
However, women took an active part in the 1998 national election. There 
are 10 women among the 122 members of the National Assembly, 8 women 
among the 61 members of the Senate, and 3 female state secretaries in 
the Cabinet, which includes a Ministry of Women's and Veterans affairs. 
There are several members of ethnic and religious minorities in the 
Cabinet and the National Assembly (see Section 5).

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
    Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of
    Human Rights
    The large domestic and international human rights community 
remained active and engaged in diverse activities. Numerous human 
rights organizations and the UNCHR conducted monitoring activities and 
human rights training for provincial officials, military officers, 
villagers, the legal community, and other groups. These organizations 
operated relatively freely throughout the country. There are 
approximately 40 NGO's involved in human rights activities, but only a 
small portion were involved actively in organizing training programs or 
investigating abuses. The Government generally cooperated with human 
rights workers in performing their investigations, but some domestic 
NGO's reported occasional limited cooperation from some provincial 
authorities in conducting inspections of prison conditions.
    In April, following widespread media criticism that a local human 
rights NGO was harboring illegal workers from Vietnam, the Government 
stated that the NGO should be held responsible for the subsequent 
disappearance of the illegal workers. One staff member of the NGO was 
detained briefly and questioned by police, but the Government took no 
official action against the NGO or its members (see Section 5).
    In September 1999, the Government and the UNCHR agreed to an 
extension until March 2002 of the UNCHR's activities in the country, 
although a formal memorandum of understanding had not been signed by 
year's end. The UNCHR maintains a head office in Phnom Penh and has six 
provincial offices. The position of the U.N. Special Representative for 
Human Rights was vacant much of the year; the newly appointed 
representative made his first trip to the country in November and met 
with government representatives at all levels, as well as with 
representatives of political parties and NGO's.
    The government-established Cambodian Human Rights Committee in 1999 
published the results of only a few of its investigations of the human 
rights abuses that had been reported by the UNCHR in previous years. 
The committee, which was established in 1998, also is charged with 
improving the administration of justice and drafting a law to establish 
an independent permanent national human rights commission. By year's 
end, the commission had not been established.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
    Disability, Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
color, language, religious beliefs, or political views. Although the 
Government does not engage in discrimination systematically, it 
sometimes fails to protect these rights in practice.
    Women.--Domestic and international NGO workers report that violence 
against women, including rape and domestic violence, is common. 
Although accurate statistics are not available, one local NGO reported 
138 incidents of rape and domestic abuse through October. Authorities 
normally decline to become involved in domestic disputes, and the 
victims frequently are reluctant to complain. Rape is unlawful, as is 
assault. Spousal rape and domestic abuse are not recognized as separate 
crimes.
    Prostitution and trafficking in women are serious problems (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Due in part to budgetary limitations, the 
Government has not enforced effectively a 1996 law against prostitution 
and trafficking in women although the Government devoted greater 
attention to the problem during the past year and initiated several 
prosecutions. Despite sporadic government crackdowns on brothel 
operators in Phnom Penh, prostitution continues to flourish. A survey 
by a local human rights NGO found that 40 percent of women and girls 
who work as prostitutes do so voluntarily, while 60 percent have been 
forced to work as prostitutes or have been deceived into prostitution. 
The NGO also estimated that there are up to 55,000 sex workers in the 
country. At year's end, the Government had begun preparation of 
legislation to decriminalize and regulate prostitution as part of a 
package of legal measures designed to address the problem of sexual 
trafficking of women and children (see Section 6.f.).
    On March 29, a Poipet brothel owner was sentenced to 12 years in 
prison for the 1998 beating death of a prostitute; this was regarded 
widely as the first successful prosecution of a crime against a sex 
worker.
    The Constitution contains explicit language providing for equal 
rights for women, equal pay for equal work, and equal status in 
marriage. In practice women have equal property rights with men, have 
the same status in bringing divorce proceedings, and have equal access 
to education and some jobs. However, cultural traditions continue to 
limit the ability of women to reach senior positions in business and 
other areas.
    According to NGO reports, women comprise 52 percent of the 
population, 60 percent of agricultural workers, 85 percent of the 
business work force, 70 percent of the industrial work force, and 60 
percent of all service sector workers. Women often are concentrated in 
lowpaying jobs in these sectors and largely are excluded from 
management positions.
    There are a large number of active women's NGO's that train poor 
women and widows and address social problems such as spousal abuse, 
prostitution, and trafficking. An active women's media center NGO 
produces and broadcasts programming on women's issues. NGO's provide 
shelters from women in crisis.
    Children.--The Constitution provides for children's rights, and 
ensuring the welfare of children is a specific goal in the Government's 
political program. The Government relies on international aid to fund 
most social welfare programs targeted at children, resulting in only a 
modest flow of funds to ameliorate problems that affect children.
    Children are affected adversely by an inadequate educational 
system. Education is free and compulsory through grade 9; however, many 
children leave school to help their families in subsistence 
agriculture. Despite an extensive government school construction 
program, schools are overcrowded and lack sufficient equipment. Less 
than 5 percent of primary school teachers have completed high school. 
The Government does not deny girls equal access to education but in 
practice families with limited resources often give priority to 
educating boys.
    Children frequently suffer from malnutrition and the inadequacy of 
the health care system. Infant mortality was reported most recently at 
89.4 per thousand, and 12 percent of children do not live to the age of 
5 years. Child mortality from preventable diseases is high.
    Child abuse is believed to be common, although there are no 
statistics available on the extent of the problem. Poverty and domestic 
violence often drive children to live on the streets; domestic NGO's 
estimate there are more than 10,000 street children in Phnom Penh 
alone, who are easy targets for sexual abuse and exploitation.
    Although sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 15 is 
illegal, child prostitution and trafficking in children were common 
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). In July 1999, the Government adopted a 
5year plan against child sexual exploitation that emphasizes prevention 
through information and protection through law enforcement. To combat 
sex tourism, the Government during the year prosecuted at least three 
cases in which foreigners were charged with pornography violations or 
pedophilia.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not require that 
buildings or government services be accessible to the disabled. 
According to the Government, approximately 1 in 250 citizens is missing 
at least one limb. This statistic reflects the continuing effects of 
land mine detonations. Programs administered by various NGO's have 
brought about substantial improvements in the treatment and 
rehabilitation of amputees. However, amputees face considerable 
societal discrimination, particularly in obtaining skilled employment.
    Religious Minorities.--Muslims are the largest religious minority 
and experience little or no discrimination in practice; however, 
occasional tensions were reported in past years among the various 
branches of Islam; these groups receive monetary support from groups in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, or Indonesia depending on the tenets of 
the particular branch.
    The small Christian community has not experienced serious or 
systematic discrimination; however, occasional tensions were reported 
when Christian evangelists attempted to remove Buddhist images or 
religious items in private homes. Christian missionary groups have not 
encountered significant difficulties in performing their work.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens of Chinese and 
Vietnamese ethnicity long have constituted the largest ethnic 
minorities. Ethnic Chinese citizens are well accepted in society. 
However, fear and animosity continue among many Khmer citizens toward 
ethnic Vietnamese, who are seen as a threat to the Cambodian nation and 
culture. The rights of minorities under the 1996 nationality law are 
not explicit; constitutional protections are extended only to ``Khmer 
people,'' that is, Cambodians.
    Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of ethnic violence 
supported by opposition politicians, during which ethnic Vietnamese 
citizens or residents were killed. Nonetheless, political opposition 
and student groups continued to make strong anti-Vietnamese statements 
during the year; they complained of political control, border 
encroachments, and other problems for which they held ethnic Vietnamese 
persons responsible.
    In March a domestic human rights NGO was criticized in the local 
Khmer press for sheltering, and then release of 34 illegal Vietnamese 
residents who had been working in a Phnom Penh garment factory (see 
Section 4).
    On March 27, more than 200 demonstrators in Phnom Penh demanded the 
eviction of 500 ethnic Vietnamese persons living as squatters inside 
the compound of a Buddhist temple. The demonstration was fueled by the 
injury of a monk during an earlier rock-throwing clash at the temple; 
monks from the temple claimed that the Vietnamese squatters insulted 
Buddhism by conducting prostitution, karaoke, and gambling on the 
temple premises. In April the squatters left the compound peacefully 
after the Government arranged for most of them to live on land in 
nearby Kandal province.
    On April 12, a group of over 20 ethnic Vietnamese fisherman killed 
3 government fisheries officials in Kandal province and wounded 3 
others during a late-night government raid on illegal fishing practices 
on the Tonle Sap river. The Government subsequently arrested three 
Vietnamese fisherman for the crimes, and their cases are under 
prosecution.
    On June 28, a hand grenade exploded under a house located in an 
ethnic Vietnamese area but caused no damage or injuries. Police 
speculated that the incident could have been the result of a personal 
dispute or could have been an attempt to frighten the ethnic Vietnamese 
residents in the area. Unlike in previous years, there were no reports 
of persons killed or injured in antiVietnamese violence.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1997 Labor Law provides workers 
with the right to form professional organizations of their own 
choosing, without prior authorization, and all workers are free to join 
the trade union of their choice; however, the Government's enforcement 
of these rights was uneven. In the wake of 1999 union complaints that 
the procedures for registration were burdensome, the Government took 
additional steps to ease registration procedures during the year. 
Membership in trade unions or employee associations is not compulsory, 
and workers are free to withdraw from such organizations; however, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training and Youth 
Rehabilitation (MOSALVY) has accepted the charter of at least one union 
that requires workers to obtain permission before they may withdraw. 
The Labor Law does not apply to civil servants, including teachers, 
judges, military personnel, or household servants. Personnel working in 
air and maritime transportation are not fully subject to the law, but 
are free to form unions.
    Most workers are subsistence rice farmers and have little knowledge 
of trade unions. Only a small fraction (estimated at less than 1 
percent) of the labor force is unionized, and the trade union movement, 
still in its infancy, is very weak. Unions are highly concentrated in 
the garment and footwear industries, where approximately 5 to 10 
percent of the 100,000 to 120,000 workers are union members. Although 
there is an expanding service sector, most urban workers are engaged in 
small-scale commerce, self-employed skilled labor, or unskilled day 
labor. The Labor Law requires unions and employer organizations to file 
a charter and lists of officers with the MOSALVY. The Ministry has 
registered 114 factory unions and 5 national labor federations since 
the Labor Law went into effect in 1997, including 57 unions during the 
year. Although all unions collect dues from members, none have been 
able to operate without outside sources of support. None of the unions 
has the capacity to negotiate with management as equals.
    One labor federation maintains an affiliation with the opposition 
SRP. Three other registered labor federations have historical ties to 
the Government or individuals within the Government. One major labor 
federation and several unaffiliated factory unions are completely 
independent.
    During the year, the Government issued regulations clarifying the 
Labor Law in a number of areas pertaining to freedom of association. 
The new regulations included procedures for the registration of labor 
unions with their registration materials that eliminated the 
requirement for union leaders to obtain ``letters of no criminal 
record'' prior to registration. The Government also improved election 
procedures for workers' representatives on the tripartite labor 
advisory committee.
    Despite these advances, the Government's enforcement of provisions 
that protect the right of association was weak. The Government's 
enforcement efforts were hampered by a lack of resources, little 
knowledge of the law by factory managers, and a lack of qualified labor 
inspectors. Unions also suffer from a lack or resources, training, and 
experience. There were a number of credible complaints about antiunion 
harassment by employers, including the dismissal of union leaders 
during the year. In at least one case, a factory defied a MOSALVY order 
to reinstate dismissed union leaders. The Government never has 
prosecuted or punished an employer for antiunion activity. The MOSALVY 
often finds in favor of employees, but rarely uses its legal authority 
to penalize employers who defy its orders. The MOSALVY often advises 
employees in such situations to sue in court, which labor unions claim 
is unnecessary, costly, and ineffective.
    The Labor Law provides for the right to strike and protects 
strikers from reprisal. There were 76 strikes during the year, the vast 
majority of which took place without the 7-day prior notice required by 
law. The Government allowed all strikes and demonstrations, including 
widespread garment industry strikes in June, in which demonstrators 
caused property damage at several locations. Two workers suffered 
injuries at the hands of the police during violent labor demonstrations 
during the year, but police intervention generally was minimal and 
restrained, even in cases in which striking workers caused property 
damage. There have been several credible reports of workers being 
dismissed on spurious grounds after organizing or participating in 
strikes. In some cases, strikers have been pressured by employers to 
accept compensation and leave their employment.
    Unions may affiliate freely, but the law does not address 
explicitly their right to affiliate internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Law 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively; however, 
the Government's enforcement of these rights was uneven. Wages are set 
by market forces, except for civil servants, for whom wages are set by 
the Government.
    Since passage of the Labor Law in 1997, there has been confusion 
over the overlapping roles of labor unions and elected shop stewards. 
The Labor Law provides unions the right to negotiate with management 
over wages and working conditions and allows unions to nominate 
candidates for shop steward positions. However, the law provides shop 
stewards the right to represent the union to the company director and 
to sign collective bargaining agreements. Legal ambiguities also exist 
in the process for unions to nominate shop stewards. In practice most 
factories elected shop stewards before a union was present in the 
enterprise; thus, for most of the year, unions had no legally 
enforceable right to negotiate with management in situations in which 
there were nonunion shop stewards present in the enterprise. In 
addition the law specifically protects elected shop stewards from 
dismissal without permission from the MOSALVY, but grants no such 
protection to elected union leaders. However, in November the MOSALVY 
issued a new declaration that gave trade unions roles that are 
comparable to those of shop stewards and extended protection from 
dismissal to certain union officers within an enterprise.
    Very little collective bargaining takes place. There are only two 
collective bargaining agreements registered with the Government. In 
addition to difficulties in defining the bargaining unit, collective 
bargaining is inhibited by the weak capacity and inexperience of 
unions.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition on Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Law 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced labor by 
children; however, the Government does not enforce its provisions 
adequately. Involuntary overtime remained widespread. Workers faced 
fines, dismissal, or loss of premium pay if they refused to work 
overtime.
    Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a serious problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    There were no reports of bonded labor during the year.
    Conditions in the commercial sex industry indicate both forced 
labor and the trafficking of persons (see Section 6.f.). Although there 
are no comprehensive surveys of the country's commercial sex industry, 
it thrives openly; many commercial sex workers are under the age of 18. 
An NGO survey in 1995 of prostitution indicated that 31 percent of 
female prostitutes were between the ages of 12 and 17 years. Up to half 
the girls involved were sold into prostitution by their families, then 
forced to work as prostitutes. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) reported that many rural families allow their daughters to travel 
to cities for jobs described as honest and well paid, but which in 
reality lead to exploitative and slaverylike situations. There have 
also been reports of children who were kidnaped and forced to work in 
the illegal sex trade (see Sections 6.b. and 6.f.). Officials of the 
Government took action in February to rescue underage or trafficked 
women from prostitution, but do not do so consistently.
    The Law on the Exploitation and Sale of Humans establishes a jail 
sentence of 15 to 20 years for any person convicted of trafficking in 
persons under the age of 15 (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Law establishes 15 years as the minimum age for 
employment, and 18 as the minimum age for hazardous work. The law 
permits children between 12 and 15 to engage in ``light work'' that is 
not hazardous to their health and that does not affect school 
attendance. The Labor Advisory Committee is responsible for defining 
what constitutes work that is hazardous to the health, safety, and 
morality of adolescents, as well as consulting with the Ministry to 
determine which types of employment and working conditions constitute 
``light work.'' However, the committee has not yet done so for any 
industry.
    The Ministry is hampered by inadequate resources, staff, and 
training. Law enforcement agencies have sufficient authority to combat 
child prostitution, but do not do so in a sustained, consistent manner. 
Some observers note that existing regulations do not address the 
problem of child labor in the informal sector adequately.
    Children under 15 account for over half the population. About 17 
percent of children between the ages of 5 and 17 work. More than half 
of these are over the age of 14, and 89 percent are engaged in 
agriculture. Only 4 percent of working children are engaged in 
industrial work, including brick factories and rubber plantations.
    In October a British Broadcasting Corporation television 
documentary drew great attention to what in fact were exaggerated 
allegations of widespread child labor in the garment industry. Several 
employees at one factory claimed to have misrepresented their ages by 
presenting inaccurate Government-issued documents in order to meet the 
factory's minimum age standard of 18 years of age. In fact child labor 
is not prevalent in the industry; however, there are instances of young 
workers who misrepresent their ages to gain employment in factories, 
including the garment factories. Most garment factories have policies 
that set the age of employment above the legal minimum of 15 years. The 
most serious child labor problems are in the informal sector.
    The ILO's IPEC (International Program for the Elimination of Child 
Labor) reported in 1999 that more than 15 percent of prostitutes were 
from 9 to 15 years of age, and that 78 percent of these girls were 
Vietnamese; the remainder were citizens.
    With assistance from the ILO, the MOSALVY established a child labor 
unit to investigate and suppress child labor. In 1997 the Government, 
in conjunction with the ILO and NGO's, also approved a national action 
plan on child labor. In 1992 the Government ratified ILO Convention 105 
(abolition of child labor) and Convention 138 (minimum age), and the 
Ministry has disseminated information about its content to employers. 
The MOSALVY had not defined worst forms of child labor, but the 
Ministry was preparing a report at year's end on the content of ILO 
Convention 182 for eventual submission to the National Assembly. It 
conducted four workshops to educate legislators on the matter. The 
Government worked with the ILO on a strategy for implementing 
Convention 182, which would include defining the worst forms of child 
labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law requires the 
MOSALVY to establish minimum wages based on recommendations by the 
Labor Advisory Committee. The minimum wage varies regionally. 
Responding to unprecedented pressure from the labor movement, the 
Ministry formally exercised its minimum wage authority for the first 
time in July, when it approved a $45 per month minimum wage; however, 
it applied only to the garment and footwear sector. It defines a month 
as 26 8-hour days, after training. Garment factories almost universally 
observe the minimum wage, or pay higher wages. There is no minimum wage 
for any other industry.
    Typically, garment workers earn relatively high wages, between $45 
and $100 per month. However, prevailing monthly wages in the garment 
sector and many other professions are insufficient to provide a worker 
and family with a decent standard of living. Civil service salaries 
also are far below market levels, requiring government officials to 
secure outside sources of income.
    The Labor Law provides for a standard legal workweek of 48 hours, 
not to exceed 8 hours per day. The law stipulates timeand-one-half for 
overtime, and double time if overtime occurs at night, on Sunday, or on 
a holiday. The Government does not enforce these standards effectively. 
Despite reminders from the Government concerning hours of work, workers 
in many garment factories complain that overtime is excessive or 
involuntary, or that they are required to work 7 days per week.
    Some factories do not pay the legally mandated premiums for 
overtime (150 percent) and night or holiday work (200 percent) 
properly, and there is legal ambiguity over which hours constitute 
night work. Another common complaint is that management violates the 
law by paying the overtime rate only for the salary component of 
workers' pay, leaving piece rates unchanged regardless of the number of 
hours worked.
    Regulations on working hours outside the garment industry very 
rarely are enforced.
    The Labor Law states that the workplace should have health and 
safety standards adequate to ensure workers' wellbeing. The Government 
enforces existing standards inconsistently, in part because it lacks 
staff, equipment, and training. Labor inspection workers also are paid 
poorly. Work related injury and health problems are common. Conditions 
in smallscale factories and cottage industries are generally poor and 
often do not meet international standards. The Government has issued 
several instructions on workplace standards, and more detailed 
regulations await approval by the labor advisory committee before they 
may be promulgated. Penalties are specified in the Labor Law, but there 
are no specific provisions to protect workers who complain about unsafe 
or unhealthy conditions. Workers who remove themselves from unsafe 
working conditions risk loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The 1996 Law on the Exploitation and 
Sale of Humans establishes a jail sentence of 15 to 20 years for any 
person convicted of trafficking in persons under the age of 15; 
however, the Government does not enforce the law effectively due in 
part to budget limitations and a lack of implementing regulations. The 
country is a source, destination, and transit country for the 
trafficking in persons.
    Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced 
prostitution remained a serious problem. Although prosecutions of 
traffickers increased, and the Government devoted greater attention to 
trafficking during the year, prosecution of traffickers has been rare.
    Surveys conducted by domestic NGO's in 1995 indicated that from 40 
to 50 percent of young women who were trafficked were victimized by a 
close relative or friend of the family for money or on promises of a 
better life. Poverty and ignorance in villages is a major factor in 
contributing to the trafficking problem. One international NGO 
estimated that 30,000 Cambodian women were trafficked to neighboring 
countries.
    The ILO's IPEC (International Program for the Elimination of Child 
Labor) reported in 1999 that more than 15 percent of prostitutes were 
from 9 to 15 years of age, and that 78 percent of these girls were 
Vietnamese; the remainder were Cambodians.
    On August 13, police raided a hotel and freed seven Romanian and 
Moldovan women who allegedly were trafficked into the country's sex 
trade. The proprietor of the hotel initially was arrested for illegally 
detaining the women; however, the court subsequently declined to 
prosecute and released the suspect.
    On August 30, 2 Taiwan residents and 6 Cambodians were arrested for 
human trafficking after a raid on a Phnom Penh hotel found 20 Cambodian 
women who police suspected were to be sent to Taiwan as sex workers 
under the guise of marrying men from Taiwan. There were unconfirmed 
press reports that women were lured from Cambodia to work in the sex 
industry in other Asian countries.
    In March the Government inaugurated a program jointly administered 
by the Ministry of Women's Affairs and the International Organization 
for Migration to train about 2,000 government officials in legal and 
socio-economic issues related to trafficking and migration problems.
    Child prostitution and trafficking in children were common. There 
were reliable reports that children were lured from or kidnaped in some 
provinces and forced into the illegal sex trade, both in Cambodia and 
abroad. Other children were smuggled into Thailand to become beggars.
    In July 1999, the Government adopted a 5-year plan against child 
sexual exploitation that emphasized prevention through information and 
protection through law enforcement. In September 1999, the Prime 
Minister instructed the Cabinet to develop additional measures to fight 
trafficking of women and children, including speedy promulgation of 
subdecrees and signing bilateral extradition treaties to bring 
traffickers to justice.
    In April the Government and a group of international NGO's 
announced a program to train police, prosecutors and judges to more 
effectively enforce the laws protecting children, especially the laws 
against sexual exploitation of children through trafficking and 
otherwise. This program was designed as part of the Government's 5-year 
plan.
    The increase in the number of foreign tourists during the year 
raised concerns of government and NGO officials that the tourist-driven 
child sex trade also would increase. The Government prosecuted at least 
three cases during the year in which foreigners were charged with child 
pornography or indecent acts against minors.
                               __________

                                 CHINA

    The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in 
which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the paramount source of 
power. At the national and regional levels, Party members hold almost 
all top government, police, and military positions. Ultimate authority 
rests with members of the Politburo. Leaders stress the need to 
maintain stability and social order and are committed to perpetuating 
the rule of the CCP and its hierarchy. Citizens lack both the freedom 
peacefully to express organized opposition to the Party-led political 
system and the right to change their national leaders or form of 
Government. Socialism continues to provide the theoretical underpinning 
of Chinese politics, but Marxist ideology has given way to economic 
pragmatism in recent years, and economic decentralization has increased 
the authority of regional officials. The Party's authority rests 
primarily on the Government's ability to maintain social stability, 
appeals to nationalism and patriotism, Party control of personnel, 
media, and the security apparatus, and the continued improvement in the 
living standards of most of the country's almost 1.3 billion citizens. 
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in 
practice the Government and the CCP, at both the central and local 
levels, frequently interfere in the judicial process, and the Party and 
the Government direct verdicts in many high-profile political cases.
    The security apparatus is made up of the Ministries of State 
Security and Public Security, the People's Armed Police, the People's 
Liberation Army, and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal 
systems. Security policy and personnel were responsible for numerous 
human rights abuses.
    The country is making a gradual transition from a centrally planned 
to a market-based economy. Although state-owned industry remains 
dominant in key sectors, the Government has privatized many small and 
medium state-owned enterprises (SOE's) and allowed private 
entrepreneurs increasing scope for economic activity. The country has 
large industrial and agricultural sectors and is a leading producer of 
coal, steel, textiles, and grains. Major exports include electronic 
goods, toys, apparel, and plastics. Trade and foreign investment are 
helping to modernize an already rapidly growing economy. The official 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate through the third quarter of 
the year was just over 8 percent--a decrease from the double-digit 
growth rates of the early 1990's, but slightly above the 1999 figure. 
Increased growth during the year was largely the result of foreign 
trade, continued heavy infrastructure investment, and a small increase 
in domestic demand.
    The economy faces growing problems, including state enterprise 
reform, unemployment, underemployment, and regional economic 
disparities. Rural unemployment and underemployment combined are 
estimated to be over 30 percent. Tens of millions of persons have left 
their homes in rural areas in search of better jobs and living 
conditions in the cities; demographers estimate that between 80 and 130 
million persons make up this ``floating population,'' with many major 
cities counting 1 million or more such persons. Urban areas also are 
coping with millions of state workers idled on partial wages or 
unemployed as a result of industrial reforms. In the industrial sector, 
continued downsizing in state-owned enterprises prompted 2 million 
layoffs in the first half of the year, bringing the total number of 
jobless urban residents to over 20 million in an urban workforce of 
about 240 million. The number of job-seeking migrant workers from rural 
areas adds significantly to this total. Industrial workers throughout 
the country continued to organize sporadically to protest layoffs and 
to demand the payment of overdue wages and benefits. However, rising 
living standards, greater independence for entrepreneurs, and the 
expansion of the nonstate sector have increased workers' employment 
options and have markedly reduced state control over citizens' daily 
lives. In 1999 a constitutional amendment officially recognized the 
role of the private sector in the economy, and private firms now 
contribute 30 to 40 percent of yearly GDP growth. The total number of 
citizens living in absolute poverty continues to decline; estimates 
range from the official figure of 42 million to the World Bank figure 
of 150 million. However, the income gap between coastal and interior 
regions, and between urban and rural areas, is wide and growing. Urban 
per capita income for 1999 was $705 (an increase of 8 percent over the 
previous year), but rural per capita income was $266 (an increase of 
only 2 percent over the previous year).
    The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and it 
continued to commit numerous serious abuses. The Government intensified 
crackdowns on religion and in Tibet, intensified its harsh treatment of 
political dissent, and suppressed any person or group perceived to 
threaten the Government. However, despite these efforts, many Chinese 
had more individual choice, greater access to information, and expanded 
economic opportunity. Nonetheless by year's end, thousands of 
unregistered religious institutions either had been either closed or 
destroyed, hundreds of Falun Gong leaders had been imprisoned, and 
thousands of Falun Gong practitioners remained in detention or were 
sentenced to reeducation-through-labor camps or incarcerated in mental 
institutions. Various sources report that approximately 100 or more 
Falun Gong practitioners died as a result of torture and mistreatment 
in custody. Controls on religious practice and freedom of expression 
also were intensified in Tibet and remained tight in Xinjiang. Only a 
handful of political dissidents remained active publicly. The 
Government's respect for religious freedom deteriorated markedly during 
the year, as the Government conducted crackdowns against underground 
Christian groups and Tibetan Buddhists and destroyed many houses of 
worship. The Government significantly intensified its campaign against 
the Falun Gong movement, which it accused in October of being a 
reactionary organization, as well as against ``cults'' in general. A 
number of qigong groups were banned. The Government continued to commit 
widespread and welldocumented human rights abuses in violation of 
internationally accepted norms. These abuses stemmed from the 
authorities' extremely limited tolerance of public dissent aimed at the 
Government, fear of unrest, and the limited scope or inadequate 
implementation of laws protecting basic freedoms. The Constitution and 
laws provide for fundamental human rights; however, these protections 
often are ignored in practice. Abuses included instances of 
extrajudicial killings, the use of torture, forced confessions, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, the mistreatment of prisoners, lengthy 
incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. In May the U.N. 
Committee Against Torture issued a report critical of continuing 
serious incidents of torture, especially involving national minorities. 
Prison conditions at most facilities remained harsh. In many cases, 
particularly in sensitive political cases, the judicial system denies 
criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and due process because 
authorities attach higher priority to maintaining public order and 
suppressing political opposition than to enforcing legal norms. The 
Government infringed on citizen's privacy rights. The Government 
maintained tight restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press and 
increased its efforts to control the Internet; self-censorship by 
journalists continued. The Government severely restricted freedom of 
assembly and continued to restrict freedom of association. The 
Government continued to restrict freedom of religion and intensified 
controls on some unregistered churches. The Government continued to 
restrict freedom of movement. Citizens do not have the right peacefully 
to change their Government. The Government does not permit independent 
domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to monitor publicly 
human rights conditions. Violence against women (including coercive 
family planning practices--which sometimes include forced abortion and 
forced sterilization); prostitution; discrimination against women; 
trafficking in women and children; abuse of children; and 
discrimination against the disabled and minorities are all problems. 
Particularly serious human rights abuses persisted in Tibet and 
Xinjiang. The Government continued to restrict tightly worker rights, 
and forced labor in prison facilities remained a serious problem. Child 
labor exists and appears to be a growing problem in rural areas as 
adult workers leave for better employment opportunities in urban areas. 
Trafficking in persons is a serious problem.
    Since December 1998, the authorities severely punished, on charges 
of subversion, at least 25 core leaders of the China Democracy Party 
(CDP). During the year, the crackdown on the China Democratic Party 
continued with the arrest or sentencing of Liu Shizun, Dai Xuezhong, 
Zhu Zhengming, Chen Zhonghe, Xiao Shichang, Li Guotao and others. 
During the year, the Government also used laws against subversion and 
endangering state security to threaten, arrest and imprison a wide 
range of political dissidents and activists, including former 
Government officials, nongovernmental organization (NGO) founders and 
activists, activists for artistic freedom, and independent advocates 
for legal reform.
    Although the Government denies that it holds political or religious 
prisoners and argues that all those in prison are legitimately serving 
sentences for crimes under the law, an unknown number of persons, 
estimated at several thousand, are detained in violation of 
international human rights instruments for peacefully expressing their 
political, religious, or social views. Persons detained at times during 
the year included political activists; leaders of unregistered 
religious groups; journalists; authors; intellectuals; labor leaders; 
and members of the Falun Gong movement, among others. Some minority 
groups, particularly Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, came under 
increasing pressure as the Government clamped down on dissent and 
``separatist'' activities. In Tibet the Government carried out a severe 
and wide-ranging crackdown on Tibetan religious practices, which showed 
some signs of moderation at year's end, and continued its ``patriotic 
education campaign'' aimed at controlling the monasteries and expelling 
supporters of the Dalai Lama. In Xinjiang authorities maintained tight 
restrictions on fundamental freedoms in an effort to control 
independence groups.
    The authorities released a few political prisoners before their 
terms were over, notably Liu Wensheng, Chen Lantao, Li Wangyang, Zhang 
Jingsheng, Yu Zhijian, and Lin Hai. However, at year's end several 
thousand others--including Bishop An Shuxin, Chen Longde, Han 
Chunsheng, Li Bifeng, Liu Jingsheng, Qin Yongmin, Shen Liangqing, Zha 
Jianguo, Wang Youcai, Pastor Xu Yongze, Fang Jue, Xu Wenli, Yang 
Qinheng, Zhang Lin, Zhang Shanguang, Zhao Changqing, Zhou Yongjun, 
Ngawang Choephel, Abbot Chadrel Rinpoche, Jigme Sangpo, and Ngawang 
Sangrol (see Tibet addendum)--remained imprisoned or under other forms 
of detention for the peaceful expression of their political, social, or 
religious views. Some of those who completed their sentences and were 
released from prison were kept under surveillance and prevented from 
taking employment or otherwise resuming normal lives. There were also 
reports of the increasing surveillance of dissidents.
    Unapproved religious groups, including Protestant and Catholic 
groups and members of nontraditional religious groups, continued to 
experience varying degrees of official interference, repression, and 
persecution. The Government continued to enforce 1994 State Council 
regulations requiring all places of religious activity to register with 
the Government and come under the supervision of official, 
``patriotic'' religious organizations. There were significant 
differences from region to region, and even locality to locality, in 
the attitudes of government officials toward religion. In some areas, 
authorities guided by national policy made strong efforts to control 
the activities of unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches; 
religious services were broken up and church leaders or adherents were 
harassed, and, at times, fined, detained, beaten, and tortured; many 
houses of worship also were destroyed. In November and December, 
authorities in and around the coastal city of Wenzhou, Zhejiang 
Province, razed or confiscated hundreds of churches or places of 
worship. At year's end, some religious adherents remained in prison 
because of their religious activities. House church groups in the 
northeast reported more detentions and arrests than in recent years, 
and authorities in Henan cracked down on underground Protestant 
churches. Several Protestant house church groups were banned. In many 
regions with high concentrations of Catholics, relations between the 
Government and the underground church loyal to the Vatican remained 
tense. In other regions, registered and unregistered churches were 
treated similarly by the authorities and reported little or no day-to-
day interference in their activities. The number of religious adherents 
in many churches, both registered and unregistered, continued to grow 
at a rapid pace. The situation in Tibet was particularly poor, as the 
Government intensified and expanded its campaign aimed at lamas, monks, 
and nuns with sympathies to the Dalai Lama.
    The Government strictly regulates the establishment and management 
of publications, controls the broadcast media, censors foreign 
television broadcasts, and at times jams radio signals from abroad. 
During the year, several publications were shut down or disciplined for 
publishing material deemed objectionable by the Government, and 
journalists, authors, and researchers were harassed, detained, and 
arrested by the authorities. Despite the continued expansion of the 
Internet in the country, the Government increased its efforts to 
monitor and control content on the Internet. Several new regulations 
regarding the Internet were issued, and many web sites, including 
politically sensitive web sites and foreign news web sites, were shut 
down or blocked by the authorities.
    During the year, the Government worked to make progress towards 
correcting systemic weaknesses in the judicial system and making the 
system more accountable to public scrutiny. New regulations aimed at 
making the Supreme People's Court and the Procuratorate and the police 
more professional and accountable went into effect. Senior officials 
openly acknowledged abuses such as using torture to extort confessions 
and admitted that extorting favors from suspects and nepotism remained 
serious problems. However, new regulations and policies passed in the 
past few years have not brought the country's criminal procedures into 
full compliance with international standards, and the law routinely is 
violated in the cases of political dissidents and religious leaders and 
adherents. The judiciary is not independent.
    Despite intensified suppression of organized dissent, some positive 
trends continued. Social groups with economic resources at their 
disposal continued to play an increasing role in community life. As 
many as 15 million persons had access to the Internet at year's end, 
although the Government increased its attempts to control the content 
of material available on the Internet. Most average citizens went about 
their daily lives without significant interference from the Government, 
enjoying looser economic controls, increased access to outside sources 
of information, greater room for individual choice, and more diversity 
in cultural life. However, the authorities were quick to suppress any 
person or group, whether religious, political, or social, that they 
perceived to be a threat to government power or to national stability, 
and citizens who sought to express openly dissenting political and 
religious views continued to live in an environment filled with 
repression.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The official press 
reported a number of extrajudicial killings, but no nationwide 
statistics are available. During the year, deaths in custody due to 
police use of torture to coerce confessions from criminal suspects 
continued to be a problem. For example, in Xinjiang Abduhelil Abdumijit 
was tortured to death in custody, according to foreign press reports. 
The deaths in custody of Falun Gong practitioners were a significant 
new development. Various sources report that approximately 100 or more 
Falun Gong adherents died during the year in police custody; many of 
their bodies reportedly bore signs of severe beatings or torture, or 
were cremated before relatives could examine them (see Section 1.c.). 
For example, in March Zhang Zhenggang was detained by police in Jiangsu 
and beaten into a coma. Zhang died 5 days later, and family members 
were not allowed to examine his body prior to cremation. In April Li 
Huixi, a Falun Gong follower in Shouguang City, Shandong, reportedly 
was beaten to death by public security officers while in custody. Li's 
body was cremated without an autopsy before his family was informed of 
his death. Falun Gong practitioner Li Zaiji died on July 7 while 
serving a sentence in a reform-through-labor camp in Jinlin. Although 
the official cause of death was listed as dysentery, family members who 
examined his body reported numerous wounds and bandages. During the 
year, several members of underground house churches reportedly also 
died while in custody, sometimes after being beaten by prison 
authorities. According to press reports, Liu Haitao was arrested at an 
underground Protestant church in Henan on September 4 and died in 
October in the Xiayi County Detention Center after being beaten and 
denied medical treatment.
    According to press reports, in June, more than 2,300 inmates at the 
Shangrao labor camp staged a protest over forced overtime labor. After 
prison officials called in over 500 armed police to suppress the 
strike, a riot occurred. Three persons were killed, and over 70 were 
injured in the incident (see Section 1.c.).
    There continued to be numerous executions carried out after summary 
trials. Such trials can occur under circumstances where the lack of due 
process protections borders on extrajudicial killing.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no new reports of disappearances. 
However, the Government still has not provided a comprehensive, 
credible accounting of those missing or detained in connection with the 
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, police and other 
elements of the security apparatus employ torture and degrading 
treatment in dealing with some detainees and prisoners. Senior 
officials acknowledge that torture and coerced confessions are chronic 
problems but have not taken sufficient measures to end these practices. 
Former detainees and the press credibly reported that officials used 
electric shocks, prolonged periods of solitary confinement, 
incommunicado detention, beatings, shackles, and other forms of abuse 
against some detained men and women. During the year, there were 
numerous credible reports of abuse of Falun Gong practitioners by the 
police and other security personnel, including police involvement in 
beatings, detention under extremely harsh conditions, and torture 
(including by electric shock and by having hands and feet shackled and 
linked with crossed steel chains). Persons detained pending trial were 
particularly at risk during pretrial detention due to systemic 
weaknesses in the legal system or lack of implementation of the revised 
Criminal Procedure Law. Reports of torture increase during periodic 
``strike hard'' campaigns in which police are encouraged to achieve 
quick results against crime. According to Amnesty International, during 
campaigns against prostitution, female migrant laborers may be detained 
and subjected to rape and abuse in custody.
    During the year, deaths in custody due to police use of torture to 
coerce confessions from criminal suspects continued to be a problem. 
Human rights monitors reported a number of unconfirmed but credible 
cases of torture. According to one report, Li Lusong of Lanxian County, 
Shanxi Province, went to local party officials to complain about the 
dilapidated facilities at the village primary school. Li was kicked and 
beaten by the police. He later posted comments critical of corruption. 
After he posted the comments, local police detained him and used a stun 
gun and pliers to pull out his tongue and cut it off with a knife. In 
December 1999, the Peoples' Daily reported that a suspect died in 
police custody in Anhui Province after refusing to admit to being a 
thief. Various sources report that approximately 100 or more Falun Gong 
adherents died during the year while in police custody. Many of their 
bodies reportedly bore signs of severe beatings or torture, and 
statements by released Falun Gong detainees regularly attest to 
mistreatment. Many of the bodies of Falun Gong practitioners who died 
in police custody were cremated before relatives could examine them.
    The Government has stated that ``the Chinese judiciary deals with 
every complaint of torture promptly after it is filed, and those found 
guilty are punished according to law.'' The press has reported that 
such punishments were carried out. In April the newspaper Liaoning 
Daily reported that several policemen were punished for ``extorting 
confessions with torture and causing fatal consequences.'' On April 5, 
the China Prosecutorial Report reported cases of forced confessions in 
Kunming. On April 16, the newspaper Legal Daily reported that the 
Guizhou Provincial Higher People's Court sentenced one police officer 
from Zunyi City to death and another to life imprisonment in connection 
with the killing of murder suspect Xiong Xianlu in 1998; Xiong was 
tortured to death. Reports such as these created the impression that 
torture remained a widespread problem. As part of its campaign to 
address police abuse, the Government in 1998 for the first time 
published national torture statistics, along with 99 case studies, in a 
volume entitled ``The Law Against Extorting a Confession by Torture.'' 
The book, which was published by the Supreme People's Procuratorate, 
stated that 126 persons had died during police interrogation in 1993 
and 115 in 1994. Most cases of torture are believed to go unreported.
    Police also beat persons being arrested and persons in detention. 
Dissident Cai Guihua reported that he was beaten by police while being 
arrested prior to the June 4 anniversary of the Tianamen Square 
massacre (see Section 1.d.). Eyewitnesses have reported frequent abuse 
of Falun Gong protesters as they were being detained.
    In May the U.N. Committee Against Torture issued a report 
expressing concern about continuing allegations of serious incidents of 
torture, especially involving Tibetans and other national minorities. 
It recommended that the country incorporate a definition of torture 
into its domestic law in full compliance with international standards, 
abolish all forms of administrative detention (Including reeducation-
through-labor), investigate promptly all allegations of torture, and 
provide training courses on international human rights standards for 
police, among other things (see Section 4).
    In late 1999, according to credible reports, the Government started 
confining some Falun Gong adherents to psychiatric hospitals. At year's 
end, according to Falun Gong, hundreds of practitioners were confined 
to mental hospitals. Authorities also confined other persons accused of 
nonviolent political crimes and other offenses to mental hospitals. In 
mid-December labor activist Cao Maobing was detained and admitted 
against his will to a psychiatric hospital in Yancheng, Jiangsu 
Province, where he reportedly also was forced to take medication 
against his will (see Section 6.a.). In December 1999, authorities in 
Henan Province committed Xue Jifeng to a mental hospital after he 
attempted to establish an independent labor union to support workers 
harmed in a financial fraud. He was held until June (see Section 6.a.). 
Wang Wanxing, who protested in Tiananmen Square in 1992, continued to 
be held in a psychiatric hospital on the outskirts of Beijing. Another 
labor dissident, Wang Miaogen from Shanghai, disappeared in 1999, and 
some observers believe that he is being held in a psychiatric hospital. 
During the year, reports began to surface in the press about a woman 
who was detained by Guangzhou police and sent to a psychiatric hospital 
in June 1999 because she appeared upset after having had her luggage 
stolen, and she lacked an identity card. The woman, who was not 
identified, was raped repeatedly by male inmates at the psychiatric 
hospital before her husband was able to secure her release 
approximately 24 hours later. At the couple's insistence, police 
investigated the rapes, but vital evidence was destroyed prior to the 
investigation, and only one of the accused had been tried to date (see 
Section 1.d.). The woman's attempt to win damages was rejected by one 
court.
    There were reports during the year that police sometimes used 
excessive force to break up demonstrations. In May up to 2,000 unpaid 
workers reportedly protested at their factory and at local government 
offices in Liaoyang, Liaoning Province; the demonstration eventually 
was dispersed violently by the police. Dozens were reported to be 
injured, and three persons were arrested (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). 
Activist Cai Guihua reportedly was beaten and roughed up by the police 
on May 31 and June 3.
    Conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and 
common criminals generally are harsh and frequently degrading. 
Conditions in administrative detention facilities (including 
reeducation-through-labor camps and custody and repatriation centers 
(see Section 1.d.) are reportedly similar to those in prisons. 
Prisoners and detainees often are kept in overcrowded conditions with 
poor sanitation, and their food is often inadequate and of poor 
quality. Many detainees reportedly rely on supplemental food and 
medicines provided by relatives; however, some prominent dissidents 
reportedly are not allowed to receive supplemental food or medicine 
from relatives. According to released political prisoners, it is 
standard practice for political prisoners to be segregated from each 
other and placed with common criminals. There are credible reports that 
common criminals have beaten political prisoners at the instigation of 
guards. Guards in custody and repatriation centers reportedly rely on 
``cell bosses'' to maintain order; these individuals frequently beat 
other detainees and have been known to steal their possessions. 
However, prominent political prisoners sometimes receive better 
treatment. The 1994 Prison Law was designed in part to improve 
treatment of detainees and increase respect for their legal rights. The 
Government's stated goal is to convert one-half of the nation's prisons 
and 150 reeducation-through-labor camps into ``modernized, civilized'' 
facilities by the year 2010. According to credible sources, persons 
held in new ``model'' prisons receive better treatment than those held 
in other prison facilities. (For prison conditions in Tibet, see Tibet 
addendum.)
    Adequate, timely medical care for prisoners continues to be a 
serious problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the 
right to prompt medical treatment if they become ill. Nutritional and 
health conditions can be grim. At year's end, political prisoners who 
reportedly had difficulties in obtaining medical treatment, despite 
repeated appeals on their behalf by their families and the 
international community, included Xu Wenli, Gao Hongmin, Qin Yongmin, 
Wang Youcai, Chadrel Rinpoche, Chen Lantao (who was released in April), 
Chen Longde, Chen Meng, Fang Jue, Hu Shigen, Kang Yuchun, Liu 
Jingsheng, Ngawang Sangdrol, Wang Guoqi, and Zhang Shanguang. Yu 
Dongyue, who defaced the portrait of Mao Zedong in Tiananmen Square 
during the 1989 student protests, reportedly is suffering severe mental 
illness from repeated beatings and mistreatment in a Hunan prison. Zhou 
Yongjun (the first chair of the Federation of Autonomous Student 
Unions), is serving a 3-year reeducation-through-labor sentence after 
returning to China from New York in 1998 and is reportedly suffering 
from rhinitis and fever. Ngawang Choephel, who is serving an 18-year 
sentence for espionage, reportedly suffers from liver, lung, and 
stomach ailments, and possibly tuberculosis. Labor activist Zhang 
Shanguang, serving a 10-year sentence for disclosing news of labor 
demonstrations to Radio Free Asia, was not permitted to see family 
members regularly in spite of suffering from serious tuberculosis. 
According to credible reports, Fang Jue is in very poor health. Xu 
Wenli, who tested positive for hepatitis B during a prison hospital 
examination, was denied treatment for the disease in 1999 despite 
repeated pleas by his family. He was said to be in poor health in 
November. Xu also reportedly was in need of dental care. An Fuxing, a 
China Democracy Party member and veteran of the Tiananmen prodemocracy 
movement, contracted hepatitis B at Liaoyuan prison and died from the 
illness in April. Hua Di, a Stanford researcher, whose 15-year prison 
sentence on charges of providing missile program secrets to persons 
abroad was overturned in mid-March, was reconvicted on November 23 and 
sentenced to 10 years in prison. He is suffering from cancer and was 
denied release on medical parole in April. Prison officials in Xinjiang 
have not allowed family members of businesswoman and prominent Uighur 
activist Rebiya Kadeer to visit or to bring her medicine for heart 
disease since her arrest on August 11, 1999. She is said to be in poor 
health, suffering from painful feet, blurred vision, and impaired 
hearing. There are also allegations that she had been abused 
physically. Officials reportedly have denied repeated requests for her 
to be hospitalized.
    According to one credible report in 1998, there have been instances 
in which women in reeducation-through-labor camps found to be pregnant 
while serving sentences were forced to submit to abortions (see Section 
1.f.).
    Forced labor in prison is common. According to press reports, in 
June more than 2,300 inmates at the Shangrao labor camp staged a strike 
to protest against forced overtime for the intensive labor of ore 
milling. After camp officials called in over 500 armed police to 
suppress the strike, a riot occurred. Three persons were killed and 
more than 70 were wounded in the incident (see also Sections 1.a. and 
6.c.). Persons may be detained without trial in custody and 
repatriation centers, in order to ``protect urban social order.'' Until 
they are repatriated, those detained may be required to pay for the 
cost of their detention and repatriation by performing forced labor 
while in detention.
    The Government does not permit the independent monitoring of 
prisons or reeducation-through-labor camps, and prisoners remain 
largely inaccessible to international human rights organizations. Talks 
with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on an 
agreement for ICRC access to prisons remain stalled. After a 1year 
suspension of unofficial dialog between a prominent businessman and 
human rights monitor and the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry resumed 
providing information regarding prisoners in March. The monitor was 
invited to visit the country 3 times during the year and received 
information regarding more than 20 prisoners, most of whom had been 
released prior to the completion of their original sentences. Prison 
visits with family members and others are monitored closely.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain serious problems. The law permits the authorities in 
some circumstances to detain persons without arresting or charging 
them, and persons may be sentenced administratively to up to 3 years in 
reeducation-through-labor camps and other similar facilities without a 
trial. Because the Government tightly controls information, it is 
impossible accurately to determine the total number of persons 
subjected to new or continued arbitrary arrest or detention. The 
Government reported in 1999 that prosecutors had censured police 
officers 70,992 times in 1998 for detentions that exceeded the legal 
time limit. According to estimates, thousands of persons remain 
incarcerated, charged with other criminal offenses, detained but not 
charged, or sentenced to reeducation-through-labor. Although the crime 
of being a ``counterrevolutionary'' was removed from the Criminal Code 
in 1997, by year's end 2000 as many as 1,000 persons remained in prison 
for the crime, and another 600 were serving sentences under the State 
Security Law, which covers the same crimes as the repealed section on 
``counterrevolution.'' Official government statistics report that there 
are some 230,000 persons in reeducation-through-labor camps. It has 
been estimated that as many as 1.7 million persons per year were 
detained in a form of administrative detention known as custody and 
repatriation before 1996; the number of persons subject to this form of 
detention reportedly has been growing since that time (see Section 
1.c.).
    Wang Wanxing, who protested in Tiananmen Square in 1992, continued 
to be held in a psychiatric hospital on the outskirts of Beijing (see 
Section 1.c.). In mid-December, labor activist Cao Maobing was detained 
and admitted against his will to a psychiatric hospital in Yancheng, 
Jiangsu Province, where he reportedly also was forced to take 
medication against his will (see Section 6.a.); he remained in the 
facility at year's end. According to reliable reports, the Government 
confined hundreds of Falun Gong adherents to psychiatric hospitals.
    The Criminal Procedure Law, which was amended in 1997, abolished an 
often criticized form of pretrial detention known as ``shelter and 
investigation'' that allowed police to detain suspects for extended 
periods without charge. Nonetheless in some cases police still can 
detain unilaterally a person for up to 37 days before releasing him or 
formally placing him under arrest. Once a suspect is arrested, the 
revised law allows police and prosecutors to detain him for months 
before trial while a case is being ``further investigated.'' Under the 
revised Criminal Procedure Law, detained criminal suspects, defendants, 
their legal representatives, and close relatives are entitled to apply 
for a guarantor to enable the suspect or defendant to await trial out 
of custody. In practice the police, who have sole discretion in such 
cases, usually do not agree. Few suspects are released on bail or put 
in another noncustodial detention pending trial.
    The Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that authorities must notify 
a detainee's family or work unit of his detention within 24 hours. 
However, in practice timely notification remains a serious problem, 
especially in sensitive political cases. Under a sweeping exception, 
officials need not provide notification if it would ``hinder the 
investigation'' of a case. In January 1999, Che Hongnian, who had been 
held incommunicado for nearly 3 months, was sentenced to 3 years of 
labor in Shandong Province, apparently for writing a letter asking how 
to contact a human rights organization in Hong Kong. His appeal was 
denied 2 months later. Police continue to hold individuals without 
granting access to family or a lawyer, and trials continue to be 
conducted in secret (see Section 1.e.).
    A major flaw of the new Criminal Procedure Law is that it does not 
address the reeducation-through-labor system, which permits authorities 
to sentence detainees administratively without trial to terms of 1 to 3 
years in labor camps. Local Labor Reeducation Committees, which 
determine the term of detention, may extend an inmate's sentence for an 
additional year. According to the latest available official statistics, 
there were some 230,000 persons in reeducation-through-labor camps in 
1997. Defendants legally are entitled to challenge reeducation-through-
labor sentences under the Administrative Litigation Law. Persons can 
gain a reduction in, or suspension of, their sentences after appeal, 
but appeals usually are not successful because of problems such as 
short appeal times and inadequate legal counsel, which weaken the 
effectiveness of the law in preventing or reversing arbitrary 
decisions. There have been cases of individuals successfully appealing 
their reeducation sentences through the courts, although the exact 
number of successful cases is unknown. Persons sentenced to 
reeducationthrough-labor during the year included activist Yao 
Zhenxiang.
    The new Criminal Procedure Law also does not address custody and 
repatriation, which allows the authorities to detain persons 
administratively without trial to ``protect urban social order.'' 
Persons who may be detained under this provision include the homeless, 
the unemployed, petty criminals, and those without permission to live 
or work in urban areas; such persons may be returned to the locality in 
which they are registered. If the location to which they are to be 
repatriated cannot be determined, or if they cannot be repatriated for 
financial reasons, such persons may be sent to ``resettlement farms.'' 
Those unable to work may be sent to ``welfare centers.'' Until they are 
repatriated, those detained may be held in custody and repatriation 
centers and may be required to pay for the cost of their detention and 
repatriation by performing forced labor while in detention. Relatives 
and friends of detainees in these centers reportedly are often able to 
secure a detainee's release by paying a fee. Provincial regulations on 
custody and repatriation in some cases have expanded the categories of 
persons who may be detained. In Beijing, for example, those who may be 
detained specifically include the mentally ill and mentally disabled, 
and ``those who should be taken into custody according to Government 
regulations.'' Many other persons are detained in similar forms of 
administrative detention, known as custody and education (for 
prostitutes and their clients) and custody and training (for minors who 
have committed crimes). Persons reportedly may be detained for long 
periods under these provisions, particularly if they cannot afford to 
pay for their release (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.d., 5, 6.c., 
6.d., and 6.f.).
    By one estimate, more than 1.7 million persons per year are 
detained under custody and repatriation or similar regulations. 
According to the NGO Human Rights in China, the reasons for such 
detentions rarely are made clear to detainees. There are reports that 
persons with documentation allowing them to live or work in urban areas 
have been detained illegally under these provisions; but, because they 
are not entitled to a trial, they have little recourse if the detaining 
officials cannot be persuaded to allow their release. Some reportedly 
are forced to confess that they were living and working without permits 
in the urban area in which they were detained, despite having the 
appropriate documentation; in some cases, such documentation reportedly 
is destroyed.
    In theory the Administrative Litigation Law of 1989 permits a 
detainee to challenge the legality of administrative detention, but the 
lack of timely access to legal counsel inhibits the effective use of 
this law. Persons serving sentences in the criminal justice system can 
request release under Article 75 of the Criminal Procedure Law or 
appeal to the Procuratorate but have no recourse to the courts to 
challenge the legality or length of criminal detention. There are 
documented cases in which local officials and business leaders 
illegally conspired to use detention as a means of exerting pressure in 
commercial disputes involving foreign businessmen. There also have been 
cases in which foreign businessmen had their passports confiscated 
during such disputes.
    A campaign initiated by the Government in 1998 to eliminate the 
China Democracy Party (CDP), a would-be opposition party, broadened and 
intensified during 1999 and continued throughout the year. This 
campaign has resulted in the arrest, detention, or confinement of 
scores of persons. Since December 1998, at least 25 core leaders of the 
CDP have been sentenced to long prison terms on subversion or other 
charges. In what some experts have described as an attempt by 
authorities to tarnish the public image of the democracy movement, 
during the year Chinese officials accused a number of democracy 
activists of soliciting prostitutes, distributing pornographic videos, 
petty theft, or other crimes unrelated to their political activities. 
On January 3 in Changsha, Tong Shidong, and Liao Shihua were sentenced 
to 10 and 6 years in prison, respectively, on charges of subversion. 
Both were members of the CDP; Tong, a professor, was accused of 
founding a branch of the CDP at Hunan University. In February CDP 
cofounder Xu Wenli's assistant, Liu Shizun, was sentenced to 6 years 
for subversion. Also in February, the second highest ranking member of 
the Shanghai branch of the CDP, Dai Xuezhong (who was arrested in 
January), was sentenced to 3 years in prison for allegedly hiring three 
persons to commit an assault with a knife. During the trial, Dai was 
not allowed to testify in his own defense. In August Dai's brother was 
sentenced to 3 years' reeducation-through-labor after he publicly 
protested Dai Xuezhong's sentence. In April a court in Hangzhou 
sentenced CDP activist Zhu Zhengming to 10 years in prison for 
subversion. In July after a 90 minute trial, Chen Zhonghe, founder of 
the Hubei branch of the CDP, and Xiao Shichang were sentenced to 7 
years and 5+ years in prison respectively on subversion charges. In 
early July, Liu Xianbin, a leading member of the CDP, was arrested in 
Beijing. In late September, Nie Minzhi, an elderly CDP member from 
Zhejiang Province, was reportedly detained and sentenced 
administratively to 1 year in a reeducation-through-labor camp. In 
early December, CDP activists Wang Zechen and Wang Wenjiang reportedly 
were sentenced in Anshan to 6 years and 4 years in prison, 
respectively, on charges of subverting state power. The two were 
arrested in June 1999 and tried in November.
    During the year, the authorities also used laws on subversion, 
endangering state security, and common crimes to arrest and imprison a 
wide range of political dissidents, activists, and others; some were 
affiliated with the CDP. Shanghai dissidents Li Guotao, Cai Guihua, Yao 
Zhenxiang, Fu Shenping, and Dai Xuewu were taken into custody on many 
occasions throughout the year. Prior to the June 4 anniversary of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre, Li Guotao was rearrested in Shanghai and 
charged with spreading reactionary publications, instigating 
disturbances, and disturbing the social order (apparently in connection 
with a letter he and others sent to the Mayor of Shanghai, protesting 
the arrest of dissident Dai Xuewu and requesting his release); on June 
28 he was sentenced to 3 years' reeducation-through-labor for demanding 
the release of CDP members. Dai Xuewu, the brother of imprisoned 
dissident Dai Xuezhong, also was arrested in Shanghai prior to the June 
4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre and charged with the 
theft of a cell phone; in August he was sentenced without a trial to 3 
years of reeducation-through-labor. Prior to the June 4 anniversary of 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, police in some cities also took 
steps to prevent planned commemorations. In Shanghai police reportedly 
detained five leading activists from May 31 to June 5, including Cai 
Guihua, Li Guotao, Dai Xuewu, and Fu Shenping. The police reportedly 
beat and roughed up Cai Guihua on May 31 and June 3. In Xian police 
reportedly harassed dissidents planning to commemorate the June 4 
anniversary and detained two persons. Press reports stated that police 
in Beijing also detained three democracy activists and a Protestant 
activist on June 4. On June 4, graduate student Jiang Xulin reportedly 
was arrested after putting up a poster on the campus of Beijing 
University that urged an investigation into the Tiananmen Square 
massacre and asked that political prisoners be released and victims' 
families be compensated. Also on June 4, police arrested Shen Zhidao, a 
supporter of the CDP, in Tiananmen Square while he attempted to 
commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. He unfurled several 
banners bearing slogans in the Square prior to being arrested. In 
August Chinese police in Jiangsu arrested Shen Chang, the leader of a 
qigong group, and charged him with organizing gatherings aimed at 
disturbing social order and tax evasion (see Section 2.c.). In 
September a court in Hebei sentenced the cofounder of the environmental 
NGO China Development Union, Qi Yanchen, to 4 years in prison for 
subversion for writing that China would have to introduce political 
reform in order to avoid widespread social unrest. The article at issue 
appeared in the prodemocracy e-mail newsletter VIP Reference (see 
Sections 1.f. and 2.a.). However, in January Song Yongyi, a visiting 
librarian and academic researcher from Dickinson College, whom 
authorities detained in August 1999 and charged with ``the purchase and 
illegal provision of intelligence to persons outside China,'' was 
released from prison and allowed to return to his home overseas in 
January (See Section 2.a.).
    Other dissidents also were detained, for varying periods, during 
the year. From January 12 to January 14, police detained and questioned 
dissident Yao Zhenxiang in Shanghai; he was not charged. According to 
press reports, on January 23 and 24, police detained Yao and several 
other dissidents (including Li Guotao, Wang Jianhua, Cai Guihua, and 
Zhou Qibing) to prevent them from attending another dissident's trial.
    In early April, a crackdown on dissidents in Shanghai began. As of 
early October, authorities imprisoned the following Shanghai dissidents 
(some more than once before being sentenced to longer terms): Dai 
Xuezhong (scheduled for release in 2002); Yao Zhenxiang (scheduled for 
release in 2002); Dai Xuewu (scheduled for release in 2003); and Li 
Guotao (scheduled for release in 2003).
    Police sometimes detained relatives of dissidents (see Section 
1.f.).
    Persons critical of official corruption or malfeasance also 
frequently were threatened, detained, or imprisoned. Ma Wenlin, a 58-
year-old lawyer in Shaanxi who had organized 5,000 peasants to urge 
authorities to reduce taxes and to punish village cadres who were 
guilty of beating villagers, remained in prison on charges of 
disrupting social order; a court sentenced him to 5 years in prison in 
November 1999. In March a court sentenced Ma Zhe, a poet and advocate 
for artistic freedom, to 5 years' imprisonment for attempting to 
overthrow Communist Party power. In April a court sentenced An Jun, 
organizer of an independent NGO critical of official corruption, to 4 
years' imprisonment for subversion.
    Minority activists continued to be targets of the police. In March 
a court sentenced Uighur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer to 8 years in 
prison for passing ``state intelligence'' information to foreigners. 
The ``state intelligence'' she was accused of attempting to pass 
consisted of newspaper articles published in the official press and a 
list of individuals whose cases had been handled by judicial organs. 
Police arrested Kadeer, her son, and her secretary while they were on 
their way to meet a visiting foreign delegation in August 1999. 
Authorities administratively sentenced Kadeer's son and secretary to 2- 
and 3-year terms respectively, in November 1999. In November they 
denied Kadeer's appeal (see Section 5).
    Local authorities used the Government's anticult campaign to detain 
and arrest large numbers of religious practitioners (see Section 2.c.); 
house church groups in the northeast reported more detentions and 
arrests than in recent years. For example, in August police arrested 
130 members of a house church in Fangcheng, Henan Province, after they 
met with 3 foreign members of a Protestant fellowship. According to 
reports, 85 church members were charged with ``using an illegal cult to 
obstruct justice.''
    Journalists also were detained or threatened during the year, often 
for reporting on subjects that met with the Government's or the local 
authorities' disapproval (see Section 2.a.). In July Zhuhai police 
arrested five journalists, including two from Hong Kong and two from 
Macau, who were attempting to report on peasant protests against a land 
redevelopment scheme. In August local police arrested Ma Xiaoming, a 
Shaanxi television station reporter who had reported on a case 
involving 12,000 peasants who brought a lawsuit against their township 
government. Ma was arrested to prevent him from meeting with a foreign 
newspaper reporter.
    During the year, there were press reports about a woman who was 
detained by Guangzhou police in June 1999 on the specious grounds of 
lacking identity documents and sent to a psychiatric hospital, where 
she was repeatedly raped by male patients before her release about 24 
hours later. At her insistence, police investigated the rapes, but 
vital evidence was destroyed prior to the investigation and only one of 
the accused had been tried. The woman's attempt to win damages has been 
rejected by one court (see Section 1.c.).
    The State Compensation Law provides a legal basis for citizens to 
recover damages for illegal detentions. Although many citizens remain 
unaware of this 1995 law, there is evidence that it is having a 
growing, if still limited, impact. Throughout the year, the official 
press published numerous articles to raise public awareness of recent 
laws meant to enhance the protection of citizens' rights, including the 
Criminal Procedure Law, the State Compensation Law, the Administrative 
Procedure Law, and others. Many citizens have used the State 
Compensation Law during the year to sue for damages.
    There were no reports that the Government forcibly exiled citizens; 
however, the Government continued to refuse reentry to the country to 
citizens who were dissidents and activists. The Government's refusal to 
permit some former reeducation-through-labor camp inmates to return to 
their homes constitutes a form of internal exile (see Section 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution states that the 
courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power 
independently; however, in practice the judiciary is subject to policy 
guidance from both the Government and the Communist Party, whose 
leaders use a variety of means to direct courts on verdicts and 
sentences in politically sensitive cases. At both the central and local 
levels, the Government and particularly the CCP frequently interfere in 
the findings of the judicial system and dictate court decisions. 
Corruption and conflicts of interest also affect judicial 
decisionmaking. Judges are appointed by the people's congresses at the 
corresponding level of the judicial structure, which can result in 
local politicians exerting undue influence over the judges they 
appoint. During a 1998 conference at a Beijing university, according to 
informed sources, one expert estimated that more than 70 percent of 
commercial cases in lower courts were decided according to the wishes 
of local officials rather than the law. State-run media have published 
numerous articles calling for an end to such ``local protectionism'' 
and for the development of a judiciary independent of interference by 
officials.
    The Supreme People's Court (SPC) stands at the apex of the court 
system, followed in descending order by the higher, intermediate, and 
basic people's courts. There are special courts for handling military, 
maritime, and railway transport cases.
    Corruption and inefficiency in the judicial system are endemic. The 
Government continued a self-proclaimed ``unprecedented internal 
shakeup'' of the judiciary, designed to combat corruption and improve 
efficiency, which began in 1998. In February the SPC issued new 
regulations tightening conflict of interest guidelines for judges. 
Judges who violate prohibitions against accepting money or other gifts 
from litigants or who privately meet with litigants may be found guilty 
of malpractice under the new regulations. Other regulations banned 
former judges from trying cases in their old courtrooms. Likewise the 
Procuratorate announced 10 new rules designed to minimize corruption in 
and to foster cost-consciousness among the procuratorates. The 
Procuratorate also announced it would select candidates for some 7,200 
vacancies through a system of national examinations. In August the SPC 
announced it would open 12 leading prosecutorial posts for competition. 
In an attempt to reduce pretrial corruption, early in the year Beijing 
courts set up a new office to handle pretrial procedures previously 
handled by judges. Under the new system, parties would have more 
difficulty influencing judges because they would no longer have advance 
notice of who the judge in the case would be. The SPC also implemented 
a self-examination and responsibility system to hold presidents of 
higher people's courts responsible for the actions of their 
subordinates. In 1999 authorities sanctioned 10 presidents of higher 
people's courts for acts of corruption by their subordinates. During 
the year, 1,450 court employees were punished for misconduct. In 1999, 
according to the SPC, 15,748 government officials and businesspersons 
were sentenced for corruption. Two officials at the ministerial level, 
65 at the prefecture or department level, and 367 persons holding posts 
at the county or division level also were sentenced for corruption. The 
Procurator General told the National People's Congress in March that, 
although procurator abuses were down 60.2 percent in 1999, 544 
procuratorial officials were disciplined, and 55 were convicted on 
criminal charges.
    Corruption among the police also is a problem. One overseas human 
rights group reported in 1999 that there had been some 9,000 reported 
cases of mishandling of justice discovered in 1998 and that 1,200 
police officers had been charged with criminal offenses. Authorities 
continued a nationwide crackdown on police corruption and abuses. 
Government statistics released in 1999 showed that in 1998 corruption 
prosecutions increased 10 percent, to over 40,000 investigations and 
26,000 indictments of officials. In late 1999, National People's 
Congress (NPC) Standing Committee Chairman Li Peng issued a warning on 
police corruption. Several high-ranking Party officials also were 
prosecuted on corruption charges during the year.
    The Government also took steps to correct systemic weaknesses in 
the judicial system and to make it more transparent and accountable to 
public scrutiny. The law requires that all trials be held in public; 
however, in practice, many trials are not. In 1999 the Supreme People's 
Court issued regulations requiring all trials to be open to the public, 
except for those involving state secrets, personal privacy, or minors; 
divorce cases in which both parties request a closed trial; and cases 
involving commercial secrets. Several courts reportedly opened their 
proceedings to the public. Under the new regulations, ``foreigners with 
valid identification'' are to be allowed the same access to trials as 
citizens. However, requests by at least one foreign mission to send an 
observer to politically sensitive trials consistently have been ignored 
by the Government. Moreover none of the numerous trials involving 
political dissidents were open to the general public. The legal 
exception for cases involving state secrets, privacy, and minors has 
been used to keep such proceedings closed to the public and closed even 
to family members in some sensitive cases (see Section 1.d.).
    However, since 1998 many trials have been broadcast, and court 
proceedings have become a regular television feature. In July courts in 
Shanghai become the first to publish verdicts on the Internet. 
According to official statistics, the courts nationwide heard 539,000 
criminal cases in 1999, an increase of 12.27 percent over 1998, and 
sentenced more than 600,000 offenders, up 14.02 percent from 1999. The 
Supreme People's Court released statistics showing that courts at all 
levels acquitted 5,878 defendants in 1999 due either to lack of 
evidence or to a conclusion that the charges filed did not amount to a 
crime.
    The first Lawyers' Law, designed to professionalize the legal 
profession, took effect in 1996. Subsequently the Ministry of Justice 
drafted relevant regulations to standardize professional performance, 
lawyer-client relations, and the administration of lawyers and law 
firms. The regulations also granted lawyers formal permission to 
establish law firms, set educational requirements for legal 
practitioners, encouraged free legal services for the general public, 
and provided for the disciplining of lawyers. Government officials 
state that there are insufficient lawyers to meet the country's growing 
needs. In March 1999 Justice Minister Gao Changli stated that the 
country had over 110,000 lawyers. According to official reports, there 
were some 9,000 law offices as of 1999. The Justice Ministry set a 
target of 150,000 lawyers, 30,000 notaries, and 40,000 grassroots legal 
service centers by 2000. According to the All-China Lawyers 
Association, the country fell short of that goal. Notaries have much 
more power than their counterparts in the West, and Justice Ministry 
officials announced in September that the country would change its 
system of notaries within 10 years so that notaries would no longer be 
Government employees, would have to have a bachelor's degree, and would 
be required to take 40 hours of professional training each year.
    Lawyers are organizing private law firms that are self-regulating 
and do not have their personnel or budgets determined directly by the 
State. More than 60 legal aid organizations (many of which handle both 
criminal and civil cases, including those stemming from disputes over 
compensation to workers) have been established around the country, and 
the Ministry of Justice has established a nationwide legal services hot 
line. Beijing and other city police departments have set up hot lines 
for citizens to complain about police misconduct. In March Beijing 
authorities claimed that their hot line received nearly 120 calls per 
day. However, neither prosecutors nor judges are required to have law 
degrees or legal experience, and qualification standards traditionally 
have been low. Only 9 percent of judges had received higher education, 
and many are not well versed in the law. During the year, the 
authorities undertook additional efforts to improve the training and 
professionalism of judges and lawyers. After July 1, in a effort to 
distance judges from prosecutors, judges in Beijing shed their military 
style uniforms, including epaulets and caps, in favor of robes or 
suits. The National People's Congress also approved separate draft 
amendments to the 1995 laws on judges and prosecutors in July. One 
amendment requires judicial or prosecutorial appointees to be law 
school graduates who have practiced law for at least 2 years, or 
postgraduates who have practiced law for at least 1 year. Another 
required heads of courts and procuratorates, members of judicial 
committees of courts and procuratorates, and heads of judicial panels 
to have passed relevant examinations.
    Police and prosecutorial officials often ignore the due process 
provisions of the law and of the Constitution. For example, police and 
prosecutors can subject prisoners to severe psychological pressure to 
confess, and coerced confessions frequently are introduced as evidence. 
In March the top prosecutor, Procurator General Han Zhubin, admitted 
that abuses such as using torture to extort confessions, extorting 
favors from suspects, and nepotism remained serious problems. In May 
1998 he also acknowledged that some prosecutors used interrogation 
rooms like ``prison cells'' to hold suspects beyond the legal detention 
period. In 1999 Han's office received 812,821 complaints; 342,017 were 
related to prosecutors. The Criminal Procedure Law forbids the use of 
torture to obtain confessions, but one weakness of the law is that it 
does not expressly bar the introduction of coerced confessions as 
evidence. For example, Zhuo Xiaojun is being held in Fuzhou; after a 
confession extracted under torture and a prolonged trial with many 
irregularities, he was sentenced to death for two murders committed 10 
years ago. Traditionally defendants who failed to show the correct 
attitude by confessing their crimes received harsher sentences. The 
conviction rate in criminal cases is over 90 percent, and trials 
generally are little more than sentencing hearings. In practice 
criminal defendants only are assigned an attorney once a case has been 
brought to court; some observers have noted that at this point, it is 
too late for an attorney to assist a client in a meaningful way, since 
the verdict often has been decided already. The best that a defense 
attorney generally can do for a client is to get a sentence mitigated. 
In most politically sensitive trials, the courts handed down guilty 
verdicts immediately following proceedings that rarely lasted more than 
several hours. There is an appeals process, but appeals rarely reverse 
verdicts.
    The revised Criminal Procedure Law was designed to address many of 
these deficiencies and give defense lawyers a greater ability to argue 
their clients' cases. It abolishes a form of pretrial detention called 
``shelter and investigation,'' puts limits on nonjudicial 
determinations of guilt, and establishes a more transparent, 
adversarial trial process. It also provides for earlier and greater 
access for defendants to legal counsel and the abolition of a 
regulation that allowed summary trials in certain cases involving the 
death penalty. The amended law gives most suspects the right to seek 
legal counsel shortly after their initial detention and interrogation. 
However, police often use loopholes in the law to circumvent a 
defendant's right to seek counsel, and political activists in 
particular still have significant problems obtaining competent legal 
representation of their own choosing. In some cases, defendants and 
lawyers in politically sensitive cases reportedly have not been allowed 
to speak during trials. The amended Criminal Procedure law still falls 
short of international standards in many respects. For example, it has 
insufficient safeguards against the use of evidence gathered through 
illegal means such as torture. Its appeals process fails to provide 
sufficient avenue for review, and there are inadequate remedies for 
violations of defendants' rights. Despite the abolition of shelter and 
investigation, in some cases police still unilaterally can detain a 
person for up to 37 days before releasing him or formally placing him 
under arrest. Once a suspect is arrested, the revised law allows police 
and prosecutors to detain him for months before trial while a case is 
being ``further investigated.'' Few suspects are released on bail 
pending trial. Also, in ``state secrets'' cases, the revised Criminal 
Procedure Law authorizes officials to deny suspects access to a lawyer 
while their cases are being investigated. The definition of state 
secrets is broad and vague, and subject to independent interpretation 
by police, prosecutors, and judges, throughout the different stages in 
a criminal case. Uncertainty regarding the scope and application of 
this statute has created concern about a detainee's right to legal 
assistance.
    The new Criminal Procedure Law also does not address certain 
shortcomings in the legal system. Under the law, there is no right to 
remain silent, no right against double jeopardy, and no law of 
evidence. The mechanism that allows defendants to confront their 
accusers is inadequate; according to one expert, only 1 percent to 5 
percent of trials involve witnesses.
    While the new Criminal Procedure Law represents some improvement 
over past practice, despite its flaws, anecdotal evidence indicates 
that its implementation remains uneven and far from complete, 
especially in politically sensitive cases. Differing interpretations of 
the law taken by different judicial and police departments have 
contributed to contradictory and incomplete implementation. The Supreme 
People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of 
Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of 
Justice, and the Legal Work Committee of the National People's Congress 
in 1998 issued supplementary implementing regulations to address some 
of these weaknesses. During the year, the Government continued its 
efforts to educate lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and especially the 
public on the provisions of this and other new laws. In 1999 the 
Ministry of Justice announced that 500,000 ministry officials would 
undergo training over the next 3 years as part of ``a massive effort to 
improve the quality of all judicial workers in the country.'' Also in 
1999, the President of the Supreme People's Court announced that all 
senior judges in the nation's courts would attend training courses 
within the next 3 years, with an emphasis on new laws and regulations.
    Trials continue to be conducted in secret. In July 1999, Wang 
Yingzheng, a 19-year-old activist in Jiangsu Province, was tried in 
secret for writing an article criticizing official corruption. Wang's 
family was not notified of the trial until several weeks afterward. In 
June 1999 labor activist He Chaohui also was tried in a closed 
courtroom in Hunan. According to Amnesty International, two sisters who 
owned a bookstore were sentenced to prison terms in January for 
distributing Falun Gong literature. The sisters reportedly were 
arrested in July 1999, held incommunicado for 3 months, and tried in 
secret (see Section 2.c.).
    Defendants frequently have found it difficult to find an attorney 
willing to handle sensitive political cases. Government-employed 
lawyers still depend on official work units for employment, housing, 
and other benefits, and therefore many may be reluctant to represent 
politically sensitive defendants. In January 1999 dissident Wang Ce was 
tried and defended himself, reportedly because lawyers recommended by 
the court refused to take his case. In February he was sentenced to 4 
years in prison. In December 1998, authorities blocked attempts by 
prominent dissidents Wang Youcai and Qin Yongmin to hire lawyers of 
their own choosing. There were no new reports of the Government 
revoking the licenses of lawyers representing political defendants, as 
it sometimes has done in the past. However, Liu Jian, a criminal 
defense attorney, reportedly was detained in July 1998 after most of 
the witnesses he had called refused to testify at the trial of a local 
official charged with taking bribes; Liu was charged with ``illegally 
obtaining evidence'' and was detained for 5 months. Liu reportedly was 
held incommunicado for 10 days and was beaten and tortured in detention 
in an effort to force a confession. He eventually pled guilty in 
exchange for a light sentence, but his criminal record prevents him 
from practicing law.
    Lawyers who try to defend their clients aggressively continue to 
have problems with police and prosecutors, leading to complaints and 
threats of harassment by law enforcement officials. Lawyers' 
professional associations have called for better protection of lawyers 
and their legitimate role in the adversarial process.
    The lack of due process is particularly egregious in death penalty 
cases. There are 65 capital offenses in the law. They include financial 
crimes such as counterfeiting currency, embezzlement, and corruption. 
During the year, several mid- or high level officials were sentenced to 
death for embezzlement or corruption; one, Hu Changqing, vice governor 
of Jiangxi Province, was executed in February. The trial of 11 
officials in the Xiamen corruption scandal was conducted in secret. 
Seven of the officials were sentenced to death, and four were sentenced 
to life in prison. Persons may be sentenced to death for other property 
crimes as well; among those reportedly executed during the year was a 
man from Yunnan Province, convicted of setting a forest fire. A higher 
court nominally reviews all death sentences, but the time between 
arrest and execution is sometimes days or less, and reviews 
consistently result in the confirmation of sentences. Minors and 
pregnant women are expressly exempt from the death sentence, and only 
those theft cases involving banks or museums warrant capital 
punishment. Amnesty International (AI), in a report issued in January 
1999, said the group independently recorded 2,701 persons sentenced to 
death in 1998, with 1,769 executions confirmed. AI stated that its 
figure for executions was based on public reports and represented only 
a fraction of death sentences and executions. AI believes that actual 
figures were higher because not all death penalties or executions are 
reported, and the authorities can manipulate such information. The 
number of executions that were reported in the Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region was particularly high; according to AI, scores of 
Uighurs, many of whom were reportedly political prisoners, were 
sentenced to death and executed in Xinjiang since 1997. The Government 
regards the number of death sentences it carries out as a state secret. 
However, in March the President of the SPC told the NPC that, in 1999, 
the Court had heard 5,768 appeals, including appeals to death 
sentences, an increase of 23.43 percent over 1998. The Central 
Commission of Political Science and Law announced on October 16 that 
515 persons were executed nationwide between early September and 
October 15.
    Persons can also receive long prison sentences for financial crimes 
after very short trials; according to a press report, on May 30, 
businessman Mou Qizhong was sentenced to life in prison for foreign 
exchange fraud after a 1day trial in November 1999.
    The shortcomings of the justice system have begun to spur public 
debate among lawyers, law professors, and jurists, and some have 
continued to press for legal reform. During the year, scholars wrote 
numerous articles focused on the absence of legal provisions 
specifically guaranteeing a suspect's right to remain silent as one of 
the main reasons for legal abuses. Under the law, a suspect has the 
duty to ``answer truthfully,'' whether or not the answer is self-
incriminatory. One article explained that under existing laws, suspects 
are often coerced into ``truthfully'' admitting their guilt, resulting 
in forced confessions becoming more common. Some legal experts called 
for a system of supervision during investigations, including the right 
to have a lawyer present during interrogation, as the only way to 
protect suspects from torture and forced confessions. Others called for 
the creation of new regulations setting out the right of the accused to 
remain silent and a system of accountability for judicial personnel. 
Major newspapers and legal journals throughout the year called for the 
introduction of a British or American system of discovery, the 
abolition of coerced confessions, a legal presumption of innocence, an 
independent judiciary, and improved administrative laws giving citizens 
more recourse against the Government. In April the Beijing newspaper 
Legal Daily published an article on torture that concluded the practice 
was due to police officials not having adequate legal or human rights 
training and holding antiquated ideas about a presumption of guilt. In 
July Shanghai lawyers publicly called for the establishment of the 
right of the accused to remain silent in a criminal investigation.
    There are signs that citizens are beginning to use the court system 
and the new legal remedies available to them to protect their rights 
and seek redress for a variety of government abuses; a growing number 
are using legal recourse against government malfeasance. The Beijing 
Higher People's Court released statistics in April stating that when 
citizens sued the Government, citizen plaintiffs won in 23 percent of 
cases (832 of 3,632) from 1990-1999. In addition a large percentage of 
such cases are settled out of court. The term ``administrative 
omission'' refers to cases in which government organizations do not 
respond or delay response to applications lodged by citizens. According 
to statistics by the SPC, the number of administrative omission 
lawsuits filed by individuals against Government organizations 
increased by 7.6 times between 1990 and 1998. However, while some 
plaintiffs have successfully filed suit against the Government, 
decisions of any kind in favor of dissidents remain rare. In particular 
appeals of prison sentences by dissidents rarely are granted. In 1999 
appeals by Lin Hai, Lai Jingbao, and Fang Jue all were denied.
    In recent years, credible reports have alleged that organs from 
some executed prisoners were removed, sold, and transplanted. Officials 
have confirmed that executed prisoners are among the sources of organs 
for transplants but maintain that consent is required from prisoners or 
their relatives before organs are removed. There is no national law 
governing organ donations, but a Ministry of Health directive 
explicitly states that buying and selling human organs and tissues is 
not allowed. The courts traditionally issue several death sentences 
before the annual lunar New Year holiday and other holidays. According 
to Hong Kong press reports, these executions have increased the demand 
for organs from executed prisoners. More than 40 wealthy individuals in 
need of transplants reportedly traveled to a hospital in Guangzhou and 
paid up to $300,000 (RMB 2.5 million) each for livers harvested from 
executed criminals. There are no reliable statistics on how many organ 
transplants occur each year using organs from executed prisoners, but, 
according to press reports, hundreds of persons from other Asian 
countries who are unable to obtain transplants at home travel to the 
country each year for organ transplants. Recipients report paying 
various amounts for the transplants, and some have reported that 
treatment may be terminated or delayed for a lack of funds or a delay 
in payment.
    Government officials deny holding any political prisoners, 
asserting that authorities detain persons not for their political or 
religious views, but because they violate the law. However, the 
authorities continued to confine citizens for political and religious 
reasons. It is estimated that thousands of political prisoners remain 
incarcerated, some in prisons and others in labor camps.
    The 1997 amended Criminal Code replaced ``counterrevolutionary'' 
offenses, which often, in the past, had been used against the 
Government's political opponents, with loosely defined provisions 
barring ``crimes endangering state security.'' At year's end, there 
were as many as 1,000 individuals in prisons serving sentences for 
``counterrevolution'' crimes. Persons detained for such offenses 
included Hu Shigen, Kang Yuchun, Yu Zhijian, Yang Lianzi, Zhang 
Jingsheng (released in June), and Sun Xiongying. Several foreign 
governments urged the Government to review the cases of those charged 
with counterrevolution, since the crime was no longer on the books, and 
release those who had been jailed for nonviolent offenses under the old 
statute. Officials have indicated that a case-by-case review of appeals 
filed by individual prisoners is possible under the law, and there is 
one known case of a successful appeal. However, the Government 
indicated that it would neither initiate a broad review of cases nor 
grant a general amnesty, arguing that ``crimes'' covered by the Law on 
Counterrevolution still are considered crimes under the State Security 
Law. According to the Government, 600 persons were imprisoned under the 
State Security Law in 1998-99. Those charged with counterrevolutionary 
crimes continue to serve their sentences.
    The authorities sentence persons administratively without trial to 
terms of 1 to 3 years in reeducation-through-labor camps. According to 
international press reports, some 230,000 persons are serving sentences 
in reeducation-through-labor camps. By one estimate, 1.7 million 
persons per year may also be detained under custody and repatriation or 
similar regulations, which allow ``undesirable'' persons in urban areas 
to be detained administratively or returned to their registered place 
of residence (see Section 1.d.). Defendants legally are entitled to 
challenge reeducationthrough-labor sentences under the Administrative 
Litigation Law. Persons can gain a reduction in, or suspension of, 
their sentences after appeal, but appeals usually are not successful 
because of problems such as short appeal times and inadequate legal 
counsel that weaken the effectiveness of the law in preventing or 
reversing arbitrary decisions.
    Amnesty International has identified 211 cases of persons who 
remain imprisoned or on medical parole for activities related to the 
1989 Tiananmen protests alone; other NGO's estimate as many as 2,000 
persons remain in prison for their actions at that time.
    The Government released some political prisoners early. Software 
businessman Lin Hai, jailed for Internet subversion, was released in 
September 1999; June 4 activist Chen Lantao was paroled 7 years early 
in April; Zhao Fengping also was released in April; Tiananmen Square 
activist Liu Wensheng was released from a prison in northern Gansu in 
August; and Yu Zhijian, who defaced the portrait of Mao Zedong in 
Tiananmen Square during the 1989 student protests, was released in 
September; Cai Guihua was released in January, detained several times 
during the year, and paroled in December; and Xu Guoxing was released 
during the year. Yue Dongyue, who also defaced Mao's portrait, had his 
sentence reduced during the year from 20 years to 18 years. However, 
many others, including Chadrel Rinpoche, Fan Zhongliang, Han Chunsheng, 
Li Bifeng, Jigme Sangpo, Ngawang Choephel, Ngawang Sangdrol, Qin 
Yongmin, Shen Liangqing, Zha Jianguo, Wang Youcai, Xu Wenli, Xu Yongze, 
Yang Qinheng, Zhang Lin, Zhang Shanguang, Zhao Changqing, and Zhou 
Yongjun remained imprisoned or under other forms of detention during 
the year. Political prisoners generally benefit from parole and 
sentence reduction at significantly lower rates than ordinary 
prisoners. In addition authorities summarily tried and sentenced 
political dissidents to long prison terms.
    Criminal punishments can include ``deprivation of political 
rights'' for a fixed period after release from prison, during which the 
individual is denied rights of free speech and association. Former 
prisoners also can find their status in society, ability to find 
employment, freedom to travel, and access to residence permits and 
social services severely restricted. Economic reforms and social 
changes have ameliorated these problems for nonpolitical prisoners in 
recent years. However, former political prisoners and their families 
still frequently are subjected to police surveillance, telephone 
wiretaps, searches, and other forms of harassment, especially when 
prominent foreigners visit the country. They also may encounter 
difficulty in obtaining or keeping employment and housing (see Section 
1.f. and 2.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, 
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that the ``freedom and privacy 
of correspondence of citizens are protected by law.'' Despite legal 
protections, authorities often do not respect the privacy of citizens 
in practice. Although the law requires warrants before law enforcement 
officials can search premises, this provision frequently has been 
ignored; moreover, the Public Security Bureau and the procuratorate can 
issue search warrants on their own authority. Authorities often monitor 
telephone conversations, fax transmissions, e-mail, and Internet 
communications of citizens, foreign visitors, businessmen, diplomats, 
and journalists, as well as dissidents, activists, and others. The 
security services routinely monitor and enter the residences and 
offices of foreigners and persons dealing with foreigners to gain 
access to computers, telephones, and fax machines. All major hotels 
have a sizable internal security presence. Authorities also open and 
censor domestic and international mail. Han Chunsheng, a Voice of 
America (VOA) listener who allegedly sent over 20 letters critical of 
the Government to a VOA mailbox, remains in prison on an 8-year 
sentence for counterrevolutionary incitement and propaganda. Government 
security organs monitor and sometimes restrict contact between 
foreigners and citizens.
    In urban areas, many persons still depend on government-linked work 
units for housing, healthcare, permission to have a child, approval to 
apply for a passport, and other aspects of ordinary life. However, the 
work unit and the neighborhood committee, which originally were charged 
with monitoring activities and attitudes, have become less important as 
means of social or political control; government interference in daily 
personal and family life continues to decline for the average citizen. 
A growing number of residents in cities are buying their own 
apartments, further weakening the work unit. In some cities, the system 
of government-linked housing is being rapidly dismantled.
    Some dissidents are under heavy surveillance and routinely have 
their telephone calls with foreign journalists and diplomats monitored. 
The authorities blocked some dissidents from meeting with foreigners, 
particularly during politically sensitive periods. On April 1, the 
Government prevented Ding Zilin, an organizer of relatives of victims 
of the Tiananmen massacre, from meeting with the widow of noted author 
Edgar Snow after learning that Mrs. Snow wished to donate money to Ding 
Zilin's organization. Ding was also prevented from leaving her home to 
meet Mrs. Snow; on April 2, security agents filmed Mrs. Snow's visit to 
her husband's tomb nearby. On April 3, Su Bingxian, an elderly 
intermediary who had agreed to convey Mrs. Snow's donation to Ding 
Zilin, was detained outside of Ding's apartment and held for 1 day. In 
June the authorities also reportedly surrounded Ding Zilin's apartment 
on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre to prevent persons 
from joining her to commemorate it. Police ordered the sister of one 
jailed dissident not to meet with a foreign diplomat on the eve of a 
high level foreign official's visit to China. Although the authorities 
released Bao Tong, a former Zhao Ziyang aide in 1997, they continue to 
monitor his activities closely with constant surveillance, at times 
preventing him from meeting with others and interfering with his 
telephone service. Officials threatened Bao when he questioned 
Communist Party policy or complained about invasions of his personal 
freedom. Other dissidents also have reported harassment by the 
authorities. Dissidents in Shanghai have been warned not to meet with 
certain persons, talk to reporters, or write or fax articles. Such 
harassment appears to be common among Tiananmen-era activists. 
Authorities also harassed and monitored the activities of relatives of 
dissidents. For example, security personnel keep close watch on 
relatives of prominent dissidents, particularly during sensitive 
periods. Dissidents and their family members routinely are warned not 
to speak with the foreign press. Security personnel followed Wei 
Xiaotao, the brother of Wei Jingsheng, to meetings with Western 
reporters and diplomats on numerous occasions.
    Government harassment prevents Tiananmen Square massacre-era 
activist Tang Yuanjun and other present and former dissidents and their 
relatives from obtaining and keeping steady employment. The Government 
continued to freeze bank accounts kept by Ding Zilin containing funds 
to help the families of Tiananmen massacre victims, an action 
criticized by dissidents within the country and human rights 
organizations abroad. In January officials detained Lu Wenhe, who had 
traveled from abroad carrying $25,000 (RMB 200,000) intended for Ding 
Zilin's fund, for 3 days and confiscated the money. By year's end, the 
money had not been returned. In July 1999, public security officials 
forced Li Ling, another activist, to withdraw $25,000 (RMB 200,000) 
from a bank account in her name that had been sent to her from abroad; 
the money, which was intended to help victims of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre and their families, was confiscated. The money had not been 
returned by year's end. Police sometimes detained the relatives of 
dissidents (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    There is evidence that official poverty alleviation programs and 
major state projects, such as the Three Gorges Dam and environmental/
reforestation projects, include forced relocation of persons.
    The authorities continue to systematically jam VOA radio 
broadcasts, but the effectiveness of this interference varies 
considerably by region, with audible signals of the VOA and other 
short-wave broadcasters reaching most parts of the country (see Section 
2.a.). Government jamming of Radio Free Asia (RFA) appears to be more 
effective (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government continued to encourage the expansion of the 
Internet; however, it also increased monitoring of the Internet during 
the year and placed restrictions on information available on the 
Internet. The Government introduced new regulations during the year 
that restricted citizens' right to privacy on the Internet, and 
monitored e-mail transmissions. Other regulations, which came into 
effect in 1997, provide for fines and other unspecified punishments to 
deal with violators. Internet control regulations are reissued 
occasionally. Enforcement generally drops off after a few months. The 
latest iteration of Internet regulations, issued on October 1, 
continues to prohibit a broad range of activities that can be 
interpreted as subversion or slandering the state (see Section 2.a.). 
During the year, the Government attempted to block e-mail from overseas 
Internet service providers used by dissident groups. There have been 
reports that the Government is attempting to develop an e-mail 
filtration system to block antigovernment e-mail messages from entering 
the country. The Government also blocked access to politically 
sensitive web sites at various times (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government continued to implement comprehensive and often 
intrusive family planning policies. The State Family Planning 
Commission (SFPC) formulates and implements policies with assistance 
from the Family Planning Association, which has 83 million members in 
1.02 million branches nationwide. Officials have predicted that the 
population will reach almost 1.6 billion in the year 2030 if current 
birth rates continue. Most demographers estimate fertility at 2.0 to 
2.3 births per woman (although the official figure is 1.8), indicating 
that the ``one-child policy'' is not applied uniformly to couples. A 
strict one-child policy applies in the cities but not in the 
countryside, where 70 percent of citizens live. According to one senior 
family planning official, only 60 million of the country's 300 million 
children under age 14 are from single-child families. Couples in urban 
areas are affected most by family planning guidelines, seldom receiving 
permission to have more than one child, although urban couples who 
themselves were only children may have two children. In general 
economic development and other factors such as small houses and high 
education expenses have reached a level where couples in major urban 
centers often voluntarily limit their families to one child. There were 
reports that, due to the success of the one-child policy in urban 
areas, the Government was beginning to relax its policies in the 
cities. In May 1999, the official press reported that although couples 
in Beijing were still limited to one child, effective October 1, 1999, 
they would no longer be required to obtain a family planning 
certificate before having their child. At year's end, the effect of 
this change was unknown. Such policies reportedly also have been 
adopted in some other areas. In Shanghai, Zhejiang Province, and parts 
of Guizhou Province, couples who met certain criteria were reportedly 
allowed to have a child without government permission. It is illegal 
for unmarried women to bear children, and unmarried women cannot get 
permission to have a child. In order to delay childbearing, the 
Marriage Law sets the minimum age at marriage for women at 20 years, 
and for men at 22 years; marrying 2 or more years later is encouraged.
    Outside the cities, exceptions to the ``one-child policy'' are 
becoming the norm. The average number of children per family in rural 
areas is slightly over two. Although rules can vary somewhat by 
Province, in rural areas, couples generally are allowed to have a 
second child if the first is a girl, an exception that takes into 
account both the demands of farm labor and the traditional preference 
for boys. Families whose first child is disabled also are allowed to 
have another child. Ethnic minorities, such as Muslim Uighurs and 
Tibetans, are subject to less stringent population controls. Minorities 
in some rural areas are permitted to have as many as four children, but 
authorities increasingly are pressuring minorities to limit births. AI 
reports that, while members of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang are 
allowed to have 2 children in urban areas and 3 in rural areas, there 
has in fact been pressure for them to have only one. In remote areas, 
such as rural Tibet, there are no effective limits, but Tibetan 
government employees and Party members are encouraged to have only one 
child.
    Population control policy relies on education, propaganda, and 
economic incentives, as well as on more coercive measures, including 
psychological pressure and economic penalties. For example, all workers 
at a factory or other work unit might lose a bonus if one worker has a 
child without permission. The national family planning policy is 
implemented through provincial and local regulations. According to 
local regulations in at least one province, women who do not qualify 
for a Family Planning Certificate that allows them to have a child must 
use an intrauterine device (IUD) or implant. The regulations further 
require that women who use an IUD undergo quarterly exams to ensure 
that it remains properly in place. If a couple has two children, those 
regulations require that either the man or woman undergo sterilization. 
According to a credible report, the number of couples undergoing 
sterilization procedures after giving birth to two children increased 
significantly in at least one inland Province. Rewards for couples who 
adhere to family planning policies include monthly stipends and 
preferential medical and educational benefits. Disciplinary measures 
against those who violate policies can include fines (sometimes called 
a ``fee for unplanned birth'' or a ``social compensation fee''), 
withholding of social services, higher tuition costs when the child 
goes to school, demotion, and other administrative punishments that 
sometimes result in loss of employment. Fines for giving birth without 
authorization vary, but they can be a formidable disincentive. 
According to the State Family Planning Commission (SFPC) 1996 Family 
Planning Manual, over 24 million fines were assessed between 1985 and 
1993 for children born outside family planning rules. In Quanzhou, 
Fujian Province, the fine for violating birth quotas is three times a 
couple's annual salary, to be paid over a 12 to 13 year period. In 
Shanghai the fine is also three times the combined annual salary of the 
parents. In Zhejiang Province, violators are assessed a fine of 20 
percent of the parents' salary paid over 5 years. According to Guizhou 
provincial family planning regulations published in July 1998, families 
who exceed birth quotas are to be fined two to five times the per 
capita annual income of residents of their local area. The regulations 
also stipulate that government employees in Guizhou who have too many 
children face the loss of their jobs. In many provinces, penalties for 
excess births in an area also can be levied against local officials and 
the mother's work unit, thus creating multiple sources of pressure. In 
Guizhou, for example, regulations state that officials in an area in 
which birth targets are not met cannot be promoted in that year. Unpaid 
fines sometimes have resulted in confiscation or destruction of homes 
and personal property by local authorities. In June 1999 Anhui Province 
promulgated amended family planning rules that stated that each couple 
``is encouraged'' to have only one child, that second births are 
``strictly controlled,'' and that ``unplanned births are forbidden.'' 
Women of childbearing age are required periodically to undergo 
pregnancy tests, and couples are required to ``practice effective 
contraceptive measures.'' Couples already having a child are required 
to adopt long-term birth control measures. In the cases of families 
that already have two children, one of the parents ``is encouraged to 
undergo sterilization.'' In addition the rules state that ``unplanned 
pregnancies must be aborted immediately.''
    However, over the past few years, authorities have initiated 
experiments to relax family planning targets in several counties. The 
integration of family planning with poverty alleviation and education 
efforts is one sign of this trend. Experimental relaxed targets in Yi 
Chun County, Shanxi Province, Chude in Hubei Province, and Longshen in 
the Gaunxi Autonomous Region have met and sometimes exceeded the 
official target and also have produced a more normal sex ratio at birth 
than in other areas. In Yicheng County, couples who have observed the 
rule of not marrying early and waiting 3 years to have their first 
child are permitted to have a second child after age 30. According to a 
foreign press report, over the past few years more than 600 counties 
covering about half the country's population have adopted more liberal 
policies in seeking to maintain low birth rates; Zhejiang Province 
reportedly has abandoned ``birth quotas'' of county-by-county 
permissible births each year, and other countries have set up 
``whispering rooms'' in family planning offices where women can talk 
privately with doctors about their birth control options. Other 
jurisdictions, such as Minglan village in Yandu County, have reportedly 
followed the earlier example of Beijing and other cities, abolishing 
birth permits and allowing couples to decide on their own when to have 
a baby. Beijing reportedly encourages local officials to initiate and 
fund their own projects on family planning.
    Penalties for family planning violators, including high fines, have 
led to widespread underreporting of rural births, making population 
statistics unreliable. By some estimates, official statistics may 
underreport the annual number of births by as much as 25 percent. Local 
officials, caught between pressures from superiors to show declining 
birth rates and from local citizens to allow them to have more than one 
child, frequently make false reports. For example, in July the Yunnan 
Ribao reported a local doctor in Xuanwei falsely had reported 700 
births of twins in order to account for families having multiple 
children. In April the government-sponsored Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences issued a book showing discrepancies in birth figures. 
According to that book, in 1998 the State Statistics Bureau reported 
19.91 million births in China, while the State Family Planning Agency 
maintained there were only 13.83 million births, a difference of more 
than 30 percent.
    Central government policy formally prohibits the use of force to 
compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization; however, intense 
pressure to meet family planning targets set by the Government has 
resulted in documented instances in which family planning officials 
have used coercion, including forced abortion and sterilization, to 
meet government goals. During an unauthorized pregnancy, a woman often 
is paid multiple visits by family planning workers and pressured to 
terminate the pregnancy. According to a senior family planning 
official, 10 million persons are sterilized each year and not all 
voluntarily. In 1998 a former Fujian Province local family planning 
official stated that local authorities in a Fujian town systematically 
used coercive measures such as forced abortion and sterilization, 
detention, and the destruction of property to enforce birth quotas. 
After the Fujian allegations were made public, the SFPC sent a team led 
by a senior official to investigate the charges. In a meeting with 
foreign diplomats, the senior official did not deny that abuses may 
have occurred but insisted that coercion was not the norm, nor 
government policy, nor sanctioned by central authorities in Beijing. 
There were reports that, after the central government's investigation, 
local officials in Fujian scaled back the intensity of their family 
planning enforcement efforts. Senior officials repeatedly have said 
that the Government ``made it a principle to ban coercion at any 
level.'' They acknowledge that problems persist and insist on the 
Government's determination to address such problems. The SFPC has 
issued circulars nationwide prohibiting family planning officials from 
coercing women to undergo abortions or sterilization against their 
will. Under the State Compensation Law, citizens also can sue officials 
who exceed their authority in implementing family planning policy, and 
in a few instances, individuals have exercised this right.
    Corruption related to family planning fines is a widespread 
problem. In 1999 the press reported that one city in Henan Province had 
punished 879 Party members and government officials for corruption in 
family planning.
    In late 1998, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) on an 
experimental basis launched a 4-year pilot project in 32 counties to 
address family planning and reproductive health issues solely through 
the use of voluntary measures, emphasizing education, improved 
reproductive health services, and economic development. The SFPC worked 
closely with the UNFPA to prepare informational materials and to 
provide training for officials and the general public in the project 
counties. Although it was still too early for an overall assessment of 
this program, visits to selected counties by foreign diplomats indicate 
that progress in implementing the program has been mixed. Some counties 
have made appreciable progress in implementing the program, while 
others have made relatively little. Notably, some counties have 
informed the general public about the UNFPA program and have eliminated 
the system of strict, government-assigned birth quotas (allowing 
couples to choose without authorization when to have their first 
child); other counties have not yet done so, or have only begun to do 
so. In Sichuan Province a couple can legally have a second child 
without applying for permission if they meet all the requirements; 
however, regulations and implementation vary from town to town. The 
Government has welcomed foreign delegations to inspect the UNFPA 
project counties. Although access to these areas has varied from 
province to province, foreign diplomats visited several counties during 
the year.
    Regulations forbid the termination of pregnancies based on the sex 
of the fetus, but because of the traditional preference for male 
children, particularly in rural areas, many families have used 
ultrasound to identify female fetuses and terminate pregnancies. The 
use of ultrasound for this purpose is prohibited specifically by the 
Maternal and Child Health Care Law, which came into effect in 1995 and 
mandates punishment of medical practitioners who violate the provision. 
According to the SFPC, a handful of doctors have been charged under 
this law. Government statistics put the national ratio of male to 
female births at 114 to 100; the World Health Organization estimates 
the ratio to be 117 to 100. The statistical norm is 106 male births to 
100 female births. These skewed statistics reflect both the 
underreporting of female births so that parents can keep trying to 
conceive a boy, and the abuse of sonograms leading to the termination 
of pregnancies based on the sex of the fetus. Female infanticide, 
abandonment, or the neglect of baby girls that results in lower female 
survival rates are also factors (see Section 5). The staterun media is 
paying increasing attention to unbalanced birth ratios, and the 
societal problems, such as trafficking in women, which they cause (see 
Section 6.f.). In the cities, the traditional preference for sons is 
changing; in the rural areas the practice continues. In July the 
Liaoshen Evening News reported that in a township of Liaoyang County, 
Liaoning Province, the male to female sex ratio was 306/100 for second 
children born between 1992 and 1999. After operating for 7 years, an 
illegal sex determination clinic was exposed when an outraged citizen 
called the Liaoyang City mayor's hot line.
    There reportedly have been instances in which pregnant prisoners in 
reeducationthroughlabor camps were forced to submit to abortions (see 
Section 1.c.).
    The Maternal and Child Health Care Law requires premarital and 
prenatal examinations to determine whether couples have acute 
infectious diseases or certain mental illnesses (not including mental 
retardation), or are at risk for passing on debilitating genetic 
diseases. The Ministry of Health implements the law, which recommends 
abortion or sterilization in some cases, based on medical advice. The 
law also provides for obtaining a second opinion and states that 
patients or their guardians must give written consent for such 
procedures (see Section 5). At least five provincial governments have 
implemented local regulations seeking to prevent persons with severe 
mental disabilities from having children. In August 1998 the Government 
issued an ``explanation'' to provincial governments clarifying that no 
sterilization of persons with genetic conditions could be performed 
without their signed consent.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution states that 
freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights to be enjoyed 
by all citizens; however, the Government restricts these rights in 
practice. During the year, the Government maintained tight restrictions 
on freedom of speech and of the press. The Government interprets the 
Communist Party's ``leading role,'' as mandated in the preamble to the 
Constitution, as circumscribing these rights. The Government does not 
permit citizens to publish or broadcast criticisms of senior leaders or 
opinions that directly challenge Communist Party rule. The Party and 
Government continue to control many--and, on occasion, all--print and 
broadcast media tightly and use them to propagate the current 
ideological line. According to official statistics, in 1998 the country 
had 2,053 newspapers, and 7,999 magazines and trade publications. It 
also published 7.24 billion copies of books representing 7,999 titles. 
All media employees are under explicit, public orders to follow CCP 
directives, and ``guide public opinion,'' as directed by political 
authorities. Both formal and informal guidelines continue to require 
journalists to avoid coverage of many politically sensitive topics. The 
State Security Law forbids journalists from divulging ``state 
secrets.'' These public orders, guidelines, and statutes greatly 
restrict the freedom of broadcast journalists and newspapers to report 
the news and lead to a high degree of self-censorship.
    The Government's harsh propaganda campaign against the Falun Gong, 
begun in 1999, continued and intensified during the year. There were 
also smaller propaganda campaigns against superstition.
    The Government strictly regulates the establishment and management 
of publications. As in previous years, the Government continued to 
close down publications and punish journalists for printing material 
deemed too sensitive. Newspaper editors may be suspended and sent to 
the Propaganda Bureau for ``rectification,'' after which they can 
generally return to work in the publishing industry. With the 
Government's consent and even open support, the press continued to 
publish stories related to citizen's rights, legal reform, official 
corruption, and official misconduct and gross abuses, particularly by 
law enforcement officials. However, newspapers cannot report on 
corruption without government and Party approval, and publishers 
published such material at their own risk. Senior officials issued a 
new call for tighter controls on the media and related fields in the 
period preceding the country's entry into the World Trade Organization. 
According to Western press reports, in August Jiang Zemin, at the 
annual leaders conference in Beidaihe, reportedly indicated that more 
media organizations, including web sites, would be asked to undergo 
government-controlled mergers in order to ensure control by Party and 
government censors. Jiang indicated the existing ban on new permits for 
magazines and publishing houses would stay in place and that 
authorities would place tighter controls on freelance contributors to 
newspapers, magazines, and web sites, as well as freelance production 
houses for television units. At year's end, it was not clear that such 
policies had been effectively implemented.
    Journalists were harassed, detained, and threatened during the 
year, often for reporting on subjects that met with the Government's or 
local authorities' disapproval, including corruption. In January the 
editor in chief of Southern Weekend, a newspaper known for its daring 
investigative reporting and critical editorials, was reassigned by 
Communist Party officials. After his departure, the newspaper's content 
reportedly became less critical of the Government than it had been 
previously. In March the government newspaper Weekly was shut down by 
the authorities after it published sensitive information regarding 
military strategy against Taiwan. In September Qi Yanchen was convicted 
in Hebei of subversion for writing an article for the prodemocracy e-
mail newsletter VIP Reference. In July Zhuhai police arrested five 
journalists, including two from Hong Kong and two from Macau, who were 
attempting to cover peasant protests against a land redevelopment 
scheme. In August local police arrested Ma Xiaoming, a Shaanxi 
television station reporter who had reported on a case involving 12,000 
peasants who brought a lawsuit against their township government. Ma 
was arrested to prevent him from meeting with a foreign newspaper 
reporter. On August 11, poet and editor of the literary journal 
Tendency, Huang Beiling (also known by his pen name of Bei Ling), was 
arrested in Beijing and charged with illegal publishing. Authorities 
also seized several hundred copies of the most recent edition of 
Tendency, which the authorities stated has ``political problems.'' 
Huang's brother and sometime partner in Tendency, Huang Feng, was 
detained on August 18, possibly in connection with his efforts to 
obtain his brother's release. Huang Beiling was released on August 25, 
and returned to his home abroad. According to the local press, in 
November several persons accused of printing and distributing Falun 
Gong literature were arrested in Chaoyan, Liaoning Province.
    In January, according to one report, the Government announced that 
it had closed down 27 newspapers, some for violations of press 
regulations or printing fabricated or sensational stories. In June 
authorities reportedly issued a new directive that required the media 
to uphold the party line and in July demoted or fired about 12 editors 
of publishing houses for ignoring the directive.
    In April 1999, journalist Gao Qinrong reportedly was sentenced to 
13 years in prison after writing a story that appeared in 1998 on 
corruption in connection with the construction of an irrigation system 
in Shanxi Province.
    The publishing industry consists of three kinds of book businesses: 
about 500 government-sanctioned publishing houses, smaller independent 
publishers that cooperate with official publishing houses to put out 
more daring publications, and an underground press. The 500 government-
approved publishing houses are the only organizations legally permitted 
to print books. The Government exerts control by issuing a limited 
number of publishing licenses, which are required for each edition of a 
book. A Party member at each publishing house monitors the content of 
the house's publications and uses the allocation of promotions, cars, 
travel, and other perks to encourage editors to exercise ``proper'' 
judgment about publications. Overt intervention by the State 
Publications Administration and Party Propaganda Bureau is strictly 
post-publication. Independent publishers take advantage of a loophole 
in the law to sign contracts with Government publishing houses to 
publish politically sensitive works. These works generally are not 
subjected to the same multilayered review process as official 
publications of the publishing houses.
    Underground printing houses, which are growing in number, publish 
the books that are the most popular with the public. These underground 
printing houses are the main targets of a campaign initiated at the end 
of 1998 to stop all illegal publications (including pornography and 
pirated computer software and audiovisual products), which has had the 
effect of restricting the availability of politically sensitive books. 
Many street vendors who sell sensitive works apparently have a tacit 
understanding with the authorities that they will look the other way 
when the vendors sell other illegal (i.e. pornographic or pirated) 
publications if the vendors do not sell politically sensitive books. 
Many pirated works are printed by police- or militaryaffiliated 
organizations, which often are not targeted for investigation. While 
government efforts have made it somewhat more difficult to find these 
books, they still are available. Pirated software, music compact discs, 
and video compact discs also are available widely and openly.
    In January Li Zhe and Wang Huimin, two distribution managers at 
Beijing's wholesale book market, were arrested for editing and 
publishing a book which exposed official corruption. In June the 
Beijing Publishing Group announced its decision to cancel its plans to 
publish of novel ``Waiting,'' by Ha Jin, a Chinese author living 
abroad. The book, which won foreign literary awards, was criticized 
publicly by a Beijing university professor as unpatriotic and for 
casting the country and its citizens in a bad light. Poet Bei Ling and 
Director of the PEN American Center Michael Roberts claim that there 
has been a tightening of the publishing rules during the year, that 15 
publishing houses were closed and that a popular sexually explicit book 
was banned.
    In early August, customs officials seized thousands of copies of a 
book being manufactured in the country by a foreign publishing company 
for publication abroad. The book contained photographs of world 
leaders, including the Dalai Lama. The Government claimed that its ban 
on politically sensitive works extended to items bound for export. Soon 
after this incident, 10,000 copies of a book of Tibetan art, published 
by the same foreign publisher for publication abroad, were seized as 
well. In early September, the books with the offending photograph of 
the Dalai Lama were released.
    Some dissidents continued to speak out despite the Government's 
restrictions on freedom of speech. In late March, just prior to the 
annual meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, former 
CCP member Bao Tong issued a letter criticizing the country's human 
rights policies. Prior to the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre, Li Guotao was rearrested in Shanghai and charged with 
spreading reactionary publications, instigating disturbances, and 
disturbing the social order (apparently in connection with a letter he 
and others sent to the mayor of Shanghai protesting the arrest of 
dissident Dai Xuewu and requesting his release). On June 28 he was 
sentenced to 3 years' reeducation-through-labor for demanding the 
release of CDP members.
    Several groups actively commemorated the June 4 anniversary of the 
Tiananmen massacre. On May 29, nine dissidents in Liaoning jointly 
wrote a letter to Jiang Zemin, urging the authorities to reverse the 
verdict on the June 4 incident. On May 31, a group of 108 surviving 
victims and family members of victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre 
released a letter through a human rights organization based outside of 
the country that demanded that Li Peng be prosecuted for his actions in 
relation to the massacre. According to the Information Center for Human 
Rights and Democracy, on June 1, Liu Xiaobo appealed for the release of 
political prisoners and apologies to the families of the victims of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre. On June 4, 50 dissidents in Chongqing, 
Henan, and Hebei staged a 24hour hunger strike to commemorate the 
massacre. In an open letter to Jiang Zemin, Tiananmen massacre victims' 
family rights activist Ding Zilin requested the return of funds 
earmarked for her group that were seized by police in January. However, 
the Government continued to threaten, arrest and imprison persons 
expressing their freedom of speech and press. In January 20-year old 
democracy activist Wang Yingzheng was found guilty of attempting to 
overthrow state power and sentenced to 4 years in prison for writing an 
open letter to Jiang Zemin denouncing corruption in China's ruling 
class. Also in January, Wang Hansheng and his wife, Xu Xianglan, were 
sentenced to 6 and 8 years in prison respectively for printing Falun 
Gong books and posters. In his March letter, Bao Tong noted heavy 
surveillance and interference with his privacy as a result of his 
continued activism (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.); he also noted that his 
freedom of speech has been threatened by the authorities. Police 
sometimes detained relatives of dissidents (see Section 1.f.). In May 
ads and other programs featuring the popular Taiwanese singer Ah Mei 
(Chang Huei-Mei) were banned, after she sang at the inauguration of the 
new Taiwanese President, Chen Shui-Bian. In July government film 
censors blacklisted popular actor-director Jian Wen because his Cannes 
Film Festival award winning film ``Demons at the Doorstep'' was judged 
to be unpatriotic in its depiction of the Japanese occupation. In 
October Beijing authorities criticized the award of the Nobel Prize for 
Literature to Gao Xingjian, an exile who is a French citizen and gave 
no indication they would lift a ban on his works.
    The Government kept tight control over the foreign press during the 
year and continued efforts to prevent foreign media ``interference'' in 
internal affairs. The authorities continued to jam, with varying 
degrees of success, Chinese- and Tibetanlanguage broadcasts of the 
Voice of America and Radio Free Asia (RFA). English-language broadcasts 
on VOA generally are not jammed, unless they immediately follow 
Chinese-language broadcasts, in which case portions of English-language 
broadcasts may be jammed. In the absence of an independent press, 
overseas broadcasts such as VOA, BBC, RFA, and Radio France 
International have a large audience, including activists, ordinary 
citizens, and even government officials. In May 1999 the press reported 
that Shanghai authorities had issued a notice that restricted pager 
services and Internet service providers, among others, from 
transmitting ``political information'' or information that could harm 
social stability.
    There are no privately owned television or radio stations, and all 
programming must be approved by the Government. Commercial program 
producers are seeking to expand the limits of broadcast content.
    Despite tighter government control of the press, information about 
the nation and the world continued to flow into the country at an 
increasing rate. Residents in Guangdong and other southern Provinces 
have wide access to Hong Kong television programs and newspapers. 
Throughout the country, a lively tabloid sector is flourishing. Radio 
talk shows remain popular, and, while avoiding the most politically 
sensitive subjects, they provide opportunities for citizens to air 
grievances about public issues. Despite licensing requirements and 
other restrictions, a small but rapidly growing segment of the 
population has access to the Internet. Most of the population has the 
means to own and use short-wave radios. The Government does not place 
restrictions on their use.
    During the year, the Government continued to encourage expansion of 
the Internet and other communications infrastructure and put more 
official information online, and the number of sites increased from 25 
to 2,400; however, the Government increased monitoring of the Internet 
during the year and placed restrictions on information available on the 
Internet. Internet use is expanding exponentially, creating a 
potentially powerful channel of information to the computer literate. 
It is estimated that nearly 15 million persons were connected to the 
Internet as of year's end, but estimates vary, with some considerably 
higher. However, increasing regulations, controls, and restrictions on 
the Internet by the Government during the year has led to self-
censorship, and had a chilling effect. In recent months a number of 
prodemocracy web sites were closed, Internet cafes were shut down, and 
web site operators were arrested. However, the number of web sites and 
Internet cafes grew dramatically during the year, and on some bulletin 
boards and web sites, frank discussions of the need for political 
reform took place.
    In early January, press reports stated that authorities in Shanghai 
ordered corporate Internet users to register with the police ``to 
strengthen the protection and safety of computers and information.'' On 
January 26, the Government issued the Computer Information Systems 
Internet Secrecy Administrative Regulations, which criminalized the 
posting and dissemination of ``state secrets'' on the Internet. 
However, the definition of ``state secrets'' remains vague. The new 
regulations also stated that operators of Internet chat rooms could be 
held liable for their content, and that web sites are required to 
submit to examination and approval by government secrecy offices. A 
November press report indicated that separate regulations on allowable 
content for Internet bulletin boards and chat rooms were also 
published. Another press report noted that additional regulations on 
bulletin boards were published on December 5.
    Internet control regulations are reissued occasionally. Enforcement 
of such regulations generally wanes after a few months. Regulations 
issued on October 1 continued to prohibit a broad range of activities 
that could be interpreted as subversion or as slandering the state. 
There is no effective enforcement of 1997 State Council regulations 
requiring those involved in international networking to apply for 
licenses and provide details regarding the scope and nature of their 
activities. The State Council also promulgated a comprehensive list of 
prohibited Internet activities, including using the Internet to 
``incite the overthrow of the Government or the Socialist system'' and 
``incite division of the country, harming national unification.'' The 
regulations, which came into effect in December 1997, provide for fines 
and other unspecified punishments to deal with violators.
    On September 26, new regulations on Measures for Managing Internet 
Content Provision were passed. The new regulations seem to be a 
codification of existing regulations and govern who can own Internet 
businesses, what can be published on the Internet, and who has 
oversight over Internet businesses; they also require all Internet 
content providers to be licensed and give such businesses 60 days to 
provide information about the businesses to the Ministry of Information 
Industry to obtain licenses. The regulations reportedly require 
Internet content providers to keep files of what they post and who 
reads it for 60 days, and ban subversive information (including 
endangering state secrets or national security), information that 
advocates cults and superstition, that is harmful to the country's 
reputation, or that is harmful to reunification efforts. The 
regulations also reportedly included requirements that Internet service 
providers ``record the times that users log on to the Internet, users' 
account numbers, Internet addresses or domain names, and the telephone 
numbers dial in from'' and defined illegal content to include news or 
information that is harmful to the country's reputation, disrupts 
social stability, disrupts efforts at reunification, or that advocates 
cults and superstition. Some observers view the new regulations at 
least in part as an attempt to shift the burden of policing the 
Internet to the Internet service providers rather than the authorities.
    The Government has specially trained police units to monitor and 
increase control of Internet content and access. In July the state 
press announced the establishment of an Internet police force in 
central Anhui Province, stating that similar police forces would be 
established in 20 other provinces. According to various sources, such 
Internet police forces were set up in 20 provinces. During 1999 central 
authorities and public security police in 16 provinces began work on 
strengthening the administration of Internet cafes, which had been 
required to register in 1999. Internet cafes also are required to 
curtail access to information on the Internet that is prohibited by law 
or regulation, and to monitor and report on customers who use the 
terminals. There are frequent reports of raids and crackdowns on 
Internet cafes; according to press reports, during 1 week in early 
February, 127 unregistered Internet cafes were shut down in Shanghai.
    In 1999 one human rights group reported a national police directive 
ordering special police units to monitor Internet bulletin boards for 
``reactionary'' notices. According to the directive, if such a posting 
were discovered, police were to contact the bulletin board service to 
seek assistance in tracing the message. Bulletin boards that did not 
stop such ``seditious'' messages from being posted would be shut down. 
A spokesman for the Government denied the existence of any such 
directive. However, some bulletin boards were shut down in 1999. 
Content on some bulletin boards has been removed, sometimes on a daily 
basis. In May 1999 the press reported that Shanghai authorities issued 
a notice that restricted pager services and Internet access providers, 
among others, from transmitting ``political information'' or 
information that could harm social stability. In October 1999, the 
Government issued State Council Order Number 273, which required firms 
using encryption products or equipment with encryption technology to 
register with the Government by January 31, 2000. The order provided 
that after the initial registration, firms using encryption technology 
would be required to provide the names, phone numbers, and e-mail 
addresses of all persons using such technology. In addition the order 
limited the import or sale of foreign encryption technology. At year's 
end, these regulations had not been enforced. In 1999 the Government 
announced the creation of a new committee charged with ``protecting 
government and commercial confidential files on the Internet, 
identifying net users, and defining rights and responsibilities;'' 
however, there was no evidence that action was taken by this committee 
during the year.
    The authorities also arrested dissidents for information 
disseminated through the Internet. In August authorities shut down the 
New Culture Forum, a prodemocracy web site, and sought Xin Wenming, the 
site's webmaster. Also in August, authorities moved against the 
nation's largest online bookstore, Jinqi Xishu, as well, for allegedly 
selling publications through ``improper channels.'' Also in August, 
police in Nanchong arrested an Internet cafe owner for publishing 
``counterrevolutionary'' articles on public bulletin boards. In 
September the cofounder of the environmental NGO China Development 
Union, Qi Yanchen, was sentenced in Hebei to a 4 years in prison for 
subversion for writing that China would have to introduce political 
reform in order to avoid widespread social unrest. The article at issue 
appeared in the prodemocracy e-mail newsletter VIP Reference. As with 
similar crackdowns against prodemocracy or religious dissidents, 
authorities frequently charge persons who maintain Internet sites with 
social crimes. For example, Huang Qi, founder of the prodemocracy web 
site New Culture Forumin Sichuan Province, was arrested immediately 
before the June 4 commemoration of the Tiananmen massacre for posting 
information about the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. He was charged 
with operating an unregistered Internet site and spreading pornography. 
In August Huang's web site reportedly was closed down. Shanghai writer 
and Revival Movement activist Wang Yiliang was sentenced to 2 years' 
reeducation through labor for allegedly downloading pictures of nude 
women.
    Authorities have at various times blocked politically ``sensitive'' 
web sites, including those of dissident groups and some major foreign 
news organizations, such as the Voice Of America (VOA), the Washington 
Post, the New York Times, and the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC). On June 4, the web site of the South China Morning Post was 
blocked temporarily. Also on June 4, police reportedly cut the 
telephone line of dissident Ding Zilin, to prevent her from 
participating in an Internet telecast to Hong Kong commemorating the 
June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. The Government 
specifically targeted web pages run by Falun Gong followers as part of 
its crackdown against the group. Nonetheless a number of human rights 
web pages continue to be accessible. The Government's efforts to block 
content and control usage have had only limited success because 
sophisticated users can bypass site blocking, and, more importantly, 
the number of Internet sites providing outside information and news 
grew so rapidly. Moreover censorship of the Internet appears to be 
applied inconsistently, although some Internet service providers 
practice self-censorship to avoid running afoul of very broadly worded 
regulations.
    By year's end, the Government had not promulgated any regulations 
governing news provided by Internet content providers. However, the 
Propaganda Department issued warnings to some providers who carry 
foreign media reports. One representative of a Western Internet content 
provider operating in the country stated that, while his organization 
will not completely stop using foreign media reports, it will focus on 
international and entertainment news when relaying foreign media 
reports, rather than on domestic affairs. However, web sites are 
restricted in their ability to post foreign news stories. In October 
1999 new rules restricted Chinese news sites from creating links to 
foreign news sites. The links disappeared temporarily but were back in 
December 1999. During the year, such links sometimes were blocked and 
sometimes were available. In January the Government issued regulations 
requiring any commercial web site with a cyber news service to first 
get approval from the Information Office before being allowed to apply 
for a business license. According to official media reports, the China 
Finance Information Network, a web site based in Wuhan, was fined and 
temporarily closed in May for carrying a report that authorities 
claimed was false. The story, regarding corruption on the part of the 
vice governor of Hubei Province, was from The Sun, a Hong-Kong based 
newspaper. On November 7, regulations were published that require web 
sites to use news from state controlled media, to obtain approval 
before posting news from foreign news sources, and to follow strict 
editorial conditions before generating their own news items. Other 
regulations were set up punishing persons who store, process, or 
retrieve information deemed to be ``state secrets'' from international 
computer networks. The regulations require any company or individual 
running a chat room, news group, or electronic bulletin board to get 
approval from the State Bureau of Secrecy. In spite of new regulations, 
dissident groups, including Falun Gong, increasingly used sophisticated 
methods to bypass Internet site blocks and to publish online magazines 
posing as bulk e-mail. News articles from foreign Chinese-language 
newspapers such as Singapore's United Morning News often are carried on 
web sites, and hundreds of newspapers have web sites.
    E-mail and e-mail publications are more difficult to block, 
although the Government attempts to do so, at times, by blocking e-mail 
from all overseas Internet service providers used by dissident groups. 
There have been reports that the Government is trying to develop an e-
mail filtration system to block antigovernment messages from entering 
the country; a project on such a system at Shenzhen University in 
Guangdong reportedly is sponsored by the Ministry of Education. Human 
Rights Watch reported that in May 1999 the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security (MOLSS) installed monitoring devices at the facilities of 
Internet service providers that can track individual e-mail accounts. 
The authorities also target some e-mail users and read their e-mail. 
According to a press report, police have installed monitoring equipment 
on the servers of the country's major Internet service providers. 
However, activists use a wide range of antifiltering countermeasures. 
Dissident groups abroad use e-mail to send publications and disseminate 
information to readers in China, and a small but growing number of 
activists within the country communicate this way as well. Email to 
certain addresses overseas is blocked but the blocking is easily 
overcome by sophisticated Internet users. Dissident electronic journals 
and web sites from overseas also use various measures to avoid 
blocking. Citizens who supply large numbers of e-mail addresses to 
organizations abroad have been prosecuted. The authorities generally do 
not prosecute citizens who receive dissident e-mail publications, but 
forwarding such messages to others is illegal. When a dissident is 
harassed or detained, activists using e-mail, faxes, telephones, and 
pagers can spread the word quickly to colleagues around the country and 
to the international community.
    Despite the restrictions on the Internet, and the fact that direct 
attacks on the Government and references to sensitive matters such as 
the Tiananmen massacre and the Government's handling of Falun Gong are 
not allowed, information and discussion on other topics, such as the 
environment and corruption, can be very pointed. Participants in 
Internet forums regularly express politically unacceptable views, 
including contributors to state-run web pages, and those run by the 
People's Daily.
    The Government does not fully respect academic freedom and 
continues to impose ideological controls on political discourse at 
colleges, universities, and research institutes. Scholars and 
researchers report varying degrees of control regarding the issues that 
they may examine and the conclusions that they may draw. Censorship of 
written material comes at the time of publication, or when 
intellectuals and scholars, anticipating that books or papers on 
political topics would be deemed too sensitive to be published, 
exercise selfcensorship. In areas such as economic policy or legal 
reform, there generally was greater official tolerance for comment and 
debate; however liberal scholars and intellectuals from many 
disciplines were under greater pressure from the Government during the 
year. Early in the year, Liu Junning was dismissed from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences. Liu and another liberal scholar publicly 
had criticized national leaders or policies. Attacks against Liu and 
another liberal scholar, including a speech by Jiang Zemin, were 
published in government newspapers in early April, and according to 
press reports, publications were prohibited from publishing works of 
some of the scholars. Many other liberal scholars also reportedly were 
criticized by the authorities. Some observers believed that this action 
was meant to send a message to other leading intellectuals as to the 
limits of allowable discourse and would have a chilling effect. There 
have been reports that liberal intellectuals have been more circumspect 
in articulating unorthodox ideas since this incident and have engaged 
in a heightened degree of self-censorship. When Yu Jie, a well-known 
essayist and liberal social commentator, arrived to take up a post at 
the Chinese Modern Language Institute (a branch of the China Writer's 
Association) in the fall, he was told that the offer had been 
rescinded. Yu reportedly has had difficulty recently getting his works 
published, and publishers reportedly have been ordered not to publish 
further editions of his previous works. According to a news report, 
economist and author He Qinglian was forced out of her job as a 
columnist with a paper in Shenzhen because of her pointed comments on 
corruption and inequity in the economy.
    Early in the year, the Government also ordered university groups to 
obtain permission before inviting outside speakers. In March a 
longstanding Chinese language program run by a foreign university was 
required to alter its curriculum to eliminate certain items deemed 
politically sensitive and material that ``portrayed the country in a 
bad light'' as a condition for the program's renewal. On June 4, 
Beijing University student Jiang Xulin was detained for publicly 
displaying an essay urging the Chinese Communist Party to reassess the 
1989 Tiananmen massacre.
    The Government continues to use political attitudes as criteria for 
selecting persons for Government-sponsored study abroad but does not 
impose such restrictions on privately sponsored students (who 
constitute the majority of students who study abroad).
    Researchers residing abroad also have been subject to sanctions 
from the authorities when their work does not meet with official 
approval. On January 29 Song Yongyi, a librarian and academic 
researcher from Dickinson College who had been arrested in August 1999 
and charged with ``the purchase and illegal provision of intelligence 
to persons outside China,'' was released from prison. Song, an expert 
on the Cultural Revolution, had traveled to the country to collect 
materials such as newspaper articles, books, and other publicly 
available information regarding that period, as he had on several 
previous occasions. His detention raised concerns about a possible 
chilling effect on other Chinese researchers, whether resident in the 
country or abroad. There also was concern that collaborative research 
with foreigners may become more difficult. In 1999 Hua Di, a Stanford 
researcher, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for providing missile 
program secrets to persons abroad; his conviction was overturned in 
midMarch (see Section 1.c.). Hua was reconvicted on November 23 and 
sentenced to 10 years in prison.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government 
severely restricts this right in practice. The Constitution stipulates 
that such activities may not challenge ``Party leadership'' or infringe 
upon the ``interests of the State.'' Protests against the political 
system or national leaders are prohibited. Authorities deny permits and 
quickly move to suppress demonstrations involving the expression of 
dissenting political views.
    At times police used excessive force against demonstrators. 
Demonstrations with political or social themes often were broken up 
quickly and violently. The number of persons who participate in 
demonstrations is often difficult to verify, and estimates of the 
numbers of participants vary. Hong Kong-based human rights groups 
allege that 1,200 persons were detained between June 18 and June 25 
during protests and public demonstrations by Falun Gong practitioners 
in 9 provinces. Falun Gong attempted to organize gatherings on 
Tiananmen Square throughout the year, especially on special 
anniversaries; such protests were often broken up violently by the 
police and security forces. In July Falun Gong practitioners attempted 
to unfurl banners or shout slogans to mark the first anniversary of the 
banning of Falun Gong. At that time, diplomats and journalists 
witnessed several hundred Falun Gong practitioners being arrested and 
several persons being beaten. Authorities prevented some demonstrations 
with possible political overtones from taking place or dispersed those 
underway, and in at least one city, Shenyang, local government 
officials banned public demonstrations effective July 20, although 
demonstrations continued to take place. In May due to concerns about 
large gatherings taking place around the June 4 anniversary of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre, the authorities banned a planned memorial 
march for a university student who had been raped and killed. 
Authorities also broke up a June 4 gathering of 30 persons at Beijing 
University that was held to commemorate the Tianamen massacre's victims 
and arrested two participants. Other small gatherings of dissidents 
planned on and around the June 4 anniversary were broken up in Beijing 
and Xian (see Section 1.d.).
    In many cases, the authorities dealt with economic demonstrations 
more leniently (see Section 6.a.), but some economic demonstrations 
were also dispersed with the use of force. In February mine workers in 
Liaoning Province clashed with police and military officers for 3 days 
after the closure of a mine was announced; the miners, although given a 
severance package, were owed 18 months' wages (see Section 6.a.). The 
area was briefly placed under martial law. In May up to 2,000 unpaid 
workers reportedly protested at their factory and at local government 
offices in Liaoyang, Liaoning Province; the demonstration was 
eventually forcibly broken up by the police. Dozens were reported 
injured, and three persons were arrested (see Sections 1.c. and 6.a.). 
In June a Hong Kong human rights group reported that in Yantou village, 
Zhejiang Province, 20 residents and 5 policemen were injured when 
police clashed with village residents over plans to demolish 200 homes. 
According to Western press reports, in July 100 villagers were hurt, 40 
policemen were injured, and 1 policemen was killed in clashes between 
security forces and villagers over a water project in drought-stricken 
Anqui City in Shandong. Also in July, there were press reports that 
police beat 5 villagers in Xian protesting against the local 
Government's failure to compensate them for requisitioned land. In 
August credible reports indicated that 1 person was killed and 
approximately 100 were injured as thousands of farmers in Fengcheng 
City, Jiangxi Province, clashed with police in week-long riots sparked 
by anger over high taxes.
    Despite restrictions in Beijing and elsewhere, the number of 
demonstrations nationwide continued to grow. According to a Public 
Security Ministry report, in 1999 more than 100,000 demonstrations took 
place, up from 60,000 in 1998. Demonstrations related to economic 
grievances and official corruption were common, and demonstrations 
related to family planning continued. Some demonstrations included 
thousands of protesters. Authorities handled many protests with 
restraint, especially those concerned with economic issues. According 
to a Hong Kongbased human rights organization, 500 workers in Fuzhou 
demonstrated in July in front of provincial government buildings to 
protest plans to close their factory. Also in July, 200 peasants in 
Yinxi town, Anhui, protested Government orders to tear down their homes 
to build an airfield. In May hundreds of university students in Beijing 
protested Beijing University's handling of the killing of a female 
student.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice. Communist Party policy and 
government regulations require that all professional, social, and 
economic organizations officially register with, and be approved by, 
the Government. Ostensibly aimed at restricting secret societies and 
criminal gangs, these regulations also prevent the formation of truly 
autonomous political, human rights, religious, environmental, labor, 
and youth organizations that directly challenge government authority. 
Since November 1999, all concerts, sports events, exercise classes or 
other meetings of more than 200 persons must be approved by Public 
Security authorities. According to Human Rights Watch, in November 
1999, An Jun, an attorney who formed an organization called 
``Corruption Watch'' to expose local corruption, was put on trial. In 
April he was sentenced to 4 years in prison on charges of inciting the 
overthrow of the Government. An had attempted to register the 
organization legally with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but it was 
banned.
    There are no laws or regulations that specifically govern the 
formation of political parties. The Government moved decisively, using 
detentions and prison terms, to eliminate the CDP, which activists 
around the country had tried since 1998 to organize into the country's 
first opposition political party (see Section 1.d.).
    According to Government statistics, by the end of 1998, there were 
1,500 national-level, quasi-nongovernmental organizations, 165,000 
social organizations, and 700,000 nonprofit organizations registered 
with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Although these organizations all 
came under some degree of government control, they were able to develop 
their own agendas. Many had support from foreign NGO's. Some sought 
advocacy roles in less controversial public interest areas such as 
women's issues, the environment, and consumer rights. In October 1998 
the Government promulgated a revised and more complete set of 
regulations on the registration of NGO's. The new rules require that 
all NGO's reregister under the revised regulations, a process that may 
be used to further restrict the numbers and types of NGO's. Regulations 
stipulate that local-level NGO's must have an official office and at 
least $3,600 (30,000 RMB) in funds. National-level groups must have at 
least $12,000 (100,000 RMB). Applications must be vetted by the 
Government, which has 2 months in which to grant approval. Once 
established, groups are required to submit to regular oversight and 
``obey the Constitution, laws, and national policies.'' They must not 
``violate the four cardinal principles, damage national unity, or upset 
ethnic harmony.'' Violators (groups that disobey guidelines or 
unregistered groups that continue to operate) may face administrative 
punishment or criminal charges. It is difficult to estimate how many 
groups may have been discouraged from organizing NGO's due to the new 
regulations. However, preexisting groups report little or no additional 
interference by the Government since the new regulations came into 
effect.
    During the year, poet Ma Zhe was charged with subversion and 
sentenced to 5 years in prison for setting up the ``Cultural Revival 
Movement,'' which advocated the end of Communist Party control over 
artists and their cultural and literary works. In July Kong Youping, 
the would-be founder of the ``China Youth Association,'' was arrested 
and charged with subversion.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religious belief and the freedom not to believe; however, the 
Government seeks to restrict religious practice to government-
sanctioned organizations and registered places of worship and to 
control the growth and scope of the activity of religious groups. There 
are five officially recognized religions--Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, 
Protestantism, and Catholicism. For each faith, there is a government-
affiliated association to monitor and supervise its activities. 
Membership in religions is growing rapidly; however, while the 
Government generally does not seek to suppress this growth outright, it 
tries to control and regulate religious groups to prevent the rise of 
groups or sources of authority outside the control of the Government 
and the Chinese Communist Party. The Criminal Law states that 
government officials who deprive citizens of religious freedom may be 
sentenced to up to 2 years in prison in serious cases. However, there 
are no known cases of persons being punished under this statute.
    During the year, the Government's respect for religious freedom 
continued to deteriorate. The Government intensified its harsh 
crackdown against the Falun Gong movement and extended its actions to 
``cults'' in general. In some regions, the atmosphere created by the 
nationwide campaigns against cults and superstition had spillover 
effects on other unofficial faiths. Various sources report that 
approximately 100 or more Falun Gong adherents died during the year 
while in police custody; many of their bodies reportedly bore signs of 
severe beatings or torture, or were cremated before relatives could 
examine them (see Section 1.c.). A number of qigong (a traditional 
Chinese health regimen with mystical overtones) and Protestant house 
church groups were banned. House church groups in northeastern China 
reported more detentions and arrests than in recent years (see Section 
1.d.), and in some areas officials destroyed hundreds of unregistered 
houses of worship. In many regions with high concentrations of 
Catholics, relations between the Government and the underground church 
loyal to the Vatican remained tense. The situation in Tibet was 
particularly poor, as the Government intensified and expanded its 
``patriotic education'' campaign aimed at neutralizing lamas, monks, 
and nuns with sympathies to the Dalai Lama (see Tibet addendum). 
Apolitical religious activities that had been tolerated in the past in 
Tibet were more tightly restricted during the year and in some cases 
were not permitted. Regulations restricting Muslims' religious 
activity, teaching, and places of worship continued to be tight in 
Xinjiang, and the Government dealt harshly with Muslim religious 
leaders who engaged in political speech and activities that the 
authorities deemed separatist.
    The state arrogates to itself the right to recognize and thus to 
allow to operate particular religious groups and spiritual movements. 
The State Council's Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) is responsible for 
monitoring and judging the legitimacy of religious activity. The RAB 
and the Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD), both of 
which are staffed by officials rather than religious adherents, provide 
policy ``guidance and supervision'' over implementation of government 
regulations on religious activity, as well as the role of foreigners in 
religious activity. During a 1999 speech, President Jiang Zemin noted 
the Party's policy on freedom of religious belief but also called for 
stronger leadership over religious work and intensified management of 
religious affairs. He added that ``we should energetically give 
guidance to religion so that it will keep in line with the socialist 
society and serve ethnic unity, social stability, and modernization.''
    The Government continued and, in some areas, intensified a national 
campaign to enforce 1994 State Council regulations and subsequent 
provincial regulations that require all places of worship to register 
with government religious affairs bureaus and to come under the 
supervision of official ``patriotic'' religious organizations. The 
Government officially permits only those Christian churches affiliated 
with either the Catholic Patriotic Association/Catholic Bishops 
Conference or the (Protestant) Three-Self Patriotic Movement/Chinese 
Christian Council to operate openly. There are six requirements for the 
registration and establishment of venues for religious activity: 
Possession of a meeting place; citizens who are religious believers and 
who regularly take part in religious activity; qualified leaders and an 
organized governing board; a minimum number of followers; a set of 
operating rules; and a legal source of income. There are reports that 
despite the rapidly growing religious population, it is difficult for 
new places of worship to be registered even among the five officially 
recognized faiths.
    At the end of 1997, the Government reported that there were more 
than 85,000 approved venues for religious activities. Some groups 
registered voluntarily, some registered under pressure, while 
authorities refused to register others. Unofficial groups claimed that 
authorities often refuse them registration without explanation. The 
Government contends that these refusals were mainly the result of 
inadequate facilities and meeting spaces. Many religious groups have 
been reluctant to comply with the regulations out of principled 
opposition to state control of religion or due to fear of adverse 
consequences if they reveal, as required, the names and addresses of 
church leaders and members. In some areas, efforts to register 
unauthorized groups are carried out by religious leaders and civil 
affairs officials. In other regions, police and RAB officials performed 
registration concurrently with other law enforcement actions. Police 
closed scores of ``underground'' mosques, temples, seminaries, Catholic 
churches, and Protestant ``house churches,'' including many with 
significant memberships, properties, financial resources, and networks. 
Some were destroyed; others were confiscated by authorities for other 
uses. It has been estimated that approximately 450 churches and temples 
were closed, destroyed, or confiscated for other uses during the weeks 
prior to December 25 in Wenzhou, and as many as 1,200 churches and 
temples were closed, destroyed, or confiscated by authorities for other 
uses in surrounding areas of Zhejiang Province during that same time. 
Leaders of unauthorized groups are often the targets of harassment, 
interrogations, detention, and physical abuse.
    In some areas there are reports of harassment of churches by local 
RAB officials which is attributed, at least in part, to financial 
issues. For example, although regulations require local authorities to 
provide land to church groups, some local officials may try to avoid 
doing so by denying registration, thus avoiding the requirement to 
provide land. Official churches also may face harassment if local 
authorities wish to acquire the land on which a church is located. In 
addition to refusing to register churches, there are also reports that 
RAB officials have requested illegal ``donations'' from churches in 
their jurisdictions as a means of raising extra revenue.
    There is significant variation in how the authorities deal with 
unregistered religious groups. In certain regions, Government 
supervision of religious activity is minimal, and in some parts of the 
country, registered and unregistered churches are treated similarly by 
authorities, existing openly side by side. Coexistence and cooperation 
between official and unofficial churches in such areas, both Catholic 
and Protestant, is close enough to blur the line between the two. In 
these areas, many congregants worship in both types of churches. 
However, in some areas relations between the two churches remain 
hostile. In other regions, particularly where considerable unofficial 
and official religious activity takes place, such as in Zhejiang, 
Guangxi, Shanghai, and Chongqing, local regulations call for strict 
government oversight of religion and authorities have cracked down on 
unregistered churches and their members. The relationship between 
unregistered and registered churches can be tense in such areas. During 
the year, some unregistered religious groups were subjected to 
increased restrictions, and, in some cases, intimidation, harassment, 
and detention. Some house church members asserted that authorities 
continued efforts to register house churches and to harass those who 
resist, especially in Henan and Shandong Provinces. Throughout the 
year, the Government moved swiftly against houses of worship outside 
its control that grew too large or espoused beliefs that it considered 
threatening to ``state security.''
    The law does not prohibit religious believers from holding public 
office; however, most influential positions in government are reserved 
for Party members, and Communist Party officials state that Party 
membership and religious belief are incompatible. This has a 
disproportionate effect in such minority-inhabited areas as Xinjiang 
and Tibet. Party membership also is required for almost all high-level 
positions in government and in state-owned businesses and 
organizations. The Communist Party reportedly issued a circular in 1997 
ordering Party members not to adhere to religious beliefs. This 
followed a 1995 document circulated to Party organizations at the 
provincial level ordering the expulsion of Party members who belonged 
to any religious organization, whether open or clandestine. There were 
reports that the Government issued a circular in early 1999 to remind 
Party cadres that religion was incompatible with Party membership, a 
theme reflected in authoritative media. President and CCP General 
Secretary Jiang Zemin stated in a September 1999 speech that ``Party 
members of all ethnic groups must have a firm faith in socialism and 
communism, cannot believe in religion, cannot take part in or organize 
religious activities, and cannot take part in feudal superstitious 
activities.'' On March 11, the Party's flagship newspaper, the People's 
Daily, published a commentary on religious affairs work. The article 
urged all Party members to ``promote atheist thought in a positive way 
and persist in educating the masses of various ethnic groups with the 
Marxist perspective on religion.'' While the commentary also called on 
the Party to protect ``citizens' freedom of religious belief,'' it 
warned that ``hostile forces outside (China's) borders and separatist 
forces are taking advantage of ethnicity and religion to bring about 
political infiltration and the separation of the motherland.'' Muslims 
allegedly have been fired from government posts for praying during 
working hours. The ``Routine Service Regulations'' of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) state explicitly that servicemen ``may not take 
part in religious or superstitious activities.'' Party and PLA military 
personnel were expelled for adhering to the Falun Gong movement; there 
is no available information indicating whether Party or PLA military 
personnel were expelled for associating with other religious or 
spiritual/mystical groups. However, according to government officials, 
in certain localities as many as 20 to 25 percent of Communist Party 
officials engage in some kind of religious activity. Most officials who 
practice a religion are Buddhist or practice a folk religion. Religious 
figures, who are not members of the CCP, are included in national and 
local government organizations, usually to represent their constituency 
on cultural and educational matters. The National People's Congress 
includes several religious leaders, including Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai, a 
Tibetan ``living Buddha,'' who is a vice chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the NPC. Religious groups also are represented in the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a forum for 
``multiparty'' cooperation and consultation led by the Chinese 
Communist Party, which advises the Government on policy.
    The authorities permit officially sanctioned religious 
organizations to maintain international contacts that do not entail 
``foreign control.'' What constitutes ``control'' is not defined. 
Regulations enacted in 1994 and expanded in September codified many 
existing rules involving foreigners, including a ban on proselytizing 
by foreigners, but for the most part foreign nationals are allowed to 
preach to foreigners, bring in religious materials for personal use, 
and preach to citizens at churches, mosques, and temples at the 
invitation of registered religious organizations. Collective religious 
activities of foreigners also are required to take place at officially 
registered places of worship or approved temporary locations. 
Foreigners are not permitted to conduct missionary activities, but 
foreign Christians teach English and other languages on college 
campuses with minimum interference from authorities as long as their 
proselytizing is low key. There were reports in early 1999 that the 
Government issued a circular to tighten control over foreign missionary 
activity in the country. However, there was no evidence of further 
tightening during the year. On March 25, police raided a house church 
service in Jilin and confiscated the Bible and camera of a foreigner 
who was in attendance. The foreign Christian subsequently was fined, 
and one local official described the house church service as a 
``heretical religious activity.''
    According to an official government white paper, there are over 200 
million religious adherents, 3,000 religious organizations, 300,000 
clergy, and 74 religious colleges. Official religious organizations 
administer local Bible schools, 54 Catholic and Protestant seminaries, 
9 institutes to train imams and Islamic scholars, and institutes to 
train Buddhist monks. Students who attend these institutes must 
demonstrate ``political reliability,'' and all graduates must pass an 
examination on their theological and political knowledge to qualify for 
the clergy. The Government permitted limited numbers of Catholic and 
Protestant seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist clergy to go 
abroad for additional religious studies. In most cases, funding for 
these training programs is provided by foreign organizations. Both 
official and unofficial Christian churches have problems training 
adequate numbers of clergy to meet the needs of their growing 
congregations. However, due to government prohibitions, unofficial 
churches have particularly significant problems training clergy or 
sending students to study overseas, and many clergy receive only 
limited and inadequate preparation. Members of the underground Catholic 
Church, especially clergy wishing to further their studies abroad, 
found it difficult to obtain passports and other necessary travel 
documents (see Section 2.d.).
    Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Government has 
restored or replaced some churches, temples, mosques, and monasteries 
damaged or destroyed between 1966 and 1976, and allowed the reopening 
of some seminaries. Implementation of this policy has varied from 
locality to locality. However, there are far fewer temples, churches, 
or mosques than existed 50 years ago (before the Revolution), despite 
the recent increase in the number of religious believers. The 
difficulty in registering new places of worship, along with the 
decrease in places of worship, has led to crowding in many existing 
places of worship.
    Approximately 8 percent of the population are Buddhist, 
approximately 1.6 percent are Muslim, and an estimated 0.4 percent 
belong to the official Patriotic Catholic Church. An estimated 0.4 to 
0.8 percent belong to the unofficial Vaticanaffiliated Catholic Church, 
an estimated 0.8 percent to 1.2 percent are registered Protestants, and 
perhaps 2.4 to 6.5 percent worship in house churches that are 
independent of Government control. There are no available estimates of 
the number of Taoists. However, according to a 1997 Government 
publication, there are over 10,000 Taoist monks and nuns and over 1,000 
Taoist temples.
    Traditional folk religion (worship of local gods, heroes, and 
ancestors) of a majority of the population has experienced a revival in 
recent years and is tolerated to varying degrees as a loose affiliate 
of Taoism, or as an ethnic minority cultural practice; however, many 
manifestations of folk religion are officially considered to be 
``feudal superstition,'' and local authorities have destroyed thousands 
of local shrines.
    Buddhists make up the largest body of organized religious 
believers. The Government estimates that there are more than 100 
million Buddhists in the country, most of whom are from the dominant 
Han ethnic group. However, it is difficult to estimate accurately the 
number of Buddhists because they do not have congregational memberships 
and often do not participate in public ceremonies. The Government 
reports that there are 13,000 Buddhist temples and monasteries and more 
than 200,000 nuns and monks. In some areas, local Governments enforced 
strictly regulations on places of worship, particularly on illegally 
constructed Buddhist temples and shrines. In 1998 a senior provincial 
party official stated that goals for the coming year were to ``tighten 
management of places of religious activities, properly handle issues 
concerning the indiscriminate establishment of temples and the setting 
up of outdoor Buddha statues, and crack down on heretical religious 
organizations and illegal religious activities.''
    Tibetan Buddhists outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) have 
more freedom to practice their religion than those in the TAR, although 
significant restrictions remain. The number of monks outside the TAR is 
substantial and growing--as is the number of teaching monks with 
advanced education--and the reconstruction of monasteries continues. 
However, restrictions remain, especially at those monasteries with 
close ties to foreign organizations. Monks who study abroad are often 
prevented from returning to their home monasteries outside of the TAR. 
There continue to be reports of monks and nuns outside of the TAR who 
have left monasteries and nunneries to avoid the patriotic education 
campaigns, which force them to choose between signing oaths with 
political content or possibly suffering serious consequences if they 
refuse to do so. (A discussion of government restrictions on Tibetan 
Buddhism in the TAR can be found in the Tibet addendum to this report.)
    In the past, official tolerance for religions considered 
traditionally Chinese, such as Buddhism and Taoism, has been greater 
than that for Christianity. However, as these non-Western faiths have 
grown rapidly in recent years, there are signs of greater government 
concern and new restrictions, especially on syncretic sects.
    According to government figures, there are 20 million Muslims, 
35,000 Islamic places of worship, and more than 45,000 imams 
nationwide. The Government has stated that there are 10 colleges 
conducting Islamic higher education and 2 other Islamic schools in 
Xinjiang operating with government support. In some areas where ethnic 
unrest has occurred, particularly among Central Asian Muslims (and 
especially the Uighurs) in Xinjiang, officials continue to restrict the 
building of mosques and the religious education of youths under the age 
of 18.
    Regulations restricting Muslims' religious activity, teaching, and 
places of worship continued to be tight in Xinjiang, and the Government 
dealt harshly with Muslim adherents who engaged in political speech and 
activities that the authorities deemed separatist. AI reported that 
Jelil Turdi, an ethnic Uighur from Xinjiang, who had been living in 
Kyrgyzstan for 3 years, was deported back to China for allegedly 
separatist activities. In October Wang Lequan, secretary of the 
Xinjiang Party Committee reminded Party members that ``cadres at all 
levels should adhere consciously to Marxist atheism. Do not believe in 
religion, do not take part in religious activities.'' Provincial-level 
Communist Party and government officials repeatedly called for stronger 
management of religious affairs and for the separation of religion from 
administrative matters. For example, the official Xinjiang Legal Daily 
reported that in recent years a township in Bay (Baicheng) County had 
found cases of ``religious interference'' in judicial, marriage, and 
family planning matters. In response the authorities began conducting 
monthly political study sessions for religious personnel. In addition 
they required every mosque to record the numbers and names of those 
attending each day's activities. The official Xinjiang Daily reported 
that Yining County early in the year reviewed the activities of 420 
mosques and implemented a system of linking ethnic cadres to mosques in 
order to improve vigilance against ``illegal religious activities.'' 
The authorities also initiated a campaign to discourage overt religious 
attire such as veils and to discourage religious marriage ceremonies. 
There were numerous official media reports that the authorities 
confiscated ``illegal religious publications'' in Xinjiang. According 
to a July report of the International Coalition for Religious Freedom, 
since April 1996, only one publisher, the Xinjiang People's Publication 
House, has been allowed to print Muslim literature in Xinjiang. Human 
Rights Watch also reported a tightening of control over the teaching 
materials, curricula, and leadership of mosques and religious schools 
in 1999. HRW also reported that six imams from Hotan City and Karakash 
County were detained toward the end of 1999 in part for non-compliance 
with religious regulations and for failing to teach government policy 
at religious meetings.
    Religious/ethnic tensions began to rise in September in Shandong 
Province when a non-Muslim merchant improperly labeled meat as being 
fit for consumption by observant Muslims. Disputes and insults between 
Muslims and non-Muslims followed, leading to angry demonstrations that 
led to a clash with police. In mid-December, according to an official 
press report, police clashed in Yangxin County with Muslim Hui, who 
were protesting a lack of respect for their religion. The police killed 
6 Hui and injured 19; 13 police officers also were injured. According 
to foreign press reports, the Hui casualties occurred when police fired 
on the crowd of protesters after they refused to disperse. Following a 
central government and Party investigation, the Shandong provincial 
authorities fired the Yangxin County party secretary, the head of the 
Yangxin County government, and the chief of the county's Public 
Security Bureau.
    In some areas, particularly in areas traditionally populated by the 
non-Central Asian Hui ethnic group, there is substantial religious 
building construction and renovation. Some young Uighur Muslims study 
outside the country in Muslim religious schools.
    The Government permits, and in some cases subsidizes, Muslim 
citizens who make the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. According to 
government statistics, more than 45,000 Muslims have made the 
pilgrimage in recent years--5,000 in 1998. However, there have been 
nongovernmental reports that fewer persons have made the pilgrimage 
since 1998; according to some estimates, less than 2,500 persons went 
in 1999 and 2000. There are many more Muslims in the country with the 
means and desire to participate in the hajj than are allowed to do so, 
leading to official corruption in granting permission to participate in 
the pilgrimage. There are conflicting reports as to the ability of 
Uighur Muslims to go on pilgrimage.
    The Government takes some steps designed to show respect for the 
country's Muslims, such as offering congratulations on major Islamic 
holidays. However, government sensitivity to concerns of the Muslim 
community is limited. In 1998 a Qing dynasty mosque, which was the 
center of Muslim life in Chengdu, was destroyed in the city's Muslim 
quarter to make way for a boulevard near an expanded city square, 
despite strong opposition from the city's Muslim population. The 
construction of a new mosque over a complex of retail establishments 
further offended the community. At the end of 1999, no construction 
upon the site of the Qing dynasty mosque had yet occurred; the imam, or 
leader, of the mosque that was demolished was ordered to leave Chengdu 
and has been forbidden to engage in religious work. The new officially 
sanctioned mosque over the retail complex has been attended only 
lightly since its opening.
    The unofficial, Vatican-affiliated Catholic Church claims a 
membership far larger than the 5 million persons registered with the 
official Catholic Church. Precise figures are difficult to determine, 
but Vatican officials have estimated that there are as many as 10 
million adherents. According to official figures, the Government-
approved Catholic Church has 69 bishops, 5,000 clergy, and about 5,000 
churches and meeting houses. There are 60,000 baptisms each year. The 
Government so far has refused to establish diplomatic relations with 
the Holy See, and there is no Vatican representative in the country. 
The Government's refusal to allow the official Catholic church to 
recognize the authority of the Papacy in matters of faith and morals 
has led many Catholics to refuse to join the official Catholic church 
on the grounds that this refusal denies one of the fundamental tenets 
of their faith.
    In January bishops of the official Catholic Church, without 
consulting the Holy See, consecrated 5 new official church bishops on 
the same day that the Pope consecrated 12 new Roman Catholic bishops in 
Rome. This was also the day on which the Pope historically consecrates 
bishops chosen for special recognition. Some bishops of the official 
church reportedly refused to attend the Beijing ceremony, which was 
seen as a deliberate affront to the Vatican. In June a new bishop was 
ordained in Hangzhou by several bishops, including one of those 
ordained in January. On the October 1st anniversary of the founding of 
the People's Republic, the Vatican canonized 120 saints with ties to 
China, 86 of whom had been killed during the Boxer Rebellion. The 
state-run media sharply criticized the canonizations. These incidents 
and the tensions between the Government and the Vatican have caused 
leadership problems for the official Catholic Church. Some bishops in 
the official Catholic Church are not recognized by the Holy See, 
although many have been recognized privately. Some church members and 
other clerics within the official Catholic Church have indicated that 
they are unwilling to accept the authority of bishops ordained without 
Vatican approval.
    The Party's Central Committee issued a document on August 16, 1999, 
calling on the authorities to tighten control of the official Catholic 
Church and to eliminate the underground Catholic Church if it does not 
accede to Government control. There are many longstanding vacancies in 
the official Catholic administration, particularly among bishops, and 
there are reports that the RAB and the official church patriotic 
association are pressuring the church to fill the vacancies quickly. In 
recent months, there has been increasing pressure by the Chinese 
Catholic Patriotic Association, the Religious Affairs Bureau, and 
police authorities on the underground church to join the official 
church.
    The Government maintains that there are between 10 and 15 million 
registered Protestants, 18,000 clergy, over 12,000 churches, and some 
25,000 meeting places. According to foreign experts, perhaps 30 million 
persons worship in house churches that are independent of Government 
control, although estimates by some house church groups range as high 
as 80 million. There are reports of divisions within both the official 
Protestant church and the house church movement over issues of 
doctrine; in both the official and unofficial Protestant churches, 
there are groups with conservative views and groups with more 
unorthodox views.
    The ongoing growth of unofficial Christian churches continued to 
cause concern among many government and Communist Party officials who 
perceive unregulated religious gatherings as a potential challenge to 
their authority, a threat to public order, and an alternative to 
Socialist thought. Both Catholic and Protestant underground churches 
came under increasing pressure during the year. Authorities in some 
areas continued a concerted effort to crack down on the activities of 
unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches. In some areas, security 
authorities used threats, demolition of buildings, extortion of 
``fines,'' interrogation, detention (sometimes prolonged), and at times 
beatings and torture to harass unofficial Christian religious figures 
and followers. In April the Fujian Provincial Government convened a 
meeting of religious affairs workers in order to exhort them to 
``ensure stability in religious circles and lead religious circles in 
making new and greater contributions to socialist material and 
spiritual civilization.'' At the meeting, a provincial leader also 
called on all religious affairs workers to ``firmly establish a Marxist 
outlook on religion.'' Implementing regulations, provincial work 
reports, and other government and party documents continued to exhort 
officials to enforce vigorously government policy regarding 
unregistered churches. Since 1998 Guangdong Province has had highly 
restrictive religious regulations. In 1999 Zhejiang Province also 
promulgated religious affairs regulations that stipulated that 
``illegal'' property and income would be confiscated from those who: 
``1) preside over or organize religious activities at places other than 
those for religious activities or at places not approved by a religious 
affairs department; 2) do missionary work outside the premises of a 
place of religious activity; and 3) sponsor religious training 
activities without obtaining the approval of a religious affairs 
department at or above the county level.'' Regulations in Guangxi, 
Shanghai, and Chongqing also call for strict government oversight. 
Authorities particularly targeted unofficial religious groups in 
Beijing and the Provinces of Henan and Shandong, where there are 
rapidly growing numbers of unregistered Protestants, and in Hebei, a 
center of unregistered Catholics. However, during the year there were 
reports that small family churches, generally made up of family members 
and friends, which conduct activities similar to those of home Bible 
study groups, usually were tolerated by the authorities as long as they 
remained small and unobtrusive. Family churches reportedly encounter 
difficulties when their memberships become too large, when they arrange 
for the use of facilities for the specific purpose of conducting 
religious activities, or when they forge links with other unregistered 
groups.
    There were many religious detainees and prisoners. In some cases, 
public security officials have used prison or reformthrough-education 
sentences to enforce regulations. In Hebei, where perhaps half of the 
country's Catholics reside, friction between unofficial Catholics and 
local authorities continued. Hebei authorities have been known to force 
many underground priests and believers to make a choice of either 
joining the Patriotic Church or facing punishment such as fines, job 
loss, periodic detentions, and, in some cases, having their children 
barred from school. Some were forced into hiding. According to a Hong 
Kong human rights organization, on March 2, 15 members of the China 
Evangelistic Fellowship were arrested while holding a service in 
Nanwang City, Henan Province. Two of the group's leaders, Jiang 
Qinggang and Hao Huaiping, reportedly faced reeducation-through-labor 
sentences. The director of the Government's RAB had labeled the 
fellowship publicly as a ``cult'' at the end of 1999. There were 
reports in May that local authorities in Zhejiang Province had closed 
down seven Catholic churches because they failed to join the official 
Catholic Church. In May Father Jiang Shurang, an underground priest in 
Zhejiang Province, was sentenced to 6 years in prison for illegally 
printing Bibles and other religious material. Roman Catholic Bishop 
Zeng Jingmu, released from a labor camp in 1998, was reportedly 
rearrested in Jiangxi on September 14 during the visit of a high-
ranking foreign Cardinal; the Government denied those reports. The 
whereabouts of Roman Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin, whose followers report 
that he was arrested in 1997, remained unclear. Underground Catholic 
sources in Hebei claimed that he still was under detention, while the 
Government denied having taken ``any coercive measures'' against him. 
Reliable sources reported that Bishop An Shuxin, Bishop Zhang Weizhu, 
Father Cui Xing, and Father Wang Quanjun remained under detention in 
Hebei. Bishop Liu reportedly remained under house arrest in Zhejiang 
Province. According to a Freedom House report, in the last half of 
1999, four Catholic bishops reportedly were detained or arrested for 
refusing to join the official church or for conducting unauthorized 
services. The four were Bishop Jia Zhiguo, Bishop Xie Shiguang, Bishop 
Lin Xili, and Bishop Han Dingxiang. All of the bishops reportedly were 
arrested for refusing to join the official church or for conducting 
unauthorized services. On February 10 in Fujian Province, a large group 
of police arrested 80-year-old underground Catholic Bishop Yang Shudao. 
The Government has denied that the elderly bishop is being detained and 
has claimed that he is receiving medical treatment. According to 
several NGO's, a number of Catholic priests and lay leaders were beaten 
or otherwise abused during the year. Underground Catholic Bishop Joseph 
Fan Zhongliang of Shanghai remained under surveillance and often had 
his movements restricted.
    Some Protestant house church groups reported more frequent police 
raids of worship services and detentions than in previous years. 
According to the Jianghuai Morning Daily in Anhui Province, on April 9, 
police detained 47 members of the unregistered Full Scope Church, whose 
leader, Xu Yongze, was released from prison only in May, although his 
3-year sentence ended in March. Although he was released from a labor 
camp, it is unclear whether Xu remains subject to some restrictions. 
According to the newspaper, six church leaders were to face criminal 
charges for organizing an ``illegal sect,'' while eight others likely 
would receive ``administrative'' (usually meaning reeducation-through-
labor) sentences. The Government's 1997 White Paper on Religious 
Freedom stated that Xu had violated the law by promoting a cult, 
preaching that the Apocalypse was near, and asking worshipers to wail 
in public spaces for several consecutive days. Group members deny these 
charges. Xu's colleagues Qin Baocai and Mu Sheng are believed to 
continue to serve reeducationthrough-labor sentences. Pastor Li Dexian 
was detained in April for 15 days, during which time he was forced into 
a crouch for 3 days, unable to sleep or use toilet facilities, with his 
wrists and ankles manacled together. Li also has been detained on other 
occasions and reports that in some instances he was beaten. According 
to credible reports, on May 16, 2000, seven house churches were raided 
in Guangdong Province. According to a press release of Christian 
Solidarity International, more than 10 house church leaders were 
arrested in the raids. Several house churches also were closed by the 
authorities. In May seven evangelical Christians were arrested in Henan 
for violating the ``Three Designates'' policy that limits religious 
services to specific venues, requires leaders to preach only within 
specific areas, and fixes the number of persons permitted to preach. In 
early August, police detained 31 members of an underground Protestant 
church in Hubei's Guangshui City. In Henan a week later, 12 members of 
an underground Protestant church were arrested. On August 23, police 
arrested 130 members of a house church headquartered in Fangcheng City, 
Henan Province, after they held services with 3 foreign members of a 
Protestant fellowship organization. Authorities stated that the 
Fangcheng church was a ``cult'' that had been banned. On August 25, the 
three foreign church members were released and deported; they reported 
being beaten while in custody. According to NGO reports, 85 of those 
arrested from the Fangcheng church were charged on August 25 with 
crimes such as ``using an illegal cult to obstruct justice.''
    Authorities also conducted demolition campaigns against 
unregistered places of worship. Beginning in early November, according 
to local press reports, officials in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, and 
surrounding areas began a campaign to close or destroy, sometimes with 
explosives, hundreds of unregistered Protestant churches and Buddhist 
and Taoist temples. Wenzhou has a long Christian history and reportedly 
counts several hundred thousand Christians among its population. It has 
been estimated that approximately 450 churches and temples were 
destroyed during the weeks prior to December 25 in Wenzhou, and as many 
as 1,200 churches and temples were closed or destroyed in surrounding 
areas of Zhejiang Province during that time. Officials stated that the 
places of worship that were closed and destroyed were targeted because 
they were unregistered and therefore illegal; however, according to 
some observers, many of the places of worship had attempted to comply 
with regulations regarding registration, but their paperwork had never 
been finalized by the RAB. According to some reports, the authorities 
carried out the campaign due to concern that there were too many 
unregistered places of worship in the Wenzhou and Luoyang areas, and 
that too many Party members were joining such groups. Authorities 
reportedly used criteria such as registration status and the degree of 
government control (measured by the existence of a Party-approved 
management committee and the participation of clergy in political study 
sessions) as criteria for targeting places of worship. Although the 
campaign appeared to have been carried out at the initiative of local 
religious affairs officials, central government authorities did not 
criticize the action or take any measures to reprimand those 
responsible. Two persons who tried to stop a demolition were arrested 
and sentenced to 2 years of reform-through-education. According to 
press reports, in 1999 more than 20 unregistered Catholic churches were 
demolished, some with explosives, by the authorities in Changle and 
other localities in Fujian Province. The churches were destroyed on the 
grounds that they had been built without the required permit or had 
been built with the wrong type of permit (such as with a permit for a 
building other than a church). Most of the churches reportedly were 
built by local congregations with the aid of remittances from relatives 
working abroad.
    The increase in the number of Christians has resulted in a 
corresponding increase in the demand for Bibles. During 1999 the 
Government approved the printing of more than 3 million Bibles, and 
there currently are more than 22 million Bibles in print. One printing 
company that is a joint venture with an overseas Christian organization 
printed over 2.3 million Bibles during 1999, including Bibles in 
Braille and minority dialects, such as Korean, Jingbo, Lisu, Lahu, 
Miao, and Yao. Although Bibles can be purchased at some bookstores, 
they are not readily available and cannot be ordered directly from 
publishing houses by individuals. However, they are available for 
purchase at most officially recognized churches, and many house church 
members buy their Bibles from churches without incident. Nonetheless, 
some underground Christians hesitate to buy Bibles at official churches 
because such transactions sometimes involve receipts that identify the 
purchaser. Foreign experts confirm reports of chronic shortages of 
Bibles, mostly due to logistical problems in disseminating Bibles to 
rural areas; the situation has, however, improved in recent years due 
to improved distribution channels, including through house churches. 
Customs officials continue to monitor for the ``smuggling'' of Bibles 
and other religious materials into the country. There have been 
credible reports that the authorities sometimes confiscate Bibles in 
raids on house churches.
    In recent years, some local authorities, especially in northeastern 
China, have subjected worship services of alien residents to increased 
surveillance and restrictions. In other areas, authorities have 
displayed increasing tolerance of religious practice by foreigners. 
Weekly services of the foreign Jewish community in Beijing have been 
held uninterrupted since 1995, and High Holy Day observances have been 
allowed for more than 15 years. The Shanghai Jewish community was 
allowed to hold services in an historic Shanghai synagogue, which had 
been restored as a museum. Local authorities indicated that the 
community could use the synagogue in the future for special occasions 
on a case-by-case basis.
    Religious groups that preach beliefs outside the bounds of 
officially approved doctrine (such as the coming of the Apocalypse, or 
holy war) or that have charismatic leaders often are singled out for 
particularly severe harassment. Police continued their efforts to close 
down an underground evangelical group called the ``Shouters,'' an 
offshoot of a pre-1949 indigenous Protestant group, which authorities 
deem to be an antigovernment, counterrevolutionary ``cult.'' Since the 
early 1980's, authorities repeatedly have detained, fined, or 
imprisoned its members. Many groups, especially those in house 
churches, reportedly are viewed by officials as ``cults.'' Some 
observers have attributed the unorthodox beliefs of some of these 
groups to undertrained clergy. Others acknowledge that some individuals 
may be exploiting the reemergence of interest in religion for personal 
gain. In October 1999, as part of its anti-Falun Gong crackdown, the 
Government passed a law outlawing ``cults.'' According to reports, the 
crackdown on the Falun Gong led to a tightening of controls on all 
nonofficially sanctioned beliefs. Recent regulations require all qigong 
groups to register with the Government. Those that did not were 
declared illegal.
    Since mid-1999 the Government has waged a severe political, 
propaganda, and police campaign against the Falun Gong spiritual 
movement; the campaign intensified significantly during the year. Falun 
Gong (or Wheel of the Law, also known as Falun Dafa) blends aspects of 
Taoism, Buddhism, and the meditation techniques of qigong (a 
traditional martial art) with the teachings of Li Hongzhi, who left the 
country in 1998. The Government estimates that there may be as many as 
2.1 million adherents of Falun Gong; Falun Gong followers estimate that 
there are as many as 100 million adherents worldwide. Some experts 
estimate that the true number of Falun Gong adherents lies in the tens 
of millions. Despite the mystical nature of some of Li's teachings, 
Falun Gong does not consider itself a religion and has no clergy or 
formal places of worship. In July 1999, 3 months after 10,000 Falun 
Gong adherents had demonstrated peacefully in front of the Zhongnanhai 
leadership compound in Beijing, the Government officially declared 
Falun Gong illegal and began a nationwide crackdown. Around the 
country, tens of thousands of practitioners were rounded up and 
detained for several days--often in open stadiums--under poor and 
overcrowded conditions, with inadequate food, water, and sanitary 
facilities. Practitioners who refused to renounce their beliefs were 
expelled from schools or fired from jobs. The China Education Daily 
reported that ``political thought and morality'' assessments of 
applicants to take university exams were expanded to include questions 
to determine whether applicants were members of Falun Gong. Some 
detainees were government officials and Communist Party members. A few 
high-ranking practitioners were forced to disavow their ties to Falun 
Gong on national television. Government officials who were 
practitioners were required to undergo anti-Falun Gong study sessions 
and were prohibited from Falun Gong activities; some were expelled from 
the Party for refusing to recant their beliefs. The authorities waged 
an intense propaganda campaign against the group, seized and destroyed 
Falun Gong literature, and attempted to shut down Falun Gong Internet 
web sites. Also in July 1999, the Government issued a warrant for the 
arrest of Falun Gong leader Li Hongzhi, who was charged with holding 
demonstrations without appropriate permits and disturbing public order. 
The Government requested INTERPOL's assistance in apprehending Li, who 
resides abroad, but INTERPOL declined to assist, on the grounds that 
the offense was not a crime recognized under the INTERPOL charter, and 
that the request was political in nature. Late in the year, President 
Jiang Zemin announced that the campaign against the Falun Gong was one 
of the ``three major political struggles'' of 1999. The crackdown on 
``cults'' intensified in late 1999, with press reports stating that 
restrictions would be tightened on several ``cults'' and various 
Christian groups. In late October 1999, as part of the Government's 
anti-Falun Gong crackdown, the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress adopted a decision to ban ``cults,'' including Falun 
Gong, under Article 300 of the Criminal Law. Under the decision, cult 
members who ``disrupt public order'' or distribute publications can 
receive prison terms of 3 to 7 years. Cult leaders and recruiters can 
be sentenced to 7 years or more in prison.
    Although the vast majority of practitioners detained later were 
released, those identified by the Government as ``core leaders'' were 
singled out for particularly harsh treatment. On November 30, 1999, 
Vice Premier Li Lanqing stated that authorities detained over 35,000 
practitioners between July 22 and October 30 1999 (the Government later 
clarified Li's statement, noting that the figure represented the total 
number of confrontations of police with adherents and that many persons 
had multiple encounters with police). In August the Director of the 
Religious Affairs Bureau stated that 151 Falun Gong practitioners had 
been convicted of leaking state secrets, creating chaos, or other 
crimes. According to credible estimates, as many as 5,000 Falun Gong 
practitioners have been sentenced without trial to up to 3 years of 
reeducation through labor. Human rights organizations estimate that as 
many as 300 practitioners have been sentenced to prison terms of up to 
18 years for their involvement in Falun Gong. According to the Falun 
Gong, hundreds of its practitioners have been confined in mental 
hospitals.
    Police often used excessive force when detaining peaceful 
protesters, including some who were elderly or who were accompanied by 
small children. During the year, there were numerous credible reports 
of abuse of Falun Gong practitioners by the police and other security 
personnel, including police involvement in beatings, detention under 
extremely harsh conditions, and torture (including by electric shock 
and by having hands and feet shackled and linked with crossed steel 
chains) (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.). Various sources report that 
approximately 100 or more Falun Gong adherents died during the year 
while in police custody; many of their bodies reportedly bore signs of 
severe beatings and/or torture, or were cremated before relatives could 
examine them (see Section 1.c.). Gao Xianmin died in police custody on 
January 17, 2000. Credible reports indicate that Gao, who was detained 
with a group of fellow practitioners in Guangzhou on December 31, 1999, 
was tortured while in custody, including by having high-density salt 
water forced into his stomach. Police gave no explanation for his 
death. On February 17, 60-year-old Chen Zixiu was detained in Weihai, 
Shandong Province, as she attempted to travel to Beijing to join 
peaceful protests there. Over the next several days, her family 
received word from another detainee that Chen was being beaten. On 
February 21, local police informed the family that Chen had died. 
According to family members, her body was covered with bruises and her 
teeth and nose were broken. According to press reports, Zhou Zhichang, 
a practitioner imprisoned in Heilongjiang Province since September 
1999, died in custody in May 2000, after an 8-day hunger strike. 
Practitioners Li Zaiji and Wang Paisheng died in custody during the 
first 2 weeks of July, according to one NGO. One practitioner 
reportedly died after a feeding tube was mistakenly inserted into her 
lung rather than her stomach.
    Practitioners defied ongoing government efforts to prevent them 
from protesting in Beijing. Protests (by individuals or small groups of 
practitioners) at Tiananmen Square occurred almost daily. 
Demonstrations also continued around the country. Police quickly broke 
up demonstrations, often kicking and beating protestors, and detained 
them. Most protests were small and short-lived as expanded police units 
quickly detained anyone who admitted to being or appeared to be a 
practitioner. Hundreds of practitioners reportedly were arrested at 
Tiananmen Square in February during lunar New Year protests, forcing a 
brief closure of the Square. Large numbers were arrested while 
protesting on March 5 (opening of the National People's Congress), 
April 25 (the anniversary of the 1999 Zhongnanhai demonstration), and 
May 11 (reportedly Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi's birthday). Hundreds 
of Falun Gong practitioners were detained after peaceful protests in 
Tiananmen Square during the week of July 22, the anniversary of the 
Government's ban on the group. Despite a heavy security presence, on 
October 1, the anniversary of the founding of the PRC, hundreds, and 
perhaps more than 1,000, peacefully protesting practitioners were again 
arrested in Tiananmen Square, forcing a brief closure of the square. 
The press, in an unprecedented move, stated that the groups caused 
disturbances lasting 40 minutes. The Government later labeled Falun 
Gong a reactionary group attempting to subvert the State. On October 
26, another mass protest marking the anniversary of the passage of 
1999's Anti-cult Law was held at Tiananmen Square; more than 100 Falun 
Gong practitioners reportedly were detained. Many reportedly were 
beaten. Over the next few days, many more practitioners were arrested 
in Tiananmen Square. An estimated several hundred Falun Gong 
practitioners were also detained after protesting in Tiananmen Square 
over the 1999-2000 New Year holiday; many were beaten during their 
arrests.
    Authorities also briefly detained foreign practitioners (however, 
it remains unclear whether the authorities were aware that such persons 
were foreigners). For example, in February, a U.S. citizen practitioner 
was detained for 3 days. In November, another foreign citizen was 
sentenced to 3 years of reeducation through labor for Falun Gong 
activities. On November 23, Falun Gong practitioner and foreign 
resident Teng Chunyan was tried on charges of providing national 
security information to foreigners, reportedly for providing foreigners 
with information about the Government's campaign against Falun Gong. On 
December 12, she was sentenced to 3 years of reeducationthrough-labor. 
Several foreign reporters also were detained briefly on April 25, after 
having taken photographs of police detaining Falun Gong demonstrators 
on Tiananmen Square. Foreign tourists routinely had their film and 
videotape confiscated after recording (often inadvertently) Falun Gong 
detentions.
    According to credible reports, authorities have confined some 
practitioners to psychiatric hospitals. AI reported that, on January 
20, a Changguang Police Station spokesman confirmed that about 50 
``extremist'' Falun Gong practitioners had been placed in a psychiatric 
hospital near Beijing and cited reports from Falun Gong practitioners 
that the practitioner's families were asked for fees to cover living 
expenses in the hospital.
    According to the local press, in November several persons accused 
of printing and distributing Falun Gong literature were arrested in 
Chaoyan, Liaoning Province. According to Amnesty International, two 
sisters, Li Xiaobing and Li Xaiomei, who owned a bookstore were 
sentenced on January 28 to 7 and 6 years in prison, respectively. They 
reportedly had been arrested in July 1999, just prior to the ban on 
Falun Gong, were held incommunicado without charge for 3 months, and 
were tried in secret. Many others have been arrested and sentenced to 
prison terms or terms of reeducation through labor for providing 
information about the crackdown on Falun Gong or abuses against Falun 
Gong practitioners to others, including the foreign media (see Sections 
1.f. and 2.a.).
    There have been reports that Falun Gong practitioners are no longer 
able to obtain passports.
    During the year, the authorities also continued a general crackdown 
on other groups considered to be ``cults,'' often using the October 
1999 decision to ban cults under Article 300 of the Criminal Law. The 
Zhong Gong qigong group, which reportedly had a following rivaling that 
of Falun Gong, was banned under the anti-cult application of the 
Criminal Law, and its leader, Zhang Hongbao, was charged with rape, 
forgery, and illegal crossing of boundaries. Zhong Gong practitioners 
deny the charges. Zhong Gong, like other qigong groups, teaches that 
the body's vital forces, or qi, can be harnessed for healing purposes 
and spiritual growth through meditation and spiritual exercises. 
According to a news report, a local Zhong Gong leader in Zhejiang 
Province, Chen Jilong, was convicted in January of illegally practicing 
medicine and was sentenced to 2 years in prison. Two leaders of other 
qigong groups also reportedly were arrested, and the Government banned 
the practice of qigong exercises on public or government property. This 
has created an atmosphere of uncertainty for many qigong practitioners, 
and there are reports that some qigong practitioners now fear 
practicing or teaching openly. There were reports that 14 unofficial 
Christian groups and a Buddhist organization (known as Guanyin Famin) 
were branded by the Government as ``evil sects,'' as well. In August 
police in Jiangsu arrested Shen Chang, the leader of a qigong group, 
and charged him with organizing gatherings aimed at disturbing social 
order and tax evasion.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts freedom of 
movement within the country and restricts the freedom to change one's 
workplace or residence. The effectiveness of the Government's national 
household registration/identification card system, used to control and 
restrict the location of an individual's residence, remained in place 
but continued to erode, and the ability of most citizens to move around 
the country to live and work continued to improve. The Government 
places other restrictions on freedom of movement, and it toughened 
these restrictions during the year, especially before politically 
sensitive anniversaries and to forestall Falun Gong demonstrations. The 
``floating population'' of economic migrants leaving their home areas 
to seek work elsewhere in the country is estimated to be between 80 and 
130 million (there are an estimated 3 million or more ``floaters'' in 
Shanghai alone). This group comprises not only migrant workers, but 
also includes a growing number of middle-class professionals attracted 
to large cities by hopes of better paying jobs in their fields. This 
itinerant population lacks official residence status, which is required 
for full access to social services and education. Unless such persons 
obtain resident status, they must pay a premium for these services. 
However, some cities, such as Beijing, are beginning to offer some 
social services free of charge. In August 1998, the Public Security 
Ministry issued revised regulations that allow persons from the 
countryside to apply for permanent residence in a city if: 1) they have 
investments or property in a city; 2) they are elderly and have 
children who live in a city; or 3) their spouses live in a city. 
Members of the ``floating'' population are subject to being detained, 
fined, and sent to custody and repatriation centers by the authorities, 
where they may be required to work off their fines. Many are 
``repatriated,'' or sent back to the areas they came from by the 
authorities (see Section 1.d.).
    Prior to sensitive anniversaries, authorities in urban areas 
rounded up and detained ``undesirables,'' including the homeless, the 
unemployed, migrant workers, those without proper residence or work 
permits, petty criminals, prostitutes, and the mentally ill or 
disabled. These persons often were detained or expelled under custody 
and repatriation regulations or similar administrative regulations (see 
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). There were reports of spot checks of 
identification documents, housing raids, and harassment of migrants at 
train and bus stations in Beijing during the year, particularly prior 
to October 1.
    Dissidents reported that the authorities restricted their freedom 
of movement during politically sensitive periods or while foreign 
dignitaries visited China (see Section 1.f.).
    As part of the crackdown on Falun Gong, authorities tried to 
prevent practitioners from traveling to Beijing, particularly in July 
and in October (see Section 2.c.).
    Under the ``staying at prison employment'' system applicable to 
recidivists incarcerated in reeducation-through-labor camps, 
authorities have denied certain inmates permission to return to their 
homes. Those inmates sentenced to a total of more than 5 years in 
reeducation-throughlabor camps on separate occasions also may lose 
their legal right to return home. For those assigned to camps far from 
their residences, this practice constitutes a form of internal exile. 
The number of prisoners subject to this restriction is unknown. 
Authorities reportedly have forced others to accept jobs in state 
enterprises where they can be monitored more closely after their 
release from prison or detention. Other released or paroled prisoners 
returned home but were not permitted freedom of movement. The 
authorities released Bao Tong, a former Zhao Ziyang aide in 1997, but 
continue to monitor his activities closely with constant surveillance, 
at times preventing him from meeting with others (see Sections 1.f. and 
2.a.). One Tianamen activist is not permitted to return to his home 
province even though he completed a 1-year sentence and was released in 
the early 1990's. Some individuals have also had their freedom of 
movement curtailed when their public appearance might be deemed 
politically sensitive. Former senior leader Zhao Ziyang remained under 
house arrest, and security around him was tightened routinely during 
sensitive periods, such as the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre 
and during the visits of important foreign leaders. Zhao was allowed to 
visit Sichuan briefly in June and has been allowed about one trip 
outside of Beijing per year.
    There is evidence that official poverty alleviation programs and 
major state projects, such as the Three Gorges Dam and environmental/
reforestation projects, include forced relocation of persons.
    The Government permits legal emigration and foreign travel for most 
citizens. Passports are increasingly easy to get. The Government 
continued to use political attitudes as criteria for selecting persons 
for Governmentsponsored study abroad. The Government did not control 
privately sponsored students, who constitute the majority of citizens 
studying abroad; however, there were some reports that academics faced 
some travel restrictions around the year's sensitive anniversaries, 
especially June 4 (see Section 2.a.). Business travelers who wish to go 
abroad can obtain passports relatively easily. Permission for couples 
to travel abroad sometimes was conditioned on agreement to delay 
childbirth. Members of the underground Catholic Church, especially 
clergy wishing to further their studies abroad, found it difficult to 
obtain passports and other necessary travel documents (see Section 
2.c.). The Government continued efforts to attract back to the country 
persons who had studied overseas. Official media have stated in the 
past that persons who have joined foreign organizations hostile to 
China should quit them before returning home and refrain while abroad 
from activities that violate the country's laws. Some Falun Gong 
members reportedly had difficulty in obtaining passports during the 
year, but this does not appear to be a national policy.
    There also were instances when the authorities refused visas or 
entry on apparent political grounds. Some foreign academics with 
contacts with the dissident community also have been refused entry 
visas repeatedly. International observers and human rights 
organizations reported that they could substantiate claims that border 
control stations keep background records of certain individuals who are 
to be denied entry. Authorities have denied these reports.
    The Government does not provide first asylum. However, since the 
late 1980's, the Government has adopted a de facto policy of tolerance 
toward the small number of persons--fewer than 100 annually--from other 
nations who have registered with the Beijing office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as asylum seekers. The Government has 
permitted these persons to remain while the UNHCR makes determinations 
as to their status and--if the UNHCR determines that they are bona fide 
refugees--while they await resettlement in other countries. As yet 
there are no laws or regulations that authorize the authorities to 
grant refugee status, but the Government reportedly continued to draft 
working rules on granting such status. The Government cooperates with 
the UNHCR when dealing with the resettlement of ethnic Han Chinese or 
ethnic minorities from Vietnam and Laos also resident in the country; 
the Government is less cooperative when dealing with some other 
refugees.
    The Government has worked with Laos and Cambodia to facilitate the 
return of resettled individuals who have decided to return to their 
home countries. The Government denies having tightened its policy on 
accepting Vietnamese asylum seekers. Due to the stable situation in 
Vietnam with regard to ethnic Chinese and the increasingly porous 
border between the two countries, very few Vietnamese have sought 
resettlement in China in recent years.
    In January seven persons granted refugee status by the UNHCR in 
Russia were deported to China, where authorities then forcibly returned 
them to the DPRK. There have been no reported refoulements by the 
Chinese Government since the January incident. In April, according to 
press reports, a group of approximately 60 North Koreans were forcibly 
repatriated after they protested conditions in a Tumen city border 
guard holding facility; the protests reportedly became violent. 
According to various observers, the number of migrants forcibly 
returned to North Korea during the year was far higher than in 1999, 
and unconfirmed reports said that some returnees faced persecution, 
including fines, beatings, incarceration, and perhaps even execution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their Government 
peacefully and cannot freely choose or change the laws and officials 
that govern them. Citizens vote directly for local nongovernmental 
village committees and among party-reviewed candidates for delegate 
positions in town and township and county-level peoples' congresses. 
However, people's congress delegates at the provincial level are 
selected by county-level people's congresses, and in turn provincial-
level people's congresses select delegates to the National People's 
Congress. Although the CCP vets all candidates at least to some degree, 
many county and provincial elections are competitive, with more 
candidates running than there are seats available.
    According to the Constitution, the National People's Congress is 
the highest organ of state power. Formally, it elects the President and 
Vice President, selects the Premier and vice premiers, and elects the 
Chairman of the State Central Military Commission. In practice the NPC 
Standing Committee oversees these elections and determines the agenda 
and procedure for the NPC under the direct authority of the Politburo 
Standing Committee. The NPC does not have the power to set policy or to 
remove Government or party leaders; however, in some instances its 
actions have affected economic policy.
    In general the election and agenda of people's congresses at all 
levels remain under the firm control of the Communist Party, the 
paramount source of political authority. A number of small 
``democratic'' parties that date from before the Communist takeover in 
1949 play a minor consultative role and must pledge their allegiance to 
the Communist Party. The CCP retains a tight rein on political 
decisionmaking and forbids the creation of new political parties. The 
Government continued efforts to suppress the China Democracy Party, an 
organization that had attracted hundreds, perhaps thousands, of members 
nationwide since its founding in 1998. Public security authorities have 
arrested nearly all of its most important leaders. Scores of CDP 
members were detained in cities throughout the country in the period 
prior to the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre in 1999. The 
CDP's three best known leaders--Wang Youcai, Xu Wenli, and Qin Yongmin-
were sentenced in December 1998 to prison terms of 13, 12, and 11 years 
respectively. Since December 1998, at least 25 core leaders of the CDP 
have been sentenced to long prison terms on subversion charges. In 
February Xu Wenli's assistant, Liu Shizun, was sentenced to 6 years for 
subversion. Also in February, Shanghai member of the CDP, Dai Xuezhong, 
was sentenced to 3 years in jail. In July after a 90-minute trial, Chen 
Zhonghe, founder of the Hubei branch of the CDP, and Xiao Shichang were 
sentenced to 7 years and 5+ years in prison respectively on subversion 
charges. In June Li Guotao was arrested in Shanghai; on June 28 he was 
sentenced to 3 years' reeducation through labor for demanding the 
release of CDP members. Shanghai dissidents Li Guotao, Cai Guihua, Yao 
Zhenxiang, Fu Shenping, and Dai Xuewu were taken into custody on many 
occasions throughout the year (see Section 1.d.). Prior to the June 4 
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Li Guotao was rearrested 
in Shanghai and charged with spreading reactionary publications, 
instigating disturbances, and disturbing the social order (apparently 
in connection with a letter he and others sent to the Mayor of 
Shanghai, protesting the arrest of dissident Dai Xuewu and requesting 
his release); on June 28 he was sentenced to 3 years' reeducation 
through labor for demanding the release of CDP members. Dai Xuewu, the 
brother of imprisoned dissident Dai Xuezhong, also was arrested in 
Shanghai prior to the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre and charged with the theft of a cell phone; in August he was 
sentenced without a trial to 3 years of reeducation through labor.
    Despite CCP control of the Government, limited democratic 
decisionmaking continued to grow as the local village committee 
elections program expanded. Under the 1987 Organic Law of the Village 
Committees, all of the country's approximately 1 million villages are 
expected to hold competitive, direct elections for subgovernment level 
local village committees. The NPC Standing Committee in November 1998 
passed a revised version of the law, which called for enhancements in 
the electoral process, including substantial improvements in the 
nominating process and the required use of voting booths. It also 
provided for improved transparency in village committee administration 
and appears to have boosted the authority of the village committees 
over communally owned properties. The revised law also explicitly 
transferred the power to nominate candidates to the villagers 
themselves, as opposed to village groups or party branches.
    Both the Government and foreign observers estimate that more than 
90 percent of villages have participated in elections for village 
committee members. However, all provinces and provincial level cities 
and regions have now held at least one village-level election. 
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the majority of provinces 
have carried out at least three or four rounds of village elections. 
Foreign observers who have monitored local village committee elections, 
including the Carter Center and the International Republican Institute, 
have judged the elections they observed, on the whole, to have been 
fair. However, many villages have yet to hold truly competitive 
elections. The Government estimates that one-third of all elections 
have serious procedural flaws; some reballoting occurs when 
irregularities are significant. Approximately another third are judged 
to have satisfied central Government guidance and the law, which 
requires use of secret ballots to select candidates. Successful village 
committee elections have included the use of secret ballots to select 
candidates, campaigns by multiple candidates, platforms, and the use of 
secret ballots in the election itself. Some regions have experimented 
with a nominating process that gives this power completely to 
villagers, as opposed to village groups or party branches.
    Candidates favored by local authorities have been defeated in some 
elections, although in general the party dominates the local electoral 
process, and roughly 60 percent of the members elected to the village 
committees are Communist Party members. In many villages, villagers are 
given ballots with a space for write-in votes; in at least one case, a 
write-in candidate won. The final ballot is the culmination of an 
election process that includes government screening of candidates and 
an indirect vote that eliminates some candidates. Many observers 
caution that the village election system is not necessarily a precursor 
for democracy at higher levels of Government, and village elections--as 
currently practiced--do not threaten to undermine the implementation of 
unpopular central policies or to endanger the leading role of the 
Communist Party. The elected village committees are not part of the 
formal government structure and have no formal constitutional role. The 
powers of elected village committees vary from region to region. Most 
committees have the authority to mediate disputes between villagers, 
improve public order, and authorize small expenditures. The committees 
also carry out political work by serving as a channel of communication 
between villagers and the Government. The village committees have no 
power to tax, set fines or punishments independently, or hire or fire 
village enterprise managers.
    The 1998 revised Village Election Law authorized the establishment 
of ``villager's representative assemblies'' to oversee the performance 
of village committees. Such assemblies already existed for years in 
some provinces; in 1997, for example, an assembly in Zhaoxin county, 
Hebei Province, reportedly removed 54 allegedly corrupt or incompetent 
village committee members and vetoed 72 ``unreasonable'' development 
projects. Township authorities in several provinces have held 
experimental elections to select local executive officials. Citizens of 
Sichuan's Buyun township in December 1998 held the first such vote. 
Despite central government expressions of concern that this election 
violated constitutional provisions requiring that the local people's 
congresses elect executive officials, the central Government ultimately 
confirmed the vote. Another experimental township election during 1999, 
the ``two ballot'' vote in Guangdong Province's Dapeng township, which 
was explicitly authorized by the National People's Congress, allowed 
groups of 100 or more citizens to nominate candidates. A township-wide 
conference of local leaders from various institutes then voted to 
select one of those candidates. The local people's congress confirmed 
the decision in a pro forma vote, thereby satisfying constitutional 
requirements.
    The Government places no restrictions on the participation of women 
or minority groups in the political process; however, they are 
underrepresented in government and politics. Women freely exercise 
their right to vote in village committee elections, but only a small 
fraction of elected members are women. The Government and Party 
organizations include approximately 12 million female officials out of 
61 million Party members. Women constitute 21.83 percent of the 
National People's Congress. The 15th Party Congress elected 22 women to 
serve as members or alternates on the 193-person Central Committee, an 
increase over the total of the previous committee. However, women still 
hold few positions of significant influence at the highest rungs of the 
Party or government structure. One alternate member of the 22-member 
Politburo is a woman, and women hold 2 of 29 ministerial-level 
positions.
    Minorities constitute 14 percent of the National People's Congress, 
although they make up approximately 9 percent of the population. All of 
the country's 56 nationalities are represented in the NPC membership. 
The 15th Party Congress elected 38 members of ethnic minorities to 
serve as members or alternates on the Central Committee, an increase 
over the total of the previous committee. However, minorities hold few 
senior Party or government positions of significant influence.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not permit independent domestic nongovernmental 
organizations to monitor publicly human rights conditions, and there 
are no independent domestic NGO's that comment on human rights 
conditions. It is difficult to establish an NGO, and the Government 
tends to be suspicious of independent organizations; most existing 
NGO's are quasi-governmental in nature and are closely controlled by 
government agencies (see Section 2.b.). However, an informal network of 
dissidents in cities around the country has become a credible source of 
information about government actions taken against activists. The 
information is disseminated to the outside world through organizations 
such as the Hong Kongbased Information Center for Human Rights and 
Democracy and the New Yorkbased Human Rights in China. The press 
regularly prints articles about officials who exceed their authority 
and infringe on citizens' rights. However, the Government remains 
reluctant to accept criticism of its human rights record by other 
nations or international organizations and criticizes reports by 
international human rights monitoring groups, maintaining that such 
reports are inaccurate and interfere with the country's internal 
affairs. The Government still maintains that there are legitimate, 
differing approaches to human rights based on each country's particular 
history, culture, social situation, and level of economic development. 
In 1993 the Government established the China Society for Human Rights, 
a ``nongovernmental'' organization whose mandate is not to monitor 
human rights conditions, but to defend the Government's views and human 
rights record.
    The Government has active human rights dialogs with a large number 
of countries, including Great Britain, France, Australia, Canada, 
Norway, Sweden, Brazil, and Japan, as well as the European Union (EU). 
However, these dialogs have not produced any fundamental improvements 
in the Government's human rights practices. In November the United 
States and China agreed in principle to resume the bilateral human 
rights dialog that was suspended by China in 1999. By year's end the 
dialog had not been scheduled yet. In recent years, the Government has 
expanded greatly the number and frequency of judicial and other types 
of legal exchanges with foreign countries.
    In May the U.N. Committee Against Torture issued a report 
expressing concern about continuing allegations of serious incidents of 
torture, especially involving Tibetans and other national minorities. 
It recommended that the country incorporate a definition of torture 
into its domestic law in full compliance with international standards, 
abolish all forms of administrative detention (including reeducation 
through labor), promptly investigate all allegations of torture and 
provide training courses on international human rights standards for 
police, among other things (see Section 1.c.). Government officials 
that appeared before the Committee stated that the country has done a 
great deal in recent years to address torture by officials but noted 
that problems remain in supervising the judicial system. On November 
20, the Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR) that was designed to 
help the country comply with the terms of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, which the Government has signed but not 
ratified. The MOU outlined the types of programs to further human 
rights that are to be implemented by the Government and the UNHCHR. 
Such programs are to include human rights education for judges, 
prosecutors, and police; other human rights education programs; the 
publication of reports; and fellowships for experts to study abroad. 
However, no agreement has yet been reached concerning a visit to the 
country by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, which has been under 
discussion since 1999.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    There are laws designed to protect women, children, the disabled, 
and minorities. However, in practice societal discrimination based on 
ethnicity, gender, and disability persists. The concept of a largely 
homogeneous Chinese society pervades the thinking of the Han majority.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Violence against women 
can be grounds for prosecution under the law, but there is no national 
law specifically targeting domestic violence, although proposed 
amendments to the 1980 Marriage Law are aimed in part at providing 
protection against spousal abuse. In recognition of the seriousness of 
spousal abuse, 13 provinces and provincial-level cities have passed 
legislation to address the problem. Sociologists note that there has 
been no detailed research on the extent of physical violence against 
women. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the reporting of 
domestic abuse is on the rise, particularly in urban areas, because 
greater attention has been focused on the problem. A July survey report 
by the All-China Women's Federation found that violence occurs in 30 
percent of families, with 80 percent of cases involving husbands 
abusing their wives. The survey implies that one in four married women 
suffers abuse. Actual figures may be higher because spousal abuse still 
goes largely unreported. According to experts, the percentage of 
households in which domestic abuse has occurred is higher in rural 
areas than in urban centers. The July survey found that domestic 
violence occurs at all socioeconomic levels. According to some experts, 
many women do not report domestic violence to the police because, even 
when appropriate legislation exists, local law enforcement authorities 
frequently choose not to interfere in what they regard as a family 
matter. Nonetheless in two recent cases in Liaoning Province, men were 
successfully prosecuted for severe cases of domestic violence. Despite 
an increasing awareness of the problem of domestic violence, there are 
no shelters for victims of domestic violence. Rape is illegal.
    Female infanticide, sex selective abortions, the abandonment of 
baby girls, and the neglect of baby girls remain problems due to the 
traditional preference for sons, and the family planning policy, which 
strictly limits urban couples to one child and rural couples to two. 
Regulations forbid the termination of pregnancies based on the sex of 
the fetus, but many families, especially in rural areas, have used 
ultrasound to identify female fetuses and terminate pregnancies. The 
use of ultrasound for this purpose is prohibited specifically by the 
Maternal and Child Health Care Law, which came into effect in 1995 and 
mandates punishment of medical practitioners who violate the provision. 
However, according to the SFPC, only a handful of doctors have been 
charged under this law. According to the latest available figures, 
compiled in 1994, the number of children abandoned each year is 
approximately 1.7 million, despite the fact that, under the law, child 
abandonment is punishable by a fine and a 5-year prison term. The vast 
majority of abandoned children eventually admitted to orphanages are 
female, although some are males who are either disabled or in poor 
health. Children put up for foreign adoption are almost exclusively 
girls. The neglect of baby girls that results in lower female survival 
rates are also factors. Female babies also suffer from a higher 
mortality rate than male babies, contrary to the worldwide trend. One 
study found the differential mortality rates to be highest in areas 
where women have a lower social status, where economic and medical 
conditions are poor, and where family planning regulations are strictly 
enforced (although the correlation for this factor was weak). 
Government statistics put the national ratio of male to female births 
at 114 to 100; the World Health Organization estimates the ratio to be 
117 to 100. The statistical norm is 106 male births to 100 female 
births. However, in July the Liaoshen Evening News reported that in a 
township of Liaoyang county, the male to female sex ratio was 306/100 
for second children born between 1992 and 1999. After operating for 7 
years, an illegal sex determination clinic was exposed when an outraged 
citizen called the Liaoyang City mayor's hot line. According to 
demographers in the country, currently there may be as many as 100 
million more men than women. The staterun media are paying increasing 
attention to unbalanced birth ratios, and the societal problems, such 
as trafficking in women, which they cause (see Section 6.f.). In the 
cities, the traditional preference for sons is changing; in the rural 
areas that preference continues.
    The authorities have enacted laws and conducted educational 
campaigns in an effort to eradicate the traditional preference for 
sons; however, this preference remains strong in rural China. A number 
of provinces have sought to reduce the perceived higher value of boys 
in providing old-age support for their parents by establishing or 
improving pensions and retirement homes.
    Central government policy formally prohibits the use of force to 
compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization; however, the 
intense pressure to meet family planning targets set by the Government 
has resulted in documented instances in which family planning officials 
have used coercion against women, including forced abortion and 
sterilization, to meet government goals.
    According to some estimates by experts, there are 4 to 10 million 
commercial sex workers in the country. The increased commercialization 
of sex and related trafficking in women has trapped thousands of women 
in a cycle of crime and exploitation, and left them vulnerable to 
disease and abuse. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, one in 
five massage parlors in the country is involved in prostitution, with 
the percentage higher in cities. Unsafe working conditions are rampant 
among the saunas, massage parlors, clubs, and hostess bars that have 
sprung up in large cities. According to one estimate, there are 70,000 
prostitutes in Beijing alone; other estimates have placed the number as 
high as 200,000 or more. Research indicates that up to 80 percent of 
prostitutes in some areas have hepatitis. In light of this and, in 
particular, of the growing threat of AIDS among sex workers, the U.N. 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
Committee in December 1998 recommended that due attention be paid to 
health services for female prostitutes. Although the central Government 
and various provincial and local governments have attempted to crack 
down on the sex trade, there have been numerous credible reports in the 
media of complicity in prostitution by local officials. Thus far 
actions to crack down on this lucrative business, which involves 
organized crime groups and business persons as well as the police and 
the military, have been largely ineffective.
    A high female suicide rate is a serious problem. According to the 
World Bank, Harvard University, and the World Health Organization, some 
56 percent of the world's female suicides occur in China (about 500 per 
day). The World Bank estimated the suicide rate in the country to be 
three times the global average; among women, it was estimated to be 
nearly five times the global average. Research indicates that the low 
status of women, and social and economic pressures due to the rapid 
shift to a market economy are among the leading causes.
    There were credible reports of trafficking in persons, and the 
kidnaping of women for sale into prostitution or marriage is a serious 
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    There is no statute that outlaws sexual harassment in the 
workplace, although there has been some discussion by legislators about 
the need for such legislation. The problem remains unaddressed in the 
legal system and often in society. There have been reports that due to 
the lack of legal protections and to women's increasing economic 
vulnerability, many victims of sexual harassment do not report it out 
of fear of losing their jobs. However, experts state that more women 
are raising their concerns about sexual harassment because of greater 
awareness of the problem.
    The Government has made gender equality a policy objective since 
1949. The Constitution states that ``women enjoy equal rights with men 
in all spheres of life.'' The 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's 
Rights and Interests provides for equality in ownership of property, 
inheritance rights, and access to education. Women's economic and 
political influence has increased. Nonetheless female activists 
increasingly are concerned that the progress that has been made by 
women over the past 50 years is being eroded and that women's status in 
society regressed during the 1990's. They assert that the Government 
appears to have made the pursuit of gender equality a secondary 
priority as it focuses on economic reform and political stability. 
Social and familial pressure also has grown for women to resume their 
traditional roles as wives and mothers. A recent study of how women are 
portrayed in the media revealed that images of a woman's worth 
increasingly are linked to her ability to attract a wealthy husband and 
be a good mother.
    The 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests was 
designed to assist in curbing gender-based discrimination. However, 
women continued to report that discrimination, sexual harassment, 
unfair dismissal, demotion, and wage discrepancies were significant 
problems. Efforts have been made by social organizations as well as the 
Government to educate women about their legal rights, and there is 
anecdotal evidence that women increasingly are using laws to protect 
their rights. For example, at Fudan University in Shanghai, the Women's 
Study Center with the support of Shanghai's labor union has established 
a hot line to inform workers, mainly women, of their legal rights. 
Nevertheless, women frequently encounter serious obstacles in getting 
laws enforced. According to legal experts, it is very hard to litigate 
a sex discrimination suit because the vague legal definition makes it 
difficult to quantify damages. As a result, very few cases are brought 
to court. Some observers also have noted that the agencies tasked with 
protecting women's rights tend to focus on maternity-related benefits 
and wrongful termination during maternity leave rather than sex 
discrimination or sexual harassment. The structure of the social system 
also prevents women from having a full range of options. Women who seek 
a divorce face the prospect of losing their housing since government 
work units allot housing to men when couples marry.
    Women have borne the brunt of the economic reform of stateowned 
enterprises. As the Government's plan to revamp state-owned enterprises 
is carried out, millions of workers have been laid off. Of those 
millions, a disproportionate percentage are women, many of whom do not 
have the skills or opportunities to find new jobs. A December 1998 
Asian Development Bank report noted that almost 70 percent of the 23 
million persons who could lose their jobs as a result of state-owned 
enterprise reform were women, even though they only constituted 36.4 
percent of the work force. A 1998 All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) report estimated that 80 percent of those laid off from 
stateowned enterprises in Heilongjiang Province were women. Women 
between the ages of 35 and 50 were the most affected, and the least 
likely to be retrained. In addition female employees were more likely 
to be required to take pay cuts when a plant or company was in 
financial trouble. There have been reports that many women have been 
forced or persuaded into early retirement as well. Discriminatory 
hiring practices appear to be on the rise as unemployment rises. 
Increasingly companies discriminate by both sex and age, although such 
practices violate labor laws.
    Many employers prefer to hire men to avoid the expense of maternity 
leave and childcare and some even lower the effective retirement age 
for female workers to 40 years of age (the official retirement age for 
men is 60 years and for women 55 years). Lower retirement ages have the 
effect of reducing pensions, which generally are based on years worked.
    The law promises equal pay for equal work. According to a 1997 
World Bank report, women's salaries, on average, were 80 to 90 percent 
of the salaries of their male counterparts. However, a recent 
Government survey found that women were paid only 70 to 80 percent of 
what men received for the same work. Most women employed in industry 
work in lower skilled and lower paid jobs.
    According to official figures, in 1995 there were 145 million 
illiterate persons above the age of 15. Women made up approximately 70 
percent of this total. A 1998 Asian Development Bank report estimated 
that 25 percent of all women are semi-literate or illiterate, compared 
with 10 percent of men. The Government's ``Program for the Development 
of Chinese Women (1995-2000)'' set as one of its goals the elimination 
of illiteracy among young and middle-aged women by the end of the 
century. The main priority was to increase the literacy of rural women, 
80 percent of whom are wholly or partially illiterate. However, some 
women's advocates were skeptical that the Government's goal could be 
attained given the lack of resources.
    While the gap in the education levels of men and women is 
narrowing, men continue to constitute the majority of the relatively 
small percentage of the population that receives a university-level 
education. According to figures released by the All-China Women's 
Federation, at the end of 1997 women made up 36 percent of all 
university students, and 30 percent of all graduate students. However, 
educators in the large cities have reported that there is a trend 
toward greater gender balance in universities. Some academics have 
reported that in some departments women are beginning to outnumber 
men--even in some graduate schools. However, women with advanced 
degrees report an increase in discrimination in the hiring process as 
the job distribution system has opened up and become more competitive 
and market driven.
    Children.--The Constitution provides for 9 years of compulsory 
education for children (see Tibet addendum); however, in economically 
disadvantaged rural areas many children do not attend school for the 
required period, if at all. Public schools are not allowed to charge 
tuition, but, faced with revenue shortfalls since the central 
Government largely stopped subsidizing primary education in the early 
1990's, many schools have begun to charge mandatory fees. Such fees 
make it difficult for poorer families to send their children to school 
or send them to school on a regular basis. Some charity-financed 
schools have opened in recent years in rural areas, but not enough to 
meet the demand. Children of migrant workers in urban areas also often 
do not attend school, although they may be allowed to do so if they pay 
required school fees (which their parents generally cannot afford, and 
which are higher than for resident children). Some unlicensed schools 
that cater to migrant children and have lower school fees reportedly 
have opened in cities in recent years. However, the quality of these 
schools is uneven. Local municipalities do not provide them with 
supplies or financial support. Because the schools are not licensed, 
their graduates may not be admitted to high school. Many of these 
schools reportedly do not offer education beyond grade six, also making 
it difficult for migrant children to obtain further education. Migrant 
schools are in constant danger of being closed by the authorities. The 
government campaign for universal primary school enrollment by 2000 
(which was not met by year's end) has helped to increase enrollment in 
some areas; however, it also reportedly has led to school officials 
inflating the number of children actually enrolled.
    An extensive health care delivery system has led to improved child 
health and a sharp decline in infant mortality rates. According to 1997 
official figures, the infant mortality rate was 33 per 1,000 in 1996. 
According to the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), in 1995 the mortality 
rate for children under 5 years of age was 47 per 1,000 live births.
    The 1992 Law on the Protection of Juveniles forbids infanticide, as 
well as abandonment or mistreatment of children. The law also prohibits 
discrimination against disabled minors, emphasizes the importance of 
safety and morality, and codifies a variety of judicial protections for 
juvenile offenders. The physical abuse of children can be grounds for 
criminal prosecution.
    There were credible reports of female infanticide. The use of 
ultrasound tests to determine gender also results in decisions to 
terminate pregnancies of female fetuses, but no reliable statistics are 
available on the extent of the problem. One 1997 newspaper article 
quoted a doctor as saying that as many as 97.5 percent of pregnancies 
terminated in his hospital were of female fetuses. A 1997 World Health 
Organization paper reported that the national ratio of male to female 
births in 1994 was 117 to 100 (the worldwide statistical norm is 106 to 
100). However, in July the Liaoshen Evening News reported that in a 
township of Liaoyang County, the male to female sex ratio was 306/100 
for second children born between 1992 and 1999. Part of the statistical 
gap may be attributable to female infanticide, sex-selective 
termination of pregnancies, and abandonment or neglect of girls. The 
underreporting of female births by couples trying to evade family 
planning laws to try to have a son is another significant factor (see 
Section 1.f.).
    According to the latest available figures, compiled in 1994, the 
number of children abandoned each year is approximately 1.7 million, 
despite the fact that, under the law, child abandonment is punishable 
by a fine and a 5-year prison term. The vast majority of abandoned 
children eventually admitted to orphanages are female, although some 
are males who are either disabled or in poor health. Children put up 
for foreign adoption are almost exclusively girls. The treatment of 
children at these institutions varies from adequate to deplorable. 
There have been reports of children at some orphanages being restrained 
for long periods of time and denied basic care and food. Accurate 
determination of infant mortality rates in orphanages is difficult, but 
rates appear to be high at many, especially among new arrivals. 
However, conditions in some other orphanages appear to be adequate, if 
Spartan. Medical professionals frequently advise parents of disabled 
children to put the children into orphanages.
    According to several sources, orphanage workers in some facilities 
reserve basic medical care and even nutrition for children who are 
deemed to have the best chances for survival. Some sources report that 
children whose prospects of survival are determined to be poor are 
placed in rooms separate from other children and subjected to extreme 
neglect. Claims that government policies, as opposed to lack of 
resources, were to blame for the lack of care of children placed in 
orphanages could not be verified. However, Human Rights Watch reported 
in 1996 that many institutions, including those with the highest death 
rates, have budgets that provide for adequate wages, bonuses, and other 
personnel-related costs, but that budgets for children's food, 
clothing, and other necessities are low throughout the country. There 
was a report in 1998 that, at least in one orphanage, a new conference 
room was built while the facilities and care for orphans under the age 
of 2 remained abysmal. The mortality rate for children under the age of 
2 at this institution reportedly approached 100 percent, even for those 
infants who entered in fair health. Bureaucratic indifference and 
corruption on the part of orphanage administrators appear to be 
significant factors in such cases. Since the mid-1990's, foreigners 
were first banned and then subjected to far more restrictions in 
visiting orphanages than previously.
    In recent years, some privately run orphanages (not funded by the 
State) have started to operate, in which conditions may be generally 
better for children. In areas where such orphanages operate, some 
state-run orphanages have exhibited a willingness to learn from them 
and to adopt some of their more modern practices.
    The Government denies that children in orphanages are mistreated or 
refused medical care but acknowledges that the system often is unable 
to provide adequately for some children, especially those who are 
admitted with serious medical problems. In an effort to address this 
problem, in November 1998 the NPC adopted a revised adoption law making 
it easier for couples to adopt. The new law dropped a restriction that 
parents who adopt a child must be childless. It also allows for 
multiple adoptions and lowers the age at which couples are eligible to 
adopt. The Civil Affairs Ministry announced in 1997 that the 
Government's top social welfare priority for that year would be to 
improve conditions in orphanages, and there have been credible reports 
of new construction, renovation, and improved care in some areas. Over 
$30 million (248.4 million RMB) reportedly was allocated for this 
program. A Government white paper on women and children issued in 1997 
stated that the central Government had spent $25.7 million (212.8 
million RMB) between 1990 and 1994 to improve ``children's welfare 
institutions,'' the official term for orphanages. During the same 
period, local Governments apparently allocated almost $18 million (149 
million RMB) to these institutions.
    Children reportedly are detained administratively in custody and 
repatriation centers, either for minor crimes that they have committed 
or because they are homeless. Such children routinely are detained with 
adults and may be required to work (see Sections 1.d, 1.e., and 6.c.).
    Despite government efforts to prevent kidnaping and the buying and 
selling of children (sometimes for labor purposes), these problems 
persist in some rural areas (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Girls and 
women are trafficked and sold as brides, and boys may be trafficked to 
provide sons for couples unable to have one. On May 30, two persons 
convicted of trafficking in children were executed in Jiangxi Province, 
and one was executed in Guizhou Province.
    People with Disabilities.--In 1990 the Government adopted 
legislation that protects the rights of the country's disabled persons. 
According to the official press, all local governments subsequently 
drafted specific measures to implement the law. The press publicizes 
both the plight of the disabled and Government efforts to assist them. 
The Government, at times in conjunction with NGO's such as the Lions 
Club International, sponsors a wide range of preventive and 
rehabilitative programs, including efforts to reduce congenital birth 
defects, treat cataracts, and treat hearing disorders. The goal of many 
of these programs is to allow persons with disabilities to be 
integrated into the rest of society.
    However, reality for the disabled lags far behind legal dictates, 
and many do not receive or have access to special assistance or to 
programs designed to assist them. Misdiagnosis, inadequate medical 
care, pariah status, and abandonment remain common problems. According 
to reports, parents of disabled children often are persuaded by doctors 
to place their children in large government-run institutions, often far 
from their parents, and in which care is often substandard. Those 
parents who choose to keep such children at home generally face 
difficulty in getting adequate medical care, day care, and education 
for these children. In a 1998 speech, Vice Premier Li Lanqing noted 
that in the past decade, the Government had helped some 14 million 
disabled citizens solve their food and clothing problems. Nonetheless, 
government statistics show that almost one-quarter of the approximately 
60 million disabled persons live in extreme poverty. According to 1998 
government statistics, the unemployment rate for disabled persons is 
26.7 percent, a decrease from the past but still almost 10 times the 
official rate for the general population. The Government's new strategy 
is to integrate the disabled into the mainstream work force, but these 
efforts are running into a cultural legacy of discrimination and 
neglect. In the mid-1990's in Beijing and eight other cities, the 
Government began, on a trial basis, to require all companies and 
institutions to hire at least 1 percent of their workers from among the 
disabled. However, over a period of 2 years in Beijing, only 400 
disabled persons obtained jobs in this way; in Shanghai, over a period 
of 3 years, only 100 persons obtained jobs.
    Standards adopted in 1994 for making roads and buildings accessible 
to the disabled are subject to the 1990 Law on the Handicapped, which 
calls for their ``gradual'' implementation. Lax compliance with the law 
has resulted in only limited access to most buildings.
    Deng Pufang, son of the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, is a 
paraplegic who heads the China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped and the 
China Disabled Persons' Federation (CDPF), Governmentaffiliated 
organizations tasked with assisting the disabled. In March 1998, this 
organization laid out a series of goals that it hoped to achieve by 
2000, including ensuring that all persons with disabilities have 
adequate food and clothing, providing rehabilitation services for 3 
million individuals, increasing to 80 percent the enrollment rate for 
disabled students, and reducing to 20 percent the unemployment rate for 
disabled workers; as of year's end, the goals had not been met.
    The Maternal and Child Health Care Law forbids the marriage of 
persons with certain specified contagious diseases or certain acute 
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. If doctors find that a couple 
is at risk of transmitting disabling congenital defects to their 
children, the couple may marry only if they agree to use birth control 
or undergo sterilization. This law mandates premarital and prenatal 
examination for genetic or contagious diseases, but it specifies that 
medically advised termination of pregnancy or sterilization requires 
the signed consent of the patients or their guardians.
    In 1998 the Adoption Law was revised to loosen age restrictions on 
adoption. This change, which was intended to facilitate adoption, may 
have unintended consequences for children with special needs. In the 
past, individuals under the age of 35 could adopt only children with 
special needs. The minimum age for adopting a healthy child is now set 
at 30 instead of 35. Some observers worry that the law, which became 
effective in 1999, may eliminate the age-based incentive for the 
adoption of children with special needs.
    Persons in urban areas who are mentally ill or disabled and are 
found on city streets can be detained administratively under custody 
and repatriation regulations, ostensibly for their protection (see 
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The conditions under which they are held in 
such centers reportedly are poor and may include being forced to 
perform labor.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to 1995 government 
statistics, the total population of the country's 55 ethnic minorities 
was 108.46 million, or 8.98 percent of the total population. Most 
minority groups reside in areas they traditionally have inhabited, many 
of which are mountainous or remote. The Government's avowed policy on 
minorities calls for preferential treatment in marriage regulations, 
family planning, university admission, and employment. However, there 
have been reports that in some areas ethnic minorities have been 
subjected to pressure to limit births to the lower number allowed Han 
(see Section 1.f.). Programs have been established to provide 
lowinterest loans, subsidies, and special development funds for 
minority areas. Nonetheless, in practice, minorities face 
discrimination. Most of the minorities in border regions are less 
educated than the national average, and job discrimination in favor of 
Han migrants remains a serious problem. Racial discrimination is the 
source of deep resentment among minorities in some areas, such as 
Xinjiang and Tibet; however, the Government does not officially 
recognize racism against minorities or tension among different ethnic 
groups as problems. The media nonetheless often denounce racism and 
call for equal treatment.
    Official figures state that the Government invested $12.6 billion 
(104 billion RMB) in infrastructure development for minority areas 
during the period 1991 to 1995. The Ninth 5-Year Plan announced in 1996 
stated that the Government would raise this figure to $27.8 billion 
(230 billion RMB) for the period from 1996 to 2000. According to 
Government statistics, between 1991 and 1996, the economies in minority 
regions grew by nearly 11 percent annually, surpassing the national 
average in each year. Government development policies have helped 
improve minority living standards. However, real incomes in minority 
areas, especially for non-Han groups, remain well below those in other 
parts of the country, and minorities credibly claim that the majority 
Han Chinese have benefited disproportionately from government programs 
and economic growth. Many development programs have disrupted 
traditional living patterns of minority groups, including Tibetans and 
the Muslim Turkic majority (including Uighurs) of western Xinjiang. For 
example, there is evidence that official poverty alleviation programs 
and major state projects, such as building dams and environmental/ 
reforestation projects, include the forced evacuation of persons (see 
Section 2.d.). Plans to develop tourism in Xinjiang also often have 
focused on marketing and investment opportunities but paid little 
attention to how minority cultures and the environment might be 
affected adversely. Since 1949 central government and economic policy 
have resulted in a significant migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang. 
According to a government white paper, in 1998 there were approximately 
8 million Uighurs, 2.5 million other ethnic minorities, and 6.4 million 
Han in Xinjiang, up from 300,000 Han in 1949.
    According to official government statistics, 15.34 million minority 
students attended schools between 1994 and 1996. A 1997 white paper 
stated that 98.2 percent of all schoolage children in the Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region were enrolled in schools in 1996. In many 
areas with a significant population of minorities, there are two-track 
school systems using either Mandarin or the local minority language. 
Students can choose to attend schools in either system. One 
acknowledged side effect of this policy, originally designed to protect 
and maintain minority cultures, has been the reinforcement of a 
segregated education system. Under this divided education system, those 
graduating from minority schools are at a disadvantage in competing for 
jobs in government and business, which require good Chinese-language 
skills. Graduates of these schools typically need a year or more of 
intensive Chinese before they can cope with course work at a Chinese-
language university (see Tibet addendum).
    The Communist Party has an avowed policy of boosting minority 
representation in the Government and the Party. A September 1999 
government white paper reported that there were 2.7 million minority 
officials in the Government. According to government statistics, there 
were 163,000 minority officials in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region. Minority officials constitute 23.3 percent of the region's 
total, exceeding the ratio of the minority population to Han Chinese in 
the region. Many members of minorities occupy local leadership 
positions, and a few have positions of influence at the national level. 
However, in most areas, ethnic minorities are shut out of positions of 
real political and decisionmaking power. In Xinjiang the job of county 
party secretary--the most important position in a county--typically is 
reserved for Han Chinese, even in counties that are close to 100 
percent Uighur. Many minorities resent Han officials holding key 
positions in minority autonomous regions.
    During the year, the Government decided to withdraw from 
consideration for World Bank funding a project to resettle some 58,000 
ethnic Han, Hui Muslim, and Tibetan farmers in a traditionally 
Mongolian and Tibetan area (Dulan county in Haixi Tibetan-Mongolian 
Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province) as part of a poverty 
alleviation program. In June 1999, the World Bank's Executive Board had 
approved the project with the condition that an independent inspection 
panel investigate whether the project was in compliance with World Bank 
standards. After the inspection panel concluded that bank standards 
were violated, the Government withdrew the Qinghai project from bank 
consideration and stated that it would finance the project 
domestically.
    Tensions between ethnic Han citizens and Uighurs in Xinjiang 
continued. Since 1996 the authorities have cracked down harshly on 
suspected Uighur nationalists and independent Muslim religious leaders. 
There were numerous reports during the year that Uighurs were being 
executed or sentenced to long prison terms for separatist activities. 
According to a February report by Human Rights Watch, the pace of 
executions and imposition of long prison terms for suspected 
separatists in Xinjiang increased during 1999, and there were more 
frequent public sentencing rallies during the year. In March a Xinjiang 
court sentenced Rebiya Kadeer, a prominent Uighur businesswoman and 
former member of the provincial-level Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference, to 8 years in prison on charges of ``passing 
state intelligence'' to foreigners; according to an official press 
report, the intelligence she was accused of passing included newspaper 
articles and a list of names of persons whose cases had been handled by 
the courts. During her trial, Kadeer was not allowed to speak to her 
lawyer, according to foreign press reports. In November according to 
foreign press reports, her appeal was rejected. Kadeer, her son, and 
her secretary were arrested while on their way to meet a visiting 
foreign delegation in August 1999. Kadeer's son and secretary were 
sentenced administratively to 2- and 3-year reeducation-through-labor 
terms, respectively, in November 1999. Kadeer is reported to be in poor 
health but has been unable to get adequate medical treatment. Many 
foreign observers believe Kadeer was singled out for her activism on 
behalf of Uighurs and for her husband's involvement with Uighur causes 
and Radio Free Asia in the United States. In April a Xinjiang court 
upheld a lower court in sentencing a Uighur man to 15 years in prison 
and sentencing 17 of his accomplices to prison terms ranging from 1 to 
14 years. The 18 were found to have possessed ``illegal publications 
and audio cassette tapes with reactionary contents'' and to have 
assembled with the intention of undermining national unity, according 
to the official media. In June a court in Xinjiang's capital handed 
down death sentences against four men found guilty of ``splitting the 
country, intentional manslaughter, robbery'' and other crimes, 
according to an official news report. Amnesty International reported 
that Zulikar Memet was executed secretly on June 21 for helping 
separatists. In July official media reported that the same court had 
ordered the execution of three ``national separatists'' who in 1997 
allegedly had established a ``Party of God'' and subsequently 
trafficked in explosive materials and engaged in murder, larceny, 
robbery, and rape. In August 1999 Amnesty International issued a report 
documenting 210 death sentences and 190 executions in Xinjiang since 
1997. According to AI, thousands of persons have been detained 
arbitrarily, including some for their suspected support of the 
separatist cause. AI reports that many Uighurs detained for political 
reasons in Xinjiang between 1990 and 1998 are believed still to be in 
custody. According to foreign press reports, Abdulhelil Abdumijit was 
tortured to death in custody.
    A campaign to stress ethnic unity and to condemn ``splittism'' and 
religious extremism that began in Xinjiang in 1997 continued. This 
campaign pervades the Chinese-language media and reaches into the 
region's school system. Authorities maintained tight control over 
``separatist activities,'' announced tightened security and 
antiterrorist measures, and mounted campaigns to crack down on 
opposition during the year. Because the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region government regularly lumps together those involved in ``ethnic 
separatism, illegal religious activities, and violent terrorism,'' it 
is often unclear whether particular raids, detentions, arrests, or 
judicial punishments involve ethnic discrimination.
    Possession of separatist publications or audiovisual materials is 
not permitted, and, according to reports, possession of such materials 
has resulted in lengthy prison sentences. The author of a history of 
the Uighurs that was severely criticized by provincial-level and 
national authorities in the mid-1990s remains prohibited from 
publishing or from meeting with foreigners. A Uighurlanguage press 
exists in Xinjiang, but it has a very small circulation, and much of 
the population depends on market rumors for information. In general 
central authorities made it clear that they do not tolerate opposition 
to Communist Party rule and responded to unrest and terrorist incidents 
with force and heightened security measures.
    The education system provides Chinese-language instruction for Han 
students and Uighur-language instruction for Uighur students until 
fourth grade and then gradually switches to Chinese as the principal 
language of instruction. Graduation from the Uighur school system 
leaves Uighurs poorly educated, with an inadequate command of the 
Chinese language.
    According to some estimates, the migration of ethnic Han into 
Xinjiang in recent decades has caused the Han-Uighur ratio in the 
capital of Urumqi to shift from 20 to 80 to 80 to 20, and is a source 
of Uighur resentment. By some estimates, 250,000 Han have moved into 
the region annually in the last few years. Han control of the region's 
political and economic institutions also has been a factor in the 
growth of tension. The testing of nuclear weapons in Xinjiang until 
July 1996 was another source of serious contention because of 
continuing health concerns and environmental degradation. Although 
government policies have brought tangible economic improvements to 
Xinjiang, Uighurs maintain that Han receive a disproportionate share of 
the benefits. The majority of Uighurs are poor farmers, and 25 percent 
are illiterate.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for 
``freedom of association;'' however, in practice this right is subject 
to the interests of the State and the leadership of the Communist 
Party, and true freedom of association does not exist. The Communist 
Party controls the country's sole officially recognized worker's 
organization, the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). 
Attempts to form independent unions are suppressed swiftly. The 1992 
Trade Union Law gives the ACFTU effective control over the 
establishment and operations of all legal subsidiary labor 
organizations. The head of the ACFTU is a member of the Standing 
Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
    Independent labor unions are illegal. The Trade Union Law required 
that the establishment of unions at any level be submitted to a higher-
level trade union organization for approval, and only approved 
registered unions are legal. The ACFTU subsumes under its authority 16 
industry-based and 31 provincial-level labor unions. They, in turn, 
have jurisdiction over roughly 590,000 ``grassroots'' labor unions 
nationwide. According to labor regulations, there can be only one 
``grassroots'' union per enterprise, and only enterprises that have at 
least 25 employees may establish unions. In the past decade or more, 
numerous attempts were made to establish independent unions. Following 
the signing of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights in 1997, a number of labor activists have petitioned 
the Government to establish free trade unions, as allowed under the 
covenant. The Government had not approved the establishment of any 
independent unions by year's end.
    Under the country's planned economy, the ACFTU's main task has been 
to assure labor discipline, mobilize workers to achieve party 
objectives, including national economic development goals, and protect 
worker welfare and interests. However, in practice the majority of 
ACFTU-affiliated unions function primarily as social organizations, 
arranging recreational activities for workers, such as movie nights, 
picnics, and charity drives. In the face of rising unemployment, unions 
have played a more active role on behalf of unemployed workers, who 
have grown to over 20 million with the restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises. The ACFTU claims that, through mid-year, it had 
established over 4,000 job placement centers and more than 6,500 
professional training programs, benefiting over 3 million unemployed 
workers. Since 1999 the ACFTU has also contributed over $50 million 
(RMB 390 million) to displaced workers in difficult circumstances. Some 
categories of unemployed workers are entitled to unemployment benefits 
for as many as 5 years, but many have not received their full 
entitlements, primarily because of funding problems in the social 
security system.
    The work force totals approximately 740 million persons, including 
roughly 540 million rural workers. The ACFTU claims 103 million 
members, over 90 percent of whom work in state-owned enterprises. The 
Trade Union Law allows workers to decide whether to join the unions in 
their enterprises, and there have been no reports of repercussions for 
the 5 percent of workers in the state-owned sector who have not joined. 
In recent years the ACFTU actively began recruiting workers in the 
private sector, including in township and village enterprises (TVE's), 
as well as in foreign joint ventures. The ACFTU has 5.5 million members 
in foreign-funded enterprises and over 2 million members in private 
(nonstate domestic) enterprises at year's end. However, the vast 
majority of enterprises in China's burgeoning private sector, which 
according to official statistics employs roughly 20 million workers, do 
not have a union. Approximately 10 percent of private firms have a 
Communist Party representative among the workforce, whose nominal task 
is to defend workers' interests. Military and security personnel are 
the only categories of workers who cannot join a union.
    The ACFTU has submitted to the Government draft amendments to the 
Trade Union Law, which would strengthen the right of private sector 
workers to form or join ACFTU-affiliated unions. These draft amendments 
are still under consideration. However, workers in many joint ventures 
and foreign-invested enterprises have some form of worker organization, 
even though they do not have unions. These organizations are not part 
of the ACFTU but usually have Communist Party members within their 
leadership. Like unions, the organizations work with management on 
labor issues but serve primarily to arrange social activities for 
workers. They do not engage in collective bargaining with management. 
According to members, these organizations have more flexible and direct 
dealings with enterprise management, since they are not subject to 
ACFTU strictures.
    There are roughly 540 million rural workers, the overwhelming 
majority of whom are not organized. Farmers do not have a union. 
However, farmers have written millions of letters to the central and 
local governments to express their views on working conditions, and 
government officials have been reasonably responsive. There are 
approximately 125 million agricultural workers in TVE's. The ACFTU has 
attempted in recent years to recruit TVE workers, but only 5.2 million 
had joined as of 1999. Although some TVE's have local branches of the 
ACFTU, most TVE managers maintain that an ACFTU presence is not 
feasible because their employees continue to be classified as 
``farmers'' rather than ``workers.'' However, some Communist Party 
secretaries in TVE's take it upon themselves to establish union 
representation and then affiliate with the ACFTU.
    In 1999 migrant workers began to form semiautonomous ``village 
labor unions'' on the rural outskirts of some cities in order to 
represent their interests in new private sector industries. These 
nascent, loosely organized groups continued to operate, but they 
reportedly did not grow in size or scope. Local governments have not 
interfered in their activities, although these organizations have not 
yet been brought formally within the ACFTU. According to some domestic 
press reports, these village unions are effective, relatively 
independent, and cooperative with city governments.
    During the year, the Government continued its efforts to eliminate 
illegal union activity, including through detention or arrest of labor 
activists. In mid-December labor activist Cao Maobing was detained and 
admitted against his will to a psychiatric hospital in Yancheng, 
Jiangsu Province, where he reportedly also was forced to take 
medication. At year's end, he remained at the facility. According to 
press reports, Cao led workers at a local silk factory in an effort to 
form an independent labor union after they concluded that the official 
ACFTU would not help them address their grievances. Workers' grievances 
included alleged corruption on the part of factory management, the 
nonpayment of promised worker subsidies, and unpaid pensions. In mid-
November 1,800 of the workers reportedly began a strike. Cao was 
arrested soon after he spoke to Western reporters about efforts to set 
up an independent union; reportedly, he suffered from no apparent 
mental illness. According to a report by the General Secretary of the 
International Metalworkers Federation, near Funing, workers at textile 
factories, a brewery, and a fertilizer plant have attempted 
unsuccessfully to form independent unions. In December 1999, 
authorities in Henan Province committed Xue Jifeng to a mental hospital 
after he attempted to establish an independent labor union to support 
workers harmed in a financial fraud. He was held until June (see 
Section 1.d.). In May Zhang Shanguang, the founder of the short-lived 
Association to Protect the Rights and Interests of Laid-off Workers, 
lost an appeal against a 1998 10-year prison sentence for providing 
``intelligence'' to foreigners. Zhang had informed a Radio Free Asia 
reporter about worker protests in Hunan Province. Labor activist Liao 
Shihua, originally arrested in 1999 on subversion charges after taking 
part in a workers' demonstration in Hunan, was sentenced in June to 6 
years in prison. Yue Tianxiang, Guo Xinmin, and Wang Fengshan, who 
established the ``China Workers Watch'' organization to defend workers' 
rights, were arrested in 1999 and sentenced to 10 years, 2 years, and 2 
years in prison, respectively, for subversion. Wang was released in 
August, but Yue and Guo remained in prison. He Chaohui, who was given a 
10-year prison sentence in 1999 for providing human rights 
organizations with information on worker protests, remained in prison. 
He had previously served 2 years in prison in the 1980's for illegal 
union activities and had more recently organized worker demonstrations 
in Hunan. In 1999 he was convicted for providing human rights 
organizations overseas with information on protests. Liu Jingsheng, who 
received a 15-year prison sentence in 1995 for attempting to organize 
independent labor unions, also remained in prison. Shanghai labor 
dissident Wang Miaogen disappeared in 1999, and some observers believe 
that he is being held in a psychiatric hospital.
    In June the Government released labor activists Li Wangyang and 
Zhang Jingsheng from prison. Li and Zhang were sentenced in 1989 to 13 
years in prison after they cofounded the ``Autonomous Federation of 
Workers'' and participated in the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. 
Zhang had earlier served a 4-year prison sentence for taking part in 
the 1979 Democracy Wall Movement. Li was released from prison on bail 
in 1996 but was reincarcerated in 1997.
    Neither the Constitution nor the labor law provides for the right 
to strike. The right to strike was removed from the Constitution in 
1982 on the grounds that the political system had eradicated problems 
between workers and enterprise owners. The Communist Party exerts 
strong control over organized labor. Strikes are not sanctioned 
officially, and workers virtually never act through unions to obtain 
concessions from management by means of work stoppages. Accurate 
statistics on strike incidents are not available. However, labor 
disputes have risen in recent years; according to the Labor Ministry, 
there were 8,150 labor disputes in 1992, and over 120,000 in 1999. 
During the year, there continued to be numerous demonstrations by 
workers and retired workers protesting unpaid wages, benefits, 
pensions, or unemployment stipends. Workers also protested continuing 
large-scale layoffs that have been prompted by industrial 
restructuring. Most demonstrations were short and nonviolent, with 
participation ranging as high as the thousands. Government authorities 
generally responded with minimal force and refrained from detaining 
large numbers of participants. However, in several cases, 
demonstrations disrupted access to railway lines or other public 
facilities and were suppressed by force. For example, in February mine 
workers in Liaoning Province clashed with police and military officers 
for 3 days after the closure of a mine was announced; the miners, 
although given a severance package, were owed 18 months' wages (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Workers were also angry over the alleged 
corruption of the factory bosses. The area was briefly placed under 
martial law. In May up to 2,000 unpaid workers reportedly protested at 
their factory and at local government offices in Liaoyang, Liaoning 
Province; the police eventually broke up the demonstration. Dozens were 
reported injured, and three persons were arrested. In December the 
Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported that 2,000 
construction workers in Heilongjiang Province who had not been paid in 
2 years briefly blocked a railway line. In at least one city, Shenyang, 
local government officials banned public demonstrations effective July 
20 (see Section 2.b.), although demonstrations continued to take place. 
Authorities in some cases provided funds to alleviate wage or benefit 
arrearages in response to the demonstrations.
    The Labor and Trade Union laws give unions the role of mediators 
with management in cases of labor disputes. Under these laws, the 
formal dispute settlement procedure allows cases to be submitted first 
to an enterprise's mediation committee, whose chairman should be a 
union representative. If the dispute remains unresolved, or if either 
party chooses to bypass the mediation process, the case may then be 
submitted to a local arbitration committee, which should include 
representatives from the union, management, and local government. If no 
solution is reached at this level, the dispute may be submitted to the 
courts. Nationwide there are approximately 270,000 enterprise labor 
dispute mediation commissions and more than 3,100 labor dispute 
arbitration commissions set up under Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security auspices. There are 1,569,000 full- and part-time enterprise 
mediators and more than 17,000 labor arbitrators. The number of labor 
disputes has risen rapidly in recent years. According to statistics 
released during the year by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 
arbitration committees nationwide handled over 120,000 labor disputes 
in 1999, nearly double the 1998 figure and quadruple the 1995 number. 
According to a 1999 report of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), these mediation efforts are often preferential to 
employers and largely are ineffective in advocating worker rights.
    The country is a member of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) and has ratified core ILO conventions prohibiting child labor and 
discrimination in remuneration for male and female workers. China has 
not ratified other core conventions regarding the right of association, 
the right to collective bargaining, and the prohibition against 
compulsory labor. The Government has worked closely with the ILO for 
several years on programs in such areas as industrial relations, 
employment promotion, and occupational safety.
    The ICFTU brought a complaint against the Government to the ILO in 
1998, alleging the detention of trade unionists and violations of the 
right to organize. The Government denied the allegations in its 
official response to the ILO in March 1999. Later in 1999, the ILO's 
governing body found the response inadequate and requested the 
Government to provide additional information. The Government has not 
yet replied to the request.
    There are no legal provisions allowing for individual unions to 
affiliate with international labor organizations. However, the ACFTU 
has cultivated relations with international trade union organizations. 
According to the ACFTU, by mid-year it had established exchanges and 
cooperative relations with over 400 trade unions and international and 
regional trade organizations in over 130 countries and regions. Over 
the past year, roughly 60 official ACFTU delegations traveled overseas 
to meet and study with trade union counterparts. During the year, the 
ACFTU for the first time received a visit from the head of the ICFTU.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Law 
permits collective bargaining for workers in all types of enterprises. 
The law also provides for workers in all types of enterprises to sign 
individual as well as collective contracts. Collective contracts are to 
be worked out between ACFTU or worker representatives and management 
and specify such matters as working conditions, wage scales, and hours 
of work. Individual contracts which are to be drawn up in line with the 
terms of the collective contract. Collective contracts must be 
submitted to local government authorities for approval within 15 days. 
According to the ACFTU, 75 million workers in over 360,000 enterprises 
worked under contracts that were negotiated in this fashion as of mid-
June 1999.
    In spite of these legal and procedural provisions for collective 
bargaining, workers in collective and state-owned enterprise have 
little real power to influence wage levels, although small number of 
workers with high level technical skills can negotiate effectively on 
salary and fringe benefits. MOLSS sets guidelines for determining the 
total wage bill for each collective or state-owned enterprise: 1) as a 
percentage of profits, 2) as a contract amount with the local labor 
bureau, 3) as a state-set amount for money-losing enterprises, or 4) as 
an enterprise-set amount subject to Labor Ministry review. Individual 
enterprises determine how to divide the total among workers, a decision 
usually made by the enterprise manager in consultation with the 
enterprise's Communist Party secretary and the ACFTU.
    Worker congresses, which are held once or twice a year, have been 
established in over 314,000 enterprises. ACFTU officials publicly have 
called for strengthening worker congresses--particularly on the sale 
and merger of enterprises. Enterprise employees or their 
representatives attend to examine enterprise policies and reform plans. 
Participants are supposed to be entitled to evaluate and, if necessary, 
dismiss enterprise managers. Unions, in consultation with management, 
are supposed to implement resolutions passed by the congresses. 
However, these rights have not been realized in practice. Many worker 
congresses are rubber stamps for deals predetermined by the manager, 
union representative, and Communist Party secretary. In smaller 
enterprises, the same person sometimes holds these three posts.
    The Trade Union Law prohibits antiunion discrimination and 
specifies that union representatives may not be transferred or 
terminated by enterprise management during their term of office. Given 
strict top-down control of organized labor activity, and Communist 
Party control of unions, instances of reprisals or discriminatory 
action by management against unions are uncommon. The Government 
ratified ILO Convention 100 on discrimination in 1990.
    Laws governing working conditions in special economic zones (SEZ's) 
are not significantly different from those in the rest of the country. 
Wages in the SEZ's and in the southeastern part of the country 
generally are higher than in some other parts of the country because 
high levels of investment have created a great demand for available 
labor. As in other areas of the country, officials have admitted that 
some foreign investors in the SEZ's are able to negotiate 
``sweetheart'' deals with local partners that effectively bypass labor 
regulations. Some foreign businesses in the SEZ's have ACFTU-affiliated 
unions, and management reports positive relations with union 
representatives. One reason is that the ACFTU discourages strikes and 
work stoppages.
    c. Prohibition on Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor, but forced labor is a serious problem, 
particularly in penal institutions. Some penal facilities contract with 
regular industries for prisoners to perform manufacturing and assembly 
work. Others operate their own companies. A 1999 directory of Chinese 
corporations published by a foreign business information company listed 
at least two correctional institutions as having business enterprises. 
Human rights advocates note government publications that document the 
export of products made with prison labor. Regulations bar the export 
of prison-made goods, but these regulations are not enforced 
effectively. In 1998 there were reports that soccer balls, manufactured 
for a foreign company, were produced for export by prisons in the 
Shanghai area. A request for investigation of the allegations was made 
to the Government in October 1998; there has been no response to date.
    In 1992 the U.S. and Chinese Governments signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) prohibiting trade in products produced by prison 
labor. It also allows U.S. officials, with the approval of the 
Government, to visit prison production facilities to check specific 
allegations that prisoners in these facilities have produced goods 
exported to the U.S. A statement of cooperation (SOC) detailing 
specific procedures for implementation of the MOU was signed in 1994. 
Although the signing of the SOC initially helped foster a more 
productive relationship between U.S. diplomats and Chinese authorities, 
since 1997 Chinese authorities have permitted only one U.S. inspection 
of prison facilities. In April the Ministry of Justice met with U.S. 
Embassy officials to discuss prison labor after having declined to do 
so for 3 years. In September the Ministry permitted U.S. Embassy 
officers to visit the Dezhou Shengjian Machine Works in Shandong 
Province, a site that was the subject of a longstanding visit request. 
No evidence was found to support allegations that prison labor there 
had been used to produce items exported to the U.S. During the year, 
the Ministry of Justice made no response to seven requestsone dating 
back to 1992 and several dating back to 1994--for visits to sites 
suspected of exporting prison labor products to the United States. U.S. 
officials also renewed requests, some dating back to 1994, for the 
Ministry of Justice to investigate 10 other facilities suspected of 
exporting prison labor products. The Ministry of Justice did not 
respond to any of these additional requests during the year.
    In addition to prisons and reform-through-labor facilities, which 
hold inmates sentenced through judicial procedures, the Government also 
maintains a network of reeducation-through-labor camps, to which 
persons are sentenced, without judicial review, through administrative 
procedures (see Section 1.d.). Inmates of reeducationthroughlabor 
facilities generally are required to work, and there have been reports 
that products made in these facilities are exported. The Government has 
taken the position that the facilities are not prisons and has denied 
access to them under the 1992 prison labor MOU with the United States. 
Credible reports from international human rights organizations and the 
foreign press indicate that some persons in pretrial detention also are 
required to work. Inmates of custody and repatriation centers, who also 
have been detained administratively without trial, reportedly are 
required to perform labor while in detention, often to repay the cost 
of their detention. Most such inmates perform agricultural labor (see 
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
    Most anecdotal reports conclude that working conditions in the 
penal system's light manufacturing factories are similar to those in 
other factories, but conditions on the penal system's farms and in 
mines can be very harsh. As in many workplaces, safety is a low 
priority. There are no available figures for deaths and injuries in 
prison industries.
    According to press reports, in June more than 2,300 inmates at the 
Shangrao labor camp staged a strike in protest against forced overtime 
doing the intensive labor of ore milling. After camp officials called 
in over 500 armed police to suppress the strike, a riot occurred. In 
the incident, 3 persons were killed and more than 70 were wounded (see 
also Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    Trafficking in women, and the kidnaping and sale of women and 
children for forced prostitution, are serious problems (see Sections 5 
and 6.f.).
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that by 
children, and the Government on balance is believed to enforce the 
prohibition effectively, except in regard to the problem of trafficking 
in children for forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.) and of 
child labor in custody and repatriation centers (see Sections 1.d., 
1.e., and 5). During the year, the media (including domestic media) 
reported several cases in which children were alleged to have been 
compelled to work (See section 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Law specifies that, with a few strictly-
supervised exceptions, ``no employing unit shall be allowed to recruit 
juveniles under the age of 16,'' 2 years older than the ILO standard 
age of 14 years for developing countries. The Labor Law specifies 
administrative review, fines, and revocation of business licenses of 
those businesses that illegally hire minors. The law also stipulates 
that children are to receive 9 years of compulsory education and that 
parents or guardians should provide for their subsistence. Laborers 
between the ages of 16 and 18 are referred to as ``juvenile workers,'' 
and are prohibited from engaging in certain forms of physical work, 
including labor in mines. The Government adopted ILO Convention 138 on 
the minimum age of employment in 1999. The Government has not adopted 
ILO convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor. The Government 
also has not made a public statement on the eradication of such labor 
or established a national program with that objective.
    The Government maintains that the country does not have a 
significant child labor problem, although Government officials concede 
privately that isolated cases of illegal child labor exist. Of the 
country's approximately 300 million children, the number who are 
working in contravention of ILO conventions or the law is unclear. 
Since 1999 the ILO has attempted unsuccessfully to secure central 
government consent to conduct studies on the national scope of illegal 
child labor. Local experts on child labor estimate that the number is 
in the tens of thousands and that the overwhelming majority of children 
involved work voluntarily, with family encouragement. These experts say 
that working children are mostly from rural areas in the interior 
provinces, where lagging economic conditions in recent years have led 
families to seek additional sources of income. Rural teenagers, for 
example, have been attracted increasingly to work in urban factories, 
since wages there are higher than can be obtained in agricultural 
areas. Apart from agricultural work, child workers in rural areas 
appear to work primarily for TVE's. In urban areas, they may take up 
such jobs as car washers, garbage collectors, and street vendors. Some 
academics suspect that coal mines, which often operate far from urban 
centers and out of the purview of law enforcement officials, also 
occasionally employ children.
    Moreover a leading labor analyst states that the growing flow of 
adult workers from rural areas to urban areas in search of better 
paying jobs has created a shortage of labor in some rural industries, 
mines, and agriculture. This has led to increased child labor in these 
areas as children are recruited to fill these jobs. In July a Hong Kong 
newspaper reported that a factory in Fujian Province employed child 
laborers. In August the same newspaper reported that a foreign fast 
food chain had been issuing promotional items in Hong Kong that were 
produced with child labor by a company in Guangdong Province. The 
company stated that it previously had inspected the factory without 
finding evidence of child labor.
    Trafficking in children for purposes of labor is a problem. While 
there are no reliable estimates of the number of children trafficked 
for all purposes, those trafficked for purposes of labor are estimated 
to be the majority. Children trafficked to work usually are sent from 
poorer interior areas to relatively richer interior areas or large 
cities; traffickers reportedly often entice parents to relinquish their 
children with promises of large remittances that their children will be 
able to send back to them. Many such children work in small factories. 
Rising school tuition fees and declining rural incomes discourage many 
rural parents from keeping their children, especially girls, in school 
beyond the fourth grade and make such offers more attractive. The 
children's remittances, along with bribes paid by traffickers to 
authorities, have made investigation into the scope of the problem 
difficult. During the year, the media gave unprecedented coverage to 
illegal child labor cases, fueling concerns in nongovernment circles 
that child labor was a bigger problem than acknowledged by the 
Government. Media reports publicized a campaign against the trafficking 
of women and children that was launched in April by the Ministry of 
Public Security and the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), the 
government agency responsible for the enforcement of child labor 
legislation (see Section 6.f.). Also in April, a story about the rescue 
of 84 children who were taken from Guizhou Province and forced to work 
in a Zhejiang Province factory appeared on television. Newspapers and 
radio stations later reported on traffickers deceiving families and 
placing children in difficult working conditions.
    The ILO and UNICEF have begun cooperation with local government 
officials and the All-China Women's Federation to assist child victims 
of trafficking, some of whom were trafficked for forced labor purposes. 
In August the ILO launched a program with local Government officials in 
Yunnan Province to reenroll former child workers in school.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law codifies many of 
the general principles of labor reform, setting out provisions on 
employment, labor contracts, working hours, wages, skill development 
and training, social insurance, dispute resolution, legal 
responsibility, supervision, and inspection. There is no national 
minimum wage; the Labor Law allows local governments to determine their 
own standards on minimum wages. In general local governments set 
minimum wage levels higher than the levels they set for the local 
minimum standard income, but lower than the current wage level of the 
average worker. Minimum wages are usually sufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    Media reports note that in many industries, including textile and 
garment manufacturing, compulsory overtime is common, and that on 
occasion, there is no provision of extra pay for overtime. There are 
also media accounts of workers being prevented from leaving factory 
compounds without permission.
    The MOLSS has implemented a nationwide system to provide 
unemployment benefits to laid-off urban workers and basic living 
stipends to the poorest urban residents. There are 20 million laid off 
and unemployed workers in an urban workforce of about 240 million (see 
Section 6.a.). Unemployment benefits are set as a percentage of a 
worker's former salary. Basic living stipends supplement the difference 
between a poor person's income and the minimum standard income for the 
city where he lives. Each city government determines the minimum 
standard income on the basis of local economic conditions. In addition 
to the stipend, families living on less than the minimum standard 
income are eligible for subsidized food, medical services, housing, and 
funds to enable school-age children to complete compulsory education. 
In 1999 the Government raised both unemployment benefits and basic 
living stipends by 30 percent, despite reports that a number of cities 
had difficulty funding benefits and stipends even before the increase. 
While there were no additional increases during the year, these funding 
problems persisted, particularly in the poorer northeastern and 
interior provinces. The cities with the highest minimum standard 
incomes were Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing at $39 (RMB 
319), $38 (RMB 312), $34 (RMB 280), and $31 (RMB 260) per month, 
respectively. Less developed cities such as Hohhot (Inner Mongolia) and 
Nanchang (Jiangxi Province) raised minimum standard incomes to $17 (RMB 
143) and $16 (RMB 130) per month, respectively. However, many workers 
reportedly are not receiving the benefits they are entitled to, because 
the state-owned enterprises and governments are unable to contribute to 
the funds that pay them (see Section 6.a.).
    According to statistics published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), the annual per capita income of urban residents in 
1999 was $705 (RMB 5,854), an increase of 8 percent in real terms from 
1998. The per capita income of rural residents was $266 (RMB 2,210), a 
real increase of 2 percent from the previous year. NBS figures for the 
first 9 months of the year indicated that urban incomes were growing by 
8.4 percent, while rural incomes were increasing by only 2.5 percent, 
widening the already large gap between the living standards of the 800 
million rural residents and those of urban workers. Economists have 
estimated the ratio between average urban incomes in southern coastal 
Provinces and rural incomes in interior Provinces at 12 to 1.
    The Government reduced the national standard workweek in 1995 from 
44 hours to 40 hours, excluding overtime. The Labor Law mandates a 24-
hour rest period weekly and does not allow overtime work in excess of 3 
hours a day or 36 hours a month. It also sets forth a required scale of 
remuneration for overtime work. Enforcement of regulations governing 
overtime work varies according to region and type of enterprise.
    Occupational health and safety remain problems and are frequent 
themes of campaigns and posters in enterprises. The poor enforcement of 
occupational health and safety regulations continues to put workers' 
lives at risk. Working conditions in the private sector often are poor. 
Recognizing this, the Government continued during the year to cooperate 
with the ILO in organizing training programs for enterprises' health 
and safety officers as well as local government officials. The current 
work injury insurance system covers only 40 million of the country's 
200 million industrial workers. Every work unit must designate a health 
and safety officer, and the ILO has established a training program for 
these officials. Nonetheless there is a high rate of industrial 
accidents, with most of the accidents occurring in the mining sector. 
In 1998 President Jiang Zemin called for a concerted effort to improve 
occupational safety after industrial accidents reached an all-time high 
of 18,268 in 1997. According to official national statistics, the 
number of industrial accidents declined 16 percent from 1997 to 15,372 
in 1998 and fell another 14 percent to 13,258 in 1999. Compared with 
1998, deaths stemming from accidents in 1999 declined 14 percent to 
12,587, and the number of seriously injured workers fell 12 percent to 
4,936. However, in 1999 there were 96 industrial accidents in which 10 
or more people died, an increase of 16 percent over 1998. During the 
year the State Economic and Trade Commission said that the number of 
industrial deaths and injuries was still excessive and faulted poor 
safety supervision by business enterprises. Less than half of rural 
enterprises meet national dust and poison standards. Many factories 
that use harmful products, such as asbestos, not only fail to protect 
their workers against the ill effects of such products, but also do not 
inform them about the potential hazards.
    Industrial accident statistics for Shenzhen and Guangdong, which 
have been reported by the Chinese and foreign media, suggest that 
official national statistics may be understated. According to press 
reports in April, an investigation by the Workers Daily found that 
15,000 serious accidents occurred in Shenzhen's 9,582 factories in 
1999, of which 12,189 were handled by the local Labor Bureau. The 
investigation also found that on average 31 workers per day were 
injured in work-related accidents that left them permanently disabled, 
and 1 worker died as a result of a work-related accident every 4+ days. 
The China Machinery Daily reported in 1999 that there were over 20,000 
cases of industrial injuries per year in Guangdong. The same newspaper 
also reported that about 50,000 persons nationwide lose fingers yearly 
in industrial accidents.
    As in 1998, the overall improvement in industrial safety in 1999 
was due largely to a decrease in mine accidents, which in past years 
have accounted for more than half of all industrial accidents. Compared 
with 1998, the number of mine accidents declined 20 percent in 1999 to 
4,516 (representing one-third of all industrial accidents). While 
mining deaths fell 18 percent to 7,705 in 1999, that number still 
represented nearly two-thirds of all industrial deaths. The decline was 
primarily the result of a continuing national drive that, for both 
safety and economic reasons, has shut down approximately 36,000 small, 
unlicensed coal mines since 1998. The purpose of the drive has been 
two-fold: to reduce mine accidents and to lower the surplus supply of 
coal, which has driven down coal prices in recent years.
    Although the Constitution does not provide for the right to strike, 
the Trade Union Law explicitly recognizes the right of unions to 
``suggest that staff and workers withdraw from sites of danger'' and 
participate in accident investigations. However, it is unclear to what 
extent workers actually can remove themselves from such dangerous 
situations without risking loss of employment. Private sector workers 
in particular fear the loss of their jobs if they complain about 
working conditions. Workers who are permanently disabled in work-
related accidents generally are fired, leaving them without a means of 
support or often even a place to live. Workers who are injured, killed, 
or sickened on the job or who are exploited by their employers often 
have little effective recourse, being unable to afford the expense of 
legal remedies, and are not compensated. However, there are a very few 
private attorneys who specialize in such cases, and there are some 
legal aid organizations which can assist workers in such cases.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in persons and the 
abduction of women for trafficking (particularly within the country) 
are serious problems. The country is a source and a destination point 
for trafficking in persons. The purchase of women was criminalized in 
1991, with the enactment of the NPC Standing Committee's ``Decision 
Relating to the Severe Punishment of Criminal Elements Who Abduct and 
Kidnap Women and Children,'' which made abduction and sale separate 
offenses. The 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and 
Interests also addressed the issue of trafficking in women. Individuals 
have been sentenced to death for their involvement in the trade in 
persons. Two persons reportedly were executed in May in Guangxi 
Province for drugging, raping, and selling three women. That same 
month, a man was executed in Guangdong Province for trafficking in 
women. On May 30, two persons convicted of trafficking in children were 
executed in Jiangxi Province and one was executed in Guizhou Province. 
In October four men in Jiangsu Province reportedly were executed for 
selling women, for between $180 and $480 each, into forced prostitution 
and pornographic exploitation. In November a man was sentenced to life 
in prison for smuggling more than 277 persons into other countries.
    According to some estimates by experts, there may be 4 to 10 
million commercial sex workers in the country, an unknown number of 
whom may have been trafficked (see Section 5). The increased 
commercialization of sex and related trafficking in women has trapped 
thousands of women in a cycle of crime and exploitation, and left them 
vulnerable to disease and abuse. According to one estimate, there are 
70,000 prostitutes in Beijing alone; other estimates have placed the 
number as high as 200,000 or more. According to the official Xinhua 
News Agency, one in five massage parlors in China is involved in 
prostitution, with the percentage higher in cities. Prostitutes can be 
found at many bars and clubs in urban areas.
    Women also are trafficked within or to China for the purpose of 
forced marriage, and it is estimated that the majority of women 
trafficked within the country are trafficked for this purpose. Some 
experts, including the CEDAW Committee, have suggested that the serious 
imbalance in sex ratios in some regions (see Section 1.f.) has created 
a situation in which the demand for marriageable women cannot be met by 
local brides, thus fueling the demand for abducted women. Others have 
suggested that the problem is exacerbated by the tendency for many 
village women to leave rural areas to seek employment, and by the 
tradition that requires that expensive betrothal gifts be given to 
women. The cost of betrothal gifts may exceed the price of a bride and 
thus makes purchasing a bride more attractive to poor rural families. 
Some families address the problem of a shortage of women by recruiting 
women in economically less advanced areas. Others seek help from 
criminal gangs, which either kidnap women or trick them by promising 
them jobs and an easier way of life and then transport them far from 
their home areas for delivery to buyers. Once in their new ``family,'' 
these women are ``married'' and raped. Some accept their fate and join 
the new community; others struggle and are punished. According to 
reports, many of the kidnapings also occur in provinces where the male 
to female ratio is generally balanced. Guangdong Province also is a 
receiving point for women trafficked for the purposes of marriage.
    There were reports that women from Burma, Laos, North Korea, 
Vietnam, and Russia were trafficked into the country either to work in 
the sex trade or to be forced to marry Chinese men. Border guards 
reportedly are involved in trafficking in women from the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea into China. Trafficking of North Korean 
women into the country to become brides or to work in the sex industry 
is reportedly widespread in the northeastern part of the country. Many 
such women, unable to speak Chinese, are virtual prisoners. Some if not 
many of the Korean women are sold against their will to rural men--in 
both ethnic Korean and ethnic Han areas--who have difficulty finding 
wives in their home villages. Others end up working as prostitutes. 
According to press reports, North Korean brides were sold for the 
equivalent of between $38 and $150. Women reportedly also were 
trafficked from Vietnam into China for purposes of forced marriage.
    According to press reports, trafficking victims have been detained 
by the authorities in custody and repatriation centers before being 
returned home (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
    Chinese women are being trafficked to other countries for work in a 
variety of forced labor situations, most commonly sweatshops and the 
sex industry. Reports indicated that women were trafficked to 
destinations including Malaysia, Burma, Taiwan, Australia, Japan, the 
United States, and Canada; most apparently were from impoverished 
areas. Most trafficked Chinese women in Malaysia are from the coastal 
areas of Guangdong, Fujian, and Shanghai. One prominent social worker 
estimates that there are thousands of Chinese women working as 
prostitutes in Malaysia. Ethnic Chinese gangs trafficked most of these 
women to Malaysia. Most Chinese women trafficked to Australia 
reportedly are from Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou.
    Despite Government efforts to prevent kidnaping and the buying and 
selling of children, trafficking in children also is a problem, 
affecting all provinces (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). There are no 
reliable estimates of the number of children trafficked. Domestically 
most trafficked children are sold to couples unable to have children; 
in particular, boys are trafficked to couples unable to have a son. 
Children also are trafficked for labor purposes. Children trafficked to 
work usually are sent from poorer interior areas to relatively richer 
interior areas; traffickers reportedly often entice parents to 
relinquish their children with promises of large remittances that their 
children will be able to send back to them (see Section 6.d.). In mid-
year, the Government emphasized the use of DNA technology to confirm 
parentage, and the Ministry of Public Security reportedly has invested 
millions of dollars to establish a national DNA databank. Since 
December 1998, the authorities also have reported an increase in the 
number of children being trafficked to other countries by alien 
smugglers for purposes of forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 
6.c.).
    Alien smuggling rings also traffic persons to other countries, 
including Australia, Canada, Croatia, Japan, the United States, Italy, 
and other countries in Europe and around the world, to work in domestic 
service, restaurants, sweatshops, and other businesses. It has been 
estimated that as many as 100,000 persons leave the country each year 
in search of better economic opportunities. Most are from a few 
counties in Fujian Province, a relatively prosperous region by the 
country's standards. Authorities in Italy reported in 1999 that an 
estimated 30,000 illegal Chinese immigrants work in sweatshop 
conditions outside of Florence, with many children working alongside 
their parents in the production of scarves, purses, and counterfeit 
brand name products. Alien smuggling rings often have ties to organized 
crime and are international in scope, sometimes smuggling persons 
through third countries in order to facilitate their entry into the 
destination country. An NGO reported that traffickers frequently rely 
on the collusion or active involvement of officials. In late 1999, 
authorities in the U.S. and Canada began to find persons smuggled from 
China in shipping containers on cargo ships arriving from Hong Kong; in 
the first 3 weeks of the year alone, according to press reports, more 
than 100 persons had been found in shipping containers in ports on the 
west coast of Canada and the United States. In one case, 3 trafficked 
persons were found dead in one poorly provisioned and unsanitary 
shipping container; another 15 survived their ordeal, but 7 of the 
survivors required hospitalization. In January two Chinese nationals 
were charged with attempting to smuggle persons from China into the 
United States. According to press reports in December 1999, several 
Chinese were smuggled into the United States in a wellprovisioned cargo 
container. There were reports that the persons in the container may 
have paid between $30,000 and $50,000 (248,000 to 410,000 RMB) each for 
their passage. On June 19, customs officials in the United Kingdom, 
conducting a routine inspection, found the bodies of 58 Chinese men and 
women in the back of a Dutch tomato truck that had crossed the English 
Channel on a ferry from Belgium. Two persons were found alive near the 
rear door of the truck. The doors had been sealed, and although the 
truck was equipped with refrigeration units, they were not turned on, 
despite the high temperatures that day. It was not immediately clear 
whether the victims died due to a lack of air, or to the heat, or both. 
Most of the victims were from Fujian Province. British officials 
arrested the truck driver on charges of manslaughter and immigration 
law violations; two Chinese nationals in the UK also were arrested. 
Dutch officials arrested another two persons in connection with the 
case. Press reports indicated that trafficked persons traveling 
clandestinely on trucks from the European continent into England have 
long been a problem.
    Those trafficked by alien smugglers may pay high prices, reportedly 
up to $70,000 each, for their passage to other countries. Many 
trafficked persons find themselves working in situations akin to 
indentured servitude. Upon arrival, many traffickers reportedly forced 
trafficked persons to repay the smuggling charges by working in 
specified jobs for a set period of time. They often are forced to pay 
charges for living expenses out of their meager earnings, as well. 
Other smugglers threaten the families of trafficked persons with 
harming a trafficked person if the family does not pay the smuggling 
fees immediately, leaving the trafficked person to work to repay the 
debt the family has incurred on his or her behalf back home. 
Nonetheless many are able save money and send it home to relatives. 
Trafficked persons generally live and work under poor conditions, and 
they may be required to work long hours. Their movements often are 
restricted by the smuggling rings that trafficked them, and their 
travel documents, which are often fraudulent, frequently are 
confiscated. Victims of trafficking face threats of being turned in to 
the authorities as illegal immigrants and threats of retaliation 
against their families at home if they protest the situation in which 
they find themselves.
    Trafficked persons who are repatriated may face fines for illegal 
emigration upon their return; after a second repatriation, persons may 
be sentenced to a term in a reeducationthroughlabor camp. Alien 
smugglers are fined $6,000 (50,000 RMB) and may be sentenced to up to 3 
years in prison, although some have been sentenced to death.
    Although the central Government and various provincial and local 
governments have attempted to crack down on the sex trade and thus on 
one type of trafficking, there have been numerous credible reports in 
the media of complicity in prostitution by local officials. Thus far 
actions to stop this lucrative business, which involves organized crime 
groups and business persons as well as the police and the military, 
have been largely ineffective. However, in April the Ministry of Public 
Security, along with the All-China Women's Federation and other 
departments, launched a several-month-long campaign against trafficking 
in women and children. Official media reported that 110,000 women and 
13,000 children who had been trafficked were rescued during the 
campaign; some were trafficked for purposes of prostitution, and others 
for labor. According to press reports, at least eight persons convicted 
of trafficking women and children for prostitution were executed during 
the campaign. At least seven others were sentenced to long prison 
terms. The Government also established a national telephone hot line on 
abduction, as well as a national databank on victims and traffickers. 
Nongovernmental experts observed that the mid-year national campaign 
against trafficking focused primarily on the criminal aspects of the 
trafficking problem and less on the reintegration of victims into their 
communities, despite the involvement of the All-China Women's 
Federation.

                               HONG KONG

    Hong Kong reverted from British to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 
1997 (the handover). As a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of 
autonomy except in defense and foreign affairs and remains a free 
society with legally protected rights. The Basic Law, approved in 1990 
by the PRC's National People's Congress (NPC), provides for fundamental 
rights and serves as a ``mini-constitution.'' A chief executive, 
selected by a 400-person selection committee that was chosen by a 
China-appointed preparatory committee, wields executive power. The 
legislature (known as the Legislative Council) is composed of directly 
and indirectly elected members. On September 10, the second Legislative 
Council was elected, for a 4-year term. Twenty-four seats were elected 
on a geographic basis through universal suffrage, 30 seats through 
functional (occupational) constituencies, and 6 seats through indirect 
election. Human rights groups and democracy advocates complained that 
the elections for functional constituency and election committee seats 
are undemocratic since only 180,000 voters were eligible to elect the 
30 legislators elected by functional constituencies and the 6 
legislators elected indirectly, while over 3 million persons were 
eligible to vote for 24 legislators elected by geographical 
constituencies. However, no parties boycotted the elections. 
Prodemocracy candidates won 17 of the 24 seats elected on a geographic 
basis (including one in a December by-election) and 22 seats overall. 
The power of the legislature is curtailed substantially by voting 
procedures that require separate majorities among both geographically 
and functionally elected legislators for bills introduced by individual 
legislators and by Basic Law prohibitions against the legislature's 
initiating legislation affecting public expenditures, political 
structure, or government operations. In addition the Basic Law 
stipulates that legislators only may initiate legislation affecting 
government policy with the prior approval of the Chief Executive. 
``Government policy'' in practice is defined very broadly. By law and 
tradition, the judiciary is independent and the Basic Law vests Hong 
Kong's highest court with the power of final adjudication; however, 
under the Basic Law, the Standing Committee of the NPC has the power of 
final interpretation of the Basic Law. The Government's controversial 
1999 request to the Chinese Government to seek such an interpretation 
resulted in an NPC Standing Committee interpretation which effectively 
overturned a ruling by the Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong's highest 
court, raising questions about the potential future independence and 
ultimate authority of Hong Kong's judiciary.
    A well-organized police force under the firm control of local 
civilian authorities maintains public order. Individual members of the 
police sometimes used excessive force. The 4,000 Chinese troops sent to 
Hong Kong in 1997 to replace the British military garrison have 
maintained a low profile and have not performed police functions.
    Hong Kong is a major international trade and finance center. It is 
the principal gateway for trade and investment with China. A thriving 
free market economy operates with limited government interference. The 
economy, which provides residents a high standard of living, is in the 
midst of a strong recovery from the 1997-98 international financial 
crisis. Per capita gross domestic product is $23,523 (HK$183,483).
    The Government generally respected the human rights of residents, 
and the law and judiciary generally provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. Human rights problems that existed 
both before and after the handover include: Limitations on residents' 
ability to change their government and limitations on the power of the 
legislature to affect government policies; reports of police use of 
excessive force; some degree of media self-censorship; violence and 
discrimination against women; discrimination against the disabled and 
ethnic minorities; intimidation of foreign domestic servants; and 
trafficking in persons for the purposes of forced labor and forced 
prostitution. Despite the ban on the Falun Gong in mainland China, the 
Falun Gong remained legally registered and generally free to continue 
its activities in Hong Kong.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    There was one reported instance of death of a detainee in police 
custody during the year. It was certified as a death by natural causes. 
At the end of 1999, there were two investigations of deaths in police 
custody that remained outstanding. Inquests held during the year 
concluded that the deceased in one of the cases had committed suicide, 
and that the deceased in the other case died as a result of natural 
causes.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law forbids torture and other abuse by the police; 
however, there were reports that police at times used excessive force 
against persons in custody. The law stipulates punishment for those who 
violate these prohibitions, and disciplinary action can range from 
warnings to dismissal. Criminal proceedings may be undertaken 
independently of the disciplinary process. Allegations of excessive use 
of force are investigated by the Complaints against Police Office, 
whose work is monitored and reviewed by the Independent Police 
Complaints Council (IPCC), a body composed of public members appointed 
by the Chief Executive.
    Although excessive use of force by police is not widespread, there 
are occasional complaints of force being used during interrogations to 
coerce information or confessions. In the first 8 months of the year, 
the Complaints against Police Office received 697 complaints of assault 
by the police. Of the
    209 cases in which investigations were completed and endorsed by 
the IPCC, 175 were withdrawn, 27 were deemed ``not pursuable,'' 5 were 
judged to be false, and 2 were judged ``unsubstantiated.'' The 
remainder (488 cases) were pending investigation at year's end. In 1999 
of the 1,098 assault allegations received, one was substantiated, and 
the incident was noted in the concerned officer's record. Human rights 
groups have called for a more independent monitoring body, noting long 
delays in hearing some allegations, the large difference between the 
number of complaints received and the few that are substantiated, the 
light punishment that police officers received when complaints are 
found to be substantiated, and the unwillingness of some witnesses to 
pursue complaints for fear of retribution. In May the U.N. Committee 
against Torture expressed concern over the ``lawful authority'' defense 
of, and the lack of prosecutions under, the Crimes (Torture) Ordinance. 
In 1999 the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed concern that police 
responsibility for investigation of police misconduct undermines the 
credibility of IPCC investigations and called on the Government to 
reconsider its approach.
    In a June protest against the Government's right of abode (see 
Section 1.e.) policies, the police were accused of using excessive 
force when they used pepper spray and hit demonstrators when removing 
them from the entrance to the main government office building. As 
recommended by the Complaints against Police Office, two police 
officers received verbal warnings for their actions.
    During the year, two police officers were sentenced to 7- and 9-
months' imprisonment respectively for accepting bribes to provide a 
journalist with information between mid-1997 and November 1999 (see 
Section 2.a.).
    Although conditions vary among facilities, prison conditions 
conform to international standards.
    In early June, 35 persons were injured during riots at a low-
security drug treatment center for prisoners. After rioting broke out 
among the prisoners, more than 200 police and security officials were 
called in to restore order. Twenty-two inmates and 13 security officers 
were injured; some of them required hospitalization.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. 
Local justices of the peace regularly inspect prisons, but these visits 
rarely are unannounced, and justices of the peace speak with prisoners 
in the presence of Correctional Services Department staff. Human rights 
monitors have called for revisions to the inspection system.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Common law, precedents 
previously in force, and the Basic Law provide substantial and 
effective legal protection against arbitrary arrest or detention. 
Suspects must be charged within 48 hours or released. The average 
length of preconviction incarceration does not exceed 80 days.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary has remained 
independent since the handover, underpinned by the Basic Law's 
provision that Hong Kong's common law tradition be maintained. Under 
the Basic Law, the courts may interpret on their own provisions of the 
Basic Law that are within the limits of the autonomy of the region. The 
courts may also interpret other provisions of the Basic Law that touch 
on Central Government responsibilities or on the relationship between 
the Central Authorities and the SAR, but before making final judgments 
on these matters, which are unappealable, the courts must seek an 
interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress. (In the controversial 1999 ``right 
of abode case,'' the Government, not the court, sought an 
interpretation from the Standing Committee.) When the Standing 
Committee makes an interpretation of the Basic Law provisions 
concerned, the courts, in applying those provisions, ``shall follow the 
interpretation of the Standing Committee.'' Judgments previously 
rendered shall not be affected. The National People's Congress vehicle 
for interpretation is its Committee for the Basic Law, composed of six 
mainland and six Hong Kong members. The Hong Kong members are nominated 
by the Chief Executive, the President of the Legislative Council, and 
the Chief Justice. Human rights and lawyers' organizations long have 
expressed concern that these exceptions to the Court of Final Appeal's 
power of final adjudication and this interpretation mechanism could be 
used to limit the independence of the judiciary or could degrade the 
courts' authority. In the controversial 1999 right of abode case the 
Government, which had lost the case in the Court of Final Appeal, Hong 
Kong's highest court, asked the court to clarify its decision. After 
the clarification, which did not fundamentally alter the court's 
decision, the Government sought an interpretation of the Basic Law 
provisions at issue in the case from the NPC Standing Committee. The 
NPC's interpretation effectively overturned the ruling by the Court of 
Final Appeal, and raised questions about the potential future 
independence and ultimate authority of Hong Kong's judiciary. During 
the year, the Chief Justice called upon the Government to explain and 
defend the principle of judicial independence, and the head of the bar 
association called the Government's 1999 appeal to the NPC to reverse a 
court ruling ``a Damocles sword'' hanging over the court. Since the 
controversy, the Government has expressed its intention to make 
recourse to the NPC interpretation mechanism a rare and exceptional 
act.
    The Court of Final Appeal is Hong Kong's supreme judicial body. An 
independent commission nominates judges; the Chief Executive is 
required to appoint those nominated, subject to endorsement by the 
legislature. Nomination procedures ensure that commission members 
nominated by the private bar have a virtual veto on the nominations. 
Legal experts complained that the commission's selection process is 
opaque. In November legislators requested that the process be made 
transparent. The Government responded that privacy concerns prevented 
opening the process to the public. The Basic Law provides that, with 
the exception of the Chief Justice and the Chief Judge of the High 
Court, who are prohibited from residing outside of Hong Kong, 
foreigners may serve on Hong Kong's courts. Approximately 40 percent of 
Hong Kong's judges are expatriates from other common law jurisdictions. 
Judges have security of tenure until retirement age (either 60 or 65, 
depending on date of appointment).
    Beneath the Court of Final Appeal is the High Court, composed of 
the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance. Lower judicial 
bodies include the District Court (which has limited jurisdiction in 
civil and criminal matters), the magistrates courts (which exercise 
jurisdiction over a wide range of criminal offenses), the Coroner's 
Court, the Juvenile Court, the Lands Tribunal, the Labor Tribunal, the 
Small Claims Tribunal, and the Obscene Articles Tribunal.
    The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and this is 
respected in practice. Trials are by jury, and the judiciary provides 
citizens with a fair and efficient judicial process.
    Human rights activists remain concerned that the legal system may 
favor those closely aligned with China or with powerful local 
institutions. In particular, concerns were raised by two 1998 Justice 
Department decisions, in which the Government decided not to prosecute 
the New China News Agency for alleged violations of the Privacy 
Ordinance (see Section 1.f.) or to prosecute a prominent newspaper 
editor with close ties to Beijing who was accused of fraud.
    In 1998 the Provisional Legislature passed the controversial 
Adaptation of Laws (Interpretive Provisions) Ordinance, which replaced 
the word ``Crown'' in Hong Kong legislation with the word ``State'' in 
hundreds of existing laws. Critics expressed concern that this change 
would place the Chinese government organs above the law, since laws 
that previously did not apply to the Crown would now not apply to the 
(Chinese) State, including Central Government organs stationed in Hong 
Kong. Since 1998 51 laws have been amended to encompass the State 
specifically.
    According to the Basic Law, English may be used as an official 
language by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. For 
historical reasons and because of the courts' reliance on common law 
precedents, almost all civil cases and most criminal cases are heard in 
English. In recent years, however, the Government has developed a 
bilingual legal system. It has increased the number of officers in the 
Legal Aid Department proficient in Chinese and extended the use of 
bilingual prosecution documents and indictments. All laws are now 
bilingual, with the English and Chinese texts being equally authentic. 
All courts and tribunals may operate in either Chinese or English. 
Judges, witnesses, the parties themselves, and legal representatives 
each decide which language to use at any point in the proceedings. In 
May 55 percent of cases at the lowest level of the court system were 
conducted in Chinese.
    Some human rights groups have expressed concern that the Government 
has not protected vigorously enough the interests of Hong Kong 
residents arrested in mainland China. The issue is complicated by the 
absence of an agreement allowing Hong Kong officials access to Hong 
Kong citizens arrested or detained in mainland China. To address this 
concern, public security authorities from Beijing and Hong Kong signed 
an agreement in October under which, beginning January 1, 2001, each 
side was to notify the other of certain categories of detentions of 
each other's residents.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law provides for the right of privacy, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. Interception of 
communications is conducted under the Telecommunications Ordinance and 
the Post Office Ordinance, which require authorization for interception 
operations at the highest levels of government. For example, wiretaps 
continued to be approved by the Chief Executive's office; a court 
issued warrant is not required. According to a September 1999 press 
report, the Government eavesdropped on private telephone conversations 
of more than 100 persons daily. The Government has refused to reveal 
how often the Chief Executive uses his powers to authorize telephone 
wiretaps and interception of private mail.
    For more than 20 years, the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption was vested with powers, including the right to authorize 
searches and detain suspects, which normally are exercised only by a 
judicial officer. Amendments to ordinances governing the Commission 
took effect in 1997, depriving the Commission of the independent 
authority to issue arrest or search warrants. However, the Commission 
still does not apply the presumption of innocence in corruption cases, 
and criminal convictions are obtained by regarding any excessive, 
unexplainable assets held by civil servants as ill-gotten until proven 
otherwise.
    In 1996 the Government established the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner for Personal Data (PCO) under the Personal Data (Privacy) 
Ordinance (PDPO) to prevent misuse and disclosure of data such as 
medical and credit records. The ordinance also prohibits matching sets 
of personal data without the consent of the subject individual or the 
commissioner, although some government departments were exempted in 
order to combat social welfare abuse and tax evasion. Some violations 
of the PDPO constitute criminal offenses. In other cases, an injured 
party may seek compensation through civil proceedings. If the PCO 
believes that violations may continue or be repeated, it may issue 
enforcement notices to direct remedial measures. From the end of 1996 
when the PDPO took effect through the end of September, the PCO had 
received 1,628 complaints. Since 1996 of the 1,525 completed 
investigations, the PCO found violations of the PDPO in 116 cases, 
resulting in 13 cases referred to the Department of Justice and the 
police for prosecution consideration, the issuance of 22 enforcement 
notices and 81 warning notices. Of the 13 cases referred to the 
Department of Justice and the police, the Government as of October had 
decided to prosecute 1 case and not to prosecute in 10 cases. 
Investigation continues in the remaining 2 cases.
    Under the Adaptation of Laws (Interpretive Provisions) Ordinance, 
passed in 1998 by the Provisional Legislature, the Personal Data 
Privacy Ordinance is not applicable to the PRC government organs in 
Hong Kong. The Government is still considering whether PDPO should 
apply to Chinese government organs. In June 1999, the High Court 
dismissed a legislator's civil suit over the failure of the then-New 
China News Agency (NCNA) to respond within the PDPO-specified time 
frame to the legislator's request for information about her in the 
agency's files, because the NCNA Director named in the suit was not in 
Hong Kong at the time the incident occurred. In October the Director of 
the NCNA, now known as the Liaison Office, Jiang Enzhu, served the 
legislator a writ requiring the legislator to pay his court costs, as 
is allowed under Hong Kong law. If unable to pay and forced to declare 
bankruptcy, the prodemocracy legislator--under the Basic Law--would 
lose her legislative seat.
    In February the Hong Kong Telecommunications Authority issued 
guidelines requiring paging services to configure their systems so that 
Hong Kong-origin messages, including messages barred for transmission 
in places outside Hong Kong, including the mainland, could be 
transmitted in Hong Kong only. In October 1999, it was discovered that 
PRC censorship of Falun Gong-related information temporarily affected 
Hong Kong users of a major local paging service, China Motion Telecom, 
because the service used mainland-located transmission centers. The 
mainland-based employees of the company would not transmit messages 
regarding Falun Gong, even for Hong Kong customers, because of an 
alleged PRC instruction that any messages related to Falun Gong not be 
broadcast. Under scrutiny from the Government and pressure from the 
wider community, the company found a technical solution to the problem 
and as a result ended mainland-based censorship for customers whose 
service was limited to Hong Kong. However, the company insisted, and 
the Hong Kong Telecommunications Authority agreed, that the company 
must follow mainland laws (including censorship rules) for customers 
whose paging service extended to the mainland. Hong Kong customers with 
China-wide (rather than Hong-Kong-only) service remain unable to 
receive messages relating to Falun Gong when they are on the mainland.
    In early June, He Zhiming, a deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs 
Department of the Central Government's Liaison Office, warned 
businessmen at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce not to do business with 
Taiwan firms that supported Taiwan independence. He noted that doing 
business with such firms posed a risk, and that those who violated the 
warning would suffer the consequences. The SAR Government quickly 
issued a statement rejecting the comments and reiterating its 
commitment to free trade. The SAR Government's statement noted that 
Chief Executive C.H.Tung had contacted the Director of the Liaison 
Office, Jiang Enzhu, after these comments were made, and he had 
indicated that the Liaison Office would continue to operate according 
to the Basic Law and would not interfere with the SAR's commercial 
activities. Nonetheless, many observers were deeply concerned by the 
incident, which followed soon after comments in April by Liaison Office 
officials to the press about how the media should report on Taiwan (see 
Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Basic Law provides for freedom 
of speech, of the press, and of publication, and there was no apparent 
change in the tradition of respect for these freedoms by the Government 
after the handover; however, some journalists and news media continue 
to practice a degree of self-censorship, particularly in mainland-
related reporting. Senior government officials regularly made 
statements in support of these freedoms. Overall, the media has been 
outspoken in defending civil liberties. Reporting on the September 
Legislative Council elections generally was regarded as fair and 
balanced. However, there are certain laws that potentially allow limits 
on some speech and press freedoms. The Telecommunications Ordinance 
grants the Government wide-ranging powers to ban messages whenever it 
``considers that the public interest so requires.'' The Public Order 
Ordinance enables the Government to ban a demonstration on national 
security grounds, including as a factor whether it advocates 
independence for Tibet or Taiwan. In practice this situation has not 
arisen and only 2 demonstrations--out of more than 7,000 since the 
handover--have been disallowed (see Section 2.b.). In November 1999, 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed concern that the offenses of 
treason and sedition under the Crimes Ordinance are defined in overly 
broad terms, thus endangering freedom of expression. The Basic Law 
requires that the Government enact legislation prohibiting ``treason, 
secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's 
Government, or theft of state secrets,'' but no such legislation has 
yet been proposed.
    Newspapers publish a wide variety of opinions, including opinions 
on Taiwan, Tibet, PRC leadership dynamics, Communist Party corruption, 
and human rights. Persons speak freely to the media, and many use the 
media to voice their views. Political debate is vigorous, and numerous 
viewpoints, including stories and opinions critical of the SAR and 
Chinese Governments and statements by leading Chinese dissidents and 
proindependence Taiwan activists, are provided in the mass media, in 
public forums, and by political groups. International media 
organizations operate freely. Sixteen major daily newspapers, 4 
commercial television stations (broadcast and cable) and 2 commercial 
radio stations function with virtually no government control.
    Foreign reporters need no special visas or government-issued press 
cards. Many local reporters continue to enter China to cover sensitive 
stories related to Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the mainland. China still 
requires journalists--both foreign and those from Hong Kong--to apply 
for permission to make reporting trips to the mainland. Those who 
bypass official channels--which many feel they must do to get the 
stories they want--risk violating Chinese regulations. At least one 
publication whose owner offended China's leadership several years ago 
subsequently has been unable to get official permission for its 
reporters to cover events on the mainland.
    There is a widespread impression among both journalists and the 
public that it is prudent for the press to engage in a degree of self-
censorship. The pressures on journalists to self-censor usually are 
subtle and indirect. There are no reports of direct orders to refrain 
from covering a certain issue, but there is a widely shared perception 
of a need for special care toward topics of particular sensitivity to 
China or Hong Kong's powerful business interests, such as leadership 
dynamics, military activity, Taiwanese or Tibetan independence, or 
powerful businessmen's relations with the mainland Government, although 
numerous articles on these subjects continue to appear in print and in 
the broadcast media. Chinese-language journalists report a pervasive, 
if tacit, understanding that editors expect those reporting on China to 
be particularly certain of their facts and careful in their wording. 
Another source of pressure comes from the belief by some publishers and 
editors that advertising revenues or their business interests in China 
could suffer if they were seen to be too antagonistic to China or 
powerful local interests. One publication that offended the leadership 
of the mainland government several years ago experienced an advertising 
slump from August to October 1999 when several property developers 
significantly reduced their advertisements in the newspaper. Executives 
at two companies reportedly acknowledged that they were wary at the 
time of advertising in that publication given perceived SAR 
administration displeasure with the newspaper. On December 10, 
International Human Rights Day, four newspapers printed Falun Gong 
advertisements protesting Chinese government persecution of its 
members. Three newspapers refused to print the advertisement; one based 
its refusal on the grounds that the advertisement was ``defamatory of 
the Central Government.''
    In what many observers saw as an example of media self-censorship, 
the South China Morning Post (SCMP) in November demoted its long-time 
China observer Willy Lo-Lap Lam from the position of editor of the 
newspaper's China coverage to a position as an associate editor on 
mainland politics. Lam resigned rather than accept the change in 
responsibilities and claimed the newspaper's management had begun to 
``tone down'' his column on China to avoid ``exasperating'' unnamed 
persons. The editor in chief denied the charges and attributed the 
change to a restructuring of China coverage for which different 
management skills were required. However, the incident followed a 
published letter to the editor from the newspaper's owner, who 
lambasted a Lam column that claimed a group of Hong Kong 
businesspersons (including the newspaper's owner) had been offered 
commercial advantages by Chinese leaders in return for supporting SAR 
Chief Executive C.H. Tung for a second term. A previous editor of the 
SCMP also described pressures from the ownership to fire Lam and others 
in the period before the handover, pressures that he only partially 
succeeded in resisting.
    During the year, the SCMP's new English-language competitor, the 
Hong Kong iMail, brought back a satirical comic strip, which had been 
dropped abruptly by the SCMP in 1995 after it implicated then-PRC 
Premier Li Peng in the sale of organs from executed prisoners.
    Since the 1999 controversy over the reassignment of the outspoken 
head of the government-owned Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) after 
RTHK produced a program in which a prominent but unofficial Taiwan 
representative endorsed then-Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's 
controversial ``two-states'' policy, RTHK has continued to air views 
and news critical of the SAR and Chinese Governments, and continues to 
be criticized for this from supporters of the mainland Government. Some 
human rights groups have expressed concern that RTHK is dropping some 
of its more political programming in favor of softer cultural fare. The 
head of RTHK has acknowledged publicly ``pressures'' on RTHK for the 
last decade, but has been circumspect when asked to describe the 
pressures or to state whether such pressures continue. In general, 
however, there has been no discernible shift in RTHK's independent 
editorial stance since 1999's controversy. Debate continues over the 
desirability of the proposed privatization of RTHK.
    At an April 12 public seminar, a senior deputy director of the 
Central People's Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong (formerly 
called the New China News Agency or Xinhua) stated that the Hong Kong 
media should not report views that advocate Taiwan independence as 
normal news. Arguing that even an objective report would have a bias, 
the official claimed that the Hong Kong media had the responsibility to 
uphold the integrity and sovereignty of the country. He claimed that 
this is not an issue of freedom of the press. He also stated that Hong 
Kong should expedite the drafting of antisubversion laws required by 
Article 23 of the Basic Law in order to define the difference between 
reporting on the issue of Taiwan independence and advocating 
independence (in order to make it clear what kind of reporting on 
Taiwan was permitted). The official's remarks created a furor among 
politicians, human rights activists, and the media, and renewed 
concerns over the drafting of the antisubversion law required by the 
Basic Law. Some saw the official's remarks regarding Taiwan as a 
warning to the press not to advocate independence for Taiwan. Acting 
Chief Executive Anson Chan issued a statement affirming freedom of the 
press under the Basic Law and restated the Government's position that 
the timetable and content of antisubversion legislation had yet to be 
decided. Prodemocracy legislators made clear their disagreement with 
the Chinese official's comments. Media and journalist organizations 
similarly objected to the official's remarks, stressing that news 
should not be influenced by government policies. Numerous newspaper 
editorials rejected the ``advice'' of the Chinese government official. 
Following the incident, there was no apparent diminution in Hong Kong 
media reporting on Taiwan, including of proindependence views. However, 
later in April, an Internet company's local affiliate blocked its chat 
room users from discussing certain politically sensitive topics. 
Phrases like ``Taiwan independence'' and ``Tibet independence'' were 
scrambled (English letters were replaced with asterisks, and Chinese 
characters were scrambled) when they were typed in chat rooms at the 
portal. Messages including those terms posted on the site's bulletin 
boards quickly were deleted. The Internet company is partly owned by 
the NCNA, the official PRC news agency (as well as by a foreign media 
company); the portal is registered in Hong Kong and has approximately 1 
million registered users. The local affiliate company's chairman stated 
to the press that ``there are certain areas that are considered 
sensitive in every market. Freedom of speech is not absolute.'' A 
spokesman for the company was quoted as saying the company wanted users 
to exercise self-discipline. After the media reports, the practices in 
question appeared to stop. In August a businessman and advisor to the 
central Government criticized the SCMP for reporting too little ``good 
news'' and too much ``bad news.'' On October 27, Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin accused the Hong Kong media of naivete and low journalistic 
standards after a series of questions from journalists about whether he 
supported another term for Chief Executive C.H. Tung. President Jiang 
also cautioned journalists that they would be held accountable if their 
reports were not accurate enough. In November several major newspapers 
found that they were not invited to cover the festivities for the 20th 
anniversary of the Shenzhen special economic zone. Several reporters 
who tried to attend were detained for not having the appropriate 
credentials. On December 20, Chinese President Jiang warned the 
residents of Macau and Hong Kong against using their freedom to oppose 
the state and stated in remarks interpreted to include Hong Kong's news 
media that Macau's news media should value press freedom but also 
consider its social responsibilities.
    In 1999 in response to a growing number of complaints about 
tabloid-style journalism, which encouraged intrusive reporting by the 
press, the Law Reform Commission (an independent commission appointed 
by the Government in the 1980's) suggested that a Press Council with 
the power to reprimand or fine a publication found to be ``in serious 
breach of the Privacy Code'' should be appointed by the Government. 
Public reaction included concerns by journalists, legal experts, human 
rights activists, and others that such a body could be used to restrict 
press freedom. The Government indicated its preference that the media 
should regulate itself. Many (but not all) major newspapers and news 
associations established an industry watchdog, the Hong Kong Press 
Council, which began its work in September. Some critics complained 
that not all newspapers, including those with the most invasion of 
privacy complaints against them (the Oriental Daily, the Apple Daily, 
and the Sun), had agreed to participate in the voluntary organization. 
Others expressed concern that even this nonstatutory organization could 
potentially be abused to restrict press freedoms. In the first 10 weeks 
of the new organization's work, it received around a dozen complaints. 
Some readers, reportedly including victims of sex crimes, claimed 
intrusion of privacy, while others complained of exaggerated, 
inaccurate, or graphic reporting.
    In November a lawyer sued two radio talk show hosts for defamation, 
and the Court of Final Appeal ordered a retrial when it ruled that the 
trial judge in a lower court had misdirected a jury in a way that could 
endanger freedom of speech. In so doing, the Court effectively 
overturned a 150-year old guideline for defamation cases and called for 
a more generous approach toward the defense of fair comment by ruling 
that honest remarks, even those made with malice, could still be 
construed as fair comments.
    During the year, a reporter for a Chinese-language newspaper was 
sentenced to 10 years in prison for bribing police officers for 
information. The two police officers were sentenced to 7- and 9-months' 
imprisonment respectively for accepting bribes from mid-1997 to 
November 1999 (see Section 1.c).
    It is illegal to desecrate a PRC or Hong Kong flag or emblem 
publicly and willfully. In December 1999, the Court of Final Appeal 
ruled unanimously that flag-desecration laws did not violate the Basic 
Law (or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
subsumed therein) and reinstated the sentences of two persons accused 
of desecrating the Hong Kong and Chinese flags during a peaceful 
demonstration in 1998. The two had received the equivalent of 12months' 
probation. In another flag desecration case pending at year's end, the 
Government charged a prominent local activist with three counts of 
desecrating the Hong Kong flag by publicly and willfully defiling it; a 
trial is scheduled for January 2001, and a verdict is expected shortly 
thereafter. During the year, the authorities reportedly took no action 
in response to an Internet website that invited site visitors to press 
a key to activate a virtual on-line desecration of the Chinese national 
flag.
    Falun Gong publications again were displayed prominently at the 
annual Hong Kong International Book Fair. However, after some Hong Kong 
publishing houses owned by mainland Chinese interests declined to 
continue publishing Falun Gong materials after the movement was banned 
on the mainland in July 1999 (see Section 2.c.), the group shifted its 
publishing to companies based abroad. Some bookstores continued to 
offer Falun Gong materials for sale, but bookstores operated by Chinese 
enterprises that removed Falun Gong books from their shelves in the 
wake of the July 1999 ban on the movement, continued to refuse to carry 
Falun Gong publications.
    The founder of the Information Center for Human Rights and 
Democracy Movements in China (which issues press releases on human 
rights-related strikes, demonstrations, and arrests in China), who 
complained in November 1999 that he was receiving almost 1,000 
harassing phone calls and faxes each day from security agents in China, 
reported that the harassment continued through April. After that, his 
fax machine continued to receive a daily deluge of nuisance faxes, but 
the attacks on his phone and pager stopped. The nuisance faxes 
continued for several more months before they, too, ceased.
    The code requiring government departments to release information to 
the public unless there is a valid reason to withhold it remained 
effective. A department may withhold ``sensitive'' information in such 
areas as defense, security, external affairs, or law enforcement. 
Guidelines for access to information are provided to the public on an 
Internet web page.
    The Basic Law provides for academic freedom, and the Government 
generally respects that freedom in practice. There is independent 
research, a wide range of opinions, and lively debate on campuses. 
However, in July a Hong Kong University-based pollster and sometime 
political commentator publicly alleged that Chief Executive Tung Chee-
Hwa had, beginning 18 months earlier, pressured him to stop conducting 
polls on the Chief Executive's declining popularity. Specifically, the 
pollster alleged that an assistant to the Chief Executive in January 
1999 complained about the polls to a University Vice Chancellor, who in 
turn had sent a deputy to speak to the pollster. Although the pollster 
never stopped his polls, including those on the Chief Executive's 
popularity, he claimed that he had altered or not asked some questions 
in his surveys as a result of the pressure. The Chief Executive, his 
assistant, and university officials denied the allegations. The media, 
opposition parties, human rights and democracy advocates, and student 
groups were quick to respond to the allegations. The controversy 
continued for over 2 months, when an independent commission was 
established by the University to investigate the matter. The commission 
concluded that the allegations of pressure on the pollster were 
credible and that the Chief Executive's assistant and the university 
Vice Chancellor had not been ``truthful'' in their testimonies. No 
evidence that the Chief Executive himself was the origin of the 
pressure came to light. The two university officials at the center of 
the controversy resigned. However, the Chief Executive's aide remained 
in his position despite calls by opposition parties and student groups 
for his removal.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Basic Law 
provides for freedom of assembly and this right is practiced without 
significant hindrance. Article 23 of the Basic Law provides that Hong 
Kong shall enact laws to prohibit subversion, secession, treason, and 
sedition against the Chinese Government. The process of developing this 
legislation continues with no indication of when such laws may be 
enacted. Amendments to the Crime Ordinance, passed by the prehandover 
Legislative Council in 1997, narrowed the definition of treason and 
sedition to include a ``proven intention of causing violence or 
creating public disorder or a public disturbance.'' However, the 
amendments stipulate that the Government must name the date when the 
change is to take effect, and the Government has chosen not to enact 
the amendments until comprehensive legislation dealing with all 
``Article 23 crimes'' is developed. In the interim, preexisting 
provisions in the Crime Ordinance dealing with treason and sedition 
continue to apply.
    A revised Public Order Ordinance, which was passed by the 
Provisional Legislature and took effect in 1997, reintroduced the 
concept of the notice of no objection for public processions and 
empowered police to object to demonstrations on national security 
grounds as well as to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Under 
the law, demonstration organizers must notify the police of their 
intention to demonstrate 1 week in advance (shorter notice is accepted 
when the Commissioner of Police is satisfied that earlier notice could 
not have been given) for a march involving more than 30 persons and for 
an assembly of more than 50 persons. The police must give a clear reply 
within 48 hours if it objects, but otherwise no reply indicates no 
objection. In practice, demonstrators can assume ``no objection'' if 
they are not notified otherwise by 48 hours in advance of the planned 
demonstration. The national security provision has never been invoked. 
Appeals of a denial to demonstrate may be made to a statutory appeals 
board comprising members from different sectors of society. No public 
official is on the board. Both the board's proceedings and the police's 
exercise of power are subject to judicial review.
    Since the handover, there have been over 7,000 demonstrations--an 
average of over 5 per day, which is higher than prehandover rates. 
Approximately half of these demonstrations required notification. The 
police have objected to five demonstrations, three of which went ahead 
after the demonstration organizers altered their plans. Of the 
remaining two cases, one involved an environmental group's plan to 
block city-center traffic with garbage trucks to urge the Government to 
open more recycling centers. That event eventually took place at a 
different venue. The other involved right of abode protesters who 
wished to continue protests in front of Government offices for 10 days 
immediately following clashes there between police and protesters 
reacting to the Court of Final Appeal's December 1999 verdict upholding 
the NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law. The 
Appeals Board supported the police decision, as it did in the two other 
cases that had come before it.
    However, demonstrators, particularly labor activists, have 
complained that demonstrations often are limited to ``designated 
areas'' where they receive little public attention and that police 
sometimes outnumber demonstrators. A police order issued in September 
1998, while underlining that it is police ``policy to facilitate, as 
far as possible, all peaceful public order events,'' also stipulates 
that certain ``internationally protected persons'' are, in addition to 
security, entitled to ``protection of their dignity.'' Human rights 
activists remain concerned that the policy could lead to the use of 
police tactics that the IPCC had previously ruled were inappropriate.
    In addition to assemblies and marches on Hong Kong-related issues, 
groups continue to be free to demonstrate on issues of sensitivity in 
mainland China. On May 28, approximately 1,000 persons marched through 
central Hong Kong to commemorate the 11th anniversary of the June 4, 
1989, massacre in Tiananmen Square. On June 4, approximately 40,000 
demonstrators attended the annual candlelight vigil to commemorate the 
anniversary. Falun Gong practitioners regularly conduct public protests 
against the crackdown on fellow practitioners on the mainland, 
including directly in front of Hong Kong offices of the Central 
Government. However, the Falun Gong reports that some commercial 
establishments have refused to rent halls to the groups' practitioners. 
In a June protest against the Government's right of abode policies, the 
police were accused of using excessive force when they used pepper 
spray and struck demonstrators when removing them from the entrance to 
the main Government office building. As recommended by the police's 
internal disciplinary body, the Complaints against Police Office, two 
police officers received verbal warnings for their actions. A report on 
the alleged misuse of force was referred to the IPCC for further 
scrutiny.
    Student groups and human rights activists have criticized the 
Public Order Ordinance and have called for amendments to the law. Some 
also have demanded that it be repealed on the grounds that its 
provisions violated the right of assembly and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Proposed amendments to 
the Public Order Ordinance include reducing the advance notification 
period, doing away with the notice of no objection, eliminating 
``excessive'' criminal penalties of up to 5 years in prison, and 
requiring the police to obtain a court order in order to prohibit a 
demonstration. In what amounts to acts of civil disobedience, one group 
refuses to comply with the notification provisions, and it has made 
clear its intention to continue to do so until the law is revoked. 
Student and other protesters were arrested for investigation in 
connection with April and June demonstrations--over proposed tuition 
hikes and right of abode, respectively--in violation of the ordinance. 
All of the protestors were released immediately, and the Government did 
not prosecute. In December in a vote heatedly opposed by prodemocracy 
legislators, the Legislative Council supported the ordinance in its 
current form by a vote of 36 to 21. The U.N. Human Rights Committee in 
November 1999 noted its concern that the ordinance could be applied to 
restrict the right of assembly unduly, and it called on the Government 
to review the law and bring its terms into compliance with the ICCPR. 
The Court of Final Appeal has not yet had the opportunity to rule on 
the conformity of the ordinance with the ICCPR.
    The Basic Law provides for freedom of association, which is 
practiced without significant hindrance. Since the handover, no 
applications for registration have been denied. From January to 
November, the Societies Office of the police registered 1,275 
organizations. However, the ``Never Forget June 4 Organization,'' whose 
constitution calls for the end of one party rule in China, claims that 
the police have delayed the group's registration. The police state that 
the organization cannot be registered until it has been formally 
established. Human rights groups also have expressed concern that the 
amended Societies Ordinance, which like the amended Public Order 
ordinance was passed by the Provisional Legislature, could be used to 
restrict political activity. The Societies Ordinance requires that new 
societies must apply for registration within 1 month of establishment. 
The Government may refuse registration if it believes that the refusal 
is necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, 
public order, or the protection of the rights and freedom of others. 
The Government also may refuse to register a political body that 
receives support from a foreign political organization or a Taiwan-
based political organization. The U.N. Human Rights Committee in 
November 1999 noted its concern that the ordinance could be applied to 
restrict unduly the right of association and called on the Government 
to review the law so as to ensure full protection of the right to 
freedom of association under the ICCPR.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Basic Law provides for freedom of 
religion, the Bill of Rights Ordinance prohibits religious 
discrimination, and the Government respects these provisions in 
practice. The Government at all levels protects religious freedom in 
full, and does not tolerate its abuse, either by government or private 
actors.
    The Government does not recognize a state religion but does grant 
public holidays to mark numerous special days on the traditional 
Chinese and Christian calendars, as well as Buddha's birthday.
    Religious groups are not required to register with the Government 
and are exempted specifically from the Societies Ordinance, which 
requires the registration of nongovernmental organizations. Catholics 
recognize the Pope as the head of the Catholic Church, unlike on the 
mainland. The spiritual movement widely known as Falun Gong, which does 
not consider itself a religion, is registered, practices freely, and 
holds regular public demonstrations against PRC policies. Despite 
complaints by PRC representatives and a stern warning from Chief 
Executive C.H. Tung not to violate Hong Kong law or act ``in any manner 
against the interests of China, Hong Kong, or 'one country, two 
systems,''' Falun Gong practitioners remained active, and organized 
public demonstrations outside PRC offices. Other traditional martial 
arts/meditation groups, known collectively as qigong groups, including 
Zhong Gong (which was banned in the PRC in late 1999), Xiang Gong, and 
Yan Xin Qigong, also are registered and practice freely in Hong Kong. 
Another group allegedly listed as an ``evil cult'' by the PRC, the 
Taiwan-based Guan Yin Method, is registered legally and practices 
freely.
    Although under the Basic Law the PRC Government has no say over 
religious practices in Hong Kong, its representatives in the SAR and 
the two PRC-owned newspapers have criticized some religious and other 
spiritual groups and individuals there. Hong Kong religious leaders 
also have noted that the Basic Law provision that calls for ties 
between local religious organizations and their mainland counterparts 
to be based on ``nonsubordination, noninterference and mutual respect'' 
could be used to limit such ties. In April mainland authorities 
reportedly charged a Hong Kong religious leader with violating this 
noninterference clause by criticizing mainland religious policies. In 
September Hong Kong-based Chinese officials urged Hong Kong's Catholic 
Church to keep ``low key'' any celebrations of the October 1 
canonization by the Pope of 120 foreign missionaries and Chinese 
Catholics who had been martyred in China. The Hong Kong Catholic Church 
stated however, that it did not alter its fairly extensive plans to 
mark the occasion. The traditional ties of the Hong Kong Catholic 
Church to the Vatican have not precluded its contacts with the official 
Catholic Church in the PRC. However, it reportedly has had many 
contacts and exchanges with its mainland counterparts in the official 
church put on hold due to the current restrictive climate in the PRC 
for religious groups.
    In June 1999, the PRC Government, which has responsibility for the 
SAR's foreign affairs, blocked a proposed papal visit. The PRC 
Government reportedly considered the visit to be one of a head of state 
rather than one of a religious leader. When this news became public in 
August 1999, Hong Kong's Chief Executive reiterated the importance of 
religious freedom to Hong Kong and noted the ``unfortunate'' fact that 
the Pope could not visit Hong Kong because of foreign policy concerns.
    Although Falun Gong is free to practice, organize, and conduct 
public demonstrations, its practitioners expressed concern about 
pressure coming from mainland authorities and their supporters. 
Numerous articles critical of the group appeared in PRC-owned Hong Kong 
newspapers. In April a PRC State Council spokesman reportedly called a 
Hong Kong Falun Gong spokesman ``a tool used by Western powers to 
subvert the Central Government.'' A Falun Gong spokesman in Hong Kong 
responded that practitioners were undeterred by the PRC's unfounded 
criticisms, but the number of Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong is 
said to have dropped from approximately 1,000 to approximately 600 
since the mainland crackdown began in mid-1999. In a December speech in 
which he made clear his comments applied equally to Hong Kong and 
Macau, Jiang Zemin said the Macau Government should never allow anyone 
to stage any activities in Macau against the Central Government or to 
split the country. Some Hong Kong publishing houses owned by mainland 
Chinese interests declined to continue publishing Falun Gong materials 
after the movement was banned on the mainland in July 1999, and some 
bookstores operated by mainland enterprises removed Falun Gong books 
from their shelves (see Section 2.a.). In addition Falun Gong 
organizers have reported reluctance on the part of some hotels, 
cultural centers, and other venues to lend or lease space for Falun 
Gong exhibitions or other activities.
    In October 1999, it was discovered that PRC Government censorship 
of Falun Gong-related information temporarily affected Hong Kong users 
of a major local paging service because the service utilized mainland-
located transmission centers. Mainland-based employees of the company 
refused to transmit messages regarding Falun Gong, even for Hong Kong 
customers, because of an alleged PRC Government instruction that any 
messages related to Falun Gong should not be broadcast. Under scrutiny 
from the Government and pressure from the wider community, the company 
found a technical solution to the problem and ceased censorship for 
customers whose service was limited to Hong Kong. However, the company 
insisted, and the Hong Kong Telecommunications Authority agreed, that 
the company must follow mainland laws (including censorship rules) for 
customers whose paging service extended to the mainland. Hong Kong 
customers with China-wide (rather than Hong Kong-only) service remained 
unable to receive messages relating to Falun Gong. The Hong Kong 
Telecommunications Authority issued amended guidelines in February 
requiring paging services to configure their systems to enable Hong 
Kong-origin paging messages, including those that would be barred for 
transmission in places outside Hong Kong, including the PRC, to be 
transmitted in Hong Kong (see Section 1.f.).
    d. Freedom of Movement, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and 
Repatriation.--The Basic Law provides residents freedom of movement 
within Hong Kong, freedom of emigration, and freedom to enter and leave 
the territory, and the Government respects these rights in practice. 
Travel documents are obtained freely and easily, however, there are 
some limits on travel to the mainland (imposed by the mainland 
Government).
    As was the case before the handover, the Taiwan passport is not 
recognized as valid for visa endorsement purposes.
    In the past, several prominent overseas dissidents have been denied 
visas to enter Hong Kong.
    Chinese authorities do not permit a number of Hong Kong human 
rights activists and legislators to visit the mainland. Many Democratic 
Party legislators, for example, are not allowed to travel to the 
mainland. Political and human rights activists assert that the 
restriction on travel to the mainland on those who disagree with the 
Central Government's policies has a dampening effect on political 
debate, particularly among those with business interests on the 
mainland. However, one prominent labor and democracy activist, 
previously denied permission for many years, was allowed to enter the 
mainland to visit his ailing parent twice during the year.
    In early August, several persons who would likely be required to 
return to the mainland as a result of the 1999 right of abode decision 
set fire to a floor of an Immigration Department office, some 
reportedly also set themselves on fire. Fifty persons were injured in 
the incident; 2 died.
    The 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol does not extend to Hong Kong, and the SAR eliminated its 
first asylum policy in 1998. On a case-by-case basis, the Director of 
Immigration has discretion to grant refugee status or asylum in cases 
of exceptional humanitarian or compassionate need, but the Immigration 
Ordinance does not provide foreigners any right to have their asylum 
claim recognized. The general practice is to refer refugee and asylum 
claimants to a lawyer or to the office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). Those granted refugee status, as well as those 
awaiting UNHCR assessment of their status, receive a subsistence 
allowance from the UNHCR, but are allowed neither to seek employment 
nor enroll their children in local schools. Of the approximately 100 
persons receiving UNHCR support in late November, around 70 began to 
receive such support during the year. The UNHCR works with potential 
host country representatives in Hong Kong to resettle those designated 
as refugees. Government policy is to repatriate all illegal immigrants, 
including the approximately 23 per day that arrive from the mainland, 
as promptly as possible. However, human rights groups have complained 
of a few cases in which seekers of asylum or refugee status have been 
arrested for illegal immigration and incarcerated for periods of up to 
several months, but there were no reports of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    In February the Government terminated its Millport policy, under 
which Vietnamese asylum seekers intercepted in boats in Hong Kong 
waters were assisted in their voluntary departure from Hong Kong, 
because of evidence the policy was being abused by illegal immigrants 
who claimed passage through Hong Kong to other destinations. In June, 
in a move welcomed by human rights groups and the UNHCR, Hong Kong 
approved for permanent resettlement approximately 1,400 Vietnamese 
refugees and migrants. With this action the SAR Government closed the 
world's last remaining Vietnamese refugee camp (Pillar Point), and 
brought to an end the resettlement process that had handled more than 
220,000 Vietnamese who had landed in Hong Kong since 1975. 
Approximately 6 percent of the 1,400 persons approved for resettlement 
declined the Government's offer, and instead chose to retain their 
refugee status in order to continue to seek resettlement elsewhere. 
Since the closure of the Pillar Point camp the number of undocumented 
Vietnamese immigrants arriving in Hong Kong dropped to approximately 40 
per month.
    The case of 289 additional Vietnamese illegal immigrants who 
entered Hong Kong from China was under appeal at year's end.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Residents' right to change their government is limited by the Basic 
Law, which provides for the selection of the Chief Executive by an 800-
person selection committee (which itself is appointed or indirectly 
elected), the direct election of less than half of Legislative Council 
members, and the inclusion of appointed members to the elected district 
councils. In addition while the approval of the Chief Executive, two-
thirds of the legislature, and two-thirds of Hong Kong's National 
People's Congress delegates is required to place an amendment to the 
Basic Law originating in Hong Kong on the agenda of China's National 
People's Congress, it is the National People's Congress that has the 
power actually to amend the Basic Law, and procedures for amendment or 
interpretations that originate in the mainland are unclear.
    The government structure is two-tiered, and it consists of the 
Legislative Council and 18 district councils. (A third, middle tier, 
collectively known as the municipal councils, was abolished at the end 
of 1999.) C.H. Tung is Chief Executive.
    The Chief Executive was chosen prior to the handover by a 400-
member selection committee, which in turn was chosen by a 150-member 
preparatory committee appointed by the Chinese Government. The Basic 
Law provides for elections for Chief Executive in 2002 and 2007, by a 
committee of 800 local residents. This committee is the same as the 
committee formed to select 6 legislators in September. It is composed 
of the 60 members of the Legislative Council, the 36 Hong Kong 
delegates to the National People's Congress, 40 representatives from 
religious groups, and 664 persons elected by the same 179,000 voters 
(some representing organizations; others voting as individuals) who 
chose the functional constituency representatives of the Legislative 
Council. The Government stated in October that it would not introduce 
legislation on election procedures of the Chief Executive until mid-
2001. The Basic Law permits amendment of the Chief Executive selection 
process after 2007 by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Council, 
with consent of the Chief Executive and the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress. The Basic Law states that ``the ultimate 
aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon 
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in 
accordance with democratic procedures.''
    A provisional legislature, appointed by the same 400-member 
committee that appointed the Chief Executive, served from July 1, 1997, 
until June 30, 1998. Although the Provisional Legislature included 33 
of 34 legislators from the 1995 Legislative Council who sought 
inclusion, the Democratic Party and several independents declined to 
seek seats in what they deemed an illegitimate body, which they claimed 
lacked a legal foundation and transparency, and excluded groups, 
parties, and individuals critical of China. The Provisional Legislature 
repealed several laws that had been enacted by the elected Legislative 
Council to enhance civil and political rights, including: Amendments to 
the Bill of Rights Ordinance; the Employee Right to Representation, 
Consultation, and Collective Bargaining Ordinance; the 1997 Employment 
(Amendment) Ordinance, and the 1997 Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance 
(see Section 6.a.). A lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the 
Provisional Legislative Council was unsuccessful, and the repeals 
remain controversial, albeit without further legal challenge.
    Elections for Hong Kong's first and second posthandover Legislative 
Councils were held in May 1998 and in September, respectively. The 
Legislative Council elected in September is to serve a 4-year term. In 
the first election, 20 members were elected directly from geographic 
districts through universal suffrage, 30 from functional (occupational) 
constituencies, and 10 by votes of a committee of local elected 
officials. In the second, 24 members were elected directly from 
geographic districts through universal suffrage, 30 from functional 
constituencies, and 6 by votes of the 800-person Selection Committee 
which is composed of representatives of professions, district councils 
and religious groups, as well as local representatives to Chinese 
national political bodies, and Legislative Councilors. Prodemocracy 
candidates won 17 of the
    24 seats elected on a geographic basis (including 1 in a December 
by-election) and 22 seats overall.
    In both the 1998 and September elections, the functional 
constituencies were drawn more narrowly than the nine broad functional 
constituencies of the 1995 Legislative Council, and the total number of 
potential voters in functional constituencies was reduced from 1.15 
million in 1995 to 189,000 in 1998. Human rights groups contend that 
the election of functional constituency representatives by so few 
persons is fundamentally undemocratic. There was general acceptance of 
the geographic electoral districts (which include 3 million registered 
voters) proposed in 1997 by the Electoral Affairs Commission. A bill 
calling for an accelerated time line for direct election of all 
Legislative Council seats was defeated in the Legislative Council in 
1998.
    In December the Court of Final Appeal ended a century-old practice 
of excluding nonindigenous villagers from participating in rural 
elections. The Court unanimously found that the practice violated both 
the Bill of Rights and the Sex Discrimination Ordinances.
    The ability of the legislature to influence policy is limited 
substantially by Basic Law provisions that require separate majorities 
among members elected from geographical and functional constituencies 
in order to pass a bill introduced by an individual member and that 
prohibit the Legislative Council from putting forward bills that affect 
public expenditure, political structure, or government operations. The 
Chief Executive's written consent is required before bills affecting 
government policy may be introduced. Additionally, the Government has 
adopted a very broad definition of ``government policy'' in order to 
block private member bills, and the President of the Legislative 
Council has upheld the Government's position. A motion proposed by a 
prodemocracy legislator to repeal restrictions on private members' 
bills was rejected in January; however, the Legislative Council's 
degree of popular representation and outspokenness gives the Government 
cause to consider its views. In June when the Legislative Council 
passed a no-confidence motion against two senior housing officials, the 
more senior of the two resigned.
    The November 1999 elections for Hong Kong's District Councils--the 
sole remaining local government body after the abolition of the 
Municipal Councils--were free and fair; however, democratic legislators 
and human rights activists complained that the appointment of nearly 
one-quarter of District Councilors by the Chief Executive is an 
undemocratic procedure. According to the District Councils Ordinance 
enacted in March 1999, the District Councils are responsible for 
advising the government on matters affecting: (1) the well-being of 
district residents; (2) the provision and use of public facilities; and 
(3) the use of public funds allocated for local public works and 
community activities.
    An October 1999 motion in the Legislative Council calling for a 
referendum on the Government's proposal to abolish the Urban and 
Regional Councils, Hong Kong's mid-tier local government organs known 
collectively as the Municipal Councils, was defeated. However, in 
December 1999, the Legislative Council passed a controversial bill 
abolishing the Municipal Councils when their terms expired at the end 
of the year. The Councils had been the subject of widespread public 
criticism for their poor handling of the Avian Flu, the Red Tide, and 
other public health issues for which they were responsible. Legislators 
from the democratic parties and human rights activists protested the 
abolition of the councils, arguing that they were important to the 
development of party and democratic political leaders. The UN Human 
Rights Committee in November 1999 also expressed concern that the 
abolition of the municipal councils would ``diminish the opportunity of 
Hong Kong residents to take part in the conduct of public affairs.''
    Hong Kong sends 36 delegates to China's National People's Congress 
(NPC). These 36 individuals are an important group since placing 
proposed amendments to the Basic Law on the agenda of the NPC requires 
the approval of two-thirds of Hong Kong's NPC delegates. Hong Kong's 
NPC delegates also are members of the Election Committee that chose 10 
of the Legislature's 60 members in 1998 and 6 of the legislatures 
members during the year. Hong Kong's NPC delegates were selected to a 
5-year term in December 1997 by an NPC-appointed committee of 424 
residents. Politicians and human rights activists criticized the 
selection process as undemocratic and lacking transparency and noted 
that Central Government Liaison Office (formerly the New China News 
Agency) Director Jiang Enzhu, who is not a Hong Kong permanent 
resident, is one of Hong Kong's 36 delegates.
    Women are underrepresented in politics and in elective office, but 
larger numbers are seeking public office than ever before. Women hold 
10 of the 60 Legislative Council seats, and women make up between 5 and 
33 percent of membership in political parties. The President of the 
Legislative Council is a woman, as is the head of the civil service 
(the number two person in the Hong Kong Government). The Equal 
Opportunities Commission noted that women were a minority in Government 
advisory bodies. A report in May compiled by the Hong Kong Federation 
of Women stated that only between 16 to 22 percent of judges, Executive 
Council members, advisory board members or top civil servants are 
women. However, women are well represented at the highest levels of 
government. The Chief Secretary, Secretary for Security, Secretary for 
Justice, Treasure Secretary and Education Secretary are all women. 
Minorities are also represented in senior civil service positions.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Dozens of domestic and international nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's) operate freely (see Section 2.b.). These organizations have 
unrestricted and thriving contacts with the local community and with 
groups overseas. Government officials are generally receptive to, and 
respectful of, their views. Prominent human rights activists who focus 
on mainland China also operate freely and enjoy permanent resident 
status in Hong Kong.
    The 1988 Ombudsman Ordinance established the Office of the 
Ombudsman, which has wide powers to investigate and report on 
grievances from members of the public as a result of administrative 
actions of the executive branch and other designated public bodies. 
However, the credibility of the Ombudsman's independence is undermined 
by the fact that most of its staff is seconded from the Government, 
putting them in the position of investigating their former and future 
bosses. A proposal for the office to become independent of the 
Government in 2002 reportedly has received official approval. Another 
limitation is that the Ombudsman does not have oversight authority over 
the police, the Independent Commission against Corruption, the Equal 
Opportunities Commission, or the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for 
Personal Data. The Ombudsman may investigate complaints of 
noncompliance with the code on access to information by government 
departments, including the police and the Independent Commission 
against Corruption. With regard to election-related complaints, the 
Ombudsman only is empowered to investigate complaints made against the 
Registration and Electoral Office, not those made against the Electoral 
Affairs Commission. Thus, the Ombudsman's human rights role regarding 
liberty of persons, freedom from arbitrary and unlawful arrest and 
detention, equality, and related matters is limited considerably.
    The Ombudsman may publish investigation reports in which the 
identity of the complainant has been disguised. In addition to 
responding to public complaints, the Ombudsman may initiate 
investigations on his own. The Ombudsman may report to the Chief 
Executive if he believes that his recommendations to the organizations 
under his jurisdiction have not been acted upon or if there are serious 
violations; the Chief Executive is bound by law to present such reports 
to the legislature.
    Human rights groups have complained that Hong Kong does not have a 
human rights commission. The U.N. Human Rights Committee in November 
1999 expressed concern ``that there is no independent body established 
by law to investigate and monitor human rights violations in Hong Kong 
and the implementation of Covenant rights.'' In March visiting U.N. 
Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson urged Hong Kong to set up such 
a body.
    Under the Basic Law, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights apply, with certain restrictions, to Hong Kong. The 
Chinese Government transmits Hong Kong's reports under these covenants, 
without editing, to the U.N. The reports are prepared without 
interference from the Chinese Government, but local NGO's have 
complained that they were not consulted fully enough on the contents of 
the reports. The Government and several domestic NGO's have testified 
before the U.N. Human Rights Committee in Geneva, Switzerland. The 
hearings, including concerns of the Committee, have received widespread 
and balanced press coverage. In May Hong Kong sent representatives to 
attend, as part of China's delegation, hearings held by the U.N. 
Committee against Torture in Geneva on China's periodic report. In 
October Hong Kong's report under the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was submitted to the 
U.N. in Geneva by the Chinese Government as part of China's periodic 
report. In November the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights considered Hong Kong's report under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Basic Law provides that all Hong Kong residents shall be equal 
before the law. The Bill of Rights Ordinance, which provides for the 
incorporation into Hong Kong law of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights as applied to Hong Kong, entitles Hong Kong 
residents to the civil and political rights recognized therein 
``without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.'' However, the ordinance binds only 
the Government, public authorities and persons acting on their behalf, 
that is, not private persons or entities. Three pieces of 
antidiscrimination legislation--the Sex Discrimination Ordinance 
(1995), the Disability Discrimination Ordinance (1995), and the Family 
Status Discrimination Ordinance (1997)--have made it illegal for any 
person or entity (public or private) to discriminate against anyone on 
the grounds of sex, marital status, pregnancy, disability, or family 
status, and prohibits behavior such as sexual harassment, harassment or 
vilification on the grounds of disability, and discriminatory 
advertising. An Equal Opportunities Commission was established in 1996 
to work toward the elimination of discrimination and to promote 
equality of opportunity with specific reference to gender, disability, 
and family status.
    Human rights groups have called for laws specifically targeting, 
among other problems, public or private discrimination based on race 
and age. The U.N. Human Rights Committee in November 1999 expressed 
concern ``that no legislative remedies are available to individuals in 
respect of discrimination on the grounds of race'' and called for 
legislation to ensure full compliance with the Covenant. A November 
survey identified strong societal prejudice against minority groups 
including mainland Chinese migrants. The Equal Opportunities Commission 
reported that the elderly are discriminated against in the allocation 
of public housing, but noted that it was powerless to help, because 
there is no legislation prohibiting age discrimination in Hong Kong.
    Although many rights activists generally consider the government's 
Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) an ally in the fight against 
discrimination, some have criticized the organization for passivity and 
for emphasizing conciliation instead of acting as a watchdog or 
pursuing court cases. In the first 8 months of the year, the Equal 
Opportunities Commission received 198 complaints of sex discrimination, 
83 of which involved pregnancy discrimination. As of the end of 
September, 5 cases were brought to court under the Sex Discrimination 
Ordinance and were pending resolution. In the first 8 months of the 
year, 191 complaints were filed under the Disability Discrimination 
Ordinance; 3 of these cases went to court. As of September, two cases 
were still pending while one case resulted in a ruling in favor of the 
plaintiffs. In the first 8 months of the year, 12 complaints were 
received under the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, which 
protects persons whose marital status changes, who have children, or 
who are responsible for caring for another family member, such as a 
child or elderly person, 11 of the 12 complaints were related to 
employment, but no cases had been filed by year's end.
    The Government's ``Code of Practice for Employers'' designed to 
prevent discrimination states that race, among other factors, should 
not be considered when hiring employees. However, it accepts that 
special circumstances exist, such as when the employee works or lives 
in the employer's home. The Government has undertaken a public 
education and awareness campaign to combat race discrimination with 
only limited effect.
    Women.--Violence against women remains a problem, particularly 
among new immigrants from the mainland. The only law that specifically 
protects battered women is the 1987 Domestic Violence Ordinance, which 
allows a woman to seek a 3-month injunction against her husband 
(extendable to 6 months). Domestic violence also may be prosecuted as 
common assault. The Government enforces the laws and prosecutes 
violators, but sentences generally are lenient. In 1999 472 cases of 
domestic violence were reported to the police, while in the first 6 
months of the year, 320 cases were reported. Cases of battered spouses 
reported to the Social Welfare Department from April 1999 to March 
increased 44 percent over the previous 12 months to 1,689 cases. Women 
tend not to seek help when subject to violence; cultural factors and 
inadequate information about available assistance and resources result 
in many cases of spousal abuse going unreported. In May the Government 
established an interdepartmental Working Group on Sexual Violence to 
ensure coordination of efforts among various departments and 
authorities in handling the problem of sexual violence. Also in May, 
the Government announced plans to establish a Women's Commission later 
in the year to address women's concerns in a comprehensive and 
systematic manner. The Government also funds programs such as family 
life education counseling, a hot line service, temporary housing, legal 
aid, and child protective services; it also has initiated public 
education and media programs.
    The Hong Kong Federation of Women's Centres asked the Government to 
prepare a comprehensive services plan especially for women from the 
mainland, with counseling and job-training to help them integrate. Hong 
Kong's Society for Community Organisation estimated that tens of 
thousands of women in Hong Kong, largely single women and widows from 
the mainland, are regularly subjected to the threat of violence, abuse, 
robbery, and sexual harassment by cohabitors. In November some 200 
women, including sex workers, domestic helpers, and members of 12 
womens groups, held an antiviolence-against-women rally, demanding 
greater Government protection for women, more assistance to victims, 
and a special court to handle such cases in a bid to preserve a woman's 
dignity.
    The general incidence of rape is low. There were 90 cases of rape 
reported to the police in 1998, 91 in 1999, and 49 in the first half of 
the year. However, underreporting is considered a serious problem. 
Amendments to the evidence bill and to the Crime Ordinance that would 
abolish the requirement of corroboration of evidence of sexual offense 
and would clarify that marital rape is a crime are under consideration.
    Prostitution is not illegal. However, there are laws against 
activities such as causing or procuring another to be a prostitute, 
living on the prostitution of others, and keeping a vice establishment. 
Many women working in the sex industry have been brought to Hong Kong 
under conditions resembling trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment is a problem. Many women tend not to seek help 
when subjected to sexual harassment, and it is underreported. Police 
statistics report 1,047 sexual harassment cases in 1999. Government and 
NGO surveys and statistics from a counseling hot line, however, suggest 
sexual harassment cases in fact total anywhere from 2+ to 10 times more 
than the number reported.
    Women face discrimination in employment, salary, welfare, 
inheritance, and promotion (see Section 6.e.). The EOC's task force on 
Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value is studying ways to implement this 
principle, including possible draft legislation. The press carries 
occasional stories of women alleging discrimination in the workplace in 
connection with pregnancies. The number of complaints to the EOC of 
dismissal after employees' return from maternity leave increased in 
1999. Official unemployment figures for the period from May through 
July were 5.7 percent for men and 4.2 percent for women. However, human 
rights organizations and unions assert that the statistics inaccurately 
record many unemployed women as housewives and that, in fact, the 
unemployment rate for women is actually higher than the unemployment 
rate for men. Women are entering professional fields, including 
medicine, in greater numbers. Nonetheless, in the medical profession 
there are few women in prestigious specialties such as surgery. Female 
judicial officers and judges make up only 18.8 percent of the 
judiciary. Women also are disproportionately represented in the lower 
echelons of the work force, holding positions such as retail sales 
assistants and office clerks. The Home Affairs Department this summer 
organized the Working Group of Web-Enabling Women to help less educated 
women enter the digital workforce. As a result of 1994 revisions to 
inheritance statutes, the law treats men and women equally in 
inheritance matters, although women still face discrimination based on 
traditional practices. Alimony is another problem, with one survey 
indicating that 80 percent of divorced women fail to receive money 
regularly from their former husbands. The November 1999 U.N. Human 
Rights Committee report expressed concern that differences exist 
between men's and women's earning levels, that women were 
underrepresented in public boards and public offices, and that there is 
customary discrimination against women in the inheritance of small 
homes in rural areas of the New Territories.
    Based on its 1999 study showing that the Education Department's 
allocation scheme for secondary school places clearly discriminated 
against girls, the EOC in July requested a judicial review of the 
scheme. Education officials acknowledge that the current system of 
secondary school place allocation discriminates against girls because 
boys and girls are ranked (and accepted) separately. The High Court's 
on the EOC's request for judicial review is pending. The November 1999 
U.N. Human Rights Committee report expressed concern that the 
educational system discriminates against girls in selection for 
secondary schools. In 1999 the number of female secondary student 
candidates accounted for 55.7 percent of the total who took university 
advanced-level examinations, and the number of female candidates who 
matriculated at universities accounted for between 52 and
    56 percent of all matriculating candidates. This is similar to 
earlier years.
    In the spring, the Government announced the establishment of a 
Women's Commission to promote and protect the interests and well being 
of women. The Commission, which had yet to begin operating as of year's 
end, reportedly plans to focus on provision of health services, 
childcare support, protecting women against violence, promotion of a 
women-friendly working environment and legal issues relating to women 
and the family.
    Children.--The Government is committed firmly to children's rights 
and welfare through well-funded systems of public education, medical 
care, and protective services. The Education Department is committed to 
providing schooling for children between 6 and 15 years of age and 
provides placement services for non-Chinese speaking children. 
Education is free and compulsory through grade nine. The Government 
supports programs for custody, protection, day care, foster care, 
shelters, small group homes, and assistance to families. The age of 
criminal responsibility for children is 7, although it must be proved 
that a child under the age of 14 understood the consequences of his or 
her actions. In May the Law Reform Commission recommended that the age 
of criminal responsibility be raised to 10, and stated that children 
between 10 and 14 should be presumed to be incapable of committing a 
crime unless that presumption can be rebutted by the prosecution. The 
Commission also recommended that the Administration carry out a general 
review of the juvenile justice system. In 1999 there were 108 youths 
under the age of 16 who were incarcerated, 48 who were in prison, 29 
who were in training centers, 27 who were in detention centers, and 4 
who were in drug addiction treatment centers. In April one youth died 
during an attempted escape from a detention center.
    Child abuse and exploitation are not widespread, but statistics 
indicate they are increasing. There is no specific laws dealing with 
child pornography, but child pornography is covered under other 
antipornography laws. A proposed bill on Prevention of Child 
Pornography and proposed amendments to the Crimes Bill before the 
Legislative Council since June 1999 would prohibit the printing, 
distribution, advertising, or possession of child pornography. The 
bills also would prohibit arranging or advertising of sexual offenses 
involving children under the age of 16. The Crimes (Amendment) Bill 
would also provide extraterritorial effect when either the perpetrator 
or the victim of a sexual offense involving a child or a person 
printing, distributing, advertising or possessing child pornography 
``has a nexus with Hong Kong.''
    In the first 6 months of the year, 754 cases of child abuse were 
reported to the police; 327 involved physical abuse of victims below 
the age of 14, and 427 involved sexual abuse of victims below the age 
of 17. Child abuse cases newly registered with the Social Welfare 
Department totaled 328 through August and 575 for all of 1999. In 1995 
the police set up a child abuse investigation unit to improve the 
treatment of victims, and in 1996 legislation was passed making it 
easier for child victims to testify in court using an interviewing 
suite for recording statements. Legal penalties for mistreatment or 
neglect of minors also were increased substantially. A witness support 
program also was launched in 1996 to help child witnesses in need. A 
child witness information kit in Chinese, with books explaining legal 
and court proceedings, was published in 1996 to help reduce children's 
anxiety about testifying. In 1998 a Child Care Center Bill was passed 
to prevent unsuitable persons from providing child care services and to 
facilitate the formation of mutual help child care groups.
    People with Disabilities.--Discrimination against the physically 
and mentally disabled persists in employment, education, and the 
provision of some public services. The 1995 Disability 
Nondiscrimination Law called for improved building access and sanctions 
against those who discriminate. The Buildings Ordinance amended in 1997 
updated design requirements. However, despite inspections and 
occasional closure of noncompliant businesses, access to public 
buildings and transportation remains a serious problem for the 
disabled. Advocates for the disabled complained that limited access for 
the disabled at polling stations made voting in both the 1998 and in 
the September elections difficult because of accessibility problems. 
The Government has an integrated work extension program in sheltered 
workshops and expanded vocational assessment and training. No 
comprehensive statistics are available on the number of disabled 
persons in the work force, but a consortium of organizations 
representing disabled persons reported that about 700,000 residents are 
disabled, and about half are able to work. A 1997 survey by the EOC 
found that depending on the kind of disability, unemployment rates 
ranged from 20 to 50 percent. There are 5,259 disabled persons employed 
as civil servants of a total civil service work force of 185,868--about 
2.8 percent of all civil servants. During the first 8 months of the 
year, the Labor Department's Selective Placement Division found jobs 
for 1,359 of 2,463 disabled job seekers. Approximately 9,000 students 
in a school population of 955,000, or just under 1 percent, are 
disabled. In the 1999-2000 school year, there were 168 places in 
regular schools for the mildly disabled under the Integrated Education 
Program. In 1997 the Government started a special university admission 
scheme for the disabled.
    In the first 9 months of the year, three cases under the Disability 
Discrimination Ordinance were brought to court with EOC involvement. 
One case was resolved in September when the court ruled in favor of the 
three plaintiffs who had been given legal assistance by the EOC. The 
other two cases remained pending.
    In 1999 the Government formed the Guardianship Board under the 
Mental Health Ordinance to protect the interests of persons with mental 
disabilities or disorders, including dementia.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government has resisted 
recommendations by human rights groups, the U.N. Human Rights, 
legislators, and others that it enact specific antirace discrimination 
legislation. In June the Government blocked a proposed antirace 
discrimination bill put forward by a legislator. The Government 
proposes to combat discrimination through education, rather than by 
legislation. A government ``Code of Practice for Employers'' designed 
to prevent discrimination states that race should not be considered 
when hiring employees. Minorities, who make up approximately 5 percent 
of the population, are well represented in the civil service and many 
professions. However, there are regular allegations of racial 
discrimination in such areas as private sector employment, admission to 
public restaurants, placement in public schools, treatment in public 
hospitals, and acceptance to institutions of higher education. Foreign 
domestic workers, most of whom are from the Philippines, are 
particularly vulnerable to discrimination. In January an Indonesian 
Migrant Workers Union was established to unite Indonesian domestic 
helpers throughout Asia and to protect members from abuse and 
exploitation; approximately 41,000 Indonesian domestic helpers work in 
Hong Kong. Similar organizations work for the interests of Philippine 
domestic helpers, of whom there are approximately 170,000. According to 
organizations representing migrant workers, police intimidation of 
migrant workers is also a problem.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right of 
association and the right of workers to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing. Trade unions must be registered 
under the Trade Unions Ordinance. The basic precondition for 
registration is a minimum of seven persons who serve in the same 
occupation. The Government does not discourage or impede the formation 
of unions. In 1999, 35 unions (comprising 33 employee unions and two 
mixed organizations of employees and employers) were registered under 
the Trade Unions Ordinance. During the year, 11 new unions (10 employee 
unions and one employee/employer mixed union) were registered. As of 
the end of August, the total number of registered trade unions was 632 
(588 employee, 25 employer, and 19 mixed). Over 20 percent of the 
approximately 3.3 million salaried employees and wage earners belong to 
a labor organization. Trade unions are independent of political parties 
and the Government.
    The Employment Ordinance includes provisions that protect against 
antiunion discrimination. Violation of the antiunion discrimination 
provisions is a criminal offense with a maximum fine of $12,800 
(HK$100,000). Employees who allege such discrimination have the right 
to have their cases heard by the Labor Relations Tribunal. The Tribunal 
may order reinstatement of the employee, subject to mutual consent of 
the employer and employee. If no such order is made, the Tribunal may 
award statutory entitlements (severance pay, etc.) and compensation. 
The maximum amount of compensation is $20,000 (HK$156,000). However, 
labor activists complain that complainants are discouraged by the Labor 
Relations Tribunal's tendency to push conciliation rather than issue 
orders. In 1999 the Labor Relations Division of the Labor Department 
handled 7 complaints of antiunion discrimination. During the first 8 
months of the year, there were 3 such complaints. Owing to insufficient 
evidence or unwillingness of employees to act as prosecution witnesses, 
no prosecution action has been taken against the employers concerned.
    Work stoppages and strikes are permitted. However, there are some 
restrictions on this right for civil servants. Through August 4 strikes 
were reported. There were 3 strikes during 1999, which resulted in 299 
lost workdays; in 1998 there were 8 strikes. Although there is no 
legislative prohibition of strikes, in practice, most workers must sign 
employment contracts that typically state that walking off the job is a 
breach of contract which can lead to summary dismissal.
    The Basic Law commits the SAR to 40 International Labor 
Organization (ILO) conventions, and the Government has amended labor 
legislation and taken administrative measures to comply (see Section 
6.b.).
    In October 1997, the Provisional Legislature promulgated the 
Employment and Labor Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill. This 
bill permits the cross-industry affiliation of labor union federations 
and confederations and allows free association with overseas trade 
unions (although notification of the Labor Department within 1 month of 
affiliation is required).
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--In June 1997, 
the Legislative Council passed three laws that greatly expanded the 
collective bargaining powers of workers, protected them from summary 
dismissal for union activity, and permitted union activity on company 
premises and time. The new ordinances would have enabled full 
implementation of ILO Conventions 87 (which was ratified with 
reservations in 1963), 98, and 154. However, in October 1997, after 
consultation with the Labor Advisory Board, the Provisional Legislature 
repealed the 1997 Employee's Right to Representation, Consultation, and 
Collective Bargaining Ordinance and the 1997 Employment (Amendment) 
Ordinance, and amended the Trade Union (Amendment) Ordinance. The 
repeal removed the new legislation's statutory protection against 
summary dismissal for union activity; the Government argued that 
existing law already offered adequate protection against unfair 
dismissal arising from antiunion discrimination.
    The 1997 Employment and Labor Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments) 
Bill removes the legal stipulation of trade unions' right to engage 
employers in collective bargaining; bans the use of union funds for 
political purposes; requires the Chief Executive's approval before 
unions can contribute funds to any trade union outside of Hong Kong; 
and restricts the appointment of persons from outside the enterprise or 
sector to union executive committees. The Hong Kong Confederation of 
Trade Unions promptly filed a complaint against the Hong Kong 
Government for violation of ILO Conventions 87, 98, and 154. In 
November 1999, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association concluded 
that the new labor ordinance breached conventions 87 and 98 and 
recommended that the Government take legislative action to remedy the 
situation. The Government provided the ILO progress reports in May 1999 
and January asserting that it was in compliance with all of the 40 ILO 
conventions that apply to Hong Kong. In January 1999, the Government 
blocked a legislator's attempt to introduce two bills on collective 
bargaining and antiunion discrimination on the grounds that they would 
affect government spending and operations and therefore fell outside 
the scope allowed for private member bills under the Basic Law (see 
Section 3).
    With the repeal of the short-lived collective bargaining 
legislation, the prehandover framework continued. There were no laws 
that stipulated collective bargaining on a mandatory basis. Wage rates 
in a few trades like tailoring and carpentry were determined 
collectively in accordance with established trade practices and customs 
rather than as a statutory mechanism. Collective bargaining is not 
practiced widely. Unions generally are not powerful enough to force 
management to engage in collective bargaining. The Government does not 
encourage it, since the Government itself does not engage in collective 
bargaining with civil servants' unions but merely ``consults'' with 
them.
    The Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor offers 
free, nonbinding conciliation services to employers and employees 
involved in disputes that may involve statutory benefits and protection 
in employment as well as arrears of wages, wages instead of notice, or 
severance pay. The Department of Labor takes a positive attitude 
towards the participation of trade unions in such dispute negotiations. 
In the first 8 months of the year, the Division handled 194 trade 
disputes and 19,667 claims, 61 percent of which were handled through 
conciliation. In 1999 the Division handled 290 disputes and 31,890 
claims, 61 percent of which were handled through conciliation. In 1998 
the Labor Relations Division handled 226 disputes and 24,231 claims, 60 
percent of which were handled through conciliation. Depending on the 
size of the claim, the remaining cases were referred to the Labour 
Tribunal or the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The use of forced 
labor is prohibited in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. 
Trafficking in persons for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem; there were credible reports that local, foreign, and mainland 
Chinese sex workers sometimes labor under onerous conditions for 
organized criminals in exchange for protection or other assistance (see 
Sections 5 and 6.f.). The law does not specifically prohibit forced or 
bonded labor by children; however, there were no reports of such 
practices.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Employment of Children Regulations prohibit employment 
of children under the age of 15 in any industrial establishment. 
Children 13 and 14 years of age may be employed in certain 
nonindustrial establishments, subject to conditions aimed at ensuring a 
minimum of 9 years' education and protecting their safety, health, and 
welfare. To enforce compliance with the regulations, the Labor 
Department conducts regular workplace inspections. In the first 8 
months of the year, the Labor Department conducted 114,668 inspections, 
during which 2 violations of the Employment of Children Regulations 
were discovered. The Department issued 5 summonses, 3 of which resulted 
in convictions and fines. In 1999 the Labor Department conducted 
160,272 inspections during which 8 violations were discovered and 3 
summonses issued, each of which resulted in convictions and fines. In 
1998 the Labor Department conducted 156,634 inspections during which 10 
violations were discovered and 11 summonses issued, of which 10 
resulted in convictions and fines. Work hours for young persons 15 to 
17 years of age in the manufacturing sector remain limited to 8 hours 
per day and 48 hours per week between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. Overtime is 
prohibited for all persons under the age of 18 in industrial 
establishments. Employment in dangerous trades is prohibited for youths 
except 16- and 17-year-old males. While provisions against forced or 
bonded labor do not specifically refer to children, there were no 
reports of such practices (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no statutory minimum 
wage except for foreign domestic workers. Aside from a small number of 
trades where a uniform wage structure exists, wage levels customarily 
are fixed by individual agreement between employer and employee and are 
determined by supply and demand. Some employers provide workers with 
various kinds of allowances, free medical treatment, and free 
subsidized transport. The average wage generally provides a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. Two-income households are 
the norm.
    The minimum wage for foreign domestic workers is approximately $450 
(HK$3,500) per month. The law requires employers to provide foreign 
domestic workers with housing, worker's compensation insurance, travel 
allowances, and food or a food allowance in addition to the minimum 
wage, which together provide a decent standard of living for a foreign 
domestic worker. However, there have been credible reports of foreign 
domestic workers, who are subject to deportation if they are dismissed, 
and thus who are less likely to raise formal complaints, illegally 
being forced to accept less than the minimum wage and unacceptable 
living conditions. There also have been a number of cases of foreign 
domestic workers successfully taking their employers to court for 
mistreatment. The standard workweek is 48 hours.
    The Factory Inspectorate Division was restructured in 1996 as part 
of a government effort to strengthen its safety and health promotion 
and enforcement program. The division--part of a new occupational 
safety and health branch of the Labor Department--consists of four 
units: An operations division covering field services such as safety 
and health advice; a support services division responsible for 
technical support services; a planning and training division; and a 
legal services division charged with processing and conducting 
prosecutions.
    The Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance and its 27 sets 
of subsidiary regulations regulate safety and health conditions. In the 
first 8 months of the year, the Labor Department conducted 101,368 
inspections of industrial and nonindustrial workplaces and issued 2,412 
summonses (2,249 of which resulted in convictions with a total of $4.13 
million (HK$32 million) in fines). In 1999 the Labor Department 
conducted 121,414 inspections and issued 2,110 summonses (1,959 of 
which resulted in convictions with a total of $4.65 million (HK$36 
million) in fines). In 1998 the Labor Department conducted 89,846 
inspections and issued 3,181 summonses (2,912 of which resulted in 
convictions with a total of $7.6 million (HK$60 million) in fines). 
Worker safety and health has improved over the years, due in part to 
the transfer of many manufacturing jobs to factories in mainland China, 
but serious problems remain, particularly in the construction industry. 
In the first quarter of the year, there were 12,425 occupational 
accidents, of which 7,211 were classified as industrial accidents. Of 
the industrial accidents, 6 involved fatalities. In 1999 there were 
58,841 occupational accidents, of which 35,986 were classified as 
industrial accidents. Of the industrial accidents, 52 involved 
fatalities. Employers are required under the Employee's Compensation 
Ordinance to report any injuries sustained by their employees in work-
related accidents. There is no specific legal provision allowing 
workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without 
jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in persons is a problem, 
and Hong Kong is both a destination and a transit point for trafficked 
persons. Specific provisions in the Immigration Ordinance, the Crimes 
Ordinance, and other relevant laws enable law enforcement authorities 
to take action against trafficking in persons. The courts can impose 
heavy fines and prison sentences for such activities as arranging 
passage of unauthorized entrants into Hong Kong (up to $465,000 (HK$5 
million) and 14 years in prison), assisting unauthorized entrants to 
remain in Hong Kong (up to $64,500 (HK$500,000) and 10 years in 
prison), using or possessing a forged, false or unlawfully obtained 
travel document (up to $19,350 (HK$150,000) and 14 years in prison), 
and aiding and abetting any person to use such a document (up to 
$19,350 (HK$150,000) and 14 years in prison). In late 1999, authorities 
in the United States and Canada began to find persons smuggled from 
China in shipping containers on cargo ships arriving from Hong Kong; in 
the first 3 weeks of the year alone, according to press reports, more 
than 100 persons had been found in shipping containers in ports on the 
west coast of Canada and the United States. In one case, 3 trafficked 
persons were found dead in 1 poorly provisioned and unsanitary shipping 
container; another 15 survived their ordeal, but 7 of the survivors 
required hospitalization. Hong Kong officials pledged to and did 
increase attempts to stop such trafficking out of Hong Kong, and began 
an investigation into the incidents, resulting in the arrest of one 
Hong Kong resident. The Hong Kong authorities also investigated many 
other trafficking incidents during the year. In November 26 intending 
illegal immigrants discovered the previous month by Hong Kong 
authorities sealed in a cargo container bound for the United States 
were convicted of attempting to stow away and of remaining in Hong Kong 
after having entered unlawfully, with most sentenced to 18 months in 
jail. Several others were arrested in connection with organizing the 
alien smuggling operation. In December another 12 intending illegal 
immigrants were discovered in a shipping container and arrested. 
Subsequent raids on offices and apartments of persons connected with 
the operation resulted in 15 additional arrests, including the alleged 
boss of the alien-smuggling syndicate. These two cases of mainlanders 
discovered hiding in containers were the first such cases where the 
illegal immigrants were caught in Hong Kong, but the 12th and 13th this 
year involving suspected use of Hong Kong as a container transshipment 
point. Most of these cases came to light through the efforts of Hong 
Kong authorities who coordinated their efforts with authorities abroad. 
Shipping companies and terminal operators took steps to detect and stop 
such smuggling as well. While the Security Bureau has policy 
responsibility over migrant trafficking, the police, customs and 
immigration departments are responsible for enforcing laws that combat 
trafficking. In July an immigration officer who accepted money in 
exchange for helping mainland Chinese enter Hong Kong illegally was 
convicted for violating the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and 
sentenced to 4-years imprisonment.
    Hong Kong is a transit point for persons trafficked from China and 
other nations to third countries. These persons generally are 
trafficked by organized crime organizations, and are trafficked for 
purposes of forced labor, or debt bonded labor, or forced prostitution. 
Countries to which such persons are trafficked include the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and various Western European countries. Many 
trafficked persons agree to pay large sums for their transport, and are 
forced to work in conditions similar to indentured servitude in order 
to repay the cost of their passage. Their movements may be restricted 
and their travel documents may be confiscated. Often, trafficked 
persons live under poor conditions, and are threatened with deportation 
or harm to family members if they complain. Thousands of persons are 
caught in Hong Kong each year with forged travel documents, some at the 
airport and others elsewhere in the territory. It is presumed widely 
that thousands of other would-be illegal immigrants pass through the 
SAR each year. It is unknown how many of these persons are trafficked.
    Government figures report the number of applications for the entry 
of Vietnamese women for taking up residence to join local husbands in 
recent years are as follows: 1998, 67 applications approved, 3 refused; 
1999, 175 approved, 55 refused; this year (through September), 85 
approved, 47 refused. Cases where the claimed relationship as husband 
and wife does not satisfy immigration officers are as a policy 
rejected. However, it is not known how many women may be trafficked 
into Hong Kong as mail order brides without going through immigration 
procedures.
    Visitors who are found to be engaged in prostitution are prosecuted 
for the offence of ``breach of condition of stay under the Immigration 
Ordinance.'' In 1999 1,193 visitors from mainland China were so 
prosecuted. Through September 1,468 were prosecuted. The figure for 
1998 was 1,247. The Government reports that it rarely encounters cases 
where visitors were forced to practice prostitution against their will. 
The number of visitors from the former Soviet Union and Malaysia found 
by the authorities to be engaged in illegal prostitution is small: 2, 
1, and 12 from Russia, Uzbekistan, and Malaysia, respectively, in 1998. 
In 1999 and this year (through September), the numbers were 5, 2, and 
0, and 1, 3, and 4, respectively. The Government has no record of 
visitor prostitutes from Eastern Europe for the same period. The number 
of illegal visitors trafficked into the country for the purpose of 
prostitution is unknown.

                                 TIBET

    (This section of the report on China has been prepared pursuant to 
Section 536 (b) of Public Law 103-236. The United States recognizes the 
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)--hereinafter referred to as ``Tibet''--to 
be part of the People's Republic of China. The preservation and 
development of Tibet's unique religious, cultural, and linguistic 
heritage and protection of its people's fundamental human rights 
continue to be of concern.)
                respect for the integrity of the person
    The Chinese Government strictly controls access to and information 
about Tibet. Thus, it is difficult to determine accurately the scope of 
human rights abuses. However, according to credible reports, Chinese 
government authorities continued to commit numerous serious human 
rights abuses in Tibet, including instances of torture, arbitrary 
arrest, detention without public trial, and lengthy detention of 
Tibetan nationalists for peacefully expressing their political or 
religious views. Tight controls on religion and on other fundamental 
freedoms continued and intensified during the year, especially during 
spring and summer. There were political protests by Tibetans in a 
number of ethnic Tibetan areas, including outside of the TAR.
    The Government's record of respect for religious freedom in Tibet 
deteriorated as TAR authorities imposed new, severe restrictions on 
many traditional religious practices and public manifestations of 
belief in urban areas during the spring and summer. In the fall, after 
a new Party secretary assumed power, there were some signs of 
moderation in the intensity of the crackdown. Local authorities in many 
areas were not enforcing the new restrictions on lower-level government 
employees, students, and others. However, tight preexisting 
restrictions remained in place for higher-level cadres and government 
workers. Activities viewed as vehicles for political dissent are not 
tolerated at any time and are promptly and forcibly suppressed. 
Individuals accused of political activism faced ongoing and serious 
persecution during the year. There were reports of the imprisonment and 
torture or the abuse of monks and nuns accused of political activism, 
the death of prisoners, and the threatened closure of monasteries.
    The lack of independent access to prisoners or to prisons makes it 
difficult to assess the extent and severity of abuses and the number of 
Tibetan prisoners; however, there were numerous reports of detentions 
and other punishments meted out during the year. A large number of 
monks and nuns remain detained or imprisoned. A number of such cases 
were cited by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture in his report to 
the 56th session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in the spring.
    There are reports that those detained, including those who have 
been tried and those who have not, are frequently subjected to forced 
labor that is injurious to their health and, in some cases, life 
threatening. Forced labor is found in prisons, detention centers, 
reeducation-through-labor facilities, and at work sites where prisoners 
are used as work forces. Tibetans outside of detention settings at 
times engage in labor on public projects managed by local governments 
without remuneration in lieu of paying taxes in cash. Tibetans are 
reportedly discriminated against in employment in Chinese government 
manufacturing and other work sites. Other fundamental worker rights 
recognized by the International Labor Organization, including the right 
to organize and the right to bargain collectively, that are broadly 
denied in China are also denied in Tibet.
    According to reports, the rate at which Tibetan political prisoners 
are dying in detention, or soon after their release, demonstrably as a 
result of abuse while in detention, is increasing. According to the 
Tibet Information Network (TIN), female political prisoners, 
particularly those held at Lhasa's Drapchi prison, are at the greatest 
risk: since 1987, 1 in 27 died while in prison or soon after being 
released. Drapchi's male political prisoners died at a rate of about 1 
in 33 since 1987. Overall TIN reports a death rate of 1 in 50 for 
Tibetan political prisoners as of year's end.
    There are many credible reports that prisoners are tortured and 
mistreated. Authorities use electric shocks, suspension in painful 
positions, and other forms of torture or abuse. Several sources 
reported the mistreatment and beatings of nuns in prison, including 24-
year-old Ngawang Sangdrol, who was imprisoned at age 13, released 9 
months later and resentenced at age 15; her prison sentence was 
extended for a third time in late 1998 to a total of 21 years for her 
involvement in demonstrations, most recently during May 1998. Ngawang 
Sangdrol reportedly has been beaten severely on multiple occasions 
because of repeated participation in protests at Drapchi prison; her 
health is poor and deteriorating, and she is not receiving adequate 
medical care, according to credible reports. There were credible 
reports that guards beat political prisoners at Drapchi prison after 
the protests in May 1998; some were beaten severely, including monk 
Thubten Kalsang and nun Phuntsog Nyidrol (who reportedly tried to 
shield Ngawang Sangdrol from beatings). In at least one cell block, 
prisoners reportedly were confined to their cells for 14 months after 
the incidents in May 1998. As a result of the May 1998 protests, 10 
prisoners also had their sentences extended for periods of 18 months to 
6 years. There are credible reports from a number of prisons that 
prisoners who resisted the political reeducation imposed by prison 
authorities, particularly demands to denounce the Dalai Lama and accept 
Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy recognized by the Government as the Panchen 
Lama, also were beaten. According to credible reports, punishments 
meted out to uncooperative prisoner leaders have resulted in hunger 
strikes among female prisoners on at least two occasions at Drapchi. 
Officials reportedly have resorted to lengthening periods of solitary 
confinement to isolate demonstrators. Authorities significantly 
increased prison capacity in Lhasa through the construction of 
additional cell blocks at Utritru prison and expansions at Drapchi 
prison.
    In February 1999 TIN and the foreign press reported increased use 
of military-style drills and exercises (often in either very hot or 
very cold weather) at Lhasa's Drapchi prison. Prison officials 
reportedly force prisoners to run barefoot, to stand motionless for 
extended periods, and to march for extended periods while shouting 
patriotic slogans. Prisoners who fall behind or who cannot remain still 
are beaten severely. Prisoners also were treated badly in other 
prisons.
    There were reported deaths and suicides of Tibetan prisoners. 
According to credible reports, Tashi Tsering, who attempted to raise 
the outlawed Tibetan flag with explosives tied around his waist during 
the National Minority Games in August, 1999, committed suicide in 
prison in February. Sonam Rinchen, a farmer, died in prison in January. 
He had been arrested for unfurling a Tibetan flag during a protest in 
1992 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. According to TIN, Shol Dawa, 
a 64-year-old political activist, died in Drapchi prison on November 
19; the circumstances of his death were not known, but he was said to 
be suffering from a kidney ailment, was in poor health, and had been 
subjected to mistreatment and beatings on several occasions in the last 
few years. He was reportedly serving a 9-year sentence for trying to 
compile a list of names of political prisoners to send out of Tibet and 
was convicted of ``espionage.'' Shol Dawa had been imprisoned a few 
times, starting in 1981. In October TIN published detailed information 
about the deaths of nine prisoners after the May 1998 protests at 
Drapchi prison. In June 1998, five nuns reportedly committed suicide 
together after weeks of severe mistreatment (including being forced to 
stand motionless in the hot sun on a daily basis over a period of 
several days, with cups of water on their heads and pieces of paper 
under their arms) following their participation in the prison protests. 
The nuns, all in their twenties, had been imprisoned for taking part in 
peaceful protests. All were near the end of their terms. At least three 
monks and a criminal prisoner also died in Drapchi during 1998.
    According to credible reports, Chadrel Rinpoche, who was accused of 
betraying state secrets while helping the Dalai Lama choose the 11th 
reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, has been held in a secret compound 
of a Sichuan prison where he is separated from other prisoners, denied 
all outside contacts, and restricted to his cell since his 1997 
sentence to 6 years' imprisonment after a trial that was closed to the 
public. In April the Government told a visiting foreign delegation that 
he is ``fine physically'' but gave no further details.
    Authorities reported that Ngawang Choephel, a Tibetan 
ethnomusicologist sentenced in 1996 to 18 years in prison on charges of 
espionage, was moved from the high security Powo Tramo prison in the 
TAR to another facility near Chengdu in Sichuan Province so that he 
could receive medical treatment. In August his mother, Sonam Deckyi, 
was allowed two 1-hour visits with her son in that Sichuan facility. 
She reported that he is very thin and that he has complained about 
pains in his torso. Also in August, he was said to be suffering from a 
variety of ailments, including digestive, urinary, kidney, and liver 
problems.
    While there was limited political violence in Tibet during the 
year, an explosion occurred in Lhasa on October 26. Some have suggested 
that the explosion, which occurred outside of the offices of the 
government department that controls neighborhood activities and 
grassroots organizations, was politically motivated; however, whether 
the explosion was politically motivated has not been determined, and 
the blast may well have been a result of construction activity.
    Legal safeguards for ethnic Tibetans detained or imprisoned are the 
same as those in the rest of China and are inadequate in design and 
implementation. According to TIN the length of the average sentence of 
Tibetan political prisoners is lengthening. For those currently 
incarcerated, the average sentence is 8 years, 8 months. Since 1987 the 
average sentence imposed on all political prisoners is 4 years, 9 
months.
    A majority of judges are ethnic Tibetans, but most have little or 
no legal training. Authorities are working to address this problem 
through increased legal education opportunities. Trials are brief and 
closed. Courts handle approximately 20 cases involving crimes against 
state security each year, for which maximum prison sentences are 15 
years for each count, not to exceed 20 years in total. Such cases 
mainly concern actions in support of Tibetan independence; such 
activities do not have to be violent to be illegal. A TIN report put 
the number of political prisoners in Tibet at 500 as of the end of 
1999. Reportedly 80 percent of female detainees are nuns, and 
approximately 66 percent of male prisoners are monks. Officials from 
the Justice and Prison Administration Bureaus told a foreign delegation 
in April that of the 2,200 prisoners currently serving sentences in the 
TAR (76 percent of whom were ethnic Tibetan, and 20 percent ethnic 
Han), 110 were incarcerated for ``endangering state security,'' 
including approximately 30 nuns and 70 monks.
    Refugee and other accounts published by NGO's report on the use of 
forced labor in prisons and other detention facilities in Tibet. 
Prisoners, usually working under production quotas, are forced to work 
in agriculture and lumbering, where the work is described as demanding, 
and accidents are frequent. Typically, forced labor in detention is 
without remuneration. Chinese law mandates that prisoners can be 
required to work up to 12 hours per day, with one rest day every 2 
weeks (Article 53 of the Statute of Reform Through Labor). However, 
some refugees report that work requirements are more onerous that those 
set forth in the law. At Drapchi prison, male prisoners work in 
vegetable fields and in factories at the prison facilities. Female 
prisoners clean toilets and also are involved in tailoring, cleaning, 
or spinning and sorting wool to be used in the manufacture of carpets 
and sweaters. According to Human Rights Watch, some Tibetan prisoners 
are required to work beyond their terms of imprisonment. Prisoners in 
pretrial detention also are forced to work.
    Promotion of family planning remains an important goal for the 
authorities in Tibet, but family planning policies permit most ethnic 
Tibetans, as well as other minority groups, to have more children than 
Han Chinese (who are subject to the same limits as citizens in other 
areas of the country--generally one child for urban couples and two for 
some rural couples). Urban Tibetans are permitted to have two children, 
while those in rural areas often have three or more. In practice 
Tibetans working for the Government, especially Communist Party 
members, are pressured to limit themselves to one child.
    The Government tightly controls official visits, and delegation 
members usually have very few opportunities to meet local persons not 
previously approved by the local authorities. Foreigners, including 
international NGO personnel and foreign residents, were subject to 
travel restrictions during several periods over the summer, and many 
foreign groups reported increased restrictions on movements during the 
year. The Government also placed restrictions on the movement of 
Tibetans during sensitive anniversaries and events and increased 
control over border areas. In February up to 54 persons were detained 
by Chinese authorities as they tried to leave China and cross without 
proper travel documents into Nepal. Some were sentenced to prison terms 
of 2 to 3 years. Scores of ethnic Tibetans studying in India were 
similarly detained in the spring after entering China from Nepal, 
according to credible reports.
    Some foreign NGO's reported restrictions on their activities and, 
in some cases, threats of expulsion. One foreign NGO was shut down 
during the year, and its foreign staff expelled.
    Many staff members and teachers of the Gyatso Children's Home, a 
Lhasa orphanage that was closed by officials in September 1999, 
remained in detention, according to reliable reports. Authorities 
allege that the home's personnel were engaged in corrupt activity and 
were linked to persons who carried out ``acts of violence.'' Several of 
the more than 60 Tibetan children who lived at the home were left by 
officials to live on the streets. Others were sent to live with 
relatives or placed in local orphanages where conditions reportedly 
were extremely poor.
                          freedom of religion
    The Government maintains tight controls on religious practices and 
places of worship. While it allows a number of forms of religious 
activity in Tibet, the Government does not tolerate religious 
manifestations that advocate Tibetan independence or any expression of 
separatism, which it describes as ``splittism.'' The Government remains 
suspicious of Tibetan Buddhism in general because of its links to the 
Dalai Lama, and this suspicion also applies to Tibetan Buddhist 
religious activities or adherents who do not overtly demonstrate their 
patriotism for the State. The Government's record of respect for 
religious freedom deteriorated during the year as authorities imposed 
new, severe restrictions on many traditional religious practices and 
public manifestations of belief in the TAR's urban areas during the 
spring and summer. However, by autumn there were signs that authorities 
no longer were enforcing the new restrictions, and tensions abated 
somewhat. The Government harshly criticized the Dalai Lama's political 
activities and leadership of a governmentin-exile. The official press 
continued to criticize vehemently the ``Dalai clique'' and, in an 
attempt to discredit the Dali Lama and undermine the credibility of his 
religious authority, repeatedly described him as a separatist who was 
determined to split China. Both central government and local officials 
often insist that dialog with the Dalai Lama is essentially impossible 
and claim that his actions belie his repeated public assurances that he 
does not advocate independence for Tibet. Nonetheless the Government 
asserts that it is willing to hold talks with the Dalai Lama as long as 
he ceases his activities to divide the country and recognizes that 
Tibet is an inseparable part of China and that Taiwan is a province of 
China.
    The Government continued its ``patriotic education'' campaign aimed 
at enforcing compliance with government regulations and either cowing 
or weeding out monks and nuns who refuse to adopt the Party line and 
remain sympathetic to the Dalai Lama. The ``patriotic education'' 
campaign also is intended to increase the Government's control over the 
Tibetan Buddhist establishment. The ``patriotic reeducation'' of monks 
and nuns, which began in 1996 in Lhasa area monasteries and in 
subsequent years was intensified and extended throughout Tibet and to 
monasteries outside of the TAR, continued but at a lower level of 
intensity. A new round of political education classes in monasteries 
began at the end of 1999 in Lhasa and in some smaller monasteries in 
more remote parts of the TAR. However, the current pattern of classes 
several times per week or per month seems less frequent than 
previously.
    Official ``work teams'' remain in some monasteries and periodically 
visit others. Topics for such required classes include relations 
between Tibetans and Han Chinese, Tibet's historical status as a part 
of China, and the role of the Dalai Lama in attempting to ``split'' the 
country. According to regulations posted at the entrances of many 
monasteries, monks are required to be ``patriotic,'' and authorities 
require monks to: Sign a declaration agreeing to reject independence 
for Tibet; reject Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai 
Lama as the 11th reincarnation of the Panchen Lama; reject and denounce 
the Dalai Lama; recognize the unity of China and Tibet; and not listen 
to the Voice of America. According to some reports, monks who refused 
these terms were expelled from their monasteries and were not permitted 
to return home to work; others have been detained. Others were forced 
to leave their monasteries after failing to pass exams on these topics 
or being found ``politically unqualified,'' and still others left 
``voluntarily'' rather than denounce the Dalai Lama. Resistance to the 
campaigns has been intense, and the Government's efforts are resented 
deeply by monks, nuns, and lay Buddhists. Although there has been some 
reduction of patriotic education activities throughout the region as 
the objectives of increasing control over the monasteries and reducing 
the numbers of monks and nuns were achieved, religious activities in 
many monasteries and nunneries were disrupted severely, and monks and 
nuns have fled to India to escape the campaigns. Approximately 3,000 
Tibetans enter Nepal each year to escape conditions in Tibet, according 
to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees; many of these refugees 
claim that they left because of the ``patriotic reeducation'' 
campaigns. The ban on the public display of photographs of the Dalai 
Lama continued, and such pictures were not readily available except 
illegally in many parts of the TAR.
    Chinese authorities closely associate Buddhist monasteries with 
proindependence activism in Tibet. The Government has moved to curb the 
proliferation of monasteries, which it charges are a drain on local 
resources and a conduit for political infiltration by the Tibetan exile 
community. Chinese officials state that Tibet has more than 46,300 
Buddhist monks and nuns and approximately 1,787 monasteries, temples, 
and religious sites. These numbers apply only to the TAR; thousands of 
monks and nuns live in other Tibetan areas of China, including parts of 
Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai Provinces. Officials have used 
these same figures for several years, although there are credible 
reports that the numbers of monks and nuns have dropped significantly 
at many sites in the TAR, especially since the beginning of the 
``patriotic education'' campaign. The Government states that there are 
no limits on the number of monks in major monasteries and that each 
monastery's democratic management committee decides on its own how many 
monks the monastery can support. However, these committees are 
government controlled; and in practice the Government generally imposes 
strict limits on the number of monks in major monasteries. Some 
monasteries reportedly have been required to decrease the number of 
monks associated with them. The Government has the right to disapprove 
any individual's application to take up religious orders, although it 
does not always exercise this right. According to a TIN report, in the 
area around Lhasa, the numbers of monks and nuns in monasteries and 
nunneries fell during the summer, as part of a drive to restrict 
religious observance; 30 monks were expelled from the Jokhang temple in 
July. At year's end, 120 monks, the official quota, remained at 
Jokhang. Although by regulation monks are prohibited from joining a 
monastery prior to the age of 18, many younger boys continue the 
tradition of entering monastic life. However, many young novices, who 
traditionally served as attendants to older monks while receiving a 
basic monastic education and awaiting formal ordination, have been 
expelled from monasteries in recent years for being underage; the fact 
that these novices were not regular members of the monasteries has 
allowed authorities to deny that there has been a significant decline 
in the numbers of monks.
    Most Tibetans practice Buddhism to some degree. This holds true for 
many ethnic Tibetan government officials and Communist Party members. 
Some 1,000 religious figures hold positions in local people's 
congresses and committees of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference. However, the Government continues to insist 
that party members and government employees adhere to the Party's code 
of atheism. A 3-year drive to promote atheism and science, first 
announced in January 1999, originally aimed at government workers, 
continued and was extended to more government offices and to schools. 
The drive was launched to promote economic progress, strengthen the 
struggle against separatism, and stem ``the Dalai clique's reactionary 
infiltration.'' Authorities threatened to terminate the employment of 
government employees whose children are studying in India (where the 
Dalai Lama's government-in-exile is located) if they did not bring the 
children back to Tibet, and authorities searched the homes of 
government workers for religious objects or pictures of the Dalai Lama.
    During the spring and summer, authorities in Lhasa and other areas 
imposed new, severe restrictions on religious activities, prohibiting 
government and Communist Party officials from going into monasteries, 
visiting the Jokhang temple, having altars in their homes, 
participating in religious activities during the Tibetan New Year, or 
placing new prayer flags on their roofs (a traditional practice during 
the Tibetan New Year). There were also credible reports that some 
government employees were forbidden to make donations to monks and nuns 
in Lhasa. In addition some government workers and Party members were 
told that they must withdraw their children from monasteries, 
nunneries, and exile schools in India and were threatened with the 
expulsion of their children from schools if the workers and Party 
members participated in forbidden religious practices. In some areas, 
private citizens also were prohibited from engaging in traditional New 
Year's activities such as placing prayer flags on the top of Bumpari (a 
mountain near Lhasa), burning incense, and making the traditional 
``lingkor'' (pilgrimage circuit around the sacred sites of Lhasa) 
during the June festival of Sagadawa, the most important religious 
holiday in Tibetan Buddhism. A number of men in street clothes 
reportedly lined the lingkor route and attempted to film persons 
walking the traditional circuit. Government employees allegedly were 
threatened with dismissal if they made the lingkor. During spring and 
summer, some Tibet University students reportedly also were forbidden 
to visit monasteries or to have religious objects in their rooms. The 
homes of private citizens in Lhasa reportedly were searched for 
religious paintings (``thangkas''). However, enforcement of these 
restrictions reportedly relaxed slightly later in the year. According 
to TIN, in July 1999, new restrictions were imposed by the authorities 
to prevent celebration of the Dalai Lama's birthday; in July these 
restrictions reportedly were enforced more stringently than in 1999. 
Reports indicate that Tibetans were forbidden to hold traditional 
incense-burning ceremonies anywhere in Lhasa, and that some places of 
worship were closed on the Dalai Lama's birthday.
    The Government continues to oversee the daily operations of major 
religious sites. The Government, which does not contribute to 
monasteries' regular operating funds, retains management control of the 
monasteries through the government-controlled democratic management 
committees and the local religious affairs bureaus. During 1999 the TAR 
Religious Affairs Bureau confirmed that its officers are members of the 
Communist Party, and that Party members are required to be atheists; 
however, it was not possible to confirm that members of the local 
religious affairs bureaus are atheists. Regulations restrict leadership 
of democratic management committees to ``patriotic and devoted'' monks 
and nuns and specify that the Government must approve all members of 
the committees. At some monasteries, government officials also sit on 
the committees. Despite these government efforts to control the 
Buddhist clergy and monasteries, antigovernment sentiment remains 
strong.
    In January the Karmapa, the highest ranking lama of Tibetan 
Buddhism's Karma Kargyu school, fled from Tibet to India after he 
reportedly had been denied access to Kargyu teachers or permission to 
study with them in India. Soon after officials closed Tsurphu 
monastery, the home of the Karmapa, to visitors. Many other persons, 
including lay persons, were questioned in connection with the Karmapa's 
flight. There were reports that several high ranking TAR officials were 
called to Beijing after the Karmapa left Tsurphu to account for their 
actions. According to TIN, authorities replaced monks on the monastic 
management committee at Tsurphu after the Karmapa's flight, while other 
monks were admonished to improve their ``political attitudes'' or face 
further ``patriotic education'' sessions. Other officials and monks at 
the monastery reportedly were under investigation by the authorities. 
On December 6, foreign officials were allowed to visit the Tsurphu 
monastery, where approximately 325 monks were said to be in residence. 
There were few other visitors at the time, even though December usually 
is a popular time for pilgrims to visit. According to reports, no new 
monks have been permitted to enter Tsurphu monastery since the Karmapa 
left; however, religious activity continued at the monastery. Officials 
reportedly are stationed at the monastery; according to some Western 
visitors, the atmosphere there is still tense, and monks are reluctant 
to talk to foreigners.
    The dramatic departure of the Karmapa added to tensions and 
increased the authorities' efforts to control monastic activity in the 
TAR. TIN reported that the Reting Monastery near Lhasa was closed to 
visitors in May after the arrest of eight monks for protesting the 
authorities' selection of 2-year-old Sonam Phuntsog in January as the 
seventh reincarnation of the Reting Rinpoche. During the summer, 
another young lama, the 7-year-old Pawo Rinpoche, reportedly was moved 
to Lhasa from Nenang monastery and was kept under house arrest. He is 
said to have returned to Nenang Monastery during the fall, where he 
remains under house arrest, with heavy security. He reportedly has been 
denied access to his religious tutors. The Pawo Rinpoche was recognized 
by the Karmapa and is one of the senior Karma Kargyu lamas remaining in 
Tibet. In December foreign officials were denied permission to visit 
Nenang Monastery.
    TIN reported that the Taglung Drag Monastery in Lhasa municipality 
was threatened with closure and its monks with expulsion if they 
refused to denounce the Dalai Lama after monks from the monastery 
shouted proindependence slogans in two separate incidents in March and 
August 1999. ``Patriotic education'' activities reportedly were 
increased, and 16 of 24 monks reportedly left the monastery in 
September 1999 rather than denounce the Dalai Lama.
    The flight of the Karmapa also has made the authorities pay more 
attention to illegal border crossings and tighten security on the 
borders with India and Nepal. As a result, greater numbers of Tibetans 
have been arrested trying to leave the TAR. According to credible 
reports, in May as many as 50 Tibetan students returning to Tibet from 
India were arrested at the Nepal-China border.
    The Government approved the selection of 2-year-old Sonam Phuntsog 
on January 16 as the seventh reincarnation of the Reting Rinpoche. A 
Tibetan government official stated that officials supervising religion 
should ensure that the boy ``loves the Communist Party of China, the 
Socialist country, and Tibetan Buddhism'' and that he help to 
``preserve the unity of the Chinese nation.'' The Dalai Lama, who by 
tradition would approve the selection of important religious figures 
such as the Reting Rinpoche, did not recognize this choice; many of the 
monks at Reting Monastery reportedly did not accept the child as the 
Reting Rinpoche.
    The Panchen Lama is Tibetan Buddhism's second most prominent 
figure, after the Dalai Lama. The Government continued to insist that 
Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy it recognizes and enthroned in 1995, is the 
Panchen Lama's 11th reincarnation. The authorities tightly control all 
aspects of his life, and he has appeared publicly in Beijing and the 
TAR only on rare occasions. His public appearances were marked by a 
heavy security presence. At all other times, the authorities strictly 
limit access to the boy. Meanwhile repeated requests for access to 
Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11th 
Panchen Lama, by high-level foreign government and private delegations, 
including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, to confirm his 
well-being and whereabouts have been denied. In October Chinese 
officials showed foreign officials two photographs purportedly 
depicting the boy. Government officials have claimed that the boy is 
being held for his own protection and that he lives in Tibet and 
attends classes as a ``normal schoolboy.'' The authorities also 
maintain that both boys are being well cared for and are receiving a 
good education. The vast majority of Tibetan Buddhists recognize Gendun 
Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama. Tibetan monks have claimed that they 
were forced to sign statements pledging allegiance to the boy the 
Government selected as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The 
Communist Party also urged its members to support the ``official'' 
Panchen Lama, and government authorities at both the regional and city 
levels had pictures of the boy printed for use in public and private 
religious displays.
    The ban on the public display of photographs of the Dalai Lama 
continued, and such pictures were not readily available except through 
illegal means. Some monasteries and many individuals displayed them 
privately. In the spring, Lhasa area neighborhood committees began 
sending teams to the homes of ordinary citizens to confiscate books 
about and pictures of the Dalai Lama. Similar restrictions are in 
effect in Tibetan areas outside the TAR; although a few shops still 
quietly sell the Dalai Lama's photograph, the vast majority of 
monasteries no longer display his photo. The Government banned pictures 
of Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama to be the 
11th reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. Portraits of Gyaltsen Norbu, 
the boy recognized by the Government to be the Panchen Lama, were on 
prominent display in some monasteries, as were sets of rules governing 
religious activity.
    The Government claims that since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, it has contributed sums in excess of $40 million (300 to 
400 million RMB) toward the restoration of tens of thousands of 
Buddhist sites, many of which were destroyed before and during that 
period, in part to promote the development of tourism in Tibet. 
However, at most sites, restoration efforts are funded privately.
    There were reports of some Falun Gong practitioners among the Han 
minority in Tibet. In addition an official press report said that 
military authorities had become concerned over the practice by some 
soldiers of Zhong Gong, a qigong-based spiritual movement, prompting 
propaganda efforts aimed at eliminating the practice.
    In June 1998, the European Union issued a report based on the trip 
of its ambassadorial delegation to Tibet in May 1998. The report was 
highly critical of the Government's control of religious freedom and 
stated that ``the delegation was in no doubt that the authorities in 
the TAR exercise extremely tight control over the principal elements of 
Tibetan religion and culture.''
        economic development and protection of cultural heritage
    Tibet is roughly the size of Western Europe, having an area of 
approximately 1.2 million square kilometers. It has the smallest 
population of China's administrative regions with approximately 2.4 
million inhabitants.
    Tibetans, as one of China's 55 minority ethnic groups, receive 
preferential treatment in marriage and family planning policies, and, 
to a lesser extent, in university admissions and government employment. 
According to official government statistics, 74 percent of all 
government employees in Tibet are ethnic Tibetans. Nonetheless, many 
positions of real power are held by ethnic Han Chinese, and most key 
decisions in Tibet are made by ethnic Han. Although government 
regulations stipulate that government and legal documents are to be in 
Tibetan, in practice written communications by officials and government 
documents very frequently only are in Chinese. In the area of private 
sector employment, discrimination against Tibetans is widespread.
    The Central Government and other provinces of China heavily 
subsidize the Tibetan economy, which has grown by an average annual 
rate of over 10 percent for the last decade. Over 90 percent of Tibet's 
budget income comes from outside sources. Tibet also benefits from a 
wide variety of favorable economic and tax policies. However, these 
policies have attracted growing numbers of ethnic Han and Hui (Muslim) 
immigrants from other parts of China, who are competing with--and in 
some cases displacing--Tibetan enterprises and labor. Government 
development policies have helped raise the material living standards of 
many ethnic Tibetans, particularly by providing better transportation 
and communications facilities, but many of the benefits of development 
and the expanding commercial sector accrue primarily to Han Chinese. 
For example, in many areas of Lhasa, almost all small businesses are 
run by Han. Rapid economic growth, the expanding tourism industry, and 
the introduction of more modern cultural influences also have disrupted 
traditional living patterns and customs and threatened traditional 
Tibetan culture.
    The Dalai Lama, Tibetan experts, and others have expressed concern 
that development projects and other central Government policies adopted 
at a 1994 national work conference on Tibet and still in effect 
encourage a massive influx of Han Chinese into Tibet, which has the 
effect of overwhelming Tibet's traditional culture and diluting ethnic 
Tibetan demographic dominance. In recent years, freer movement of 
persons throughout China, governmentsponsored development, and the 
prospect of economic opportunity in Tibet have led to a substantial 
increase in the non-Tibetan population (including China's Muslim Hui 
minority as well as Han Chinese) in Lhasa and other urban areas. An 
increased number of immigrants from China's large transient population 
seek to take advantage of these new economic opportunities. Most of 
these migrants profess to be temporary residents, but small businesses 
run by ethnic Han and Hui citizens (mostly restaurants and retail 
shops) are becoming more numerous in almost all Tibetan towns and 
cities. Discrimination in employment reportedly is rampant; ethnic Han 
are hired preferentially for many jobs and receive greater pay for the 
same work. Ethnic Tibetans reportedly are fired discriminatorily from 
some jobs. In addition many jobs require proficiency in Chinese (which 
gives Han an advantage). Connections also reportedly work to the 
advantage of the ethnic Han (who tend to be in the higher ranking 
positions), and it is more difficult for Tibetans to get permits and 
loans to open businesses than it is for ethnic Han.
    In Lhasa, the Chinese cultural presence is obvious and widespread. 
Buildings are of Chinese architectural style, the Chinese language is 
widely spoken, and Chinese characters are used in most commercial and 
official communications. Lhasa had a population of 139,683 in 1998. 
Some observers have estimated that at least half and perhaps more of 
Lhasa's residents are Han Chinese; elsewhere in the TAR, the Han 
percentage of the population is significantly lower. In rural areas, 
the Han presence is often negligible. Chinese officials assert that 95 
percent of Tibet's officially registered population is Tibetan, with 
Han and other ethnic groups making up the remaining 5 percent. This 
figure does not include the large number of ``temporary'' Han 
residents, including military and paramilitary troops and their 
dependents, many of whom have lived in Tibet for years.
    There are reports that malnutrition among Tibetan children is 
widespread in many areas of the TAR. This is particularly true of rural 
areas and has resulted in high rates of stunted growth among children. 
Nutritional deficiency ailments, such as goiter (from a lack of 
iodine), night blindness (from a lack of Vitamin A), and rickets are 
said to be relatively common among children in some areas.
    Illiteracy and semiliteracy levels are high. According to official 
government statistics, 42 percent of persons in the TAR are illiterate 
or semiliterate. Illiteracy and semiliteracy rates are as high as 90 
percent in some areas. Chinese officials over the past few years have 
downgraded the use of Tibetan in education and in 1997 announced that 
they would begin teaching Chinese to Tibetan children starting in the 
first grade. The Government stated that this step was taken in order to 
make Tibetan children more competitive with their Han counterparts, and 
provide more educational and employment opportunities in the long run. 
Primary schools at the village level follow a Tibetan curriculum, but 
these schools usually have only two or three grades.
    Approximately 83 percent of eligible children attend primary 
school, according to official statistics, but most pupils end their 
formal education after graduating from village schools. According to 
local education officials, Tibetan is the main language of instruction 
in 60 percent of middle schools, especially in more remote areas, 
although there are special classes offering instruction in Chinese. 
NGO's maintain that this figure is high. Most, but not all, of the 
students in the Chinese classes are ethnic Han. Most of those who 
attend regional high schools continue to receive some of their 
education in Tibetan, but knowledge of Chinese is essential as most 
classes are in Chinese. Tibetan curriculum high schools exist in a few 
areas, primarily in Tibetan areas outside the TAR. Since the mid-
1980's, the Government has allocated funds to enable Tibetan secondary 
students to study in schools elsewhere in China. According to 
government figures, there are 13,000 Tibetan students currently 
studying in some 100 schools in different parts of China. Knowledge of 
Chinese is usually necessary to receive a higher education, although 
some minority colleges allow for study of some subjects in Tibetan.
    Tibet University, which has 3,000 students, was established to 
train Tibetan teachers for the local educational system. Ethnic 
Tibetans resent the disproportionate Han representation in the student 
body and faculty. Tibetans, officially said to constitute approximately 
95 percent of the region's population, make up approximately 67 percent 
of Tibet University's student body and only 50 percent of the faculty. 
Although Tibetans are given admission preference, Han Chinese students 
frequently gain admission because they score higher on admission exams 
due to stronger Chinese-language skills and educational backgrounds. 
Authorities reportedly require professors, particularly those from 
Tibet University's Tibetan Language Department, which is viewed as a 
potential source of dissent, to attend political education sessions and 
limit course studies and materials in an effort to prevent 
``separatist'' political and religious activity on campus. Many ancient 
or religious texts are banned from the curriculum for political 
reasons. The Tibetan Language Department, which was closed to new 
students in the fall of 1997, was reopened in 1998 after its curriculum 
had been purged of religious and ``separatist'' materials. According to 
TIN, 70 Han students were admitted to the Tibetan Language Department 
to prepare them to work as administrators in Tibet and Tibetan areas 
outside the TAR. This is the first time the university has enrolled 
such a group, and there are reports of tensions between Han students 
and ethnic Tibetans on campus.
    Prostitution is a growing problem in Tibet, as it is elsewhere in 
the country, according to experts working in the region. Hundreds of 
brothels operate openly in Lhasa; up to 10,000 commercial sex workers 
may be employed in Lhasa alone. Much of the prostitution occurs at 
sites owned by the Party, the Government, or the military. Most 
prostitutes in Tibet are ethnic Han women, mainly from Sichuan. 
However, a substantial number of ethnic Tibetans, mainly young girls 
from rural or nomadic areas, also work as prostitutes. The incidence of 
HIV/AIDS among prostitutes in Tibet is unknown but is believed to be 
relatively high.
    During the year, there were reports that TAR authorities were 
pressuring employers of ethnic Tibetans who were raised or educated in 
India to dismiss such employees, especially in the tourism industry. 
Lhasa tour agencies have been forced to dismiss ethnic Tibetan tour 
guides educated in India and Nepal. These guides were required to seek 
employment with the government's Tibet Tourism Bureau (TTB). Prior to 
gaining employment with the TTB, applicants must pass an examination on 
tourism and politics. Many, if not most, Tibetan tour guides educated 
abroad reportedly fail this exam. Tourist hotels and restaurants have 
been ``encouraged'' to dismiss ethnic Tibetan employees educated 
abroad, as well.
    In October 1999, the official news agency Xinhua reported that the 
Tibet Autonomous Regional Television opened a Tibetan-language 
satellite television channel. The channel broadcasts in Tibetan for 10 
hours each day, and reaches areas in Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and 
Yunnan Provinces as well. There also are two bilingual channels, on 
which Tibetan language programs make up 15 percent of the total. 
According to an NGO report, radio broadcasts by the Oslo-based Voice of 
Tibet were blocked starting in January. The signals of the Tibetan 
language services of VOA and RFA suffer from the same jamming of their 
frequencies by Chinese authorities as the signals of their Chinese 
language services. However, Tibetans are able to listen to the 
broadcasts at least some of the time.
    The Internet has been open to the public since April 1999. At 
year's end, Lhasa had several Internet cafes, and estimates put the 
number of Internet users at several thousand.
    Despite the designation of dozens of buildings in the old section 
of Lhasa as protected cultural heritage sites, there were credible 
reports during the year that some traditional buildings were destroyed. 
However, most of the protected sites have been preserved.
    China's economic development policies, supported in Tibet by 
central government subsidies, are modernizing parts of Tibetan society 
and changing traditional Tibetan ways of life. Although the Government 
has made efforts in recent years to restore some of the physical 
structures and other aspects of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture 
damaged or destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, repressive social 
and political controls continue to limit the fundamental freedoms of 
ethnic Tibetans and risk undermining Tibet's unique cultural, 
religious, and linguistic heritage.
                               __________

                                 TAIWAN

    The March victory of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian marked the first transition from 
one political party to another in Taiwan's history. The president 
appoints the premier, who heads the Executive Yuan (EY), or Cabinet. 
Constitutional amendments adopted in 1997 provided the Legislative Yuan 
(LY) with the authority to dismiss the Cabinet with a no-confidence 
vote. The previous ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) retains the majority 
in the LY, whose members were elected in a free and fair election in 
December 1998. In addition to the DPP and KMT, the People First Party 
and the New Party play significant roles in the LY. The Judicial Yuan 
(JY) is constitutionally independent of the other branches of the 
political system, but corruption and political influence remain serious 
problems. However, the new DPP Government made efforts to eliminate 
corruption and to diminish political influence over the judiciary.
    The National Police Administration (NPA) of the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI), the NPA's Criminal Investigation Bureau, and the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Investigation Bureau are responsible for law 
enforcement relating to internal security. The police and security 
agencies are under effective civilian control. Some members of the 
police occasionally committed human rights abuses.
    Taiwan has a dynamic, export-oriented, free market economy. 
Liberalization of the economy diminished the dominant role that state-
owned and party-run enterprises played in such major sectors as 
finance, transportation, utilities, shipbuilding, steel, 
telecommunications, and petrochemicals. As the economy evolved, 
services and capital- and technology-intensive industries have become 
the most important sectors. Major exports include computers, electronic 
equipment, machinery, and textiles. Citizens generally enjoy a high 
standard of living and an equitable income distribution.
    The authorities generally respect human rights; however, problems 
remain in some areas. Principal problems during the year included 
police abuse of detainees; prison overcrowding; political and personal 
pressures on the judiciary; some infringements on citizens' privacy; 
violence and discrimination against women; child prostitution and 
abuse; societal discrimination against Aborigines; restrictions on 
workers' freedom of association and on their ability to strike; and 
instances of trafficking in women and children. However, during the 
year, political and personal pressures on the judiciary decreased 
significantly.
    In his May 20 inaugural address, President Chen declared that 
Taiwan must include international human rights in its legal code and 
establish a national human rights committee.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Although the Constitution does not directly address the 
issues of torture and punishment, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
stipulates that no violence, threat, inducement, fraud, or other 
improper means shall be used against accused persons; however, there 
were credible reports that police occasionally physically abused 
persons in their custody.
    The law allows suspects to have attorneys present during 
interrogations, primarily to ensure that abuse does not take place (see 
Section 1.d.). The MOJ claims that each interrogation is recorded and 
that any allegation of mistreatment is investigated. Nonetheless 
lawyers and legal scholars note that abuses most often occur in local 
police stations where interrogations are not recorded and when 
attorneys often are not present. Informed observers note that police 
emphasize confessions by suspects as the principal investigative tool. 
Law enforcement agencies remain weak in scientific investigative 
skills; however, the NPA has made efforts to improve its investigative 
skills, upgrading its crime laboratory technology and training crime 
scene examiners. International observers also have noted that the 
judicial system sometimes has accepted confessions even when they 
contradict available physical evidence or logic. The NPA denies that 
police abuse suspects. It asserts that regulations forbid such abuse 
and that police who abuse suspects will be punished. The NPA 
implemented regulations in 1997 to protect further the rights of 
suspects during questioning, including forbidding the questioning of 
suspects at night and requiring audio or, whenever possible, 
videotaping of interrogations. Nevertheless there are credible reports 
that the physical abuse or the threat of abuse of prisoners is a 
recurring investigative technique. In one such case in April, in order 
to obtain a confession, police allegedly physically abused four youths 
who were suspected of robbing the residence of a prominent person. The 
head of the police station subsequently made a public apology to the 
youths when it was discovered that eight other individuals were 
responsible for the crime. Detainees who are abused physically have the 
right to sue the police for torture, and confessions shown to have been 
obtained through torture are inadmissible in court proceedings. In July 
the parents of the four youths filed suit against the police. In 
November the Taiwan High Court began a retrial of the ``Hsichih 
Trio''--three youths convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 
1992. The three claim that the police tortured them into confessing.
    The authorities state that they have made efforts to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish officials responsible for torture and other 
mistreatment. Although the basic responsibility for investigating 
mistreatment lies with prosecutors, the Control Yuan (CY), a coequal 
branch of the political system that investigates official misconduct, 
also investigates such cases. While the authorities state that respect 
for human rights is a part of basic police training, human rights 
groups assert that the measures the authorities have taken to protect 
human rights are inadequate to create an ethos of respect for human 
rights among police and security personnel. Women's and children's 
rights groups are active in monitoring police and judicial performance 
and periodically mount campaigns to correct abuses.
    Corporal punishment is forbidden under military law and strictly 
prohibited in practice. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has 
taken steps to address the occasional reports of physical abuse of 
military personnel by promulgating regulations specifying the 
appropriate treatment of lower ranking personnel and by conducting 
regular polls of servicemen and their families to discover any abuse. 
The authorities also have established a telephone hot line to report 
alleged abuses within the military. Reports of abuse are investigated 
and handled according to the law. In addition the MND has established 
practical training and curriculums for all military personnel who have 
contact with new recruits. Pressure from parents of recruits and a 
program to retain recruits also have contributed to an apparent 
reduction in abuses. In 1999 the MND established a committee for the 
protection of the rights of military personnel. Using the expertise of 
outside consultants, the committee handles personal problems of 
military personnel and is part of the MND's effort to promote 
``humanitarian management'' within the military. In January the MND 
began quarterly evaluations of commanding officers' performance in 
preventing injuries to soldiers under their command. In August the MND 
issued a decree prohibiting officers from ``bullying'' new recruits, 
spelling out the proscribed behavior, and specifying stiff penalties 
for violations.
    Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards. 
However, overcrowding at the 49 prisons and overly long stays at the 
detention centers for illegal aliens remained problems, although the 
authorities have begun to address this latter problem (see Section 
2.d.). Despite an increase in facilities since 1997, the number of 
inmates detained at year's end exceeded capacity by 7,385. The primary 
reason for overcrowding has changed. The number of parolees dropped, 
and the number of inmates rose after a 1997 amendment to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure reversed a 1994 amendment that had allowed prisoners 
to be paroled after serving one-third, rather than one-half, of their 
sentences. On the other hand, the number of incarcerated drug users, 
which previously had been the fastest growing category of inmates, 
leveled off. In addition the Ministry of Justice has set up drug 
treatment facilities to reduce the number of addicts in the prison 
population.
    The authorities permit prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities generally observe 
this prohibition. Police legally may arrest without a warrant anyone 
they suspect of committing a crime for which the punishment would be 
imprisonment of 5 years or more and may question persons without a 
formal summons when circumstances are too urgent to report to a public 
prosecutor. However, immediately after detaining a suspect the 
authorities must apply to a prosecutor for a warrant to detain the 
arrestee for up to 24 hours and must give written notice to the 
detainee or a designated relative or friend, stating the reason for the 
arrest or questioning. Indicted persons may be released on bail at 
judicial discretion. In May the NPA ordered all police stations to 
prohibit the media from photographing persons under detention and to 
cease providing the names of detainees to the media. However, this 
order is not being observed in practice, as detainees frequently appear 
on television news programs.
    In 1997 an amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure shifted the 
power of investigative detention from the prosecutors to the courts. 
Under the 1997 law prosecutors must apply to the courts within 24 hours 
after arrest for permission to continue detaining an arrestee. The 
duration of this pretrial detention is limited to 2 months, and the 
courts may approve a single extension of 2 months. Limits also were set 
for detention during trial. If a crime is punishable by less than 10 
years' imprisonment, then no more than 3 extensions of 2 months each 
may be granted during the trial and appellate proceedings. During the 
second appeal, only one extension may be granted. The authorities 
generally observe these procedures, and trials usually take place 
within 3 months of indictment.
    The revised Code of Criminal Procedure requires the police to 
inform a suspect during an interrogation of the specific charges in 
question, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the 
right to ask the police to investigate evidence that would be favorable 
to the suspect. If the charges are amended subsequently, the police 
must inform the suspect. The authorities generally respect a detainee's 
request to have a lawyer present during the investigation phase, but 
defense lawyers and human rights groups continue to complain that the 
rules do not provide adequate protection since suspects often do not 
have legal representation during police interrogation. A contributing 
factor is that there is no legal requirement that indigent persons be 
provided counsel during police interrogation, although such counsel is 
provided during trials. Informed observers report that the ``public 
defense counsels'' do not provide effective defense assistance. They 
typically do not appear until the final debate hearing of the trial, 
and they seldom spend a significant amount of time discussing the case 
with their clients.
    The authorities do not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, corruption and political influence 
remain serious problems. The new DPP Government made efforts to 
eliminate corruption and to diminish political influence.
    The Judicial Yuan (JY) is one of the five coequal branches of the 
political system. The JY is headed by a president and a vice president 
and also contains the 16-member Council of Grand Justices (CGJ), which 
interprets the Constitution as well as laws and ordinances. Subordinate 
JY organs include the Supreme Court, high courts, district courts, the 
Administrative Court, and the Committee on the Discipline of Public 
Functionaries. In 1999 the LY passed legislation adding an additional 
level to the Administrative Court to provide for judicial review.
    The law provides for the right of fair public trial, and this is 
generally respected in practice. Judges, rather than juries, decide 
cases; all judges are appointed by, and are responsible to, the JY. In 
a typical court case, parties and witnesses are interrogated by a 
single judge but not directly by a defense attorney or prosecutor. The 
judge may decline to hear witnesses or to consider evidence that a 
party wishes to submit if the judge considers it irrelevant; a refusal 
to hear evidence may be a factor in an appeal. Trials are public, but 
attendance at trials involving juveniles or potentially sensitive 
issues that might attract crowds may require court permission.
    A defendant has the right to an attorney. If the defendant is 
charged with committing a crime for which the penalty is 3 or more 
years' imprisonment or if the defendant is indigent, the judge may 
assign an attorney. Attorneys assigned to defendants generally assist 
during the investigative phase of a case and at trial, but generally 
are not present during police interrogations. Informed observers report 
that public defense counsels do not provide effective defense 
assistance (see Section 1.d.). A 1997 law states that a suspect may not 
be compelled to testify. The Code of Criminal Procedure states that a 
confession shall not be the sole evidence used to find a defendant 
guilty. Nonetheless informed observers note that convictions frequently 
result from a combination of a confession and circumstantial evidence 
of varying quality. However, in September a Taipei district court 
dropped drug trafficking charges against a suspect. The police were 
unable to present any evidence other than a confession and had failed 
to record the interrogation. Any convicted person has the right to 
appeal to the next higher court level. Persons sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment of 3 years or more may appeal beyond that level. The 
Supreme Court automatically reviews life imprisonment and death 
sentences. Under the law, prosecutors have the right to appeal verdicts 
of not guilty to the next higher court level.
    The LY passed legislation in 1997 revising procedures in the 1985 
``Antihoodlum'' Law, which had departed from international standards of 
due process. The revised procedures require all witnesses to testify 
openly but provide procedures for their subsequent protection, ``in 
exceptional circumstances.'' In 1995 the Council of Grand Justices 
(CGJ) declared unconstitutional the administrative procedures that had 
been used to sentence hoodlums to reformatory education.
    In February opposition political parties charged the then-ruling 
KMT administration with interference in the judicial process when a 
court ordered the search of the residence of the former president of 
the LY in connection with a banking scandal. The case had been under 
investigation for more than a year, but the residence was not searched 
until shortly after the politician in question quit the KMT to support 
an opposition presidential candidate. The authorities asserted that new 
evidence had come to light that mandated the search.
    The JY took measures to reduce political influence on judges. 
Measures taken include: Judicial appointments and promotions are 
decided by secret ballot of an independent committee; judicial 
decisions no longer are subject to review by presiding judges, except 
in the case of decisions by ``assistant judges;'' distribution of cases 
is decided by the judges themselves; and judges and the President of 
the JY are prohibited from taking part in political activities. The new 
administration's anticorruption campaign also has reinforced the JY's 
efforts to eliminate judicial corruption. The JY's anticorruption 
department increased efforts to uncover possible corruption cases 
during the year and is more responsive to public complaints regarding 
judicial personnel. Measures from the 1999 National Judicial Reform 
Conference strengthened the supervision and evaluation of judge's 
performance. These factors have reduced the incidence of judicial 
misconduct; however, occasionally individual judges still are found to 
be involved in illegal activities. In September a judge in Tainan was 
arrested on suspicion of running a brothel since 1998 and using his 
position to protect the business from police scrutiny.
    In June the Shilin District Court in Taipei city and the Miaoli 
county courts adopted the new trial system in response to the JY 
President's 1999 judicial reform proposals. Serving as a potential 
model for the rest of the island, the defendant-oriented trial system 
will better protect the rights of the accused. Although the LY has yet 
to enact the JY President's proposed code of judicial conduct, the 
proposals have resulted in revised precepts for evaluation of judicial 
performance, and strengthened reviews of judges' financial disclosure 
reports.
    In 1999 the law was revised to create the position of law clerks. 
Working as assistants to judges, the law clerks are intended to improve 
judicial performance and the quality of decisions.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution and sections of the Criminal and 
Civil Codes contain provisions protecting privacy. A prosecutor or a 
judge must issue a warrant before a search, except when ``incidental to 
arrest.'' However, critics claim that the ``incidental to arrest'' 
provision is not only unconstitutional but also often interpreted 
broadly by police to justify searches of locations other than actual 
arrest sites. According to the NPA, warrantless searches are allowed 
only in special circumstances, such as to arrest an escapee or if facts 
indicate a person is in the process of committing a crime. In any such 
case, the police must file a report with the prosecutor or court within 
24 hours. A policeman who carries out an illegal search may be sued for 
illegal entry and sentenced to up to 1 year in prison. Few defendants 
or their spouses have filed charges against policemen found to have 
obtained evidence illegally. Furthermore illegally obtained evidence is 
not excluded automatically from consideration by the court; instead, 
its admission is left to the discretion of the judge. Increasingly 
judges are excluding illegally obtained evidence, although in the past 
such evidence was admitted and frequently provided the basis for 
conviction. For example, in September a judge refused to admit evidence 
obtained through an illegal wiretap.
    In addition to criminal suspects, persons are subject to searches 
and identity checks by police in public places. Roadblocks to check 
vehicles randomly are conducted routinely. Pedestrians also are subject 
to identity checks. Such checks are based only on a section of the 
Police Administration Law, and police officers are given wide 
discretion.
    The wiretapping of telephones is a serious problem. The 
Telecommunication Law and Code of Criminal Procedure provide that 
judicial and security authorities may file a written request to a 
prosecutor's office to monitor telephone calls to collect evidence 
against a suspect involved in a major crime. The 1999 
Telecommunications Protection and Control Law sought to bring 
unauthorized wiretapping under control by imposing severe penalties. 
The Ministry of Justice maintains that there are many fewer 
applications for wiretaps under the new law because of the tighter 
regulations in force. According to the NPA, 3,377 police wiretaps were 
approved in the 12-month period after the new legislation took effect, 
compared with more than 15,000 telephones that were reportedly 
wiretapped in 1999. The law also regulates wiretapping by the 
intelligence services.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities respect these 
rights in practice.
    Print media represent the full spectrum of views within society. 
However, some political influence still exists over the electronic 
media, particularly broadcast television stations. The ruling DPP is 
associated with Formosa TV (FTV), an island-wide broadcast television 
station based in Kaohsiung. The Government is the largest shareholder 
of Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV), and the military is the largest 
shareholder of the Chinese Television System (CTS), although it does 
not appear to play any role in programming. The opposition KMT is the 
largest shareholder of China Television Company (CTV). A fifth island-
wide broadcast station run by a nonprofit public television foundation 
under the Government Information Office (GIO) was inaugurated in 1998. 
However, the existence of approximately 100 cable television stations, 
some of which carry programming openly critical of the various 
political parties, including the ruling party, has diminished greatly 
the importance of political party influence over the broadcast 
television stations. Over 80 percent of households receive cable 
television, which includes local, privately financed channels, as well 
as many major international networks. Cable television call-in programs 
have given the public an additional means of expressing their views.
    Controls over radio stations were more limited than those over 
television stations and are being liberalized further. During the 12-
month period ending in September, the GIO received 496 applications for 
radio broadcast frequencies. A total of 71 frequencies were made 
available, and 6 of these were apportioned; applications for the 
remaining frequencies are under review. However, many of the newly 
authorized radio stations have limited broadcast ranges, and 
approximately 40 of the available frequencies are in remote areas, 
leading critics to charge that the stations do not constitute a genuine 
counterweight to the authorities' monopoly on island-wide radio 
broadcasting.
    Observers noted that licensing requirements oblige prospective 
radio station owners to have more capital than actually is required to 
operate a station. This requirement inhibits individuals or groups from 
applying for radio station licenses. However, the GIO claims that the 
$1.5 million (NT$50 million) required capitalization is based upon 
consideration of actual business costs and notes that the required 
capitalization is reduced to $31,250 (NT$1 million) for radio stations 
serving remote areas or designated ethnic groups and civic 
organizations, or which promote local development. Reportedly over 100 
unlicensed ``underground'' radio stations, many associated with 
opposition parties, operate illegally.
    There is a vigorous and active free press. In 1999 the LY abolished 
the Publications Law, which had empowered the police to seize or ban 
printed material that was seditious, treasonous, sacrilegious, 
interfered with the lawful exercise of public functions, or violated 
public order or morals. There were no reports of censorship of the 
print media during the year, nor were there any seizures of materials 
on political grounds. The police sometimes seize pornographic materials 
in accordance with the Prevention of Child and Juvenile Sexual 
Trafficking Law. In October prosecutors searched the offices of a 
newspaper and homes of two of its reporters in connection with the leak 
of a confidential transcript concerning a National Security Bureau 
investigation. Critics charged that the searches violated press freedom 
and urged reforms that would require judicial approval before such 
searches could be undertaken. The Ministry of Justice maintained that 
such limits would cripple law enforcement efforts.
    The GIO requires that any publications imported from mainland China 
be sent to the GIO Publications Department for screening before sale or 
publication and still seeks to ban the importation of publications that 
advocate communism or the establishment of united front organizations, 
endanger public order or good morals, or violate regulations or laws. 
However, few local publishing companies observe this regulation, and 
substantial People's Republic of China-origin material is imported 
every year and is widely available at schools and in research 
institutes. Moreover, cable television systems broadcast uncensored 
television channels from mainland China.
    Among other restrictions regulating the media are those precluding 
persons previously convicted of sedition from owning, managing, or 
working in television and radio stations. DPP leaders, many of whom 
were convicted of sedition after the 1979 Kaohsiung incident, 
nevertheless are not affected because their rights were restored 
through presidential amnesties by the previous administration.
    There are few restrictions on academic freedom. The expression of 
dissenting political views is common.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the authorities respect this 
right in practice. Permits are required for outdoor public meetings, 
and they are routinely granted.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; and the 
authorities respect this right in practice. The Civic Organization Law 
requires all civic organizations to register. No groups are known to 
experience any difficulty registering. Registered civic organizations 
may solicit donations from the public, contributors to them may take 
income tax deductions for their contributions, and the employees of 
such organizations are eligible to receive employment-linked benefits 
such as national health insurance coverage.
    Under the Civic Organization Law the Constitutional Court holds the 
power to dissolve political parties. Grounds for dissolution include 
objectives or actions that are deemed to jeopardize the existence of 
the ``Republic of China.'' The Constitutional Court heard no cases 
under this law during the year.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the authorities respect this right in practice. Religious 
organizations may register with the central authorities through their 
island-wide associations under either the Temple Management Law, the 
Civic Organizations Law, or the chapter of the Civil Code that governs 
foundations and associations. Registered organizations operate on a 
tax-free basis and are required to make annual reports of their 
financial operations. While individual places of worship may register 
with local authorities, many choose not to register and operate as the 
personal property of their leaders. In the past, concern over abuse of 
tax-free privileges or other financial misdeeds occasionally prompted 
the authorities to deny registration to new religions whose doctrines 
were not clear, but there were no reports that the authorities sought 
to suppress new religions during the year. In December the President 
granted a special amnesty to 19 conscientious objectors who had been 
imprisoned for refusing military service on religious grounds.
    d. Freedom of Movement, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and 
Repatriation.--The authorities do not restrict freedom of internal 
travel. Foreign travel by passport holders is common.
    Nonresident Taiwan passport holders are usually issued ``overseas 
Chinese'' passports and must seek entry permits for travel to Taiwan. 
According to 1992 revisions to the National Security Law (NSL), entry 
permits may be refused only if there are facts sufficient to create a 
strong suspicion that a person is engaged in terrorism or violence. 
Reasons for entry and exit refusals must be given, and appeals may be 
made to a special board. No exit or entry permit refusals were reported 
during the year. In September, in connection with the trial of a 
political dissident who had returned to the island without obtaining 
clearance, a high court judge applied to the Council of Grand Justices 
for review of the law. In his application the judge questioned whether 
the NSL's requirement for nonresident passport holders to obtain 
permission to enter Taiwan violated constitutional provisions for 
freedom of movement. In 1993 new measures provided that holders of 
Taiwan passports who normally reside abroad may return and regain their 
household registration, a document required to vote or participate as a 
candidate in an election.
    Since 1987 Taiwan has relaxed substantially strictures against 
travel by residents to the Chinese mainland, and such travel is common. 
Relatively tight restrictions on the entry of Chinese from the mainland 
for national security reasons, which previously had been relaxed to 
permit cross-strait exchanges, were further relaxed in December when 
the LY passed legislation permitting mainland Chinese to visit for 
business, academic, or tourism purposes. The Government also revised 
regulations to permit PRC journalists to come to Taiwan for the first 
time ever.
    There is no law under which noncitizens may ask for asylum, and 
there were no applications for refugee status during the year. While 
the authorities have been reluctant to return to the mainland those who 
might suffer political persecution, they regularly deport to the 
mainland, under provisions of the Mainland Relations Act, mainlanders 
who illegally enter the island for economic reasons. There were no 
reports of forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
    The detention centers for illegal immigrants continue to attract 
media attention. While recent expansion projects sought to relieve 
overcrowded conditions, some detention centers continued to be 
overcrowded, and inmates complained about overly long stays at the 
centers while waiting to be repatriated. The Bureau of Entry and Exit 
faults mainland Chinese authorities for delays in repatriation. In July 
the authorities began allowing some detained illegal aliens from 
mainland China to return to the mainland by airplane via Hong Kong at 
their own expense. In September the authorities began repatriating 
illegal alien mainland Chinese directly from the island of Matsu rather 
than taking them to detention centers on Taiwan.
    In 1999 the LY enacted the Entry, Exit, and Immigration Law, which 
provided strict sentencing guidelines for alien smuggling. Several 
cases have been brought before the courts under this new law (see 
Section 6.f.).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully, and 
citizens exercise this right in practice. In March for the first time 
an opposition party candidate was elected President, winning a 39 
percent plurality in a 3-man race. Generally free and fair popular 
elections for the LY have taken place three times since 1992. In April 
the National Assembly (NA) voted to allow its term to expire without 
new elections. The NA determined that an election would be called in 
the event that the NA is needed to decide a presidential recall or to 
amend the Constitution. Most of the NA's functions were transferred to 
the LY. Corruption and vote buying, particularly in local elections, 
are problems that the new administration is seeking to address. Within 
its first 6 months in office, the Chen Administration had obtained 
convictions for corruption against one LY member and one former LY 
member. In addition, another former LY member and three local 
government officials are under investigation, and 215 persons were 
indicted on charges of vote buying. In October the Ministry of Justice 
Investigation Bureau was ordered to cease political intelligence 
gathering regarding politicians and political parties, and to 
concentrate on criminal matters.
    In the wake of its victory in the March presidential election, the 
ruling DPP grew to include some 350,000 members. The KMT remains the 
largest political party, with over 750,000 members reaffirming their 
membership in a registration drive following the March electoral 
defeat. It secured a working majority in the 1998 LY elections and now 
controls 112 of 220 seats. The runner-up in the presidential election, 
a KMT-maverick candidate, founded the People First Party, which has 17 
LY members. The New Party founded by breakaway KMT members in 1993 has 
9 seats in the LY and about 30,000 members.
    The KMT benefits from its ownership of a major television channel 
and of enterprises and business holdings estimated to be worth in 
excess of $6 billion, and from the fact that its members still hold 
many key positions throughout the bureaucracy and in local governments. 
The DPP's election victory notwithstanding, its ability to administer 
the island is facing a severe challenge. The lack of cooperation 
between the ruling and opposition parties in the LY has kept the new 
Administration from fully implementing its legislative agenda. In 
November the opposition parties formed an alliance in the LY and 
initiated a campaign to recall President Chen. While by year's end this 
effort had stalled, the opposition alliance since October has refused 
to work directly with the Premier.
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, and, while 
still underrepresented, their role in government and politics is 
increasing. In March a woman for the first time was elected vice 
president, and nine women are members of the Cabinet, including the 
Minister of Interior and the Chairperson of the Mainland Affairs 
Council. Two of 29 Control Yuan members are women. A number of women 
also hold important political party positions. Two of the 11 members of 
the DPP Central Standing Committee are women, as are 11 of the KMT's 31 
Central Standing Committee members.
    Aborigine representatives participate in most levels of the 
political system, partially through holding 8 reserved seats in the 
LY--half of which are elected by the plains Aborigines and half by 
mountain Aborigines. An Aborigine serves as Chairman of the Council of 
Aboriginal Affairs. The magistrate of Taitung County is an Aborigine 
first elected in 1993 and reelected in 1997.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The principal human rights organizations are the Chinese 
Association of Human Rights and the Taiwan Association for Human 
Rights. Both organizations operate freely, although coordination 
between the two is limited. Both organizations investigate human rights 
complaints, many of which come to public attention through the media 
and statements by lawmakers from all political parties. The authorities 
also permit representatives of international human rights organizations 
to visit and meet with citizens freely. Amnesty International maintains 
a Taipei office. Women's and children's human rights groups monitor 
police and judicial performance and campaign to correct abuses (see 
Section 1.c.).
    In his May 20 inaugural address, President Chen declared that 
Taiwan must include international human rights in its legal code and 
establish a national human rights committee.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality of citizens before the law 
``irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation.'' 
Constitutional amendments enacted in 1997 also provide for the rights 
of disabled persons. While the authorities are committed to protecting 
these rights, discrimination against some groups continues.
    Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence and 
rape, remains a serious problem. Wife beating is especially widespread. 
In 1994 the DPP Women's Development Committee claimed that 35 percent 
of married women were victims of spousal abuse. The authorities fund 
domestic violence hot lines, which have handled some 17,000 cases over 
the past decade. The Ministry of Justice has taken steps to strengthen 
the protection of women and children against violence in accordance 
with the 1999 Domestic Violence and Protection Control Law. This law 
allows prosecutors to take the initiative in investigating complaints 
of domestic violence without waiting for a spouse to file a formal 
lawsuit. Although some cases are prosecuted, strong social pressure 
discourages abused women from reporting incidents to the police in 
order to avoid disgracing their families. Rape also remains a serious 
problem, and its victims are stigmatized socially. One expert estimates 
that 7,000 rapes occur annually--10 times the number reported to the 
police. In 1999 the LY passed legislation that permits the prosecution 
of the crime of rape without requiring the victim to press charges. 
According to a law passed in 1997, rape trials no longer are public 
unless the victim consents. The Code of Criminal Procedure establishes 
the punishment for rape as not less than 5 years' imprisonment, and 
those convicted usually are sentenced to from 5 to 10 years in prison. 
There were 2,042 cases of rape or sexual assault reported in 1999. A 
total of 627 persons were indicted for the crime of rape and 197 were 
convicted. Marital rape is a crime.
    In 1998 the LY passed legislation that required all city and county 
governments to set up domestic violence prevention and control centers. 
The centers provide victims with protection, shelter, legal counseling, 
and other services on a 24-hour basis. From July 1999 to October 2000 
the centers handled 34,904 cases of domestic violence. Under the law, a 
judicial order may be obtained to prohibit violators from approaching 
victims. The Ministry of Interior also provides assistance, such as 
financial assistance and shelter, to victims of rape or domestic 
violence. In 1999 the Ministry established a domestic violence 
prevention committee to implement a comprehensive program for the 
protection of women and children.
    Prostitution, including coerced prostitution and child 
prostitution, is also a problem (see Section 6.f.and 6.c.). The 
authorities are phasing out legalized prostitution; in 1999 the LY 
banned prostitution, but exempted prostitutes already registered with 
the authorities. Under the law, no new houses of prostitution may be 
registered. There have been reports of a growing trend of young women, 
often well educated, voluntarily entering into part-time prostitution 
to earn additional spending money. There also are credible reports of 
women being trafficked into the country for purposes of prostitution 
(see 6.c. and 6.f.).
    The law prohibits sex discrimination, and the LY in recent years 
has begun a systematic review and revision of those portions of the 
legal code relating to divorce, property, and child custody. As a 
result of legislation passed in 1998, many sections of the code that 
discriminated against women were eliminated. For example, women now are 
no longer required to adopt their husband's last name after marriage.
    There is no equal employment rights law, and enforcement of 
existing sex discrimination laws remains a problem, although the major 
city and county administrations have set up committees to accept 
complaints of sexual discrimination in the workplace. Labor laws 
provide for maternity leave, but employers do not always grant it. 
Women also complain of being forced to quit jobs due to marriage, age, 
or pregnancy. Women often complain of less frequent promotions and 
lower salaries than their male counterparts, although the Labor 
Standards Law prohibits gender-based differences in wages. According to 
the Council on Labor Affairs, salaries for women average 85 percent of 
those for men performing comparable jobs.
    Male spouses of female citizens now are treated the same as female 
spouses of male citizens. In 1999 the LY passed legislation permitting 
spouses of citizens to apply for permanent residency after residing in 
Taiwan for 5 years. However, the Citizenship Law continues to stipulate 
that the transmission of citizenship occurs exclusively through the 
father. A citizen mother with a foreign husband thus cannot apply for a 
Taiwan passport for her child. However, when such a child reaches age 
14, the child may apply.
    NGO's involved with women's issues include the Women Rescue 
Foundation and the Women Awakening Foundation, which help women victims 
of domestic violence; and the Garden of Hope, which helps rescue child 
prostitutes.
    Children.--The Constitution has provisions to protect children's 
rights, and the authorities are committed to supporting them. Education 
for children between 6 and 15 years of age is free and compulsory, and 
this rule is enforced. The percentage of school age children attending 
primary school is 99.92 percent, and those attending junior high school 
99.89 percent. Children also are provided health care under the 
national health insurance scheme.
    Child abuse is a significant problem. In the first 10 months after 
the Domestic Violence Control Law was passed in mid-1999, the Domestic 
Violence Protection Center received more than 900 applications for 
protection of children. The 1993 revision of the Child Welfare Act 
states that any persons discovering cases of child abuse or neglect 
must notify the police, social welfare, or child welfare authorities, 
that child welfare specialists must make such notification within 24 
hours, and that the authorities involved must issue an investigation 
report within 24 hours. Both the Ministry of Interior's Social Affairs 
Department and nongovernmental specialists assert that these 
requirements are followed. During the year, a senior member of a 
Buddhist academy was charged with sexually assaulting several novice 
monks who were children. In 1999 the LY passed legislation creating a 
Child Welfare Bureau in the Ministry of Interior to enhance efforts to 
protect child welfare. Financial subsidies are provided to low-income 
families with children in day care facilities and to local governments 
to promote child protection efforts.
    In 1999 the first juvenile court was established in Kaohsiung to 
handle criminal cases. Previously regular courts handled such cases. 
The new court includes 24 juvenile counselors. There are three juvenile 
detention centers on the island.
    Although no reliable statistics are available, child prostitution 
is a serious problem, particularly among Aborigine children (see 
Section 6.c. and 6.f.). Most child prostitutes range from 12 to 17 
years of age. The juvenile welfare law enables juvenile welfare bodies, 
prosecutors, and victims to apply to courts for termination of 
guardianship of parents and the appointment of qualified guardians if 
parents have forced their children into prostitution. If children are 
engaged in prostitution of their own free will, and the parents are 
incapable of providing safe custody, the courts may order competent 
authorities to provide counseling for not less than 6 months and not 
more than 2 years. However, legal loopholes and cultural barriers 
remain obstacles to enforcement. On occasion parents have sold a child 
into prostitution, a problem associated mostly with Aborigine families 
(see Section 6.c.).
    According to some reports, brothel owners, to prevent child 
prostitutes from escaping, use violence, drug addiction, and other 
forms of coercion. In 1995 the LY passed legislation providing for as 
much as 2 years' incarceration for customers of prostitutes under the 
age of 18. The legislation also requires the publication of the names 
of violators in newspapers. Under a plan adopted by the NPA, city and 
county authorities across the island have established police task 
forces to strengthen their efforts against child prostitution. During 
the first 7 months of the year, 379 persons were arrested for 
violations of the law, resulting in 66 convictions. In 1999 the LY 
amended the Prevention of Child and Juvenile Sex Trafficking Law to 
prohibit the media from running advertisements involving the sex trade 
and to impose penalties on citizens arrested abroad for having sex with 
minors (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Disabled Welfare Law was revised and 
strengthened in 1990. It prohibits discrimination against the disabled 
and sets minimum fines at approximately $2,400 (NT$73,800) for 
violators. Under these revisions, new public buildings, facilities, and 
transportation equipment must be accessible to the disabled, while 
existing public buildings were to be brought into conformity by 1995. 
Although new buildings appear to meet accessibility requirements, there 
does not as yet appear to be a substantial effort aimed at refitting 
older buildings to accommodate disabled people.
    A leading expert in the field estimates that the number of disabled 
is between 400,000 and 500,000--possibly as high as 700,000. One-third 
of the total are severely disabled and receive shelter or nursing care 
from the authorities. The Disabled Welfare Law requires large public 
and private organizations to hire disabled persons equal to 2 and 1 
percent of their work forces respectively. Organizations failing to do 
so must pay, for each disabled person not hired, the basic monthly 
salary (approximately $570 (NT$18,880)) into the Disabled Welfare Fund, 
which supports institutions involved in welfare for the disabled. Many 
organizations complain that it is difficult to find qualified disabled 
workers, and they appear to prefer to pay the fines involved.
    Indigenous People.--The island's only non-Chinese minority group 
consists of the Aboriginal descendants of Malayo-Polynesians already 
established when the first Chinese settlers arrived. According to the 
Council of Aboriginal Affairs, there were 381,000 Aborigines at the end 
of 1998. More than 70 percent are Christian, while the dominant Han 
Chinese are largely Buddhist or Taoist. The civil and political rights 
of Aborigines are protected fully under law. The NA amended the 
Constitution in 1992 and again in 1997 to upgrade the status of 
Aboriginal people, protect their right of political participation, and 
ensure their cultural, educational, and business development. In 
addition the authorities instituted social programs to help Aborigines 
assimilate into the dominant Chinese society. The cabinet-level Council 
of Aboriginal Affairs was established in 1996 to protect Aboriginal 
rights and interests. Critics have noted that its budget is quite 
small. As part of its efforts to preserve ethnic identities, the 
Ministry of Education now includes some Aboriginal-language classes in 
primary schools. Under 1998 legislation, the Ministry of Education 
subsidizes university education for Aborigines and works to preserve 
Aboriginal culture, history, and language through the establishment of 
Aboriginal studies centers.
    Although they face no official discrimination, Aborigines have had 
little impact, over the years, on major decisions affecting their 
lands, culture, traditions, and the allocation of their natural 
resources. In addition they complain that they are prevented from 
owning ancestral lands in mountain areas under the authorities' 
control, some of which have been designated as national parks or 
conservation areas. Land rights remain a crucial issue for Aborigines, 
along with social discrimination, educational underachievement, low 
economic status, and high rates of alcoholism. Some Aboriginal leaders 
have come to believe that only some form of autonomy can preserve their 
land rights, which constantly are threatened by Chinese developers who 
use connections and corruption to gain title to Aboriginal land. 
According to MOI statistics, only about 50 percent of Aborigine 
children complete elementary school. In the past, Aborigines were not 
allowed to use non-Chinese personal names on legal documents, but this 
rule was changed by legislation in 1996.
    The sale of Aboriginal girls into prostitution by their parents 
also is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Although the JY ruled in 1995 that 
the right to organize trade unions is protected by the Constitution, 
legislation implementing this decision has not passed; teachers, civil 
servants, and defense industry workers still are not permitted to form 
labor unions. Even with this ruling, a number of laws and regulations 
limit the right of association. Labor unions may draw up their own 
rules and constitutions, but they must submit these to the authorities 
for review. Unions may be dissolved if they do not meet certification 
requirements or if their activities disturb public order. However, 
there were no instances of the authorities dissolving local labor 
groups or denying new unions certification.
    The Labor Union Law requires that union leaders be elected 
regularly by secret ballot, and, in recent years, workers have 
sometimes rejected ruling party or management-endorsed union slates. 
Under the new administration there has been no reported political 
interference in union affairs. Unions may form confederations, but no 
administrative district, including a city, county, or province, can 
have competing labor confederations.
    Under the previous administration the Council of Labor Affairs 
(CLA) recognized one island-wide labor federation, the KMT-associated 
Chinese Federation of Labor. The DPP administration significantly eased 
restrictions on the right of association by recognizing three new 
island-wide labor federations. In May the CLA recognized the Taiwan 
Confederation of Trade Unions (previously known as the National 
Federation of Industrial Unions). The Chinese Labor Unions Federation 
and the National Trade Union Confederation were established in July and 
August respectively. Nonetheless the percentage of workers who are 
labor union members has not increased in recent years due to the 
extremely low unemployment rate, higher wages, the shift from 
manufacturing to service industries, the small scale and poor 
organization of most unions, and past prosecution of labor activists by 
the authorities. As of March, some 2.9 million workers, approximately 
30 percent of the 9.7 million-person labor force, belonged to 3,785 
registered labor unions.
    The law governing labor disputes recognizes the right of unions to 
strike but imposes restrictions that make legal strikes difficult and 
seriously weaken collective bargaining. For example the authorities 
require mediation of labor/management disputes when they deem the 
disputes to be sufficiently serious or to involve ``unfair practices.'' 
The law forbids both labor and management from disrupting the ``working 
order'' when either mediation or arbitration is in progress. The law 
mandates stiff penalties for violations of no-strike and no-retaliation 
clauses. Employers in the past sometimes ignored the law and dismissed 
or locked out workers without any legal action being taken against 
them, although no such cases were reported during the year. The CLA 
reported that from 1990-99, there were 34 strikes, of which 23 involved 
workers at bus companies seeking increased pay and reduced hours. 
Strikes threatened in late 1999 and in August by airport employees did 
not materialize because workers obtained satisfactory concessions from 
management. There were no strikes in 1999 and three strikes in 1998.
    In 1971 the People's Republic of China replaced Taiwan in the 
International Labor Organization. The CFL is affiliated with the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The new federations 
are not internationally affiliated.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Except for the 
categories of workers noted in Section 6.a., the Labor Union Law and 
the Settlement of Labor Disputes Law give workers the right to organize 
and bargain collectively.
    Under the Labor Union Law, employers may not refuse employment to, 
dismiss, or otherwise unfairly treat workers because they are union 
members. However, in practice employers sometimes have dismissed union 
leaders without reasonable cause, or laid them off first during 
employee cutbacks, and observers point out that the law has no specific 
penalties for violations. Several union leaders of a container terminal 
company were laid off at the end of 1998 following a strike earlier in 
the year. According to the National Federation of Independent Trade 
Unionists, over 400 trade unionists and supporters have been fired 
since the labor movement began to expand after the 1987 lifting of 
martial law.
    The Collective Agreements Law provides for collective bargaining 
but does not make it mandatory. Since such agreements are used only in 
large-scale enterprises, and less than 5 percent of enterprises fall 
into this category, the proportion of workers covered remains small. 
Employers set wages generally in accordance with market conditions.
    Firms in export processing zones are subject to the same laws 
regarding treatment of labor unions as other firms and follow normal 
practices including collective bargaining agreements with their unions.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Standards 
Law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of 
these practices, apart from forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 
6.f.). The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and the 
authorities generally enforce this prohibition effectively. However, 
some parents of Aboriginal children sell them into prostitution, and 
the requirements of the law make prosecution difficult at times (see 
Section 5).
    In 1999 nine women who were forced to work as ``comfort women'' 
(women who, during World War II, were forced to provide sex to soldiers 
of the Japanese Imperial Government) filed lawsuits in Japan seeking 
$100,000 (NT$3,000,000) and a formal apology from the Japanese 
Government. The case is before the courts.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Standards Law (LSL) prohibits forced and bonded 
child labor, and the authorities generally enforce this prohibition 
effectively, although the sale of Aboriginal children into prostitution 
remains a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). To protect children from 
the worst forms of exploitation, the authorities have enacted a Child 
Welfare Law, Juvenile Welfare Law, and Child and Juvenile Sexual 
Transaction Prevention Act to protect children from debt bondage, 
prostitution, pornographic performances, and other illicit activities 
specified in ILO Convention 182. The LSL stipulates age 15, after 
compulsory education required by law ends, as the minimum age for 
employment. County and city labor bureaus enforce minimum age laws.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The LSL mandates labor 
standards. The law is not well enforced in areas such as overtime work 
and pay or retirement payments. A 1996 amendment extended the LSL to 
all salaried employees. By the end of 1999, the LSL covered 5.7 million 
of Taiwan's 6.6 million salaried workers. The CLA conducts publicity 
campaigns to increase public awareness of the law and has set up 
telephone hot lines to accept complaints of LSL violations.
    The CLA did not increase the minimum monthly wage, which remained 
at $505 (NT$15,840). While sufficient in less expensive areas, this 
wage does not assure a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family in urban areas such as Taipei. However, the average 
manufacturing wage is more than double the legal minimum wage, and the 
average for service industry employees is even higher. In June the LY 
passed legislation to reduce working hours from 48 hours per week to 84 
hours in 2 weeks. In 1998 the public sector adopted a new system 
providing for a 5-day workweek every other week. According to a CLA 
survey, about one-third of private enterprises also have adopted that 
system.
    Because of an acute labor shortage (the unemployment rate remained 
at 2.7 percent in 1999), there has been a legal influx of foreign 
workers in the last several years. The law stipulates that foreign 
workers who are employed legally receive the same protection as local 
workers. However, in 1998 foreign domestic workers were exempted from 
the LSL, denying them the right to safeguards provided to citizens. 
Moreover authorities say that in many cases illegal foreign workers, 
many from Thailand and the Philippines, receive board and lodging from 
their employers, but no medical coverage, accident insurance, or other 
benefits enjoyed by citizens. Illegal foreign workers also are 
vulnerable to employer exploitation in the form of confiscation of 
passports, imposition of involuntary deductions from wages, and 
extension of working hours without overtime pay. In addition observers 
say that conditions in many small- and medium-sized factories that 
employ illegal foreign labor are dangerous, due to old and poorly 
maintained equipment. Observers have alleged that legal foreign workers 
are sometimes similarly exploited. The CLA has urged employers not to 
mistreat foreign workers, and employers are subject to the same 
penalties for mistreating foreign workers as for mistreating citizen 
workers. In November the CLA ended the practice of requiring foreign 
female workers to undergo pregnancy tests. In the past, those who 
tested positive were subject to immediate deportation. According to CLA 
statistics, there are 311,000 legal foreign workers, including 
approximately 140,000 workers from Thailand and 108,000 workers from 
the Philippines. In 1999 the CLA signed a labor agreement with Vietnam 
permitting its workers to obtain employment in Taiwan. The CLA has 
stated that its goal is to keep the number of foreign workers at the 
300,000 level. In June the authorities placed an indefinite ban on the 
entry of new Philippine blue-collar workers, insisting that the ban was 
due to the high rate at which Philippine workers left their jobs and 
the aggressive stance of the Philippine Representative Office in labor 
cases. The ban was lifted in December. Due to increased unemployment 
among blue-collar workers and Aborigines, the CLA announced on 
September 1 that it would reduce the foreign labor quota on major 
construction projects from 50 to 30 percent.
    The 1991 revised Occupational Safety and Health Law (OSHL) extended 
coverage to include workers in agriculture, fishing, and forestry 
industries and appeared to strengthen penalties for safety violations. 
It nevertheless still provides only minimal standards for working 
conditions and health and safety precautions. The OSHL gives workers 
the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without 
jeopardy to continued employment.
    The 1993 Labor Inspection Law was designed to strengthen the 
enforcement of labor standards and health and safety regulations. It 
increased the number of enterprises and types of safety factors to be 
inspected; gave inspectors quasi-judicial powers; required 
preexamination of dangerous working places such as naphtha-cracking 
plants, pesticide factories, and firecracker factories; and raised 
penalties for violations. Critics allege that the CLA does not 
effectively enforce workplace laws and regulations because it employs 
too few inspectors. During the year, 33 new inspectors were added 
resulting in 256 inspectors available for the approximately 300,000 
enterprises covered by the OSHL. The inspection rate in 1999 was 8.2 
percent, down slightly from 8.3 percent in 1998. The CLA maintains that 
it has strengthened its safety checks at workplaces with a greater risk 
of worker injury and is offering training programs to help workers 
protect their rights. Since many enterprises are small, family-owned 
operations employing relatives unlikely to report violations, actual 
adherence to the hours, wage, and safety sections of various labor laws 
is hard to document but is believed to be minimal in these smaller 
enterprises. The CLA has established hot lines to receive complaints 
about OSHL violations.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no law specifically 
prohibiting trafficking; however, traffickers of persons for sexual 
purposes may be prosecuted under the Sexual Violation Offenses Act, 
which outlaws sexual transactions for profit. In addition in 1999 the 
LY enacted legislation which criminalized alien smuggling (see Section 
2.d.). The 1995 Statute for Prevention of Child and Juvenile Sexual 
Trafficking empowers the authorities to prosecute any person who 
intends to force a girl below the age of 18 to engage in sex or to sell 
or pawn her by other means. Nonetheless there are occasional reports of 
organized crime rings trafficking in women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution. The majority of cases involve women from mainland China, 
Thailand, or Cambodia. Criminal gangs in mainland China reportedly use 
deceptive measures to recruit and procure young women who are then 
funneled to Taiwan-based organized crime gangs who arrange sham 
marriages to enable them to obtain visas to enter Taiwan. The women 
then are forced into prostitution. The extent of the problem is 
difficult to determine; there have been 50,000 marriages between 
persons from mainland China and Taiwan since 1992, but less than 1 
percent are believed to involve the trafficking gangs. In September 
Cambodian police arrested two men from Taiwan for allegedly luring 
Cambodian women into fake marriages for purpose of trafficking them to 
Taiwan where they would be forced into prostitution. Observers have 
noted that light sentences for traffickers hamper police efforts to end 
this trade. Trafficking victims, if arrested for prostitution, also 
face light sentences, such as fines or deportation (see Sections 5 and 
6.c.).
    The sale of Aboriginal girls into prostitution by their parents 
also is a problem. However, this practice is believed to have declined, 
at least in part due to intensive efforts on the part of social workers 
and NGO's to combat the practice. The NPA also coordinated the 
formation of police task forces in local jurisdictions to investigate 
and prevent the sale of Aboriginal girls into prostitution. From the 
beginning of 1998 through April 1999, 46 Aboriginal girls were found to 
be engaged in prostitution.
    Taiwan is a major transit point for persons from mainland China 
attempting to travel illegally to the United States and other 
countries. In 1999 the LY enacted the Entry, Exit, and Immigration Law, 
which provided for up to 3 years imprisonment and/or up to $30,000 (NT$ 
1,000,000) fine for alien smuggling. Several cases have been brought 
before the courts under this new law.
                               __________

                               EAST TIMOR

    East Timor made significant progress in establishing its 
institutions of democracy and governance; however, during its first 
full year of independence from Indonesia, reconstruction and recovery 
from the September 1999 violence that ravaged the territory was a 
central focus of activity, and numerous problems remained. In a U.N.-
administered consultation vote on August 30, 1999, an overwhelming 
majority of East Timorese voted against autonomy (and, in effect, for 
independence from Indonesia), and in early September 1999, the U.N. 
Secretary General declared the ballot results to be ``an accurate 
reflection of the will of the East Timorese people.'' As a result, in 
October 1999, the Government of Indonesia approved revocation of the 
1978 Indonesian parliamentary decree that annexed East Timor, allowing 
for the establishment of the U.N. Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET), which is mandated by the U.N. Security Council to 
establish a democratic government in East Timor.
    UNTAET continued to govern East Timor, and the National 
Consultative Council (NCC) advised the Transitional Administrator. In 
July UNTAET established a new governing structure, the East Timor 
Transitional Administration (ETTA). With the addition in October of the 
Foreign Affairs portfolio, the ETTA cabinet consisted of nine 
ministries, four of which were headed by UNTAET officials and five of 
which were headed by East Timorese. UNTAET appointed members of the NCC 
and the cabinet in close consultation with the National Council of 
Timorese Resistance (CNRT), a political umbrella of proindependence 
parties. An UNTAET-appointed National Council (NC) replaced the NCC in 
late October. The NC is comprised entirely of East Timorese. In the 
latter part of the year, divisions within the CNRT complicated the 
political situation. Under UNTAET regulations, Indonesian law applies 
throughout East Timor, except in areas in which UNTAET specifically has 
repealed laws or superceded them with its own regulations.
    In February the Australian-led International Force in East Timor 
(INTERFET), which arrived in September 1999, transferred military 
authority to UNTAET Peacekeeping Forces (UN-PKF). The UN-PKF's role was 
to restore and preserve basic social order and prevent violence by pro-
Indonesia militias operating inside East Timor. The UN-PKF was present 
in the eastern and central sectors of the territory but maintained an 
especially strong presence on the border, where, despite repeated 
assurances from the Government of Indonesia, crossborder Indonesian-
military-supported militia incursions from Indonesia continued. Despite 
such sporadic militia incursions, the security situation in most of 
East Timor was stable throughout the year. In mid-January INTERFET 
transferred responsibility for internal security to the U.N. Civilian 
Police (CIVPOL). In July the first group of 50 East Timorese cadets 
graduated from the Police Academy and began working alongside CIVPOL, 
augmented by a police assistance group comprised of East Timorese who 
formerly were part of the Indonesian police forces. The former East 
Timorese guerrilla forces, Falintil, remained in the Aileu cantonment 
area. By midyear more than half of the estimated 1,500 Falintil 
personnel had returned to their home areas on ``leave,'' and a 
dissident commander known as ``L-7'' led a few dozen of his men out of 
the cantonment area in July. In August an UNTAET commissioned study 
recommended that Falintil become the core of a new East Timor Defense 
Force, and in September the ETTA cabinet approved the study's low-cost 
option for such a force. In the interim, the UN-PKF employed a number 
of Falintil personnel as advisors and guides. After an international 
donors conference in November, plans were underway to begin training a 
new defense force beginning in early 2001.
    East Timor is an extremely poor territory, with two-thirds to 
three-fourths of the population of 775,000 persons engaged in 
subsistence agriculture. The Asian Development Bank estimated the per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) to be approximately $395. An 
estimated 70 to 80 percent of East Timor's infrastructure was damaged 
severely by the systematic scorched-earth campaign that Indonesian 
military and militia forces conducted in September 1999, as they 
withdrew from the territory. During the year, reconstruction proceeded 
slowly. By midyear the majority of the population had basic shelter and 
sufficient food supplies. Some commercial activity resumed, much of 
which served the large foreign presence in the territory. The rural 
agricultural economy began to recover, but unemployment remained high 
in the urban areas. Coffee remained the territory's only significant 
export, but falling world prices and a domestic export tax hindered its 
export. In October negotiations began with Australia over the revenue 
from the potentially lucrative Timor Gap oil and gas region, located in 
the waters between East Timor and Australia. However, the Timor Gap is 
not expected to be economically productive for 5 to 10 years. Property 
ownership disputes and the lack of a comprehensive commercial code 
hinder investment and related long-term development. Urban unemployment 
and wage and price inflation remain significant problems. Most 
observers believe that East Timor will remain heavily dependent on 
foreign assistance for the foreseeable future.
    UNTAET generally respected the human rights of East Timorese. The 
arrival of the INTERFET forces and withdrawal of Indonesian forces in 
September 1999 largely brought to an end the decadeslong pattern of 
serious human rights abuses by Indonesian authorities and their East 
Timorese allies; however, many serious problems remained. East Timorese 
Indonesia-backed militias based in West Timor, Indonesia, sometimes 
crossed into East Timor and threatened, robbed, attacked, and 
occasionally killed local villagers and peacekeeping forces. A U.N. 
peacekeeper was killed on July 24, and another was killed in August in 
clashes with militias inside East Timor. Six militia personnel were 
killed in clashes with the UN-PKF in the first 11 months of the year. 
There were isolated attacks and instances of harassment of returning 
refugees who were suspected of being former militia members, and CNRT-
sponsored security groups sometimes were involved in such abuses. The 
vast majority of the prison population is composed of pretrial 
detainees, despite explicit protective regulations. On occasion the 
independence of the judiciary was questioned, and the judiciary's 
resources remained extremely inadequate. The CNRT benefited from its 
close relationship with UNTAET and at times allegedly misused its 
political influence for employment advantages. By November more than 
170,000 internally displaced persons (IDP's) had returned to East Timor 
from West Timor and other areas of Indonesia, but many others remained 
in West Timor. By year's end, most children had returned to school, but 
the educational infrastructure, which had not been fully rebuilt, 
suffered from inadequate facilities and educational materials. There 
were occasional attacks on Protestant churches, which had been closely 
associated with the prointegration cause. Muslims were subjected to 
harassment, and the mosque in Dili was attacked. Ethnic Chinese 
businessmen faced some extortion and harassment, and non-Portuguese 
speakers reported discrimination in government hiring. Local leaders 
sometimes forced suspected militia members returning from West Timor, 
Indonesia, to engage in compulsory labor.
    During the year, significant efforts were made to bring to justice 
those persons responsible for the most serious abuses committed during 
1999. UNTAET established a Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU) to 
address the most recent and serious cases and concluded a memorandum of 
understanding with the Government of Indonesia on legal, judicial, and 
human rights cooperation. In October UNTAET issued an arrest warrant 
for a prominent militia leader and requested his extradition from 
Indonesia. On December 11, UNTAET filed indictments against those 
persons suspected of committing war crimes and related atrocities in 
1999. The Indonesian Government had not responded formally by year's 
end.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--The arrival of the 
INTERFET forces and withdrawal of Indonesian forces in September 1999, 
largely brought to an end the decades-long pattern of serious human 
rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, by Indonesian security 
forces. INTERFET members committed no extrajudicial killings during the 
year. However, East Timorese pro-Indonesia militias based in West 
Timor, Indonesia, which were armed and supported by elements of the 
Indonesian armed forces, crossed into East Timor and threatened, 
robbed, attacked, and sometimes killed local villagers and peacekeeping 
forces during the year. In addition violence against East Timorese 
former militias returning from West Timor occasionally was a problem 
(see Section 1.c.).
    During the year, there were reports that returning IDP's, alleged 
to have militia links, were killed. In January and February, two men 
were killed in Ermera district. While it is believed that these were 
retaliatory killings related to the two men's proautonomy sympathies, 
these two cases still were under investigation at year's end. In March 
militia members reportedly killed a villager near Maliana. In April 
Gabriel Alves, a suspected militia member, was beaten and kicked to 
death in Ulmera, Liquica. A suspect was arrested, but by year's end, no 
prosecutions had taken place.
    On July 24, approximately eight militia members shot and killed New 
Zealand U.N. peacekeeper Private Leonard William Manning and mutilated 
his corpse, near Suai, East Timor, where Manning's unit was patrolling 
the East/West Timor border area. On August 10, East Timorese militia 
members killed Nepalese U.N. peacekeeper Private Devi Ram Jaisi and 
wounded four other persons (see Section 1.c.). By year's end, UNTAET 
and the Government of Indonesia had been unable to capture the militia 
suspects in these incidents.
    UNTAET and the UN-PKF estimated that in September as many as 150 
armed militia members were operating inside East Timor. However, in 
response to the killings of U.N. personnel, the UNPKF liberalized its 
rules of engagement to permit peacekeepers to shoot at militia members 
who are perceived to be a threat to the UN-PKF. As of November, 
peacekeepers had shot and killed six suspected militia members 
operating within East Timor. By year's end, more than a dozen pro-
Indonesia militia members, lacking support from the local population, 
had surrendered to the UN-PKF and UNTAET, and the UNPKF believes that 
most of the remaining militia members returned to West Timor.
    Elements of the Indonesian security forces (TNI) and prointegration 
East Timorese militias, armed and largely supported by the TNI, were 
responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings in East Timor 
throughout 1999, but especially after the results (an overwhelming vote 
for independence) of the August 30, 1999 consultation vote were 
announced (see Section 1.c.). During the year, UNTAET made significant 
efforts to bring to justice those persons responsible for the most 
serious abuses committed during 1999. UNTAET established a Serious 
Crimes Investigation Unit to address the most recent and serious cases. 
In April UNTAET concluded a memorandum of understanding with the 
Government of Indonesia on legal, judicial, and human rights 
cooperation. In October UNTAET issued a warrant for the arrest of 
Eurico Guterres, a militia member who allegedly was involved in the 
1999 mass violence in East Timor, and requested his extradition from 
Indonesia. At year's end, Guterres remained in Indonesia facing trial 
for causing a disturbance at a September 24 weapons handover ceremony 
presided over by Indonesian Vice President Soekarnoputri in Atambua, 
West Timor. He was being held on charges of illegal possession of 
weapons and instigating his followers to engage in illegal acts. On 
December 11, UNTAET filed indictments against those persons suspected 
of committing war crimes and related atrocities in 1999. The Indonesian 
Government (Attorney General's Office) had not taken a position or 
responded formally by year's end.
    During the year, UNTAET provided considerable assistance to 
Indonesian authorities investigating the atrocities committed in East 
Timor during 1999. In Indonesia the Commission for Investigation of 
Violations of Human Rights in East Timor (KPPHAM) conveyed its report 
of human rights violations in East Timor to the Indonesia Attorney 
General's office on January 31. The report built upon an earlier 
interim report that held Indonesian security forces responsible for the 
destruction and violence that followed the East Timor consultation vote 
on August 30, 1999. The KPP-HAM members recommended the investigation 
of more than 30 persons, including the commander of the security forces 
and other high-ranking TNI and police officers. The Indonesia Attorney 
General said that his office initially would prosecute five major cases 
arising from the 1999 violence in East Timor and for which pro-
Indonesia militia groups backed by TNI forces allegedly were 
responsible. These cases included the April 6, 1999 massacre in 
Liquisa, in which at least 25 persons died; the April 17, 1999 killings 
at proindependence activist Manuel Carrascalao's house, in which at 
least 15 persons died; the September 5, 1999 attack on the compound of 
the Catholic Diocese in Dili; the September 6, 1999 massacre of at 
least 50 priests and IDP's at a church in Suai; and the September 21, 
1999 killing of Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes. The cases did not 
include the September 26, 1999 attack on a humanitarian convoy near Los 
Palos by ``Team Alfa'' paramilitary personnel, in which Team Alfa 
members killed eight persons, including nuns and religious workers. The 
Indonesia Attorney General's office named a total of 23 suspects in 
September and October (one of whom, an East Timorese militia commander, 
militia members killed in early September). Those accused included 
several Indonesian army and police generals, but not then-Indonesian 
Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, former Indonesian Armed Forces 
intelligence chief Zacky Anwar Makarim, or other senior members of the 
Indonesian military leadership who were named as responsible parties in 
the KPP-HAM report. Progress on these cases was slow, and the number of 
suspects named small in comparison to the number of persons believed 
responsible.
    There also were efforts to hold persons accountable for killings of 
suspected militia members in 1999. For example, four suspected militia 
members reportedly were murdered in Bobonaro town on September 29, 
1999. A suspect was arrested during the year and investigation of this 
case was ongoing as of year's end.
    During the year, the U.N. began investigating the 1975 murders of 
five journalists in East Timor (see Section 2.a.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances during the year.
    There were numerous reports of abductions and disappearances in 
East Timor following the flight and forced relocation of more than 
250,000 East Timorese civilians in September 1999. In addition dozens 
of East Timorese prisoners, including political prisoners, previously 
held in Becora prison in Dili, reportedly were taken to West Timor in 
September 1999. By year's end, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) 
had tracked down the vast majority of the former prisoners. Some had 
returned to East Timor, while others remained in West Timor.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--UNTAET regulations provide that all persons undertaking 
public duties or holding public office shall observe internationally 
recognized human rights standards, as reflected in the U.N. Convention 
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. In the early part of the year, there were isolated cases of 
local residents mistreating returning refugees who were suspected of 
being former militia members or militia sympathizers. Such mistreatment 
occasionally took the form of interrogations, stonings, beatings, and 
forced labor (see Section 6.c.). Irregular CNRT-sponsored security 
groups sometimes facilitated the abuse of such returning refugees, and 
CIVPOL and local UNTAET officials often permitted the CNRT security 
groups to screen returnees to determine if they had been associated 
with militias or Indonesian intelligence or had committed abuses. This 
screening usually occurred once the returnees had arrived back in their 
home areas. Those returnees that were suspected of having committed 
abuses sometimes were beaten during these sessions, at times severely. 
For example, in early February a CNRT investigation unit (which was 
questioning returnees about past militia affiliations) beat and stabbed 
a militia member in Liquica. However, the returning refugees generally 
were reintegrated without significant problems (see Section 2.d.).
    Throughout the year, pro-Indonesia militias clandestinely entered 
East Timor from West Timor and threatened, robbed, and sometimes beat 
and killed local villagers (see Sections 1.a. and 2.d.).
    Rivalries between members of the politically dominant CNRT and the 
small opposition group known as the Democratic Republic of East Timor 
(RDTL) occasionally led to intimidation and violence. Some members of 
the CNRT reportedly extorted protection money from businesses.
    There were numerous acts of rape and sexual abuse that TNIsupported 
militia groups perpetrated against displaced East Timorese women in 
1999, in addition to the widely reported rapes of women whom the 
Aitarak militia group kept as sex slaves in their Dili headquarters, 
also during 1999 (see Section 5). The Dili court indicted one militia 
member on a rape charge stemming from the September 1999 violence in 
Suai, and a Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (see Section 1.e.) 
special team established to address sexual violence was investigating 
numerous other rape cases. In 1999 the KPP stated that it received 
reports that the TNI and the militias raped 60 women in East Timor 
during the September 1999 wave of violence. Cases of East Timorese 
women whom Indonesian soldiers and civilian personnel allegedly raped 
in previous years remained unresolved.
    Prison conditions meet the basic food, sanitation and health 
requirements of prisons.
    UNTAET permits visits by independent human rights monitors to 
prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--UNTAET regulations, 
which are based on the U.N. Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 
explicitly preclude arbitrary arrest and detention, and require a 
hearing within 48 hours of arrest to review the lawfulness of the 
arrest and detention. UNTAET regulations provide the right to a trial 
without undue delay.
    Pretrial detention is allowed only for crimes carrying a sentence 
of over 1 year. In principle a judge must review pretrial detention 
every 30 days; however, in practice limited resources have hindered 
this review, and some persons remained in pretrial detention longer 
than stipulated. The maximum pretrial detention period is not to exceed 
6 months for suspects who are charged with crimes carrying a sentence 
of 5 years or less. In the case of a suspect who is charged with a 
crime carrying a sentence of more than 5 years, a court panel may 
extend the pretrial detention for an additional 3 months. For crimes 
with a sentence of over 10 years, a court panel may order additional 
pretrial detention beyond 9 months. Upon the expiration of the maximum 
detention period, a judge may order the release of a detainee. 
Throughout the year, roughly half of all detainees were overdue for 
review of their pretrial detention. UNTAET's general policy is to keep 
the prison population as low as possible. Consistent with this 
approach, during the year 236 detainees were released on bail upon 
review; however, charges against them were not dropped, and their legal 
status was uncertain. Ninety-seven percent of the total prison 
population, or 158 persons, were pretrial detainees at year's end. Of 
the pretrial detainees, three-quarters were charged with murder, 
manslaughter, rape, or other violent crimes that carried a sentence of 
over 10 years.
    In East Timor, arbitrary detention of persons suspected of 
proindependence sympathies by prointegration militia groups was a 
continuing problem in the months prior to and shortly after the 
September 1999 consultation. However, during the year, there were few 
reports that UNTAET officials arbitrarily detained persons. The one 
known exception occurred in September when a foreign reporter was 
arrested for ``offending the dignity'' of the CNRT president (see 
Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). There also were no confirmed reports of 
militia groups having committed such abuses in East Timor. While there 
were reports that Falintil members detained some persons in their 
cantonment area at Aileu, it was not clear whether the detainees were 
in ``protective custody'' (some suspected militia members ended up in 
Aileu after being driven from their home areas) or held against their 
will.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--UNTAET regulations--specifically 
the new Court Law--provide for the establishment of an independent 
judiciary in East Timor. Section two of the Court Law provides that 
judges perform their duties ``independently and impartially'' without 
``improper influence.'' Similarly the new Prosecution Law requires that 
all public prosecutors discharge their duties impartially. These 
regulations generally were respected during the year; however, the 
independence of the judiciary occasionally was questioned. For example, 
following disturbances in Dili in late April, a judge reportedly issued 
arrest warrants at the request of CNRT officials. In September the Dili 
District Court ordered the arrest of a Japanese reporter for 
``offending the dignity'' of CNRT President Xanana Gusmao--a crime 
under the Indonesian Criminal Law Code that the East Timor courts still 
were using during the year, despite Indonesia's revocation of the law. 
The reporter later was released, and UNTAET subsequently revoked the 
Indonesian statute used in the case (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). In 
March UNTAET created a civil law court system with 13 district courts 
and 1 national Court of Appeal. In June UNTAET established a public 
prosecutor's office. However, by year's end, only the Dili District 
Court and Court of Appeals were functioning. By December ETTA had made 
progress in creating a legal basis for the justice sector, but it still 
faced serious challenges in recruiting and training enough qualified 
judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. The judiciary's shortage of 
personnel largely accounts for UNTAET's inability to process criminal 
cases against most detained suspects within a reasonable time (see 
Section 1.d.).
    UNTAET established a special legal mechanism to prosecute those 
Indonesian and pro-Indonesian East Timorese persons responsible for the 
mass killings in 1999 and other serious human rights abuses. In March 
UNTAET established a special Serious Crimes Panel within the Dili 
District Court to serve as a de facto international tribunal for the 
1999 atrocities. The special panel--which is expected to consist of two 
international judges and one East Timorese judge--has exclusive and 
``universal'' jurisdiction to adjudicate cases of genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offenses, and torture that 
occurred between January 1 and October 25, 1999. In June UNTAET created 
a corresponding Serious Crimes Prosecution Division under the General 
Prosecutor. This unit then incorporated an internationally staffed 
Serious Crimes Investigation and Prosecution Unit that originally was 
created during the early part of the year under the office of Human 
Rights Affairs. UNTAET also adopted international definitions of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and command 
responsibility into a criminal code for the Serious Crimes Panel. On 
December 11, UNTAET filed the first indictments against Indonesian and 
pro-Indonesia suspects. Those persons indicted included both 
Indonesians and East Timorese; as of year's end, some suspects were in 
detention in Dili while others were at large in Indonesia. UNTAET 
requested assistance from the Government of Indonesia in extraditing 
identified suspects at large in Indonesia; however, by year's end, the 
Government of Indonesia had refused to extradite suspects to East Timor 
or to allow UNTAET investigators to question suspects in Indonesia.
    The Transitional Authority's ability to employ fully this legal 
mechanism and to begin prosecutions by year's end was constrained 
severely by insufficient staff and funding and by procedural and 
organizational disputes within UNTAET. In particular, the UNTAET 
Serious Crimes Investigation Unit was understaffed and underfunded, 
limiting its ability to investigate the five priority incidents related 
to the 1999 atrocities.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--UNTAET allows for these rights, as provided by 
relevant U.N. human rights covenants. However, the CNRT receives 
material support and derives legitimacy from its close relations with 
UNTAET; other political entities do not enjoy such advantages (see 
Section 3). There were credible charges that the CNRT used its 
political position to influence the allocation of jobs in education, 
possibly including illegally adding names to payrolls.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--UNTAET regulations provide for the 
freedom of speech and press as stipulated in the U.N. International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. There are two independent 
newspapers in the territory, published in several languages, whose 
editorials freely criticize UNTAET, the CNRT, and other political 
entities. One of the newspapers was founded during the year. While 
insufficient financial resources and facilities have constrained the 
development of independent print and broadcast media, there are no 
political or legal impediments to new entries to the media market. In 
September a foreign reporter was arrested for ``offending the dignity'' 
of the CNRT president; he later was released (see Sections 1.d. and 
1.e.). In Indonesia no one was held accountable for the September 1999 
killing of Dutch journalist Sander Theones in Dili by assailants 
believed to have been members of the Indonesian Battalion 745. In 
September it was announced that the U.N. was investigating the October 
1975 murders of five Australia-based journalists in East Timor (see 
Section 1.a.).
    UNTAET operates one television and one radio station. The Catholic 
Church operates one radio station, and there are several small 
community radio stations that were founded during the year.
    Although the telecommunications infrastructure largely is 
underdeveloped, there are no legal or administrative restrictions on 
Internet access.
    UNTAET respects academic freedom. The University of East Timor 
reopened in a new location in November after the university's previous 
facilities were destroyed in September 1999.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--UNTAET allows for 
freedom of assembly, and this right exists in practice. Many peaceful 
demonstrations occurred throughout the year. Most demonstrations 
centered on complaints over allocation of jobs, salaries, severance pay 
issues, and admission of students to the university.
    UNTAET allows for the freedom of association, and strongly 
advocates for the freedom of political parties (see Section 3). Many 
NGO's were established during the year (see Section 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--UNTAET regulations provide for freedom of 
religion. Representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, Protestant 
churches, and the Islamic community, occupy appointed seats on the 
National Council. More than 90 percent of the population of East Timor 
is Roman Catholic. The relatively few Protestant churches in East Timor 
previously were identified with the Indonesian military forces and pro-
Indonesia East Timorese. Accusations that Protestant clergymen were 
linked to pro-Indonesia East Timorese militias sometimes led to violent 
incidents. East Timor's small Muslim community consists of ethnic East 
Timorese as well as ethnic Malay migrants from other parts of 
Indonesia. The former group was well-integrated into East Timorese 
society, but the latter group experienced some harassment. Some Muslim 
groups at times were victims of harassment, and in December gangs 
attacked the main mosque in Dili. Local gangs attacked the main mosque 
in Dili on December 31, injuring three persons in the mosque. The 
mosque members' resistance to the gang's demand for a car apparently 
precipitated the violence. There were no arrests in cases related to 
religious violence or attacks against churches and mosques (see Section 
5). UNTAET's ability to respond to such attacks was hindered by 
insufficient prison space and judicial resources (see Sections 1.c. and 
1.e.).
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--UNTAET respects the rights of freedom of 
movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation.
    Throughout the year, pro-Indonesia militias entered East Timor from 
West Timor and attacked, threatened, and sometimes killed local 
villagers (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The fear of such violence 
sometimes led East Timorese residents to abandon their villages 
temporarily. For example, in August militia members who penetrated East 
Timor as far as the Manufahi district, in the central sector, caused 
more than 1,000 local residents to flee their villages for fear of 
militia attacks.
    During the year, UNTAET worked closely with the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) to provide for the repatriation of IDP's from West 
Timor to East Timor, including the provision of transportation, 
shelter, and food. Working in cooperation with NGO's, UNTAET, the IOM, 
and the UNHCR have resettled in East Timor an estimated 170,000 of the 
approximately 250,000 former residents who fled, or whom pro-Indonesia 
militia removed forcibly to West Timor and elsewhere, in September 
1999.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    In January 1999, the Government of Indonesia announced its 
willingness to consider broad-based autonomy or independence for East 
Timor, paving the way for a U.N.-sponsored agreement concluded between 
Indonesia and Portugal in May of that year. The agreement provided for 
the holding of a popular consultation on the issue of East Timorese 
independence, under the supervision of the U.N. Following the 
agreement, the U.N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established in 
order to oversee the preparatory arrangements leading to, and 
implementation of, the referendum. After three postponements due to a 
fragile security situation, the referendum was held on August 30, 1999. 
Indonesian armed forces-backed militia groups attempted, through 
numerous killings, attacks, rapes, and other abuses to intimidate the 
East Timorese population into voting for autonomy (and, in effect, 
against independence), or to prevent them from voting at all; 
nevertheless, some 98 percent of registered voters cast their ballots, 
and 78.5 percent of the voters opposed the autonomy proposal. In early 
September 1999, the U.N. Secretary General declared that the ballot 
results were ``an accurate reflection of the views of the East Timorese 
people.'' However, in the period after the announcement of the results, 
incidents of mass killing, violence, and destruction were reported 
widely throughout the province (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.d., 4, and 
5). Indonesian security forces allowed armed militia groups that 
opposed independence for East Timor to intimidate and kill at will, and 
the Indonesian military and prointegration militias allegedly 
systematically forced the relocation of East Timorese refugees into 
West Timor, Indonesia, partly in order to undermine the legitimacy of 
the U.N. consultation. However, in October 1999, the Indonesian 
Parliament approved revocation of the 1978 parliamentary decree that 
annexed East Timor, allowing for the establishment of UNTAET. In late 
October 1999, UNTAET became responsible for maintaining a police and 
military apparatus in East Timor.
    UNTAET is mandated by the U.N. Security Council to establish a 
democratic government in East Timor. During the early part of the year, 
UNTAET governed East Timor, and the NCC advised the Transitional 
Administrator. The National Consultative Council consisted of 15 
members, including 4 UNTAET officials, 7 representatives of the CNRT, 3 
representatives of pro-Indonesia political groups, and 1 representative 
of the Roman Catholic Church. In July UNTAET established a new 
governing structure, the East Timor Transitional Administration. The 
ETTA cabinet consists of nine ministries after the addition in October 
of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. UNTAET officials head the ministries 
of Internal Security; Justice; Political, Constitutional and Electoral 
Affairs; and Finance. East Timorese head the ministries of: Internal 
Administration; Infrastructure; Economic Affairs; Foreign Affairs; and 
Social Affairs. UNTAET appointed members of the NCC and the cabinet in 
close consultation with the CNRT, a political umbrella of 
proindependence parties, which functioned as the main East Timorese 
political interlocutor for UNTAET.
    UNTAET responded positively to initial East Timorese criticism that 
it failed to integrate the views of East Timorese and their 
representatives sufficiently. An UNTAET-appointed 36-member National 
Council replaced the NCC in late October. The NC, a body of 
representatives appointed by UNTAET, also in close consultation with 
the CNRT, is responsible for exercising important policy decisions 
concerning East Timor's transition process. The NC is comprised 
entirely of East Timorese, representing the 13 districts, the CNRT, 
other political groups, and a variety of NGO, youth, and religious 
groups. In the latter part of the year, disagreement within the CNRT 
complicated the political situation. Following the CNRT Congress in 
August, the leaders of the two largest pre-Indonesian era parties, 
Fretilin and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), broke relations with 
the CNRT leadership and refused to participate in the CNRT-successor 
organization, the CNRT/National Congress.
    In December in his capacity as President of the CNRT, Xanana Gusmao 
presented to the NC a proposed timeline for the process leading to the 
election of a constituent assembly, the drafting and adoption of a 
constitution, and eventual independence. By year's end, UNTAET, the 
CNRT, and the NC, were overseeing the promulgation of East Timor's 
first constitution and subsequent government.
    Under UNTAET regulations, Indonesian law applies throughout East 
Timor except in areas where UNTAET specifically has repealed laws or 
superceded them with its own regulations.
    UNTAET advocates the freedom of political parties and adheres to 
the U.N. International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, the CNRT receives 
material support and derives legitimacy from its close relations with 
UNTAET; other parties do not enjoy the same advantages. During the 
year, there were credible charges that the CNRT used its political 
position to influence the allocation of jobs (see Section 1.f.).
    UNTAET and the CNRT have made significant efforts to include women 
in appointed political bodies, and there are 13 women on the National 
Council; however, women remain underrepresented in the government and 
politics, especially at top leadership levels.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no restrictions on the right of persons to form NGO's. 
Numerous NGO's were established during the year, devoted to a wide 
variety of civil society issues.
    UNTAET adheres to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and 
actively has promoted investigation of human rights abuses occurring in 
East Timor. On October 15, 1999, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights appointed the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor 
(ICIET), which issued a report in January that made several 
recommendations, including that an international tribunal be 
established to prosecute those responsible for the mass abuses. UNTAET 
facilitated visits to East Timor of members of the KPP-HAM (see Section 
1.a.). Within UNTAET itself there is a Human Rights Unit and a Serious 
Crimes Investigation Unit to investigate past human rights violations 
and to bring the perpetrators of past abuses to justice (see Section 
1.e.). UNTAET also has engaged a special rapporteur to produce a 
comprehensive report on human rights abuses in East Timor since 1975. 
Nevertheless, resource constraints as well as procedural and 
organizational disputes within UNTAET have hampered progress on these 
investigations (see Section 1.e.).

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    UNTAET regulations prohibit all forms of discrimination. 
Nonetheless, violence against women is a problem, as is discrimination 
against women and religious and ethnic minorities.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women is a significant problem in 
East Timor. It is alleged widely that TNI-backed militias raped 
numerous women during the September 1999 violence in East Timor, and 
kept many as sex slaves (see Section 1.c.). Kirsty Sword Gusmao, wife 
of East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao, reported to the 
international press in November that 33 pregnant East Timorese women 
returned to East Timor and claimed that they had been abducted and 
forced to serve as sex slaves for the TNI in West Timor, Indonesia. 
Rape is a punishable offense, as specified by Indonesian law. Few cases 
of rape have been prosecuted in the courts, although there was one 
indictment and numerous charges during the year (see Section 1.c.). The 
NGO FOKUPERS offers some assistance to women who have been victims of 
violence.
    Customary practices in East Timor discriminate against women. For 
example, in some regions or villages where traditional practices hold 
sway, women may not inherit or own property. More importantly women's 
groups are concerned that the CNRT is encouraging women to resolve rape 
and domestic violence cases through traditional rules, which usually 
provide only for compensation to be paid to the victim. UNTAET 
regulations implement the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; however, discrimination 
complaints were not a priority during the year, and no cases are known 
to have been reported.
    There were no reports of gender-based employment discrimination 
during the year. Women usually deferred to men when job opportunities 
arose at the village levels.
    East Timor Women against Violence (ETWAVE) is an East Timorese 
human rights NGO that advocates on behalf of women. FOKUPERS, a women's 
organization, has set up a women's and children's shelter for victims 
of domestic violence and incest.
    Children.--Primary education is compulsory and free; however, while 
the majority of children returned to school during the year after 
having fled their villages during the 1999 violence, a shortage of 
schools and educational materials still remained at year's end. The 
government is rebuilding and replacing the educational infrastructure 
destroyed by the Indonesian military and proIndonesia militias in 
September 1999. The government heavily relies on international aid in 
its efforts to rebuild educational infrastructure. The government has 
coordinated widespread inoculation programs and provided free medical 
care in many areas of the territory.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no reports of discrimination 
against disabled persons in employment, in education, or in the 
provision of other government services. However, UNTAET has not enacted 
legislation or otherwise mandated a provision of accessibility to 
buildings for the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--There were isolated instances of communal 
and sectarian violence during the year, although such incidents also 
have strong political and cultural undertones. Local, presumably Roman 
Catholic, residents attacked Protestant churches in East Timor, which 
had been associated closely with the pro-Indonesia cause, and Roman 
Catholics often accused Protestant clergymen of being linked to pro-
Indonesia East Timorese militias. In June villagers burned three 
Protestant churches in Aileu district after a dispute between Catholic 
and Protestant youths.
    East Timor's small Muslim community consists of ethnic Timorese and 
ethnic Malay migrants from Indonesia. Ethnic East Timorese Muslims 
generally are wellintegrated into society, but ethnic Malay East 
Timorese Muslims are not integrated very well and experienced some 
societal harassment during the year. In the early months of the year, a 
group of approximately 250 ethnic Malay Muslims residing at the mosque 
compound in Dili were harassed by local youth gangs who were throwing 
stones at the mosque and surrounding structures. Such harassment 
appeared to have abated during the latter part of the year; however, on 
December 31, local gangs attacked the main mosque in Dili, injuring 
three persons. The mosque members' resistance to the gang's demand for 
a car reportedly precipitated the violence.
    There were no arrests in cases related to attacks on churches or 
mosques, largely because of insufficient resources (see Sections 1.c., 
1.e., and 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Chinese businessmen have 
been subjected to extortion and harassment, sometimes from elements 
reportedly associated with the CNRT which accused the ethnic Chinese 
businessmen (who make up less than 1 percent of the population) of, 
among other things, financially backing rival groups. Local gangs have 
harassed Muslims who are ethnic Malays. In addition there have been 
tensions between the Makasai-speaking group of East Timorese origin 
located in the eastern part of the island and Tetum-speaking and other 
ethnic groups around Dili.
    The CNRT has proclaimed Portuguese the official language of East 
Timor, although only a small minority of the population speaks it. The 
majority of non-Portuguese speakers, especially members of the younger 
generation educated under the Indonesian system, complain that non-
Portuguese speakers are discriminated against when political and civil 
service positions are filled.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--UNTAET generally applies Indonesian 
labor statutes, with some modifications to suit local conditions. 
Indonesian law permits private sector workers to form worker 
organizations without prior authorization, and unions may draft their 
own constitution and rules and elect their representatives. No labor 
unions had been organized in East Timor by year's end. Workers in East 
Timor generally have little experience negotiating contracts, promoting 
worker rights, or engaging in collective bargaining and negotiations. 
As a result, dissatisfied workers or disappointed job applicants 
frequently resorted to strikes, demonstrations, and sometimes 
destruction of property. Disputes usually centered on demands for 
higher salaries or severance pay for jobs in which short-term contracts 
had expired. Without organized labor unions, many of these disputes 
were resolved through the arbitration of local NGO's or UNTAET.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--It is estimated 
that roughly two-thirds to three-quarters of East Timor's work force is 
in engaged in subsistence agriculture, and thus is not employed for 
pay. While collective bargaining is permitted, attempts to organize 
workers only were beginning by year's end.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Indonesian law still 
in effect in East Timor prohibits forced labor. However, during the 
year, local leaders informally required a number of returnees accused 
of involvement in the post-consultation destruction of September 1999 
to engage in compulsory labor as a means of punishing them for their 
alleged offenses (see Section 1.c.). Examples of such compulsory labor 
included repairing damaged structures and participating in clean-up 
operations. UNTAET tolerated this practice.
    Forced or bonded labor by children is not known to occur (see 
Section 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Indonesian law prohibits children under the age of 15 from 
working more than 4 hours per day. UNTAET has not addressed this issue 
and numerous children in East Timor, especially in rural areas, work in 
the agricultural sector. Forced or bonded child labor is not known to 
occur.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage. 
Indonesian laws still in effect provide for minimum standards of worker 
health and safety, days off, and other standard benefits. There are no 
restrictions on the rights of workers to file complaints and seek 
redress.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Applicable Indonesian law prohibits the 
trafficking in women and children, whether for the purposes of 
prostitution or for forced labor; however, trafficking of women and 
children from Indonesia to East Timor is a problem.
    There were numerous international media reports that in 1999 over 
40 East Timorese children were flown from refugee camps in West Timor, 
Indonesia, for the domestic sex trade.
                               __________

                                  FIJI

    Until May 19, the country was governed by a democratically elected 
Government; however, on that date, following a protest march against 
Indo-Fijian Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry's Government, armed 
indigenous Fijian supremacists led by George Speight, with the support 
of a number of rebel soldiers and hundreds of civilians, seized 
Parliament and took Chaudhry hostage along with several Members of 
Parliament. On May 29, President Ratu Mara was ousted in a nonviolent 
coup led by the military forces. Military commander Frank Bainimarama 
appointed himself Head of State, attempted to abrogate the 
Constitution, declared martial law, and began to rule by decree. After 
the May 19 takeover of Parliament, violent incidents occurred in many 
parts of the country. Roads were barricaded, public and private 
property was seized by rebel sympathizers, troops on Vanua Levu 
mutinied, Indo-Fijian settlements were terrorized by Ethnic Fijians, 
and IndoFijian businesses were looted and burned. In July a military-
backed civilian interim administration was installed after lengthy 
negotiations between the military regime and the rebels, and a meeting 
of the ethnic Fijian Great Council of Chiefs. In late July, the 
militarybacked civilian interim administration arrested the rebel 
leadership, charged the leaders with treason, and began to assert 
control over the country. A Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) was 
endorsed by the Great Council of Chiefs in September and was asked to 
draft a new constitution. However, the CRC suspended its work in 
December following a High Court ruling that the CRC had no legal 
standing. In November the High Court ruled that the 1997 Constitution 
remained in force. The interim administration appealed this decision 
and requested a stay of the High Court's ruling. The Court of Appeal 
denied the request. The full Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear the 
appeal in February 2001.
    The 1997 Constitution was designed to promote greater political 
stability. Ethnicity remains a dominant factor in Fijian life and 
affects the country's politics, economy, and society. The population is 
a multiracial, multicultural mix, with indigenous Fijians comprising 51 
percent, Indo-Fijians (descendents of immigrants from the Indian 
subcontinent) approximately 42 percent, and Asians, Caucasians, and 
other Pacific Islanders making up the rest of the population of more 
than 775,000 persons. The ethnic division is illustrated by the 
contrast between the private and public sectors; IndoFijian families 
largely control most private businesses, while indigenous Fijians 
largely head the government ministries and the military forces. Prior 
to the May takeover of Parliament, the judiciary was independent; 
however, with the purported abrogation of the Constitution and other 
events, including the abolition of the Supreme Court, the status of the 
judiciary is uncertain.
    Until the military coup in late May, the Fiji Military Forces 
(FMF), a small professional force, came under the authority of the 
Ministry for Home Affairs, as did the police. The Fiji Intelligence 
Service was dissolved by the Cabinet in 1999, but its functions were 
absorbed by the Police Special Branch and by a new analytical unit that 
was established in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Police and military 
forces committed human rights abuses.
    Sugar and tourism are the mainstays of the economy, accounting for 
more than half of foreign exchange earnings. Investment is depressed 
due to continuing concerns over the resolution of land lease issues and 
political upheaval. Economic growth of approximately 7 percent was 
achieved in 1999 due to record numbers of tourists and a large sugar 
crop following 2 years of droughts and floods. However, the economy has 
suffered significantly as a result of the political turmoil. Targeted 
sanctions were imposed on the country by a number of states, and the 
key garment, sugar, and tourism sectors were affected adversely. 
Tourism remained depressed at year's end. The gross domestic product 
(GDP) has declined by an estimated 10 percent since 1999. Skilled 
workers and professionals have departed the country in large numbers. 
Health and education services in particular were affected.
    The Government's human rights record deteriorated during the year 
and is generally poor. With the ouster of a democratically elected 
Government, the purported abrogation of the Constitution in May, and 
the installation of a military-backed civilian interim administration 
in July, citizens lost the right peacefully to change their government. 
The Constitution contains provisions that reduce previous factors that 
abridged the right of citizens to change their government. However, it 
also maintained a partially ethnically based electoral system. A major 
human rights problem remains ethnically based discrimination. A number 
of government policies, including hiring practices, education policies, 
and land tenure preferences continue to provide protection for 
indigenous Fijian interests. Other human rights problems include 
several political and extrajudicial killings; occasional police and 
military abuse of detainees and suspects; informal and formal 
constraints on the freedom of speech and the press and selfcensorship; 
restrictions on freedom of assembly and movement; violence and 
discrimination against women; instances of abuse of children; racial 
discrimination and violence; reports of forced labor; and trafficking 
in persons.
    Ethnically motivated societal violence led to abuses, including 
looting and destruction of property.
    Rebel forces committed abuses, including killings and beatings.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
       From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--At least 16 persons 
died as a result of political turmoil arising from the takeover of 
Parliament on May 19 and culminating in the mutiny in Queen Elizabeth 
barracks on November 2 (see Section 1.c., 3, and 5). Throughout this 
period, a number of rebel supporters reportedly were beaten in 
detention, and five rebel soldiers implicated in the November 2 mutiny 
were beaten to death (see Section 1.c.). Two of the five rebels were 
not directly involved in the attack on the barracks, but were arrested 
elsewhere and subsequently killed. By year's end, no disciplinary 
action had been taken against the soldiers involved in these incidents.
    In July in Naboro prison, security officers killed one prisoner in 
quelling a violent uprising (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading.--Treatment or 
Punishment
    Police and military personnel sometimes abuse detainees and 
suspects; the authorities have punished some of the offending officers, 
but these punishments have not deterred all police abuses. There were a 
number of reports that military and police authorities used excessive 
force when apprehending and interrogating suspects, and there continued 
to be incidents of abuse of persons after they were released on bail. 
The Police Department's Internal Affairs Unit is required to 
investigate complaints of police brutality. The law permits corporal 
punishment as a penalty for criminal acts but this provision seldom is 
invoked by the courts.
    On July 26, the military-backed civilian interim administration 
arrested the rebel leadership, including George Speight, and charged 
them with treason (see Section 1.d.). Two to three dozen rebels 
reportedly were injured while resisting arrest by the military forces; 
one reportedly was shot and injured. In early September, Varinava Tiko, 
a cousin of George Speight and the rebel who led the takeover of 
Korovou town, was admitted to a hospital after being interrogated by 
the military forces. He reportedly suffered a broken jaw and broken 
ribs. In August the Chief Magistrate stated publicly that he was 
concerned that military and prison officials abused rebel leader George 
Speight and his supporters following their arrests in July. At their 
first court appearance, a number of rebels bore visible signs of 
beatings.
    Concerns were raised regarding the police investigation of the 
takeover of Parliament in May. The Police Commissioner was placed on 
leave and subjected to a closed disciplinary hearing before the Chief 
Justice regarding alleged negligence and other misdeeds with respect to 
the May 19 rebel takeover of Parliament. He was reinstated after the 
review found that a number of accusations were unsubstantiated. A 
number of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued to express 
concerns about the Commissioner's alleged behavior during the takeover 
of Parliament and subsequent events as well as the manner in which he 
was ``cleared'' of any wrongdoing by the Chief Justice.
    In early July, Speight supporters burned and looted shops in 
Levuka. Also in July, the 50 Indo-Fijian families in a settlement at 
Tailevu reportedly were robbed and beaten by ethnic Fijians. Livestock, 
vehicles, and household items were stolen (see Section 5).
    On November 2, members of the Special Forces First Meridian 
Squadron (also known as the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit) 
mutinied at the Queen Elizabeth barracks in Suva. Approximately 50 
soldiers reportedly participated in the mutiny, and at least 8 soldiers 
were killed, 5 of them due to beatings in custody. Two of the rebel 
soldiers killed or wounded were not at the barracks when the mutiny 
occurred. By year's end, no disciplinary action had been taken against 
the soldiers involved in the beating deaths of the mutineers. By year's 
end, over 30 rebel First Meridian Squadron members were detained. 
International observers have not been granted access to the detained 
rebel soldiers, and family members have been granted only restricted 
access to them, after an initial period of being denied access (see 
Section 1.d.).
    Soon after the November mutiny, a relative of former Prime Minister 
Sitiveni Rabuka was forcibly taken from his car and beaten by soldiers. 
The victim was a member of the Fiji Military Forces and was suspected 
of having been part of the mutiny.
    On December 15, while free on bail, one of the rebels involved in 
the May takeover of Parliament was beaten severely and threatened with 
death by several soldiers. He suffered a broken arm and three broken 
ribs as a result of the attack. The military forces admitted to having 
detained the rebel briefly for spreading false rumors that had the 
potential to destabilize the country. By year's end, no disciplinary 
action had been taken against the soldiers involved in the incident.
    Former Prime Minister Chaudhry stated that he and his son were 
assaulted while being held hostage in Parliament by George Speight and 
his supporters. Chaudhry also stated that his life was threatened while 
he was held hostage.
    After the May 19 takeover of Parliament and subsequent military 
takeover, unrest developed in many parts of the country (see Sections 
1.a., 3, and 5). Much of the violence was directed at Indo-Fijian 
settlements; many such settlements, especially in rural areas, were 
terrorized (see Section 5). Some Indo-Fijian residents in the Muaniveni 
area reported that they went to the nearest police station to report 
the attacks, only to find that some of the police officers assisted the 
attackers. Indo-Fijian businesses also were looted and burned by mobs 
made up mainly of ethnic Fijians. On June 16, the home of the Permanent 
Secretary for Fijian Affairs was subjected to an attempted firebombing 
by unknown persons; the Permanent Secretary is the brother of Commander 
Frank Bainimarama. On July 11, supporters of George Speight seized the 
police station in Labasa on Vanua Levu; five police officers reportedly 
were beaten. The same day, the airport in Lomaloma in the Lau islands 
was occupied by supporters of George Speight. Following the July 26 
arrest of George Speight, two foreign pilots were held hostage briefly 
when their airplane was seized at the Savusavu airport on Vanua Levu. 
In June and July, several resorts were taken over and some foreign 
tourists were held hostage. On July 11, 45 resort guests were released; 
they had been held at the Turtle Bay resort after it was taken over by 
persons claiming indigenous rights to the land.
    There were reports of arbitrary arrests of persons by civil and 
military authorities, followed by beatings and release in remote 
places.
    Prison conditions do not meet minimum international standards, and 
conditions are extremely harsh, particularly at Suva and Naboro 
prisons. Food and sanitation in prisons are limited. The Government 
established a separate detention center on Nukulau island outside of 
Suva to hold George Speight and a number of his supporters, all of whom 
were charged with treason.
    A number of prison disturbances (some politically motivated) and 
escapes occurred during the year. In one incident in July at Naboro 
prison, 20 prison officials were held hostage by inmates. The Prison 
Department's Special Response Unit, reportedly with the aid of military 
forces, quelled the uprising, but 1 prisoner was killed by security 
officers, 15 were injured, and 9 prisoners escaped (see Section 1.a.). 
Many of the injured prisoners were hospitalized with serious wounds; 
some officers also were injured in the incident. Concerns exist that 
rules requiring the use of ``appropriate force'' to subdue prisoners 
were ignored.
    The Government permits visits to prisons, other than restricted 
Nukulau Island, by church groups, family members, and the Fiji Red 
Cross; however, the military-backed civilian interim administration has 
been less willing to allow the Fiji Red Cross access to prisoners since 
the November 2 mutiny (see Sections 1.a.). The International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), which established a permanent office in the 
country during the year, has been denied access to prisoners.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Law of Arrest and 
Detention provides that a person may be arrested only if police believe 
that a criminal law has been broken or is about to be broken; however, 
there were instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrested 
persons must be brought before a court without ``undue delay.'' This 
requirement normally is taken to mean within 24 hours, with 48 hours as 
the exception (such as when an arrest is made during a weekend). Under 
the Emergency Powers Decree presently in force, the police and military 
forces may detain individuals for up to 7 days before charges are 
brought. Rules governing detention are designed to ensure that suspects 
are questioned fairly. Detainees have the right to a judicial review of 
the grounds of their arrest; in urgent cases, detainees may apply to a 
judge at any time, whether he is sitting or not. Incommunicado and 
arbitrary detention, both illegal, occasionally occur.
    There were reports of arbitrary arrests and beatings during the 
year (see Section 1.d.). The military forces periodically ``release,'' 
then immediately rearrest, persons in order to remain in nominal 
compliance with the Emergency Powers Decree.
    On July 26, the military-backed civilian interim administration 
arrested the rebel leadership, including George Speight, and charged 
them with treason. Hundreds of rebel supporters were arrested, charged 
with various offenses, but released. Treason charges also were dropped 
against four persons associated with the May 19 takeover of Parliament 
(see Section 1.e.). Several persons who reportedly were involved, 
including a number of chiefs, were not charged. Nine persons who were 
charged with treason remain under detention on Nukulau Island.
    The head of the Fiji Trade Union Congress, Diwan Shankar, was 
detained briefly by soldiers in June while traveling in the western 
part of the country (see Section 6.a.). He was not charged with any 
crime.
    In July hundreds of IndoFijians temporarily were held hostage by 
ethnic Fijians on Vanua Levu (see Section 5).
    In September the National Fire Authority Administrator was detained 
briefly but not charged by the military forces after holding a union 
meeting.
    Family members and international NGO's questioned the lengthy 
detainment without charge of persons allegedly involved in the November 
2 mutiny. More than 30 soldiers of the First Meridian Squadron remained 
in detention while their investigations continued at year's end. Access 
to these detainees by the ICRC is prohibited (see Section 1.c.). Family 
access is severely restricted, and the detainees have been moved 
repeatedly for security reasons.
    Exile is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1997 Constitution provided for 
an independent judiciary, and prior to the takeover of Parliament in 
May, the judiciary was independent; however, with the putative 
abrogation of the Constitution and subsequent events, including the 
abolition of the Supreme Court, the status of the judiciary is 
uncertain. The Supreme Court was abolished by decree. The independence 
of the High Court, in particular that of the Chief Justice, was 
questioned following the participation of the Chief Justice in the 
drafting of a number of the decrees issued by the militarybacked 
civilian interim administration. One of the decrees extended the time 
in office of the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice also was criticized 
for his role in ``interfering'' in a case brought by the deposed 
Chaudhry Government in Lautoka and for deciding to exclude the public 
and media from hearings regarding the conduct of the Police 
Commissioner. In October the Lautoka court rebuked the Chief Justice 
for attempting to move a case in which he was one of the accused to 
Suva and for attempting to select a judge to hear the case. A number of 
judges resigned. Fiji's Law Society met on several occasions and issued 
a number of critical statements regarding the status of the judiciary.
    The judicial structure is patterned on the British system. The 
principal courts are the magistrate courts, the High Court, the Court 
of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. However, in late May the Supreme 
Court was abolished by decree; the Court of Appeal, the High Court, and 
the magistrate courts continued to function.
    There are no special courts; military courts try members of the 
armed forces. Magistrate courts continue to try the large majority of 
cases. In addition to its jurisdiction in serious civil and criminal 
cases, the High Court is granted special interest jurisdiction on 
behalf of the public and is empowered to review alleged violations of 
individual rights in addition to its jurisdiction in serious civil and 
criminal cases.
    Defendants have the right to a public trial and to counsel. Trials 
in the High Court provide for the presence of assessors (citizens 
randomly selected to represent the community); cases in magistrate 
court do not. In litigation involving lesser complaints, a public legal 
advisor assists indigent persons in domestic or family law cases. The 
right of appeal exists but continues to be hampered by delays in the 
appeals process. Bail is granted freely, and most defendants do not 
experience pretrial detention. There is no provision for bail for the 
charge of treason.
    The Muanikau Accord between the rebels and the military regime, 
which led to the release of the hostages taken at Parliament in May, 
included an immunity decree for the rebels covering unspecified 
``political crimes'' (see Section 3). However, on July 26, the 
military-backed civilian interim administration arrested the rebel 
leadership, including George Speight, and charged them with treason. In 
early October, the High Court ruled that the immunity decree did not 
apply to one rebel leader, who is accused of shooting two police 
officers and a foreign journalist. It is unclear whether other rebel 
leaders likewise may be found not to be immune from prosecution. In 
October the military-backed civilian interim administration stated its 
intention to prosecute those involved in the May 19 takeover of 
Parliament. However, treason charges against eight soldiers involved in 
the takeover of Parliament were dropped on October 11. A number of the 
soldiers released after treason charges were dropped on October 11 were 
involved in the November 2 mutiny. Five rebels were beaten to death 
following the mutiny (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Four others, 
including the former chief of the Fiji Intelligence Service, had their 
treason charges dismissed and were released in December. The soldiers 
who were not released reportedly are to be tried under military law.
    The law sometimes treats women differently from men. In some 
instances, there is a presumption of reduced competence and thus 
reduced responsibility for women. For example, only women can be 
charged with infanticide (if a man kills an infant the act is treated 
as murder, a more serious charge). A female defendant in an infanticide 
case is presumed to have diminished mental capacity, and sentences are 
reduced or suspended accordingly.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--In general the Government respects the privacy of the 
home; however, the Home Affairs Ministry has powers, within specific 
operational guidelines, to search persons and property, access private 
financial records, and monitor mail and telephones when a warrant is 
issued by the National Security Council. The military forces and police 
have similar capabilities. The Home Affairs Ministry conducts 
surveillance of persons whom it believes represent a security threat.
    A military curfew initially imposed countrywide in May ended in the 
capital in December. An all-day curfew was imposed briefly in Suva 
after the mutiny by rebel soldiers on November 2; it ended on November 
4. Military checkpoints continue to be manned countrywide and impromptu 
checkpoints occasionally are erected. All curfews had been lifted by 
year's end, and special passes for travel after curfew are no longer 
required (see Section 2.d.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech generally is 
respected; however, there were both informal and formal governmental 
constraints on freedom of speech and press. The Chaudhry Government was 
criticized for attempts to regulate the independent media, and there 
were credible reports of attempts by individual members of the Chaudhry 
Government and the military-backed interim civilian administration to 
pressure editors or otherwise interfere with the press. The former 
editor of the Fiji Times was denied a renewal of his work permit in 
April by the Chaudhry Government. One foreign television crew was 
prevented from transmiting a news story following the May 19 takeover 
of Parliament because of allegations that it altered certain photos. 
After the assumption of power by the military-backed civilian interim 
administration in July, a number of steps were taken to limit citizens' 
ability to speak publicly or privately about issues such as human 
rights and democracy; meetings and protests concerning such topics were 
canceled and otherwise limited by the authorities (see Section 2.b.).
    Political figures and private citizens can and do speak out against 
the Government. However, the Public Order Act and other laws prohibit 
actions that are likely to incite racial antagonism.
    Legislation pertaining to the press is contained in the Newspaper 
Registration Act and the Press Correction Act. Under the Newspaper 
Registration Act, all newspapers must be registered with the Government 
before they can publish. The Press Correction Act gives the Minister of 
Information sole discretionary power to order a newspaper to publish a 
``correcting statement'' if, in the Minister's view, a false or 
distorted article is published; however, this provision has never been 
used. Should the newspaper refuse to publish the Minister's correction, 
it may be sued in court and, if found guilty, fined approximately $500 
(FJ$1,000). Individuals may be fined $150 (FJ$300) and imprisoned for 6 
months or both. The acts allow the Government to arrest anyone who 
publishes ``malicious'' material. This includes anything the Government 
considers false news that could create or foster public alarm or result 
in ``detriment to the public.''
    The media operate without prior censorship but with considerable 
self-censorship. Government ownership of shares in the Fiji Post 
newspaper and its links to the Fiji Sun newspaper through Fijian 
Holdings, an investment company on whose board a number of ministers 
have served, call into question the complete independence of the press. 
Newspapers occasionally print editorials critical of the Government and 
occasionally conduct investigative reporting. They widely report 
statements about the political situation by opposition figures and 
foreign governments. In addition the letters-to-the-editor columns of 
the two daily newspapers frequently carry political statements from a 
wide cross section of society, including members of the deposed precoup 
government. These letters are highly critical of the Government, its 
programs, and the Constitution. Criticism, albeit muted, of the once-
sacrosanct traditional chiefly system is appearing more frequently. 
However, the Government still views negative comments about individual 
chiefs with disfavor.
    An active local organization, the Fiji Islands Media Association, 
is an affiliate of the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA). These 
associations provide training opportunities for journalists and have 
established a code of ethics for the media. The Fiji News Council 
strives to promote high journalistic standards, safeguard media 
independence, and resolve complaints from the public.
    In 1999 the Chaudhry Government bought one of the country's two 
daily newspapers, the Fiji Post, and announced that all government 
advertising and official statements would be published only in the Fiji 
Post. The Fiji Islands Media Association noted its concern about these 
developments and their effect on media freedom. However, the military-
backed interim civilian administration has placed ads in all three 
daily newspapers.
    The country's television news production is owned and operated by 
Fiji One, the only national non-cable television station. A trust 
operating on behalf of the provincial governments owns 51 percent of 
Fiji One; the other 49 percent is owned by private individuals and 
interests. The Chaudhry Government commenced legal proceedings against 
Fiji One in an attempt to cancel its exclusive license. The company 
reached an out-of-court agreement with the Chaudhry Government agreeing 
to the early termination of its exclusive license. The television 
station was attacked in May by coup supporters following a broadcast 
that was perceived to be critical of George Speight. The lives of a 
number of reporters were threatened, and the station stopped 
broadcasting for a number of days as a result of extensive damage to 
its equipment. On October 20, several soldiers detained the executive 
director, the news director, and a journalist of the public radio 
station at the offices of the Fiji Broadcasting Corporation in Suva. 
Earlier in the month, the radio station had reported on tensions within 
the military forces, and the arresting soldiers reportedly asked the 
journalists for the names of their sources within the military forces. 
The authorities have accused the radio station of trying to destabilize 
the military-backed civilian interim administration. On October 21, the 
Fiji Sun reported that the Minister of Information sent a letter to 
Fiji Television asking that former Prime Minister Chaudhry not be 
interviewed on the ``Close Up'' program.
    Both the Chaudhry government and the military-backed civilian 
interim administration were forbidden to comment on politically 
sensitive issues such as the Constitution, land issues, and relations 
between communities, citing the need to respect the sovereignty of the 
State and noninterference in internal matters.
    Academic freedom generally is respected; however, government work 
permit stipulations and University of the South Pacific (USP) contract 
regulations effectively deter university employees from participating 
in domestic politics. The USP media center web site was temporarily 
closed in August by the university chancellor following the posting of 
an editorial considered too ``political'' by the head of the media 
center. Student groups organize freely.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1997 
Constitution provided for the right to assemble for political purposes, 
subject to restrictions in the interest of public order; however, both 
the Chaudhry Government and the military-backed civilian interim 
administration restricted this right in practice. Permits for public 
gatherings had to be obtained from the district officer, and the 
Chaudhry Government did not always grant permits for large outdoor 
political meetings or demonstrations, particularly if the police 
advised of difficulties with the anticipated crowd size or their 
ability to assure public safety. Nevertheless, until May the Chaudhry 
Government routinely issued permits for rallies organized by political 
parties, religious groups, and groups opposed to government policies. 
Authorities allowed two protest marches against the elected Government 
to proceed, one in April and one in May, despite concerns about 
security. The April protest march, however, was one of the largest 
antigovernment protests in the country's history, with 2,000 marchers 
and up to 8,000 participants. On May 4, Home Affairs Minister Joji 
Uluinakauvadra announced that no further permits would be issued to 
groups protesting against the Government. According to press reports, 
the police and other authorities were ordered not to allow any such 
protests.
    The military-backed civilian interim administration also banned all 
requests for political rallies or marches, and a number of marches and 
other protests that called for the restoration of the 1997 Constitution 
and the reinstatement of the elected government were not allowed by the 
military forces or the interim administration, including a ``peace 
march'' organized by the son of one of the hostages that was to be held 
on June 12.
    An Emergency Powers Decree and a series of other decrees provide 
sweeping powers to the military and police forces to prevent all types 
of meetings and gatherings. For example, the militarybacked civilian 
interim administration announced on September 13 that all meetings, 
public or private, would require a special permit. Agendas of proposed 
meetings reportedly were required to be submitted to the military 
forces for review before the permits were to be issued, and no permits 
for events deemed political would be issued. However, meetings for some 
indigenous political parties were allowed.
    The military and police forces prevented a protest march in July 
that was scheduled to take place between Lautoka and Suva. The head of 
the Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC) was detained briefly in July by 
the military forces while on union business in Lautoka (see Section 
6.a.). He was released without being charged (see Section 1.d.). The 
executive meeting of the Fiji Public Service Association in August was 
disrupted by the military forces. In September the National Fire 
Authority Administrator was held briefly but not charged by the 
military forces after holding a union meeting. A private meeting of 
Indo-Fijian leaders in midSeptember was delayed due to a demand by the 
police and the military forces that they be allowed to attend. A youth 
rally for democracy scheduled to be held at Suva's Civic Center in mid-
September did not take place after the military authorities informed 
organizers that they could not hold the meeting as Commander 
Bainimarama was ``out of the capital.'' A meeting organized by Fiji's 
Women's Rights Groups in December was canceled only hours before it was 
scheduled to have been held and after initial approval had been 
granted.
    The 1997 Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respected this provision in practice. Opposition 
parties operate largely without government interference. Political 
organizations operate and issue public statements. However, the deposed 
prime minister was accused of treason by political leaders associated 
with the militarybacked civilian interim administration for his 
activities to try to restore constitutional democracy.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The 1997 Constitution provides for 
religious freedom, and this provision was respected in practice by both 
the Chaudhry Government and the military-backed civilian interim 
administration. The Government does not restrict foreign clergy and 
missionary activity or other typical activities of religious 
organizations.
    However, the role of religion in the State continued to be a 
political issue. In the past, former Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka 
publicly indicated his willingness to consider making the country ``a 
Christian state;'' however, he helped to create the Constitution's 
compromise language. From September until its demise, a number of 
submissions were made to the Constitutional Review Commission calling 
for the country to be considered a Christian state. Several 
predominantly ethnic Fijian political parties that participated in the 
1999 general elections called for a Christian state and the 
reintroduction of measures to mandate respect for Christian values, 
such as a ban for all but essential services on Sunday (such a ban was 
introduced following the two 1987 coups, but it was lifted in 1995). 
Other parties, which are dominated by Indo-Fijians, do not support such 
actions and insist that church and State should remain separate. The 
president of the Methodist Church, the dominant religion particularly 
among ethnic Fijians, has stated that the church has no official role 
in politics. However, senior Methodist leaders, including a past church 
president, were candidates for office in the 1999 general elections. 
The Christian Democratic Party used the Methodist Church headquarters 
to hold the swearing-in ceremony for its candidates.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government generally does not 
restrict freedom of movement within the country or abroad; however, a 
military curfew was imposed countrywide from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. daily; 
it was removed in December in the capital area. An allday curfew was 
briefly imposed in Suva after the mutiny by rebel soldiers on November 
2; it was lifted on November 4. During periods when curfews were in 
effect, military checkpoints were located across the country, and 
special passes were required for travel after curfew. Access to Nukulau 
Island, located near Suva, was curtailed, since it is being used to 
detain individuals charged with treason.
    Citizens are free to emigrate. More than 50,000 have done so since 
the 1987 coups. There was a significant increase in the number of 
citizens who took steps to leave the country during the year. The 
Government does not restrict the return of citizens if they choose to 
do so and has encouraged those who left after the 1987 coups to return. 
Occasional detentions at the airport occur, but the courts have ordered 
redress where warranted.
    An internally displaced persons (IDP) camp was established in 
Lautoka, which houses over 300 Indo-Fijians from the Nausori area. As 
of December, over 400 displaced Indo-Fijians were housed in camps set 
up in Labasa and Western Viti Levu. The ICRC and the Fiji Red Cross 
visited the camps and provided assistance.
    The law includes provisions for providing refugee and asylum status 
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. In the past, the 
Government has been reluctant to grant first asylum without assurances 
that the asylum seeker would be moved to a third country. There were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: the Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Until May 19, the country was governed by a democratically elected 
Government; however, citizens subsequently lost the right to change 
their government peacefully as a result of a military takeover, which 
followed the seizure of Parliament by indigenous Fijian supremacists.
    On May 19, following a protest march against Prime Minister 
Chaudhry's Government, armed indigenous Fijian supremacists led by 
George Speight, with the support of over 50 rebel soldiers and hundreds 
of civilians, seized Parliament and took Prime Minister Mahendra 
Chaudhry and members of parliament hostage. On May 29, President Ratu 
Mara was ousted in a nonviolent coup led by the military forces. On the 
same day, military commander Frank Bainimarama seized executive power 
and issued a number of decrees, including the purported abrogation of 
the 1997 Constitution and the implementation of emergency powers 
imposing martial law. Bainimarama then began to rule by decree. In July 
a military-backed civilian interim administration was installed after 
lengthy negotiations between the new military regime and the rebels, 
and a meeting of the ethnic Fijian Great Council of Chiefs. With these 
events, citizens lost the right to change their government peacefully. 
The last of the hostages held in Parliament were released on July 13. 
In late July, the militarybacked civilian interim administration 
arrested the rebel leadership, including George Speight, despite an 
immunity decree and began to assert effective control over the country 
(see Section 1.e.).
    In October the military-backed civilian interim administration 
stated its intention to prosecute those involved in the takeover of 
Parliament on May 19. A number of persons have been charged with 
treason and other crimes. However, treason charges against eight 
soldiers involved in the takeover of Parliament were dropped on October 
11 (see Section 1.e.). A number of the soldiers released later were 
involved in the November 2 mutiny. Treason charges also were dropped in 
December against four others, including the former head of the Fiji 
Intelligence Service. The soldiers reportedly are to be tried under 
military law. The police force and the acting Police Commissioner were 
criticized for not charging high profile senior figures, particularly 
ethnic Fijian chiefs, who allegedly were involved in criminal acts. 
Media and public criticism has focused on what has been called ``two 
sets of laws,'' one for the elite Fijian community and another for 
other persons.
    From September until its demise later in the year, a Constitutional 
Review Commission endorsed by the militarybacked civilian interim 
administration was charged with drafting a new constitution. Its terms 
of reference, approved by the Great Council of Chiefs for the 
commission, would ensure ethnic Fijian political supremacy. A number of 
concerns were raised regarding the legitimacy, membership, and terms of 
reference of the Commission. There were no Indo-Fijian representatives 
on the Commission and its membership included a number of individuals 
closely associated with the ouster of the elected Government.
    The deposed ``People's Coalition'' government of former Prime 
Minister Chaudhry initiated a legal challenge to the putative 
abrogation of the Constitution and the removal of the elected 
Government. In November the High Court ruled that the 1997 Constitution 
remained in force and that the military-backed civilian interim 
administration had no legal basis. The decision was appealed by the 
interim administration, which asked for a stay of the High Court 
ruling. The Court of Appeal denied the request for a stay. The full 
Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear the appeal in February 2001. 
Former Prime Minister Chaudhry, the country's first Indo-Fijian Prime 
Minister, also began an international campaign to restore 
constitutional democracy.
    The Constitution, as amended in 1997, reduced the ethnically based 
factors that previously abridged the right of citizens to change their 
government. Under its provisions, the Prime Minister and the President 
can be of any race. It established a 71-member lower house with 25 open 
seats and 46 seats allocated to different ethnic communities. The open 
seats, which were unprecedented, were established by an electoral 
commission and apportioned into districts of approximately equal 
population. Of the 46 communal seats, 23 were allotted to indigenous 
Fijians, 19 to Indo-Fijians, 3 to ``general voters'' (for the most part 
Caucasians and East Asians), and 1 was alloted to the Rotumans (an 
ethnically distinct Polynesian group), roughly proportional to the 
different communities' representation in the population. The amended 
Constitution also contained an alternate vote system for elections to 
the lower house to replace the winner takes all system of the previous 
constitution. The Senate remained an appointed body--the President 
appoints 32 members, of which the Great Council of Chiefs nominates 14 
members, the Prime Minister nominates 9, the opposition leader 
nominates 8, and the Council of Rotuma nominates 1 member.
    Included in the 1997 Constitution was a strengthened bill of rights 
and a compact among the country's citizens to protect their respective 
rights and interests; however, the Constitution acknowledged that the 
paramountcy of indigenous Fijian interests could not be subordinated to 
the interests of other communities. In July 1998, Parliament passed a 
new Emergency Powers Act that could be invoked if Parliament determined 
that there was a threat to the life of the nation. International media 
organizations criticized the law due to concerns that the Government 
could close or censor publications during times of crisis. The 
Emergency Powers Act was amended by decree by the military-backed 
civilian interim administration, which also invoked the amended act. 
The amended Emergency Powers Decree has been in force since May 29.
    The military-backed civilian interim administration, which had no 
cabinet representatives from the Indo-Fijian minority (44 percent of 
the population), stated that it intended to promulgate a new 
constitution that would protect the rights of ethnic Fijians, institute 
affirmative action for ethnic Fijians, and safeguard the property 
rights of ethnic Fijians. The interim administration also stated that 
it intended to hold elections by March 2002.
    Women in both the Fijian and Indian communities have functioned 
primarily in traditional roles, and are underrepresented in government 
and politics. However, until the takeover of Parliament in May, an 
increasing number of women were rising to prominent positions in 
politics and public service. The May 1999 elections resulted in an 
increased number of women elected to Parliament. Five women were 
members of the 27-member Cabinet, with 1 selected as Deputy Prime 
Minister. There is one female cabinet member in the military-backed 
civilian interim administration--the Minister for Women's Affairs. 
Women also play important roles in the chiefly system and can be chiefs 
in their own right. The former President's wife is one of the three 
highest ranking chiefs.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several new local nongovernmental organizations began campaigns 
that focus on human rights. These include the Citizens' Constitutional 
Forum and Fiji Blue. In addition women's rights' organizations, the 
labor movement, religious groups, and political parties have begun 
campaigns focused on human rights issues. The Fiji Red Cross was 
permitted access to the hostages held at Parliament and assisted 
communities throughout the country affected by the political turmoil. 
However, the military-backed civilian interim administration has been 
less willing to allow the Fiji Red Cross access to prisoners since the 
November 2 mutiny (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    There are also several small, foreign-based organizations that 
concentrate on local human rights causes, including the Coalition for 
Democracy in Fiji (with offices in New Zealand and Australia) and two 
United Kingdom-based groups, the International Fiji Movement and the 
Movement for Democracy in Fiji. There is little interaction between the 
Government and these groups.
    The ICRC established a permanent office in the country during the 
year.
    The Fiji Human Rights Commission, which was established by the 
Chaudhry Government, while still in place, ceased to function in 
practice. One commissioner resigned. The chair of the commission was 
accused of conflict of interest because of his marriage to a minister 
in the military-backed civilian administration. The Commission staff 
reportedly was denied permission by its chairman to investigate human 
rights abuses in the Muaniveni area--the site of a number of abuses 
against the Indo-Fijian community. A number of reports were compiled by 
the Citizens' Constitutional Forum and the Fiji Human Rights Group 
documenting alleged human rights violations, mostly concerning crimes 
against rural Indo-Fijian settlements. These reports were submitted to 
the United Nations, the European Union, and the British Commonwealth.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The amended 1997 Constitution, prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of race, sex, place of origin, political opinion, color, 
religion, or creed, and contains specific affirmative action provisions 
for those disadvantaged as a result of such discrimination. In the 
compact included in the amended Constitution, there was a specific 
provision for affirmative action and ``social justice'' programs to 
secure effective equality of access to opportunities, amenities, and 
services for the Fijian and Rotuman people and for all disadvantaged 
citizens and groups.
    Women.--Reliable estimates indicate that 10 percent of women have 
been abused in some way, and this abuse is a major focus of the women's 
movement. Women are addressing the problem of domestic violence 
actively. Police have adopted a ``no drop'' rule, according to which 
they prosecute cases of domestic violence even when the victim does not 
wish to press charges. The traditional practice of ``reconciliation'' 
between aggrieved parties is sometimes taken into account in mitigation 
of sentences.
    There is a small but active women's rights movement that has 
pressed for serious punishment for rape. Courts have imposed sentences 
that vary widely but generally are lenient. Women have sought to have 
all rape cases heard in the High Court where sentencing limits are 
higher.
    Suva, the capital, and Ba, Labasa, and Lautoka have established 
privately funded women's crisis centers; the centers offer counseling 
and assistance to women in cases of rape, domestic violence, and other 
problems, such as child support.
    Constitutional changes that came into effect in the 1997 
Constitution were designed to redress the imbalance in spousal and 
offspring rights between male and female citizens. Under the amended 
Constitution, male and female citizens enjoy equal rights in regard to 
the granting of residence for spouses, and registering and racially 
designating children in regard to electoral rolls and ethnic communal 
property.
    In general women in the ethnic Fijian community are more likely to 
rise to prominence in their own right than are women in the IndoFijian 
community. Women have full rights of property ownership and 
inheritance, and a number are successful entrepreneurs. Women generally 
are paid less than men, a discrepancy that is especially notable in the 
garment industry. Garment workers, most of whom are female and many of 
whom are Chinese laborers, are subject to wages that are considerably 
lower than in other sectors. A significant number of garment workers 
reside at their places of work. According to press reports, some 
garment workers supplement their low income through prostitution.
    Trafficking in persons, particularly women, is a problem (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and 
welfare but has limited financial resources to carry out the 
commitment. In addition the legal system is at times unable to protect 
the rights of children, since children's testimony is inadmissible in 
court unless corroborated by an adult. Societal changes have undermined 
the traditional village and extended family-based structures; 
outgrowths of this evolution include increased child abuse and a 
growing number of homeless youths in urban centers.
    School is mandatory through the primary grades. NGO reports 
indicate that over 5,000 students dropped out of school following the 
political upheaval in the country beginning in May. Concerns over 
security and inability to pay school fees following loss of employment 
were cited as two reasons for the decrease in attendance.
    Corporal punishment is administered in some schools. The Ministry 
of Education has guidelines for the administration of such punishment 
by principals and head teachers. A number of incidents were reported 
during the year of alleged beatings of children at school. There is 
credible information that not all abuses are reported or punished.
    People with Disabilities.--Discrimination against the physically 
disabled in employment, education, and the provision of state services 
is illegal. However, there is no legislation or mandated provision for 
accessibility for the disabled. Several voluntary organizations promote 
greater attention to the needs of the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Police no longer are investigating reports 
of damage to a small number of Hindu temples in 1997. Religious leaders 
in the minority Muslim population continued to request the 
establishment of separate Islamic courts for their community.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The stated purpose of two 
military coups in 1987 was to ensure the political supremacy of 
indigenous Fijians and to protect their traditional way of life and 
communal control of land. To this end, the post-1987 coup government 
initiated a number of constitutional and other measures to ensure 
ethnic Fijian control of the executive and legislative branches. The 
Government also successfully raised the proportion of ethnic Fijians 
and Rotumans in the public service to 50 percent or higher at all 
levels, but most significantly at the senior level: Indo-Fijians 
represent only approximately 10 percent of the highest levels of the 
civil service. The 1997 Constitution sought to redress this imbalance 
by specifically noting that ``the composition of state services at all 
levels must be based on the principle of reflecting as closely as 
possible the ethnic composition of the population.'' George Speight, 
who led the May 19 takeover of Parliament, professed to be taking 
action on behalf of ethnic Fijians (see Section 3). The military-backed 
civilian interim administration continued to profess that it intends to 
ensure the political supremacy of indigenous Fijians and to protect 
their traditional way of life and communal control of land.
    Control of the land remains a highly sensitive issue. Ethnic 
Fijians hold, communally, over 80 percent of land, the State holds 
another 8 percent, and the remaining land is freehold. The British 
colonial administration instituted the present land ownership 
arrangements to protect the interests of indigenous Fijians whose 
traditional beliefs, cultural values, and selfidentity are tied to the 
land. Most cash crop farmers are Indo-Fijians, who lease land from the 
ethnic Fijian landowners through the Native Land Trust Board. Many 
IndoFijians, particularly farmers, believe that the absence of secure 
land tenure discriminates against them. A number of Agricultural 
Landlord and Tenant Agreement (ALTA) leases have expired and a large 
number are scheduled to expire in coming years. The uncertainty over 
future land tenure arrangements is a significant cause of tension 
between the ethnic Fijian and IndoFijian communities. A parliamentary 
select committee was established following the election of the Chaudhry 
Government to review agricultural land tenure agreement issues, but 
Parliament has not met since May. According to press reports, the 
Chaudhry Government was considered by many ethnic Fijians to be working 
in favor of Indo-Fijians, because it tried to get leases renewed 
without much of an increase in rent. On July 11, 45 resort guests were 
released; they had been held at the Turtle Bay resort after it was 
taken over by persons claiming indigenous rights to the land.
    Prior to the political upheaval that began in May, Indo-Fijians 
were subjected to occasional harassment based on race. There have been 
no credible allegations of government involvement in such incidents, 
which the police have investigated, sometimes resulting in arrests. 
Since the takeover of Parliament on May 19, violence against Indo-
Fijians was perpetrated by ethnic Fijians. On May 19, over 160 stores 
were looted and 30 stores were burned in downtown Suva, most of them 
belonging to IndoFijians. Police arrested 275 persons for looting in 
connection with that day's events. In Suva on May 31, armed protesters 
supporting the rebels reportedly stoned cars, beat the motorists in 
them, and stole vehicles; the protesters appeared to target IndoFijians 
in the attacks. After the takeover of Parliament in May, Indo-Fijian 
settlements also were terrorized. IndoFijian businesses continued to be 
looted and burned through year's end. On June 11, Speight supporters 
set fire to and destroyed a bar owned by an Indo-Fijian. On the 
following day, the home of Indo-Fijian labor leader Diwan Shankar was 
firebombed, but suffered minimal damage (see Section 6.b.). An IDP camp 
was established in Lautoka; it houses more than 300 Indo-Fijians from 
the Nausori area. Additional camps were established in Labasa and 
Western Viti Levu by cane growers' unions. The ICRC and the Fiji Red 
Cross visited the camps and provided assistance.
    The Muaniveni and Baulevu areas near Nausori, in Naitasiri 
province, experienced a particularly high level of violence, including 
looting, arson, and physical intimidation, directed against Indo-
Fijians. The attacks reportedly were carried out by persons with ties 
to George Speight. On June 19 and 20, 52 Indo-Fijian homes were 
attacked in Muaniveni. The IndoFijian families in the area reportedly 
left their homes at night to avoid the attackers. Some residents 
reported that they went to the nearest police station to report the 
attacks, only to find that some of the police officers had assisted the 
attackers. According to press reports, the police assisted ethnic 
Fijians in the area to steal crops, kill cattle, and transport items to 
supporters of George Speight in Suva. There were a number of arrests in 
connection with the attacks, and the police began an internal 
investigation into these complaints that confirmed these reports. 
Violence also was reported in the Dreketi and Rakiraki areas, including 
theft, looting, and arson. Soldiers dispatched to Vanua Levu to quell 
disturbances there reportedly killed one Speight supporter and arrested 
37 others in early August. In early July, Speight supporters burned and 
looted shops in Levuka. Also in July, the 50 Indo-Fijian families in a 
settlement at Tailevu reportedly were robbed and beaten by ethnic 
Fijians (see Section 1.c.). Livestock, vehicles, and household items 
were stolen. Hundreds of IndoFijians were held hostage temporarily on 
Vanua Levu in July (see Section 1.d). There continued to be credible 
reports of arson and looting of Indo-Fijian settlements in remote rural 
areas, and sporadic attacks on Indo-Fijians continued at year's end.
    The Chaudhry Government established a special police unit to 
investigate allegations of criminal activity within the Chinese 
community. It also focused particular attention on what it termed the 
``expatriate'' business community and had announced its intention to 
review all immigration records relating to foreign workers. It 
intervened in a number of visa cases, refusing visas or renewals of 
work permits. In 1999 it called on private companies to ``localize'' 
their hiring practices. The minority Chinese community complained about 
perceived government harassment in this regard, and the nation's 
employers' organization spoke against government interference.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law protects the right of workers 
to form and join unions, elect their own representatives, publicize 
their views on labor matters, and determine their own policies, and the 
authorities respect these rights in practice. However, the law permits 
restrictions to be applied in government employment and in the 
interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or 
public health, or to protect the rights and freedoms of other persons. 
An estimated 55 percent of the workforce is unionized.
    All unions must register with, but are not controlled by, the 
Government. The only central labor body is the Fiji Trade Union 
Congress (FTUC), which was associated closely with the opposition Fiji 
Labor Party until mid-1992; unions operate under its auspices. The FTUC 
subsequently adopted a more independent political stance. While certain 
unions remain ethnically based, both Indo-Fijians and ethnic Fijians 
hold leadership roles in the trade union movement. In the past, the 
FTUC participated, along with the employer's federation, in the 
Government's Tripartite Economic Strategies Committee; however, it has 
not been active since the seizure of Parliament on May 19.
    Strikes are legal, except in connection with union recognition 
disputes, and trade unions can conduct secret strike ballots without 
government supervision. There are credible reports that in July and 
August, following the takeover of the democratically elected 
Government, the military forces actively intervened to prevent union 
efforts to mobilize strike action in the sugar cane belt. The head of 
the FTUC and other union representatives have been briefly detained by 
the military authorities while on union business. The FTUC has 
coordinated closely with the international labor movement in the 
aftermath of the ouster of the elected Government. Representatives of 
Australian and New Zealand unions have visited Fiji to support the 
FTUC.
    Unions can affiliate internationally. The FTUC associates 
internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
recognizes the right to organize and bargain collectively. Employers 
are required to recognize a union if more than half of the employees in 
a workplace have joined it. Recognition is determined by union 
membership rather than by an election. The Government has the power to 
order recalcitrant employers to recognize unions and has done so. Key 
sectors of the economy, including sugar and tourism, are heavily 
organized. Following the 1992 return to accountable government, the 
Government lifted wage guidelines, and unrestricted collective 
bargaining on wages is now the norm.
    Wage negotiations generally are conducted on an individual company 
or enterprise basis, although industry wide negotiations are on the 
increase. The law specifically prohibits antiunion discrimination, but 
the law does not mandate that fired workers be reinstated.
    Export processing zones (EPZ's) are subject to the same laws as the 
rest of the country. However, the FTUC has been unsuccessful in 
obtaining collective bargaining agreements in EPZ's and claims that 
intimidation of workers by employers is widespread. The FTUC sees union 
recognition as the single issue that does not have effective legal 
recourse. The FTUC argues that because of alleged illegal and 
intimidating practices in EPZ's, including threats of loss of work for 
those active in organizing workers, unions are unfairly prevented from 
representing workers in the EPZ's.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
specifically prohibits forced labor, including forced and bonded labor 
by children; however, trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 
6.f.), and there were media reports that a form of bonded labor may be 
practiced on a remote copra plantation on an outer island. Media 
reports also allege that working conditions in some garment factories 
may amount to bonded or forced labor and may include overcrowded 
factory housing and excessive work hours. Workers at a garment factory 
in Lami reportedly conducted a hunger strike in December to protest 
working conditions (see Section 6.e.).
    The Government enforces the prohibition against forced and bonded 
labor by children effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age of Employment.--
Children under the age of 12 may not be employed in any capacity. 
``Children'' (under age 15) may only be employed outside school hours 
in family enterprises and not in the industrial sector. ``Young 
persons'' (ages 15 to 17) may be employed in certain occupations not 
involving heavy machinery and with specified hours and rest breaks. 
Enforcement by the Ministry of Labor and Industrial Relations generally 
is effective except for family members working on family farms or 
businesses and ``self-employed'' homeless youths. There has been an 
increase in self-employed school-aged youths in urban areas, 
particularly in those working as shoeshine boys. School is mandatory 
only through the primary grades. Children (under age 15) may be 
employed outside school hours only in certain occupations.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage. Certain sectors have minimum wages set by the Ministry for Labor 
and Industrial Relations, which enforces them effectively. The 
manifesto of the ousted ``People's Coalition'' government called for 
the establishment of a minimum wage. Minimum wage levels provide a 
sparse but adequate standard of living for a worker and family in all 
sectors except the garment sector. Wages are generally lower in the 
garment industry, which largely comprises female (mainly Chinese) 
workers; in the garment industry, the starting hourly wage is $0.36 
(FJ$0.72) for learners and $0.47 (FJ$0.94) for others. The wages are 
based on an assumption that garment workers are young adults or married 
women living at home and not supporting a household.
    Working conditions and employee contracts in garment factories vary 
widely, with conditions in some factories reportedly amounting to 
indentured servitude (see Section 6.c.). There are no regulations 
specifying maximum hours of work for adult males. Women can perform 
night work in factories and overtime but are prohibited from 
underground work in mines. Workers in some industries, notably 
transportation and shipping, complained of excessive hours of work. 
Indo-Fijians, who generally require a cash income to survive, are more 
vulnerable to pressure to work long hours than are ethnic Fijians. Many 
ethnic Fijians return to their villages rather than work what they 
consider excessive hours. Particularly in the garment industry, migrant 
workers (predominantly Chinese) are increasing in number and are a 
largely unregulated work force.
    There are workplace safety regulations, a Worker's Compensation 
Act, and an accident compensation plan. Government enforcement of 
safety standards under the direction of the Labor Ministry suffers from 
a lack of trained enforcement personnel and from lags in compensation 
hearings and rulings, but unions do a reasonable job of monitoring 
safety standards in organized workplaces. The International Labor 
Organization's (ILO) 1992 recommendations cited the need to improve 
working conditions, particularly in the garment industry. The 
Government, supported by the FTUC, passed occupational health and 
safety legislation, which came in to effect in 1997. The Government 
continues to work with the ILO (which maintains an office in Suva) to 
address problems concerning working conditions. By law an employee has 
the right to remove himself from a hazardous work site without 
jeopardizing his employment, but most fear the loss of their jobs if 
they do so.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address the subject of trafficking in persons, although laws against 
bonded and forced labor could be used to prosecute traffickers; 
trafficking in persons is a problem. There was an increase in the 
number of persons arriving in or transiting the country with altered or 
falsified travel documents. Nadi International Airport is a hub for 
travel in the Pacific and an increasing number of Asian nationals 
without appropriate travel papers were apprehended and deported during 
the year. The police believe that an organized Asian criminal network 
exists in the country that coordinates illegal trafficking in persons. 
There are unconfirmed reports that some laborers recruited from Asian 
countries, particularly in the garment sector, are held in conditions 
of forced labor (see Section 6.c.). There are also reports that Chinese 
women working in the garment sector may be involved in prostitution.
    There is no available information as to whether persons working in 
the sex industry are forced into prostitution.
                               __________

                               INDONESIA

    Indonesia made progress in some areas of its transition from a 
longentrenched authoritarian regime to a more pluralistic, 
representative democracy; however, the country also encountered 
significant setbacks in areas of democratic governance. In October 
1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid was elected in the country's first 
pluralistic elections, in a process judged free and fair by 
international monitors. The democratically-elected government faced 
enormous challenges because institutions required for a democratic 
system either do not exist or are at an early stage of development. 
Existing institutions, including the government bureaucracy and 
security establishment, often were obstacles to democratic development. 
When governmental authority changed hands from President B.J. Habibie 
to President Wahid the political system was revamped to provide for 
separation of powers, with an executive branch, a president, and an 
appointed cabinet that ultimately are accountable to a directly elected 
parliament. The Parliament (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) were installed in October 1999, replacing the former DPR, which 
was elected in 1997, and the former MPR. In accordance with 
constitutional procedures, the new MPR elected, in a transparent 
balloting procedure, Wahid as President, and Megawati Soekarnoputri as 
Vice President in October 1999. The 500-member DPR, of which 462 
members were chosen in the 1999 elections (but which also includes 38 
unelected members of the military), became a forum for vigorous debate 
of government policy and practice during the year. The Parliament 
frequently challenged the authority and policies of the executive 
branch, and in mid-July formally exercised its right to summon 
President Wahid to respond to questions about his actions. The MPR, 
which consists of the Parliament, 130 elected regional representatives, 
and 65 appointed functional group representatives, held its first 
annual session in August; previously the MPR ordinarily had met every 5 
years to elect the President and Vice President and to consider other 
matters reserved for the MPR. Severe criticism of President Wahid's 
performance led the MPR in August to issue a decree mandating the 
President to cede additional authorities over daily governance to Vice 
President Megawati as stipulated in a subsequent presidential decree. 
This decision has not appeared to alter significantly the power 
relationship between the President and Vice President. During its 
August session, the MPR amended the 1945 Constitution to, among other 
changes, incorporate human rights protections modeled on the U.N. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although human rights activists 
expressed concern that a constitutional amendment prohibiting 
retroactive application of laws could be used to shield past human 
rights violators from prosecution. The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, it remains subordinated to the 
executive and suffers from pervasive corruption.
    The 275,000-member armed forces (TNI) are under the supervision of 
a civilian defense minister but retain broad nonmilitary powers and an 
internal security role, and are not fully accountable to civilian 
authority. The military and police jointly occupy 38 appointed seats in 
the DPR reserved for the security forces, as well as 10 percent of the 
seats in provincial and district parliaments. During the first half of 
the year, political leaders considered phasing out reserved seats for 
the security forces in the DPR and MPR. The security forces agreed to 
relinquish their appointed seats in the national and regional 
legislatures in 2004, but the MPR adopted a decree during its August 
session that extended the security forces' presence in the MPR until 
the year 2009. In March President Wahid signed a decree abolishing the 
Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation of National 
Security (BAKORSTANAS), which had given the security forces wide 
discretion to detain and interrogate persons who were perceived as 
threats to national security. In July President Wahid signed a decree 
removing the national police force of 175,000 members from the 
supervision of the Minister of Defense and providing for civilian 
oversight. This step, in addition to the formal separation of the 
police from the armed forces in 1999, was intended to give the police 
primary responsibility for internal security. Notwithstanding these 
changes, the military continues to play a substantial internal security 
role in areas of conflict, such as Aceh, the Moluccas, and Irian Jaya. 
Both the TNI and the police committed numerous serious human rights 
abuses throughout the year.
    The economy, which is market-based with a significant degree of 
government intervention, increased by approximately 3.5 percent during 
the year, following a more than 13 percent decline in real terms in 
1998 and no real growth in 1999. Industrial exports grew strongly, 
particularly in labor-intensive textile, electronics, wood products, 
and other light manufacturing industries based on the densely populated 
islands of Java and Bali. Underemployment remained high at 
approximately 19 million persons. Over 40 percent of the adult working 
population is employed in agriculture, which in Java, Bali, and 
southern Sulawesi primarily involves rice and other food crops but 
elsewhere concentrates on cash crops such as oil palm, rubber, coffee, 
tea, coconut, and spices. Per capita gross domestic product among the 
population of 211 million was $580 in 1999, well below the levels 
achieved before the severe economic downturn that began in July 1997. 
The downturn affected most severely the urban poor, particularly in 
Java, partly as a result of a wholesale shift in employment from the 
higher-paying formal sector to the less secure informal sector. The 
negative impact of the economic and financial downturn was smaller in 
less populated, natural resource-rich Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and 
Sumatra. Large disparities in the distribution of wealth and political 
power contributed to social tensions across the country and continued 
to create demands for greater regional autonomy. In response, the 
Government prepared for the implementation of two potentially 
significant 1999 laws providing for greater political and economic 
decentralization and for revenue sharing among the country's provinces 
and districts.
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and the overall 
human rights situation worsened during the year, despite the Wahid 
Government's efforts to continue the country's democratic transition 
and permit the exercise of basic freedoms. Security forces were 
responsible for numerous instances of, at times indiscriminate, 
shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other abuse, and 
arbitrary detention in Aceh, West Timor, Irian Jaya (also known as 
Papua or West Papua), the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and elsewhere in the 
country. TNI personnel often responded with indiscriminate violence 
after physical attacks on soldiers. They also continued to conduct 
``sweeps'' which led to killing of civilians and property destruction. 
The Government and the leaders of the Free Aceh Movement members signed 
an agreement in May providing for a humanitarian pause in the fighting 
between them, beginning on June 2. During the pause, both sides agreed 
not to undertake offensive operations or maneuvers. Initially the 
humanitarian pause greatly reduced violence in Aceh, but by September 
violence had returned to roughly pre-pause levels. Army forces, police, 
and GAM members committed numerous extrajudicial killings. In Irian 
Jaya (Papua) police shot and killed persons involved in Papuan 
independence flag-raisings or demonstrations on a number of occasions, 
even when these demonstrations were nonviolent. There continued to be 
credible reports of the disappearance of dozens of civilians, including 
Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) activist, and 
Tengku Hashiruddin Daud, an Acehnese Member of Parliament. Both later 
were found dead with indications of torture. East Timorese 
prointegration militias resident in West Timor, armed and largely 
supported by the army, were responsible for numerous acts of violence 
in West Timor directed at local West Timorese residents and 
international aid workers, including the murder of three U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) officials in Atambua in September. 
The militias made repeated crossborder raids into East Timor, which 
resulted in the deaths of two U.N. Peacekeeping Force personnel. In 
West Timor, the militias attacked and threatened UNHCR and other 
humanitarian aid workers throughout the year, leading to the withdrawal 
of international aid workers on several occasions, intimidated East 
Timorese internally displaced persons (IDP's) and the local population 
in West Timor, and destroyed property belonging to international 
organizations. Twenty-four army personnel received jail sentences of 8 
to 10 years in May for the massacre of 58 civilians in Beutong Ateuh, 
West Aceh, in July 1999. However, the most senior military officer 
involved in the incident inexplicably disappeared after the 
convictions. In response to past abuses, joint civilianmilitary courts 
and various other investigative bodies are pursuing several other cases 
involving army and police officers, but aside from the Beutong Ateuh, 
West Aceh case, no other cases were brought to trial. Security forces 
systematically employed arbitrary arrest and detention without trial in 
Aceh. The Government has not prosecuted any persons in connection with 
the militia-related crimes in West or East Timor dating back to 1999, 
although the Attorney General in September and October named 23 persons 
as suspects in East Timor human rights cases (one of whom was killed in 
early September).
    Rapes and sexual exploitation by security forces continued to be a 
problem, particularly in West Timor. Prison conditions are harsh. 
Despite initial steps toward reform, the judiciary remains subordinate 
to the executive, suffers from corruption, and does not always ensure 
due process. Security forces infringe on citizens' privacy rights. The 
Government generally respects freedom of speech and the press; however, 
journalists continued to suffer intimidation and assaults. The 
Government places significant controls on freedom of assembly, but 
allowed most demonstrations to proceed without hindrance during the 
year, except in Aceh and Irian Jaya. Security forces sometimes resorted 
to excessive force in order to disrupt peaceful demonstrations. There 
were numerous credible reports that police assaulted persons detained 
in Irian Jaya after violent clashes, and police detained persons for 
organizing peaceful independence flagraisings. The Government generally 
respects freedom of association, although the Communist Party remains 
banned. The Government legally provides for religious freedom for five 
designated religions; unrecognized religions are subject to 
restrictions. The Government continues to restrict freedom of movement 
to a limited extent. Thousands of Acehnese residents fled their 
villages during conflicts between the security forces and separatists. 
The army, East Timorese militias in West Timor, and militant groups in 
Maluku also forced the relocation of hundreds of thousands of persons. 
In West Timor, the Government's failure to disarm and disband the East 
Timorese prointegration militias impeded the repatriation or 
resettlement of thousands of East Timorese IDP's.
    Domestic human rights organizations continued to play a significant 
role in advocating improved human rights conditions; however, the 
authorities continued to subject some NGO's to monitoring and 
interference, and in August in Jakarta, unknown persons allegedly 
kidnaped, held, and threatened a group of agrarian activists for 2 
weeks before releasing them. Violence and discrimination against women 
are widespread problems. Child abuse and child prostitution are 
problems, and female genital mutilation (FGM) persists in some areas. 
Discrimination against the disabled, and against indigenous, religious, 
and ethnic minorities also are widespread problems. Interreligious 
violence, particularly in the Moluccas, claimed over 3,000 lives, and 
thousands of Christians in Maluku were forced to convert to Islam. 
Discrimination against ethnic minorities continued. Attacks against 
houses of worship continued, and the lack of an effective government 
response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to 
allegations of official complicity in some of the incidents.
    During the year the Government ratified International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor, 
enacted a new law on trade unions, and continued to allow new trade 
unions to form and operate. Nonetheless, enforcement of labor standards 
remains inconsistent and weak in some areas. Millions of children work, 
often under poor conditions. Forced and bonded child labor remains a 
problem, although the Government continued to take steps during the 
year to remove children from fishing platforms, on which bonded child 
labor most commonly occurs. Trafficking of persons into and from the 
country for the purpose of prostitution and sometimes for forced labor 
is a problem.
    The Government was ineffective in deterring social, interethnic, 
and interreligious violence that accounted for the majority of deaths 
by violence during the year. Enforcement of the law against criminal 
violence deteriorated, resulting in religious groups purporting to 
uphold public morality, and mobs dispensing ``street justice'' operated 
with impunity.
    In Aceh dozens of lowlevel civil servants, police, and military 
personnel were murdered and abducted during the year. Private non-
Acehnese residents also sometimes suffered attacks. It generally is 
believed that separatists carried out many of these, and other, 
killings. In Irian Jaya, mobs killed over 20 migrant settlers and 
wounded scores of others on October 6 and 7 after police opened fire on 
indigenous Papuans resisting the removal of Papuan independence flags. 
Unknown attackers killed two police members and a security guard in 
Abepura, Irian Jaya, on December 7, and two timber workers near the 
Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border on December 9. Police blamed both 
attacks on the Free Papua Organization (OPM) although local human 
rights groups believe that groups with ties to the security forces were 
involved.
    The DPR enacted landmark legislation establishing a human rights 
court, and deliberated on and debated other draft legislation with 
human rights implications, such as a bill on broadcasting. In January 
President Wahid issued Presidential Decree No. 6, which repealed the 
ban (passed in 1967) on the practice of Chinese religion 
(Confucianism), beliefs, and customs. Ethnic Chinese celebrated New 
Year's openly for the first time in over 30 years.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Historically, 
politically-related extrajudicial killings have occurred most 
frequently in areas where separatist movements were active, such as 
Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, and security forces continued to 
employ harsh measures against separatist movements in these areas. In 
addition security forces killed unarmed demonstrators, and there also 
were numerous instances of reported extrajudicial killings by security 
forces in cases involving alleged common criminal activity.
    In Aceh army and police personnel committed many extrajudicial 
killings and used excessive force or directed force against 
noncombatants in an attempt to quell separatist movements; at times the 
police and army forces were responding to rebel attacks. On February 9, 
in Cot Merbo village, North Aceh, TNI troops shot and killed four 
Acehnese civilians, whom the military claimed were GAM guerillas. On 
March 10, police shot and killed two apparently unarmed men at a police 
checkpoint near Banda Aceh. Police later stated that the two men were 
members of GAM and were shot while fleeing the scene. According to a 
TNI spokesperson, on March 12, TNI troops shot and killed three armed 
separatists after they resisted arrest and fired shots at the troops in 
Bate Pila, North Aceh. On May 17, police shot and killed a civilian in 
Cunda, a village north of Lhokseumawe. According to police, he was shot 
after he attempted unsuccessfully to steal a police officer's revolver 
from his holster at a checkpoint. Other witnesses confirmed that the 
man fled the checkpoint; however, they denied that there was a struggle 
over the gun and instead claimed that the police chased and caught the 
man, and then executed him. On May 17 and 18, police killed eight 
villagers in Hagu Barat Laout, North Aceh. Police claimed that the 
eight villagers were armed separatist guerillas; local residents claim 
that all the victims were fishermen and that they were watching a 
soccer match when, without provocation, the police attacked. In 
November police and army troops attempting to prevent Acehnese from 
attending a rally calling for a referendum on Acehnese independence 
killed over 20 persons in the provincial capital of Banda Aceh (see 
Section 2.b.). On December 6, three Acehnese humanitarian workers with 
the NGO Rehabilitation Action For Torture Victims in Aceh (RATA) were 
killed at close range near Lhokseumawe (see Section 4). A survivor of 
the shooting said that a group of Acehnese government collaborators and 
plainclothes military personnel shot the victims. Police arrested 11 
persons, including 3 policemen and 4 soldiers, in connection with the 
RATA killings; they remained in detention at year's end. There were 
numerous other instances of excessive force by the military and police 
during the year that went unpunished.
    During the year there were numerous extrajudicial killings in Aceh 
that could not be clearly attributed to either the security forces or 
to the armed separatist movement, the Free Aceh Movement. According to 
domestic NGO's and press reports, 636 persons were killed in Aceh 
during the year, 494 of whom were civilians and 142 of whom were police 
or military members. On January 24, Tengku Nashiruddin Daud, an 
Acehnese representative to the DPR, disappeared in Medan, North 
Sumatra. His body was found outside Medan on January 25, and family 
members identified it on January 30. Nashiruddin had advocated strongly 
for the trial of military officers accused of human rights violations 
in Aceh; he also was opposed to an independent Aceh. Police had made no 
progress in identifying Nashiruddin's killers by year's end. The body 
of Sukardi, a volunteer with the Bamboo Thicket Institute, a local 
environmental and human rights organization based in Aceh, was found on 
February 1, after he was reported missing the day before. On April 6, 
unknown persons shot and killed a female doctoral candidate at Aceh's 
Syah Kuala University. On May 27, eight armed men abducted Sulaiman 
Ahmad, a TNI lieutenant colonel, and hanged him. On May 29, unknown 
persons shot and killed a TNI lieutenant in a videostore in Geudong, 
Aceh. On August 5, foreign-resident Acehnese NGO activist Jafar Siddiq 
Hamzah disappeared in Medan. His body was found on September 4, along 
with four other unidentified bodies southeast of Medan. All bodies had 
multiple stab wounds and bruises. Police had made no progress in 
identifying the perpetrators of the killings by year's end. On 
September 16, unknown persons shot and killed Tengku Safwan Idris, 
rector of the Ar-Raniry State Islamic Institute, at his home in Banda 
Aceh. Police investigated the murder but were unable to identify the 
perpetrators.
    In Irian Jaya (Papua) police shot and killed persons involved in 
largely peaceful Papuan independence flag-raisings or demonstrations on 
at least 6 occasions, injuring numerous persons and killing at least 33 
(see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 5). For example, Police Mobile Brigade 
(Brimob) troops opened fire on a group of Papuans who were raising a 
Papuan Independence Flag in Sorong, Papua on the morning of August 22. 
Three Papuans were killed and at least 12 others were injured; 1 
policeman was injured. After the police failed to persuade the crowd to 
disperse peacefully heated arguments broke out between the Papuans and 
the police. Some sources allege that police then began firing their 
weapons; two other sources allege that members of the crowd began a 
scuffle and threw stones first. However, all sources agree that the 
police overreacted and began firing indiscriminately into the crowd. 
The incident was similar to a series of police reactions to flag-
raisings over the past 2 years, although the number of victims was 
significantly higher in this case. On October 6, police killed six 
persons in Wamena, Papua, who resisted police efforts to take down 
Papuan flags. At least 20 other persons were injured (see Section 5). 
Police and Papuans clashed in Merauke on November 3 and 4. Reports 
indicate that 5 Papuans died of gunshot wounds and another Papuan died 
of stab wounds; police injured at least 17 other Papuans. The 
circumstances of the incident are unclear. According to police, Papuans 
injured several persons and damaged non-Papuan property during the 
incident (see Section 5). Police killed two Papuans during a clash in 
Fak Fak on December 1. Police and Papuans clashed again in Merauke on 
the morning of December 2, and police fired into a crowd, shooting and 
killing seven Papuans and injuring at least eight others. After a 
December 7 attack on a police station in Jayapura, police killed 3 
persons, and detained and beat over 100 others (see Section 5). On 
December 18, troops shot and killed four Papuans near Tiom, Papua, 
after the Papuans shot arrows at the soldiers, killing one soldier.
    East Timorese prointegration militias based in West Timor, who, 
according to credible reports, continued to be armed and supported by 
the army, committed numerous extrajudicial killings. On July 24, 
approximately eight militia members shot, killed, and mutilated a New 
Zealand U.N. peacekeeper near Suai, East Timor, where the U.N. unit was 
patrolling the East/West Timor border area. On July 30, East Timorese 
IDP's from TNI Battalion 744 killed Bernard Loddo, a resident of 
Kupang, West Timor. On August 10, East Timorese militias killed a 
Nepali U.N. peacekeeper and wounded three other peacekeepers and one 
East Timorese civilian near Suai. On September 6, a mob of East 
Timorese IDP's led by militia members attacked UNHCR offices in 
Atambua, West Timor and killed three international UNHCR staff members, 
then mutilated and burned their bodies. Security forces that were 
assigned to protect the UNHCR office failed to prevent the militia 
forces from attacking and left the area before the militia's second 
attack on the building, when the three UNHCR workers were killed. In 
December authorities began to process for trial six suspects linked to 
the attack; at year's end, authorities had not detained any other 
suspects.
    According to credible reports, security forces in the Maluku island 
chain, especially in the centrally located island of Ambon, were 
responsible for some of the shooting deaths that occurred during 
widespread riots and communal clashes throughout the year. Despite 
claims to the contrary, there was no credible evidence to suggest that 
the security forces as an institution supported one side or the other 
during the violence (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
    In March a foreign citizen disappeared while in the custody of 
immigration officials in East Kalimantan; the citizen continued to be 
presumed dead at year's end. Immigration officers detained him for 
overstaying his visa in November 1999. In March the foreigner was being 
transferred from Kalimantan to Jakarta on an inter-island ferry when he 
allegedly jumped overboard and drowned. Government officials waited 
over 2 weeks before informing his government of his disappearance. No 
disciplinary action was taken against the immigration personnel 
responsible for his disappearance and presumed death, and there were no 
developments in the case by year's end.
    The police on several occasions used deadly force to disperse 
demonstrators. For example, in Medan, North Sumatra on May 1, police 
shot and killed two students at Nommensen University after crowds took 
two police hostage and threw Molotov cocktails during a demonstration 
to protest the detention of another student. On June 14, in Pontianak, 
West Kalimantan, police shot and killed one student during a 
demonstration in front of the governor's office. On June 18, in Blitar, 
East Java, police shot and killed two persons involved in a long-
running protest and land dispute at a plantation. On June 21, in 
Porsea, North Sumatra, police reportedly shot and killed one person 
during a clash with demonstrators. On July 20, in Muara Enim, South 
Sumatra, police shot and killed one person during a demonstration by 
farmers over land rights. On September 27, in Bondowoso, East Java, 
police killed five persons in a crowd that was demanding the release of 
a detainee in police custody.
    The police often employed deadly force in apprehending suspects or 
dealing with alleged criminals, many of whom were unarmed. During the 
year police shot and killed at least 15 Africans suspected of 
trafficking in narcotics. Other nationalities were not subjected to 
similar harsh treatment in narcotics or other criminal cases, 
suggesting that the killings were racially motivated. In response to 
criticisms that the methods used were unjustifiably harsh and amounted 
to execution without trial, police generally claimed that the suspects 
were fleeing, resisting arrest, or threatening the police. Complete 
statistics about the number of these cases were not released by year's 
end (see Section 5).
    The military or police rarely are held accountable for committing 
extrajudicial killings or using excessive force, and with the exception 
of the 24 soldiers who were convicted for the death of 58 civilians in 
Aceh in July 1999, no government personnel were held accountable during 
the year. However, during the year, the Government initiated and 
continued an unprecedented number of investigations into human rights 
cases in Aceh, East Timor, and other areas of the country.
    In July 1999, the Government appointed an independent commission 
(KPP Aceh) to investigate human rights violations in Aceh. In November 
1999, the Commission recommended that the Government investigate five 
cases of alleged human rights violations. On April 17, the trial of 24 
army personnel and a civilian, who all previously were convicted for 
the killing of 58 civilians in Beutong Ateuh in July 1999, began; 
however, none of the accused was above the rank of lieutenant colonel. 
During the trial, soldiers testified that they had killed civilians but 
argued that they were not guilty of murder because they were following 
their commanders' orders. The commander reportedly disappeared; 
however, NGO's reported a subsequent sighting of him in the company of 
other military officials. The trial ended in May when the 24 defendants 
received sentences of 8 to 10 years. By year's end, no one had been 
charged in the other four cases, which include: the May 1999 massacre 
at Krueng Geukey, North Aceh; the February 1999 attack on demonstrators 
that resulted in seven persons killed in Idi Cut, East Aceh; a series 
of killings and abductions at a detention facility in Pidie from 1997-
98; and an August 1996 rape of Sumiati, an Acehnese women, by a 
soldier.
    There were no new developments during the year in the killings that 
occurred when security forces broke up a peaceful proindependence 
demonstration in Biak, Irian Jaya in 1998.
    The Commission for Investigation of Violations of Human Rights in 
East Timor (KPP-HAM) delivered its report of human rights violations in 
East Timor to the Attorney General's Office on January 31. The Attorney 
General said that his office would initially prosecute five major cases 
arising from the April 6, 1999 massacre in Liquisa; the April 17, 1999 
killings at independence leader Manuel Carrascalao's house; the 
September 5, 1999 attack on the compound of the Catholic Diocese in 
Dili; the September 6, 1999 massacre of priests and displaced persons 
at a church in Suai; and the September 21, 1999 killing of Dutch 
journalist Sander Thoenes. The Attorney General's Office named 23 
suspects in September and October (one of whom, an East Timorese 
militia commander, militia members killed in early September). Those 
accused included several army and police generals, but did not include 
then-Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, former Armed Forces 
intelligence chief Zacky Anwar Makarim, and other senior members of the 
military leadership who were named as responsible parties in the KPP-
HAM report. Progress on these five cases was slow, and the number of 
suspects named was small in comparison to the number of persons 
believed responsible. Although Indonesian authorities were assisted 
greatly in their investigation by the U.N. Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (UNTAET), the Government did not cooperate fully in 
December when UNTAET requested similar support for its own 
investigations into the atrocities.
    In November the national police spokesman announced that the police 
would summon for questioning by military police 11 policemen who were 
suspected of involvement in the May 1998 shooting deaths of 4 students 
at Trisakti University in Jakarta; however, none of the 11 policemen 
had been questioned by year's end. In December the Parliament formed a 
special committee to conduct an investigation of the Trisakti killings.
    The police conducted an investigation of the July 27, 1996 attack 
on the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), 
questioning the top army and police leadership at the time. A joint 
police/military team subsequently questioned witnesses and potential 
suspects, and by November had begun submitting cases to the Attorney 
General's Office for prosecution (see Section 1.b.).
    The East Java police reopened an investigation into the 1993 murder 
of labor activist Marsinah, questioning again over a dozen witnesses 
and previous suspects, including civilians and army and police 
personnel. In December the East Java police chief said Australian 
laboratory tests confirmed that Marsinah's blood had been found in the 
home of the owner of the factory where Marsinah worked and in a van 
believed to have transported her to the place where she was found. 
However, by year's end, there was no further action on the police 
investigation.
    In February the National Human Rights Commission (KOMNASHAM) formed 
a commission to investigate the September 1984 killing of scores of 
demonstrators by security forces at Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. The 
commission questioned senior army and police officials, exhumed mass 
graves where victims were buried, and reported the investigation 
results, including names of 23 persons considered to be responsible for 
the killings, to the Attorney General in October (see Sections 1.c. and 
4).
    There were no new developments during the year in the shooting 
deaths of at least nine demonstrators at Atma Jaya University in 
November 1998.
    On March 14, President Wahid went on national television and asked 
for forgiveness for the 1965-67 massacre of suspected members of the 
banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and for the role of his 
organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, in the killings. In November researchers 
from the Indonesian Institute for the Study of the 1965-66 Massacre 
unearthed the remains of 24 persons in a forest near Wonosobo, Central 
Java. They are believed to have been killed in March 1966 because of 
their PKI affiliation.
    Citizens' attacks on other citizens caused the majority of killings 
during the year.
    In Aceh armed separatist groups killed many soldiers, police, civil 
servants, and local residents throughout the year. On January 1, a mob 
surrounded a TNI sergeant who was buying fish in a market in Simpang 
Tiga, Pidie, Aceh and stabbed him to death. According to press reports, 
on January 6, the bodies of two men who had been shot to death were 
found wrapped in separatist flags and left on a roadside in Muara Dua, 
North Aceh. On April 5, alleged GAM members killed four TNI personnel 
in an ambush near Lhokseumawe. GAM has claimed responsibility for a 
July 2 attack in Nissam district, North Aceh, in which assailants 
killed three Brimob members and wounded six others. On September 20, 
GAM forces attacked a police post in Pidie with a grenade launcher, 
killing three soldiers.
    On October 6 and 7, in Wamena, Irian Jaya, members of Papuan ``task 
forces'' (Satgas Papua--informal private security organizations of 
Papuan men and youths that ostensibly provide protection for Papuan 
tribal and other leaders and groups), and other Papuans armed with 
knives, spears, and arrows killed at least 24 non-Papuans, after 
security forces opened fire on and killed 2 task force members who 
resisted efforts to take down Papuan independence flags flying in the 
town. Unknown persons killed two police officers and a security guard 
in Abepura, Irian Jaya, on December 7, and two timber workers near the 
Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border on December 9. Police blamed both 
attacks on the Free Papua Organization (OPM) (see Section 5). On 
December 16, Papuans reportedly attacked soldiers with traditional 
weapons near the town of Tiom, killing one soldier and injuring three 
others. The soldiers responded with gunfire.
    According to multiple sources, over 3,000 persons were killed, 
largely because of their religious identity, in North Maluku, Maluku, 
and Central Sulawesi provinces in the eastern part of the country. The 
fighting in all three provinces had political, economic, ethnic, and 
religious overtones (see Sections 2.c. and 5). While initial conflicts 
emerged over land tenure issues and the political and economic status 
of local residents versus migrants, in many cases the conflicts later 
evolved into highly-charged religious clashes. One of the major factors 
contributing to the continuation of violence in these islands was the 
failure to bring the perpetrators to justice (see Sections 2.c. and 5); 
another factor was the failure of the authorities to prevent armed 
militants from traveling in large groups to the Moluccas from Java.
    Interreligious fighting in the Moluccan island group, which began 
in Ambon in January 1999, spread to most major islands in the Moluccas 
during the year. Christian and Muslim groups used increasingly 
sophisticated weapons as the fighting continued, causing over 3,000 
deaths and destroying many churches, mosques, and, in some cases, 
entire towns. The level of violence intensified in late 1999 and in the 
early part of the year after Christian gangs and militia (and to a 
lesser extent, Muslim gangs and militia) attacked isolated villages in 
Halmahera and other parts of North Maluku. During the first 6 months of 
the year, and following the December 1999 attacks by Christians, Muslim 
militias drove Christian populations away from many areas of North 
Maluku and Maluku provinces (see Section 2.d.). As IDP's fled to 
neighboring areas and islands, their resentment against those who had 
attacked them often sparked conflict in their new places of residence. 
In addition unverified reports of provocations and conspiracies fueled 
the continuous cycle of violence. The violence decreased in Ambon in 
late January, after security forces began enforcing a curfew and 
disarming civilians. At the same time, mutually-destructive fighting 
escalated in Halmahera and other parts of North Maluku. By April there 
were some signs of reconciliation in Ambon after the provincial 
government established reconstruction programs and markets in border 
areas between Muslim and Christian communities. However, in late April, 
serious rioting broke out immediately following a visit by Vice 
President Megawati Soekarnoputri. There was a further upsurge in 
violence in midMay after boats filled with members of the Laskar Jihad, 
Muslim militants from Java, arrived in Ambon and other parts of the 
Moluccas (see Section 5). As many as 2,000 to 3,000 militants 
ultimately arrived via boat. Law and order continued to deteriorate 
steadily, and in late June, violent mobs stormed through Ambon city 
with little or no security force interference. There also were large-
scale Muslim attacks against Christians in Halmahera in May and June. 
The level of violence decreased, particularly in North Maluku, after 
President Wahid declared a state of civil emergency in both provinces 
in late June (see Section 2.d.); the state of emergency still was in 
effect at year's end. However, violent interreligious clashes continued 
occasionally during the remainder of the year, especially in Ambon and 
neighboring islands in central Maluku.
    Beginning in late May, the area of Poso in Central Sulawesi, and 
numerous villages in the region experienced renewed religious riots and 
violence, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread destruction. 
Christian gangs from surrounding villages reportedly expelled Muslims 
from the town of Poso in retaliation for past hostilities, which 
included the burning of hundreds of Christians' houses in the preceding 
months (see Section 2.d.). In the most serious incident, Christian 
gangs killed over 100 unarmed Muslims in a small village outside Poso. 
In July the regional military commander announced that 211 persons had 
been confirmed dead in and around Poso; other estimates ranged as high 
as 500 fatalities. Both Christian and Muslim outsiders were accused of 
instigating the violence (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
    Over 30 persons were killed in a series of bombings in Jakarta and 
Medan during the year (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Ten persons died when 
a car-bomb exploded in the basement of the Jakarta Stock Exchange on 
September 13, two persons died in a car bomb incident near the gate of 
the Philippine Ambassador's residence, and several others were killed 
in bombings in Medan. Eighteen persons died in an apparently 
coordinated series of bombings at or near churches in nine cities on 
the night of December 24 (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Except for the case 
of the Stock Exchange bombing, no suspects had been apprehended by 
year's end.
    According to press reports, during the year 145 persons accused of 
committing crimes (usually theft or responsibility for vehicular 
accidents) were killed by mobs of persons on the scene of the alleged 
crimes in the most populous urban areas of Jakarta, West Java, East 
Java, and North Sumatra. Countrywide statistics were not available at 
year's end.
    In Kalimantan interethnic clashes resulted in killings on at least 
two occasions. In Kumai, Central Kalimantan, four persons died in 
fighting between indigenous Dayaks and Madurese migrants (originally 
from the island of Madura near Java) in July. In Pontianak, West 
Kalimantan, at least 11 persons died in fighting between ethnic Malay 
and Madurese in October. Sectarian violence between Dayaks and Madurese 
migrants erupted on December 16 in Central Kalimantan. According to 
official news agency reports, about 100 Dayaks attacked and burned 
approximately 20 migrant houses. The attacks were in reprisal for a 
number of unsolved killings of Dayaks, allegedly committed by Madurese. 
An estimated 50,000 Madurese who fled their homes during interethnic 
violence in 1999 (see Section 5) remained in IDP camps in West 
Kalimantan.
    During the year, there were a number of reports of killings of 
persons who practice traditional magic (``dukun santet'') (see Section 
5). In the Malang area of East Java, police reported to the press that 
unknown persons killed 10 persons suspected of being dukun santet. 
There also were reports of killings of dukun santets in West and 
Central Java. In February in West Java, police arrested 12 persons 
suspected of participating in the killing of 7 dukun santet. Police 
acknowledged in November that at least 20 villagers in the Cianjur area 
of West Java had been executed for allegedly practicing traditional 
magic. Police arrested 20 persons suspected of involvement in the 
killings in November. However, none of the cases had come to trial by 
year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--According to a report issued by the Committee 
for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), 843 persons 
still are missing as a result of military operations, land disputes, 
and political and religious activities over the past 20 years.
    In Aceh there continued to be credible reports of the disappearance 
of many civilians. KONTRAS reported in December that 53 cases of forced 
disappearance involving 69 persons had occurred between January 1 and 
the end of November. Three prominent Acehnese disappeared in Medan, 
North Sumatra: Member of Parliament, religious leader, and human rights 
activist Tengku Nashiruddin Daud in January; armed separatist spokesman 
Ismail Syahputra in June; and NGO activist Jafar Siddiq Hamzah in 
August. Nashiruddin's and Jafar's bodies later were found, bearing 
signs of torture (see Section 1.a.); Syahputra remained missing at 
year's end. NGO's allege that TNI forces or police personnel are 
responsible for many cases of civilian disappearances.
    There were no developments in the investigation into the causes of 
death or the identification of the remains of 32 bodies found floating 
around Biak, Irian Jaya in July 1998 after navy and police forces broke 
up a proindependence demonstration. Multiple reports claimed that many 
of the bodies were demonstrators who had been detained and then killed 
while in custody.
    There were no developments in the numerous disappearances of 
persons in East Timor in 1999 and in earlier years.
    Four members of the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), an NGO based 
in Bandung, West Java that advocates for dispossessed farmers, claimed 
that they were kidnaped at gunpoint by unknown persons on August 14. 
Their alleged abduction came after police forcibly removed them from a 
demonstration and hunger strike that they were conducting inside the 
Parliament building in Jakarta. They claimed that after several days in 
solitary confinement they were driven to different locations and 
interrogated at length about their organization's activities, finances, 
and aims. They said that they were not tortured physically, but that 
their lives and those of their families and colleagues frequently were 
threatened. Their captors released them on August 27. Police opened an 
investigation into the kidnaping, but were unable to identify the 
perpetrators (see Sections 1.e. and 4).
    There were no developments in the case of 12 persons who 
disappeared (and are presumed dead) in Java during a series of 
kidnapings of opponents of the Soeharto regime carried out by Army 
Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel in 1997 and 1998. However, the 
police conducted an investigation into the 1996 PDI incident in which 
16 persons disappeared, and submitted cases to the Attorney General's 
Office (see Section 1.a.). No new information emerged on the fate of 
the 16 missing persons by year's end.
    In Aceh armed separatists often abduct army members, police 
personnel, civil servants, and others, although they do not always 
acknowledge responsibility for these incidents. Militia groups are 
believed to have killed some civilians based on suspicions that they 
were collaborators or informants of the security forces.
    In Irian Jaya, the six plantation employees who were abducted in 
July 1999 near Arso remained missing.
    Kidnaping of children for ransom is a recent and reportedly growing 
phenomenon. In October a man was arrested for kidnaping three children 
from wealthy families living in the Jakarta area; one child was 
murdered after his parents failed to pay the ransom.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Criminal Code makes it a crime punishable by up to 4 
years in prison for any official to use violence or force to elicit a 
confession; however, in practice legal protections are both inadequate 
and widely ignored, and security forces continued to employ torture and 
other forms of mistreatment, particularly in regions where there were 
active security concerns, such as Aceh and Irian Jaya. Police often 
resort to physical abuse, even in minor incidents.
    In Aceh army and police officials routinely use excessive force and 
violence when investigating attacks by armed separatists. Police and 
army personnel also routinely respond to attacks on soldiers by 
engaging in indiscriminate violence against bystanders. For example, on 
March 18, Brimob units beat and otherwise abused at least 20 villagers 
in Gulampang Tiga, Pidie district, apparently while searching for a 
prominent GAM leader. In August after a soldier was shot in Idi 
Rayeuk's central market, troops fired indiscriminately, beat many 
bystanders, and burned over 60 market stalls. Soldiers beat or shot 
over 100 persons during the incident, including 3 children who were 
shot. An army commander later publicly apologized for the troops' 
actions; however, there were no reports of personnel being held 
accountable for the Idi Rayeuk incident. In October police allegedly 
shot 1 man and burned 150 market stalls after rebels attacked police in 
the regency of Pidie. Police denied responsibility for the shooting and 
burning.
    There were numerous credible reports that the army and police 
continued routinely to torture detainees in Aceh. For example, on 
August 27, police detained three local workers of the international NGO 
Oxfam, and beat them while they were detained. According to Amnesty 
International, police pulled out one worker's fingernails and burned 
him with cigarettes. Amnesty International also reported that on 
September 5, in Meukek subdistrict, Brimob detained Amrisaldin, a 
volunteer worker with the humanitarian organization SAVE Emergency for 
Aceh (SEFA). Police released Amrisaldin on September 6, after they 
reportedly punched him, kicked him, and slashed him with a knife. 
Police allegedly also threatened him with death and burned his pubic, 
chest, and armpit hair with matches. On September 19, in Banda Aceh, 
police arrested three leaders of the student NGO Aceh Referendum 
Information Center (SIRA) and beat them with rifle butts, cables, and 
belts while they were in custody (see Sections 1.d. and 4). Methods of 
torture documented in the past include beating, whipping, electric 
shock, and rape.
    There were numerous credible reports that police assaulted persons 
detained in Irian Jaya after violent clashes in Wamena in October, 
Merauke in November, and Jayapura in December. In the Jayapura case, 
police detained and beat, often severely, over 100 persons following an 
attack on a police station, including 19 persons between the ages of 7 
and 18. Two Papuan students died of injuries inflicted by the police, 
and a third student was shot and killed (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    On March 7, in an isolated area of North Aceh's Matangkuli 
subdistrict, a group of armed men in army fatigues raped 4 women and 
sexually molested 12 others; they also beat severely 6 men and robbed 
their families; no persons had been charged by year's end. The trial 
for the rape of Sumiati, an Acehnese woman allegedly raped by a TNI 
soldier, did not begin by year's end; Sumiati's rape case is one of 
five human rights trials that the special commission was scheduled to 
hear (see Section 1.a.). No charges were brought in the August 1999 
rape of nine Acehnese women in Kecamatan Tangse Selatan, Pidie 
district, for which TNI soldiers allegedly were responsible.
    There are allegations that prointegration East Timorese militias in 
West Timor are holding East Timorese women as ``sex slaves'' (see 
Section 5). In November 33 pregnant East Timorese women returned to 
East Timor and claimed that the TNI had abducted them and forced them 
to serve as their sex slaves in West Timor. No one was held accountable 
for the numerous acts of rape and sexual abuse that TNIsupported 
militia groups perpetrated against displaced East Timorese women in 
1999.
    On June 17, a mob of approximately 65 East Timorese IDP's assaulted 
UNHCR staff, including UNHCR West Timor Director Craig Sanders, at the 
Noelbaki camp near Kupang. One demonstrator smashed the windshield of 
the vehicle in which Sanders was riding with a machete. No UNHCR staff 
members were injured. Although the security forces were present, they 
did not intervene to prevent the violence. The army apprehended nine 
suspects and handed them over to the police, who promptly released them 
without taking any action.
    In January the Minister of State for Women's Empowerment said that 
the Government would follow up on the recommendations of the joint 
factfinding team (TGPF) that investigated the May 1998 civil unrest 
that struck Jakarta and other cities. The team's report, issued in 
November 1998, found evidence that some elements of the army may have 
been involved in provoking the violence, which included attacks against 
Sino-Indonesian women, and urged further investigation of the at least 
85 instances of violence against women that the team verified. However, 
no further investigations have taken place (see Section 5).
    There were instances in which security forces responded with 
brutality to peaceful demonstrations, although they usually allowed 
peaceful demonstrations to proceed without resorting to force. In 
January police wounded 13 persons, some with gunshots, when they 
forcibly dispersed persons protesting inadequate compensation for land 
acquired for a resort on Bintan Island near Singapore. In at least six 
instances in Irian Jaya during the year, police attempted to break up 
peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans raised the Papuan independence 
flag, and when Papuans resisted, police responded with excessive force, 
killing and injuring demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 2.a., 2.b., and 
5).
    Security forces often responded forcefully when demonstrators 
wielded canes, threw stones or Molotov cocktails, or tried to break 
through police lines. Such responses occurred on several occasions 
during the year when demonstrators sought to approach former President 
Soeharto's residence to protest the Government's failure to bring him 
to justice for his actions while in office.
    KONTRAS reported that during the first 11 months of the year, the 
police were responsible for 872 serious human rights violations 
nationwide, the bulk of them in Aceh province. Police violations 
included 26 instances of forced disappearance, 140 extrajudicial 
killings, 408 cases of torture or inhumane treatment, and 298 arbitrary 
detentions. According to KONTRAS, joint police and military operations 
were responsible for an additional 64 violations, and the armed forces 
themselves were responsible for 21 violations.
    Police entered and caused property damage to the building housing 
the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and Jakarta Legal Aid 
Society (LBH) on two occasions in which they pursued demonstrators who 
sought refuge in the LBH building. Police broke windows and damaged 
cars with rocks, nightsticks, and bullets during the incidents.
    In May a group of approximately 55 East Timorese persons ransacked 
the Jakarta office of the NGO People's Solidarity with East Timor 
(Solidamor), injuring two Solidamor staff members, one of whom required 
hospitalization. The attackers smashed office equipment, smeared blood 
on the porch, and stole approximately $2,400 (Rp. 22.8 million) in cash 
from the office. Police detained four of the attackers for 24 hours, 
but no attackers were charged.
    On July 1, a group of East Timorese IDP's vandalized several West 
Timorese schools approximately 12 miles outside Kupang, near Oesau. 
They reportedly were unhappy with the low school grades their children 
had received. Later the same day a group of East Timorese militia 
members wearing camouflage and ninja masks, armed with grenades and 
possibly automatic weapons, burned 16 buildings that housed over 40 
West Timorese families in Oesau. Local residents believe that the 
attackers were former soldiers from East Timorese territorial infantry 
battalions 744 and 745.
    On August 22, East Timorese militias beat and severely wounded two 
UNHCR staff members at the Naen camp near Kefamenanu, West Timor. The 
UNHCR staff had been invited to the camp to distribute shelter supplies 
when a machete-wielding man attacked them and a mob stoned them.
    A series of bombings occurred in Jakarta, Medan, and other cities 
during the year (see Section 1.a.). Targets included churches in Medan 
(see Section 5), the Attorney General's Office in Jakarta, the 
Philippines Ambassador's residence, the Malaysian Embassy, a bus near 
the building where former President Soeharto's corruption trial was 
held, the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the office of KONTRAS (see Section 
4), the Jakarta Governor's residence, and a Jakarta hotel. An 
apparently coordinated series of bombings at or near churches in 9 
cities on the night of December 24 killed 18 persons and wounded 
numerous others (see Sections 1.a., 2.c., and 5). Except for the case 
of the Stock Exchange bombing, no suspects were apprehended by year's 
end.
    In June the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI) attacked and vandalized 
KOMNASHAM's office to protest the Commission's findings following an 
investigation of the 1984 Tanjung Priok killings (see Sections 1.a. and 
4). FPI members, who alleged that ``immoral'' activities were occurring 
within the establishments, openly ransacked restaurants and nightclubs 
in several neighborhoods of Jakarta, injuring patrons of the 
establishments in the process. No FPI members were investigated or 
charged, despite the fact that criminal trespass and vandalism are 
violations of the Criminal Code. Several Islamic groups threatened 
Western persons and conducted ``sweeping'' operations at hotels and 
other public venues in Solo, Central Java, in late October and early 
November to drive such persons out of the city. Police questioned 
members of Islamic groups about these threatening activities, but no 
further action was taken against the perpetrators.
    Prison conditions are harsh, with mistreatment and extortion of 
inmates by guards and violence among prisoners common. The incidence of 
mistreatment drops sharply once a prisoner is transferred from police 
or military custody into the civilian prison system or into the custody 
of the Attorney General. Credible sources report that criminal 
prisoners in some facilities are beaten routinely and systematically as 
punishment for infractions of prison rules and to extract information 
about other prisoners. Punishments have included the use of electric-
shock batons and the stapling of the ears, nose, and lips. In June a 
dispute between prisoners led to rioting by hundreds of inmates at the 
Bulak Kapal Prison east of Jakarta. Prison guards shot and wounded five 
inmates, and prisoners stabbed two guards during the incident. Prison 
authorities acknowledged that overcrowding was a factor in the riot 
(the prison was built for 300 inmates but held 531 persons at the 
time). In July police questioned three prison guards at Jakarta-area 
prisons who were suspected of drug trafficking in the prisons. Former 
inmates at Jakarta's Cipinang Prison told the press in November that 
drug use among prisoners is common, and that inmates can obtain drugs, 
better treatment, and better conditions by bribing guards.
    The Government generally does not permit routine prison visits by 
human rights monitors, although some visits occasionally are permitted.
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was able to 
visit identified prisoners and detainees of concern during the year 
(see Section 4).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Criminal Procedures 
Code contains provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, but it 
lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms, and authorities routinely 
violate it. The code specifies that prisoners have the right to notify 
their families promptly and that warrants must be produced during an 
arrest except under specified conditions, such as when a suspect is 
caught in the act of committing a crime. The law authorizes 
investigators to issue warrants to assist in their investigations or if 
sufficient evidence exists that a crime has been committed. However, 
authorities sometimes made arrests without warrants.
    The law presumes that defendants are innocent and permits bail. 
They or their families also may challenge the legality of their arrest 
and detention in a pretrial hearing and may sue for compensation if 
wrongfully detained. However, it virtually is impossible for detainees 
to invoke this procedure, or to receive compensation after being 
released without charge. In both military and civilian courts, appeals 
based on claims of improper arrest and detention rarely, if ever, are 
accepted. The Criminal Procedures Code also contains specific limits on 
periods of pretrial detention and specifies when the courts must 
approve extensions, usually after 60 days.
    The authorities routinely approve extensions of periods of 
detention. In areas where active guerrilla movements exist, such as 
Aceh and Irian Jaya, there are many instances of persons being detained 
without warrants, charges, or court proceedings. Bail rarely is 
granted. The authorities frequently prevent access to defense counsel 
while suspects are being investigated and limit or prevent access to 
legal assistance from voluntary legal defense organizations. Special 
laws on corruption, economic crimes, and narcotics are no under the 
Criminal Code.
    In March President Wahid abolished the Agency for Coordination of 
Assistance for the Consolidation of National Security (BAKORSTANAS), 
which had operated outside the legal code and had wide discretion to 
detain and interrogate persons who were perceived as threats to 
national security.
    Security forces frequently detained participants suspected of 
inciting demonstrations, although most were released after questioning 
(see Section 2.b.). In November police in East Kalimantan arrested 
Wuaya Kawilarang, a regional coordinator for the Indonesian Prosperity 
Trade Union (SBSI), for investigation of charges that he incited 
workers at a large oil and gas operation to violence. He remained in 
detention at year's end (see Section 6.b.).
    There are no reliable data on the number of arbitrary arrests or 
detentions without trial, particularly in Aceh and Irian Jaya, but 
there is ample evidence that arbitrary arrests and detention without 
trial are employed systematically in Aceh.
    During the year several Acehnese were detained pending trial on 
political charges. Police arrested Muhammad Nazar, the chairman of the 
Information Center for a Referendum in Aceh (SIRA), on November 20 on 
charges of inciting hatred (see Sections 1.a. and 4). He remained in 
detention at year's end.
    Police detained numerous persons in Irian Jaya after violent 
clashes in Wamena in October, Merauke in November, and Jayapura in 
December (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5). In March the regional police 
command for Irian Jaya investigated criminal charges against 16 leading 
members of the Papuan Presidium Council for crimes against the security 
of the state and public order, based on claims that they had organized 
a gathering of Papuan community leaders in February and a peaceful 
Papuan independence flag-raising on December 1, 1999. The investigation 
against some of the 16 persons later was dropped; however, in November 
police arrested the chairman, secretary general, and three other Papuan 
Presidium Council members on the same charges (see Sections 2.a. and 
5). On December 1, police arrested seven persons during a demonstration 
in front of a foreign embassy to draw attention to human rights 
violations in West Papua (Irian Jaya) and to press for an international 
dialog to resolve the Papuan issue. Four of the detainees remained in 
police custody at year's end. On December 15, police detained the 
director of the Institute of Human Rights Study and Advocacy in Papua 
(ELS-HAM Papua) for 22 hours (see Section 4). In mid-December, 17 
Papuan activists went on trial in Wamena on charges of endangering 
state security by promoting separatism. The trial was continuing at 
year's end.
    Several foreign tourists have been subject to arbitrary arrest and 
detention while traveling in Irian Jaya. In most cases, travelers who 
take photographs are accused of being journalists without proper 
journalist visas and are detained and deported. In one case, a person 
was held without formal charges for 2 weeks before being deported; 
although no formal charges were filed and he never was served with a 
deportation order, highranking government officials publicly alleged of 
espionage at the time of his deportation, although they later retracted 
these accusations. In December police arrested a foreign journalist who 
did not have the proper visa (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
independence of the judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is 
subordinated to the executive and the military. Pursuant to a 1999 law, 
a gradual transfer of administrative and financial control over the 
judiciary from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court is taking 
place over a period of 5 years. However, judges currently are civil 
servants employed by the executive branch, which controls their 
assignments, pay, and promotion. Low salaries encourage widespread 
corruption, and judges are subject to considerable pressure from 
governmental authorities, who often exert influence over the outcome of 
numerous cases.
    A quadripartite judiciary of general, religious, military, and 
administrative courts exists below the Supreme Court. The right of 
appeal from a district court to a high court to the Supreme Court 
exists in all four systems. The Supreme Court does not consider factual 
aspects of a case, only the lower courts' application of the law. The 
Supreme Court theoretically is an equal branch in relation to the 
executive and legislative branches, but it does not have the right of 
judicial review over laws passed by Parliament.
    A panel of judges conducts trials at the district court level, 
which consists of posing questions, hearing evidence, deciding guilt or 
innocence, and assessing punishment. Initial judgments rarely are 
reversed in the appeals process, although sentences can be increased or 
reduced. Both the defense and the prosecution may appeal cases.
    In November the DPR enacted a law establishing a permanent human 
rights court. The law, mandated by the 1999 Human Rights Law (Law 39/
99), creates four new district courts to adjudicate gross violations of 
human rights. The law requires that each of the five-member human 
rights courts include three human rights judges appointed to 5-year 
terms by the President upon nomination by the Supreme Court. Although 
cases are appealed to the standing High Court and Supreme Court, the 
law requires that those courts include three human rights judges on an 
ad hoc basis on the five-member panel when hearing human rights cases. 
The law provides for internationally-recognized definitions of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and command responsibility as core 
elements of gross human rights violations. However, it does not include 
war crimes as defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions as a gross 
violation. The law strengthens the powers of the Attorney General, who 
is the sole investigating and prosecuting authority in cases of gross 
human rights violations, and who is empowered to appoint ad hoc 
investigators and prosecutors. The law also empowers the Attorney 
General (as well as the courts) to detain suspects or defendants for 
multiple fixed periods in cases of gross human rights violations. 
However, the law requires the extension of any detention of alleged 
violations to be approved by the human rights court. For gross human 
rights violations that occurred before the enactment of the law, the 
law allows the President, with the recommendation of the DPR, to create 
an ad hoc bench within one of the new human rights courts to hear cases 
associated with a particular offense.
    Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and to produce 
witnesses in their defense. An exception is allowed in cases in which 
distance or expense is deemed excessive for transporting witnesses to 
court; in such cases, sworn affidavits may be introduced. State 
prosecutors are reluctant to use existing legal powers to plea bargain 
with defendants or witnesses, or to grant witnesses immunity from 
prosecution. As a result, witnesses generally are unwilling to testify 
against the authorities. The courts commonly allow forced confessions 
and limit the presentation of defense evidence. Defendants do not have 
the right to remain silent and can be compelled to testify against 
themselves.
    The Criminal Procedures Code gives defendants the right to an 
attorney from the time of arrest, but not during the prearrest 
investigation period, which may involve prolonged detention. Persons 
summoned to appear as witnesses in investigations do not have the right 
to legal assistance even if information developed during testimony 
subsequently becomes the basis of an investigation of the witness. The 
law requires counsel to be appointed in capital punishment cases and 
those involving a prison sentence of 15 years or more. In cases 
involving potential sentences of 5 years or more, an attorney must be 
appointed if the defendant is indigent and requests counsel. In theory 
indigent defendants may obtain private legal assistance, such as that 
provided by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation. However, in practice 
defendants often are persuaded not to hire an attorney, or access to an 
attorney of their choice is impeded.
    In many cases, procedural protections, including those against 
confessions coerced by the security forces or police, are inadequate to 
ensure a fair trial. Corruption is a common feature of the legal 
system, and the payment of bribes can influence prosecution, 
conviction, and sentencing in civil and criminal cases.
    Despite the beginning of the transfer of administrative and 
financial control over the judiciary from the Department of Justice to 
the Supreme Court, there were few signs of judicial independence. The 
Courts continued to be used to take action against, or deny legal 
remedy to, political activists and government critics.
    During the year, victims of human rights violations sought for the 
first time to use the courts to obtain redress. In July the People's 
Democratic Party sued former President Soeharto and 13 other former 
senior officials for damages associated with the imprisonment of party 
leaders, the banning of the party, and the destruction of its property. 
The suit still was being heard at year's end. In addition four members 
of the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) sued the police in Jakarta for 
forcibly removing them from a peaceful demonstration and hunger strike 
that they were conducting inside the Parliament building in Jakarta. 
After being forcibly removed, they later were kidnaped and threatened 
by unknown persons (see Sections 1.b. and 4). A district court 
dismissed the suit, but an appeal to the High Court still is pending.
    President Wahid released all remaining political prisoners from the 
Soeharto and Habibie eras in December 1999. No new persons were 
convicted on political charges during the year.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--Judicial warrants for searches are required except for 
cases involving suspected subversion, economic crimes, and corruption; 
however, security agencies regularly made forced or surreptitious 
entries into homes and offices. In August a person claiming to be a 
representative of an international organization entered the Jakarta 
office of an international NGO involved in media issues and took a 
laptop computer but no other valuables. Unknown persons also 
surreptitiously entered the residence of the NGO's director and made 
intimidating telephone calls to staff members. The circumstances of 
these incidents suggested that members of the security forces were 
involved. Security forces also commonly engage in surveillance of 
persons and residences and selective monitoring of local and 
international telephone calls without legal restraint.
    The Government and DPR discussed implementing the Law on Overcoming 
Dangerous Situations, which the DPR approved in September 1999 but 
which the President never signed. The law would allow the military to 
conduct search and seizure operations for weapons during a declared 
state of emergency without a warrant but would require that such 
searches be reported to the courts within 24 hours. In November the 
Cabinet decided to further postpone implementation of the law to permit 
additional discussion and possible amendments.
    Government security officials monitor the movements and activities 
of former members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its front 
organizations, especially persons whom the Government believes were 
involved in the abortive 1965 coup. These persons and their relatives 
sometimes are subjected to surveillance, required check-ins, periodic 
indoctrination, and restrictions on travel outside their city of 
residence. They also are required to have official permission to change 
their place of residence. The requirement that ``E.T.'' (``Ex-Tapol'' 
or political prisoner) be stamped on the identification cards of these 
prisoners was ended officially in 1995, although in practice it 
continued to be used in many cases. At least some individuals who had 
E.T. stamped on their identity cards were able to have the stamp 
removed. This stamp has been used by the Government to monitor the 
activities of these persons, allowing the Government and prospective 
employers to identify alleged former PKI members, thereby subjecting 
them to official and unofficial discrimination. Even when the stamp has 
been removed, these former political prisoners continue to face 
discrimination and restrictions on employment.
    Under the government-sponsored transmigration program, large 
numbers of persons were moved voluntarily from overpopulated areas to 
more isolated and less developed areas (this program began during the 
Dutch colonial period and has been carried out more or less 
continuously since then). It also was used to resettle local 
populations within East Timor and Irian Jaya. However, the Government 
reduced its support after the economic downturn that began in mid-1997, 
and in December Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Alhilal Hamdi 
announced that since August the Government had stopped sending 
transmigrants between islands. He said that henceforth the Government 
only would support transmigration within the same province. Human 
rights monitors state that in general the transmigration program 
violates the rights of indigenous people and deceives some 
transmigrants into leaving their home villages without any means of 
return. Human rights activists also have claimed that a number of those 
resettled are persons who have been forced off lands that are coveted 
by developers who have collusive arrangements with the Government or 
security forces. Conditions at some relocation sites are life-
threatening, with inadequate measures to protect the transmigrant 
population against diseases endemic to the sites. In June 68 
transmigrant families left their camp in Bonggo subdistrict, Irian 
Jaya, because of poor living and agricultural conditions, disease, and 
inadequate support from the Government. They told the Legal Aid Society 
in Jayapura, where they took refuge, that 39 families at the site were 
suffering from severe malnutrition, and that lack of health care 
facilities contributed to a high disease and mortality rate. Police 
detained several of the transmigrants briefly, calling them 
``provocateurs'' when meeting with NGO's and the press to discuss their 
situation. Transmigrants and migrants outside of the Government's 
transmigration program received direct and indirect government support 
in the form of developmental assistance programs and contracts with the 
TNI or local government officials. This practice, particularly in Irian 
Jaya and parts of Kalimantan, led to resentment among indigenous 
populations, whose members believed that their rights were infringed 
upon and that they were being discriminated against in the disbursement 
of development funds to other newly arrived groups that they perceived 
to be their economic rivals (see Section 5).
    The Government used its authority, and at times intimidation, to 
appropriate land for development projects, particularly in areas 
claimed by indigenous people, and often without fair compensation (see 
Section 5).
    The Government prohibits the import of Chinese-language 
publications (see Sections 2.a. and 5).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1945 Constitution contains a 
general provision for freedom of expression that was strengthened by 
the MPR's amendment of the Constitution in August, and the 1999 law on 
human rights provides for substantive protection of press freedom (see 
Section 1.d.); however, journalists continued to suffer intimidation 
and assaults. The Alliance of Indonesian Journalists (AJI) revealed 
that police had assaulted journalists 105 times during the first 10 
months of year.
    In 1999 the Parliament enacted a press law that provides for 
freedom of the press, prohibits censorship, and prescribes penalties 
for anyone who violates these rights. However, the law requires the 
press to report events and opinions ``with respect to religious and 
moral norms of the public,'' and to adhere to the presumption of 
innocence. Press companies that violate this provision can be fined up 
to $55,000 (Rp. 500 million). Advertising that degrades the dignity of 
certain religions or creates disorder among diverse religions, is 
contrary to public morality, refers to addictive substances or displays 
cigarettes, is prohibited. The law established a Press Council to 
create and enforce a code of journalistic ethics. The Council consists 
of journalists nominated by journalist associations, representatives of 
press companies, and public figures nominated by journalists and press 
companies. President Wahid signed a decree in May that appointed 
members of the Council. The 1999 law replaced previous press laws that 
were viewed as being more restrictive of press freedom.
    On December 3, in Irian Jaya, police arrested a Swiss reporter, 
Oswald Iten, for photographing a clash between separatists and security 
forces in the province and detained him on suspicion of violating the 
country's immigration laws by reporting without a press visa (see 
Section 1.d.). Police threatened Iten with a 5year jail term. They 
released him on December 14.
    In September the Film Censor Board (LSF) issued a circular to 
television stations stating that recorded talk shows that discuss 
social and political topics must be reviewed by the Board before they 
are broadcast. Media figures and legal experts said that the circular 
had no legal standing because it conflicted with the 1999 Press Law, 
which forbids censorship of the press. Some observers called for the 
abolition of the LSF.
    During the year, the media often exercised press freedom with 
detailed and aggressive reporting on corruption, political protests, 
national unrest, the trials of former President Soeharto and members of 
his family, public debate between President Wahid and the DPR, and the 
DPR and MPR sessions. Domestic press and television coverage of West 
and East Timor highlighted the statements of government officials and 
prointegration leaders, and uncritically conveyed the government 
(prointegration) view on most issues, in many cases actively seeking to 
discredit UNTAET. However, the media did provide extensive coverage of 
the findings of the Attorney General in East Timor (see Sections 1.a, 
1.c., 4, and 5). UNTAET's versions of events and reports of abuses by 
the militias appeared occasionally.
    Since the abolition of the Department of Information in 1999, most 
editors believe that the Government no longer requires a license to 
publish a newspaper or magazine because there no longer is a 
controlling body to receive reports.
    The Government operates a nationwide television network with 12 
regional stations. Private commercial television networks, most with 
ownership by, or management ties to, former President Soeharto's 
family, continued to flourish. All are required to broadcast 
government-produced news, but they also broadcast news and public 
affairs programming independently. Television networks increased their 
news coverage during the year, including extensive coverage of the DPR 
and MPR sessions.
    Over 1,000 private radio broadcasting companies exist in addition 
to the Government's national radio network. They all were required to 
belong to the government-sponsored Association of Private Radio 
Stations in order to receive broadcast licenses. The Government radio 
station, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), produces the program 
``National News.'' Private radio stations and 53 regional government 
network affiliates relay the news programming throughout the country.
    Regulations issued by the Government in 1998 reduced the number of 
compulsory government RRI programming broadcasts from 14 to 4 per day. 
While private radio stations in the provinces generally adhered to the 
Government's requirement, many private radio stations in larger urban 
areas broadcast the RRI program only once per day. The regulations 
allowed stations to produce their own news programs, and many have done 
so. Candid live coverage of demonstrations and other breaking stories 
increased markedly during the year. Moreover, ``talk radio'' call-in 
programs regularly address timely political and socioeconomic issues.
    Foreign television and radio broadcasts are readily accessible. 
Satellite dishes and cable television networks have proliferated 
throughout the country, and there is unrestricted access to the 
Internet. The Government made no effort to restrict access to satellite 
programming and has proclaimed an ``open skies'' policy. Foreign 
periodicals circulate widely without censorship. The authorities have 
delayed distribution of publications by a day or more, although this is 
rare. The Government restricts the import of Chinese-language 
publications and music (see Sections 1.f. and 5). There are seven 
locally-published Chinese language newspapers. In November a new 
independent television station, Metro TV, began broadcasting 2 hours of 
news in Mandarin per day. The program was the first Chinese-language 
television broadcast in the country since 1965.
    The Government regulates access to the country by visiting and 
resident foreign correspondents, particularly to areas of unrest. It 
occasionally reminds the latter of its authority to deny requests for 
visa extensions. Special permission is necessary for foreign 
journalists to travel to Aceh and Irian Jaya. In February in West 
Timor, police detained three Portuguese television journalists for 3 
days and harassed them before forcing them to leave the country. In 
June the Government lifted the ban on travel to the country of a 
foreignbased NGO representative and an international newsmagazine 
reporter.
    The Government requires a permit for the import of foreign 
publications and videotapes, which must be reviewed by government 
censors. Significant amounts of material bypass customs and censorship 
procedures.
    Most books by the prominent novelist and former political prisoner 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer remain banned, although some are in circulation. 
According to a study published in the newspaper Kompas, from 1969 to 
1998 the Government banned 199 books, approximately 50 percent for 
religious reasons, 30 percent for political reasons, and 20 percent for 
ideological reasons. However, bookshops--especially ``alternative 
bookstores'' at university campuses and cultural centers--openly sell 
many new and newly reprinted titles. The Government banned no 
additional books during the year; however, protests from Islamic groups 
prompted a publisher to remove books by the religious philosopher Anand 
Krishna from bookstores. Media and human rights NGO's criticized the 
calls to withdraw the books from circulation as a violation of freedom 
of expression.
    The 1999 law on crimes against the State (see Section 1.d.) 
prohibits persons from disseminating or developing the teachings of 
communism, or from seeking to eliminate or replace the state ideology 
of Pancasila in a way that causes harm to persons or property.
    In January police and TNI troops began rounding up youths in South 
Aceh and ordering them to take down proreferendum banners and to clean 
referendum graffiti off of streets and walls. The investigation against 
some of the 16 persons later was dropped. In Aceh security forces shot 
and wounded a youth in August who was suspected of displaying the Free 
Aceh Movement (GAM) flag on the country's independence day (August 17). 
In early December a police officer in Aceh announced a ban on the 
flying of the Free Aceh Movement flag, and said that the police would 
deal harshly with those who defied the ban.
    During the first 6 months of the year, the Government generally 
tolerated the flying of Papuan independence flags in Irian Jaya. In 
March the police investigated charges against 16 persons for crimes 
partly related to their support of a peaceful Papuan independence flag-
raising on December 1, 1999. However, in late September new National 
Police Chief Suryo Bimantoro ordered all Papuan independence flags to 
be taken down, and police efforts to remove flags forcibly sparked 
violent clashes with Papuans (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 5). In 
November the regional police command for Irian Jaya revived criminal 
charges against five Papuan Presidium Council leaders for crimes 
against the security of the State and public order, based in part on 
evidence that they had organized a peaceful Papuan independence flag-
raising.
    The law provides for academic freedom, and there are no significant 
constraints in practice on the activities of scholars. Political 
activity, open discussions, and blunt criticism of the Government at 
universities continued to flourish during the year.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government places 
significant controls on the exercise of this right. The Government 
promulgated regulations in 1995 that eliminated the permit requirements 
for some types of public meetings; however, a requirement to notify the 
police remained in effect for most other meetings, and in practice many 
public meetings were dispersed forcibly, sometimes with lethal force 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The vast majority of public gatherings 
and demonstrations, which have proliferated rapidly since President 
Soeharto's resignation in 1998, occurred without any official 
interference.
    The 1998 law on freedom of expression requires that demonstrators 
notify the police 3 days in advance and appoint someone accountable for 
every 100 demonstrators. The law restricts demonstrations near specific 
sites. Nevertheless, frequent demonstrations are held in Jakarta and 
around the country with or without official permission. The Government 
previously had invoked the law to detain and try demonstrators in 
Jakarta and elsewhere; however, no such trials occurred during the 
year. Participants in several demonstrations were killed and suffered 
injuries when security forces seeking to disperse crowds shot, beat, 
and kicked demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In November 
police and army troops who were attempting to prevent Acehnese from 
attending a rally in Banda Aceh calling for a referendum on Acehnese 
independence killed over 20 persons (see Section 1.a.). Police also 
broke up several peaceful demonstrations in Irian Jaya. In at least six 
instances, police broke up peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans 
raised the Papuan independence flag and, after demonstrators resisted, 
killed and injured many demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.a., 
and 5).
    In January police wounded 13 persons while forcibly dispersing 
persons who were protesting inadequate compensation for land that the 
Government appropriated for a resort on Bintan Island (see Section 
1.c.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government places significant controls on the exercise of this right. 
The 1985 Social Organizations Law (ORMAS) requires the adherence of all 
organizations, including recognized religions and associations, to the 
official ideology of Pancasila. This provision, which limits political 
activity, is widely perceived to be designed to inhibit the activities 
of groups that seek to engage in democratic political competition, to 
make Indonesia an Islamic state, to revive communism, or to reintroduce 
partisan ideological division into the country. It empowers the 
Government to disband any organization that it believes to be acting 
against Pancasila, and it requires prior government approval before any 
organization can accept funds from foreign donors.
    The Government announced late in 1995 its intention to relax a 
regulation requiring police approval for all meetings of five or more 
persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites. 
However, in practice this regulation continues to apply to union 
meetings (see Section 6.a.).
    The 1999 Law on Crimes Against the State (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.a.) prohibits the formation of organizations that ``are known to or 
are properly suspected'' of embracing the teachings of Communism/
Marxism/Leninism ``in all its forms and manifestations.''
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom for members of five out of six officially-recognized religions 
and belief in one supreme God, and the Government generally respects 
these provisions; however, there are some restrictions on certain types 
of religious activity, including unrecognized religions.
    Although the population is over 85 percent Muslim, the practice and 
teachings of five out of six officially-recognized religions generally 
are respected, and the Government actively promotes mutual tolerance 
and harmony among them. The law states that the Government ``embraces'' 
Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and 
Confucianism. Presidential Decree 6/2000, promulgated in January, 
repealed the ban on the practice of Chinese religion (Confucianism), 
its beliefs, and its customs (Presidential Decree 14/1967). After the 
January passage of Presidential Decree 6/2000, Confucianists were 
permitted to celebrate publicly the Chinese New Year for the first time 
in over 30 years. A Ministry of Interior Circular (No. 477/805), issued 
in late March, permits Confucianism to be listed as a religion on 
marriage license applications, allowing Confucian marriages to be 
recognized and registered officially in the country. However, not all 
communities have implemented the new guidelines. While the law formally 
``embraces'' only these religions, it explicitly states that other 
religions, including Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, and Taoism are 
not forbidden. The Government permits the practice of the mystical, 
traditional beliefs of ``Aliran Kepercayaan.'' Some religious 
minorities, including the Baha'i and Rosicrucians, were given the 
freedom to organize in May when Presidential Decree 69/2000 revoked 
Presidential Decree 264/1962, which had restricted their activities. 
The MPR adopted a Human Rights Charter in 1998 that provides citizens 
the freedom to practice their religion without specifying any 
particular religion.
    A 1976 decision by the Attorney General, reinforced by a separate 
decision by the same office in 1978, banned Jehovah's Witnesses from 
practicing their faith. Open practice of the faith remains banned, and 
members report that they continue to experience difficulty registering 
marriages, enrolling children in school, and in other civil matters. 
Jehovah's Witnesses claim that Trinitarian Christians instigated the 
Government bans. Mainstream Christian leaders have influenced 
government policy to be biased against more conservative Christians.
    Members of the Bahai faith did not report problems during the year. 
The Government in some provinces has banned the messianic Islamic sect 
Darul Arqam; the Government also bans the AlMa'Unah school in some 
provinces. The Government closely monitors Islamic groups considered to 
be deviating from orthodox tenets, and in the past has dissolved some 
groups. Historically, the Government has tried to control Muslim groups 
whose practices deviate from mainstream Islamic beliefs because of 
pressure by nongovernmental leaders of mainstream or conservative/
traditional Muslim groups as well as the Government's concern for 
national unity. A proposal to implement Islamic law failed to gain the 
MPR approval in August. President Wahid voiced strong opposition to the 
proposal, arguing that its implementation would threaten national 
unity.
    The legal requirement to adhere to Pancasila extends to all 
religious and secular organizations. Because the first tenet of 
Pancasila is belief in one supreme God, atheism is forbidden. Although 
individuals are not compelled to practice any particular faith, all 
citizens must be classified as members of one of the officially 
recognized religions. As this choice must be noted on official 
documents, such as the identification card, failure to identify a 
religion can make it impossible to obtain such documents. The 
Government strongly opposes Muslim groups that advocate establishing an 
Islamic state or acknowledging only Islamic law.
    President Wahid has continued to emphasize harmony, tolerance, and 
mutual respect among different religious communities. Other high-level 
officials continued to make public statements and emphasized by example 
the importance of respect for religious diversity. However, some lower 
level officials continued to show reluctance to facilitate and protect 
the rights of religious minorities.
    Religious violence and the lack of an effective government response 
to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to allegations 
that officials were complicit in some of the incidents or, at a 
minimum, allowed them to occur with impunity. There were numerous 
instances of attacks on churches, mosques, temples, and other religious 
facilities during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 5). The most 
widespread interreligious violence occurred in the Moluccas, where well 
over 100 houses of worship were damaged or destroyed and thousands of 
persons were killed as Christians and Muslims engaged in mutually-
destructive violence. On Keswuii and Teor Islands in Maluku, hundreds 
of Christians converted to Islam in November and December to save their 
lives (see Section 5). The Government continued to be reluctant to 
intervene in mob attacks on houses of worship and proved ineffective in 
controlling the violence in North Maluku and Maluku provinces; however, 
governmental efforts to respond to communal violence in the provinces 
of Sulawesi generally were more effective (see Section 5).
    In North Maluku and Maluku provinces, Christian sources alleged 
that elements of the security forces were biased against them. For 
example, predominantly Muslim units dispatched from Java and Sulawesi 
allegedly sided with Muslim vigilantes and used excessive force against 
Christians. In other instances, security forces appeared to be biased 
against Muslims. Muslims on Ambon claimed that members of the 
predominantly Christian police force sided with their coreligionists. 
However, there was no evidence to suggest that the security forces, as 
an institution, supported either. Some individuals and some units 
occasionally sided with their coreligionists, but their actions 
appeared to be random and contrary to orders. Some military troops were 
detained and interrogated for allegedly openly siding with militia in 
at least one episode on Haruku; however, there were no reports that 
such perpetrators ever were punished. Several hundred police officers 
have themselves been attacked and some even killed because of their 
religion; hundreds of police members and their families, and numerous 
other government officials, are among the country's IDP's.
    The Government formed a special interagency team to investigate the 
December 24 bombings on Christian churches, and an NGO has formed a 
joint fact-finding team with the Government to investigate the 
Christmas Eve church bombings (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
    According to many Christian officials, the anti-Christian sentiment 
behind the violence in the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and elsewhere is not 
new, but the impunity associated with such acts is. They claim that 
such impunity has contributed significantly to the attacks that have 
occurred since Soeharto resigned in May 1998. The Government did not 
investigate fully most cases of attacks on religious facilities that 
occurred during riots, and in other cases, did not investigate such 
incidents at all.
    A 1969 regulation provides that before a house of worship may be 
built, consent must be obtained from local residents living near the 
site, and a license must be obtained from the regional office of the 
Department of Religion. Some Christians claim that this regulation is 
used to prevent them from building churches and rebuilding damaged 
religious facilities. Despite these alleged problems, the building of 
churches continued.
    The law allows conversion between faiths, and such conversions do 
occur. Independent observers note that it has become increasingly 
difficult to obtain official recognition for interfaith marriages 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. Persons who are not members of one of 
the five accepted religions also have difficulty in obtaining official 
recognition of their marriages.
    The Government views proselytizing by recognized religions in areas 
heavily dominated by another recognized religion as potentially 
disruptive and discourages it. Foreign missionary activities are 
relatively unimpeded, although in Irian Jaya, and occasionally 
elsewhere, missionaries have experienced difficulties and delays in 
renewing residence permits. In addition visas allowing the entrance of 
new foreign clergy are difficult to obtain. Laws and decrees from the 
1970's limit the number of years that foreign missionaries may spend in 
the country; some extensions were granted in remote areas like Irian 
Jaya. Foreign missionary work is subject to the funding stipulations of 
the Social Organizations Law.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law permits the Government to bar 
persons from either entering or departing the country, and the 
Government continued to restrict freedom of movement to a limited 
extent. In 1999, according to Department of Justice information quoted 
in the press, the Government maintained a list of 3,665 foreigners who 
are barred from entering the country, and 417 citizens who are 
prohibited from leaving the country. Five prominent Papuan leaders who 
were barred from leaving the country in August 1999 (see Section 5) 
subsequently were allowed to travel abroad; however, some of them only 
were able to travel after foreign governments made high-level 
representations on their behalf.
    The Government also restricts movement by citizens and foreigners 
into and within parts of the country. The 1999 Law on Overcoming 
Dangerous Situations (see Section 1.f.) also would allow the military 
to limit land, air, or sea traffic, to prohibit migration into and out 
of areas, to order relocation of persons outside areas, and to order 
house arrest in a declared state of emergency. However, this law has 
not been signed by the President and still is under discussion in the 
DPR.
    The Government must approve the assignment of staff members of 
foreign institutions that implement technical cooperation programs, 
including NGO's, before they are allowed to enter the country. Foreign 
consultants and foreign assistance staff, particularly those working in 
sensitive parts of the country such as Aceh, Irian Jaya, and the 
Moluccas, must be cleared by the Intelligence Coordination Agency 
(BAKIN) before their assignments can be approved by the State 
Secretariat (see Section 4).
    On June 23, President Wahid announced a ban on all travel to Maluku 
and North Maluku provinces; however, the ban was not enforced 
effectively. On June 26, the President declared a state of civil 
emergency for both provinces. The emergency decree, originally in place 
for 90 days, was extended indefinitely (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.c., 
and 5).
    The Government requires that individuals obtain permits to work in 
certain areas, primarily to limit further population movement to 
crowded cities. Special permits are required to visit certain parts of 
Irian Jaya. Although former political prisoners associated with the 
abortive 1965 coup no longer are officially required to carry the stamp 
``E.T.'' on their identity cards, in many cases, the stamps have not 
been eliminated in practice (see Section 1.f.). Among other 
restrictions, some former prisoners still are required to obtain 
permission from security and intelligence authorities to move.
    Following the August 30, 1999 consultation vote in East Timor, 
there was credible evidence that in a planned and orchestrated 
operation, the security forces forcibly removed or compelled to flee a 
substantial percentage of the 250,000 East Timorese who departed the 
territory at that time. Over 170,000 of these IDP's have returned to 
East Timor, but intimidation by East Timorese prointegration militia 
forces in the camps in West Timor continued to prevent many others from 
returning (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    All international assistance to the IDP's in West Timor was 
suspended following the September 6 attack on UNHCR personnel (see 
Sections 1.a. and 4). The Government's failure to disarm and disband 
the militias created security conditions unfavorable for the resumption 
of international assistance. There is evidence that TNI elements have 
supported the militias with supplies and training, although that 
support apparently declined toward year's end. The Government's 
disarmament campaign after the September 6 killings of 3 UNHCR workers 
in Atambua resulted in the surrender of 103 standard issue weapons. The 
TNI did not confiscate any weapons by force. Estimates of the number of 
standard issue weapons that were not surrendered range from 100 to over 
1,000. Only toward year's end did the Government begin to take steps to 
promote the voluntary and safe return of IDP's; for example, by 
agreeing to settle pension claims for some IDP's who requested 
repatriation, or resettlement in Indonesia. There is no evidence that 
the Government is returning forcibly or resettling East Timorese IDP's.
    Sectarian violence in the Moluccas has displaced nearly 500,000 
persons, which account for about half of the over 1 million IDP's in 
the country. North Maluku officials estimate that there are 197,000 
IDP's escaping the conflict in North Maluku, and the Diocese of Ambon 
estimates that conflicts in Maluku province have generated about 
289,000 IDP's.
    According to the Government's IDP statistics released in August, 
there were over 20,000 IDP's in North Sulawesi, most of them Christians 
from North Maluku and Maluku provinces. However, Christian sources 
claim that there are 60,000 to 100,000 Christian IDP's in North 
Sulawesi. Since the majority of these IDP's are housed in private 
residences instead of camps, the Government had not included them in 
its official data. By midNovember, several hundred Muslim IDP's had 
returned to their homes in North Maluku. The North Maluku provincial 
government announced in mid-November that it would return about 178,000 
IDP's currently in Ternate, Tidore, and parts of Halmahera to their 
places of origin before the Ramadan holiday began in the third week of 
December. However, very few returned by year's end due to Christian 
resistance in the areas where Muslim IDP's were going to return, and 
Muslim fears that they would have no means of making a livelihood and 
that Christians would attack them. The IDP's are almost all Muslims. 
Christian IDP leaders in North Sulawesi and Jakarta claim that the 
Government has not actively encouraged Christian IDP's, most of whom 
are in North Sulawesi, to return to their homes in Ternate and Tidore 
and other parts of North Maluku. As a result, there are no Christians 
in Ternate and Tidore, except for a few wealthy Sino-Indonesian 
Christians who were encouraged to return and international humanitarian 
aid workers.
    There were over 58,000 IDP's in Central Sulawesi, most of whom were 
Muslims from Poso, Central Sulawesi. Estimates suggest that 20 percent 
of the Muslim IDP's from Poso may have returned to the area. Most 
Muslim IDP's remain in camps or other temporary settlements. There were 
about 17,000 IDP's in South Sulawesi and over 100,000 in Southeast 
Sulawesi, most of whom were Muslims from East Timor and the Moluccas.
    The Government generally has encouraged and assisted foreign and 
domestic humanitarian aid to the Moluccas and Sulawesi (see Section 4). 
However, on occasion both Muslim and Christian groups have accused some 
foreign donors of partiality. The Government has not been particularly 
effective or helpful in promoting the voluntary and safe return or 
resettlement of the IDP's in these areas.
    In East Java, police forcibly evicted to other areas persons 
rumored to be practitioners of magic (see Section 1.a.).
    An estimated 50,000 Madurese who fled their homes during 
interethnic violence in 1999 remained in IDP camps in West Kalimantan 
and Madura (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    Throughout the year, tens of thousands of rural Acehnese 
temporarily fled their villages and became IDP's. In some cases, IDP's 
were fleeing security forces that were patrolling the area or otherwise 
intimidating them (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In other cases, armed 
separatists terrorized or coerced villagers into becoming IDP's, in 
part to create international attention and sympathy.
    Unrest in Irian Jaya caused numerous persons to leave their homes 
in Wamena and other areas. Many were migrants from other parts of the 
country and are believed to have returned to their original provinces. 
Several thousand Papuan refugees reside in camps in Papua New Guinea.
    While the law lacks provisions for dealing with refugees/asylees in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government cooperates with the 
UNHCR, which maintains a regional office in Jakarta. There are a number 
of Iraqis in the country, some of whom requested and were granted 
refugee status by the UNHCR. In past years, the Government offered 
first asylum to over 125,000 Indochinese boat persons. The Galang 
Island camp was closed in 1996, and by the end of 1999 the last 
remaining asylum seekers had been repatriated or permitted to settle 
permanently in the country. The Government has not formulated a policy 
regarding asylum seekers, but in practice it has respected the 
principle of not returning asylum seekers to the countries from which 
they fled.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    In 1999 citizens for the first time successfully changed their 
government through an open, transparent democratic process, following 
decades of authoritarian rule. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
is constitutionally the highest authority of the State. It meets every 
5 years in a ``General Session'' to elect the President and Vice 
President in separate secret ballots and to establish the ``Broad 
Guidelines of State Policy'' (GBHN), which is intended to serve as a 
policy plan for the Government. The MPR met in August in the first of 
its newly instituted ``Annual Sessions,'' to consider constitutional 
amendments and policy recommendations. The 695-member MPR consists of 
the 500 Members of the House of Representatives (DPR), 130 regional 
representatives, who are elected by provincial legislatures, and 65 
appointed representatives from functional and societal groups. The June 
7, 1999 general election, in which 48 political parties participated, 
was monitored by domestic and international observers and was widely 
considered open, fair, and free. In October 1999, the newly installed 
MPR chose Abdurrahman Wahid as President and Megawati Soekarnoputri as 
Vice President in a transparent process, which was broadcast live on 
national television. The next round of general and presidential/vice 
presidential elections is scheduled for in 2004.
    The military's significant historical sociopolitical role is to be 
phased out gradually. Although the police and military formally were 
separated in July by presidential decree (reinforced in August by an 
MPR decree), the two institutions continue jointly to hold 38 unelected 
seats in the DPR and 10 percent of the seats in provincial and district 
parliaments, in partial compensation for not being permitted to vote. 
In addition to these appointed legislative positions, active-duty 
military and police officers also may run for election to government 
office but, in a significant departure from past practice, are expected 
to retire (except those appointed to legislative bodies) after they are 
elected. Retired officers occupy important positions at all levels of 
government and often retain strong ties to their former institutions. 
The military and police have agreed to relinquish their appointed seats 
in the DPR and regional legislatures by 2004, but an MPR decree passed 
in August allows them to retain seats in the MPR until ``not later than 
2009. In an apparent effort to blunt demands for an immediate end to 
their legislative positions, military and police legislators generally 
have sought to limit their involvement in matters deemed not to affect 
their core interests.
    The legislative branch, which had no independence during the 
Soeharto era, has moved forcefully to establish its independence from 
the executive branch. A number of constitutional changes, MPR decrees, 
and legal changes have enhanced legislative branch authorities, raising 
some concerns that the balance of power may have shifted too far from 
the executive branch. The legislative branch has demonstrated its 
independence through the DPR's aggressive pursuit of its government 
oversight function, as well as the MPR's success in August in forcing 
President Wahid to cede more authority over daily government management 
to Vice President Megawati because of perceived inefficiency and 
inconsistency in the Wahid Administration's implementation of policy. 
During the year, the DPR exercised its right to initiate legislation 
occasionally, mainly due to cumbersome procedures and a lack of 
expertise; however, it exercised considerable influence over the final 
content of bills introduced by the Government.
    The MPR is empowered to amend the Constitution and issue decrees, 
functions that it undertook in the first of its newly instituted 
``Annual Sessions'' held in August. A key demand of the reform movement 
was an overhaul of the 1945 Constitution, which was perceived to have 
fostered the development of past authoritarian regimes. In the first 
amendment of the Constitution, the 1999 MPR passed curbs on executive 
power including a limit of two 5-year terms for the president and vice 
president. At the same time, the MPR empowered an ad hoc working 
committee to consider further amendments and to draft MPR decrees. This 
effort resulted in the passage of the second amendment to the 
Constitution during the ``Annual Session'' in August. Due to limited 
time and unresolved issues, the MPR did not produce the sweeping 
restructuring of state institutions many had hoped for, leaving in 
place inconsistencies resulting from the Constitution's blending of 
presidential and parliamentary characteristics. However, the second 
amendment did include many important changes, including provisions for 
protections of human rights modeled closely on the U.N. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, regional autonomy, and further separation 
of powers. The working committee is continuing deliberations on further 
constitutional reforms to be considered during the 2001 and 2002 annual 
MPR sessions.
    The remaining 92 percent of national and 90 percent of regional 
parliamentary seats that are not occupied by members of the military 
and police are filled through elections held every 5 years. All adult 
citizens, except active-duty members of the armed forces, persons in 
prison convicted of crimes punishable by over 5-years' incarceration, 
persons suffering from mental disorders, and persons deprived of voting 
rights by an irrevocable verdict of a court of justice, are eligible to 
vote. Members of the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) may not 
run for office.
    International and domestic monitoring groups and the major 
political parties accepted the June 1999 parliamentary election as 
generally free and fair, notwithstanding many technical problems and 
irregularities, particularly in remote areas. The numerous technical 
problems, due to inadequate preparations and ambiguities in the 
regulations, included inadequate supplies of ballots and reporting 
forms, poor training of poll workers, confusion over procedures, and 
insufficient funds to pay poll workers. There were numerous, and in 
some cases credible, allegations of vote buying and scattered 
allegations of voter intimidation, particularly in rural areas. In some 
cases, alleged violations were referred to judicial authorities for 
legal action; however, in most cases, political parties reached 
informal solutions among themselves.
    The actions of some small party representatives on the General 
Election Commission (KPU) contributed to a significant delay in 
validating election results and led to a considerable loss of public 
faith in the impartiality and integrity of the KPU. In June the DPR 
amended the 1999 election laws to establish a new and more independent 
KPU, which currently is being formed through a transparent process that 
encourages public involvement. Some observers are concerned that the 
new KPU secretariat will remain administratively dependent upon the 
Ministry of Home Affairs.
    While there are no legal restrictions on the role of women in 
politics, they are underrepresented in government. The Vice President, 
Megawati Soekarnoputri, is a woman. Following the August Cabinet 
reshuffle, 2 of 26 ministers are women. However, there now are fewer 
women in the DPR and in the MPR than during the Soeharto era. Women 
represent less than 9 percent of DPR members, a decrease from 13 
percent during former President Soeharto's last term. Nonetheless, many 
women activists argue that the quality of female politicians has 
improved. Female Members of Parliament announced in mid-October the 
formation of a non-partisan women's caucus. Surveys have shown that 
while more than one-third of civil servants are women, less than 6 
percent are in positions of authority (see Section 5).

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Although still subjected to monitoring by and interference from the 
authorities, domestic human rights organizations were extremely active 
in advocating that the Government improve its human rights performance. 
They pressured the Government to investigate human rights abuses, acted 
as defense counsel in political trials, sought to offer assistance--and 
in some cases protection--to victims and witnesses of human rights 
abuses, and urged improvements in government policies and legislation.
    At times security force members killed, abused, and detained human 
rights activists and humanitarian workers, most frequently in areas 
with active insurgencies. For example, in early August Acehnese 
foreign-resident NGO activist Jafar Siddiq Hamzah disappeared in Medan. 
His body, which showed signs of torture, was found in early September 
(see Section 1.a.). On August 27, Brimob officers tortured three staff 
members of the international humanitarian organization Oxfam (see 
Section 1.c.). On September 5, police detained and beat a volunteer for 
Save Emergency for Aceh, a humanitarian organization (see Section 
1.c.). During the year, police arrested three leaders of a group that 
advocates for a referendum on Aceh's political status, beat them while 
in custody, and later detained the group's chairman (see Sections 1.c. 
and 1.d.). On December 6, three Acehnese humanitarian workers who were 
assisting torture victims were killed near Lhokseumawe (see Section 
1.a.).
    On December 15, police summoned the director of Papua's best-known 
human rights organization, the Institute for Human Rights Study and 
Advocacy in Papua (ELS-HAM), for questioning; police released him on 
December 16 after nearly 22 hours of questioning. The director was 
ordered to the station after ELSHAM held a press conference in which it 
accused the police of the extrajudicial killing of three persons on 
December 7 (see Section 1.a.).
    Four members of an NGO based in Bandung, West Java, that advocates 
on behalf of dispossessed farmers, claim that they were kidnaped on 
August 14 (see Sections 1.e. and 4). The office of the Committee for 
Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), based in Jakarta, 
was attacked during a series of bombings in various areas of the 
country (see Section 1.c.).
    Intimidation, threats, and violence toward NGO's escalated in West 
Timor as the year progressed, greatly hindering humanitarian 
operations. Intimidation by militias and outright attacks prevented 
numerous humanitarian organizations that sought to assist refugees in 
West Timor during the post-consultation period from delivering 
assistance, particularly around the IDP camps (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.).
    The Government must approve the assignment of staff members of 
foreign institutions that implement technical cooperation programs, 
including NGO's, before they are allowed to enter the country (see 
Sections 2.c. and 2.d.); some NGO's allege that the Government has used 
this requirement to restrict their activities, especially in sensitive 
areas.
    The Government generally considered outside investigations or 
foreign-based criticism of alleged human rights violations to be 
interference in the country's internal affairs. In addition security 
forces and intelligence agencies tended to viewed foreign NGO's and 
international organizations with suspicion and distrust, particularly 
those operating in conflict areas. Nevertheless, the Government 
generally encouraged and assisted foreign and domestic humanitarian aid 
to the Moluccas and Sulawesi, and to other areas. However, on occasion 
both Muslim and Christian groups accused some foreign donors of 
partiality (see Section 2.d.).
    The ICRC generally was allowed access to identified detainees by 
civilian and military officials at the central government level. In 
Aceh the ICRC maintained an office in Lhokseumawe and was allowed to 
visit known prisoners and others detained by security forces. The ICRC 
conducted humanitarian operations in Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, 
North Maluku, and East and West Timor; however, the Government 
sometimes hindered ICRC's access to these areas and was slow in 
accrediting additional staff members.
    The government-appointed National Human Rights Commission 
(KOMNASHAM), in its 7th year of operation, continued actively to 
examine reported human rights violations and to demonstrate 
independence from the Government. During the year, Islamic and East 
Timorese groups physically attacked KOMNASHAM's Jakarta office because 
of controversy over some of the Commission's findings (see Section 
1.c.). Lacking enforcement powers, KOMNASHAM attempts to work within 
the system, sending teams to inquire into alleged human rights 
problems. It employs persuasion, publicity, and moral authority to 
highlight abuses, to recommend legal and regulatory changes, and to 
encourage corrective action. The Government appointed KOMNASHAM's 
original chairman, who then appointed the other 24 initial Commission 
members.
    The 1999 Human Rights Law (Law 39/1999) gave KOMNASHAM statutory 
authority and increased its membership to 35 members. Future members 
are required to serve 5-year terms and to be nominated by KOMNASHAM, 
confirmed by the Parliament, and approved by the President. The law 
gives KOMNASHAM subpoena powers and provides that disputes settled by 
written agreement through the Commission's mediation are enforceable in 
court. However, the law does not give KOMNASHAM the power to enforce 
its recommendations or to recommend government action. By year's end, 
the Commission had not appointed the new members authorized by the 1999 
law.
    In 1999 KOMNASHAM supported the work of the KPP-HAM and forwarded 
its findings to the Attorney General in late January. In February 
KOMNASHAM formed a commission to investigate the 1984 killing of Muslim 
demonstrators at Tanjung Priok, Jakarta (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). 
In August KOMNASHAM opened an office in Ambon, Maluku province. 
Commission members conducted an investigation into human rights 
violations in Irian Jaya in October following an outbreak of violence 
in Wamena (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited the 
country from November 21 to 24. She addressed a KOMNASHAM conference on 
transitional justice and expressed U.N. support for training for 
prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers involved in Indonesia's East 
Timor tribunal, requested by the Attorney General. However, the 
Government did not agree to extend a memorandum of understanding on the 
status of UNHCHR's planned assistance to, and field office in, 
Indonesia. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
program officer assigned to Jakarta completed his assignment in May and 
had not been replaced. At year's end, the office remained open and 
staffed with locals.
    In response to the U.N. Security Council's (UNSC's) adoption of 
Resolution 1319 after the September 6 killing of three UNHCR workers in 
West Timor (see Section 1.a.), the Government and various political 
leaders initially indicated that they would oppose the actions that the 
UNSC mission called for in the resolution. However, the Government 
later invited the UNSC mission to observe the situation in West Timor 
and to assess the Government's compliance with the resolution. The UNSC 
mission, consisting of permanent representatives from five member 
countries, visited West Timor and Jakarta from November 14 to 17.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution does not forbid explicitly discrimination based on 
gender, race, disability, language, or social status; however, it 
stipulates equal rights and obligations for all citizens, both native 
and naturalized. An amendment to the Constitution adopted during the 
year introduces the possibility of affirmative action to achieve fair 
and equal treatment; however, some activists believe that because the 
amendment does not mention men or women specifically, it will not 
adequately protect women.
    The Guidelines of State Policy (legal statutes adopted by the MPR) 
explicitly state that women have the same rights, obligations, and 
opportunities as men. However, guidelines adopted in the past 20 years 
also state that women's participation in the development process must 
not conflict with their role in improving family welfare and the 
education of the younger generation. Marriage law designates that the 
man as the head of the family. The Constitution grants citizens the 
right to practice their individual religions and beliefs; however, the 
Government only recognizes six religions and imposes some restrictions 
on other religious activity, although some of these restrictions were 
lifted during the year (see Section 2.c.).
    Women.--Violence against women remains poorly documented. Women's 
rights NGO's estimate that only 15 percent of domestic violence 
incidents are reported. According to a legal aid organization involved 
in domestic violence issues, about 11 percent of rural women suffer 
some form of domestic violence. Experts on the subject agree that the 
number of incidents has risen since the onset of the country's economic 
downturn starting in mid-1997, which has been aggravated by social 
changes associated with rapid urbanization. The Government has 
acknowledged the problem of domestic violence in society; however, 
violence against women, especially when it occurs within the home, 
largely is perceived by the public to be a private matter and not 
within the purview of the Government.
    Rape is a punishable offense, and perpetrators have been arrested 
and sentenced for rape and attempted rape, but reliable statistics are 
unavailable. Women's rights activists believe that rape is 
underreported seriously due to the social stigma attached to victims. 
Some legal experts report that unless a woman immediately seeks an 
examination at a hospital that produces physical evidence of rape, she 
will be unable to bring charges successfully. A witness also is 
required in order to prosecute for rape, and only in rare cases can a 
witness be produced, according to legal experts. Some women reportedly 
fail to report rape to police because the police do not take their 
allegations seriously. The maximum prison sentence for rape is 12 
years, but observers claim that sentences usually are much shorter. Mob 
violence against accused rapists frequently is reported. An August 1999 
conference of forensic experts recommended the adoption of standard 
procedures be adopted for examining and taking statements from rape 
victims, in an effort to improve the successfulness of rape 
prosecutions. However, by year's end, no rape investigation standards 
were in place, nor were uniform procedures followed.
    Rape by a husband of a wife is not considered a crime under the 
law. Cultural norms dictate that problems between a husband and wife 
are private matters, and violence against women in the home rarely is 
reported. While police could bring assault charges against a husband 
for beating his wife, due to social attitudes they are unlikely to do 
so.
    The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination 
for trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced 
prostitution and sometimes for forced labor (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.). It is widely alleged that TNIbacked militias raped numerous 
women during the 1999 violence in East Timor and kept many as sex 
slaves (see Section 1.c.). Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, the wife of East 
Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao, reported to the 
international press in November that 33 pregnant East Timorese women 
returned to East Timor and claimed they had been abducted and forced to 
serve as sex slaves for the TNI in West Timor.
    Female domestic servants also are vulnerable to exploitation and 
abuse. In some cases, unscrupulous recruitment agencies have promised 
women employment as domestic servants overseas and then held them 
against their will for extended periods until jobs are found for them. 
Women working abroad as domestic servants often risk various forms of 
abuse, exploitation, and other cruel treatment. The Government has 
taken some steps to assist its citizens working abroad, but advocates 
charge that much more needs to be done (see Section 6.f.).
    Harassment is not a crime under the law, only ``indecent 
behavior.'' However, sexual harassment charges may damage a civil 
service career. The law reportedly only covers physical abuse, and 
requires two witnesses. Female job applicants and workers have 
complained of being victimized sexually by supervisors. Many groups 
criticized the 1997 Manpower Law for failing to address sexual 
harassment and violence against women in the workplace and for 
providing inadequate protection in areas of employment where women 
regularly suffer abuse, such as overseas employment and household 
service. As of year's end, the Manpower Law was undergoing extensive 
revisions.
    In 1998 the Government, in consultation with women's NGO's, 
established a National Commission on Violence against Women. The 
Commission's mandate is to improve and coordinate government and NGO 
efforts to combat violence against women and to provide assistance to 
victims. During the year, the Commission reported that violence against 
women resulting from the economic crisis continued to rise.
    In November 1999, a group of government officials and NGO 
representatives signed a declaration calling for the development of a 
joint strategy to end violence against women. The group drafted a 2001-
2004 national action plan, which incorporates a ``zero tolerance'' 
strategy of violence against women, creates safety mechanisms to 
protect women against violence, and establishes new legislation to 
penalize perpetrators of such violence. In February the Government 
signed the Protocol of the U.N. Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). However, national 
legislation and implementing regulations to support the action plan 
have not yet been enacted. The Government provided technical support, 
but not funding, to establish and administer a women's crisis center in 
a leading public hospital in Jakarta. Foreign governments have funded 
some of these crisis center projects.
    The Government provides some counseling for abused women, and 
several private organizations assist women. Many of these organizations 
focus on reuniting the family rather than on providing protection to 
women. Many women rely on the extended family system for assistance in 
cases of domestic violence. Both public and private initiatives to 
assist female victims of violence were undertaken during the year. 
There are a small but growing number of women's crisis centers, 
including a drop-in center founded in Jakarta by the government-
sponsored National Women's Organization (KOWANI) in 1996 and a crisis 
center for women in Yogyakarta that is administered by an NGO. Women's 
Partner (Mitra Perempuan), a crisis center for women that opened in 
1997, runs a 24-hour hotline and a temporary shelter for abused women. 
The hotline receives several calls each day from battered women. The 
National Commission reports a general increase in the number of female 
victims of violence seeking assistance from crisis centers, attributing 
the increase both to a growing awareness of services and to an increase 
in the incidence of violence against women. Some public hospitals in 
Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya have integrated crisis centers that 
assist and protect abused women and children. These centers are co-
sponsored by the Government and the Women's Crisis Center (Pusat Krisis 
Perempuan). One of these centers, located in a Jakarta hospital, 
reported 30 cases of rape, 31 cases of domestic violence, and 37 cases 
of child abuse during a 4-month period during the year. Jakarta, 
Surabaya, and Yogyakarta police have opened ``women's desks'' in their 
precincts to assist rape and domestic violence victims and to 
investigate their cases.
    Under the Constitution, women are equal to and have the same 
rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. However, in practice, 
women face some legal discrimination. Marriage law defines the man as 
the head of the family. Marriage law for Muslims, based on Shari'a 
(Islamic law), allows men to have up to four wives if the husband is 
able to provide equally for each of them. Court permission and consent 
of the first wife is required, but reportedly most women cannot refuse. 
Cabinet officials and military personnel customarily have been 
forbidden from taking second wives, although reportedly a few ministers 
in President Wahid's Cabinet have second wives. During the year, 
Government Regulation 10/1983, which stipulates that a male civil 
servant must receive the permission of his superior to take a second 
wife, came under considerable attack and renewed scrutiny. The Minister 
of State for Women's Empowerment, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, proposed 
that the regulation be revoked or modified, arguing that supervisors 
often use the regulation as leverage over subordinates and that the 
regulation is an embarrassment to women. She also asserted that many 
men avoid the regulation by establishing illicit relationships. Other 
women, including First Lady Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid, opposed 
revoking the regulation, arguing that it protects women. Some women's 
groups urged the Government to ban polygyny altogether.
    In divorce cases, women often bear a heavier evidentiary burden 
than men in obtaining a divorce, especially in the Islamicbased family 
court system. Divorced women rarely receive alimony, and there is no 
enforcement of alimony payment. According to Shari'a, a divorced wife 
is entitled to only 3 months of alimony, and even alimony for this 
brief period is not always granted.
    The 1958 Citizenship Law states that children's citizenship is 
based only on the citizenship of the father. Children of citizen 
mothers and foreign fathers are considered foreigners and require visas 
to remain in the country until the age of 18, at which time they may 
apply for citizenship. They are prohibited from attending public 
schools and must attend private, international schools, which usually 
are more expensive. There were considerable efforts during the year to 
change the law, but the restrictions remained.
    Foreign women married to citizens also face difficulties. Their 
children are citizens and thus are not allowed to attend international 
schools unless they get special permission through the Ministry of 
Education. Such women usually are taxed as foreign heads of households, 
but they do not have property, business, or inheritance rights. There 
was much discussion about problems with the citizenship law, and NGO's 
and the Government appeared to agree that the law needed revision. 
However, by year's end, the Government had not taken any action to 
remedy these problems.
    Although some women (such as Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri) 
have a high degree of economic and social freedom and occupy important 
positions in both the public and private sectors, most women do not 
have such status and they constitute a disproportionately high 
percentage of the lower end of the socioeconomic and political scale 
(see Section 3). Surveys have shown that while more than one-third of 
civil servants are women, less than 6 percent are in positions of 
authority.
    Female workers in manufacturing generally receive lower wages than 
men. Many female factory workers are hired as day laborers instead of 
as full-time permanent employees, and companies are not required to 
provide benefits, such as maternity leave, to day laborers. Women's 
rights activists report that there is a growing trend in manufacturing 
to hire women to do work in their homes for less than the minimum wage 
(see Section 6.e.).
    Unemployment rates for women are approximately 50 percent higher 
than those for men. Women often are not given the extra benefits and 
salary that men are given when they are the heads of households, and in 
many cases do not receive employment benefits for their family members, 
such as medical insurance and income tax deductions. Income disparity 
between men and women diminishes significantly with higher educational 
achievement. Some women's activists believe that a growing number of 
professional women are advancing in a variety of fields, especially in 
the legal profession. However, no statistics are available to support 
this assertion. According to a study conducted during the year, only 20 
percent of top managers and affluent consumers in Jakarta are female.
    Law Number 21/1999 requires that the Government to formulate 
national policies to forbid and eliminate discrimination (including by 
gender) in the workplace. However, there were no implementing 
regulations in effect and discrimination continued in practice.
    Despite laws that provide women with a 3-month maternity leave, the 
Government acknowledged that pregnant women often are dismissed or 
replaced while on leave from their jobs. Some companies require women 
to sign statements that they do not intend to become pregnant. Labor 
laws mandate 2 days of menstrual leave per month for women, although 
this leave is not allowed in all cases.
    Women disproportionately suffer from illiteracy, poor health, and 
inadequate nutrition. The illiteracy rate among women is 17 percent, 
compared to 10 percent among men; the national illiteracy rate average 
for citizens over 15 years old is 12 percent, according to a UNICEF 
report. The Government is making efforts to reduce the high maternal 
mortality rate, which is 425 per 100,000 live births, according to 
official figures, and as high as 650 per 100,000, according to 
estimates from other sources. In Irian Jaya, the maternal mortality 
rates is 1,025 deaths per 100,000 and in Maluku 796 deaths per 100,000 
live births.
    During the year, hundreds of thousands of women and children were 
displaced by violent conflicts in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North 
Maluku provinces, West Kalimantan, Irian Jaya (Papua), and Aceh (see 
Section 2.d.). In addition to those directly victimized by violence, a 
substantial number of those displaced suffered from nutritional 
deficiencies and other health problems.
    Women's advocacy groups remained active throughout the year. 
Numerous NGO-organized conferences and rallies concerned with women's 
issues were held, as well as some that were organized by academic 
institutions and government ministries.
    Children.--The Government has expressed a commitment to children's 
rights, education, and welfare, but insufficient resources prevent the 
implementation of such a commitment. With the abolition of the Ministry 
of Social Affairs in late 1999, there is no ministry that specifically 
addresses children's issues. In its draft budget for 2001, the 
Government proposed to allocate 4.7 percent of government expenditures 
to education, or 0.74 percent of the country's GDP. A 1979 law on 
children's welfare defines the responsibility of the State and parents 
to nurture and protect children. However, implementing regulations 
never have been promulgated, and the law's provisions on protection of 
children have yet to go into effect.
    The Government allocates only 8 percent of its human resources 
development budget to health care. Low-cost medical care is available, 
although access and availability sometimes are sporadic, especially in 
rural areas. The results of a Ministry of Health study conducted during 
the year on public health services concluded that over 40 percent of 
the country's public health centers had no attending physicians. 
According to a UNICEF report issued during the year, the percentage of 
women and children without access to health care ranged from 20 to 50 
percent, with the most limited access in rural areas and poorer 
provinces. Moreover, government spending on health care also has 
dropped in real terms due to the economic downturn. In some cases, 
women and children unable to pay medical bills have been detained by 
hospitals that maintained their own ``debtors' prisons.'' There also 
were reports of hospitals refusing treatment to children suffering from 
malnutrition, due to insufficient resources.
    According to a credible report from a local NGO, infant mortality 
rates nearly have doubled as a result of the economic downturn, 
increasing from 55 per 1,000 in 1995 to 100 per 1,000 deaths in 1998. 
According to UNICEF'S report, 7 percent of the country's children die 
before they are 5 years old and 5 percent die before their first 
birthdays. Almost 50 percent of children grow up in unhealthy or unsafe 
environments. The overall use of health care facilities by children has 
dropped significantly since the economic downturn began in mid-1997.
    Throughout the year, UNICEF continued to warn of a ``lost 
generation'' of youth as a result of the economic crisis. UNICEF 
estimates that 8 million preschool-age children were undernourished, 
which threatens the development of brain function. According to U.N. 
data, as many as 30 to 50 percent of the country's children under the 
age of 5 may be suffering from some form of malnutrition, an increase 
from 9.8 percent in 1995. One university source estimated that 20 
million children were malnourished, an increase from 8 million in 1997. 
Specifically, researchers have begun to document an increase in 
children suffering from deficiencies of Vitamin A, iron, and protein. 
According to a UNICEF study released during the year, many of the 
country's children suffer from ``hidden hunger'' or malnourishment.
    On an anecdotal level, the media frequently reported on instances 
of children dying from malnutrition or lack of treatment for the 
condition. Such reports were most frequent in Java, but also were 
reported in Sumatra and other regions.
    The Government estimates that by 2001, the country will have 40 
million school-aged children, about 19 percent of the country's 
population. A 1994 law increased mandatory education requirements from 
6 to 9 years (6 years of elementary education and 3 years of junior 
high education). However, the law has not been implemented fully, due 
to a lack of government enforcement, inadequate school facilities, and 
insufficient financial resources of families to support children's 
school fees. Official and unofficial fees for public education, 
including payments for registration, books, meals, transport, and 
uniforms have become prohibitively high for many families.
    According to ILO and UNICEF statistics, about 6.1 to 6.4 million 
children between the ages of 7 and 15 have dropped out of school since 
the economy plummeted in 1997. An academic source estimated in November 
that the current number of students not enrolled in school for that age 
group even was higher, about 6.8 million. According to Ministry of 
Education data, 11.7 million children through the age of 18 were not 
attending school in 1999, while the ILO estimated that 11.9 million 
school-aged children did not attend school during the year.
    Schooling for children in areas of conflict was disrupted severely 
during the year. Hundreds of thousands of children in Maluku and North 
Maluku provinces and in Central Sulawesi fled their homes to escape 
violence (see Section 2.d.), interrupting their education and exposing 
them to malnutrition, disease, and other hazards. NGO's and religious 
groups in Maluku province estimate that thousands of Muslim and 
Christian children between the ages of 12 and 17 have become child 
soldiers (see Sections 6.d.). Younger children between the ages of 7 
and 12 provide support services to the militias. Some of the children 
involved in fighting reportedly are from outside the province. In one 
incident, a 16-year-old from Java, who had joined the Laskar Jihad 
militia, was killed while fighting on Saparua Island, Maluku province.
    According to the Department of Manpower, the number of working 
children increased from approximately 2 million before the economic 
downturn began in 1997 to an estimated 2.5 million in mid-1999. 
Children's advocates and labor analysts agree that the number of 
working children has increased significantly due to the downturn, but 
contend that the number of working children was higher than the 
Government's current estimate even before the downturn, and has 
increased significantly since 1997 (see Section 6.d.). The ILO 
estimated that between 6 and 8 million children worked during the year, 
and World Vision, an international NGO, estimated that there were 6.5 
million children working in the country.
    According to a recent study, there are about 170,000 street 
children in 12 urban areas. Of these, about 20 percent are girls. At 
least 60 percent of the street children polled were not enrolled in 
school. There were about 13,000 street children in Jakarta. Medan, 
Bandung, Surabaya, Makassar (Ujung Pandang), and Yogyakarta are other 
cities with substantial populations of street children. Of the 1,600 
street children living in Yogyakarta, about 25 percent are girls. 
Almost all of them were victims of sexual abuse or were engaged in 
prostitution. Another NGO survey suggests that there are at least 
100,000 street children and 6 million abandoned children in the 
country.
    Street children sell newspapers, shine shoes, help to park or watch 
cars, and otherwise attempt to earn money. Many street children work 
under hazardous conditions as scavengers, garbage pickers, and on 
fishing platforms and fishing boats. According to credible sources, 
there are hundreds, perhaps over 1,000 children working in hazardous 
conditions on fishing platforms off the east coast of North Sumatra 
(see Section 6.c.). Many thousands of children work in factories and 
fields (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
    A number of local and international NGO's work with street 
children. NGO's have criticized the Government for making inadequate 
efforts to help street children and working children. The Government is 
working in cooperation with the U.N. Development Program, UNICEF, the 
ILO, and with NGO's to create programs for street children and child 
laborers. One project includes the establishment of ``open houses'' in 
targeted areas to provide vocational training and basic education to 
street children. Open houses for street children have been established 
in several provinces.
    Another approach to the problem of street children is the National 
Program for Discipline and Clean Cities Decree. Under this program, 
street children are removed physically from cities by bus. Usually, 
they are taken outside the city and left there. Sometimes they are 
taken to ``holding houses'' where they first are interrogated and later 
released. NGO's criticize this practice as ineffective and inhumane.
    Child prostitution (see Section 6.f.) and other sexual abuses 
occur, but firm data are lacking. Police continue to uncover syndicates 
involved in trafficking girls to work in brothels on various islands or 
in other countries (see Section 6.f.). According to one 1998 NGO study, 
there were 406 cases of child abuse that year, 900 to 1,200 cases of 
child rape, and 40,000 to 70,000 cases of other sexual abuse against 
children.
    A separate criminal justice system for juveniles does not exist. 
Ordinary courts handle juvenile crime, and juveniles often are 
imprisoned with adult offenders. A Juvenile Justice Law was passed by 
Parliament in 1996 and was signed by President Soeharto in 1997. It 
defines juveniles as children between the ages of 8 and 18 and 
establishes a special court system and criminal code to handle juvenile 
cases; however, it has not been implemented yet.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is practiced in some parts of the country. No 
national legislation exists on FGM. Customary (adat) law has allowed 
for symbolic female circumcision and small-cut (mild) incisions of the 
clitoris, which would fall under the World Health Organization's 
(WHO's) type IV classification of FGM (this category includes pricking, 
piercing or incising of the clitoris). According to reports, FGM 
practices appear to be increasingly symbolic in nature (for example, a 
pinprick or the cutting of a ceremonial root). More invasive FGM 
practices--removal of the clitoral prepuce, partial removal of the 
sensitive tip of the clitoris, and even total removal--reportedly occur 
in Madura, South Sulawesi, and parts of East Java. However, there are 
no epidemiological reports on the frequency of these practices. Since 
FGM is not regulated, and religious leaders have taken no formal 
position, the method used often is left to the discretion of the local 
traditional practitioner. FGM usually occurs within the first year 
after birth, often on the 40th day, although it is done in some areas 
up to the age of 10. It is performed either at a hospital or, 
especially in rural areas, by the local traditional practitioner.
    Both government officials and NGO leaders familiar with FGM issues 
believe invasive FGM practices are on the decline. The Government 
included FGM as a gender issue in its National Action Plan to End 
Violence against Women, published in late November. FGM heads the 
Action Plan's list of religious teachings requiring investigation and 
modification. The Government and NGO's are directing awareness 
campaigns towards Muslim religious leaders and those directly involved 
in performing female circumcisions (such as traditional birth 
attendants), and towards society at large, to bring about an end to 
invasive practices.
    People with Disabilities.--Precise statistics on the number of 
disabled persons in the country are not available. In 1999 the U.N. 
estimated that about 5.43 percent of the population (about 10 million 
persons) were disabled, while the Government estimated that 3 percent 
of the population (6 million persons) were disabled. Families often 
hide disabled family members to avoid social stigma or embarrassment. 
Several provinces have established rehabilitation centers for the 
disabled. Authorities reportedly take disabled persons off the streets 
and bring them to these centers for job training. Nevertheless, many 
disabled citizens beg for a living.
    The Constitution requires that the Government provide care for 
orphans and the disabled; however, it does not specify the definition 
of the term ``care'', and the provision of education to all mentally 
and physically disabled children never has been inferred from the 
requirement. Regulations require the Government to establish and 
regulate a national curriculum for special education by stipulating 
that the community should provide special education services to its 
children.
    According to a UNICEF report during the year, there are about 2 
million disabled children between the ages of 10 and 14. Law No. 4/1997 
on Disability and Government Regulation No. 72 on Special Education 
stipulate that every disabled child has the right to access to all 
levels and types of education and rehabilitative treatment as 
necessary. However, this does not occur in practice. NGO's are the 
primary providers of education for the disabled. There are 1,084 
schools for the disabled; 680 are private and 404 are government-
operated. Of the government schools, 165 are ``integrated,'' serving 
both regular and special education students. In Jakarta there are 98 
schools for the disabled, 2 of which are government-operated and 96 of 
which are private. The Government also runs three national schools for 
the visually and hearing impaired, and mentally disabled. These schools 
accept children from throughout the country.
    The 1997 Disability Law was designed to provide access to 
education, employment, and assistance for the disabled. It requires 
companies employing over 100 persons to give 1 percent of their 
positions to the disabled. However, the disabled face considerable 
discrimination in employment, although some factories have made special 
efforts to hire disabled workers. The law mandates accessibility to 
public facilities for the disabled; however, virtually no buildings or 
public transportation provide such accessibility in mind.
    President Wahid, who is visually impaired, and First Lady Sinta 
Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid, who has limited mobility from an automobile 
accident, are advocating improved services and opportunities for 
persons with disabilities. In September President Wahid acknowledged 
that discrimination exists in the country's tourism industry and that 
disabled persons receive neither appropriate services nor the 
opportunity to travel.
    Indigenous People.--The Government considers the term ``indigenous 
people'' to be a misnomer, because it considers all citizens except 
ethnic Chinese to be indigenous. Nonetheless, it publicly recognizes 
the existence of several ``isolated communities,'' and their right to 
participate fully in political and social life. The Government 
estimates that the number of persons in isolated communities is 1.5 
million. This includes, but is not limited to, groups such as the Dayak 
population in Kalimantan, some of whom live in remote forest areas, 
indigenous communities located throughout Irian Jaya, and economically 
disadvantaged families living as sea nomads on boats near Riau in 
eastern Sumatra and near Makassar (Ujung Pandang) in southern Sulawesi. 
Critics maintain that the Government's approach is paternalistic and 
designed more to integrate indigenous people into society than to 
protect their traditional ways of life. Human rights monitors criticize 
the Government's transmigration program for violating the rights of 
indigenous people (see Section 1.f.) and for encouraging exploitation 
of natural resources upon which indigenous people depend for their 
livelihood.
    Sixty percent of the country's population of over 200 million lives 
in Java, which represents only 7 percent of the country's territory. 
The government-sponsored transmigration program seeks to resettle 
persons from densely populated areas to sparsely populated areas 
outside Java (see Section 1.f). The majority of migrants are 
spontaneous migrants who are not part of the official program.
    Critics of transmigration claim that it often threatens indigenous 
cultures and sparks social envy. Some critics claim that transmigration 
has been used as a political tool to inject nonindigenous persons into 
certain areas to ``Indonesianize'' these areas, in part to preclude 
secessionist movements. In some areas, such as in certain parts of 
Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Kalimantan, Aceh, and Irian Jaya, relations 
between transmigrants and indigenous people are hostile. NGO's also 
report tensions between transmigrated Javanese and indigenous 
populations in the Mentawai Islands off the west coast of Sumatra. 
Indigenous groups often complain that they receive less government 
support and funding than transmigrants, and transmigrants complain that 
in some cases they are moved to areas with undesirable land and 
inadequate infrastructure. Transmigrants sometimes are settled on land 
of disputed ownership.
    Acute tensions continued in West Kalimantan between the indigenous 
Dayak and ethnic Malay peoples and the settlers from Madura, an island 
off the eastern coast of Java. At least 11 persons died in clashes 
between Malays and Madurese in October (see Section 1.a.). The Madurese 
community in West Kalimantan developed around an earlier group of 
transmigrants, although the majority of Madurese in the area are 
spontaneous immigrants. DayakMadurese violence in the Sambas region 
north of Pontianak prompted tens of thousands of Madurese to flee in 
1997 and 1999; an estimated 50,000 remain in camps in West Kalimantan 
(see Section 2.d.).
    Land disputes are a major source of tension throughout the country, 
particularly in many sparsely populated resourcerich areas 
traditionally inhabited by indigenous people. The tension often is 
expressed along racial/ethnic lines because developers frequently are 
ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Land disputes represent the largest 
category of complaints submitted to the National Human Rights 
Commission and a significant portion of the cases brought to legal aid 
foundations and other assistance organizations. According to a law 
derived from colonial era practices, all subsurface mineral resources 
belong to the Government. The Basic Agrarian Law states that land 
rights cannot be ``in conflict with national and state interests,'' 
which provides the Government with a broad legal basis for land 
seizures. When disputes cannot be settled, the Government has the 
authority to define fair compensation for land.
    However, in practice compensation for the land often is minimal or 
even nonexistent. Decisions regarding development projects, resource-
use concessions, and other economic activities generally are carried 
out without the participation or informed consent of the affected 
communities. When indigenous people clash with private sector 
development projects, the developers almost always prevail. There are 
numerous instances of the use of intimidation, sometimes by the 
military, and often by hired ``thugs,'' to acquire land for development 
projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous people. Such 
intimidation has been used in Jakarta, other parts of Java, North 
Sumatra, Aceh, and other areas. Some NGO's that seek to aid these 
communities are subjected to verbal attacks, raids, and other forms of 
intimidation by government security forces. Throughout 1999 and during 
the year, NGO's have been more vocal and effective in lobbying for 
indigenous people's rights. According to credible sources in West 
Sumatra, large tracts of land in the province have been confiscated 
over the past several years by commercial plantation developers who 
paid bribes to the local governor. In some cases, NGO's report that 
farmers were evicted from the land without compensation to allow for 
new palm oil plantations staffed by Javanese transmigrants. Competition 
for land and resources remains acute in Sumatra.
    NGO's assert that violations of the rights of indigenous people are 
frequent in the mining and logging areas, and that violations stem from 
the Government's denial of ownership by indigenous people of ancestral 
land, erosion of indigenous groups' traditional social structure, and 
forced takeover of land. These problems are most prevalent in Irian 
Jaya and Kalimantan. In Central Kalimantan, NGO's report that local 
residents have suffered as a result of discontinued projects to convert 
peat land into agricultural land for rice cultivation. Vast tracts of 
land have been designated as transmigration areas. Tens of thousands of 
indigenous people have been forced to cease their traditional farming 
and forest-based livelihoods; many become poorly paid laborers on new 
agricultural projects.
    In Southeast Sulawesi, the Moronene people have been struggling for 
more than 40 years to secure government recognition of their claim to 
ancestral lands in what is now Rawa Aopa Watumohai National Park. The 
Government insists, most recently on the basis of the 1999 Forestry 
Law, that the Moronene people must resettle on land outside the park. 
In 1997 and 1998, security personnel acting on orders from the 
provincial government destroyed houses and crops in an effort to force 
the Moronene off their lands, but they refused to leave. In September 
they reached agreement with the local government that they would be 
allowed to remain on their lands until a court decided the merits of 
their claim. However, from November 23 to 25, approximately 70 security 
personnel sought to evict the Moronene from the park. The security 
team, which consisted of local police, Brimob members, and forest 
police and officials, reportedly destroyed 23 homes in the 3 villages 
of Hukaea-Laeya, Lampopola, and Lanowulu. At year's end, the Moronene 
still were living in Hukaea-Laeya village, but they feared further 
destruction of their settlements since the Government has not changed 
its position that they must leave.
    Bonded labor has become a problem for some Dayaks in East 
Kalimantan (see Section 6.c.). According to the ILO, on at least one 
project, a logging company established a company store in a remote 
area, where workers had to purchase necessities at inflated prices. 
Since the workers could not afford the prices, they bought the goods 
using vouchers representing future wages, thereby, according to the 
ILO, ``turning once independent and relatively well-off farmers into 
impoverished bonded laborers trapped in an ever-mounting cycle of 
debt.''
    Tensions with indigenous people in Irian Jaya, who refer to 
themselves as Papuans or West Papuans, continued. Papuans complain of 
racism, religious bias, paternalism, and condescension as constant 
impediments to better relations with non-Papuans, including members of 
the Government, the military, and the non-Papuan business community. A 
large percentage of the population of Irian Jaya consists of migrants, 
who are economically and politically dominant. Most civil servants in 
local governments in Irian Jaya and other isolated areas continue to 
come primarily from other parts of the country, rather than from the 
local indigenous population. Tensions between Papuans and migrants 
increased during the year, particularly after Papuans killed 24 
migrants in Wamena on October 6 and 7 after security forces opened fire 
on Papuans who resisted efforts to take down Papuan independence flags 
(see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.). The attack caused an exodus of several 
thousand migrants from the Wamena area and from Irian Jaya (see Section 
2.d.). Papuans and migrants clashed again in Merauke in early November 
and December and at the Abepura market area in Jayapura November 11 to 
13, resulting in injuries on both sides and the burning or looting of 
migrant shops. Unknown attackers killed two police and a security guard 
in Abepura, Irian Jaya, on December 7, and two timber workers near the 
Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border on December 9. Police blamed both 
attacks on the Free Papua Organization (OPM) (see Section 1.a.).
    During the year Papuans asserted themselves politically to a 
greater extent than in the past. Beginning in late 1999, Papuan 
political figures and traditional tribal organizations began forming 
Papuan ``task forces'' (Satgas Papua). In February Papuan community and 
tribal leaders organized a ``great consultation'' of Papuan leaders to 
set an agenda for self-government and designate a Papuan Presidium 
Council to speak on behalf of Papuans. The consultation's closing 
statement called for the holding of a congress comprised of the entire 
Papuan community. The congress was held from May 29 through June 4 in 
Jayapura, and involved more than 2,000 delegates from each of Irian 
Jaya's districts, other parts of the country, and the Papuan community 
overseas. Delegates approved a resolution rejecting the 1969 ``Act of 
Free Choice,'' which confirmed Irian Jaya's incorporation into 
Indonesia; called on the central Government, along with the U.N. and 
the U.S. and Dutch governments, to review the process by which the 
territory became a part of Indonesia and to recognize Papua's 
sovereignty since 1961; and mandated the Papuan Presidium Council to 
strive for international recognition and report back to the congress on 
December 1 on progress toward these goals. Presidium Council leaders 
traveled throughout the province to publicize the results of the 
congress, regularly met with government officials in Jakarta, and 
journeyed to other countries to advance the Papuan cause. On December 
1, Presidium leaders led a peaceful commemoration of the 1961 
declaration of independence by Papuan community leaders, then under 
Dutch rule. Presidium vice chairman Tom Beanal recounted the 
Presidium's efforts since the Papuan Congress to start a dialog with 
Jakarta, and appealed for calm. The day was observed peacefully in most 
parts of Irian Jaya.
    The Government initially responded to Papuan initiatives by 
welcoming the call for dialog and offering special autonomy within the 
context of a united Indonesia. President Wahid met several times with 
Papuan leaders and visited Irian Jaya on December 31, 1999 and January 
1, 2000, when he announced that the name of the province would be 
changed to Papua; however, the Government never introduced legislation 
to change the name. Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri visited the 
province in May and September. President Wahid provided $110,000 (Rp. 1 
billion) for the holding of the Papuan congress and indicated that he 
would open the congress, although ultimately he accepted his advisors' 
recommendation not to participate. After the congress, he met with 
Presidium Council leaders and reemphasized the Government's firm stance 
against Papuan independence, but said it was permissible to fly Papuan 
independence flags as long as they were smaller and flown below the 
Indonesian flag. However, during the August MPR session, legislators 
attacked Wahid's stance toward Papuans and demanded a tougher approach 
that rejected the flying of the independence flag, the use of the name 
``Papua,'' and other perceived manifestations of proindependence 
sentiment. In late September new National Police Chief Suryo Bimantoro 
ordered all Papuan independence flags to be taken down. Police attempts 
to remove forcibly flags in Wamena on October 6, Fak Fank on December 
1, and Merauke on November 4 and December 2, sparked violent clashes 
with Satgas Papua members, resulting in many deaths and heightened 
tensions between Papuans and non-Papuan migrants (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.). After Papuans attacked a police station in Jayapura on December 
7, police shot and killed a student at a nearby dormitory and detained 
and beat more than 100 others, 2 of whom died as a result of the 
beatings. Police revived criminal charges against five leading members 
of the Papuan Presidium Council for crimes against the security of the 
State and public order in November (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). Police 
encouragement of the formation of migrant ``solidarity'' organizations, 
and the arming of some of those organizations by security forces, also 
has sharpened divisions between the two communities. Moreover, the 
creation of an armed ``Red and White Task Force'' (Satgas Merah Putih) 
in Papua, reportedly at the instigation of the army, has raised 
concerns that certain elements of the national security forces may be 
seeking to create an armed Papuan paramilitary force, modeled on East 
Timorese militias, to oppose Papuan independence efforts, and, to 
oppose specifically, the Satgas Papua groups, the vast majority of 
which are considered proindependence.
    Religious Minorities.--Closures and attacks on churches, temples, 
and other religious facilities, ranging from minor vandalism to arson, 
increased during the year, according to the Indonesian Christian 
Communications Forum (ICCF). The ICCF recorded 122 religiously-
motivated attacks on Christian churches or other Christian facilities 
during the year. There are no available national estimates on the 
number of mosques that were damaged or destroyed during the year. The 
largest number of attacks on citizens and places of worship occurred in 
North Maluku, Maluku, and Central Sulawesi provinces in the eastern 
part of the country, causing more than 3,000 deaths, the displacement 
of nearly 500,000 persons, and damage to at least 81 churches and 
dozens of mosques (see Sections 1.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
    Attacks on places of worship reflect religious tensions, but other 
contributing factors include underlying socioeconomic and political 
tensions between poor Muslims and more affluent Sino-Indonesian 
Christians. Similarly, in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, economic 
tensions between native Christians and Muslims who migrated to these 
areas in recent decades were a significant factor in incidents of 
interreligious violence. Christian and Muslim communities in these 
provinces blamed each other for initiating and perpetuating the 
violence.
    The Government failed to suppress or respond to most cases of 
violence and did not resolve fully the many cases of attacks on 
religious facilities and churches that occurred during riots; in other 
cases, the Government did not investigate such incidents at all (see 
Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
    Anti-Christian sermons and publications also increased, leading to 
concerns that societal support for religious tolerance was eroding. In 
the early part of the year, a movement known as the Islamic State of 
Indonesia (NII) emerged on university campuses in Java. There were 
sporadic reports from some neighborhoods of Jakarta that student 
followers of the NII movement set up roadblocks, checked identification 
cards, and harassed passing non-Muslims, in some cases forcing them to 
recite passages from the Koran. Similar incidents occurred in Makassar, 
South Sulawesi. Many of the country's religious minorities expressed 
growing concern over what they perceived to be increasing demands by 
certain Muslim groups to impose Shari'a law in the country; however, 
during the year, a proposal to implement Islamic law failed (see 
Section 2.c.).
    The Laskar Jihad (``holy war troops''), another Muslim group that 
was formed during the year, engaged in paramilitary training, and 
leaders of the group announced that they were planning to wage war on 
Christians in the Moluccas. The Government closed a conspicuous Laskar 
Jihad training camp south of Jakarta, but otherwise was reluctant to 
challenge the organization openly. Many of its recruits, some of whom 
were children (see Section 6.d.), were deployed to Maluku and North 
Maluku provinces beginning in late April, where they reportedly joined 
in fighting against Christians.
    President Wahid conceded in late December that hundreds of 
Christians on Keswui and Teor Islands in Maluku converted to Islam in 
November and December to save their lives. By year's end, only an 
estimated 165 converts had been able to leave the 2 islands. There also 
have been credible reports of forced conversions occurring in other 
parts of Maluku and North Maluku. Estimates range from over 3,500 to 
8,000 cases. While most documented cases involve Christians who 
converted to Islam, there have been reports of Muslims who were forced 
to convert to Christianity in Halmahera, North Maluku.
    Christian IDP's from Keswui and Teor who had undergone conversion 
said in media interviews that Muslim militants told Christians to 
convert to Islam or face probable death at the hands of Muslim 
militias. According to these sources, Christians were herded into 
mosques and converted to Islam en masse. Both male and female converts 
later were forced to undergo circumcision to prove that they were 
genuine Muslims, despite the fact that Muslim women in Maluku were not 
customarily circumcised. The victims suffered considerable pain and 
some developed infections as a result of the forced circumcisions.
    A number of bombings and bombing attempts primarily targeted 
against Christian facilities occurred throughout the year in North 
Sumatra, including one that exploded in May at a Protestant Church in 
Medan and injured at least 33 persons. The perpetrators of the attacks 
had not been identified by year's end. There were numerous theories for 
the attacks; there is no clear evidence that the bombings were 
religiously motivated. Bombs exploded almost simultaneously on the 
evening of December 24, in seven of the country's provinces, in or near 
nine churches where members were attending Christmas Eve services. 
Nineteen citizens died from the blasts, some of whom were Muslims 
guarding churches, and 84 persons were injured. The bombings appear to 
be the product of a concerted and synchronized effort to create discord 
between religious groups. However, the bombings are more likely driven 
by political interests than by religious hatred. The Government formed 
a special interagency team to investigate the bombings. The NGO 
Indonesian Forum for Peace (FID) formed a joint fact-finding team with 
the Government to investigate the bombings. A number of other bombings 
also occurred during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    Muslims are a religious minority in the easternmost province of 
Irian Jaya. Local sentiment against the efforts of Muslim missionaries 
to win converts in the predominantly Christian province, as well as 
resentment of the arrival in the province of mainly Muslim migrants 
from other parts of the country, has in the past led to attacks on 
mosques in Irian Jaya. However, there were no reports of attacks on 
mosques in Irian Jaya during the year.
    During the year there were occasional reports of murders of persons 
who practice traditional magic (``dukun santets'') (see Section 1.a.) 
in East, Central, and West Java, including a January 18 attack in the 
Malang area of East Java on a woman suspected of being a shaman. The 
number of these killings is believed to have declined since 1998, when 
nearly 200 such persons were killed in East Java, and since 1999, when 
more than 30 dukun santet were killed in West Java.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government officially 
promotes racial and ethnic tolerance. Ethnic Chinese, which represent 
approximately 3 percent of the population--by far the largest 
nonindigenous minority group--historically have played a major role in 
the economy. In 1998 anti-Chinese sentiment led to serious and 
widespread attacks on Chinese-owned businesses. Despite the Wahid 
Government's commitment to reopen the investigation into these attacks, 
the Government has failed to pursue the 1999 recommendations of the 
joint fact-finding team (TGPF) that was commissioned to investigate the 
1998 attacks (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 4).
    Racially motivated attacks against Sino-Indonesians have dropped 
sharply since mid-1998, although Sino-Indonesians continued to report 
instances of discrimination and harassment. One Sino-Indonesian woman 
told the press that she was attacked by machete-wielding militants 
claiming to be members of the ``Commandos against Communism,'' who 
threatened to burn down her office building and murder her staff if 
they did not vacate the premises. When she later returned from a trip, 
she found that arsonists had burned down her office. She had been 
investigating the slaughter of Sino-Indonesians during the mid-1960's.
    An undetermined number of Sino-Indonesians remain abroad or away 
from their normal places of residence in the country. While many now 
reside in Singapore, there also are sizeable Sino-Indonesian 
populations in Australia and the U.S. Prominent Sino-Indonesians 
estimate that approximately half of the Sino-Indonesian men living 
abroad occasionally return to their homes for short visits to protect 
their remaining business interests, but most keep their families and 
the bulk of their capital offshore or in other parts of the country.
    With the revocation of Presidential Decree 14/1967 in January, 
Confucianism may be practiced in public and the law no longer forbids 
the celebration of the Chinese New Year in temples or public places 
(see Section 2.c.). As a result, Chinese New Year decorations were 
displayed prominently during the year and sold in public shopping areas 
in several major cities. The Chinese language now may be taught, 
spoken, and printed, and private instruction in Chinese no longer is 
prohibited. Some universities, including the University of Indonesia, 
offer Chinese-language instruction. A number of private institutions 
openly offer courses as well. Chinese-language publications in the 
country no longer are banned; however, customs regulations still 
prohibit the import of Chinese language publications and music (see 
Section 2.a.). State universities still have informal quotas that limit 
the enrollment of ethnic Chinese students.
    Authorities no longer are required to note a special code on the 
national identification card for citizens of Chinese extraction. 
However, some Sino-Indonesians have claimed that this practice 
continues.
    Since 1959 noncitizen ethnic Chinese have been denied the right to 
run businesses in rural areas; however, the Government does not 
restrict this right for Sino-Indonesians.
    Indigenous residents of Irian Jaya and various human rights groups 
charge that Papuans are underrepresented in the civil service in that 
province. The Government has made some efforts to recruit more civil 
servants in Irian Jaya, and there has been some increase in the number 
of civil servant trainees in this province, despite a ``no growth'' 
policy in the civil service as a whole.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Private sector workers are by law 
free to form worker organizations without prior authorization, and 
unions may draw up their own constitutions and rules and elect their 
representatives. In July the DPR enacted and in August President Wahid 
signed a new law on trade unions, which provides for ``notification'' 
(registration) of unions at the factory, district, provincial, and 
national levels and allowed unions to form federations and 
confederations. Unions are required to have at least 10 members and 
must be open to all persons, without differentiating on the basis of 
political orientation, religion, ethnicity, national origin, or gender. 
Under the new law and previous registration regulations, more than 20 
new or previously unrecognized union federations have notified the 
Department of Manpower of their existence since 1998, and thousands of 
workplace-level units have registered with the Department of Manpower, 
although some unions have complained of difficulty in registering their 
workplace units.
    The Federation of All-Indonesian Trade Unions (SPSI), which was 
formed by the merger (under the Government's direction) of existing 
labor organizations in 1973, is the oldest trade union organization. 
The head of the SPSI and many members of the executive council also are 
members of the Golkar political organization and its constituent 
functional groups. In August 1998, the SPSI leadership split over the 
issue of reforming the Federation's structure. Following the split, the 
Department of Manpower stated that it would no longer intervene in 
organizational disputes within trade unions or provide guidance to any 
unions.
    The new trade union law allows the Government to petition the 
courts to dissolve a union if its basis conflicts with Pancasila or the 
1945 constitution, or if a union's leaders or members, in the name of 
the union, commit crimes against the security of the State and are 
sentenced to at least 5 years in prison. Once a union is dissolved, its 
leaders and members may not form another union for at least 3 years 
after the original union's dissolution.
    The new trade union law does not address the adjudication of 
jurisdictional disputes among multiple unions in a workplace, and 
existing laws and regulations do not provide clear guidance on how 
jurisdictional disputes should be handled. Such ambiguity occasionally 
has led to clashes between unions in a workplace. In one instance in 
June in Medan, North Sumatra, workers from the Indonesian Prosperity 
Trade Union (SPSI) attacked the offices of the Metalworkers Union 
affiliated with the SBSI after SBSI workers staged a strike at a metal 
factory at which the SPSI Metalworkers Union also had representation. 
The SPSI workers damaged office equipment and injured several persons 
in the office.
    Since 1999 civil servants have not been required to belong to 
KORPRI, a nonunion association. Employees of several government 
departments announced that they would form their own employee 
associations, and union organizations began to seek members among civil 
servants. Unions also are seeking to organize stateowned enterprise 
(SOE) employees, defined to include those working in enterprises in 
which the State has at least 5percent ownership, although they have 
encountered some resistance from enterprise management, and the legal 
basis for registering unions in SOE's remains unclear. Teachers must 
belong to the Teachers' Association (PGRI). While technically 
classified as a union, the PGRI continues to function more as a welfare 
organization and does not appear to have engaged in trade union 
activities such as collective bargaining. Some groups of teachers have 
formed unofficial unions outside the PGRI. Other teachers have gone on 
strike for better wages and allowances, a rare and technically illegal 
action for teachers. Mandatory PGRI contributions are deducted 
automatically from teachers' salaries.
    The Government announced in 1995 its intention to relax a 
regulation requiring police approval for all meetings of five or more 
persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites. 
However, in practice this regulation continues to apply to union 
meetings. Permission routinely was given to the faction of the SPSI 
that retains strong links to the Golkar party leadership, but other 
labor organizations claim that local civilian and security officials 
often have discouraged or denied permission to hold gatherings. During 
the early part of the year, police repeatedly interrogated a foreign 
staff member of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity 
when he tried to renew his police clearance and work permit. Police 
objected to the staff member's observation of worker demonstrations and 
strikes. He eventually was able to renew his documents. In May police 
in Medan, North Sumatra, briefly detained two staff members of the 
Solidarity Center when they arrived to participate in a union workshop. 
The police stated that the staff workers had not obtained required 
letters from Jakarta police before traveling to Medan. The workshop was 
allowed to proceed in their absence.
    All organized workers except civil servants have the legal right to 
strike. State enterprise employees and teachers rarely exercise this 
right, but private sector strikes are frequent. Before a strike legally 
can occur in the private sector, the law requires intensive mediation 
by the Department of Manpower and prior notice of the intent to strike. 
However, no approval is required. In practice dispute settlement 
procedures rarely are followed, and formal notice of the intent to 
strike rarely is given, because Department of Manpower procedures are 
slow and have little credibility among workers. Therefore, sudden 
strikes usually result from longstanding grievances, attempts by 
employers to prevent the formation of union branches, or denial of 
legally mandated benefits or rights.
    Strikes frequently occurred during the year across a wide range of 
industries and occasionally were protracted. In addition to normal work 
stoppages, workers occasionally used unorthodox tactics, such as 
blocking Jakarta's airport toll road. Representatives of 4,700 footwear 
workers, who did not receive severance pay when their factory closed, 
staged a sit-in for several weeks in the national Parliament until the 
company paid the severances. Among the largest companies affected by 
such tactics were a manufacturing group in Surabaya, East Java; a 
cigarette manufacturer in Kediri, East Java; an oil and gas producer in 
Riau province in Sumatra; and natural gas and mining companies in East 
Kalimantan. Most strikes were conducted and resolved peacefully. In one 
prominent case, a major electronics manufacturing company fired (with 
the Government's permission) 900 striking workers at its Jakarta plant 
after a lengthy work stoppage. Some unions complained that strike 
leaders were singled out for layoffs when companies downsized. In 
several cases, most notably in Riau and East Kalimantan, workers 
damaged property and intimidated nonstriking workers, and there were 
disputes among different unions represented in the same company. In 
most cases, workers were not arrested for these actions, although 
police detained the SBSI regional coordinator in East Kalimantan in 
November for investigation of charges that he incited workers to 
violence. In at least two cases (at a glass manufacturing plant in 
Jakarta and at a major natural gas facility in East Kalimantan), police 
fired rubber bullets at workers who blocked roads and entry gates to 
company facilities and resisted orders to disperse. Groups claiming to 
represent labor also sometimes resorted to violence. In Surabaya groups 
of as many as 500 persons invaded industrial parks and looted factories 
in early May.
    The SPSI maintains international contacts but its only 
international trade union affiliation as a federation is with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Trade Union Council. Some of the 
SPSI's federated sectoral unions are members of international trade 
secretariats. The SBSI is affiliated with the World Confederation of 
Labor and some international trade union secretariats.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is provided for by law, and the Department of Manpower 
promotes it within the context of the national ideology, Pancasila. 
Until 1994 only recognized trade unions--the SPSI and its components--
could engage legally in collective bargaining. By issuing new 
regulations on union registration and enacting the new trade union law, 
the Government allows for new workers' organizations that register with 
the Government to conclude legally binding agreements with employers. 
Under the union registration regulation signed in September 1999 (which 
was not repealed by the new trade union law), if there is more than one 
union represented in a company, a union or coalition of unions must 
have the support of a majority of workers in order to bargain or 
negotiate on their behalf.
    In companies without unions, the Government discourages workers 
from utilizing nongovernment outside assistance, for example, during 
consultations with employers over company regulations. Instead, the 
Department of Manpower prefers that workers seek its assistance and 
believes that its role is to protect workers. However, there are 
credible reports that for many companies, consultations are perfunctory 
at best and usually only occur with management-selected workers; there 
also are credible reports to the contrary from foreign companies. 
According to government statistics, approximately 80 percent of the 
factorylevel SPSI units have collective bargaining agreements. The 
degree to which these agreements are negotiated freely between unions 
and management without government interference varies. By regulation 
negotiations must be concluded within 30 days or be submitted to the 
Department of Manpower for mediation and conciliation or arbitration. 
Most negotiations are concluded within the 30-day period. Agreements 
are for 2 years and can be extended for 1 year.
    According to NGO's involved in labor issues, in current practice 
the provisions of collective bargaining agreements rarely go beyond the 
legal minimum standards established by the Government, and the 
agreements often merely are presented to worker representatives for 
signature rather than negotiation. Although government regulations 
prohibit employers from discriminating against or harassing employees 
because of union membership, there are credible reports from union 
officials of employer retribution against union organizers, including 
firing workers, that is not prevented effectively or remedied in 
practice. Some employers reportedly have warned their employees against 
contact with union organizers. The SPSI documented 135 cases in which 
companies violated their workers' right to organize by intimidating, 
punishing, or firing SBSI members because of their affiliation with the 
union or because they attempted to organize SBSI units within their 
factories--a problem other labor organizations and activists have 
encountered in trying to form unions. In November police in East 
Kalimantan arrested Wuaya Kawilarang, a regional coordinator for the 
SBSI, for investigation of charges that he incited workers to violence. 
He remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    Regional and national labor dispute resolution committees 
adjudicate charges of antiunion discrimination, and their decisions can 
be appealed to the State Administrative Court. However, due to adverse 
decisions many union members believe that the dispute resolution 
committees generally favor employers. As a result, workers frequently 
present their grievances directly to the National Human Rights 
Commission, Parliament, and NGO's. Administrative decisions in favor of 
dismissed workers usually are monetary awards; workers rarely are 
reinstated. The law requires that employers obtain the approval of the 
labor dispute resolution committee before firing workers, but the law 
often is ignored in practice. During the year, the ILO Committee of 
Experts expressed concern that the Government had delayed 
implementation of the Manpower Act No. 25 of 1997 until October 1. On 
October 3, the Government announced another year's delay to consider 
revisions to the law, which has been criticized by labor unions.
    Since 1996 unions affiliated with the SPSI have been able to 
collect union dues directly through payroll deductions (the 
``checkoff'' system) rather than having the Department of Manpower 
collect dues and transfer them to the SPSI. Implementation of this 
system remains uneven, but labor observers generally believe that it 
has given more authority to factory-level union units where the 
checkoff system is practiced. Union officials at SPSI headquarters 
stated that not all local branches of the unions send a portion of dues 
collected to regional and central headquarters as provided in the 
SPSI's bylaws. Unions other than the SPSI have complained of 
difficulties in getting companies to set up a checkoff system for their 
members. In cases where the SPSI is not the only union in the factory, 
other unions occasionally have charged that companies automatically 
deduct union dues for the SPSI from workers affiliated with other 
unions.
    The police and the army continue to be involved in labor matters, 
although since the mid-1990's there has been a shift from open 
intervention and demonstrations of force by uniformed troops to less 
visible measures. On at least two occasions, security forces fired on 
striking workers (see Section 6.a.). However, the most common form of 
military involvement in labor matters, according to union and NGO 
representatives, is a longstanding pattern of collusion between police 
and military personnel and employers, which usually takes the form of 
intimidation of workers by security personnel in civilian dress. The 
military also employs baiting tactics: infiltrating workers' ranks and 
encouraging protests or worker actions, and sometimes attempting to 
provoke a violent worker action, to which the military then forcefully 
responds. Employer and union representatives also have complained about 
the ``invisible costs'' of corruption, which they and others estimate 
constitute up to 30 percent of a company's expenses.
    There are seven exporting processing zones (EPZs) in the country. 
Batam Island, near Singapore, is the largest. Labor law applies in 
EPZ's and in the rest of the country, although nongovernmental 
observers believe that in practice enforcement of laws in EPZ's is 
weaker than in other areas.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced labor, including forced and bonded labor by children, and the 
Government generally enforces this prohibition; however, forced and 
bonded labor by children remains a problem, and there also were 
instances of debt bondage of adults. In the past, NGO's estimated that 
as many as 3,000 children worked on fishing platforms, known as 
``jermals,'' under inhumane and dangerous conditions. There are 
credible reports that hundreds, perhaps over 1,000, children still work 
on the jermals off the east coast of North Sumatra in conditions of 
bonded labor (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). Most are recruited from 
farming communities in inland regions of North Sumatra. Once they 
arrive at the work site, miles offshore, they are held as virtual 
prisoners and are not permitted to leave for at least 3 months or until 
a replacement worker can be found. The children receive average monthly 
wages of $5 to $14 (Rp. 45,000 to 120,000), well below the regional 
minimum wage. They live in isolation on the sea on platforms the size 
of basketball courts, work 12 to 20 hours per day in dangerous 
conditions, and sleep in the workspace with no access to sanitary 
facilities or schooling. There are reports of physical, verbal, and 
sexual abuse of such children.
    In November 1997, the Department of Manpower issued a circular 
letter with the force of law that prohibits the hiring of persons under 
the age of 14 on fishing platforms. In 1999 the Government stopped 
issuing permits to build new jermals, and announced plans to physically 
remove children from the jermals and provide them with educational and 
economic alternatives (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). NGO's advocating 
the removal of children from jermals estimate that there was a 50 
percent drop in the number of children working on jermals during the 
year. However, rehabilitation programs for children removed from 
jermals have documented little success, and NGO's are concerned that 
some of these children now engage in other forms of hazardous labor. 
Jermals operate under the paid protection of national naval vessels; 
reportedly, the navy has a financial interest in some jermals.
    In East Kalimantan a logging company reportedly traps Dayak 
laborers in a cycle of debt and turns them into bonded laborers (see 
Section 5).
    The country is a source, transit point, and destination for 
trafficking in women and children, sometimes for forced labor (see 
Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Labor law prohibits children under the age of 15 from 
working more than 4 hours per day, but an estimated 6 to 8 million 
children meet or exceed this daily limit. Government enforcement of 
child labor laws is weak or nonexistent. With the exception of children 
working on fishing platforms, there were no significant government 
efforts to strengthen enforcement during the year. The Government 
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but does not enforce 
this provision effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor on March 8, and President Wahid signed it into domestic law 
as Law No. 1/2000. Before the enactment of Law 1/2000, a Department of 
Manpower circular issued in 1997 had prohibited children from working 
in hazardous sectors, including maritime, plantation, construction, 
slaughterhouse, textile, leatherworking, entertainment, and 
manufacturing activities involving the use of hazardous materials and 
pollutants.
    Despite adoption of legislative and regulatory measures, most 
children continued to work in unregulated environments, including 
domestic work. Although the ILO has sponsored training of labor 
inspectors on child labor matters under the International Program on 
the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), enforcement is nonexistent. 
During the year, labor inspectors who had received the training had not 
removed any children from the workplace.
    The Government acknowledges that there is a class of children who 
must work for socioeconomic reasons, and in 1987 the Minister of 
Manpower issued a regulation on ``Protection of Children Forced to 
Work.'' This regulation legalized the employment of children under the 
age of 14 who must work to contribute to the income of their families. 
It required parental consent, prohibits dangerous or difficult work, 
limits work to 4 hours daily, and requires employers to report the 
number of children working under its provisions. It did not set a 
minimum age for children in this category.
    In February 1999, after years of negative publicity, the Government 
launched an initiative to eliminate child labor on jermals off the 
coast of North Sumatra. By midyear, NGO's estimated that the number of 
children working on jermals had declined by as much as 50 percent (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). However, hundreds, and perhaps over 1,000 
children continue to work on the jermals, and active kidnaping or 
recruiting of such children continues.
    According to the Department of Manpower, the number of working 
children increased from approximately 2 million before the economic 
downturn began in 1997 to an estimated 2.5 million by mid-1999. The 
State Bureau of Statistics (BPS) stated that 1.9 million children 
through age 14 were working in 1998. The ILO and the NGO World Vision 
argued that official estimates were too low, citing the fact that 
between 11 and 12 million school-age children (up to age 18) were not 
attending school, and a large number likely were involved in some form 
of work. The ILO estimated that between 6 and 8 million children worked 
during the year. World Vision estimated that there were 6.5 million 
children working. Of these 6.5 million children, 4.1 million worked in 
the informal sector, and 2.4 million worked in the formal sectors. 
Other NGO's estimated that more than 10 percent of children worked more 
than 4 hours per day, and that over 35 percent of these children worked 
over 35 hours per week. Other NGO's estimate that 8.5 million school-
age children are not enrolled in school and most are employed in the 
underground economy with no legal protection and poor compensation.
    It is estimated that more children work in the informal sector than 
the formal sector, selling newspapers, shining shoes, helping to park 
or watch cars, and otherwise earning money. Where children work in the 
formal sector, such work tends to fall between the informal and formal 
economies, including working alongside their parents in home 
enterprises and on plantations, and in family-owned shops and small 
factories, particularly those that are satellites of large industries. 
There are children working in large factories; however, the number is 
unknown, largely because documents verifying age are falsified easily. 
Some employers hire children because they are easier than adults to 
manage and less likely to organize or make demands on employers. 
Children working in factories usually work the same number of hours as 
adults. Children work in the rattan and wood furniture industries, the 
garment industry, the footwear industry, food processing, toy-making, 
and small mining operations, and other industries.
    In March six children between the ages of 12 and 14 fled from a 
chicken farm in Klaten, Central Java, where they had been forced to 
work from early morning to late at night without any pay for over 1 
month. The owners of the farm later were detained for questioning and 
put on trial. The case was settled out of court, but child labor 
advocates who worked on the case did not participate in the settlement 
decision.
    Other children, mostly girls, serve as live-in domestic servants. 
Many begin working when they are between 14 and 16 years old. Although 
accurate figures are unavailable, it is estimated that the number of 
child domestic workers is in the millions. Observers agree that this 
number began increasing in 1998 as a result of the economic downturn. 
One study conducted by Atma Jaya University in Jakarta estimated that 
there were at least 400,000 children under age 15 working as domestic 
servants in Jakarta alone. Most of them are not allowed to study or 
take academic courses. There are no regulations protecting domestic 
workers. These children work long hours, receive low pay, are on call 
24 hours per day, generally are unaware of their rights, and often are 
far from their families.
    Children are involved in a variety of hazardous work activities. In 
addition to those working on fishing platforms (see Section 6.c.), 
children perform piece work in small shoe factories (bengkels) where 
they are exposed to hazardous bleaches and glues. Thousands of other 
children work on rubber, sugarcane, tobacco, cocoa, and coffee 
plantations, often helping their parents meet stiff production quotas. 
Many companies employing adults condone the practice of children 
assisting their parents in the fields. Other children are employed in 
construction work, quarrying, gold and other types of mining, pearl 
diving, and forestry activities, many of which pose serious hazards. 
During the year, the ILO called on the Government to stop the 
employment of up to 3,000 children in Central Kalimantan in gold 
mining. The media reported the use of mercury in Central Kalimantan 
gold mining, underscoring the danger posed to these children.
    Some children work as scavengers in dumpsites. In the Bantar Gebang 
dumpsite in Bekasi (south of Jakarta), an NGO working with children 
there estimates that as many as 550 children ages 7 to 15 work at the 
dump to help their parents. About 74 percent of the children are under 
age 12. Children work long hours in extremely unsanitary conditions. 
Almost all of the children have health problems. In one survey, 84 
percent of the children suffered from minor infections. NGO's have 
ongoing programs to teach children to avoid hazardous waste such as 
syringes and other potentially toxic waste.
    It is believed that thousands of Muslim and Christian adolescent 
children in Maluku province have become soldiers and that younger 
children provide support services to the militas (see Section 5).
    The country is a source, destination, and transit point for 
trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage. Rather, area wage councils working under the supervision of the 
National Wage Council establish minimum wages for regions and basic 
needs figures for each province--a monetary amount considered 
sufficient to enable a single worker to meet the basic needs of 
nutrition, clothing, and shelter. The Government increased the average 
minimum wage by 70 percent (when adjusted for inflation) between 1992 
and 1997. However, the high inflation rate in 1998 depressed sharply 
the purchasing power of the minimum wage. The minimum wage generally is 
not sufficient to meet the government-determined ``minimum living 
need'' for a single person, or a family. After the minimum wage 
increases in April, in Jakarta the monthly minimum wage is about $37 
(344,000 Rp), which is equal to 81 percent of the government-determined 
minimum living need for a single person, and down from 95 percent in 
1997. The average national minimum wage is about $24 per month (Rp. 
230,000), although wages in the most heavily populated urban areas 
(Jakarta area, West Java, East Java, and North Sumatra), are 
significantly higher. Nevertheless, enforcement of minimum wage and 
other labor regulations remains inadequate, and sanctions are light.
    Labor law and ministerial regulations provide workers with a 
variety of other benefits, such as social security, and workers in more 
modern facilities often receive health benefits, free meals, and 
transportation. The law establishes 7- or 8-hour workdays and a 40-hour 
workweek, with one 30-minute rest period for every 4 hours of work.
    The law also requires 1 day of rest weekly. The daily overtime rate 
is 1.5 times the normal hourly rate for the first hour and 2 times the 
hourly rate for additional overtime. Regulations allow employers to 
deviate from the normal work hours upon request to the Minister of 
Manpower and with the consent of the employee. Workers in industries 
that produce retail goods for export frequently work overtime to 
fulfill contract quotas. Observance of laws regulating benefits and 
labor standards varies between sectors and regions. Employer violations 
of legal requirements are fairly common and often result in strikes and 
employee protests. The Department of Manpower continues publicly to 
urge employers to comply with the law. However, in general, government 
enforcement and supervision of labor standards are weak.
    Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of 
industrial health and safety. Companies with more than 100 employees 
may obtain public recognition of their compliance with safety and 
health standards through a safety audit procedure. In the largely 
Western-operated oil sector, safety and health programs function 
reasonably well. However, in the country's 100,000 larger registered 
companies outside the oil sector, the quality of occupational health 
and safety programs varies greatly. The enforcement of health and 
safety standards is hampered severely by the limited number of 
qualified Department of Manpower inspectors, as well as by the low 
level of employee appreciation for sound health and safety practices. 
Allegations of corruption on the part of inspectors are common. Workers 
are obligated to report hazardous working conditions. Employers are 
forbidden by law from retaliating against those who do report, but the 
law is not enforced effectively. As a result, workers who remove 
themselves from hazardous working conditions may risk loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a source, transit point, 
and destination for trafficking in women and children for the purpose 
of prostitution and sometimes for forced labor.
    Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, the wife of East Timorese independence leader 
Xanana Gusmao, reported to the international press in November that 33 
pregnant East Timorese women, who had returned to East Timor, claimed 
that they were abducted and forced to serve as sex slaves for the TNI 
in West Timor.
    There are credible reports of trafficking in girls and women and of 
temporary ``contract marriages'' with foreigners in certain areas, such 
as West Kalimantan and Sumatra, although the extent of this practice is 
unclear. Many such marriages are not considered legal, and the children 
born from them are considered born out of wedlock. According to one 
recent report, poor Sino-Indonesian parents from Sinkawang, West 
Kalimantan, who were desperate for money and believed that their 
daughters would have a better future, have sold thousands of their 
daughters into contract marriages to Taiwanese men. Some of the girls 
were as young as 14 years old. If such marriages fail, the women have 
no legal recourse. According to one source, there were as many as 
10,000 Sino-Indonesian women from Sinkawang living in Taiwan whose 
legal status was uncertain. Others enjoy successful marriages and their 
families at home prosper as a result of the relationship.
    Prostitution is widespread. Official statistics reported 75,106 
registered prostitutes in 1999, up from 72,000 in 1995. However, NGO's 
estimate that there are as many as 1.3 million prostitutes in the 
country, 30 percent of which may be under 16 years of age. A university 
professor estimates that about 150,000 children enter prostitution each 
year. The prevalence of child prostitutes appears to vary by region. 
According to a recent NGO study, about 15 percent of the prostitutes in 
parts of Central Java were between 16 and 20 years old. In a seminar 
held in Batam in August, researchers reported that 50 percent of more 
than 1,800 sex workers that they surveyed in 1998 were younger than 18 
years old. More recent estimates suggest that as many as 6,000 sex 
workers in Batam are under age 18. In September the ILO, in 
collaboration with the University of Indonesia's department of social 
welfare, published a preliminary study of trafficking trends in 
Jakarta, Batam (Sumatra), Medan (Sumatra), and Bali, which found that 
many girls entering prostitution after failed marriages that they had 
entered into when they were as young as 10 to 14.
    While not documented thoroughly, the sex trade is believed widely 
to have increased sharply as women hurt by the economic downturn sought 
means of support for their families. In addition NGO findings indicate 
a growing trend in child prostitution and sexual exploitation. 
Instances of families in rural areas of Java and Sumatra being forced 
by economic circumstances to ``sell'' their daughters to local men 
continued to be reported. An October NGO report found that trafficking 
in teenage girls from North Sumatra to Singapore and Malaysia was 
increasing. A growing number of children enter prostitution to help 
their families or to support drug habits. Other teenage prostitutes 
come from middle class families. Child prostitutes can earn $500 to 
$1,000 (about Rp. 4.7 to 9.4 million) per month, 10 to 20 times what an 
unskilled factory worker earns. The demand for young girls is 
increasing, as many clients seek young girls who are perceived to be 
less likely to carry HIV/AIDS.
    Police continue to uncover syndicates involved in trafficking young 
women and girls, many younger than age 18, to work in brothels on 
islands in Riau province, Jakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya (all in Java); 
Denpasar (Bali); Medan (Sumatra); Ambon (Maluku); Manado, Makassar, and 
Kendari (Sulawesi); and Jayapura, Sorong, and Merauke (Irian Jaya). 
Others are trafficked to Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, and 
Australia. Many of the girls and women were hired under false 
pretenses. One tactic commonly employed is to offer young women in 
rural areas jobs as waitresses or hotel employees in distant regions, 
typically at island resorts. After the new recruits arrive at the site 
they learn that they have been recruited as sex workers. In some 
instances, women are held forcibly at brothels or are prevented from 
leaving an island. In other cases, the women have no option other than 
to accept the work because they lack money to travel and facing other 
economic pressures. There also have been cases of boys involved in 
prostitution, especially in popular tourist destinations such as Bali 
and Lombok; at times such boys have been victims of trafficking, 
although the incidence reportedly is low.
    A baby trafficking ring was uncovered in Medan in September. Four 
persons were arrested and three babies were confiscated as evidence. 
The babies allegedly were procured from lowincome families and were 
sold to wealthy infertile couples.
    Trafficking in children for forced labor, particularly onto 
``jermals'' (fishing platforms) off the coast of North Sumatra, is a 
significant problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    Hundreds of thousands of women abroad work as domestic servants. 
According to Ministry of Manpower statistics, there were approximately 
1.5 million registered workers employed abroad from 1994 to 1999, and 
almost 70 percent of these workers were female. Host countries include 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Korea, and the Persian Gulf states. 
Although the percentage of the total is very low, in numerous cases, 
these women were subjected to conditions that amounted to trafficking. 
Recruiting agencies sometimes abuse and hold captive women recruited to 
work abroad as domestic servants, even before such women depart the 
country. The most common complaints among women working abroad are 
being underpaid or not paid at all; extreme working conditions and 
severe physical and sexual abuse also are common.
    The Government, in response to negative publicity and NGO efforts, 
took steps to improve conditions for female migrant workers in the 
country and to improve consular protection for those working abroad; 
however, many women remain vulnerable. In contrast to NGO assertions, a 
consortium of labor recruiters insists that accounts of severe abuse of 
female migrant workers are exceptions to the norm. Nevertheless, as a 
result of extensive lobbying efforts, in late October, the Ministry of 
Manpower and Transmigration announced that it would suspend for 2 
months the placement of migrant workers abroad, especially those 
working in the informal sector, including maids. However, on November 
7, President Wahid announced that the Government was lifting the 
temporary ban on the basis that the ban only served to encourage more 
illegal placements of female workers abroad.
    While there are laws designed to protect children from sexual 
abuse, prostitution, and incest, the Government has made no special 
enforcement efforts in these areas. Government efforts to combat the 
problem are sporadic, relatively small-scale, and of limited 
effectiveness. In response to public pressure, the Jakarta city 
government closed down brothels in the red-light district of Kramat 
Tunggak in North Jakarta. Meanwhile corrupt government officials, some 
of whom are involved in trafficking themselves, sometimes hinder 
enforcement efforts that compromise their financial interests. 
Moreover, NGO's allege that there still is considerable reluctance to 
acknowledge, both within society and the Government, that prostitution 
is a major industry.
    Muslim religious groups reacted to perceived government inaction 
against prostitution by attempting to combat the problem themselves. 
Muslim groups' raids on and destruction of brothels and other venues 
allegedly involved in prostitution, including massage parlors, karaoke 
bars, and nightclubs, increased in frequency and in degree of 
aggression during the year (see Section 1.c.). The actions of these 
religious vigilante groups merely has served to force prostitution 
further beyond the scrutiny of official control.
    Domestic NGO's lead in the efforts to monitor and prevent 
trafficking. At least a dozen NGO's generally are active in combating 
trafficking in persons. The Indonesian Women's Association for Justice 
(APIK) facilitates public awareness programs in Jakarta to sensitize 
young women to the dangers of trafficking. The Indonesian Child 
Advocacy Foundation (LAAI) and the City Social Worker Group (KKSP) work 
to eliminate child employment on jermal fishing platforms in North 
Sumatra. Mitra Perempuan operates a hotline to record abuse cases and 
help abused women. The Indonesian Child Welfare Foundation (YKAI) 
issues anecdotal reports on trafficking incidents. The child labor 
umbrella organization, JARAK (NGO Network for Action Programs to 
Eliminate Child Labor in Indonesia), has 63 organizational members in 
15 provinces and is involved in efforts to eliminate all aspects of 
child labor, including trafficking.
                               __________

                                 JAPAN

    Japan is a parliamentary democracy based on the 1947 Constitution. 
Sovereignty is vested in the people, and the Emperor is defined as the 
symbol of state. Executive power is exercised by a cabinet, composed of 
a prime minister and ministers of state, which is responsible to the 
Diet, a two-house parliament. The Diet, elected by universal suffrage 
and secret ballot, designates the Prime Minister, who must be a member 
of that body. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Conservative Party, 
and the Komeito party formed the current Government in July. The 
judiciary is independent.
    The self defense forces are responsible for external security and 
have limited domestic security responsibilities. The well-organized and 
disciplined police force is firmly under the control of the civilian 
authorities. However, there continued to be credible reports that 
police committed some human rights abuses.
    The industrialized free market economy is highly efficient and 
competitive in world markets and provides residents with a high 
standard of living.
    The Government respects the human rights of its citizens; however, 
there are problems in some areas. There continued to be some credible 
reports that police and prison officials physically and psychologically 
abused prisoners and detainees. Officials sometimes are dismissed for 
such abuse but seldom are tried, convicted, and imprisoned. Violence 
against women and children, child prostitution, and trafficking in 
women are problems. Women, the Ainu (Japan's indigenous people), the 
Burakumin (a group whose members historically are treated as outcasts), 
and alien residents experience varying degrees of societal 
discrimination, some of it severe and longstanding. The Ministry of 
Justice handles complaints of discrimination. However, the Ministry's 
Human Rights Defense Bureau has a small staff and limited investigative 
or enforcement powers. The administrative system for combating human 
rights violations is weak. Many cases end up in court.
    The Justice Ministry's Human Rights Commission continued to work on 
a 5-year mandate to develop measures to educate citizens about the 
importance of respecting human rights. In July 1999, the Commission 
submitted a report calling for greater attention to human rights 
education, particularly at the municipal level. The report also cited a 
number of ongoing human rights problems, including sexual harassment, 
violence in the home, and discrimination against the elderly, the 
disabled, minorities, and foreigners. The panel is to submit 
recommendations on relief measures by 2002.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for freedom from torture and 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and the Penal 
Code prohibits violence and cruelty toward suspects under criminal 
investigation; however, reports by several bar associations, human 
rights groups, and some prisoners indicate that police and prison 
officials sometimes used physical violence, including kicking and 
beating, as well as psychological intimidation, to obtain confessions 
from suspects in custody or to enforce discipline. There also were 
allegations of beatings of detainees by employees of private security 
companies that operate immigration detention facilities at Narita 
International airport. In 1998 the Supreme Court ordered the Kanagawa 
police to pay a $5,850 (700,000 yen) fine to a man who was beaten in 
custody. Internal police reports that alleged coverups of misconduct, 
corruption, and bullying shook public confidence in the police at the 
beginning of the year, and resulted in the establishment in March of 
the Council on the Reform of Police Systems, a six-person board of 
academic and other private sector experts, to consider new rules 
governing police conduct and duties, as well as changes to the overall 
law enforcement structure. In July the Council submitted its 
recommendations; the Diet incorporated some of the Council's 
recommendations into the Revised National Police Law passed in 
November. The new law allows individuals to lodge complaints against 
the police with national and local public safety commissions. These 
commissions may direct the police to conduct investigations.
    The Constitution and the Criminal Code include safeguards to ensure 
that no criminal suspect can be compelled to make a selfincriminating 
confession, nor convicted or punished in cases where the only evidence 
against him is the accused's own confession. The appellate courts have 
overturned some convictions in recent years on the grounds that they 
were obtained as a result of coerced confessions. In April, after 
another man admitted his guilt, prosecutors dismissed charges against a 
man held for over a year in police custody after having ``confessed'' 
to fraud and theft charges. He had undergone intense questioning prior 
to confessing. In addition civil and criminal suits alleging abuse 
during interrogation and detention have been brought against some 
police and prosecution officials. About 90 percent of all criminal 
cases going to trial include confessions, reflecting the priority the 
judicial system places on admissions of guilt. The Government points 
out that the high percentage of confessions, like the high conviction 
rate, is reflective of a higher standard of evidence needed to bring 
about indictment in the Japanese system. In Japan confession is 
regarded as the first step in the rehabilitative process.
    Physical restraints, such as leather handcuffs, continue to be used 
as a form of punishment, and some prisoners have been forced to eat and 
relieve themselves unassisted while wearing these restraints. Ministry 
of Justice officials state that restraints are used inside prisons only 
when prisoners have been violent and pose a threat to themselves and 
others, or when there is concern that a prisoner might attempt to 
escape. In May the Osaka District Court awarded a prisoner $5,000 
(500,000 yen) in compensation for being confined in leather handcuffs 
for 3 days while he was being held in solitary confinement. The Court 
ruled that manacling the man after he attacked a warder was 
appropriate, but that the punishment's duration was too long.
    Prison conditions meet most minimum international standards; 
however, prisons in most areas of the country are not heated, and 
prisoners are given only minimal additional clothing to protect 
themselves against cold weather. There have been cases of frostbite 
among the prison population. In February a foreign national prisoner 
was hospitalized for frostbite while incarcerated at Fuchu prison. The 
Ministry of Justice requested a second year of funding in August as 
part of a 3-year plan to install heaters in prison buildings 
nationwide. Individual cells will remain unheated. Prisoners may not 
purchase or be given supplementary food. They are discouraged strongly 
from complaining about conditions. Prisoners face severe restrictions 
on the quantity of their incoming and outgoing correspondence. The 
authorities read letters to and from prisoners, and the letters may be 
censored, or, with a court order, confiscated. All visits with 
convicted prisoners are monitored; however, those whose cases are 
pending are allowed private access to their legal representatives. 
Prison officials claim that the ``no complaining'' policy is designed 
to keep family members from worrying about their loved ones. For the 
same reason, the Justice Ministry usually does not inform a condemned 
inmate's family prior to the person's execution. Human rights 
organizations report that lawyers also are not told of an execution 
until after the fact, and that death row prisoners are held for years 
in solitary confinement with little contact with anyone but prison 
guards. Parole may not be granted for any reason, including medical and 
humanitarian, prior to an inmate serving two-thirds of his or her 
sentence.
    In the past, the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations and human 
rights groups have criticized the prison system, with its emphasis on 
strict discipline and obedience to numerous rules. Prison rules remain 
confidential. Wardens continue to have broad leeway in enforcing 
punishments selectively, including ``minor solitary confinement,'' 
which may be imposed for a minimum of 1 and not more than 60 days and 
in which the prisoner is made to sit (for foreigners) or kneel (for 
Japanese) motionless in the middle of an empty cell.
    Conditions in immigration detention facilities meet most 
international standards.
    The Government restricts access to prisons and detention facilities 
by human rights groups.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Constitutional 
provisions for freedom from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment generally 
are respected in practice. The law provides for judicial determination 
of the legality of detention. Persons may not be detained without 
charge, and prosecuting authorities must be prepared to demonstrate 
before trial that probable cause exists in order to detain the accused. 
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a suspect may be held in police 
custody for up to 72 hours without judicial proceedings. A judge may 
extend preindictment custody based on a prosecutor's application by up 
to two consecutive 10-day periods. These extensions are sought and 
granted routinely. Under extraordinary circumstances, prosecutors may 
seek an additional 5-day extension, bringing the maximum period of 
preindictment custody to 25 days.
    In 1999 the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional the section of 
the Criminal Procedure Code under which police and prosecutors have the 
power to control and may limit access by legal counsel when deemed 
necessary for the sake of an investigation. Counsel may not be present 
during interrogations at any time before or after indictment. As a 
court-appointed attorney is not approved until after indictment, 
suspects must rely on their own resources to hire an attorney before 
indictment, although local bar associations provide detainees with 
limited free counseling. Critics charge that access to counsel is 
limited both in duration and frequency; the Government denies that this 
is the case. An attorney is provided at government expense after 
indictment if the arrested person cannot afford one. In 1999 
presentencing bail was available in 15.6 percent of cases.
    Bar associations and human rights groups have criticized the use of 
a ``substitute prison system'' for prisoners awaiting court hearings. 
Although the law stipulates that suspects should be held in ``houses of 
detention'' between arrest and sentencing, a police detention facility 
may be substituted at the order of the court. This provision originally 
was added to cover a shortage of normal detention facilities. According 
to year-end Ministry of Justice data, normal detention facilities were 
filled to 66.2 percent of capacity in 1999. Critics charge that 
allowing suspects to be detained by the same authorities who 
interrogate them heightens the potential for abuse and coercion. The 
Government counters that cases sent to police detention facilities tend 
to be those where the facts are not in dispute. A 1997 Justice Ministry 
regulation permits detention house officials to limit the amount of 
documentation related to ongoing court cases retained by prisoners.
    The length of time before a suspect is brought to trial depends on 
the nature of the crime but rarely exceeds 3 months from the date of 
arrest; the average is 1 to 2 months. In one case an accused allegedly 
was held for 3 years.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and 
free from executive branch interference. The Cabinet appoints judges 
for 10-year terms, which can be renewed until judges reach the age of 
65. Justices of the Supreme Court can serve until the age of 70 but 
face periodic review through popular referendums.
    There are several levels of courts, including high courts, district 
courts, family courts, and summary courts, with the Supreme Court 
serving as the highest judicial authority. Normally a trial begins at 
the district court level, and a verdict may be appealed to a higher 
court, and ultimately, to the Supreme Court.
    The Government respects in practice the constitutional provisions 
for the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal in 
all criminal cases. Although most criminal trials are completed within 
a reasonable length of time, cases may take several years to work their 
way through the trial and appeals process. For example, in the complex 
1995 case of the Aum Shinrikyo cult sarin gas attack on the Tokyo 
subway system, trials of seven senior members of the cult were still 
underway in district courts at year's end, although 193 trails stemming 
from the attack have been completed.
    There is no trial by jury. The defendant is informed of the charges 
upon arrest and is assured a public trial by an independent civilian 
court with defense counsel and the right of crossexamination. The 
Constitution provides defendants with the right not to be compelled to 
testify against themselves as well as to free and private access to 
counsel. However, the Government contends that the right to consult 
with attorneys is not an absolute one and can be restricted if such 
restriction is compatible with the spirit of the Constitution. Access 
is sometimes abridged in practice; for example the law allows 
prosecutors to control access to counsel before indictment, and there 
are allegations of coerced confessions (see Section 1.c.). Defendants 
are protected from the retroactive application of laws and have the 
right of access to incriminating evidence after a formal indictment has 
been made. However, the law does not require full disclosure by 
prosecutors, and material that the prosecution does not use in court 
may be suppressed. Critics claim that legal representatives of 
defendants do not always have access to all needed relevant material in 
the police record to prepare their defense. A defendant who is 
dissatisfied with the decision of a trial court of first instance may, 
within the period prescribed by law, appeal to a higher court.
    No guidelines mandate the acceptable quality of communications 
between judges, lawyers, and non-Japanese speaking defendants, although 
the Supreme Court publishes handbooks explaining the legal procedures 
and terms for court interpreters. In April the Supreme Court introduced 
a training system to help court interpreters understand complicated 
trial procedures. However, no standard licensing or qualification 
system for certifying court interpreters exists, and a trial may 
proceed even if the accused does not understand what is happening or 
being said. The Supreme Court's 1998 statistics show a chronic shortage 
of qualified court interpreters, particularly for non-English speaking 
defendants. Foreign prisoners frequently claim that police urge them to 
sign statements in Japanese that they cannot read, and that are not 
adequately translated.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution protects the right to privacy of 
family, home, and correspondence, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Under the Constitution, each search or seizure must 
be based on a separate warrant issued by a judge. Standards for issuing 
such warrants exist to guard against arbitrary searches. In August the 
Diet enacted legislation, which allows law enforcement authorities to 
use wiretaps in certain criminal investigations, including suspected 
drug offenses, murder, and trafficking in persons. The legislation also 
stiffened penalties for the unauthorized use of wiretaps by police 
authorities. Under this legislation, wiretaps can only be used if law 
enforcement officials can demonstrate that all other investigative 
techniques have been ineffective.
    There were no new developments in the long-standing effort by 
groups representing the women and the disabled to obtain a government 
investigation, a formal apology, and compensation in the case of the 
several thousand disabled women who were sterilized without their 
consent between 1949 and 1992. A law that the Government revoked in 
1996 permitted doctors to sterilize persons with mental or physical 
disabilities or certain hereditary diseases without consent, after they 
had received the approval of committees appointed by local governments.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press.
    Academic freedom is protected. However, the Education Ministry's 
decision to order revisions to elementary, middle, and high school 
textbooks based on national curriculum guidelines remains a source of 
domestic and international controversy. In 1997 the Supreme Court ruled 
that state screening of textbooks did not violate the constitutional 
provisions for freedom of expression.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly and association, and the Government 
respects these rights in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respected this right in 
practice. Following the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo terrorist attacks, a 1995 
amendment to the Religious Corporation Law gave government authorities 
increased oversight of religious groups and required greater disclosure 
of financial assets by religious corporations. The amendment allows 
authorities to monitor more effectively the operations of registered 
religious corporations. The Government does not require that religious 
groups be licensed. However, to receive official recognition as a 
religious organization, which brings tax benefits and other advantages, 
a group must register with local or national authorities as a 
``religious corporation.'' In practice almost all religious groups 
register.
    The only religion under active government surveillance is the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult. Aum Shinrikyo lost its legal status as a religious 
organization in 1996 following its sponsorship of terrorist attacks. In 
response to reports of increased cult fundraising and recruitment 
activities, local police and communities have taken measures against 
cult members and chapters, including denying residency permits and 
public school access to cult leader Asahara's children. In December 
1999, the Diet passed a set of bills that allow the authorities to more 
easily seize the group's assets, tighten surveillance against it, and 
force it to pay compensation to victims of its past crimes.
    Members of the Unification Church and Jehovah's Witnesses have 
alleged that police do not act in response to allegations of forced 
deprogramming of church members. They also claim that police do not 
enforce the laws against kidnaping when the victim is held by family 
members, asserting that Unification Church members are subjected to 
prolonged arbitrary detention by individuals, who are not charged by 
police.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have the right to travel freely 
both within the country and abroad, to change their place of residence, 
to emigrate, and to repatriate voluntarily. Citizenship may be 
forfeited by naturalization in a foreign country or by failure of 
persons born with dual nationality to elect Japanese citizenship at the 
required age.
    Revisions to the immigration law aimed at reducing visa overstays 
and smuggling of persons became effective in February. The new law 
imposes stiff penalties on persons illegally entering the country, and 
those deported are denied reentry for at least 5 years instead of the 
previous penalty of 1 year.
    Asylum and refugee policy is in accordance with the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 
recent years, the Government has granted asylum to those claiming fear 
of persecution in only a small number of cases. It believes that most 
persons seeking asylum in the country do so for economic reasons. 
During the year, approximately 300 persons in the country were either 
seeking asylum or accorded refugee status. As of year's end, the 
Government had recognized 22 refugee cases; 202 new asylum cases were 
pending. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
most new applicants were from Pakistan, Burma, Afghanistan, and Iran. 
In addition approximately 10,400 Vietnamese nationals are permitted to 
reside in the country under special residence permits.
    The Government has shown flexibility in dealing with visa 
extensions for Chinese student dissidents, although it continues to be 
reluctant to grant permanent asylum. Burmese asylum applicants have 
complained that asylum cases can go on for years without a formal 
decision.
    The Government requires applicants to appear at an immigration 
office within 60 days of arrival or within 60 days of learning that 
they are likely to be persecuted in their home country. Individuals who 
do not present their applications within the 60day time frame due to 
extenuating circumstances may apply for an exception. An alien who is 
recognized as a refugee has access to educational facilities, public 
relief and aid, and social welfare benefits. An alien who is denied 
refugee status may appeal the decision to the Ministry of Justice. 
Rejected applicants also may take their cases to court if Ministry 
authorities do not recognize their objections. In an effort to make 
procedures clearer to applicants, the Government distributes a pamphlet 
in English, Chinese, and eight other languages to those interested in 
the asylum process.
    While the Government sometimes grants first asylum, there are no 
standard procedures established, and the Justice Ministry and the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry jointly decide upon such grants on a case-by-
case basis. In 1998 the Justice Ministry began reversing an earlier 
decision to deny asylum to a group of Burmese prodemocracy students. In 
1999 another 40 to 50 persons denied asylum were granted special 
residency status renewable on a yearly basis as of year's end. During 
the reporting period, 12 Afghan nationals who had been denied asylum on 
first application were granted special resident status, and 
approximately 15 other persons had been granted this status for 
humanitarian reasons as well.
    There were no reports that persons were forced to return to a 
country where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully and 
are able to exercise this right in practice through frequent, free, and 
fair elections on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot. In 
1998 the Diet granted citizens living overseas the right to vote for 
candidates in national elections in races based on proportional 
representation. In 1999 the Diet extended these absentee voting 
privileges to fishermen and mariners.
    The country is a parliamentary democracy governed by the political 
party or parties able to form a majority in the lower house of its 
bicameral Diet. The Liberal Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, 
and the Komeito party formed the current Government in July.
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in 
government and politics, but they are underrepresented in both areas. 
In recent years there has been a slow increase in the number of women 
holding public office. As of December, women held 36 seats in the 
480member lower house of the Diet (7.5 percent), and 43 of the 252 
seats in the upper house (17.1 percent), the highest number since 1946. 
There are 2 women in the 19-member Cabinet. Two of the country's 47 
governors are women (in Osaka prefecture and in Kumamoto); both were 
elected during the year.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of local and international human rights organizations 
function freely, without governmental restrictions, investigating and 
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials 
generally are cooperative and responsive to their views, although the 
Government restricts access to prisons and detention facilities by 
human rights groups (see Section 1.c.).
    The Justice Ministry's Human Rights Commission continued to work on 
a 5-year mandate to develop measures to educate citizens about the 
importance of respecting human rights. In July 1999, the Commission 
submitted a report that called for greater attention to human rights 
education, particularly at the municipal level, and cites a number of 
ongoing human rights problems, including sexual harassment, violence in 
the home, and discrimination against the elderly, the disabled, 
minorities, and foreigners. The panel is expected to submit 
recommendations on relief measures by 2002.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
creed, sex, social status, or family origin, and, in general, the 
Government respects these provisions.
    Women.--According to National Police Agency statistics, 2,060 rapes 
and 6,310 indecent assaults were reported through November. However, a 
government-sponsored poll showed that violence against women, 
particularly domestic violence, often goes unreported due to social and 
cultural concerns about shaming one's family or endangering the 
reputation of one's spouse or offspring. Husbands have been prosecuted 
for spousal rape; usually these cases involve a third party who 
assisted in the rape. The National Police Agency confirmed 7 cases of 
spousal rape through November. Typically women who are victims of 
domestic violence return to the home of their parents rather than file 
reports with the authorities. Therefore National Police Agency 
statistics on violence against women probably understate the magnitude 
of the problem. In the domestic violence survey conducted by the Prime 
Minister's Office released in February, 5 percent of wives said they 
had experienced ``life-threatening violence'' at least once. According 
to a survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in 1998, one in 
three women reported some form of physical abuse in the home. Frequent 
complaints by female commuters that they have been groped or otherwise 
molested on crowded trains led the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department 
to establish special molestation complaint offices at three Tokyo train 
stations in 1995. In December the Keio Electric Railway Company 
announced plans to introduce women-only rail cars on late night trains 
in the Tokyo area over the holiday season to deal with the problem of 
groping. A Keio spokesman stated that the company had received 351 
complaints about groping in the year ending March 31, an increase of 
100 complaints over the previous 12month period. Many local governments 
are responding positively to a need for confidential assistance by 
establishing special women's consultation departments in police and 
prefectural offices. A new antistalking law went into effect in 
November in response to rising complaints about women's lack of 
recourse in dealing with stalkers. Through December 26, the police 
arrested 20 persons under this new law.
    Trafficking in women is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    The Constitution and the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Law 
prohibit sexual discrimination and provide for individual dignity and 
the essential equality of the sexes in the family. However, sexual 
harassment in the workplace remains widespread. A 1997 survey by the 
Ministry of Labor reported that 62 percent of women claimed to have 
experienced at least one act of sexual harassment. A National Personnel 
Authority survey of female public servants conducted from July to 
September similarly found that 69.2 percent of all female respondents 
believe they have been subjected to acts that constitute sexual 
harassment. The National Personnel Authority established workplace 
rules in April 1999 in an effort to stop harassment in public servants' 
workplaces. New survey data indicates that the most severe forms of 
sexual harassment may be declining in government workplaces; female 
public servants who said that their bosses had pressured them into a 
sexual relationship dropped from 17 percent in 1997 to 2.2 percent. In 
April 1999, a revision to the 1997 Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 
Law intended to address problems of sexual harassment and 
discrimination against women went into effect. The revised EEO Law 
includes measures to identify companies that fail to prevent sexual 
harassment, although it does not include punitive measures to enforce 
compliance. The new law's only penalty is that names of companies that 
practice sexual discrimination can be publicized. The Ministry of Labor 
does not enforce compliance through fines or other punitive penalties. 
However, since the 1999 revision, there was a 35 percent jump in 
consultations over workplace sexual harassment cases. Under a 1997 
revision to the Labor Standards Law an arbitration committee is allowed 
to initiate procedures to help ensure the rights of female workers at 
the worker's request, without first having to obtain approval from both 
management and the worker's union. A number of government entities 
continued to establish hot lines and designate ombudsmen to handle 
complaints of discrimination and sexual harassment.
    In August the former governor of Osaka, Isamu Yamada, was sentenced 
to an 18-month suspended prison term after pleading guilty in a 
criminal court to molesting a 21-year-old campaign worker. In a 1999 
civil suit, he was ordered to pay the campaign worker $107,000 
(11,235,000 yen), the largest award ever in the country in a sexual 
harassment suit. Women's groups viewed the result as a positive step 
forward in the effort to combat sexual harassment.
    The Labor Standards Law forbids wage discrimination against women. 
Under the revised EEO Law, women may work overtime shifts for the first 
time.
    Women make up 40 percent of the labor force, and women between the 
ages of 15 and 64 have a labor force participation rate of 51 percent. 
Although the Labor Standards and the EEO law prohibit wage 
discrimination against women, in 1999 female workers on average earned 
only 62 percent of average male earnings. Women age 20 to 24 earned 91 
percent of men's wages for this age group, but average earnings of 
women age 50 to 54 were only 54 percent of the earnings of men in this 
age cohort. Much of this disparity results from the ``two-track'' 
personnel administration system found in most larger companies, under 
which new hires are put into one of two categories: Managerial track 
(those engaged in planning and decisionmaking jobs and with the 
potential to become top executives), or general track (those engaged in 
general office work). According to a 1998 survey by the Management and 
Coordination Agency, women held 9.2 percent of managerial positions. A 
1998 Labor Ministry survey found that over half of the companies with a 
two-track personnel system did not even consider women for managerial 
track positions. According to the Home Ministry, as of April 1999, 
women constituted 32 percent of all local government workers but held 
only 4 percent of top local government positions. Female workers have 
suffered disproportionately from the continued sluggishness of the 
economy. A 1999 Rengo labor union study reported that the number of 
nonworking women grew by 420,000 as many gave up looking for jobs due 
to the tight employment market.
    In addition to discrimination, the traditional male/female division 
of labor at home places disproportionate burdens on working women, who 
are still responsible for almost all child care and household duties.
    Women's and disabled person's advocacy groups continue to press for 
a government investigation into sterilization cases that were carried 
out between 1949 and 1992, a formal government apology and compensation 
(see Section 1.f.).
    In 1993 the government spokesperson publicly acknowledged and 
apologized for the former Imperial Government's involvement in the 
army's practice of forcing as many as 200,000 women (including Koreans, 
Filipinos, Chinese, Indonesians, Dutch, and Japanese) to provide sex to 
soldiers between 1932 and 1945. A 1999 U.N. Subcommission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities report included a 
recommendation that the Government provide state compensation to former 
``comfort women'' and prosecute those responsible for setting up and 
operating ``comfort stations'' during World War II. The Government has 
been unwilling to pay direct compensation to individual victims, on the 
grounds that postwar treaties already settled all war claims.
    The ``Asian Women's Fund'' (AWF) was established in 1995 as a 
private, government-sponsored fund to ``extend atonement and support'' 
to former ``comfort women.'' The AWF supports three types of projects: 
Payments to individual victims; medical and welfare assistance to 
individual comfort women; and funding projects to improve the general 
status of women and girls. Projects in the first category are funded by 
private donations, while the second and third types of projects are 
financed by the Government and administered by the AWF. As of December, 
the AWF had collected donations totaling approximately $4.6 million 
(486 million yen) and given lump-sum payments of almost $19,000 (2 
million yen) each and a letter of apology signed by the Prime Minister 
to more than 170 women. These women also received medical and welfare 
assistance from the AWF. In 1998 the AWF reached an agreement with a 
Dutch affiliate to start compensation payments to former Dutch comfort 
women. Government officials estimate that up to 100 Dutch women were 
forced to provide sexual services during World War II.
    The Government's refusal to pay direct compensation continues to 
draw international criticism. In December a coalition of NGO's held the 
Women's International War Crimes Tribunal in Tokyo, a 5day long mock 
trial designed to publicize the plight of former comfort women and the 
sentiment among many that the Government had not taken responsibility 
adequately for the abuses suffered by comfort women during World War 
II. In September, 15 former comfort women filed a class action lawsuit 
in a U.S. federal district court against the Japanese Government 
seeking compensation and an apology. At year's end, the case was 
pending. Similar lawsuits have been filed in other jurisdictions in 
previous years. In 1998 the Yamaguchi District Court ordered the 
Government to pay $2,542 (300,000 yen) in state compensation to three 
Korean former sex slaves for neglecting its constitutional duty to 
enact compensation legislation following the Government's 1993 
admission. However, the Court denied the plaintiffs' demand for an 
official government apology. This was the first court judgment rendered 
in favor of foreign war victims. Five other cases concerning former 
comfort women are pending in Tokyo District Court.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and 
welfare, and in general, the rights of children are protected 
adequately. Boys and girls have equal access to health care and other 
public services. Education is free and compulsory through the lower 
secondary level (age 14). Education is available widely to students who 
meet minimum academic standards at the upper secondary level through 
the age of 18.
    Public attention also is focused increasingly on reports of 
frequent child abuse in the home. According to the National Police 
Agency, 44 children died of abuse or neglect, one less than in 1999. 
However, the number of child abuse cases increased 55 percent during 
the year. The police investigated 186 cases of child abuse during the 
year, in which 182 adults were arrested and 166 children put into state 
protection. Child protection centers also dealt with 12,411 cases of 
abuse, an increase of 60 percent over the previous year. A March 1999 
report by the Ministry of Health and Welfare warned that recent cuts in 
funding by local governments to centers handling child abuse cases was 
exacerbating the problem, particularly since caseloads at counseling 
centers nearly doubled from 1988 to 1996. However, in May the Diet's 
enactment of a law granting child welfare officials authority to 
prohibit abusive parents from meeting or communicating with their 
children raised public awareness of the problem of child abuse. The law 
also bans abuse under the guise of discipline and obliges teachers, 
doctors, and welfare officials to report any suspicious circumstances.
    Severe bullying (``ijime'') continued to be a societal concern, at 
elementary and junior high schools, bullying most often involves verbal 
abuse, with physical abuse occurring more often at the high school 
level. However, because many cases go unreported, it is difficult to 
determine the exact number. According to a 1998 Management and 
Coordination Agency study, one in three elementary and junior high 
school students has been bullied, but more than one-third of the 
victims did not report the bullying to anyone. An Education Ministry 
survey released in August reported 18,900 cases of student-on-student 
violence in public schools during the 1999-2000 academic year. In June 
a court ruling linked an elementary school boy's 1994 suicide to 
corporal punishment inflicted by his teacher apparently this was the 
first time a teacher has been held accountable for such action by the 
courts. Educators, lawyers, and members of the boy and teacher's 
families residing in the Hyogo region where the incident occurred set 
up committees on classroom discipline and hot lines designed to prevent 
similar violence in the future. In addition to compiling statistics on 
bullying and consulting with various groups concerned with children's 
welfare, the Ministry of Justice's Office of the Ombudsman for 
Children's Rights provides counseling services for children 18 years of 
age and younger who have been victims of bullying.
    Teachers also increasingly are becoming the targets of student 
violence. Education Ministry statistics for 1999 showed an 11.2 percent 
increase in assaults on teachers by students from the previous year.
    In previous years, both the Government and society in general 
appeared to take a lenient attitude toward teenage prostitution and 
dating for money (which may or may not have involved sexual 
activities). However, in 1999 the Diet passed a law, which went into 
effect late that year, banning sex with children under age 18 as well 
as the production, sale, or distribution of child pornography. The law 
has reduced the open availability of child pornography. The law was 
passed following heightened public attention to a growing problem of 
teenage prostitution and international criticism over Japan's lax laws 
on child pornography. And, whereas in 1998 INTERPOL estimated that 80 
percent of Internet sites with child pornography originated in Japan, 
by late 1999, after passage of the law, the police reported most of 
these locations had either disappeared entirely or were accessible only 
at random hours so as to avoid detection and arrest. Since April 1999, 
operators of pornographic home pages and suppliers of pornographic 
images have been required to register with local safety commissions and 
to ban offering such pages to persons under the age of 18. However, 
teenage prostitution and dating for money continued to be a societal 
concern. Through October the police arrested 508 persons for 
patronizing teenage prostitutes.
    Under juvenile law, juvenile suspects are tried in family court and 
have the right of appeal to an appellate court. Family court 
proceedings are not open to the public, a policy that has been 
criticized by family members of juvenile crime victims. The number of 
juveniles arrested and sent to prosecutors was down 6.3 percent in 
1999, according to the National Police Agency.
    During the year, the Tokyo prefectural government put into effect 
programs to protect the welfare of stateless children, whose births 
their illegal immigrant mothers refused to register for fear of 
forcible repatriation. Justice Ministry statistics showed 837 stateless 
minors under age 5 in 1999.
    People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility 
to buildings for the disabled; however, 1994 legislation on 
construction standards for public facilities allows operators of 
hospitals, theaters, hotels, and similar enterprises to receive low-
interest loans and tax breaks if they build wide entrances and 
elevators to accommodate those with disabilities. There are an 
estimated 2.9 million physically disabled and roughly 2 million 
mentally disabled persons. Although not generally subject to overt 
discrimination in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services, the disabled face limited access to public 
transportation, ``mainstream'' public education, and other facilities. 
In November the barrier free transportation law took effect requiring 
public transport systems to take measures to make their facilities more 
accessible to the disabled as well as the elderly. In January revisions 
to the Civil Code went into effect to enable persons with hearing 
problems or speech impediments to create valid wills; previously they 
could not because they cannot ``convey orally'' to a notary the 
contents of a will or affirm that the text the notary reads back to 
them is correct.
    The Deliberation Panel on the Employment of the Handicapped, which 
operates within the Ministry of Labor, has mandated since 1976 that 
private companies with 300 or more employees hire a fixed minimum 
proportion of disabled persons. The penalty for noncompliance is a 
fine. A 1998 cabinet directive ordered private companies to raise the 
proportion of physically disabled persons in their work force from 1.6 
to 1.8 percent and raised the percentage of disabled persons among 
civil servants from 2 to 2.1 percent.
    An amendment to the Law to Promote the Employment of the 
Handicapped to include the mentally disabled took effect in 1998. The 
amendment also loosened the licensing requirements for community 
support centers that promote employment for the disabled, and it 
introduced government subsidies for the employment of mentally disabled 
persons in part-time jobs.
    In 1995 the Headquarters for Promoting the Welfare of Disabled 
Persons, set up by the Prime Minister's Office, recommended that 
municipalities draw up formal plans for the care of disabled citizens 
by the end of March 1997. In 1996 the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
also instructed local governments to set numerical targets for the 
number of home help providers and care facilities allocated to the 
disabled. However, only one-third of the nation's municipalities have 
formal care plans for disabled citizens.
    Women's and disabled person's advocacy groups continue to press for 
a government investigation into sterilization cases that were carried 
out between 1949 and 1992, a formal government apology, and 
compensation (see Section 1.f.).
    Indigenous People.--The Ainu are a people descended from the first 
inhabitants of Japan. Under an 1899 law, the Government pursued a 
policy of forced assimilation, imposing mandatory Japaneselanguage 
education and denying the Ainu their right to continue traditional 
practices. The law also left the Ainu with control of only 
approximately 0.15 percent of their original land holdings.
    In 1997 the Sapporo District Court ruled that the Ainu were a 
minority aboriginal race, and later that year the Diet passed the Law 
to Promote Ainu Culture. The law officially recognized the Ainu as an 
ethnic minority and required all prefectural governments to develop 
basic programs for promoting Ainu culture and traditions. It canceled a 
series of previous laws that discriminated against the Ainu, including 
an 1899 law. However, the law stopped short of recognizing the Ainu as 
the indigenous people of Hokkaido and also failed to address whether 
they deserved special rights as a distinct ethnic group. The new law 
did not mandate civil rights protection for the Ainu. A nonbinding 
accompanying resolution referred to the Ainu as a legal Japanese 
minority. A 1998 report submitted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur to the 
16th U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations stated that the Ainu 
had never entered into a consensual juridical relationship with any 
state and stated that the lack of such an agreement deprived them of 
their rights. Many Ainu criticize the Law to Promote Ainu Culture for 
not advancing Ainu political rights and criticize the Government for 
not providing funds for noncultural activities that would improve Ainu 
living conditions or financial status.
    The Ainu continue to face societal discrimination while engaging in 
an uphill struggle against complete assimilation. An Ainulanguage 
newspaper was established in 1997. In 1998 a local Hokkaido radio 
station began broadcasting a weekly 15minute Ainu-language program. 
Also in 1998, the Japan Ainu Association, a nationwide organization of 
Ainu, was established to lobby the Government for economic assistance 
and greater social welfare benefits for Ainu throughout the country.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The homogeneous nature of 
Japanese society impedes the integration of minority groups. This 
historically has affected Burakumin, Koreans, and alien workers.
    The Burakumin (descendants of feudal era ``outcasts'' who practiced 
``unclean'' professions such as butchering and undertaking), although 
not subject to governmental discrimination, are frequently victims of 
entrenched societal discrimination, including restricted access to 
housing and employment opportunities. They are estimated to number 
approximately 3 million, but most prefer to hide their identity. In a 
1993 government survey, 33 percent of Burakumin said that they suffered 
discrimination at some point during their lifetime, with 24 percent 
experiencing difficulties in marriage, 24 percent in daily life, and 21 
percent at their place of work. Beginning in 1969, the Government 
introduced with some success a number of social, economic, and legal 
programs designed to improve conditions for the Burakumin and hasten 
their assimilation into mainstream society. However, in recent years, 
some within the Burakumin community have questioned whether 
assimilation is an appropriate goal. When the basic legislation to 
provide funding for Burakumin programs expired in 1997, the Government 
enacted legislation effective for 5 years that retains 15 of the 
original 45 programs for Buraku communities.
    In 1997 the Buraku Liberation League rewrote its manifesto for the 
first time in 13 years, placing less emphasis on class struggle and 
more emphasis on civil rights, social welfare, and the environment. The 
new platform also replaced the term Burakumin (hamlet people) with 
Buraku Jumin (hamlet residents), to try to debunk the false concept 
that these people are a different race from other Japanese. The 
platform was adopted at a national convention.
    According to the Ministry of Justice, there were nearly 1.5 million 
legal foreign residents as of December 31, 1999, accounting for 1.23 
percent of the population. Of these approximately 636,500 were ethnic 
Koreans, followed by 294,200 Chinese, and 224,300 Brazilians. The 
number of Korean residents--a record low 40.9 percent of the foreign 
population in 1999--has been decreasing steadily as Korean nationals 
naturalize or marry Japanese, which allows their children to gain 
Japanese citizenship automatically. Despite improvements in legal 
safeguards against discrimination, Korean permanent residents (most of 
whom were born, raised, and educated in Japan) still are subject to 
various forms of deeply entrenched societal discrimination.
    Other foreigners also are subject to discrimination. There is a 
widespread perception that many crimes are committed by foreigners. In 
May the governor of Tokyo stated publicly that foreigners in the 
country might riot after an earthquake and warned that the country's 
self defense forces should be prepared. In December the Tokyo police 
admitted that as part of an anticrime effort, 700 posters, which 
ultimately were not used, had been issued to police stations to post in 
the Tokyo area that noted the increase in crime among foreigners, 
particularly among Chinese, and that urged citizens to call the police 
if they heard persons speaking Chinese. Justice Ministry officials in 
Toyama Prefecture ordered several shops to remove notices printed in 
English and Russian that warned persons they could not enter the stores 
if they did not understand Japanese on the grounds that the notices 
constituted racial discrimination.
    By law aliens with 5 years of continuous residence are eligible for 
naturalization and the simultaneous acquisition of citizenship rights, 
including the right to vote. However, in practice most eligible aliens 
choose not to apply for citizenship, in part due to fears that their 
cultural identity thereby would be lost. Obstacles to naturalization 
include broad discretion available to adjudicating officers and great 
emphasis on Japanese language ability. Naturalization procedures also 
require an extensive background check, including inquiries into the 
applicant's economic status and assimilation into Japanese society. 
Koreans are given the option of adopting a Japanese surname. The 
Government defends its naturalization procedures as being necessary to 
ensure the smooth assimilation of foreigners into Japanese society. 
Alien permanent residents may live abroad up to 4 or 5 years without 
losing their right to permanent residence the country.
    In 1995 the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not bar 
permanent foreign residents from voting in local elections. However, 
the Court also ruled that existing laws denying voting rights to 
foreign residents are not unconstitutional. In April and in August, the 
Supreme Court upheld Nagoya and Osaka High Court decisions rejecting 
appeals by Korean permanent residents demanding the right to vote in 
local elections. The courts have consistently ruled that limiting the 
vote to Japanese nationals is constitutional, but that the Diet could 
legislate suffrage for foreign residents. A ruling coalition proposal 
to submit such legislation for Diet approval was a major point of 
discussion during Korean President Kim Daejung's visit to Tokyo in 
September. However, at year's end the Government had not introduced the 
proposed legislation. In March 1999, the Osaka Prefectural Assembly 
passed a measure granting permanent residents local suffrage, becoming 
the third prefecture to pass such a bill.
    Under the School Education Law, students attending Chinese, Korean, 
or other non-Japanese schools are not eligible to take national 
university examinations. However, in August the Education Ministry 
announced that beginning in 2001, graduates of non-Japanese schools 
would be eligible to take national university examinations if they pass 
a state-run high school equivalency test. A number of local governments 
provide subsidies to Korean schools; the central Government does not 
subsidize any non-Japanese language schools.
    In April a revised law to end the practice of fingerprinting 
permanent foreign residents went into effect. Instead of 
fingerprinting, the Government established a family registry system 
that uses the resident's picture and signature and contains information 
on parents and spouses living in the country, a system similar to that 
used for Japanese nationals. All foreign residents still are required 
to carry alien registration certificates at all times, but the revised 
law reduces the penalties imposed on those found without documentation. 
The Government restored a Korean woman's permanent residency status 2 
days after the new law entered into effect, 14 years after she had lost 
it for refusing to be fingerprinted.
    In 1996 the Home Affairs Ministry reversed the long-held national 
policy of opposition to localities lifting the Japanese nationality 
requirement for public servants. However, the Ministry instructed local 
governments to restrict noncitizens' access to jobs that involved the 
exercise of public authority and formation of public opinion. The 
directive also required local governments to clearly state which jobs 
were closed to noncitizens. Some of the jobs considered off limits 
include tax collection, construction permit issuance, sanitation 
inspection, and firefighting.
    Several local governments already have changed their rules in 
response to the Government's new position. In 1999 the Hakodate 
municipal government began to allow foreign residents to take 
employment tests for all city jobs except firefighters. According to a 
1997 joint survey conducted by the All Japan Prefectural and Municipal 
Workers Union and the Korean Residents Association in Japan, 19.8 
percent of local governments still forbid the hiring of noncitizens.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of workers to associate freely in unions. Approximately 12 
million workers, 22 percent of all employees, belong to labor unions. 
Unions are free of government control and influence. Most unions are 
involved in political activity as well as labor relations, but they are 
not controlled by political parties. The Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation, which represents 7.6 million workers and was formed in 
1989 through the merger of several confederations, is the largest labor 
organization. There is no requirement for a single trade union 
structure, and there are no restrictions on who may be a union 
official. Members of the armed forces, police, and firefighters are not 
permitted to form unions or to strike. These restrictions have led to a 
long-running dispute before the International Labor Organization's 
(ILO) Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
over the observance of ILO Convention 98 concerning the right to 
organize and bargain collectively. The Committee has observed that 
these public employees have a limited capacity to participate in the 
process of determining their wages and has asked the Government to 
consider any measures it could take to encourage negotiations with 
public employees.
    The right to strike, implicit in the Constitution, is exercised. 
During 1999 87,000 workdays involving 26,000 employees were lost to 
strikes. The law prohibits retribution against strikers and is enforced 
effectively. Public employees do not have the right to strike.
    Unions are free to affiliate internationally and are active in 
international bodies, most notably the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions, and maintain extensive international contacts.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides unions with the right to organize, bargain, and 
act collectively. These rights are exercised freely, and collective 
bargaining is practiced widely. The annual ``Spring Wage Offensive,'' 
in which individual unions in each industry conduct negotiations 
simultaneously with their firms, involves nationwide participation. 
Management usually consults closely with its enterprise union. However, 
trade unions are independent of management and aggressively pursue the 
interests of their workers. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, 
and adequate mechanisms exist for resolving cases that occur, including 
the reinstatement with back wages of any workers fired for union 
activities. However, the collective bargaining rights of public 
employees are limited. The Government determines the pay of government 
employees based on a recommendation by the independent National 
Personnel Authority.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
provides that no person shall be held in bondage of any kind. 
Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited. 
Although children are not specified in the provision, this legal 
prohibition against forced or compulsory labor applies equally to 
adults and to children. Although in general forced or bonded labor does 
not occur, women are trafficked to Japan and coerced into prostitution 
(see Section 6.f.).
    In September a U.S. federal judge dismissed 13 lawsuits filed by 
former Allied prisoners of war against several Japanese companies 
seeking compensation for forced labor during World War II on the 
grounds that these claims were settled by the 1951 San Francisco Treaty 
of Peace with Japan barring war-related claims. The judge did not rule 
on whether similar suits filed by plaintiffs from China and South 
Korea, which were not signatories to the Treaty, could continue. 
Survivors and families of Chinese and Korean workers also continue to 
press claims for damages and compensation for their forced labor during 
the war, both in Japanese civil courts and in complaints to the ILO. In 
1999 the Tokyo High Court ordered the Kajima Corporation to settle with 
Chinese wartime laborers and their survivors for forced labor at the 
Hanaoka copper mine it operated during the war. On November 29, the 
Kajima Corporation agreed to establish a $4.6 million (500 million yen) 
fund to be administered by the Chinese Red Cross to compensate wartime 
workers. This was the first such settlement with Chinese forced to work 
in Japan during the war; however, the Kajima Corporation noted that the 
settlement did not represent an official acknowledgement of liability 
for events at the mine. An ILO committee has called on the Government 
to take additional measures to satisfy individual Chinese and Korean 
victims of forced labor during the war.
    The Asian Women's Fund continued to support former comfort women, 
who were forced to provide sexual services to Japanese troops during 
World War II (see Section 5).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution bans the exploitation of children. Both 
societal values and the rigorous enforcement of the Labor Standards Law 
protect children from exploitation in the workplace. The Government 
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that performed by children 
and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    Child labor is virtually nonexistent. By law children under the age 
of 15 may not be employed, and those under age 18 may not be employed 
in dangerous or harmful jobs. The Labor Inspection Division of the 
Ministry of Labor, which vigorously enforces the Labor Standards Law, 
reports no violations. Society places an extremely high value on 
education, which is compulsory through the lower secondary (i.e., ninth 
grade) level. Enrollment levels for both boys and girls through the 
free and widely available upper secondary level (age 18) exceed 95 
percent.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages are set on a 
regional (prefectural) and industry basis, with the input of tripartite 
(workers, employers, public interest) advisory councils. Employers 
covered by a minimum wage must post the concerned minimum wages, and 
compliance with minimum wages is considered widespread. Minimum wage 
rates, effective during the year, ranged from $53 (5,560 yen) per day 
in Tokyo and Osaka to $46 (4,795 yen) in Miyazaki, Aomori, Iwate, and 
Akita prefectures and are considered sufficient to provide a worker and 
family with a decent standard of living. The Labor Standards Law 
provides for a 40-hour workweek for most industries and mandates 
premium pay for hours worked over 40 in a week, or 8 in a day. However, 
labor unions frequently criticize the Government for failing to enforce 
maximum working hour regulations in smaller firms.
    The Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry estimated that, as 
of January 1, there were 251,697 foreign nationals residing illegally 
in the country. Illegal immigrants come primarily from South Korea, the 
Philippines, China, Thailand, and Malaysia.
    While many foreign illegal residents came in search of better 
paying manufacturing and construction jobs, these opportunities 
decreased during the economic slowdown. Thus more of the foreign 
workers are unemployed or marginally employed. Activist groups claim 
that employers exploit or discriminate against foreign workers, who 
often have little or no knowledge of the Japanese language or their 
legal rights. The Government has tried to reduce the inflow of illegal 
foreign workers by prosecuting employers. Recent revisions of the 
Immigration Law provide for penalties against employers of undocumented 
foreign workers. Suspected foreign workers also may be denied entry for 
passport, visa, and entry application irregularities. The August 1999 
revision to the immigration law also established penalties for illegal 
stays separate from existing injunctions against illegal entry. The 
Government continues to study the foreign worker issue, and several 
citizens' groups are working with illegal foreign workers to improve 
their access to information on worker rights.
    The Ministry of Labor effectively administers various laws and 
regulations governing occupational health and safety, principal among 
which is the 1972 Industrial Safety and Health Law. Standards are set 
by the Ministry of Labor and issued after consultation with the 
Standing Committee on Safety and Health of the Central Labor Standards 
Council. Labor inspectors have the authority to suspend unsafe 
operations immediately, and the law provides that workers may voice 
concerns over occupational safety and remove themselves from unsafe 
working conditions without jeopardizing their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law specifically prohibits 
trafficking, and there are provisions that could be used to combat it, 
the trafficking of persons, and particularly of women into the country 
for sexual purposes, is a problem. The Constitution prohibits holding 
persons in bondage; and in April 1999 the Law on Control and 
Improvement of Amusement Businesses was amended in order to supplement 
the Prostitution Prevention Act as an instrument against trafficking. 
The amended law sanctions employers rather than just sanctioning 
prostitute/victims and requires the Government to refuse to grant or to 
revoke the business license of anyone convicted of the ``crime of 
encouragement'' to engage in prostitution. The Penal Code contains 
articles that forbid the illegal arrest or confinement of another, as 
well as the kidnaping of another for profit. Labor and immigration laws 
also contain provisions relevant to trafficking victims. However, 
relatively few persons ever are prosecuted in connection with 
trafficking and forced sexual servitude; those who are prosecuted 
generally are prosecuted in connection with violations of immigration 
law. In May 1999 the Diet enacted a law intended to prevent all forms 
of sexual exploitation of children, whether trafficked or not, which 
imposes a 1- to 3-year sentence on anyone convicted of trading in 
children for the purpose of child prostitution or child pornography 
(see Section 5).
    In 1998 the U.N. Committee on Human Rights noted that ``traffic in 
women and insufficient protection for women subject to trafficking and 
slavery-like practices remain serious concerns.'' Japan is a 
destination country for trafficking in women for purposes of sexual 
exploitation. Brokers in source countries (e.g., the Philippines, the 
states of the former Soviet Union, and Thailand) recruit women and 
``sell'' them to Japanese intermediaries, who in turn coerce them into 
the sex trade by subjecting them to excessive debts and seizing their 
passports. Agents, brokers, and employers involved in trafficking for 
the sex trade often have ties to organized crime. Reliable statistics 
on the number and origin of women trafficked to the country are 
unavailable, but a government-funded study released in August found 
that nearly twothirds of foreign women surveyed following arrests for 
immigration offenses stated that they were working in the sex industry 
under duress. Ministry of Justice statistics indicated that 1.5 percent 
of the 24,661 women deported in 1999 were deported as prostitutes 
(others who worked in the sex industry were deported for other 
reasons). According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 126,982 
foreign women who overstayed their visas in 1998; it is not known how 
many such women are involved in the sex industry or have been 
trafficked. Many women who are trafficked into the country, 
particularly from the Philippines, enter on entertainment visas. An 
estimated 40,000 women from the Philippines enter the country each year 
on such visas. ``Entertainers'' are not covered by the Labor Standards 
Law, and have no minimum wage protections; however, there are 
indications that they may be somewhat less vulnerable to abuse by 
employers than female migrant workers entering on other types of visas 
or illegally.
    During the year, Human Rights Watch published an extensive report 
on Thai women in Japan. According to the report, many Thai women are 
enticed to come to the country with offers of lucrative legitimate 
employment, only to be forced into the sex industry; many others 
reportedly know that they will work in the sex trade. The passports of 
the trafficked women usually are confiscated by their ``employers,'' 
leaving them unable to escape their circumstances.
    The Government makes little effort to assist victims of trafficking 
for sexual purposes other than to house them temporarily in facilities 
established under the Antiprostitution Law, in detention centers for 
illegal immigrants, or through referrals to shelters run by NGO's; 
generally they are deported as illegal aliens. Women without 
documentation or sufficient funds to return to their country of origin 
may be detained for long periods. Several NGO's provide assistance to 
trafficking victims.
    In recent years there has been a surge in the smuggling of illegal 
immigrants from China. These illegal immigrants often are held in debt 
bondage to make them pay off the smugglers.
                               __________

                                KIRIBATI

    Kiribati is a constitutional republic with a popularly elected 
president and a legislative assembly, 40 members of which are elected 
by universal adult suffrage, and 2 of whom are members by virtue of 
their office. The country has a population of 87,000, which occupies 33 
small islands widely scattered across 1.365 million square miles of the 
central Pacific. The population is primarily Micronesian, with a 
significant component of Polynesian origin. The judiciary is 
independent.
    A police force of about 250 personnel is controlled effectively by 
civilian authority.
    Economic activity consists primarily of subsistence agriculture and 
fishing. The islands' isolation and meager resources, including poor 
soil and limited arable land, severely limit prospects for economic 
development.
    The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however, 
in the traditional culture, women occupy a subordinate role and have 
limited job opportunities.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
are forbidden by the Constitution; however, traditional practice 
permits corporal punishment for criminal acts and other transgressions. 
On some outer islands, the island councils occasionally order strokes 
with palm fronds to be administered for public drunkenness and other 
minor offenses, such as petty thievery.
    Prisons meet minimum international standards. There are separate 
facilities for men and women. Family members and church representatives 
are allowed access to prisoners.
    The question of monitoring prison conditions by local human rights 
groups has not arisen, and no policy concerning such monitoring has 
been formulated.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
respects these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and 
free of governmental interference.
    The judiciary consists of a high court, magistrate courts, a court 
of appeal, and land courts. Litigants also have the right of appeal to 
the Privy Council in London.
    The right to a fair public trial is provided by law and observed in 
practice. The Constitution provides that an accused person be informed 
of the nature of the offense with which he is charged and be provided 
adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. The right to 
confront witnesses, present evidence, and appeal convictions is 
provided for in law. Procedural safeguards are based on English common 
law.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities respect these provisions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanctions.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice; however, there were some instances 
in which the Government limited these rights.
    In May a former president established the country's first private 
newspaper, which enabled the opposition to present views divergent from 
those in the government-owned newspaper. The sole radio station is 
government owned; it regularly broadcasts Radio Australia programming. 
An opposition attempt to operate a private radio station was blocked in 
1999 when the Government closed the station and fined the owners for 
attempting to import broadcasting equipment without a license. A 
foreign journalist remains barred from entering the country after 
cabinet officials stated in 1999 that the journalist's articles ``gave 
a bad impression of the country.'' Churches published newsletters and 
other periodicals. High costs limited the availability of foreign print 
media and Internet access, but there were no Government imposed 
limitations.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly and association, including the right 
to form or belong to associations for the advancement or protection of 
a group's interests, and the Government does not impose any 
restrictions on these rights in practice. A permit is required for a 
public gathering, but these are granted routinely.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    There were no reports of refugees. The Government has not 
formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens choose the Government in periodic free and open elections. 
The President is elected for a 4-year term and exercises executive 
authority. No less than three and no more than four presidential 
candidates are nominated by the elected Legislative Assembly from among 
its members. Under the Constitution, the President is limited to three 
terms.
    In free and fair elections, voters reelected President Teburoro 
Tito to a second term in November 1998, with 52.3 percent of the votes. 
Most of President Tito's cabinet ministers have served in the previous 
cabinet.
    Women are underrepresented in politics and government. Two women 
hold permanent secretary positions, and there is 1 in the 42-member 
Parliament.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no restrictions on the formation of local nongovernmental 
organizations that concern themselves with human rights, but none have 
been formed. There have been no reported allegations of human rights 
violations by the Government and no known requests for investigations.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
creed, national origin, or sex, and the Government generally observed 
this prohibition in practice. Society is fundamentally egalitarian and 
has no privileged class.
    Women.--Violence against women does not appear to be a major 
problem in this isolated, rural society. Rape is a crime, and the law 
is enforced when charges are brought to court, although it is suspected 
that prosecutions are relatively infrequent. Wife battering 
traditionally is addressed through communal pressure.
    The traditional culture, in which men are dominant, has impeded a 
more active role for women in the economy. However, women slowly are 
finding work in unskilled and semiskilled occupations. The Government 
has increased its hiring and promotions of women to some extent; 
however, women may not work at night except under specified 
circumstances (generally in service jobs such as hotel clerks). 
Statistics on the participation of women in the work force and on 
comparative wages were unavailable. Women have full rights of ownership 
and inheritance of property. Women have full and equal access to 
education.
    Children.--Within its limited financial resources, the Government 
makes adequate expenditures for child welfare. Primary education is 
compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 12 years. The 40 
percent of primary school graduates who pass a national examination 
qualify to attend secondary school; a small fee is charged for 
matriculation at a secondary school.
    If child abuse exists, it is rare and has not become a source of 
societal concern.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence or complaint of 
discrimination in employment, education, or provision of other state 
services. Accessibility for the disabled has not been mandated.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Freedom of association is provided 
for in the Constitution. Workers are free to organize unions and choose 
their representatives. The Government does not control or restrict 
unions. Over 90 percent of the work force is occupied in fishing or 
subsistence farming, but the small wage sector has a relatively strong 
and effective trade union movement. In 1982 the seven registered trade 
unions merged to form the Kiribati Trade Union Congress (KTUC); which 
has approximately 2,500 members, mostly from the public service sector. 
The law provides for the right to strike. However, strikes are rare, 
the last one took place in 1980.
    Unions are free to affiliate internationally. The KTUC is 
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is provided for under the Industrial Relations Code. The 
Government sets wages in the large public sector. However, in a few 
statutory bodies and government-owned companies, employees may 
negotiate wages and other conditions. In the private sector, individual 
employees also may negotiate wages with employers. In keeping with 
tradition, negotiations are generally nonconfrontational. There have 
been no reports of antiunion discrimination. However, mechanisms exist 
for resolving any such complaints.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not practiced. The 
prohibition does not specifically mention children, but forced and 
bonded labor by children is not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age 
of 14. Primary education is compulsory for children between the ages of 
6 and 12. Children through the age of 15 are prohibited from industrial 
employment and employment aboard ships. Labor officers from the 
Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Employment generally enforce these 
laws effectively, given the rudimentary conditions of the economy and 
its industrial relations system. Children rarely are employed outside 
the traditional economy. Although not prohibited specifically, forced 
and bonded labor by children is not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government has taken no 
concrete action to implement longstanding legislation authorizing the 
establishment of minimum wages. Income tends to be pooled within the 
extended family, and the standard income is adequate. There is no 
legislatively prescribed workweek. Workers in the public sector (80 
percent of the wage-earning work force) work 36.25 hours per week, with 
overtime pay for additional hours.
    Employment laws provide rudimentary health and safety standards for 
the workplace. For example, employers must provide an adequate supply 
of clean water for workers and ensure the existence of sanitary toilet 
facilities. Employers are liable for the expenses of workers injured on 
the job. The Government's ability to enforce employment laws is 
hampered by a lack of qualified personnel. Workers cannot remove 
themselves from hazardous work sites without risking loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, through, or within the country.
                               __________

                 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a dictatorship 
under the absolute rule of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP). Kim Il Sung 
led the DPRK from its inception until his death in 1994. Since then his 
son Kim Jong Il has exercised unchallenged authority. Kim Jong Il was 
named General Secretary of the KWP in October 1997. In September 1998, 
the Supreme People's Assembly reconfirmed Kim Jong Il as Chairman of 
the National Defense Commission and declared that position the 
``highest office of state.'' The presidency was abolished leaving the 
late Kim Il Sung as the DPRK's only president. The titular Head of 
State is Kim Yong Nam, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme 
People's Assembly. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il continue to be the 
objects of intense personality cults. The regime emphasizes ``juche,'' 
a national ideology of self-reliance. The judiciary is not independent.
    The Korean People's Army is the primary organization responsible 
for external security. It is assisted by a large military reserve force 
and several quasi-military organizations, including the Worker-Peasant 
Red Guards and the People's Security Force. These organizations assist 
the Ministry of Public Security and cadres of the KWP in maintaining 
internal security. Members of the security forces committed serious 
human rights abuses.
    The State directs all significant economic activity, and only 
government-controlled labor unions are permitted. Industry continued to 
operate at much-reduced capacity that reflects antiquated plant and 
equipment and a severe shortage of inputs. This decline is due in part 
to the collapse of the former Soviet Union and East European Communist 
governments and the consequent sharp decline in trade and aid. Efforts 
at recovery have been hampered by heavy military spending--which 
amounted to perhaps a quarter of gross domestic product before the 
economy went into decline and is probably now a larger share of 
national output. It also is held back by a lack of access to commercial 
lending stemming from the DPRK's default on its foreign debt and its 
inability to obtain loans from international financial institutions. 
Never food self-sufficient, the country relies on trade to supplement 
domestic production, which has been hobbled by disastrous agricultural 
policies. Since 1995 nearly annual droughts and floods have destroyed 
crops and ruined agricultural land, and hunger and malnutrition have 
been widespread. Famine has caused internal dislocation, widespread 
malnutrition, and approximately a million deaths from starvation and 
related diseases. Economic and political conditions have caused 
thousands of persons to flee their homes. The Government continued to 
seek international food aid, produce ``alternative foods,'' and take 
steps to boost production. It has supported the spread of farmers' 
markets to make up for the contraction of food supplied through the 
public distribution system. Food, clothing, and energy are rationed 
throughout the country. The U.N.'s World Food Program provides 
assistance to the elderly, children and mothers, and persons employed 
in flood damage recovery efforts.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it 
continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the 
right to change their government peacefully. There continued to be 
reports of extrajudicial killings and disappearances. Citizens are 
detained arbitrarily, and many are held as political prisoners; prison 
conditions are harsh. The constitutional provisions for an independent 
judiciary and fair trials are not implemented in practice. The regime 
subjects its citizens to rigid controls. The leadership perceives most 
international norms of human rights, especially individual rights, as 
illegitimate, alien, and subversive to the goals of the State and 
party. The Penal Code is draconian, stipulating capital punishment and 
confiscation of all assets for a wide variety of ``crimes against the 
revolution,'' including defection, attempted defection, slander of the 
policies of the party or State, listening to foreign broadcasts, 
writing ``reactionary'' letters, and possessing reactionary printed 
matter. The Government prohibits freedom of speech, the press, 
assembly, and association, and all forms of cultural and media 
activities are under the tight control of the party. Radios sold in 
North Korea receive North Korean radio broadcasts only; radios obtained 
abroad by the general public must be altered to work in a similar 
manner. Cable News Network (CNN) television is available in one 
Pyongyang hotel frequented by foreigners. Under these circumstances, 
little outside information reaches the public except that approved and 
disseminated by the Government. The Government restricts freedom of 
religion, citizens' movements, and worker rights. There were reports of 
trafficking in women and young girls among refugees and workers 
crossing the border into China.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Defectors and 
refugees report that the regime executes political prisoners, opponents 
of the regime, repatriated defectors, and others (reportedly including 
military officers suspected of espionage or of plotting against Kim 
Jong Il). Criminal law makes the death penalty mandatory for activities 
``in collusion with imperialists'' aimed at ``suppressing the national 
liberation struggle.'' Some prisoners are sentenced to death for such 
ill-defined ``crimes'' as ``ideological divergence,'' ``opposing 
socialism,'' and other ``counterrevolutionary crimes.'' In some cases, 
executions reportedly were carried out at public meetings attended by 
workers, students, and school children. Executions also have been 
carried out before assembled inmates at places of detention. Border 
guards reportedly have orders to shoot-to-kill potential defectors (see 
Section 2.d.).
    Religious and human rights groups outside the country report that 
members of underground churches have been killed because of their 
religious beliefs and suspected contacts with overseas evangelical 
groups operating across the Chinese border (see Section 2.c.).
    In August 1998, a Reuters report stated that, following a March 
1998 coup attempt, authorities arrested several thousand members of the 
armed forces and executed many of them.
    Many prisoners reportedly have died from disease, starvation, or 
exposure (see Section 1.c.).
    According to unconfirmed press reports from Japan and the Republic 
of Korea in 1997, several senior party officials were executed publicly 
in September 1997. The Kyodo News Network reported that Seo Kwan Hui, 
Secretary of Agriculture for the KWP, and 17 other senior officials, 
including some from the army and from the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth 
League, were executed for corruption and working for South Korea. In 
1998 Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that among those executed were 
a four-star general who ran the Political Bureau of the Korean People's 
Army and Choe Hyon Tok, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the Supreme People's Assembly. According to the AFP, seven persons in 
this group were executed by firing squad before thousands of 
spectators.
    In December a South Korean newsmagazine quoted a defector as 
stating that in 1999 in the city of Hyesan, on the border with China, 
the military had publicly executed 19 residents, secretly killed over 
20 persons, and imprisoned 600. The targets of the purge were frequent 
travelers to China and opium addicts.
    Another South Korean newsmagazine reported that there were at least 
20 public executions during 1997 either for economic offenses, 
including stealing cattle and electric wire, or for attempting to 
defect. Amnesty International (AI) reported in January 1997 that at 
least 23 persons had been executed publicly between 1970 and 1992 for 
offenses that reportedly included ``banditry'' and ``stealing rice from 
a train.'' Government officials reportedly told AI in 1995 that only 
one or two executions had taken place since 1985.
    North Korean officials informed AI in 1995 that Japanese citizens 
Cho Ho Pyong, his ethnic Japanese wife Koike Hideko, and their three 
young children were killed by the authorities in 1972 while attempting 
to leave the country. The authorities told AI that Cho escaped from a 
detention center where he was being held for spying and killed a guard 
in the escape.
    b. Disappearance.--The Government reportedly is responsible for 
cases of disappearance. According to defector reports, individuals 
suspected of political crimes often are taken from their homes by state 
security officials late at night and sent directly, without trial, to 
camps for political prisoners. There also have been reports of past 
DPRK involvement in the kidnaping abroad of South Koreans, Japanese, 
and other foreigners. In 1995 the Japanese press estimated that as many 
as 20 Japanese may have been kidnaped and detained in North Korea. 
According to Japanese government officials, these abductions took place 
between 1977 and 1983. In addition several suspected cases of 
kidnaping, hostage-taking, and other acts of violence apparently 
intended to intimidate ethnic Koreans living in China and Russia have 
been reported. There were unconfirmed reports that North Korean agents 
kidnaped a South Korean citizen, Reverend Dongshik Kim, in China and 
took him to North Korea in January. There is credible evidence that the 
DPRK Government may have been involved in the July 1995 abduction of a 
South Korean citizen working in China as a missionary. This missionary 
subsequently appeared publicly in North Korea and was portrayed as a 
defector. The DPRK denies that it has been involved in kidnapings.
    In November 1997, the South Korean Government arrested several 
alleged North Korean espionage agents. According to the South Korean 
Government's report on its investigation, those arrested claimed that 
three South Korean high school students, missing since 1978, had been 
kidnaped by the North Korean Government and trained as espionage 
agents. The three were identified as Kim Young Nam, who disappeared 
from Son Yu beach, and Yi Myong U and Hong Kyun Pyo, both of whom 
disappeared from Hong To island beach. According to those arrested, 
there were several other kidnapings in the late 1970's and early 
1980's.
    AI reports detail a number of cases of disappearances including 
that of Japanese citizen Shibata Kozo and his wife Shin Sung Suk, who 
left Japan in 1960 and resettled in North Korea. The authorities 
reportedly arrested Shibata in 1962 after he encouraged a demonstration 
by former Japanese residents protesting the poor treatment given them. 
In 1993 AI claimed that he was still in custody and in poor health and 
that there had been no word about his wife and three children since 
1965. In 1995 North Korean officials informed AI that Shibata Kozo, his 
wife, and children died in a train accident in early 1990, a few weeks 
after he was released from nearly 30 years in prison. However, AI 
reports that Shibata Kozo was still in custody at the time of the 
alleged accident.
    The cases of three ethnic Korean residents of Beijing, China (16, 
18, and 20 years of age), reported by AI in 1995 to have been taken to 
North Korea against their will, remained unresolved. The three were 
taken in apparent retaliation for criticism in the Japanese media of 
North Korean human rights violations made by their father, a former 
prisoner in North Korea. The North Korean authorities deny this 
allegation, claiming that the three brothers were deported to North 
Korea for breaking Chinese law and that they are now living with 
relatives.
    Numerous reports indicate that ordinary citizens are not allowed to 
mix with foreigners, and AI has reported that a number of North Koreans 
who maintained friendships with foreigners have disappeared. In at 
least one case, AI reported that a citizen who had disappeared was 
executed for maintaining a friendship with a Russian national.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--While there is no information on recent practices, 
credible reports indicate that prisoners are mistreated and that many 
have died from disease, starvation, or exposure.
    In 1998 a Polish newspaper reported the experiences of a woman who 
spent 10 years in a North Korean concentration camp before fleeing 
first to China and then to South Korea. The approximately 1,800 inmates 
in this particular camp typically worked 16 to 17 hours per day. The 
woman reported severe beatings, torture involving water forced into a 
victim's stomach with a rubber hose and pumped out by guards jumping on 
a board placed across the victim's abdomen, and chemical and biological 
warfare experiments allegedly conducted on inmates by the army. South 
Korean media reported that the DPRK State Security Agency manages the 
camps through use of forced labor, beatings, torture, and public 
executions.
    Prison conditions are harsh. International nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) and defector sources report that whole families, 
including children, are imprisoned together. ``Reeducation through 
labor'' is common punishment, consisting of forced labor, such as 
logging and tending crops, under harsh conditions. A small number of 
persons who claimed to have escaped from detention camps reported that 
starvation and executions are common. In one prison, clothing 
reportedly was issued only once in 3 years. AI reported the existence 
of ``punishment cells,'' too low to allow standing upright and too 
small for lying down flat, where prisoners are kept for up to several 
weeks for breaking prison rules. Visitors to North Korea reported that 
they observed prisoners being marched in leg irons, metal collars, or 
shackles.
    A former prison camp inmate who later defected to South Korea told 
the South Korean press that conditions in prison camps became more 
difficult as the food crisis worsened in the mid-1990's. With the food 
ration reduced to 2 ounces daily in 1996, 20 percent of the inmates in 
one camp died. Prisoners who tried to escape were publicly executed as 
a warning to others. Inmates were forced to find shelter in nearby 
mountains when authorities destroyed the camp's housing area in 1996 in 
anticipation of a visit by an international human rights group. The 
majority of prisoners in the camps were those who had contacted South 
Koreans, attempted to go to South Korea via China, those who studied 
abroad, and members of antigovernment groups.
    In 1999 credible witnesses reported that prisoners held on the 
basis of their religious beliefs were treated worse than other inmates 
were. One witness, a former prison guard, reported that those believing 
in God were regarded as insane, as the authorities taught that ``all 
religions are opiates.'' He recounted an instance in which a woman was 
kicked hard and left lying for days because a guard overheard her 
praying for a child who was beaten.
    The Government normally does not permit inspection of prisons by 
human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There are no 
restrictions on the ability of the Government to detain and imprison 
persons at will and to hold them incommunicado.
    Little information is available on criminal justice procedures and 
practices, and outside observation of the legal system has been limited 
to ``show trials'' for traffic violations and other minor offenses.
    Family members and other concerned persons find it virtually 
impossible to obtain information on charges against detained persons. 
Judicial review of detentions does not exist in law or in practice.
    Defectors claim that North Korea detains between 150,000 and 
200,000 persons for political reasons, sometimes along with their 
family members, in maximum security camps in remote areas. An October 
1992 report by two former inmates made reference to severe living 
conditions in what they called ``concentration camps.'' North Korean 
officials deny the existence of such prison camps but admit that there 
are ``education centers'' for persons who ``commit crimes by mistake.''
    In 1991 a North Korean defector who had been a ranking official in 
the DPRK Ministry of Public Security said that there were two types of 
detention areas. One consists of closed camps where conditions are 
extremely harsh and from which prisoners never emerge. In the other, 
prisoners can be ``rehabilitated.''
    One credible report lists a dozen political prisoner camps and 
approximately 30 forced labor and labor education camps in the DPRK. It 
is believed that some former high officials are imprisoned in the 
camps. Visitors formerly were allowed, but currently any form of 
communication with detainees, including visitors, is said to be 
prohibited.
    In mid-1999, an ethnic Korean with foreign citizenship was arrested 
for unauthorized contact with North Koreans. This person was detained 
for a month before being released.
    In May 1998, a foreigner of Korean descent was detained and held 
incommunicado for nearly 3 months before he was finally released. In 
September 1998, another foreigner of Korean descent was held 
incommunicado for more than a month for an unspecified ``violation of 
law'' before being released and expelled from the country.
    South Korean newspapers reported in 1997 that family members of 
North Korean defector Hwang Chang Yop, former head of the Juche 
Research Institute, and a senior advisor to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong 
Il, who defected to South Korea in that year, either were under house 
arrest or incarcerated in political prisons. However, visiting 
foreigners have seen some members of his family.
    In March 1999, North Korean officials in Thailand tried to detain a 
Bangkok-based North Korean diplomat, Hong Sun Gyong, and his family. 
Hong and his wife escaped from their abductors and then requested 
asylum. Their son was taken to Laos by North Korean officials but 
subsequently was allowed to rejoin his parents in Thailand.
    The Government is not reported to use forced exile. However, the 
Government routinely uses forced resettlement and has relocated many 
tens of thousands of persons from Pyongyang to the countryside. 
Although disabled veterans are treated extremely well, there are also 
reports that other physically disabled persons and those judged to be 
politically unreliable have been sent to internal exile. Often those 
relocated are selected on the basis of family background. Nonetheless, 
there is some evidence that class background is less important than in 
the past because of the regime's emphasis on the solidarity of the 
``popular masses'' and united front efforts with overseas Koreans. 
According to unconfirmed September 1997 foreign press reports, some 500 
senior officials were sent into internal exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution states that 
courts are independent and that judicial proceedings are to be carried 
out in strict accordance with the law; however, an independent 
judiciary and individual rights do not exist. The Public Security 
Ministry dispenses with trials in political cases and refers defendants 
to the Ministry of State Security for imposition of punishment.
    The Constitution contains elaborate procedural protections, and it 
states that cases are heard in public, and that the accused has the 
right to a defense; hearings may be closed to the public as stipulated 
by law. When trials are held, lawyers are apparently assigned by the 
Government. Reports indicate that defense lawyers are not considered 
representatives of the accused; rather, they are expected to help the 
court by persuading the accused to confess guilt. Some reports note a 
distinction between those accused of political crimes and common 
criminals and state that the Government affords trials or lawyers only 
to the latter. The Government considers critics of the regime to be 
``political criminals.''
    Numerous reports suggest that past political offenses have included 
such behavior as sitting on newspapers bearing Kim Il Sung's picture, 
or (in the case of a professor reportedly sentenced to work as a 
laborer) noting in class that Kim Il Sung had received little formal 
education. The KWP has a special regulation protecting the images of 
Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. All citizens are required by this 
regulation to protect from damage any likeness of the two Kims. 
Beginning in the 1970's, the 10 Great Principles of Unique Ideology 
directed that anyone who tore or otherwise defaced a newspaper photo of 
either of the two Kims was a political criminal and punished as such. 
Defectors have reported families being punished because children had 
accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kim's. Families must 
display pictures of the two Kim's in their homes, and if local party 
officials found the family had neglected its photos, the punishment was 
to write self-criticism throughout an entire year (see Section 1.f.).
    A foreigner hired to work on foreign broadcasts for the regime was 
imprisoned for 1 year without trial for criticizing the quality of the 
regime's foreign propaganda. He then was imprisoned for 6 more years 
(with trial) shortly after his release for claiming in a private 
conversation that his original imprisonment was unjust. While AI has 
listed 58 political prisoners by name, the total number of political 
prisoners being held is much larger. Several defectors and former 
inmates reported that the total figure is approximately 150,000, while 
South Korean authorities said the total figure is about 200,000.
    The South Korean Ministry of National Unification reported to its 
National Assembly in October 1997 that North Korea held more than 
200,000 political prisoners in camps where many had frozen or starved 
to death, and that famine may have worsened conditions. The report went 
on to describe the camps as having no electricity or heating 
facilities. The report claimed that those who attempted to escape were 
executed immediately. Most camps are located in remote mountain or 
mining areas. Some reports indicated an increase in the number of 
political prisoners as North Koreans had begun to complain more openly 
about the failure of the Government's economic policies.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of 
person and residence and the privacy of correspondence; however, the 
Government does not respect these provisions in practice. The regime 
subjects its citizens to rigid controls. The state leadership perceives 
most international norms of human rights, and especially individual 
rights, as alien social concepts subversive to the goals of the State 
and party. The Government relies upon an extensive, multilevel system 
of informers to identify critics and potential troublemakers. Whole 
communities sometimes are subjected to massive security checks. The 
possession of ``reactionary material'' and listening to foreign 
broadcasts are both considered crimes that may subject the transgressor 
to harsh punishments. In some cases, entire families are punished for 
alleged political offenses committed by one member of the family. For 
example, defectors have reported families being punished because 
children had accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kims. 
Families must display pictures of the two Kims in their homes, and must 
keep them clean. Local party officials have conducted unannounced 
inspections once a month, and if the inspectors found the family had 
neglected its photos, the punishment was to write self-criticism 
throughout an entire year (see Section 1.e.).
    The Government monitors correspondence and telephones. Telephones 
essentially are restricted to domestic operation, although some 
international service is available on a very restricted basis.
    The Constitution provides for the right to petition. However, when 
an anonymous petition or complaint about state administration is 
submitted, the Ministries of State Security and Public Safety seek to 
identify the author through handwriting analysis. The suspected 
individual may be subjected to a thorough investigation and punishment.
    The regime justifies its dictatorship with arguments derived from 
concepts of collective consciousness and the superiority of the 
collective over the individual, appeals to nationalism, and citations 
of ``the juche idea.'' The authorities emphasize that the core concept 
of juche is ``the ability to act independently without regard to 
outside interference.'' Originally described as ``a creative 
application of Marxism-Leninism'' in the national context, juche is a 
malleable philosophy reinterpreted from time to time by the regime as 
its ideological needs change and used by the regime as a ``spiritual'' 
underpinning for its rule.
    As defined by Kim Il Sung, juche is a quasi-mystical concept in 
which the collective will of the people is distilled into a supreme 
leader whose every act exemplifies the State and society's needs. 
Opposition to such a leader, or to the rules, regulations, and goals 
established by his regime is thus in itself opposition to the national 
interest. The regime therefore claims a social interest in identifying 
and isolating all opposition.
    Since the late 1950's, the regime has divided society into three 
main classes: ``Core,'' ``wavering,'' and ``hostile.'' These three 
classes are further subdivided into subcategories based on perceived 
loyalty to the Party and the leadership. Security ratings are assigned 
to each individual; according to some estimates, nearly half of the 
population is designated as either ``wavering'' or ``hostile.'' These 
loyalty ratings determine access to employment, higher education, place 
of residence, medical facilities, and certain stores. They also affect 
the severity of punishment in the case of legal infractions. While 
there are signs that this rigid system has been relaxed somewhat in 
recent years--for example, children of religious practitioners are no 
longer automatically barred from higher education--it remains a basic 
characteristic of KWP political control.
    Citizens with relatives who fled to South Korea at the time of the 
Korean War still appear to be classified as part of the ``hostile 
class'' in the DPRK's elaborate loyalty system. This subcategory alone 
encompasses a significant percentage of the population. One defector 
estimated that the class of those considered potentially hostile may 
comprise 25 to 30 percent of the population; others place the figure at 
closer to 20 percent. Members of this class are still subject to 
discrimination, although defectors report that their treatment has 
improved greatly in recent years.
    The authorities subject citizens of all age groups and occupations 
to intensive political and ideological indoctrination. Even after Kim 
Il Sung's death, his cult of personality and the glorification of his 
family and the official juche ideology remained omnipresent. The cult 
approaches the level of a state religion.
    The goal of indoctrination remains to ensure loyalty to the system 
and leadership, as well as conformity to the State's ideology and 
authority. The necessity for the intensification of such indoctrination 
repeatedly is stressed in the writings of Kim Jong Il, who attributes 
the collapse of the Soviet Union largely to insufficient ideological 
indoctrination, compounded by the entry of foreign influences.
    Indoctrination is carried out systematically, not only through the 
mass media, but also in schools and through worker and neighborhood 
associations. Kim Jong Il has stated that ideological education must 
take precedence over academic education in the nation's schools, and he 
has also called for the intensification of mandatory ideological study 
and discussion sessions for adult workers.
    Another aspect of the State's indoctrination system is the use of 
mass marches, rallies, and staged performances, sometimes involving 
hundreds of thousands of people. In September 1998, celebrations of the 
50th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK included hours of 
carefully choreographed demonstration of mass adulation of the 
leadership. In October similar celebrations of the 55th anniversary of 
the KWP reportedly involved upwards of 1 million persons.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides 
for freedom of speech and the press, the Government prohibits the 
exercise of these rights in practice. The regime only permits 
activities that support its objectives. Articles of the Constitution 
that require citizens to follow ``Socialist norms of life'' and to obey 
a ``collective spirit'' take precedence over individual political or 
civil liberties.
    The Government strictly curtails freedom of expression. The 
authorities may punish persons for criticizing the regime or its 
policies by imprisonment or ``corrective labor.'' One defector reported 
in 1986 that a scientist, whose home was under surveillance through his 
radio set, was arrested and executed for statements that he made at 
home critical of Kim Il Sung. In another case, AI reports that a family 
formerly resident in Japan was sent to a ``reeducation-through-labor'' 
center because one member of the family allegedly made remarks 
disparaging the Government.
    The Government attempts to control all information. It carefully 
manages the visits of Western journalists. In 1996 the Cable News 
Network was allowed to broadcast live, unedited coverage of the 2nd 
year memorial service for the death of Kim Il Sung. The regime recently 
allowed foreign journalists to report on the food situation. Foreign 
journalists also were allowed to report on the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO) light-water reactor groundbreaking at 
Kumho in 1997. During the June 13 to 15 inter-Korean summit, and during 
the October visit of U.S. Secretary of State Albright, groups of 
foreign journalists were permitted to accompany official delegations 
and to file reports, although under strict state monitoring. Also, the 
presidents of 46 South Korean newspaper and broadcast organizations, 
led by the South Korean Minister of Culture and Tourism, traveled to 
the country in August and met with Kim Jong Il. Although more foreign 
journalists have been allowed into North Korea, the Government still 
maintains strict control over the movements of foreign visitors. For 
example, journalists accompanying a foreign minister from another 
country were not allowed to visit a department store or a train 
station; they were not allowed to talk to officials or to persons on 
the street. Those who arrived with cellular or satellite phones had 
them confiscated for the duration of their stay. Domestic media 
censorship is strictly enforced, and no deviation from the official 
government line is tolerated.
    The regime prohibits listening to foreign media broadcasts except 
by the political elite, and violators are subject to severe punishment. 
Radios and television sets receive only domestic programming; radios 
obtained from abroad must be submitted for alteration to operate in a 
similar manner. CNN television broadcasts are available in a Pyongyang 
hotel frequented by foreigners. Private telephone lines operate on an 
internal system that prevents making and receiving calls from outside 
the country. International phone lines are available under very 
restricted circumstances. There may be very limited Internet access in 
North Korea for government officials, according to recent reports.
    During the year, the DPRK defended threats and reiterated 
criticisms first made in late 1997 of the South Korean media for 
criticizing the North Korean leadership. The first instance was in 
response to a South Korean newspaper editorial, the second in reaction 
to a television drama about life in North Korea.
    The Government severely restricts academic freedom and controls 
artistic and academic works. Visitors report that one of the primary 
functions of plays, movies, operas, children's performances, and books 
is to contribute to the cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung and 
Kim Jong Il.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the 
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, the Government does not 
respect this provision in practice. The Government prohibits any public 
meetings without authorization.
    Although the Constitution provides for freedom of association, the 
Government does not respect this provision in practice. There are no 
known organizations other than those created by the Government. 
Professional associations exist primarily as a means of government 
monitoring and control over the members of these organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for ``freedom of 
religious belief;'' however, in practice the Government discourages 
organized religious activity except that supervised by officially 
recognized groups. Genuine religious freedom does not exist. The 
Constitution also stipulates that religion ``should not be used for 
purposes of dragging in foreign powers or endangering public 
security.''
    Although in the past the Government has branded religiously active 
persons as ``counterrevolutionaries'' and killed or imprisoned them, in 
more recent times, it has allowed the formation of several government-
sponsored religious organizations. These serve as interlocutors with 
foreign church groups and international aid organizations. Foreigners 
who have met with representatives of these organizations believe that 
some are genuinely religious but note that others appear to know little 
about religious dogma, liturgy, or teaching. A constitutional change in 
1992 deleted the clause about freedom of antireligious propaganda, 
authorized religious gatherings, and provided for ``the right to build 
buildings for religious use.''
    The number of religious believers is unknown but has been estimated 
by the media and religious groups at 10,000 Protestants, 10,000 
Buddhists, and 4,000 Catholics. There are also an undetermined number 
of persons belonging to underground Christian churches. In addition the 
Chondogyo Young Friends Party, a government-sponsored group based on a 
traditional Korean religious movement, still is in existence. There are 
300 Buddhist temples. Most of the temples are regarded as cultural 
relics, but in some of them religious activity is permitted. Two 
Protestant churches under lay leadership and a Roman Catholic church 
(without a priest) have been opened since 1988 in Pyongyang. Several 
schools for religious education exist. There are 3-year religious 
colleges for training Protestant and Buddhist clergy. A religious 
studies program also was established at Kim Il Sung University in 1989; 
its graduates usually go on to work in the foreign trade sector.
    There has been a limited revival of Buddhism with the translation 
and publication of Buddhist scriptures that had been carved on 80,000 
wooden blocks and kept at an historic temple. It is not known whether 
any Catholic priests, whose role is a fundamental element for the 
practice of the Catholic faith, remain in the country. Seoul Archbishop 
Nicholas Jin-Suk Cheong, appointed by the Pope as Apostolic 
Administrator of Pyongyang, was quoted in July as stating that while 
there were 50 priests in the country in the 1940's, it is not known if 
they are still alive. In November a delegation from the Vatican visited 
the country. Although some foreigners who have visited the DPRK over 
the years say that church activity appears staged, others believe that 
church services are genuine, although sermons contain both religious 
and political content supportive of the regime. The Government claims, 
and visitors confirm, that there are more than 500 authorized ``house 
churches.''
    Persons engaging in religious proselytizing may be arrested and are 
subject to harsh penalties, including imprisonment and prolonged 
detention without charge. The regime appears to have cracked down on 
unauthorized religious groups in recent years, especially persons who 
proselytize or who have ties to overseas evangelical groups operating 
across the border with China, as the Government appears concerned about 
religiously based South Korean relief and refugee assistance efforts 
along the northeast border with the People's Republic of China becoming 
entwined with more political goals, including overthrow of the regime. 
The food crisis apparently has heightened government concern about 
antiregime activity. An article in the Korean Workers Party newspaper 
in 1999 criticized ``imperialists and reactionaries'' for trying to use 
ideological and cultural infiltration, including religion, to destroy 
socialism from within. South Korean law requires all parties, including 
religious groups, travelling to North Korea or contacting North Koreans 
to request permission from the South Korean security agency. This 
requirement increases suspicions among North Korean officials about the 
intentions of such groups.
    There is no reliable information on the number of religious 
detainees or prisoners, but there have been unconfirmed reports that 
some of those detained in the country are detained because of their 
religion.
    Religious and human rights groups outside the country have provided 
numerous, unconfirmed reports that members of underground churches have 
been beaten, arrested, detained in prison camps, or killed because of 
their religious beliefs. One unconfirmed report stated that a dozen 
Christians have been executed since January 1999. According to another 
unconfirmed report, 23 Christians were executed between October 1999 
and April; some reportedly were executed under falsified criminal 
charges, and some reportedly were tortured prior to their executions. A 
religious nongovernmental organization quoted an unnamed South Korean 
pastor's claims that 400 Christians were executed in 1999. These 
reports could not be confirmed or disproved because of the 
effectiveness of the Government in barring outside observers. 
Nonetheless, the collective weight of anecdotal evidence of harsh 
treatment of unauthorized religious activity lends credence to such 
reports. The regime deals harshly with its critics and views religious 
believers belonging to underground congregations or with ties to 
evangelical groups in North China as opponents. Reports of executions, 
torture, and imprisonment of religious persons in the country continue 
to emerge.
    Little is known about the actual life of religious persons in the 
DPRK. Members of government-recognized religious groups do not appear 
to suffer discrimination; in fact some reports claim they have been 
mobilized by the regime. Persons whose parents were believers but who 
themselves are nonpracticing are able to rise to at least the midlevels 
of the bureaucracy. Such individuals, as a category, suffered broad 
discrimination in the past. Members of underground churches connected 
to border missionary activity appear to be regarded as subversive 
elements.
    The Government deals harshly with all opponents, including those 
engaging in religious practices deemed unacceptable to the regime. In 
April 1999, witnesses testified before the U.S. Congress on the 
treatment of persons held in prison camps through the early 1990's. The 
witnesses stated that prisoners held on the basis of their religious 
beliefs generally were treated worse than other inmates. One witness, a 
former prison guard, testified that those believing in God were 
regarded as insane, as the authorities taught that ``all religions are 
opium.'' He recounted an instance in which a woman was kicked 
repeatedly and left with her injuries unattended for days because a 
guard overheard her praying for a child who was being beaten. Because 
of the effectiveness of the Government in barring outside observers, 
such allegations could not be substantiated.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--In the past, the regime has controlled 
internal travel strictly, requiring a travel pass for any movement 
outside one's home village. These passes were granted only for official 
travel or attendance at a relative's wedding or funeral. Long delays in 
obtaining the necessary permit often resulted in denial of the right to 
travel even for these limited purposes. In recent years, it appears 
that the internal controls on travel have eased significantly. There 
are reports of the large-scale movement of people across the country in 
search of food. Only members of a very small elite have vehicles for 
personal use. The regime tightly controls access to civilian aircraft, 
trains, buses, food, and fuel.
    The regime limits foreign travel to officials and trusted artists, 
athletes, academics, and religious figures. It does not allow 
emigration. In recent years, there have been numerous reports of a 
steady increase in North Korean migrants arriving in China, Hong Kong, 
Vietnam, and other Asian countries. The regime reportedly retaliates 
against the relatives of some of those who manage to escape. According 
to the Penal Code, defection and attempted defection (including the 
attempt to gain entry to a foreign embassy for the purpose of seeking 
political asylum) are capital crimes. Refugees have stated that DPRK 
border guards have received orders to shoot-to-kill persons attempting 
to cross the border into China, although some border crossings for 
family visits and trade are permitted. Others have reported that some 
would-be refugees who have been involuntarily returned have been 
executed (see Section 1.a.). Following the collapse of European 
communism, the regime recalled several thousand students from overseas 
but in recent years again has allowed small numbers of students to 
study abroad. Nonetheless, in recent years substantial numbers of 
persons have fled to neighboring countries in search of food. Many 
return after securing food.
    The Chinese Government states that there are only a few hundred 
North Koreans in China; others estimate that there are tens of 
thousands. Most have crossed the border clandestinely in small groups 
to seek food, shelter, and work. In January China returned to the DPRK 
seven persons who had been granted refugee status by the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees in Russia in December 1999 but were forced 
back into China. How the DPRK authorities dealt with the seven is 
unknown.
    The Government strictly controls permission to reside in, or even 
enter, Pyongyang. This is a significant lever, since food, housing, 
health, and general living conditions are much better in Pyongyang than 
in the rest of the country.
    AI has reported serious human rights abuses involving North Korean 
workers and refugees living in Russia. There are about 6,000 DPRK 
workers in North Korean-run camps in the Russian Far East engaged in 
farming, mining, and construction. Conditions in these camps are harsh; 
food is scarce; and discipline is severe. In the past, there have been 
allegations that discipline includes physical torture such as placing 
wooden logs between the knees of offenders, after which they were 
forced to sit down, causing them excruciating pain. In recent years, 
offenders have been sent back to the DPRK for punishment due to the 
increased scrutiny that the labor camps have been under since Russian 
and foreign media began reporting on the conditions in these camps in 
the early 1990's.
    North Koreans in Russia comprise two groups: Those who were 
selected to work in Russia but refused to return to the DPRK and those 
who have fled into Russia from the DPRK. Until 1993 under a secret 
protocol, the DPRK Public Security Service reportedly was allowed to 
work inside Russia to track down workers who fled the camps. Since 1993 
many North Koreans have been engaged in business in the Russian Far 
East.
    Many North Koreans in Russia face severe hardships due to their 
lack of any identification. Workers arriving in Russia usually have 
their passport and other identification confiscated by North Korean 
border guards.
    The DPRK Government reportedly tried to prevent persons from 
staying in Russia by using diplomatic channels to influence Russian 
authorities and international organizations. In a number of cases, 
North Korean authorities reportedly told Russian authorities that a 
particular North Korean who had applied for asylum in Russia or 
elsewhere was a criminal offender in North Korea. An extradition treaty 
signed by both nations in 1957 requires that persons with criminal 
records be returned to their country.
    From 1959 to 1982, 93,000 Korean residents of Japan, including 
6,637 Japanese wives, voluntarily repatriated to North Korea. Despite 
DPRK assurances that the wives, more than a third of whom still had 
Japanese citizenship, would be allowed to visit Japan every 2 or 3 
years, none were permitted to do so until 1997. However, many have not 
been heard from, and their relatives and friends in Japan have been 
unsuccessful in their efforts to gain information about their condition 
and whereabouts.
    The DPRK and the Japanese Government held a series of bilateral 
meetings in Beijing in the second half of 1997, during which the DPRK 
agreed to allow some Japanese wives resident in North Korea to visit 
Japan. The first such visit occurred in November 1997 when 15 Japanese 
wives arrived for a 1-week visit. An additional 12 Japanese wives 
visited for a week in January and February 1998. However, in June 1999 
the DPRK cancelled a visit by Japanese wives to Japan, citing 
``artificial hurdles and inhuman acts on the Japanese side.'' The 
visits resumed after the Japanese Government and the DPRK restarted 
normalization talks in April. A group of 16 Japanese wives visited 
Japan from September 12 to 16.
    Although the DPRK has permitted an increasing number of overseas 
Koreans to visit their relatives in North Korea over the past decade, 
most requests for such visits are still denied. From August 15-18, the 
DPRK and the Republic of Korea sent delegations of 100 members of 
separated families to each other's capitals for family reunion 
meetings. However, the meetings generally were of limited duration and 
certain topics were not allowed to be discussed. From November 30 to 
December 2, a second such reunion took place, and further reunions were 
scheduled for 2001. Many foreign visitors to the 1995 International 
Pyongyang Sports Festival reported that they were denied permission to 
visit or otherwise contact their relatives, even those who lived only a 
few miles from Pyongyang.
    Although more foreign journalists have been allowed into North 
Korea, the Government still maintains the strictest control over the 
movements of foreign visitors. For example, journalists accompanying a 
foreign minister from another country were not allowed to visit a 
department store or a train station; they were not allowed to talk to 
officials or to persons on the street. Those who arrived with cellular 
or satellite phones had them confiscated for the duration of their 
stay.
    Reports, primarily from refugees, indicate that the Government 
routinely uses forced resettlement, particularly for those deemed 
politically unreliable.
    Although the DPRK is a member of the United Nations, it does not 
participate in international refugee forums, and it is not in contact 
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. There is no known policy 
or provision for first asylum.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have no right or mechanisms to change their leadership or 
government. The political system is completely dominated by the KWP, 
with Kim Il Sung's heir Kim Jong Il in full control. Very little 
reliable information is available on intraregime politics following Kim 
Il Sung's death. The legislature, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), 
which meets only a few days a year, serves only to rubber-stamp 
resolutions presented to it by the party leadership. In October 1997, 
Kim Jong Il acceded to the position of General Secretary of the Korean 
Worker's Party. In September 1998, the SPA reconfirmed Kim as the 
Chairman of the National Defense Commission and declared that position 
the ``highest office of State.'' The presidency was abolished, leaving 
the late Kim Il Sung as the DPRK's only President. The titular head of 
state is Kim Yong Nam, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme 
People's Assembly.
    In an effort to give the appearance of democracy, the DPRK has 
created several ``minority parties.'' Lacking grassroots organizations, 
they exist only as rosters of officials with token representation in 
the Supreme People's Assembly. Their primary purpose appears to be 
promoting government objectives abroad as touring parliamentarians. 
Free elections do not exist, and the regime has criticized the concept 
of free elections and competition among political parties as an 
artifact of capitalist decay.
    Elections to the Supreme People's Assembly and to provincial, city, 
and county assemblies are held irregularly. In July 1998, SPA elections 
were held for the first time since 1990. According to the government-
controlled media, over 99 percent of the voters participated to elect 
100 percent of the candidates approved by the KWP. Results of previous 
SPA elections have produced virtually identical outcomes. The vast 
majority of the KWP's estimated 3 million members (in a population of 
23 million) work to implement decrees formulated by the Party's small 
elite.
    Few women have reached high levels of the Party or the Government.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not permit any independent domestic 
organizations to monitor human rights conditions or to comment on 
violations of such rights. Although a North Korean Human Rights 
Committee was established in 1992, it denies the existence of any human 
rights violations in North Korea. However, by offering international 
human rights organizations an identifiable official interlocutor, the 
Committee helped increase the ability of international human rights 
organizations to enter into two-way communication with the regime.
    Although the World Food Program has been given access to most 
counties in North Korea, it has been excluded from several dozen. 
Foreign aid workers and aid workers from international organizations, 
who provide substantial food aid, frequently are denied access to sites 
where this food is distributed, and thus are unable consistently to 
verify that the aid reaches its intended recipients. Many foreign NGO's 
report being charged large fees by Government officials to get visas 
for foreign staff, to set up offices, and to establish programs. There 
have been reports of abduction of ethnic Korean aid workers by 
government officials; some victims were required to pay a large fine to 
obtain their release.
    In April 1998, during the 54th meeting of the U.N. Commision on 
Human Rights, the North Korean delegation accused the international 
community of slandering the DPRK's human rights record, adding that the 
DPRK Government would not tolerate ``any attempt to hurt the 
sovereignty and dignity of the country under the pretext of human 
rights.''
    In 1996 a delegation from AI visited the DPRK and discussed legal 
reforms and prisoner cases with senior government officials. The 
Government has ignored requests for visits by other international human 
rights organizations, and none are known to have visited.
    In August 1997, the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted a resolution 
criticizing the DPRK for its human rights practices. The DPRK 
subsequently announced that it would withdraw from the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), calling the resolution 
an attack on its sovereignty. In October 1997, the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee issued a statement criticizing the attempt by North Korea to 
withdraw from the ICCPR, noting that countries that had ratified the 
ICCPR could not withdraw from the covenant. In August 1998, the Human 
Rights Committee readopted a resolution urging the DPRK to improve its 
human rights record. In July for the first time in 16 years, the regime 
submitted a report on human rights to the U.N. Human Rights Committee.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution grants equal rights to all citizens. However, in 
practice the Government denies its citizens most fundamental human 
rights. There was pervasive discrimination on the basis of social 
status.
    Women.--There is no information available on violence against 
women.
    The Constitution states that ``women hold equal social status and 
rights with men.'' However, although women are represented 
proportionally in the labor force, few women have reached high levels 
of the party or the Government. In many small factories, the work force 
is predominantly female. Like men, working-age women must work. They 
are thus required to leave their preschool children in the care of 
elderly relatives or in state nurseries. However, according to the 
Constitution, women with large families are to work shorter hours. 
There were reports of trafficking in women and young girls among North 
Koreans crossing the border into China (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Children.--Social norms reflect traditional, family-centered values 
in which children are cherished. The State provides compulsory 
education for all children until the age of 15. Some children are 
denied educational opportunities and subjected to other punishments and 
disadvantages as a result of the loyalty classification system and the 
principle of ``collective retribution'' for the transgressions of their 
parents (see Section 1.f.).
    According to the World Food Program, the international community is 
feeding nearly every child under the age of 7 years. In some remote 
provinces, many persons over the age of 6 years reportedly appear to be 
suffering from long-term malnutrition. A nutrition survey carried out 
by UNICEF and the World Food Program in the aftermath of flood 
disasters found that 16 percent of children under 7 years of age 
suffered from acute malnutrition and that 62 percent suffered from 
stunted growth. In August 1997, a senior UNICEF official said that 
about 80,000 children were in immediate danger of dying from hunger and 
disease; 800,000 more were suffering from malnutrition to a serious but 
lesser degree.
    Like others in society, children are the objects of intense 
political indoctrination; even mathematics textbooks propound party 
dogma. In addition foreign visitors and academic sources report that 
children from an early age are subjected to several hours a week of 
mandatory military training and indoctrination at their schools. School 
children sometimes are sent to work in factories or in the fields for 
short periods to assist in completing special projects or in meeting 
production goals.
    In practice children do not enjoy any more civil liberties than 
adults. In June 1998, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) released its concluding observations on a February 1996 report 
submitted by the DPRK, detailing its adherence to the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The UNCRC found that the DPRK 
strategy, policies, and programs for children do not fully reflect the 
rights-based approach enshrined in the convention. The UNCRC also 
expressed concern over de facto discrimination against children with 
disabilities and at the insufficient measures taken by the state party 
to ensure that these children have effective access to health, 
education, and social services, and to facilitate their full 
integration into society.
    In the fall of 1998, the NGO's Doctors Without Borders (DWB) and 
Doctors of the World closed their offices in the country because the 
Government reportedly denied them access to a large population of sick 
and malnourished children. DWB officials said that they had evidence 
that orphaned and homeless children had been gathered into so-called 
``9-27 camps.'' These camps reportedly were established under a 
September 27, 1995 order from Kim Jong Il to ``normalize'' the country. 
North Korean refugees who have escaped from the 9-27 camps into China 
have reported inhuman conditions.
    Information about societal or familial abuse of children is 
unavailable. There were reports of trafficking in young girls among 
North Koreans crossing the border into China (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--Traditional social norms condone 
discrimination against the physically disabled. Apart from disabled 
veterans, disabled persons almost never are seen within the city limits 
of Pyongyang, and several defectors and other former residents report 
that disabled persons are assigned to the rural areas routinely. 
According to one report, authorities check every 2 to 3 years in the 
capital for persons with deformities and relocate them to special 
facilities in the countryside. There are no legally mandated provisions 
for accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled. 
In an April 1998 statement, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the 
Child criticized ``de facto discrimination'' in the country against 
children with disabilities.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Nongovernmental labor unions do not 
exist. The KWP purports to represent the interests of all labor. There 
is a single labor organization, the General Federation of Trade Unions 
of Korea, which is affiliated with the formerly Soviet-controlled World 
Federation of Trade Unions. Operating under this umbrella, unions 
function on the classic ``Stalinist model,'' with responsibility for 
mobilizing workers behind production goals and for providing health, 
education, cultural, and welfare facilities. Unions do not have the 
right to strike.
    North Korea is not a member of, but has observer status with, the 
International Labor Organization.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have no 
right to organize or to bargain collectively. Government ministries set 
wages. The State assigns all jobs. Ideological purity is as important 
as professional competence in deciding who receives a particular job, 
and foreign companies that have established joint ventures report that 
all their employees must be hired from lists submitted by the KWP. 
Factory and farm workers are organized into councils, which do have an 
impact on management decisions.
    There is one free economic and trade zone (FETZ). The Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) negotiated a separate 
protocol and service contracts for workers at the site of its light 
water reactor project. The government agency, which supplied the labor 
to KEDO, bargained effectively on the workers behalf (see Section 
6.e.).
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--In its report to the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee, the regime stated that its laws prohibit 
forced or compulsory labor. The Government frequently mobilizes the 
population for construction projects. Military conscripts routinely are 
used for this purpose as well. ``Reformatory labor'' and ``reeducation 
through labor'' are common punishments for political offenses. AI 
reports that forced labor, such as logging and tending crops, is common 
among prisoners. School children are assigned to factories or farms for 
short periods to help meet production goals (see Section 5).
    There are reports of the trafficking of North Korean women and 
young girls among North Koreans crossing the border into China. Many 
become brides, but some work in the sex industry. Many reportedly are 
held as virtual prisoners (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--According to the Constitution, the State prohibits work by 
children under the age of 16 years. As education is universal and 
mandatory until the age of 15, it is believed that this regulation is 
enforced. There is no prohibition on forced labor by children, and 
school children are assigned to factories or farms for short periods to 
help meet production goals (see Section 6.c.).
    There are reports of trafficking in young girls among North Koreans 
crossing into China, some to become brides and others forced to work in 
the sex industry (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No data is available on the 
minimum wage in state-owned industries. Until the recent food crisis, 
wages and rations appeared to be adequate to support workers and their 
families at a subsistence level. Wages are not the primary form of 
compensation since the State provides all educational and medical needs 
free of charge, while only token rent is charged. The minimum wage for 
workers in North Korea's FETZ is approximately $80 per month; in 
foreign-owned and joint venture enterprises outside the FETZ the 
minimum wage is reportedly close to $110 per month. It is not known 
what proportion of the foreign-paid wages go to the worker and what 
proportion remains with the State. KEDO, the international organization 
charged with implementation of a light-water reactor and other 
projects, has concluded a protocol and a related memorandum of 
understanding concerning wages and other working conditions for 
citizens who are to work on KEDO projects. Unskilled laborers receive 
about $110 per month while skilled laborers are paid slightly more 
depending on the nature of the work performed (see Section 6.b.).
    The Constitution states that all working-age citizens must work and 
``strictly observe labor discipline and working hours.'' The Penal Code 
states that anyone who hampers the nation's industry, commerce, or 
transportation by intentionally failing to carry out a specific 
assignment ``while pretending to be functioning normally'' is subject 
to the death penalty; it also states that anyone who ``shoddily carries 
out'' an assigned duty is subject to no less than 5 years' 
imprisonment.
    Even persistent tardiness may be defined as ``anti-Socialist 
wrecking'' under these articles, although as a result of food shortages 
absenteeism reportedly has become widespread as more time must be spent 
finding food. A DPRK official described the labor force to an audience 
of foreign business executives by noting that ``there are no riots, no 
strikes, and no differences of opinion'' with management.
    In 1994 the authorities reportedly adopted new labor regulations 
for enterprises involving foreign investments. The regulations on labor 
contracts set out provisions on the employment and dismissal of 
workers, technical training, workhours, rest periods, remuneration, 
labor protection, social security, fines for violations of regulations, 
and settlement of disputes.
    The Constitution stipulates an 8-hour workday; however, several 
sources report that most laborers work from 12 to 16 hours daily when 
factories are operating. Some of this additional time may include 
mandatory study of the writings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The 
Constitution provides all citizens with a ``right to rest,'' including 
paid leave, holidays, and access to sanitariums and rest homes funded 
at public expense. Many worksites are hazardous, and the rate of 
industrial accidents is high. It is believed that workers do not have 
the right to remove themselves from hazardous working conditions 
without jeopardizing their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no known laws specifically 
addressing the problem of trafficking in persons.
    There have been reports of trafficking in women and young girls 
among North Koreans crossing the border into China. Some were sold by 
their families as wives to men in China. A network of smugglers 
reportedly facilitates this trafficking. Many such women, unable to 
speak Chinese, are held as virtual prisoners. Many end up working as 
prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
                               __________

                           REPUBLIC OF KOREA

    The Republic of Korea is governed by a directly elected president 
and a unicameral legislature selected by both direct and proportional 
voting. Kim Dae-jung was elected President in a free and fair election 
in December 1997 and was inaugurated in February 1998. A free and fair 
National Assembly election was held in April. The Constitution provides 
for an independent judiciary, and in recent years, the judiciary has 
shown increasing independence; however, several scandals in 1999 
involving alleged illegal influence peddling and cronyism have damaged 
the image of prosecutors and judges.
    Responsibility for maintaining internal security lies with the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS)--formerly known as the National 
Security Planning Agency, the Korean National Police (KNP), and the 
Defense Security Command (DSC). Legislation enacted in 1993 restricts 
the NIS and the DSC from involvement in domestic politics and grants 
the NIS investigative authority only in cases involving terrorism, 
espionage, and international crime organizations. The Government 
revised this law in 1996 to allow the NIS to investigate members of 
domestic organizations that are viewed as supporting the government of 
the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (North Korea; DPRK). The 
statutory restrictions on the DSC remain in place. Some members of the 
security forces were responsible for occasional human rights abuses.
    Following a rebound in 1999 from the 1997-98 financial and economic 
crisis, the country's economic growth began to level off in 2000. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) increased by an estimated 9.3 percent in 2000, 
with 6 to 7 percent GDP growth estimated in the second half of the 
year. Underpinning this strong performance was the Government's 
continued commitment to a comprehensive financial and corporate 
restructuring plan. However, the country's economic growth was 
dependent on a narrow range of export products, and the still somewhat 
fragile financial system left the economy susceptible to unpredictable 
external conditions. Unemployment fell steadily from its 8.6 percent 
peak in February 1999 to 3.6 percent in November 2000.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, problems remain in some areas, although there were 
some improvements. Police abused detainees, although human rights 
groups reported that the number of such cases continued to decline. The 
Government continued to require released political prisoners to report 
regularly to the police under the Social Surveillance Law; however, 
during the year, it did not undertake independent investigations of the 
cases of some prisoners who were sentenced on charges believed to have 
been fabricated by previous governments. Some of these prisoners 
reportedly were subjected to torture to extract confessions and 
received trials that did not meet international standards of fairness. 
The use or threatened use of the National Security Law (NSL)--which 
forbids contacts with North Korea--continued to infringe upon citizen's 
civil liberties, including the right to freedom of expression. The 
President continued to urge that sections of the NSL be revised to 
protect human rights and make the law consistent with the new 
atmosphere of improved relations with North Korea and the Government's 
attempts to expand contacts with that country. In September 63 spies 
from the DPRK who had been released from prison returned voluntarily to 
that country. Domestic violence and rape and physical abuse remain 
serious problems, and there is insufficient legal recourse for dealing 
with them. Women also continued to face legal and societal 
discrimination. Ethnic minorities, very small in number, face legal and 
societal discrimination. Trafficking in persons is a problem; the 
country is considered a transit point for alien smugglers, including 
traffickers of primarily Asian women and children for the sex trade and 
domestic servitude.
    In July a revised child protection law went into effect, increasing 
the penalties for child abuse. In the first half of the year, the 
Government enacted laws authorizing the investigation of the arrests 
and so-called ``mysterious'' deaths of prodemocracy activists under 
previous military governments. Some of the activists were sentenced on 
charges believed to have been fabricated by previous governments.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or extrajudicial killings.
    To investigate and redress complaints that officials of past 
military governments had tortured and killed prodemocracy activists, 
the Government enacted the Special Act on the Investigation of 
Suspicious Deaths in May. In August a nineperson panel was commissioned 
to review cases such as the 1960 student uprising and the 1980 Kwangju 
civil uprising and to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the 
arrests and deaths of prodemocracy activists.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Penal Code prohibits the mistreatment of suspects; the 
Government has ordered investigating authorities to protect the human 
rights of suspects, and allegations of abuse by authorities of those in 
custody for questioning continued to decline. Nonetheless, police 
sometimes abuse persons in custody. Prosecutors continued to place much 
emphasis on securing convictions through confessions. This focus is 
driven by cultural factors, with confession viewed as a necessary basis 
for the reform and rehabilitation of wrongdoers. While the Supreme 
Court has ruled that confessions obtained after suspects have been 
deprived of sleep during an interrogation cannot be used in court, 
there continued to be reports that police questioned suspects 
throughout the night. Credible sources also reported that in some cases 
police verbally or physically abused suspects (including beatings, 
threats, and sexual intimidation) in the course of arrest and police 
interrogation. However, human rights groups report that the number of 
such cases continued to declined during the year. In 1999 the Ministry 
of Justice (MOJ) announced that criminal suspects, who previously had 
been required to wear prison garb in court, would be allowed to wear 
street clothes until the court rendered a judgment.
    Police and security officials who abuse or harass suspects rarely 
are punished, and public concern over impunity of police who commit 
abuses appears to be growing. In a highly publicized case, in February 
a former police officer, Lee Kun-an, known as the ``torture cop'' for 
his abuse of suspects, was convicted of the illegal confinement and 
cruel punishment of a suspected North Korean spy and sentenced to 7 
years in prison. In February 1999, in a highly publicized case, several 
police officers were disciplined after it was discovered that they had 
shackled the feet and tied the hands of a 63-year-old man whom they had 
arrested for a traffic violation.
    Former detainees who claimed that officials of previous military 
governments had tortured them continued to request compensation. 
However, the Government has not provided an effective mechanism for 
redress, such as an independent body to investigate complaints of past 
human rights violations. To investigate and redress complaints that 
officials of past military governments had tortured detainees, the 
Government in January enacted the Act on the Restoration of the Honor 
of and Compensation for Persons Engaged in the Democratic Movement.
    Prison conditions are Spartan. Prison diets are adequate, but the 
facilities offer little protection against cold in the winter and heat 
in the summer. Some prisoners claim that these conditions damaged their 
health and that medical care was inadequate. Inmates occasionally 
criticized guards for using excessive force or needlessly putting 
prisoners in manacles.
    Inmate access to reading materials, telephones, and television 
broadcasts has improved significantly in recent years. Beginning in 
March, the MOJ allowed prisoners to receive four visitors per month, 
and model prisoners who had served more than one-third of their 
sentences were allowed unsupervised meetings with visitors. Model 
prisoners also are exempt from mail censorship and eligible for 
overnight leave. The MOJ also announced a law that prohibits searches 
of women inmates by male prison guards without prior permission from 
the warden. Also beginning during the year, pregnant inmates received 
prenatal care for the full term of their pregnancies.
    There is little independent monitoring of prison conditions, 
although representatives of human rights groups may visit certain 
prisoners at the discretion of the prison warden.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law is broadly 
outlined and open to interpretation. The National Security Law (NSL) 
defines espionage in broad terms and permits the authorities to detain 
and arrest persons who commit acts viewed as supporting North Korea, 
and thus perceived to be dangerous to the country. Authorities arrested 
not only persons accused of spying on behalf of North Korea, but also 
those who praised North Korea, its former leader Kim Il Sung, or North 
Korea's ``self-reliance'' (``juche'') political philosophy. Persons 
traveling to North Korea without authorization also have been arrested 
under the NSL, as have some who appeared to be expressing opposing 
political views peacefully. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has termed 
the NSL ``a major obstacle to the full realization of the rights 
enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.'' President Kim Dae-jung, who himself was arrested and 
sentenced to death under the NSL, has acknowledged that the law has 
``problematic areas,'' and enforcement of the law was loosened in light 
of the June NorthSouth Summit and recent improvements in relations 
between the two countries. According to MOJ data, during the year 130 
persons were arrested for NSL violations, and 50 remained in custody at 
year's end. The NSL arrest figure is nearly 60 percent lower than in 
1999.
    The NSL permits the imprisonment for up to 7 years of anyone who, 
``with the knowledge that he might endanger the existence or security 
of the State or the basic order of free democracy, praised, encouraged, 
propagandized for, or sided with the activities of an antistate 
organization.'' The legal standard for knowledge that one might 
endanger the security of the State is vague. Consequently a number of 
persons have been arrested for what appeared to be the peaceful 
expression of opposing views, which the authorities considered proNorth 
Korean or antistate.
    In August 1998, Father Moon Kyu Hyun, a Roman Catholic priest, was 
arrested on charges of violating the NSL after he returned from North 
Korea. Although the Government had granted him permission to travel to 
North Korea in 1998, prosecutors alleged that Father Moon wrote in 
praise of Kim Il Sung in a North Korean visitors book and participated 
in a North Koreansponsored reunification festival in Panmunjom. The 
eight other priests who traveled with Father Moon were not arrested. In 
May Father Moon was sentenced to 2 years in prison and received a stay 
of execution of that sentence for 2 years. He filed an appeal.
    The Government's rationale for retaining the NSL has been that 
North Korea is trying actively to subvert the Government and society 
and that due to this special circumstance, some forms of expression 
must be limited to block the greater danger to freedom and democracy 
posed by North Korean totalitarianism. The effect sometimes is to 
relieve the Government of the burden of proof in a court of law that 
any particular speech or action in fact threatens the nation's 
security. For example, the Government has prosecuted citizens for 
unauthorized travel to North Korea (see Section 2.d.). Novelist Hwang 
Sokyong served 4 years of a 7-year sentence for making an unauthorized 
visit to North Korea. He was released in 1998 by a special presidential 
amnesty, and his civil rights were reinstated by a special March 1999 
amnesty.
    The Criminal Code requires warrants to be issued by judges in cases 
of arrest, detention, seizure, or search, except if the person is 
apprehended while committing a criminal act, or if a judge is not 
available and the authorities believe that the suspect may destroy 
evidence or escape capture if not quickly arrested. In such emergency 
cases, judges must issue arrest warrants within 48 hours after 
apprehension, or, if a court is not located in the same county, within 
72 hours. Police may detain suspects who voluntarily appear for 
questioning for up to 6 hours but must notify the suspects' families. 
The police generally respected these requirements.
    The standards for issuing warrants were tightened in 1997, but 
following complaints from prosecutors that the new system was 
administratively cumbersome, the National Assembly voted to ease 
standards for issuing warrants. Authorities normally must release 
suspects after 30 days unless an indictment is issued. Consequently, 
detainees are a relatively small percentage of the total prison 
population.
    The Constitution provides for the right to representation by an 
attorney and in May 1999, the MOJ announced that it would enforce a 
suspect's right to have a lawyer present during police interrogation. 
Beginning in January, individual police stations employed lawyers as 
legal advisors to aid in examining relevant legal clauses in charging 
suspects. There were no reports of access to legal counsel being 
denied.
    The MOJ announced in March that all prosecutors' offices have 
private rooms where suspects could consult with lawyers. There is a 
bail system, but human rights lawyers say that bail generally is not 
granted when detainees are charged with committing serious offenses.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and in recent years, the judiciary has shown 
increasing independence; however, several recent scandals involving 
alleged illegal influence peddling and cronyism have damaged the image 
of prosecutors and judges. The President appoints the Chief Justice and 
most justices of the Constitutional Court. Although judges do not 
receive life appointments, they cannot be fired or transferred for 
political reasons. Some district court judges, citing the recent 
conciliatory mood between North and South Korea, have ruled that 
contrary to prosecutors' assertions, activists' exchange of faxes with 
North Korean students or meetings with North Korean representatives in 
third countries were not, in themselves, sufficient grounds to convict 
them of violating the NSL.
    Local courts are presided over by judges who render verdicts in all 
cases. There is no trial by jury. Defendants can appeal a verdict to a 
district appeals court and to the Supreme Court. Constitutional 
challenges can be taken to the Constitutional Court, which was created 
in 1988.
    The Constitution provides defendants with a number of rights in 
criminal trials including the presumption of innocence, protection 
against self-incrimination, freedom from retroactive laws and double 
jeopardy, the right to a speedy trial, and the right of appeal. When a 
person is detained physically, the initial trial must be completed 
within 6 months of arrest. These rights generally are observed. Trials 
are open to the public, but the judge may restrict attendance if he 
believes spectators may seek to disrupt the proceedings.
    Judges generally allow considerable scope for the examination of 
witnesses by both the prosecution and defense. Cases involving national 
security and criminal matters are tried by the same courts. Although 
convictions rarely are overturned, appeals often result in reduced 
sentences. Death sentences are appealed automatically.
    Human rights groups believe that many dissidents tried by past 
military governments during the 1970's and 1980's were sentenced to 
long prison terms on false charges of spying for North Korea. 
Furthermore, these persons reportedly had been held incommunicado for 
up to 60 days after their arrest, subjected to torture, forced to make 
``confessions,'' and convicted after trials that did not conform to 
international standards for a fair trial. To investigate and redress 
complaints that officials of past military governments had tortured 
former detainees, in January the Government enacted the Act on the 
Restoration of the Honor of and Compensation for Persons Engaged in the 
Democratic Movement. In July 1998, the Government repealed the system 
by which ``ideological prisoners'' had to renounce their real or 
alleged beliefs and instituted a system by which prisoners had to sign 
a written promise to obey the law and pledge to recognize the Republic 
of Korea in order to be released from prison. A total of 56 were freed, 
but only 7 signed the pledge in the 1999 Independence Day amnesty. 
Although the new system was a significant step for the Government, 
human rights groups criticized the requirement of a promise to obey the 
law, including the NSL, as tantamount to forcing citizens to renounce 
their beliefs. However, on the occasion of a special presidential 
amnesty in March 1999, 17 longterm, unconverted prisoners, that is, 
persons who had refused to renounce allegiance to the DPRK and 
Communist beliefs, were released without having to renounce their 
beliefs or sign an oath of obedience. However, some released political 
prisoners were required to report their activities regularly to the 
police. According to the MOJ, no long-term unconverted prisoners 
remained incarcerated. On September 3, 63 North Korean spies, who had 
been released from South Korean prisons, were allowed to return to 
North Korea per their wishes.
    It is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners 
because it is not clear whether particular persons were arrested for 
merely exercising the rights of free speech or association or whether 
they were detained for committing acts of violence or espionage. Some 
human rights monitors estimate the number of political prisoners at 
300. However, these monitors' definitions of political prisoner often 
include all persons imprisoned for politically motivated acts, without 
distinction as to whether the acts themselves included violence or 
other criminal behavior. The number of political prisoners and 
detainees as defined by international standards appears to number under 
200.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--In general the Government respects the integrity of 
the home and family. In the past, the security services conducted 
varying degrees of surveillance, including wiretaps of political 
dissidents. The 1995 Antiwiretap Law and the law to reform the NIS 
(then known as the National Security Planning Agency) were designed to 
curb government surveillance of civilians and largely appear to have 
succeeded. The Antiwiretap Law lays out broad conditions under which 
the monitoring of telephone calls, mail, and other forms of 
communication are legal. It requires government officials to secure a 
judge's permission before placing wiretaps, or, in the event of an 
emergency, soon after placing them, and it provides for jail terms for 
those who violate this law. Some human rights groups argue that a 
considerable amount of illegal wiretapping still is taking place, and 
they assert that the lack of an independent body to investigate whether 
police have employed illegal wiretaps hinders the effectiveness of the 
Antiwiretap Law.
    In 1998 several opposition lawmakers broke into the NIS (the then 
National Security Planning Agency) liaison office in the National 
Assembly building and removed documents that they claimed substantiated 
allegations that the office was being used by the NIS to conduct 
surveillance of National Assembly members. Several opposition 
legislators have alleged that they are under surveillance by the 
Government and that their homes, offices, and cellular telephones are 
tapped.
    The NSL forbids citizens from listening to North Korean radio in 
their homes or reading books published in North Korea if the Government 
determines that they are doing so to help North Korea. However, in 
October 1999, the Government legalized the viewing of North Korean 
satellite telecasts in private homes. Furthermore, the Government 
allowed the personal perusal of North Korean books, music, television 
programs, and movies as a means to promote understanding and 
reconciliation with North Korea.
    Student groups make credible claims that government informants are 
posted on university campuses.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--While most political discourse is 
unrestricted, under the NSL the Government limits the expression of 
ideas that authorities consider Communist or pro-North Korean. Broad 
interpretations of the NSL allow for restrictions on peaceful dissent.
    Although the Government has abandoned direct control over the news 
media, it continues to exercise indirect influence, and government 
officials vigorously lobby reporters and editors. The latent threats of 
tax investigations against companies and pressure on advertisers still 
are believed to induce newspapers and broadcasters to self-censor 
criticism of the Government in some cases. Moreover, while the 
Government's anticorruption campaign curtailed politicians' payments of 
money to reporters, it did not eliminate them. Nevertheless, press 
criticism of the Government is extensive in all fields, and authorities 
have not used repressive measures to stop media reporting. Many radio 
and television stations are state supported, but they maintain a 
considerable degree of editorial independence in their news coverage.
    Journalists allege that the libel laws are used to harass 
publications for articles that are unflattering but not necessarily 
untrue, and in the past some journalists have been arrested and jailed 
for libel.
    Prosecutors continued to indict dissidents under the NSL for 
producing, selling, or distributing pro-North Korean or proCommunist 
materials. Court precedents allow citizens to possess these kinds of 
publications for purely academic use, profit, or curiosity, but not 
with the intent of subverting the State. Prosecutors have wide 
discretion in determining motives for possessing or publishing such 
materials.
    There is wide reporting of North Korean issues and issues 
concerning NorthSouth relations.
    The Government Censorship Board, which screens movies for sex and 
violence, has followed more liberal guidelines in recent years and 
allowed the release of a broader range of films. The Government does 
not control access to the Internet, but it made some effort--largely 
ineffective--to control Internet pornography.
    The Government generally respected academic freedom, and no 
instances of prosecution for scholarly writing were reported during the 
year. However, student groups credibly report the presence of 
government informants on university campuses (see Section 1.f.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Law on 
Assembly and Demonstrations prohibits assemblies considered likely to 
undermine public order. The law requires that the police be notified in 
advance of demonstrations of all types, including political rallies, 
and the police must notify organizers if they consider the event 
impermissible under this law.
    In June more than 3,000 riot police forcibly dispersed about 1,000 
striking workers at the Lotte Hotel in Seoul. The workers were taken 
into detention; at least 33 were beaten and injured (see Section 6.a.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. There are no 
registration requirements. Associations operate freely, except those 
deemed by the Government to be seeking to overthrow the State.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Most citizens can move freely throughout 
the country; however, police may restrict the movements of some former 
prisoners. Foreign travel generally is unrestricted; however, the 
Government must approve travel to North Korea (see Section 1.d.). To 
obtain approval, potential visitors must demonstrate that their trip 
does not have a political purpose--that is, to praise North Korea or to 
criticize the South Korean Government. During the year, the Government 
actively promoted the expansion of contacts of all types between 
citizens and persons in North Korea. However, travelers to North Korea 
who do not receive government permission are likely to be arrested upon 
their return.
    In the past, the Government forbade some citizens convicted of 
politically related crimes from returning to the country, and some 
citizens still face sanctions if they return.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations 
in assisting refugees. Government guidelines provide for offering 
temporary refuge in the case of a mass influx of asylum seekers. 
However, the issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during 
the year. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they had a fear of persecution.
    The Government ratified the International Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees in 1992; it went into effect in 1994, when 
provisions covering asylum seekers were included in the immigration 
law. Since 1994 54 individuals have sought asylum, but none so far has 
been granted asylum. According to the UNHCR, the Government's handling 
of asylum applications remains rigid. In 1999 the Government agreed to 
suspend temporarily exit orders for persons whose cases were under 
review by the UNHCR. The MOJ asserted that the asylum applicants did 
not qualify for refugee status under the refugee convention, failed to 
present evidence to back their claims, or made false statements on 
their applications.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The Constitution, as amended in 1987, provides for 
the direct election of the President and for a mixed system of direct 
and proportional election of legislators to the unicameral National 
Assembly. The President serves a single 5-year term and may not be 
reelected. The National Assembly's term is 4 years. All citizens 20 
years of age or older have the right to vote, and elections are held by 
secret ballot.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Because of 
cultural traditions and discrimination, women occupy few important 
positions in government. There is one woman in the Cabinet, the 
Minister of Environment. In the April National Assembly election, 16 
female legislators were elected to the 299seat National Assembly, one 
of them chairs a special committee on women's affairs.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are active in 
promoting human rights, and they operate without government 
restriction. Chief among these groups are the Lawyers for a Democratic 
Society, Sarangbang, the Human Rights Committee of the National Council 
of Churches in Korea, the Korean Bar Association, People's Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy, and ``Mingahyup,'' an association of the 
families of political prisoners. These groups publish reports on human 
rights and make their views known both inside and outside the country. 
Government officials generally have been willing to meet with 
international human rights groups.
    In September the MOJ sent to the National Assembly a bill that 
would establish a human rights commission to investigate accusations of 
human rights violations. The President first mentioned this action as 
one of his 100 presidential policy pledges in February 1998.
    There is little independent monitoring of prison conditions, 
although representatives of human rights groups may visit certain 
prisoners at the discretion of the prison warden.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and equal opportunity statutes forbid 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, disability, or 
social status, and the Government respects these provisions. However, 
traditional attitudes limit opportunities for women and the disabled. 
Ethnic minorities are very small in number; they face both legal and 
societal discrimination.
    Women.--Violence against women remains a problem, and some women's 
rights groups maintain that such violence, including spousal abuse, has 
worsened with the recent decline of the economy. A 1997 survey found 
that 31.4 percent of households had experienced incidents of domestic 
violence during that year. In 1998 the Government enacted the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim Protection Act, which 
defines domestic violence as a serious crime. Authorities can order 
offenders to stay away from victims for up to 6 months and order them 
to be put on probation or to see court-designated counselors. The law 
also requires police to respond immediately to reports of domestic 
violence. Women's groups praised the law as a significant step in 
combating domestic violence. Several instances during the year of 
sexual harassment and attempted rapes allegedly committed by well-known 
men raised public awareness of these problems.
    Rape remained a serious problem, with 6,359 cases reported in 1999, 
according to MOJ statistics, the most recent available. Many rapes go 
unreported because of the stigma associated with being raped. Women's 
groups' activities have increased awareness of the importance of 
reporting and prosecuting rapes, as well as of offenses such as sexual 
harassment in the workplace. According to women's rights groups, cases 
involving sexual harassment or rape generally go unprosecuted, and 
perpetrators, if convicted, often receive very light sentences.
    A law was enacted to combat sexual harassment in the workplace, and 
went into effect in July 1999. Under the law, companies can be fined up 
to $2,500 (3 million won) for failing to take steps to prevent sexual 
harassment in the workplace or failing to punish an offender. The law 
also requires companies to establish in-house sexual harassment 
complaint centers and forbids firms from punishing employees for taking 
their complaints to outside organizations. In addition the Ministry of 
Education announced that the law's guidelines would apply at public 
schools and that teachers who make genderdiscriminatory remarks would 
be disciplined. As examples of such remarks, the Ministry cited 
statements that emphasized women's traditional roles in families, 
stressed men's leadership in society, and encouraged female students to 
work for good marriages instead of embarking on a career after 
graduation.
    The 1991 Family Law permits women to head a household, recognizes a 
wife's right to a portion of the couple's property, and allows a woman 
to maintain greater contact with her children after a divorce. Although 
the revisions help women who choose to divorce, including victims of 
domestic violence, the stigma of divorce remains strong, and there is 
little government or private assistance for divorced women. These 
factors, plus the fact that divorced women have limited employment 
opportunities and have difficulty remarrying, lead some women to stay 
in abusive situations. The Government has established some shelters for 
battered women and has increased the number of childcare facilities, 
giving women in abusive situations more options, but women's rights 
groups say that they fall far short of effectively dealing with the 
problem.
    The country's conservative traditions make women subordinate to men 
socially and economically. Despite the passage of equal employment 
opportunity legislation in 1987, few women work as company executives, 
and sexual discrimination in the workplace remains a problem. However, 
in January 1999 the National Assembly revised the 1987 Equal Employment 
Act to include tougher penalties to be imposed on companies that are 
found to discriminate against women in hiring and promotions. Under the 
revised law, the Presidential Commission on Women was granted the 
authority to investigate sexual discrimination cases in the workplace. 
A company found guilty of practicing sexual discrimination could be 
fined up to $4,200 (5 million won) and have its name published in the 
newspaper. The revised law also provides for a public fund to support 
victims in seeking legal redress. Nevertheless, some government 
agencies' preferential hiring of applicants with military service 
(nearly always men) points to continued legal barriers against women. 
In December 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that government 
agencies' preferential hiring practices for those who have performed 
military service discriminated against women and disabled persons and 
were unconstitutional. Women have full access to education, and social 
mores and attitudes are changing gradually. For example, the major 
political parties are making more efforts to recruit women; the 
Ministry of Women's Affairs continued its efforts to expand employment 
opportunities; and the military and service academies continued to 
expand opportunities for women.
    The Government provides an allowance of $417 (500,000 won) per 
month to 143 former ``comfort women'' (women who, during World War II, 
were forced to provide sex to soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army).
    The country is considered a transit point for traffickers of Asian 
women and children sold into the sex trade and domestic servitude (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
rights and welfare through its well-funded system of public education. 
The Government provides high-quality elementary education to all 
children free of charge, and education is compulsory through the age of 
15. Most children obtain a good secondary education. High-quality 
health care is widely available to children.
    As public awareness of the problem of child abuse continues to 
grow, the number of reported cases has increased. According to one 
NGO's figures, 2,115 cases of child abuse were reported in 1999. The 
Seoul metropolitan government operates a children's counseling center 
that investigates reports of abuse, counsels families, and cares for 
runaway children. Until 1998 there was no specific law against child 
abuse; however, the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim 
Prevention Act, which defines domestic violence as a serious crime, 
allows a child to bring charges against a parent in cases of abuse. 
During the year, the Government enacted a revised child protection law 
that mandated the establishment of a child abuse hot line and the 
dispatch of trained personnel to take preliminary measures for the 
protection of an abused child. Under the revised law, the Government 
also is to establish new child welfare facilities for abused children. 
Revisions also included increased penalties for convicted child 
abusers, who would face up to 5 years in prison (compared with the 
previous 2 years) for child abuse.
    In July 1999, the Government's Commission on Youth Protection, 
exercising its mandate to ``regulate the circulation of harmful 
materials and substances and to protect youth from harmful 
entertainment establishments,'' revised the Youth Protection Law. Under 
the revised law, owners of entertainment establishments who hire minors 
under the age of 19 face prison terms of up to 10 years and a fine of 
$17,000 (20 million won) per minor hired. The law previously had 
provided for a prison term of 3 years and a fine of $23,000 (28 million 
won) no matter how many minors were hired. The Commission also 
announced that it was expanding the definition of ``entertainment 
establishment'' to include facilities, such as restaurants and cafes, 
where children sometimes were hired illegally as prostitutes.
    In July the Juvenile Sexual Protection Act took effect. It 
established the maximum imprisonment for the sale of the sexual 
services of persons under 19 years of age at 20 years. It also 
established prison terms for persons convicted of purchase of sexual 
services of youth under the age of 19 (see Section 6.f.).
    The traditional preference for male children continues, although it 
is less evident among couples under the age of 40. Although the law 
bans fetal testing except when a mother's life is in danger, when a 
hereditary disease would be transmitted, in cases of rape or incest, 
such testing and the subsequent termination of pregnancies with female 
fetuses frequently occur. The Government has expressed concern about 
the widening disparity between male and female birth rates.
    The country is considered a transit point for traffickers of Asian 
women and children sold into the sex trade and domestic servitude (see 
Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The law provides broad protections 
against discrimination against people with disabilities. Although 
measures aimed at creating opportunities for the disabled have been 
taken, public facilities for their everyday care and use remained 
inadequate. However, there is no legal discrimination against disabled 
persons in employment, education, or the provision of other state 
services.
    In 1995 the Government expanded job training programs, medical 
benefits, and welfare facilities for disabled citizens. Since 1991 
firms with over 300 employees have been required by law either to hire 
disabled workers or pay a fee. Surveys indicate that most companies 
either paid the fee or evaded the law, with one 1999 survey indicating 
that 9 out of 10 firms with more than 300 employees failed to meet the 
legally mandated 2 percent job quota for disabled workers. In the past, 
the Government increased the subsidies provided to companies that hire 
the disabled. Nonetheless, the hiring of the disabled remains 
significantly below target levels. The disabled make up less than 1 
percent of the work force. New public buildings are required to include 
facilities for the disabled, such as ramp access to entrances, a 
wheelchair lift, and special parking spaces. The Health and Welfare 
Ministry announced in 1995 that existing government buildings must be 
retrofitted with these facilities by 2005. As of 1998, 47.4 percent of 
public buildings and facilities had facilities for the disabled. In 
December 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that government agencies' 
preferential hiring practices for those who have performed military 
service discriminated against disabled persons and were 
unconstitutional.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is racially 
homogeneous, with no ethnic minorities of significant size. Except in 
cases of naturalization, citizenship is based on parentage, not place 
of birth, and persons must show their family genealogy as proof of 
citizenship. Thus, ethnic Chinese born and resident in Korea cannot 
automatically obtain citizenship or become public servants and may have 
difficulty being hired by some major corporations. Due to legal as well 
as societal discrimination, many ethnic Chinese have emigrated to other 
countries since the 1970's. There are approximately 20,000 ethnic 
Chinese, who represent 0.05 percent of the population. In June 1998, 
the Government passed legislation to allow a female citizen to transmit 
citizenship to her child regardless of the citizenship of the child's 
father. Amerasians face no legal discrimination, but informal 
discrimination is prevalent, making it more difficult for them to 
succeed in academia, business, or government.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides workers the 
right to associate freely, except for public sector employees. In 1998 
the Government passed legislation that, beginning in January 1999, 
allowed white-collar government workers to form workplace councils. 
Blue-collar workers in such government agencies as the postal service, 
railways, telecommunications, and the National Medical Center are 
allowed to organize unions. As few as two employees may form a union. 
Until 1997 the Trade Union Law specified that only one union was 
permitted at each workplace. However, labor law changes in 1997 
authorized the formation of competing unions starting in 2002. All 
unions are required to notify the authorities when formed or dissolved. 
According to 1999 figures, about 12.6 percent of workers belong to a 
union. There are approximately 5,560 trade unions.
    In the past, the Government did not grant formal recognition to 
labor federations that were not affiliated with the country's two 
legally recognized labor groupings--the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions (FKTU) and the Independent Korean Federation of Clerical and 
Financial Workers. However, in the past several years, the Labor 
Ministry officially recognized some independent white-collar 
federations representing hospital workers, journalists, and office 
workers at construction firms and at government research institutes. 
The courts ruled in 1992 that affiliation with the FKTU was not 
required for registration as a legal labor federation. The legalization 
of the teachers' union paved the way for government recognition of the 
dissident Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in November 1999. 
In practice labor federations not formally recognized by the Labor 
Ministry have operated without government interference.
    Strikes are prohibited in government agencies, state-run 
enterprises, and defense industries. By law unions in enterprises 
determined to be of ``essential public interest,'' including public 
transportation, utilities, public health, banking, and 
telecommunications can be ordered to submit to government-ordered 
arbitration in lieu of striking. However, in practice the Government 
rarely imposes arbitration. The number of labor disputes has declined 
in recent years. According to Labor Ministry statistics, 198 strikes 
occurred in 1999, the last year for which complete data are available. 
The Labor Dispute Adjustment Act requires unions to notify the Labor 
Ministry of their intention to strike; it mandates a 10-day ``cooling-
off period'' before a work stoppage legally may begin and 15 days in 
public interest sectors. Labor laws prohibit retribution against 
workers who have conducted a legal strike and allow workers to file 
complaints of unfair labor practices against employers. In recent 
years, the Government has cultivated a more neutral stance in labor 
disputes. In 1998 the National Assembly adopted a law that permits mass 
layoffs of workers in cases of corporate restructuring. The impending 
layoffs of thousands of workers led to strikes in the auto and banking 
industries.
    In August 1998, striking workers shut down the Hyundai Motors' auto 
plant in Ulsan; although the Government threatened to use police to 
remove the workers, labor and management settled their dispute 
peacefully. There were no reports that employer-hired squads assaulted 
workers during the year. In July a threatened bank workers' strike was 
averted, in contrast with a 1998 bank union strike in which strikers 
caused property damage.
    According to government figures, as of August, 49 persons had been 
arrested for allegedly instigating violent strikes or illegally 
disrupting business (a total of 129 were arrested and tried in 1999). 
In June more than 3,000 riot police forcefully dispersed approximately 
1,000 striking workers at a hotel strike in Seoul. Also in June, police 
dispersed a strike among workers at the National Health Insurance 
Corporation. Several union leaders were arrested in both strikes, and 
the violence in the hotel strike led to injuries to 33 strikers. 
Although there were several large general strikes, the Government did 
not punish union members for their participation in these strikes or 
other mass rallies. Workers fired by employers that were found guilty 
of unfair labor activities were reinstated.
    In December Seoul police violently dispersed demonstrations by 
striking union members at two banks. Most workers left voluntarily, but 
several who refused to disperse were injured in conflicts with police.
    The ban on teachers' unions was lifted in July 1999. Accordingly, 
the KCTU-affiliated Korean Teachers' Union (Chonkyojo) and the FKTU-
affiliated Korean Union of Teachers and Educational Workers became 
legal. Although the two teachers unions have the right to bargain 
collectively with the Ministry of Education on wages or working 
condition--but not school curriculums--it is illegal for the unions to 
enter into collective action. In the April National Assembly election, 
several candidates from the KCTU-affiliated Democratic Labor Party made 
unsuccessful bids for assembly seats.
    Labor laws prohibiting political activities by unions were 
rescinded in 1997. Election laws that apply to other social 
organizations regulate unions. These regulations prohibit donations by 
unions (and other social organizations) to political parties. Some 
trade unionists have temporarily resigned from their union posts to run 
for office.
    The FKTU and KCTU are affiliated with the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Most of the FKTU's 20 constituent 
federations maintain affiliations with international trade 
secretariats, as does the KCTU Metalworkers Council.
    In 1998 the country was reinstated to the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation's (OPIC) insurance programs, which had been 
suspended since 1991 on worker rights grounds.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution and the Trade Union Law provide for the right of workers 
to collective bargaining and collective action. This law also empowers 
workers to file complaints of unfair labor practices against employers 
who interfere with union organizing or practice discrimination against 
union members. Employers found guilty of unfair practices can be 
required to reinstate workers who were fired for union activities.
    Extensive collective bargaining is practiced, even with unions 
whose federations are not recognized legally by the Government. The 
labor laws do not extend the right to organize and bargain collectively 
to defense industry workers or to white-collar government employees, 
although the Government passed legislation to allow government workers 
to form workplace councils beginning in 1999, including workers at 
state or publicly run enterprises.
    There is no independent system of labor courts. The central and 
local labor commissions form a semiautonomous agency of the Labor 
Ministry that adjudicates disputes in accordance with the Labor Dispute 
Adjustment Law. Each labor commission is composed of equal numbers of 
representatives of labor and management, plus neutral experts who 
represent the ``public interest.'' Local labor commissions are 
empowered to decide on remedial measures in cases involving unfair 
labor practices and to mediate and, in some situations, arbitrate labor 
disputes. Arbitration can be made compulsory in sectors of the economy 
(for example, utilities and transportation) deemed essential to public 
welfare.
    In 1998 the Government established the Tripartite Commission, with 
representatives from labor, management, and the Government to deal with 
labor issues related to the economic downturn. The work of the 
Commission made it legal for companies to lay off workers due to 
economic hardship and authorized temporary manpower agencies. Disputes 
among labor, management, and government representatives led to the 
withdrawal of the KCTU representatives in September 1999.
    In the past, regulations forbade intervention in disputes by 
socalled third parties, such as labor federations not recognized by the 
Government. Labor laws were revised in 1997 to remove the ban on third-
party intervention and allow nonrecognized federations to assist member 
unions involved in a strike. Under this provision, persons who assist 
trade unions or employers in a dispute or in the course of bargaining 
are required to register with the Ministry of Labor. Those who fail to 
do so may face a large fine or a maximum sentence of 3 years' 
imprisonment.
    Enterprises in the two export processing zones (EPZ's) had been 
designated by the Government as public interest enterprises. Workers in 
these enterprises, whose rights to organize formerly were restricted, 
gradually have been given the rights enjoyed by workers in other 
sectors of the economy. Labor organizations are permitted in EPZ's.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced and compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory labor by 
children, and it is not known to occur. The Constitution provides that 
no person shall be punished, placed under preventive restrictions, or 
subjected to involuntary labor, except as provided by law and through 
lawful procedures. The country is a transit point in trafficking in 
Asian women and children (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Standards Law prohibits the employment of 
persons under the age of 15 without a special employment certificate 
from the Labor Ministry. Because education is compulsory through middle 
school (about age 14), few special employment certificates are issued 
for full-time employment. Some children are allowed to hold part-time 
jobs such as selling newspapers. To obtain employment, children under 
age 18 must have written approval from their parents or guardians. 
Employers can require minors to work only a limited number of overtime 
hours and are prohibited from employing them at night without special 
permission from the Labor Ministry. Child labor laws and regulations 
are clear and usually enforced when violations are found, but the 
Government employs too few inspectors to carry out regular inspections. 
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces 
this prohibition (see Section 6.c.). The Government has not defined 
Worst Forms of Child Abuse or hazardous work.
    The country is a transit point for trafficking in Asian women and 
children (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government implemented a 
minimum wage in 1988, and the minimum wage level is reviewed annually. 
Since September 1999, the minimum wage was approximately $1.45 (1,600 
won) per hour. Companies with fewer than 10 employees are exempt from 
this law. The FKTU and other labor organizations assert that the 
current minimum wage does not meet the basic requirements of urban 
workers. In fact workers earning the minimum wage would have difficulty 
in providing a decent standard of living for themselves and their 
families, despite fringe benefits, such as transportation expenses, 
with which companies normally supplement salaries (however, the money 
an average blue-collar worker takes home in overtime and bonuses 
significantly raises the total compensation package). According to the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, 4.2 percent of the population lived 
below the poverty level as of July 1999.
    Amendments to the Labor Standards Law passed in 1989 brought the 
maximum regular workweek to 44 hours, with provision for overtime to be 
compensated at a higher wage. The law also provides for a 24-hour rest 
period each week. Labor laws were revised in 1997 to establish a 
flexible hours system, according to which employers could require 
laborers to work up to 48 hours during certain weeks without paying 
overtime, so long as average weekly hours for any given 2-week period 
did not exceed 44. If a union agreed to a further loosening of the 
rules, management could ask employees to work up to 56 hours in a given 
week. The legislation established a daily cap of 12 hours on the 
working day. Labor groups claim that the Government does not enforce 
adequately the maximum workweek provisions at small companies.
    Foreign workers, most of whom come from China, the Philippines, 
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan, often face difficult working 
conditions. In the early 1990's, the Government sought to ease the 
problems of illegal workers by creating a program that allowed about 
60,000 foreign workers to enter the country legally to work at 
established wages with legal safeguards. In September the Government 
announced that industrial trainees would be allowed to remain in the 
country for as long as 5 years. Previously, those entering the country 
on trainee visas could remain for 3 years.
    The Government reports that approximately 235,000 foreign workers 
reside in the country and that about 150,000 are illegal residents. It 
is difficult for illegal workers to seek relief for loss of pay or 
unsatisfactory living and working conditions because they face 
deportation. However, the Government has established counseling centers 
that hear complaints from illegal foreign workers about such problems 
as overdue wages and industrial accidents. The MOJ announced in March 
that it would suspend deportation proceedings for illegal residents 
awaiting back pay. The MOJ also announced that it would establish a 
human rights committee for foreign workers to address problems that 
some foreign workers face from primarily private sector employers. 
These workers have been subjected to beatings, forced detention, 
withheld wages, and seizure of passports. Finally, employers reported 
to have abused foreign workers would be subject to criminal charges and 
disadvantaged in the Government's allocation of jobs for overseas 
workers. Foreigners working as language teachers have complained that 
the language institutes that hired them frequently violated employment 
contracts, for which the legal system provided insufficient redress.
    The Government sets health and safety standards, but the accident 
rate is unusually high. However, this rate continued to decline 
gradually due to improved occupational safety programs and union 
pressure for better working conditions. The Labor Ministry still lacks 
enough inspectors to enforce the labor laws fully. The Industrial 
Safety and Health Law does not provide job security for workers who 
remove themselves from dangerous work environments.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Criminal Code states that, ``A 
person who kidnaps another by force or coercion for purposes of 
engaging in an indecent act or sexual intercourse, or for gain, shall 
be punished by imprisonment for not less than 1 year . . . this shall 
apply to a person who buys or sells a woman for purpose of 
prostitution.'' The Labor Standards Law prohibits employment of any 
person under 18 years of age in work that ``is detrimental to morality 
or health.''
    Trafficking in persons is a problem. Because of lax control of 
transit areas at international airports, the country is considered a 
transit point for alien smugglers, including traffickers of primarily 
Asian women and children for the sex trade and domestic servitude. 
Relatively small numbers of Korean economic migrants, seeking 
opportunities abroad, are believed to have become victims of 
traffickers as well (see Section 5). One travel agency was accused of 
visa fraud and the trafficking of women to a Western country for 
prostitution. There were several reports of the falsification of Korean 
documents by travel agencies; many cases involved the trafficking of 
citizens of China to Western countries.
    The Juvenile Sexual Protection Act enacted in July imposes lengthy 
prison terms for persons convicted of sexual crimes against minors (see 
Section 5).
    In May police arrested 5 persons for visa fraud for the purpose of 
trafficking in aliens; the group had reportedly recruited more than 
1,000 persons. In November police arrested Lim Il-kwon, a citizen 
convicted of past alien trafficking, on charges of document fraud. He 
admitted to the smuggling of women to Japan and Western countries for 
purposes of prostitution. Police believe that Lim was responsible for 
the trafficking of hundreds of persons. Police also arrested another 
suspected trafficker who admitted document fraud for international 
travel. All the suspects awaited trial at year's end.
    Most related arrests are made on charges of travel document fraud, 
not trafficking itself. There were no trafficking arrests during the 
year.
                               __________

                                  LAOS

    The Lao People's Democratic Republic is an authoritarian, 
Communist, one-party state ruled by the Lao People's Revolutionary 
Party (LPRP). Although the 1991 Constitution outlines a system composed 
of executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in practice the LPRP 
continued to influence governance and the choice of leaders through its 
constitutional ``leading role'' at all levels. The 99-member National 
Assembly, elected in 1997 under a system of universal suffrage, 
selected the President and Prime Minister in 1998. The judiciary is 
subject to executive influence.
    The Ministry of Interior (MOI) maintains internal security but 
shares the function of state control with party and mass front (People 
Network) organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for the monitoring and oversight of foreigners working in the country; 
its activities are augmented by other security organizations and 
surveillance systems. The MOI includes local police, security police 
(including border police), communication police, and other armed police 
units. The armed forces are responsible for external security but also 
have some domestic security responsibilities that include 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities. Civilian authorities 
generally maintain effective control over the security forces. There 
continue to be credible reports that some members of the security 
forces committed human rights abuses.
    Laos is an extremely poor country of 5.2 million persons.
    After the LPRP came to power in 1975, 10 percent of the population 
(at least 360,000 persons) fled the country to escape the Government's 
harsh political and economic policies. The economy is principally 
agricultural; 85 percent of the population is engaged in subsistence 
agriculture. Per capita gross domestic product is estimated to be $300 
per year. Since 1986 the Government largely has abandoned its Socialist 
economic policies, although in practice the operation of the state-
owned banks and enterprises indicates a reluctance to discard old 
models. Most economic reforms have begun to move the country gradually 
from a moribund, centrally planned system to a marketoriented economy 
open to foreign investment with a growing legal framework, including 
laws to protect property rights.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor throughout the 
year, and there were a number of serious problems. Citizens do not have 
the right to change their government. During clashes with insurgents in 
the north, there were unconfirmed accusations that government troops 
deliberately killed noncombatant civilians. At times members of the 
security forces abused detainees and brutally beat suspected 
insurgents. Government troops razed one village in the north. Prison 
conditions are extremely harsh. Police used arbitrary arrest, 
detention, and intrusive surveillance. Lengthy pretrial detention is a 
problem. The judiciary is subject to executive influence, suffers from 
corruption, and does not ensure citizens' due process. The Government 
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government restricts freedom 
of speech and imposes some restrictions on press freedom, assembly, and 
association. However, it permitted some access to the foreign press and 
the Internet. The Government restricts freedom of religion and arrested 
and detained approximately 95 Christians, and more than 25 members of 
religious communities remained in custody at the end of the year. 
Forced renunciation campaigns and church closings continued in some 
areas. The Government imposes some restrictions on freedom of movement. 
Some societal discrimination against women and minorities persists. The 
Government actively supported a policy of encouraging greater rights 
for women, children, disabled persons, and minorities. The Government 
restricts some worker rights. The Government continued to focus on the 
problem of trafficking in women and children.
    Several small-scale explosive devices were detonated in urban areas 
during the year, causing one death and dozens of injuries. No group 
claimed responsibility for these acts. Official statements initially 
downplayed the incidents, attributing them to personal quarrels and 
vendettas; some government officials later blamed ``foreign 
terrorists.''
    Organized Hmong insurgent groups were responsible for occasional 
clashes with government troops. These exchanges reportedly were brutal 
on both sides. The organized Hmong insurgent group, the Chao Fa, was 
responsible for the killing of more than 15 civilians in 4 incidents in 
Vientiane and Xieng Khouang provinces and in Saysomboune Special Zone. 
These incidents appeared to be acts of deliberate terror against 
citizens who do not support resistance to the Government.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of politically motivated killings by government 
officials during the year. There continued to be isolated, unconfirmed 
reports of deaths at the hands of security forces in remote areas, 
usually in connection with personal disputes and the personal abuse of 
authority.
    In armed actions against insurgents, government troops burned down 
one village in the north in the first part of the year; accusations 
that government troops deliberately killed civilian noncombatants could 
not be confirmed (see Section 1.c.).
    In October security forces killed from three to five prisoners who 
had escaped from Phongsaly provincial jail; there was no evidence that 
the prisoners were armed or had threatened their pursuers. Some reports 
stated that the prisoners had already been recaptured.
    According to unconfirmed reports, in early May police from 
Phonesavanh, Xieng Khouang province, shot and killed two Hmong 
civilians visiting from another province who were out walking after the 
nighttime curfew. There is no additional evidence available about the 
case, including whether the Government gave compensation to the 
victims' families, the usual practice with accidental shootings in 
security zones.
    A series of bomb detonations in urban areas killed at least one 
bystander and injured dozens. No group claimed responsibility for these 
small-scale bombings. Official statements initially downplayed the 
incidents, attributing them to personal quarrels and vendettas; some 
government officials later blamed ``foreign terrorists,'' failing to 
acknowledge that the incidents may have been acts of terror by internal 
rivals for power and influence. Authorities arrested two suspects whom 
they later released.
    Attacks by armed groups on official and civilian travelers 
continued on a small scale in the central and north central regions. 
The attacks reportedly involved various factors including insurgency, 
clan rivalry, robbery, and reaction to encroaching development. The 
Government remained concerned about the safety of foreign tourists and 
aid workers in remote areas, although there were no confirmed attacks 
on foreigners during the year.
    In January Hmong insurgents attacked Xieng Khouang province's 
district capital town of Muang Khoune, killing 7 persons and burning 
down 17 structures. Credible reports indicated that Hmong insurgents 
attacked a village in Kasi district in July and killed five civilians. 
Other reports indicated that the Hmong insurgents shot and killed 
persons gathering food during February to April in the forest areas of 
Saysomboune Special Zone. There was no evidence that the deaths were 
intentional.
    In December Hmong insurgents attacked a village in Xieng Khouang 
province. They killed three civilians and destroyed houses.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances of Lao citizens; however, reports indicated that two 
U.S. citizens disappeared in April 1999 near the northwest border with 
Thailand. The two men, Michael Vang and Houa Ly, disappeared soon after 
reportedly entering the country. The matter remained under review by 
authorities at year's end, but there was no evidence that the 
Government either provided the promised investigative cooperation or 
conducted a serious unilateral investigation during the year.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading.--Treatment or 
Punishment
    The Constitution and the Penal Code prohibit torture, and the 
Government generally respected these provisions in practice; however, 
on occasion, members of the security forces subjected detainees to 
abusive treatment. For example, early in the year, a few local police 
and prison officials in one southern province beat a number of 
religious detainees. In March 1998, Lao authorities, some wearing 
police uniforms, detained a foreign citizen and three family members in 
an unofficial detention center for 4 days. The Government did not file 
charges against the four persons. The officials reportedly kept the 
four persons in locked, windowless rooms and subjected them to long and 
arduous interrogation before releasing them. The Government offered no 
explanation for this treatment. There is no evidence that the 
Government has investigated the incident seriously, and no prosecution 
or punishment of the perpetrators is expected.
    The Government chose not to address numerous reports of massive 
human rights violations by government authorities that were made by 
groups outside the country. Most of these reports could not be 
confirmed through independent sources. However, there continue to be 
credible reports that some members of the security forces committed 
human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention and intimidation. 
There were credible reports that some members of the security forces 
burned down a Hmong village in the northern insurgency area and were 
responsible for nearly beating some villagers to death, and that other 
members abused citizens in the first half of the year during clashes 
with insurgents or armed individuals suspected to be insurgents. Some 
members of the security forces in Xieng Khouang and Saysomboune Special 
Zone threatened families and villages.
    A series of eight bombs exploded in Vientiane during the year, 
killing at least one and injuring dozens of persons. Authorities found 
as many as four other unexploded bombs in Vientiane and two others in 
southern provinces. Another bomb exploded in the south, with no 
injuries. The Vientiane Times reported official claims that the bombs 
were the result of business disputes and personal vendettas.
    Prison conditions generally are extremely harsh. Food rations are 
minimal, and most prisoners rely on their families for their 
subsistence. The Government discriminates in its treatment of 
prisoners, restricting the family visits of some and prohibiting visits 
to a few. Prison authorities use degrading treatment, solitary 
confinement, and incommunicado detention against perceived problem 
prisoners, especially suspected insurgents. On occasion authorities 
used incommunicado detention as an interrogation method; in isolated 
cases, this was life threatening. There are confirmed reports that a 
few jails place prisoners in leg chains, wooden stocks, or fixed hand 
manacles for extended periods. Medical facilities range from poor to 
nonexistent. Prison conditions for women are similar to those for men.
    Several international human rights groups continued their 
longstanding requests to the Government to move two political prisoners 
to a prison with better conditions, including more modern medical 
facilities (see Section 1.e.). At year's end, the Government continued 
to ignore these humanitarian pleas.
    The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison 
conditions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for 
arrest warrants issued by the prosecutor, and the Constitution provides 
for procedural safeguards; however, in practice the Government does not 
respect these provisions, and arbitrary arrest and detention remain 
problems. Police sometimes use temporary arrest as a means of 
intimidation. Police exercise wide latitude in making arrests, relying 
on exceptions to the requirement for arrest warrants for those in the 
act of committing a crime or for ``urgent'' cases. The length of 
detention without a pretrial hearing or formal charges is 
unpredictable, and access to family or a lawyer is not assured. There 
is a functioning bail system, but its implementation is arbitrary. A 
statute of limitations applies to most crimes. Alleged violations of 
security laws have led to lengthy pretrial detentions without charge 
and minimal due process protection of those detained. Reports indicated 
that some students, teachers, and their associates who had staged 
protests in 1999 remained in detention without trial at year's end. 
These persons had peacefully advocated multiparty democracy and 
increased political freedom and had expressed hostility to the regime. 
Their detention without trial violates the 1year statutory limit.
    During the year, government authorities arrested and detained more 
than 95 Christians and their spiritual leaders, at times holding them 
in custody for months (see Section 2.c.) Those detained without trial 
at year's end for their religious activities include: One person in 
Phongsaly; two persons in Luang Namtha; two persons in Vientiane 
Municipality; and four persons in Savannakhet (see Section 2.c.). Eight 
lowland Lao men who returned from China have been detained without 
trial since 1997 (see Section 2.c.).
    Police sometimes administratively overrule court decisions, at 
times detaining a defendant exonerated by the court, in violation of 
the law (see Section 1.e.).
    Three former government officials detained in 1990 for advocating a 
multiparty system and criticizing restrictions on political liberties 
were not tried until 1992. One died in prison since that time. That 
same year, the court finally tried and handed down life sentences to 
three men detained since 1975 for crimes allegedly committed during 
their tenure as officials of the previous regime. One of these persons 
reportedly has died in prison.
    An estimated 100 to 200 persons, based on known cases, are in 
detention for suspicion of violations of national security. Most of 
these detainees are held without trial; one person has been detained 
since 1992.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
independence of the judiciary and the prosecutor's office; however, 
senior government and party officials wield influence over the courts, 
although likely to a lesser degree than in the past. Some corrupt 
members of the judiciary appear to act with impunity, leading many 
observers to conclude that persons can bribe judges with money. The 
National Assembly Standing Committee appoints judges; the executive 
appoints the Standing Committee.
    The People's Courts have three levels: District; municipal and 
provincial; and a Supreme Court. Decisions of both the lower courts and 
separate military courts are subject to review by the Supreme Court.
    The Constitution provides for open trials in which defendants have 
the right to defend themselves with the assistance of a lawyer or other 
person. The Constitution requires authorities to inform persons of 
their rights. The law states that defendants may have anyone represent 
them in preparing a written case and accompanying them at their trial, 
however, only the defendant may present oral arguments at a criminal 
trial. Due to lack of funds, most defendants do not have attorneys or 
trained representatives. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence; 
however, in practice lawyers face severe restrictions in criminal 
cases. Most trials are little more than direct examinations of the 
accused, although judges appear not to hold preconceived views of a 
trial's outcome. Defendants sometimes are not permitted to testify on 
their own behalf. Trials for alleged violations of some security laws 
and trials that involve state secrets, children under the age of 16, or 
certain types of family law are closed.
    Police sometimes administratively overrule court decisions, at 
times detaining a defendant exonerated by the court, in violation of 
the law.
    There are four known political prisoners. Two prisoners from the 
pre-1975 regime, Colonel Sing Chanthakoumane and Major Pang Thong 
Chokbengvoun, are serving life sentences after trials that did not 
appear to be conducted according to international standards. Two former 
government officials, Latsami Khamphoui and Feng Sakchittaphong, were 
detained in 1990 for advocating a multiparty system and criticizing 
restrictions on political liberties, and were not tried until 1992. 
They are serving 14year sentences based on their 1992 convictions.
    Because some political prisoners may have been arrested, tried, and 
convicted under security laws that prevent public court trials, there 
is no reliable method to ascertain accurately their total number. There 
have been no verifiable reports of other political prisoners in the 
last few years. International humanitarian organizations are not 
permitted to visit political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family,
    Home, or Correspondence.--The Government limits citizens' privacy 
rights, and the Government's surveillance network is vast. Security 
laws allow the Government to monitor individuals' private 
communications (including e-mail) and movements. The Government 
increased these elements of state control again during the year, 
especially in areas involving safety and security problems. However, 
some personal freedoms accorded to citizens expanded along with the 
liberalization of the economy.
    The Constitution prohibits unlawful searches and seizures; however, 
police at times disregarded constitutional requirements to safeguard 
citizens' privacy, especially in rural areas. By law security police 
may not authorize their own searches; they must have approval from a 
prosecutor or court. However, in practice police did not always obtain 
prior approval. The Penal Code generally protects privacy, including 
mail, telephone, and electronic correspondence. But as is the case with 
email monitoring, government security concerns prevail over such legal 
protections. In October the National Internet Control Committee 
promulgated highly restrictive regulations on Internet use (see Section 
2.a.).
    Ministry of Interior forces monitor citizens' activities; in 
addition a loose militia in both urban and rural areas has 
responsibility for maintaining public order and reporting ``bad 
elements'' to the police. Militia usually concern themselves more with 
petty crime and instances of moral turpitude than with political 
activism, although some rural militia may be used for security against 
insurgents. A sporadically active system of neighborhood and workplace 
committees plays a similar monitoring role.
    The Government permits the public sale of few leading foreign 
magazines and newspapers; however, minimal restrictions on publications 
mailed from overseas are enforced only loosely (see Section 2.a.). The 
Government allows citizens to marry foreigners but only with its prior 
approval. Although the Government routinely grants permission, the 
process is lengthy and burdensome. Marriages to foreigners without 
government approval may be annulled, with both parties subject to 
fines.
    The Government displaced internally hundreds of persons during the 
year, mainly as a result of organized infrastructure development 
programs. The Government provides compensation to displaced persons in 
the form of land and household supplies.
    Credible sources reported flexibility by the Government toward the 
disposition of infrastructure-related and other governmentplanned 
resettlements. One hydropower project resettlement village opened 
during the year, funded by investors. However, some local 
administrators forced highlander groups to resettle in lowland areas to 
control their use of farming methods that destroy forest areas in the 
pursuit of increased food security.
    There are two Internet service providers. In the second half of the 
year, the National Internet Control Committee in the Prime Minister's 
Office began a review of national telecommunications and Internet 
access procedures; it stated that it intends to monitor and control 
Internet communications more actively. Some Internet users reported 
that they received email warnings from the Government during the year.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely 
restricts political speech and writing in practice. The Government also 
prohibits most criticism that it deems harmful to its reputation. The 
Penal Code forbids slandering the State, distorting party or state 
policies, inciting disorder, or propagating information or opinions 
that weaken the State. The Government showed limited tolerance of 
general criticisms of good governance or public service, and citizens 
who lodge legitimate complaints with government departments generally 
do not suffer reprisals. However, government concern about potential 
public violent displays of discontent over failed economic policies and 
concern over the series of terrorist bombings led to tighter control of 
the media. Newspapers did not report on investigations into the causes 
of any of the eight bombs that exploded in Vientiane from March through 
December. In July the Vientiane Times reported that officials had 
stated that the bombings were the result of business disputes or 
personal vendettas (see Section 1.c.).
    All domestic print and electronic media are state-owned and 
controlled. Local news in all media reflects government policy. 
Television talk shows and opinion articles refer only to differences in 
administrative approach. However, translations of foreign press reports 
generally are without bias, and access to Thai radio and television and 
foreign-based Internet servers is unhindered. Only a few other Asian 
and Western newspapers and magazines are available, through private 
outlets that have government permission to sell them.
    Authorities also prohibited the dissemination of materials deemed 
to be indecent, to undermine the national culture, or to be politically 
sensitive. Films and music recordings produced in government studios 
must be submitted for official censorship. However, in practice most 
foreign media are easily available. Government enforcement of 
restrictions on nightclub entertainment generally was lax during the 
year.
    Citizens have 24-hour access to Cable News Network and the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, among other international stations accessible 
via satellite television. The Government requires registration of 
receiving satellite dishes and a onetime licensing fee for their use, 
largely as a revenuegenerating scheme, but otherwise makes no effort to 
restrict their use.
    Foreign journalists must apply for special visas. Unfettered access 
to information sources and domestic travel unescorted by officials--
hallmarks of a more liberal government attitude in previous years--
declined during the year.
    The Government controls all domestic Internet servers, blocks 
access to those World Wide Web sites that are deemed pornographic or 
are critical of government institutions and policies, and monitors e-
mail. In October the National Internet Control Committee promulgated 
highly restrictive regulations on Internet use by citizens. The 
regulations significantly curtailed freedom of expression and made 
``disturbing the peace and happiness of the community and ``reporting 
misleading news'' criminal acts. However, the Government in the past 
has been limited in its ability to enforce such regulations.
    The Constitution provides for academic freedom; however, the 
Government restricts it, although it has relaxed its restrictions in 
certain areas. Lao and Western academic professionals conducting 
research in Laos may be subject to restrictions on travel and access to 
information and Penal Code restrictions on publication. As the sole 
employer of virtually all academic professionals, the Government 
exercises some control over their ability to travel on research or 
study grants. However, the Government, which once limited foreign 
travel by professors, actively seeks out these opportunities worldwide 
and approves virtually all such proposals.
    Credible reports indicate that some academically qualified ethnic 
minorities, including Hmong, are denied opportunities for foreign 
fellowships and study abroad based on the actions of some state and 
party officials whose discriminatory behavior goes unchecked. On rare 
occasions, the Government has denied government employees who were not 
party members permission to accept certain research or study grants, 
apparently because they had chosen not to join the LPRP.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government continues to 
restrict this right in practice. The Penal Code prohibits participation 
in an organization for the purpose of demonstrations, protest marches, 
or other acts that cause turmoil or social instability. Such acts are 
punishable by a prison term of from 1 to 5 years. If defendants are 
tried for political crimes against the State, they may face much longer 
sentences of up to 20 years or possible execution.
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to organize and 
join associations; however, the Government restricts this right in 
practice. The Government registers and controls all associations and 
prohibits associations that criticize it. Political groups other than 
mass front organizations approved by the LPRP are forbidden. Although 
the Government restricts many types of formal professional and social 
associations, in practice informal nonpolitical groups can meet without 
hindrance. Individuals who in 1997 formed the Foundation for Promoting 
Education, a private voluntary organization in Vientiane Municipality, 
were active during the year and awarded prizes for educational 
achievement and scholarships to needy students. The group is supported 
by private contributions and operates independently under its own 
charter; however, it reports to the Ministry of Education. The Buddhist 
Promotion Foundation is a semiprivate group founded in 1998 by the Lao 
Buddhist Fellowship Association, which reports to the National Front.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice. The 
Constitution prohibits ``all acts of creating division of religion or 
creating division among the people.'' The Party and Government appear 
to interpret this section narrowly, thus inhibiting religious practice 
by all persons, including the Buddhist majority and a large population 
of animists. Although official pronouncements accepted the existence of 
religion, they emphasized its potential to divide, distract, or 
destabilize.
    The Constitution notes that the State ``mobilizes and encourages'' 
monks, novices, and priests of other religions to participate in 
activities ``beneficial to the nation and the people.'' The Department 
of Religious Affairs in the LPRP Lao National Front for Construction, 
an LPRP mass organization, is responsible for overseeing all religions.
    During the year, government authorities arrested and detained more 
than 95 Christians and their spiritual leaders, at times holding them 
in custody for months. In some isolated cases, prisoners were detained 
in prison with crude, one-leg, wood stocks or fixed hand manacles.
    In the following provinces, prisoners are serving 2 to 3-year 
prison terms for peaceful religious activities found under the Penal 
Code to be creating social turmoil: In Attapeu (6 jailed); in Houaphan 
(3 jailed); in Luang Prabang (3 jailed); in Oudomxay (2 jailed). In 
Oudomxay 3 other persons arrested for proselytizing, purportedly in 
coordination with foreigners, were sentenced to 15-year (1 jailed) and 
12-year sentences (2 jailed). The more severe sentences in Oudomxay 
were based on harsh Penal Code provisions for acts against the State.
    In Savannakhet province, a renunciation and churchclosing campaign 
that was begun in 1999 by district authorities, supported by police, 
military forces, and representatives of the national front continued 
into the second half of the year. For the first time, churches of 
longer standing were targeted. Only about 10 churches--less than half--
remained open at year's end. Most practitioners who found that their 
local churches had been closed were able to move their activities to 
new places of worship. As in late 1999, in a few villages in which 
churches had been recently closed, security forces mobilized on Sundays 
to stop all large vehicles that carried multiple passengers during 
Sunday worship hours. These actions expressly prevented villagers from 
traveling to other places to conduct worship services. In July in 
Vientiane province, the Government began a similar renunciation and 
church-closing campaign that continued through year's end. District-
level police, military, and national front authorities instructed 
Christians, especially Christians from the Khmu and Hmong ethnic 
groups, to renounce their faith or face arrest and imprisonment. 
Vientiane provincial authorities arbitrarily closed at least 1 dozen 
churches, including a church in a refugee returnee village agreed to at 
the time the village was established under U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) auspices. In Vientiane province, authorities targeted 
both Protestant and Catholic congregations.
    The Party controls the Buddhist clergy (Sangha) in an attempt to 
direct national culture. After 1975 the Government attempted to 
``reform'' Buddhism and ceased to consider it the state religion, 
causing thousands of monks to flee abroad, where most still remain. The 
Government has only one semireligious holiday--Boun That Luang--also a 
major political and cultural celebration. However, the Government 
recognizes the popularity and cultural significance of Buddhist 
festivals, and many senior officials openly attend them. Buddhist 
clergy are featured prominently at important state and party functions. 
The Lao National Front directs the Lao Buddhist Fellowship Association, 
which adopted a new charter in April 1998. The Front continues to 
require monks to study Marxism-Leninism, to attend certain party 
meetings, and to combine with their teachings of Buddhism the party-
state policies. In recent years, some individual temples have been 
permitted to receive support from Theravada Buddhist temples abroad, to 
expand the training of monks, and to focus more on traditional 
teachings.
    The authorities continued to be suspicious of parts of the 
religious community other than Buddhism, including some Christian 
groups, in part because these faiths do not share a similarly high 
degree of direction and incorporation into the government structure as 
is the case with Theravada Buddhism. Authorities especially appear to 
suspect those religious groups that gain support from foreign sources, 
aggressively proselytize among the poor or uneducated, or give targeted 
assistance to converts. The Government strictly prohibits foreigners 
from proselytizing, although it permits foreign nongovernmental 
organizations with religious affiliations to work in the country. 
Foreign persons caught distributing religious material may be arrested 
or deported. Although there is no prohibition against proselytizing by 
citizens, there was increased local government investigation and 
harassment of citizens who do so under the constitutional provision 
against creating division of religion.
    The Government's tolerance of religion varied by region. In general 
central government authorities appeared unable or unwilling to control 
or mitigate harsh measures that were taken by local or provincial 
authorities against the practices of members of minority religious 
denominations. Although there was almost complete freedom to worship 
among unregistered groups in a few areas, particularly in the largest 
cities, government authorities in many regions allowed properly 
registered religious groups to practice their faith only under 
circumscribed conditions. In other areas, such as Savannakhet, Luang 
Prabang, Phongsaly, Houaphanh, Oudomxay, and Attapeu, the authorities 
arrested and detained religious believers and their spiritual leaders 
without charges. In more isolated cases, provincial authorities 
instructed their officials to monitor and arrest persons who professed 
belief in Christianity, Islam, or the Baha'i faith. For example, there 
is clear evidence that in Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, and Vientiane 
provinces, the authorities continued to force some Christians to sign 
renunciations of their faith.
    Citizens in Luang Prabang continued to report that local 
authorities ordered them to stop their open practice of Christianity 
completely, under threat of arrest. The order appeared to apply only to 
new converts; believers of long standing were allowed to continue their 
beliefs but not to conduct worship or practice their faith openly. 
Local officials monitored Christians closely to ensure that they did 
not practice their religion and harassed and arrested some Christians 
who violated these policies.
    Although authorities generally tolerated diverse religious 
practices, in the southern Laos panhandle, a pattern of petty local 
harassment persists. Many converts must undergo a series of harsh 
government interviews; however, after overcoming that initial barrier, 
they generally are permitted to practice their new faith unhindered. 
Members of longestablished congregations had few problems in practicing 
their faith; however, some churches established a century ago continued 
to be subjected to harassment by local government officials in 
Savannakhet. Many groups of coreligionists seeking to assemble in a new 
location are thwarted in attempts to meet, practice, or celebrate major 
religious festivals.
    Some minority religious groups report that they were unable during 
the year to register new congregations or receive permission to 
establish new places of worship, including in Vientiane. Authorities 
sometimes advised new branches to join other religious groups with 
similar historical roots, despite clear differences between the groups' 
beliefs. Some groups did not submit applications to establish places of 
worship because they did not believe that their applications would be 
approved.
    The Roman Catholic Church is unable to operate effectively in the 
highlands and much of the north. However, it has an established 
presence in five of the most populous central and southern provinces, 
where Catholics are able to worship openly. There are three bishops: In 
Vientiane, Thakhek, and Pakse. The status of the Catholic Church in 
Luang Prabang center remains in doubt; there appears to be a 
congregation there but due to local obstructionism, worship services 
may not always be conducted readily.
    Over 250 Protestant congregations conduct services throughout the 
country. The Lao National Front has recognized two Protestant groups, 
the Lao Evangelical Church, the umbrella Protestant church, and the 
Seventh Day Adventist Church. The Front strongly encourages all other 
Protestant groups to become a part of the Lao Evangelical Church. The 
Government has granted permission to these approved denominations to 
have a total of four church buildings in the Vientiane area. In 
addition the Lao Evangelical Church has maintained church buildings in 
Savannakhet and Pakse.
    The Government permits major religious festivals of all established 
congregations without hindrance. Two mosques and two Baha'i centers 
operate openly in Vientiane municipality; two other Baha'i centers are 
located in Vientiane province and Pakse. Five Mahayana Buddhist pagodas 
are located in Vientiane, and others are found in larger cities and 
towns.
    Animists generally experience no interference by the Government in 
their religious practices, which vary extensively among the 48 to 69 
identified ethnic groups and tribes in the country.
    The Government does not permit the printing of religious texts or 
their distribution outside a congregation and restricts the import of 
foreign religious texts and artifacts. The Government requires and 
grants routinely its permission for formal links with coreligionists in 
other countries; however, in practice the line between formal and 
informal links is blurred, and relations generally are established 
without much difficulty.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Migration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights; however, the Government restricted some of these rights in 
practice. Citizens who travel across provincial borders are required to 
report to authorities upon their departure and arrival. In designated 
security zones, roadblocks and identity card checks are routine. 
Citizens who seek to travel abroad are required to apply for an exit 
visa; however, the Government grants such visas routinely. Foreigners 
are restricted from traveling to certain areas such as the Saysomboune 
Special Zone, an administrative area operated by the military forces, 
for safety and security reasons.
    During the year, security forces in at least one province set up 
roadblocks during Sunday worship hours, which prevented villagers from 
traveling to participate in religious worship services (see Section 
2.c.).
    Fear of insurgent attacks on civilians in vehicles traveling in the 
north-central areas impedes travel, especially along parts of Route 13, 
Route 7, and Route 1. Bandits operate in the same area (see Section 
1.a.). The Government attempts to ensure safety on these roads.
    Citizens are free to emigrate; exit visas are required, and the 
Government grants these routinely.
    Since 1980 more than 29,060 citizens who sought refugee status in 
Thailand, China, and other countries have returned to Laos for 
permanent resettlement under monitoring by the UNHCR. There were no new 
returnees during the year. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR to 
assist such returnees to reintegrate. Most are ethnic Hmong and other 
minorities. These returnees generally have been treated the same as 
other citizens.
    The Constitution provides for asylum and the protection of 
stateless persons under the law, but in practice, the Government does 
not provide first asylum. There were no known cases during the year of 
asylum seekers being returned to a country where they feared 
persecution.
    The Government has a longstanding policy of welcoming back 
virtually all those among the 10 percent of the population who fled 
after the change in government in 1975. Many have visited relatives, 
some have stayed and gained foreign resident status, and some have 
reclaimed citizenship successfully. A small group, tried in absentia in 
1975 for antigovernment activities, does not have the right of return.
    Eight Lowland Lao men who returned from China have been detained 
without trial since 1997, which is beyond the limit for investigative 
detention (see Section 1.d.).
    Some refugee returnees carry identification cards with distinctive 
markings, ostensibly for use by authorities. Such cards tend to 
reinforce a pattern of societal discrimination against the refugees. 
Authorities increasingly harassed religious minorities in refugee 
returnee villages, and local officials closed a Christian church in one 
such village. The Government had permitted use of the church building 
at the time that the refugees returned (see Section 2.c.).

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The 
Constitution legitimizes only a single party, the Lao People's 
Revolutionary Party, which must approve all candidates for local and 
national elections. Candidates need not be LPRP members.
    The Constitution provides for a 99-member National Assembly, 
elected every 5 years in open, multiple-candidate, fairly tabulated 
elections, with voting by secret ballot and universal adult suffrage. 
The National Assembly chooses a standing committee apparently based on 
the previous standing committee's decision. Upon the committee's 
recommendation, the National Assembly elects or removes the President 
and Vice President. The standing committee also has powers over 
elections (including approval of candidates), supervision of 
administrative and judicial organizations, and the sole power to 
recommend presidential decrees. Activities of the standing committee 
are not fully transparent.
    The National Assembly, upon the President's recommendation, elects 
the Prime Minister and other Ministers in the Government.
    The National Assembly may consider and amend draft legislation but 
may not propose new laws. The Constitution gives the right to submit 
draft legislation to the National Assembly standing committee and the 
ruling executive structure.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however, 
women increased their representation in the National Assembly in 1997 
elections from 9 percent to 20 percent, as 20 of the 27 female 
candidates won seats. Four members of the 48-member LPRP Central 
Committee are women, 2 of whom are also members of the 7-member 
standing committee in the National Assembly. There are no women in the 
Politburo or the Council of Ministers.
    The proportions of ethnic minority members in the 99-member 
National Assembly: 10 Lao Soung (highland tribes) and 26 Lao Theung 
(midslope dwelling tribes)are consistent with their proportions in the 
general population. There are 10 Hmong in the National Assembly. Men of 
lowland Lao origin dominate the upper echelons of the Party and the 
Government. Nonetheless, the President, 2 Deputy Prime Ministers, 3 
Ministers, and 36 members of the National Assembly are believed to be 
members of ethnic minority groups.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no domestic nongovernmental human rights organizations, 
and the Government does not have a formal procedure for registration. 
Any organization wishing to investigate and publicly criticize the 
Government's human rights policies would face serious obstacles if it 
were permitted to operate at all. The Government cooperates on an 
uneven basis with international human rights organizations.
    A human rights unit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA's) 
Department of International Treaties and Legal Affairs has 
responsibility for inquiry into allegations of human rights violations. 
This government unit rarely responds to inquiries regarding individual 
cases, but early in the year published in Lao language a partial 
compilation of international conventions on human rights.
    In 1998, at the invitation of the Government, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Trafficking in Children visited various locations and 
made inquiries into possible incidents of child prostitution and child 
pornography.
    The Government maintains contacts with the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC); government officials received ICRC training on 
human rights law in 1998, and the Government is translating more 
international conventions with ICRC support. The Government permitted 
U.N. human rights observers to monitor the treatment of almost 30,000 
returned refugees in all parts of the country with minimal 
interference; however, it occasionally obstructs monitoring so that it 
cannot be conducted in accordance with international standards.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law for all 
citizens without regard to sex, social status, education, faith, or 
ethnicity. Although the Government sometimes has taken action when 
well-documented and obvious cases of discrimination came to the 
attention of high-level officials, the legal mechanism whereby a 
citizen may bring charges of discrimination against an individual or 
organization is neither widely developed nor widely understood among 
the general population.
    Women.--There are reports that domestic violence against women 
occurs, although it is not widespread. Sexual harassment and rape 
reportedly are rare. In cases of rape that are tried in court, 
defendants generally are convicted.
    Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, and the Lao 
Women's Union operates nationally to promote the position of women in 
society. Discrimination against women is not generalized; however, 
varying degrees of traditional culturally based discrimination persist, 
with greater discrimination practiced by some hill tribes. Many women 
occupy responsible positions in the civil service and private business, 
and in urban areas their incomes are often higher than those of men. 
The Family Code prohibits legal discrimination in marriage and 
inheritance.
    In the period from 1997 through 2000, the Government increased 
support for the position of women in society in development programs, 
some of which are designed to increase the participation of women in 
the political system.
    Children.--The level of support for education is exceedingly low. 
Government funding to provide fully for children's basic health and 
educational needs is inadequate. Education is compulsory through the 
fifth grade, but children from rural areas and poor urban families 
rarely comply with this requirement. There is a significant difference 
in the treatment of boys and girls in the educational system: Female 
literacy is 48 percent versus 70 percent for males. However, men and 
women attend the three universities in approximately equal numbers. 
Violence against children is prohibited by law, and violators are 
subject to stiff punishments. Reports of the physical abuse of children 
are rare. Trafficking in women and children is a problem (see Section 
6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--With donor assistance, the Government is 
implementing limited programs for the disabled, especially amputees. 
The law does not mandate accessibility to buildings or government 
services for disabled persons, but the Labor and Social Welfare 
Ministry began to establish regulations on building access and some 
sidewalk ramps in Vientiane during the year. The Lao National 
Commission for the Disabled (LNCD) is formulating a new draft law and 
other policies regarding the disabled, and the Lao Disabled Persons 
Association set up offices in Champassak and Xieng Khouang provinces to 
assist with rehabilitation, job skills training, and social integration 
of the disabled. The LNCD also hosted a regional conference on 
disabilities in Vientiane in November to promote leadership and 
organizational skills for disabled persons.
    Religious Minorities.--The enhanced status given to Buddhism in 
Luang Prabang--famed for its centuries-old Buddhist tradition and 
numerous templesapparently led some local officials there to act more 
harshly toward minority religions, particularly toward Christians and 
Baha'is, than in other areas of the country (see Section 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides for 
equal rights for citizens of all minorities, and there is no legal 
discrimination against them. However, societal discrimination persists.
    Approximately half the population is ethnic Lao, also called 
``lowland Lao.'' Most of the remainder is a mixture of diverse upland 
hill tribes whose members, if born in Laos, are Lao citizens. There are 
also ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese minorities, particularly in the 
towns. There is a small community of South Asian origin. The 
implementation in 1994 of the 1990 Law on Nationality provided a means 
for Vietnamese and Chinese minorities to normalize their Lao 
citizenship; a small number did so during the year. The Government 
encourages the preservation of minority cultures and traditions; 
however, due to their remote location and difficult access, minority 
tribes have little voice in government decisions affecting their lands 
and the allocation of natural resources.
    The Hmong are one of the largest and most prominent highland 
minority groups. Societal discrimination against the Hmong continues, 
although there are a number of Hmong officials in the senior ranks of 
the Government. In recent years, the Government focused some limited 
assistance projects in Hmong areas in order to overcome disparities in 
income along regional and ethnic lines. Some international observers 
claim that governmental policies aimed at assimilating the Hmong into 
larger societysuch as regional boarding schools--are not respectful of 
Hmong native culture; others see this approach as an escape from 
centuries of poverty.
    In the intensified Hmong insurgency in the north, government forces 
beat Hmong insurgents and treated them harshly in some Hmong villages 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In an unconfirmed report, a foreign 
newspaper in December recounted an alleged government soldier's account 
that security forces had shot to death a number of young Hmong men in 
Saysomboune Special Zone during the year.
    During the year, the Government continued to assist citizens, 
largely members of ethnic minorities, who returned to Laos after having 
fled in 1975. Central and local government officials worked with 
organizations such as the UNHCR to provide land and a sustainable level 
of economic security. Repatriated Hmong generally face no greater 
discrimination than those Hmong who remained. A number of Hmong 
returnees were forced to renounce their Christian faith, and one church 
in a returnee village was closed by authorities. Two U.N. observers who 
monitored repatriation efforts reported no significant human rights 
violations.
    Under the Constitution, aliens and stateless foreign citizens are 
protected by ``provisions of the laws'' but do not in practice enjoy 
rights provided for by the Constitution. During the year, there were 
isolated cases of persons of Lao ethnic background who, as citizens of 
other nations, suffered discrimination when arrested or detained and 
were denied due process, apparently on the basis of their Lao ethnic 
background.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Under the 1990 Labor Code and a 1995 
prime ministerial decree, labor unions can be formed in private 
enterprises as long as they operate within the framework of the 
officially sanctioned Federation of Lao Trade Unions (FLTU), which in 
turn is controlled by the LPRP. Most of the FLTU's 77,057 members work 
in the public sector.
    The State employs the majority of salaried workers, although this 
situation is changing as the Government reduces the number of its 
employees and privatizes state enterprises. Subsistence farmers 
comprise an estimated 85 percent of the work force.
    Strikes are not prohibited by law, but the Government's ban on 
subversive activities or destabilizing demonstrations (see Section 
2.b.) makes a strike unlikely, and none were reported during the year. 
However, the Labor Code does not prohibit temporary work stoppages.
    With advice from the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
including a foreign expert provided by the ILO to work with the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the Government in 1994 revised 
the Labor Code in an effort to clarify the rights and obligations of 
workers and employers. However, the ILO Committee of Experts cited the 
Government for its failure to submit reports required of member states.
    The FLTU is free to engage in contacts with foreign labor 
organizations, which during the year included the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Trade Union and the Asia-Pacific 
American Labor Alliance. The FLTU is a member of the World Federation 
of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no 
right to organize and bargain collectively. The Labor Code stipulates 
that disputes be resolved through workplace committees composed of 
employers, representatives of the local labor union, and 
representatives of the FLTU, with final authority residing in the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Labor disputes are infrequent. 
The Government sets wages and salaries for government employees, while 
management sets wages and salaries for private business employees.
    The Labor Code stipulates that employers may not fire employees for 
conducting trade union activities, for lodging complaints against 
employers about labor law implementation, or for cooperating with 
officials on labor law implementation and labor disputes. Workplace 
committees are one mechanism used for resolving complaints.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code 
prohibits forced labor except in time of war or national disaster, 
during which the State may conscript laborers; however, trafficking in 
women and children is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The Code also 
applies to children under the age of 15, and generally is enforced 
effectively; however, reports that children are being lured into other 
countries for sexual exploitation and slave labor continued, and 
increased over the previous year (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age.--for Employment
    Under the Labor Code, children under the age of 15 may not be 
recruited for employment. However, many children help their families on 
farms or in shops. The Labor Code accordingly provides that children 
may work for their families, provided that such children are not 
engaged in dangerous or difficult work. Such employment of children is 
common in urban shops, but rare in industrial enterprises. The 
Ministries of Interior and Justice are responsible for enforcing these 
provisions, but enforcement is ineffective due to a lack of inspectors 
and other resources. Education is compulsory through the fifth grade, 
but this requirement rarely is observed in the rural areas or among the 
urban poor. Some garment factories reportedly employ a very small 
number of underage girls. The Labor Code prohibits forced and bonded 
labor performed by children under age 15, and the law generally is 
enforced effectively; however, there were reports that children were 
lured into sexual exploitation and slavery abroad (see Sections 6.c. 
and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides for a 
broad range of worker entitlements, including a workweek limited to 48 
hours (36 hours for employment in dangerous activities), safe working 
conditions, and higher compensation for dangerous work. The Code also 
provides for at least 1 day of rest per week. Employers are responsible 
for all expenses for a worker injured or killed on the job, a 
requirement generally fulfilled by employers in the formal economic 
sector. A section of the Labor Code mandates extensive employer 
responsibility for those disabled while at work. During the year, this 
law was enforced adequately. The daily minimum wage is $0.53 (4,000 
kip), which is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for 
a worker and family. Most civil servants receive inadequate pay. 
However, few families in the wage economy depend on only one member for 
income. Some piecework employees, especially on construction sites, 
earn less than the minimum wage. Many persons are illegal immigrants, 
particularly from Vietnam, and are more vulnerable to exploitation by 
employers. Although workplace inspections reportedly have increased, 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare lacks the personnel and 
budgetary resources to enforce the Labor Code effectively. The Labor 
Code has no specific provision allowing workers to remove themselves 
from a dangerous situation without jeopardizing their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prohibits abduction and 
trade in persons as well as the constraint, procuring, and prostitution 
of persons; however, trafficking in women and children is a problem. 
Laos is a source and transit country for trafficking in persons. The 
Government only recently has focused on the trafficking of persons 
across its borders. Although there is no reliable data available on the 
scope and severity of the problem, there are indications that the 
numbers are considerable. The Government has increased monitoring and 
educational programs provided by the Lao Women's Union and the Youth 
Union, both party-sanctioned organizations, designed to educate girls 
and young women about the schemes of recruiters for brothels and 
sweatshops in neighboring countries and elsewhere. In the past, the 
Government has prosecuted some persons for involvement in such 
recruiting activities. Recent evidence indicates an increase in arrests 
for procuring; however, this may not reflect a genuine government 
effort to address the problem. During the year, law enforcement 
agencies conducted a minimal number of raids on entertainment 
establishments accused of fostering prostitution.
    The Government remains concerned about Lao children being lured 
into sexual exploitation and slave labor in other countries, but the 
Government denied that there were any problems in the country that 
involve child prostitution. The National Commission for Mothers and 
Children, established in 1992 and chaired by the Foreign Minister, 
continues an active program with support from the U.N. Children's Fund. 
The Commission, working with the Lao Women's Union, Youth Union, 
Justice Ministry, and Labor Ministry, has conducted workshops around 
the country designed to make parents and teenagers aware of the dangers 
of HIV. At the Government's invitation, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Trafficking in Children visited in 1998 (see Section 4).
                               __________

                                MALAYSIA

    Malaysia is a federation of 13 states and 3 federal territories 
with a parliamentary system of government based on periodic multiparty 
elections in which the ruling National Front coalition has held power 
for more than 40 years. Opposition parties actively contest elections, 
but face significant obstacles in competing with the long-entrenched 
ruling coalition. However, in the November 1999 elections, opposition 
parties won roughly 25 percent of the seats in the Federal Parliament, 
and an opposition party also retained control of one state government 
and gained control of another. The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, government action, constitutional 
amendments, legislation, and other factors undermine judicial 
independence and strengthen executive influence over the judiciary. The 
impartiality of the judiciary continued to be a concern during the 
year, although the December appointments of a highly regarded new Chief 
Justice and Attorney General were viewed with optimism by most 
observers.
    The Royal Malaysian Police have primary responsibility for internal 
security matters. The police report to and are under the effective 
control of the Home Minister. Some members of the police committed 
human rights abuses.
    Malaysia is an advanced developing country with an estimated per 
capita gross domestic product of $3,640 and an unemployment rate of 3.0 
percent. Following nearly a decade of strong economic growth averaging 
over 8 percent annually, it was hit hard by the 1997 regional financial 
and economic crisis. After contracting by 7.5 percent in 1998, the 
economy began to recover in 1999, during which it posted a 5.8 percent 
growth rate. Analysts predicted a 7 to 8 percent growth for the year. 
During 1998 the Government adopted stimulative fiscal and monetary 
policies to promote economic recovery and established institutions to 
recapitalize distressed financial institutions and to remove 
nonperforming loans from the banking system. It also enacted selected 
capital controls to eliminate offshore trading in the local currency 
(ringgit) and to insulate the domestic economy from the effects of 
short-term, speculative capital flows. The Government takes an active 
role in the development of the export-oriented economy. Manufacturing 
accounts for 30.0 percent of GDP, services for 54.3 percent, 
agriculture for 9.4 percent, construction for 3.6 percent, and mining 
for 7.2 percent. Principal manufactured products include 
semiconductors, consumer electronics, electrical products, textiles, 
and apparel. Palm oil exports and production of natural rubber, cocoa, 
and tropical timber also are significant.
    The Government generally respected its citizens' rights in some 
areas; however, its record was poor in a number of other areas, and 
significant problems remain. Police committed a number of extrajudicial 
killings; however, authorities prosecuted the perpetrators in some of 
these cases. Police on occasion tortured, beat, or otherwise abused 
prisoners, detainees, and demonstrators. The former chief of police was 
sentenced to 2 months imprisonment for having beaten the handcuffed and 
blindfolded former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. In 
1999, an Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) delegation found that prison 
conditions were not in accord with international norms; the Government 
subsequently took some steps to improve prison conditions. Conditions 
in the detention facilities of illegal aliens continued to pose a 
threat to life and health, although marginal improvements in food and 
water rations were reported. The trial of a prominent human rights 
activist on charges arising from her criticisms of such conditions 
continued. Police continued to use several statutes to arrest and 
detain many persons without charge or trial. Prolonged pretrial 
detention is a serious problem. Detained criminal suspects often were 
denied access to legal counsel prior to being charged formally. Many 
observers expressed serious doubts about the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary, especially in high-profile cases. Former 
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar was charged with corruption in 1998 for 
political reasons, and was convicted and sentenced to 6 years in prison 
in April 1999. In August he was convicted of sodomy and sentenced to 9 
years, to be served consecutively with the earlier 6-year sentence. 
Improper conduct by the police and prosecutors, along with many 
questionable rulings by the judge, denied Anwar a fair opportunity to 
defend himself. Anwar remained in prison at year's end, but he was 
transferred to a hospital in December to receive treatment for a 
slipped disk in his back. Politically motivated, selective prosecution 
continued to be a concern during the year. The courts continued to defy 
most of a 1999 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that a U.N. 
Special Rapporteur was immune from several libel suits. Authorities 
infringed on citizens' privacy rights in some instances.
    Government restrictions, pressure, and intimidation led to a high 
degree of press selfcensorship. The Government raided newsstands that 
sold an opposition party newspaper, limited its publication, and 
refused to renew the publication permits of several other political 
weeklies. Independent on-line newspapers operated without government 
interference. In 1999 a U.N. Special Rapporteur reported that the 
Government systematically curtailed freedom of expression. The 
Government did not respond to the report by year's end. Proliferating 
slander and libel suits threatened to stifle freedom of speech. The 
Government placed some restrictions on freedom of assembly and some 
peaceful gatherings. The Government continues to restrict significantly 
freedom of association. The Government continued to prohibit students 
from participating in some political activities. The Government places 
some restrictions on religious freedom, in particular the right of 
Muslims to practice teachings other than Sunni Islam. In addition the 
right of Muslims to change their religion was hindered by many 
practical obstacles. The Government continued to impose some 
restrictions on freedom of movement. Government policies create 
significant restrictions on opposition parties' ability to compete 
effectively with the ruling coalition. The Election Commission's lack 
of independence impedes it from effectively enforcing election results 
and monitoring elections. The Government continued to criticize harshly 
human rights NGO's, but also met with several such groups during the 
year. The Government established a National Human Rights Commission in 
April. Despite some limitations on its scope, the Commission 
established several human rights working groups, publicly supported the 
right of peaceful assembly in certain instances, and in December opened 
a public inquiry into alleged police misconduct during a November 5 
opposition gathering. Despite government efforts, societal violence and 
discrimination against women remain problems. Sexual abuse of children 
is a problem, although it is punished severely. Indigenous people face 
discrimination and often are exploited, especially in regard to land 
issues. Longstanding policies give preferences to ethnic Malays in many 
areas, and ethnic minorities face discrimination. Some restrictions on 
worker rights persist. Child labor persists, although the Government 
has taken vigorous action against it. The country is a source, transit, 
and destination country for trafficking in women and girls for the 
purpose of forced prostitution.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, police committed a number of 
extrajudicial killings. Police leadership continued efforts to curb 
such abuses during the year, including by inviting the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission to provide human rights training to police officers.
    At year's end, the press reported that the police had killed 49 
persons (in 27 separate incidents) during the course of apprehension. 
Press accounts suggested that police conduct was appropriate in a 
number of these incidents; however, several cases raised concerns.
    In January 1999, the Bar Council called on the police to implement 
a standard procedure to investigate every lethal shooting by police; 
however, the police did not implement such a procedure. By year's end 
the Government had not formed an independent commission to investigate 
police killings, as was recommended by a group of 119 domestic NGO's in 
February 1999. In October 1999, the Deputy Home Minister informed 
Parliament that police had shot and killed 387 persons over the past 5 
years.
    In April police shot and killed three suspected robbers in waters 
off Sabah state during an antipiracy campaign. In August police shot 
and killed three men in Sabah whom police suspected were on their way 
to commit a robbery. Also in August, police shot and killed a suspected 
arsonist who reportedly attacked them with a knife. In several 
incidents throughout the year, police shot and killed individuals who 
they claimed had ``run amok'' and threatened bystanders. At year's end, 
the results of any police internal investigations into these and other 
incidents of police extrajudicial killings during the year were not 
available.
    A Human Rights Watch report issued in August on the status of 
Burmese Rohingya illegal immigrants in the country documented 
allegations of deaths during the 1990's in illegal immigrant detention 
camps due to beatings and inhuman conditions such as inadequate food 
and medical care (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). The conditions in the 
camps remained a cause for concern; however, there were no reports of 
similar deaths during the year.
    There were developments in several cases of extrajudicial killings 
from previous years. The case of a policeman charged in 1999 with 
culpable homicide not amounting to murder for shooting a doctor seated 
in his car went to trial. In December the policeman was sentenced to 8 
years in prison by the sessions court for causing the death of the 
person. The policeman has appealed the decision to the High Court. In 
August a coroner ruled that four police officers and one civilian were 
culpable in the 1995 death of a youth in police custody. A negligence 
suit against the police regarding the death of a couple shot by police 
in 1998 in connection with the alleged kidnaping of the son of a state 
chief minister was to be heard in November, but it was postponed to a 
future date that had not been determined by year's end. In July 
testimony during a coroner's inquiry indicated that six men who were 
killed by police in a 1998 incident had been shot in the head at close 
range. In April the police announced that an inquiry would be made into 
the case of a 21-year-old who died in police custody in 1999. In May a 
woman filed suit against police for the death of her husband in police 
custody in 1999 and said publicly that her husband's death might be 
linked to his involvement with the opposition National Justice Party. A 
domestic worker who sued the government and the then-Inspector General 
of Police in 1992 over the death of her son in police custody in 1990 
was awarded a judgment of just over $10,000 (40,000 ringgit). In May 
two policemen convicted of injuring an Indonesian illegal immigrant who 
later died in police custody were sentenced to 3 years in prison.
    In June Acehnese leader Teauku Don Zulfari, exiled from Indonesia, 
was shot and killed in a Kuala Lumpur restaurant. The press speculated 
that the assailants were either gangsters or political rivals from 
Aceh.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    In late April, members of the Filipino terrorist group Abu Sayyef 
attacked a diving resort on the island of Sipadan, seizing several 
hostages of various nationalities. The group released all of the 
hostages but one, a Filipino national, who was being held in the 
Philippines at year's end.
    In early September, four armed Abu Sayyaf rebels kidnaped three 
Malaysian hostages at the Pasir Dive Resort on Pulau Pandanan in Sabah 
state. All three hostages had been released at year's end.
    In both instances, the Government made attempts to retrieve 
hostages and prevent further attacks.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--No constitutional provision or law specifically prohibits 
torture, although laws that prohibit ``committing grievous hurt'' 
encompass torture; however, at times some police tortured, beat, and 
otherwise abused prisoners, detainees, and other citizens. The 
authorities investigated some police and other officials for such 
abuses; however, the Government does not release routinely information 
on the results of investigations, and whether those responsible are 
punished is not always known.
    Police sometimes abuse detainees. There were several press reports 
of persons who alleged police torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment while in custody. For example, in April a 16-year-old 
schoolboy sued the police, alleging that he was tortured after a 
February arrest in connection with an arson case. In October a 
suspected robber claimed that police had shot him in the eye during an 
interrogation. He reportedly then was ordered to tell doctors that he 
had been in an accident. In November a man claimed that police had 
squeezed his genitals with pliers in order to make him confess to a 
theft. All of the cases were under investigation at year's end.
    Police sometimes subjected criminal suspects and illegal alien 
detainees to physical and psychological torture during interrogation 
and detention. During the 1998 trial of former Deputy Prime Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim, senior police officers testified that the police had 
institutionalized techniques to subject some ``national security'' 
detainees to coercive and abusive treatment. A senior police officer 
said that the police did not consider the legality of such tactics. 
However, the Government continued to require police to attend community 
relations and ethics courses to address public concerns over police 
misconduct. The results of such courses were unclear at year's end.
    In March former Inspector General of Police Tan Sri Rahim Noor was 
sentenced to 2 months in jail and ordered to pay the maximum fine of 
about $525 (2,000 ringgit) for ``causing hurt'' after pleading guilty 
to beating former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 while 
Anwar was blindfolded and handcuffed in police custody. The beating 
badly bruised Anwar's face, neck, and arms, and reportedly temporarily 
left him with impaired balance and unclear vision. Rahim said that 
Anwar had provoked him. Charges of attempted assault were reduced as 
part of a plea bargain. Rahim paid the fine, but his lawyers 
immediately appealed the sentence, and he remained on bail. The 
prosecution appealed the sentence, which it termed inadequate. In June 
a hearing of Rahim's appeal was postponed until September after his 
lawyers claimed that Rahim was ill. In September the court again 
rescheduled the hearing to November after the defense informed the 
judge that Rahim had been admitted to a hospital. The appeal was heard 
in November; Rahim's fine was waived, but the 2-month jail sentence was 
upheld. Rahim's lawyer's appealed the sentence to the Federal Court. 
Rahim will lose his pension if the sentence is not overturned.
    In 1999 Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad formed the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry after a long police internal investigation 
established that police had been responsible for the beating of Anwar, 
but failed to identify a culprit. The Commission found no members of 
the police besides Rahim culpable or complicit in the beating of Anwar 
or in the subsequent cover-up. In April 1999, the Malaysian Bar Council 
expressed concern that the Royal Commission had recommended that no 
action be taken against senior police officers who failed to report or 
arrest Rahim after the beating. Anwar's supporters continued to call on 
the Prime Minister, who oversaw the police as the Home Minister at the 
time of Anwar's arrest, to take responsibility for Anwar's beating. The 
Prime Minister had not responded by year's end.
    During the year, there was no response from the Government to 
charges that psychological pressures and threats of physical coercion 
had been used in previous years to obtain confessions in the 
politically sensitive trials of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim. In July the case against fashion designer Mior Abdul Razak bin 
Yahya for fabricating evidence, was dismissed as ``not amounting to an 
acquittal,'' after being postponed four times. Mior had sworn in an 
affidavit that police had threatened and abused him after he was 
detained in September 1998, causing him to confess falsely to having 
had sexual relations with the former Deputy Prime Minister. In February 
Anwar's codefendant, Sukma Darmawan, testified that he had confessed 
falsely to a homosexual relationship with Anwar under police pressure 
in exchange for a promise that the would be free for such testimony. 
One other alleged homosexual partner of Anwar's gave a consistent 
description of the psychological and physical abuse used by police to 
force similar confessions from him.
    No government response was reported to the March 1999 police report 
filed by opposition activist Abdul Malek bin Hussin in which he accused 
police of torturing him in 1998 while he was under detention without 
charge under the Internal Security Act (see Section 1.d.). Malek 
alleged that police among other abuses, had beaten him unconscious and 
forced him to drink their urine.
    During the year, riot police several times forcibly dispersed 
peaceful demonstrators in Kuala Lumpur, using truncheons, water 
cannons, and tear gas (see Section 2.b.). In April the Legal Aid 
Centre, representing 48 persons arrested during street protests on 
April 15 to mark the first anniversary of Anwar Ibrahim's sentencing on 
corruption charges, called on the Government to probe allegations of 
police brutality during the protests. The Human Rights Commission 
announced in April that it would look into the allegations. Opposition 
activist Tian Chua claimed that police beat him in August after they 
detained him during a demonstration outside the courthouse where Anwar 
Ibrahim was being convicted and sentenced on sodomy charges. Tian 
reportedly suffered back injuries during the beating. He brought his 
case before the commission and announced that he intended to sue the 
Government.
    Logging companies reportedly used police force and intimidation to 
appropriate land from indigenous Iban and Penan communities in Sarawak 
(see Section 5).
    Criminal law prescribes caning as an additional punishment to 
imprisonment for those convicted of some nonviolent crimes such as 
narcotics possession, criminal breach of trust, and alien smuggling. 
Judges routinely include caning in sentences of those convicted of such 
crimes as kidnaping, rape, and robbery. Some state Islamic laws, which 
bind only Muslims (see Section 1.e.), also prescribe caning. The 
caning, which is carried out with a +-inch-thick wooden cane, commonly 
causes welts, and it sometimes causes scarring. Male criminals age 50 
and above and women are exempted from caning. According to the 
provisions of the Child Act passed in December, male children may be 
given up to 10 strokes of a ``light cane'' (see Section 5).
    Prison conditions are poor. The authorities in 1999 announced that 
changes would be made concerning prison conditions, in the wake of a 
1999 report by the IPU on the treatment in prison of then political 
prisoner Lim Guan Eng. The report found that the conditions of Lim's 
imprisonment did not comply with the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules 
(Treatment of Prisoners) and the U.N. Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. 
The report cited portions of the Minimum Rules that concern light, 
ventilation, and proper bedding, and Principle 6 of the Body of 
Principles, which prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment. However, the delegation that drafted this report did not 
visit Lim in prison, and therefore was unable to make direct 
observations. The Government stated that Lim was detained under the 
same conditions as other prisoners and in accordance with the colonial-
era 1952 Prison Rules and the 1995 Prisons Act, which, the Government 
contended, met the standards of the U.N. Minimum Rules.
    Deputy Home Minister Ong Ka Ting told Parliament in 1999 that the 
Government had completed a review of prison rules and made amendments 
that would improve the management of prisoners. Ong said that the 
amendments would be promulgated after their approval by the Attorney 
General. Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawai announced in April that 
the Government had spent over $250,000 (1 million ringgit) during the 
year to provide every prisoner with a mattress, although this had not 
been confirmed by independent monitors by year's end. In August prison 
officials announced that a number of current prison rules would be 
reviewed. Officials stated that these changes would include allowing 
female prisoners to keep children with them until age 4 instead of the 
current restriction to age 3 and expanding visiting privileges.
    Prison overcrowding is a serious problem. In 1999 the Director 
General of Prisons said that the country's 35 prisons held 27,400 
prisoners; total designed capacity is 20,000. In March the Deputy Home 
Minister announced that eight more prisons, two juvenile reform 
schools, and a moral rehabilitation center would be built by 2005. 
``Security'' prisoners (see Section 1.d.) were detained in a separate 
detention center.
    Credible reports by former prisoners indicated that guards at some 
prisons regularly beat prisoners convicted of criminal offenses.
    NGO's and former detainees have made credible allegations of 
inadequate food, poor medical care and sanitation, and abuse by guards 
in government camps for illegal immigrants. Conditions are considered 
to have improved with increased food and water rations, and vitamin B 
shots for detainees suffering from beri-beri. A Human Rights Watch 
report issued in August on the status of Burmese Rohingya illegal 
immigrants in the country documented allegations of deaths in the camps 
due to beatings and inhuman conditions during the 1990's (see Sections 
1.a. and 2.d.). There were no reports of similar deaths during the 
year. In July 1999, after 3 days without adequate supplies of water, 
192 illegal aliens escaped from the Lenggeng detention center. 
Testimony during the ongoing trial of nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) activist Irene Fernandez (see Section 2.a.) described inhuman 
conditions at illegal alien detention camps from 1993 to 1995. Former 
detainees from this period testified during the trial that they had 
been kicked, beaten with sticks and rubber hoses by camp policemen, 
refused medical treatment for their injuries, and subjected to severe 
punishments, including sexual abuse. Some physical abuse still occurs 
in the camps.
    The law provides that young boys and girls in remand (judicially 
approved detention) may be placed in prison. The local press reported 
in September that children as young as 10 years old were held in 
prisons for offenses such as petty theft or involvement in school 
fights. Although kept in a separate cell block, they reportedly mingled 
with adult prisoners during communal activities. The Prisons Department 
acknowledged that more than 200 juveniles between 14 and 21 years of 
age were being held in prisons, in particular at Sungai Buloh. A prison 
official claimed that the juvenile prisoners, 82 percent of whom were 
waiting for their cases to be heard, are kept separately from adult 
prisoners at all times. In September the Government identified 2,061 
juveniles held in 26 prisons throughout the country. The Minister in 
the Prime Minister's Office responsible for legal affairs said that he 
would review the rules governing custody of juveniles, claiming that 
the law did not provide for such imprisonment of minors. According to 
press reports in November, officials from the National Unity and Social 
Development Ministry expressed surprise that juvenile offenders still 
were being sent to prison, despite plans to relocate them to separate 
facilities.
    The Government has an agreement with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) that permits visits to certain categories of 
prisoners. The Government has not blocked or denied such visits. 
However, the ICRC did not visit prisons during the year. In August an 
ICRC representative arrived to open a regional facility in the country, 
but he had not received accreditation from the Government. Other NGO's 
and the media generally are not permitted to monitor prison conditions. 
Access to illegal alien detention camps is restricted.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police continued to use 
several statutes to arrest and detain many persons without charge or 
trial. Suspects in some crimes (called ``seizable offenses'') may be 
arrested without warrants; suspects in other crimes (``nonseizable 
offenses'') may be arrested only based on a warrant from a magistrate. 
Crimes characterized as bailable offenses permit suspects to present 
bail at the police station according to a schedule. Bail is not 
available for nonbailable offenses and sometimes also is denied in 
other circumstances, for example, great risk of flight. Police may hold 
suspects for 24 hours without charge. Police may request a magistrate 
to extend the period of remand without charge for up to 2 weeks. After 
this extension, the police, if they wish to hold the suspect, must 
charge him and seek an order of detention from a magistrate. In some 
cases, police have released suspects under remand and quickly 
rearrested them on new but similar charges. However, in general police 
practice is in accord with legal provisions concerning detention.
    Police may deny prisoners under remand access to legal counsel and 
routinely they do so. During this period of remand, police also may 
question suspects without giving them access to counsel. Police justify 
this practice as necessary to prevent interference in ongoing 
investigations. Judicial decisions have upheld this practice. 
Defendants' advocates claimed that the lack of access to counsel 
seriously weakened defendants' legal rights.
    Crowded, understaffed courts and the legal safeguards and appeals 
available to the accused often result in lengthy pretrial detention, 
sometimes lasting several years. In 1998 the Prison's Director General 
stated that roughly half of the prison population consisted of 
prisoners who had not yet been sentenced. Most such prisoners either 
have been convicted and are awaiting sentence or are in the midst of 
their trials. In April a government minister acknowledged that a 
prisoner had been held for more than 8 years pending trial.
    Three laws permit the Government to detain suspects without 
judicial review or the filing of formal charges: the 1960 Internal 
Security Act (ISA); the 1969 Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of 
Crime) Ordinance, and the 1985 Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive 
Measures). Enacted more than 40 years ago when there was an active 
Communist insurgency, the ISA empowers the police to hold for up to 60 
days any person who may act ``in a manner prejudicial to the security 
of Malaysia.'' The Home Minister may authorize further detention for 
periods of up to 2 years. Those released before the end of their 
detention period are subject to ``imposed restricted conditions'' for 
the remainder of their detention periods. These conditions limited 
their rights to freedom of speech, association, and travel outside the 
country.
    According to the Government, the goal of the ISA is to control 
internal subversion. According to a prominent local human rights NGO, 
as of November 30, there had been 76 detentions under the ISA during 
the year. In addition, according to the NGO's statistics through June, 
836 persons had been detained under the Dangerous Drug Act and, as of 
August 31, 418 persons were being detained under the Emergency 
Ordinance.
    The ISA often is used against what the Government considers 
nonpolitical crimes, including those against ostensibly ``deviant'' 
Muslim groups. The Government states that deviant groups pose a danger 
to national security because of their radical beliefs. The ISA, and the 
threat of invoking the ISA, also are used to intimidate and restrict 
political dissent. For example, in 1998 the police detained Anwar 
Ibrahim and 27 of his followers under the ISA after a series of largely 
peaceful antigovernment demonstrations. The Government claimed that the 
demonstrations threatened national security (see Sections 1.e. and 
2.b.). The 29 members of the Al-Ma'unah sect arrested in June initially 
were detained under the ISA.
    Security authorities sometimes wait several days after detention 
before informing an ISA detainee's family. Even when there are no 
formal charges, the authorities must inform detainees of the 
accusations against them and permit them to appeal to an advisory board 
for review every 6 months. However, advisory board decisions and 
recommendations are not binding on the Home Minister, are not public, 
and often are not shown to the detainee. In the past, some ISA 
detainees have refused to participate in the review process under these 
circumstances.
    Amendments to the ISA in 1997 sharply circumscribed judicial review 
of ISA detentions. Although the Bar Council has in the past asserted 
that detentions under the ISA should be subject to judicial review on 
both procedural and substantive grounds, the courts have not concurred 
with this interpretation, and they review ISA detentions only on 
technical grounds. Detainees freed on technical grounds nearly always 
are detained again immediately.
    In May 1999, the Government announced new procedures for ISA 
detention. According to press reports, the new amendments stipulated 
that senior police officials must concur with ISA detentions. The then-
Deputy Minister in the then Prime Minister's Department Datuk Ibrahim 
Ali claimed that the amended procedures would help prevent misuse of 
the ISA. The details were not reported.
    In early August, the Government charged 29 members of the Al-
Ma'unah sect, who were arrested for the early June raids on two army 
depots, after previous remandings had expired. The group was charged 
under Section 121 of the Penal Code with ``waging or attempting to wage 
or abetting the waging of war'' against the King. Also in August, the 
Government detained under the ISA at least 33 additional Al-Ma'unah 
members solely for their membership in the group. In December six 
members of the first group were convicted and sentenced to 10 years in 
prison. The remaining members (of both groups) remained in custody at 
year's end. In March police in Sarawak detained two persons under the 
ISA for allegedly dealing illegally in firearms (see Sections 1.e. and 
2.c.).
    Opposition leaders and human rights organizations continued to call 
on the Government to repeal the ISA and other legislation that deprived 
persons of the right to defend themselves in court. For example, in 
August 70 opposition parties and nongovernmental groups signed a 
memorandum calling for the repeal of the ISA. However, during the year, 
a number of ruling coalition politicians and government officials 
stated that the ISA still was necessary and would not be repealed. In 
February the Deputy Home Minister said in Parliament that the ISA is 
useful in maintaining the peace, but it would not be misused. In July 
the Prime Minister said ``the ISA is a legitimate law of the country, 
and although we do not like using it, we have the right to use it 
against persons whose actions can jeopardize the country's security.''
    Under the 1969 Emergency Ordinance, which was instituted after 
intercommunal riots in that year, the Home Minister may issue a 
detention order for up to 2 years against a person if he deems it 
necessary to protect public order, or for the ``suppression of 
violence, or the prevention of crimes involving violence.'' In fact the 
Government has used the Emergency Ordinance for other reasons. In 
September press reports quoted a police official as saying that 328 
persons were detained under the ordinance during the year.
    Provisions of the 1985 Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive 
Measures) give the Government specific power to detain suspected drug 
traffickers without trial. Such suspects may be held for up to 39 days 
before the Home Minister must issue a detention order. Once the 
Ministry has issued an order, the detainee is entitled to a hearing 
before a court. In some instances, the judge may order the detainee's 
release. Suspects may be held without charge for successive 2-year 
intervals with periodic review by an advisory board, whose opinion is 
binding on the Home Minister. However, the review process contained 
none of the procedural rights that a defendant would have in a court 
proceeding. The police frequently detained suspected narcotics 
traffickers under the Special Preventive Measures after the traffickers 
are acquitted of formal charges--often as they leave the courtroom. 
Between January and September, 1,259 persons were detained under this 
measure. The Government detained over 1,300 persons under this law in 
1999.
    Immigration laws are used to detain possible illegal aliens without 
trial or hearing. The detainees are not accorded any administrative or 
legal hearings and are released only after their employers prove their 
legal status. Those who were able to produce legal documents normally 
are released immediately; those who were unable to prove their legal 
status often were held for extended periods before deportation. Illegal 
aliens were kept in detention centers that are separate from prisons 
(see Section 1.c.).
    Law enforcement authorities also used the Restricted Residence Act 
to restrict movements of criminal suspects for an extended period. The 
act allows the Home Ministry to place criminal suspects under 
restricted residence in a remote district away from their homes for 2 
years. The Ministry is authorized to issue the banishment orders 
without any judicial or administrative hearings. Human rights activists 
have questioned the need for this law, which was passed more than 60 
years ago (during British sovereignty) under very different 
circumstances, and they have called for its repeal. The Government has 
continued to justify the act as a necessary tool and has used it in the 
recent past, primarily to combat vice and gambling offenses. In July 
1999, the Terengganu state chief of police warned publicly that 
operators of illegal gambling machines would be banished under the act 
if they did not cease their activities. In August 1999, Director 
General of the Anticorruption Agency (ACA) Datuk Ahmad Zaki Husin 
proposed using the act to banish officials suspected of corruption. 
After the Bar Council expressed concerns over the proposal, Zaki 
clarified that the Restricted Residence Act might be used only for 
``syndicated graft.'' Also in August 1999, the Deputy Prime Minister 
warned ``get-rich-quick'' scheme operators that they might face 
banishment under the act. The Government has not disclosed how many 
persons were subject to the Restricted Residence Act and no accurate 
estimate was available. In April the Deputy Home Minister said in 
Parliament that during 1999 there were 93 persons held in prison 
waiting to be placed under restricted residence, and 17 of these 
persons were released from prison into restricted residence. In 
September the Selangor state government stated that it might use the 
Restricted Residence Act to banish those responsible for the increase 
in illegal video and gaming outlets in Selnagor.
    In 1998 the Attorney General stated that the Government had 
expedited hearings on the cases of 44 prisoners held ``at the pleasure 
of the Sovereign'' for inordinate periods, often well exceeding the 
maximum sentences for their original crimes. In one case, a prisoner 
had been held for 37 years. Most such ``forgotten prisoners'' committed 
their crimes as minors or while of unsound mind. The Government has not 
released the findings of the hearings held on these cases, or indicated 
whether any of the 44 prisoners have been released.
    Section 396 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows the detention of 
a person whose testimony as a material witness is necessary in a 
criminal case, if that person is likely to abscond.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, since 1988 government action, 
constitutional amendments, legislation restricting judicial review, and 
other factors steadily have eroded judicial independence and 
strengthened executive influence over the judiciary. A number of high-
profile cases continued to cast doubts on judicial impartiality and 
independence, and raised questions of arbitrary verdicts, selective 
prosecution, and preferential treatment of some litigants and lawyers. 
Members of the bar, NGO's, and other observers (including those who 
attended a 1999 Commonwealth Law Conference held in the country) 
continued to express serious concern about the deterioration of the 
independence and overall fairness of the judiciary. In December a new 
Chief Justice and Attorney General were sworn into office. Most 
observers were optimistic that these appointments will help restore the 
health and credibility of the judiciary. Immediately after taking his 
position, the new Chief Justice made public remarks regarding the 
importance of restoring public trust in the judiciary.
    High courts have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases 
involving serious crimes and most civil cases. Civil suits involving 
automobile accidents and landlord-tenant disputes are heard by sessions 
courts. Juvenile courts try offenders under age 18. The Special Court 
tries cases against the King and sultans. The Court of Appeal has 
appellate jurisdiction over high court and sessions court decisions. 
The Federal Court, the country's highest court, hears appeals of court 
of appeal decisions.
    Islamic religious laws administered by state authorities through 
Islamic courts bind ethnic Malays and other Muslims in some matters. In 
1997 the Government announced that it would harmonize Islamic law at 
the federal level and appoint an Islamic law federal attorney general. 
However, the Government has not been able to obtain the necessary 
agreement of all the states and the proposal has not been implemented, 
though it is still under discussion.
    Indigenous people in Sarawak and Sabah also have a system of 
customary law to resolve matters such as land disputes between tribes.
    Penghulu (village head) courts may adjudicate minor civil matters, 
but these are rarely used.
    The military has a separate system of courts.
    The secular legal system is based on English common law. Trials are 
public, although judges may order restrictions on press coverage. For 
example, in the corruption trial of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar, 
the judge often restricted press coverage of defense testimony and 
remarks that might embarrass senior government leaders. However, the 
judge generally did not restrict press coverage of testimony and 
remarks that might embarrass Anwar.
    Defendants have the right to counsel, bail is sometimes available, 
and strict rules of evidence apply in court. Witnesses are subject to 
cross-examination. The defense in both ordinary criminal cases and 
special security cases is not entitled to a statement of evidence 
before the trial. In general, limited pretrial discovery in criminal 
cases hobble defendants' ability to defend themselves.
    Defendants enjoy the presumption of innocence and may appeal court 
decisions to higher courts. In criminal cases, defendants also may 
appeal for clemency to the King or local state rulers as appropriate. A 
single judge hears each criminal trial. There are no jury trials.
    A 1997 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code that may erode 
defendants' presumption of innocence continued to concern lawyers. 
Before the 1997 amendment, the prosecution was required to prove its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt or the defendant would receive a summary 
dismissal without having to present the defense case. Now, the 
prosecution only needs to prove a legally sufficient uless disproved 
case, and the defense must be called. In August 1999, a man was 
convicted of murder after electing to enter a no defense. The judge 
ruled that the prosecution had proven a legally sufficient case and, 
when the man chose to offer no defense, the judge convicted him and 
sentenced him to death.
    In 1998 Parliament passed amendments to the 1964 Courts of 
Judicature Act that limited the rights of defendants to appeal in some 
circumstances. The Government stated that these amendments would 
expedite the hearing of cases in the upper courts. The president of the 
Bar Association said in 1998 that the amendments imposed too many 
restrictions on appeals.
    The Attorney General may restrict the right to a fair trial in 
criminal cases by invoking the 1975 Essential (Security Cases) 
Regulations. These regulations governing trial procedure normally apply 
only in firearm cases. In cases tried under these regulations, the 
standards for accepting selfincriminating statements by defendants as 
evidence are less stringent than in normal criminal cases. Also, the 
authorities may hold the accused for an unspecified time before making 
formal charges. The Attorney General has the authority to invoke these 
regulations in other criminal cases if the Government determines that 
the crime involves national security considerations, but such cases are 
rare. However, the Essential Regulations were invoked in September at 
the beginning of the trial of the 29 members of the Al-Ma'unah sect 
accused of carrying out arms thefts at 2 army posts in July. Defense 
lawyers argued that the use of the Essential Regulations was 
unconstitutional, since no certificate of emergency declaring a 
national emergency had been issued. The judge ruled that the Attorney 
General has the discretion to opt to use the Essential Regulations, if 
he sees fit to do so (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    Even when the Essential Regulations are not invoked, defendants and 
defense lawyers lack legal protections against interference. For 
example, during a trial police may call and interrogate witnesses who 
have given testimony not helpful to the prosecution. Human rights 
advocates accused police of using this tactic to intimidate witnesses. 
One instance of this practice led the Bar Council in July 1999 to issue 
a statement of concern. Police also have used raids and document 
seizures to harass defendants. Selective prosecution that is, 
prosecution based on political rather than legal considerations, is a 
serious problem in the legal system. According to the law, the decision 
to prosecute a case rests solely with the Attorney General. In August 
1999, the former Chief Justice publicly reminded magistrates and judges 
not to question the Attorney General's sole discretion to prosecute. 
Opposition leaders and some NGO's made credible accusations of 
political interference in the judicial process. In April 1999 the Prime 
Minister publicly denied that he interfered in the decisions of the 
Attorney General. In February the Minister in the Prime Minister's 
Department responsible for legal affairs stated in Parliament that the 
Attorney General does not practice selective prosecution.
    In practice the Attorney General uses his power to prosecute 
selectively. In May 1999, the Attorney General warned that those 
accusing the Government of selective prosecution could be charged with 
sedition or criminal defamation. The Bar Council criticized the 
Attorney General's statement and stated that it showed ``a lack of 
respect or understanding of the concept of democracy and the rule of 
law.'' No one was charged with sedition or criminal defamation on such 
grounds during the year.
    Contempt of court charges also have restricted the ability of 
defendants and their attorneys to defend themselves. Attorney Zainur 
Zakaria, after raising a legal issue on behalf of his client Anwar 
Ibrahim, was charged with contempt in 1998. Zainur lost his appeal in 
September but was granted a stay of execution of the 3month sentence 
pending his appeal to the Federal Court, the country's highest court. 
The Bar Council expressed concern over Zainur's case and other contempt 
of court cases several times in recent years and in March 1999, it 
prepared a draft Contempt of Courts Act to provide explicitly what 
would constitute contempt. The Chief Justice said in April 1999 that 
there was no need for a Contempt of Courts Act because judges do not 
abuse their power. In August 1999, former Deputy Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department Datuk Ibrahim Ali said that the Government would 
study the Bar Council's draft; however, the Government had not passed 
or considered such a bill by year's end. In September senior government 
officials participated in a Bar Council seminar on contempt of court 
provisions.
    Following a number of high-profile corruption cases, the Government 
amended the Anticorruption Act in 1997. The law gives the Attorney 
General powers that impinge on the presumption of innocence and 
requires accused persons to prove that they acquired their monetary and 
other assets legally.
    Islamic courts do not give equal weight to the testimony of women. 
Many NGO's have complained that women do not receive fair treatment 
from Islamic courts, especially in matters of divorce.
    In August, a judge ruled that U.N. Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers Datuk Param Cumaraswamy, because of 
his status as a U.N. Special Rapporteur, was immune from one of four 
libel suits pending against him in Malaysia. The judge explicitly 
stated that his ruling did not affect any of the other suits pending 
against Param. The suits stem from a longstanding and complex series of 
events. In 1997 Param and former Malaysian Bar Council secretary 
general Tommy Thomas were sued by several large companies, prominent 
businessmen, and a prominent lawyer for libel for an article, in an 
international legal journal. The article alleged that certain 
plaintiffs and their lawyers enjoyed improper preferential treatment in 
the courts. In judgments that widely were thought to be politically 
motivated and improperly influenced by favoritism, the courts had 
rejected Param's claim of immunity. In April 1999, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) had ruled that because of his status as a U.N. 
Special Rapporteur, Param was immune from the suits. The following 
month the Prime Minister said that the Government would abide by the 
ICJ's decision; however, in October 1999, a court defied the ICJ and 
ruled that Param would have to defend himself. Similar decisions were 
handed down in the other three suits. The U.N. expressed its regret 
over the court's decisions, and in December 1999, asked the Government 
to reimburse it for legal expenses. Param appealed the rulings, leading 
to the August decision. The other 3 libel suits against Param were 
still pending at year's end.
    The libel case against Tommy Thomas was settled in October 1998 
after he issued a written apology through his lawyers. However, he then 
issued a statement that the settlement was initiated by his insurance 
company over his objections. Subsequently Thomas issued a second 
statement retracting his earlier one. However, the judge cited him for 
contempt of court. He was convicted in 1998 and sentenced to 6 months 
in prison. The appeal of his conviction was still pending at year's 
end.
    In June the High Court granted an order preventing the Malaysian 
Bar Council from holding an extraordinary meeting to discuss a motion 
calling for an investigation into alleged improper conduct by the Chief 
Justice. In 1994 the Chief Justice was accused of accepting vacation 
travel, from a lawyer who had matters pending before the court. The 
High Court stated that the allegations against the Chief Justice had 
not been verified.
    The cases against former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and 
some of his associates, and against Irene Fernandez (see Section 2.a.), 
have raised questions about judicial independence and impartiality. 
Nonetheless, the Courts did not rule exclusively in favor of the 
Government. In August a court convicted and fined a Member of 
Parliament (M.P.) from the ruling coalition government more than $2,600 
(10,000 ringgit) on a contempt charge. The M.P. filed an appeal; if the 
conviction stands, he would lose his seat.
    Former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is a political prisoner. 
In September 1998, after a political conflict, Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohammad removed Anwar as Deputy Prime Minister. Later the same month, 
after a large and mostly peaceful demonstration in which he called for 
Mahathir's resignation, Anwar was detained for alleged corruption and 
sodomy. The Government was motivated primarily by its desire to remove 
Anwar from political prominence following the significant manifestation 
of popular support for the reform movement that Anwar began after his 
removal. While in detention, Anwar was beaten by the former Inspector 
General of Police Rahim Noor (see Section 1.c.).
    For several days, Anwar was denied medical treatment for the 
injuries that he received at the hands of Rahim. Presumably to avoid 
bringing a visibly injured Anwar to court, police changed Anwar's 
status to ``detention without charge'' under the Internal Security Act. 
Anwar's status subsequently was changed again to ``criminal 
detention.'' Anwar later was tried and convicted on four counts of 
corruption. He was sentenced to 6 years in prison for corruption in 
April 1999. In April Anwar's appeal of the conviction and sentence was 
denied by the Court of Appeals. He has appealed to the Federal Court, 
the country's highest court. At year's end, Anwar's appeal of this 
conviction still was pending. At the request of his lawyers in 
November, the appeal was postponed because Anwar was in the hospital 
being treated for a slipped disk in his back. No date has yet been set 
to hear the appeal.
    During Anwar's corruption trial, the judge made several 
questionable rulings that greatly limited Anwar's ability to defend 
himself against what some individuals believe were politically 
motivated charges. For example, the judge sentenced one of Anwar's 
attorneys to 3 months' imprisonment for contempt after the attorney 
raised in court charges of prosecutorial misconduct. The judge greatly 
restricted the scope of Anwar's defense (on occasions during the trial, 
the judge explicitly said that he did not care if there was a 
conspiracy to bring down Anwar) and tolerated improper activities by 
the police and prosecutors. The judge allowed prosecutors to amend the 
charges in the middle of the trial, which is permitted under the law 
but in this case clearly was unfair to Anwar. Anwar was denied the 
ability to rebut evidence of sexual misconduct presented by prosecution 
witnesses when the judge, at the end of the prosecution's case, allowed 
prosecutors to amend the charges, and then expunged the record of all 
evidence of sexual misconduct. Since his arrest, Anwar has been denied 
bail on questionable legal grounds.
    On August 8, Anwar was convicted on a separate charge of sodomy and 
sentenced to 9 years in prison, to be served consecutively with the 
6year sentence that Anwar received for corruption. Once he completes 
his 15 years in prison, he would be disqualified from holding any 
public office for 5 years. His adopted brother, Sukma Damarawan, a 
codefendent in the case, was sentenced to 6 years in prison and four 
strokes of the cane, but he remains free on bail. Lawyers for both 
immediately filed appeals. At the beginning of the sodomy trial, 
prosecutors changed the dates of the alleged acts of sodomy, allegedly 
because the defense had discovered that the apartment building where 
the sodomy allegedly took place had not been completed by the original 
dates. Despite testimony detailing how police had coerced a confession 
from an alleged homosexual partner, on July 26 1999, the judge ruled 
that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that this 
confession had been voluntary. A few days later, another witness 
admitted that police had coached part of his testimony. On August 18, 
1999, the lead police investigator materially contradicted his 
testimony (in order to make it consistent with the amended dates of the 
alleged offense); on the next day, the judge ruled that the policeman 
had not lied. In April the judge ruled that the Prime Minister, who was 
called by the defense in an attempt to prove a political conspiracy 
against Anwar, would not be required to testify. Defense attorneys 
maintained that they were not permitted by the judge to call a number 
of desired witnesses. The defense claimed that the judge exerted such 
pressure during the summer to bring the trial to an early conclusion.
    Anwar's conviction and sentence were criticized strongly by 
opposition parties, human rights groups, and a number of foreign 
governments and international human rights organizations. For example, 
the Malaysian Bar Council criticized the trial, citing irregularities 
in the evidence, and characterized the sentence as ``manifestly 
excessive and harsh.'' Anwar remained in prison at year's end, but he 
was transferred to a hospital in December to receive treatment for a 
slipped disk in his back. He is permitted to receive visits from only 
his family and lawyers. According to the law, Anwar is a ``common 
criminal'' rather than a political prisoner, and therefore does not 
have the right to receive visits from international human rights 
organizations.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law provides for these rights; however, 
authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights in some cases. 
Provisions in the security legislation (see Section 1.d.) allow the 
police to enter and search without a warrant the homes of persons 
suspected of threatening national security. Police also may confiscate 
evidence under these acts. In some cases each year, police use this 
legal authority to search homes and offices, seize books and papers, 
monitor conversations, and take persons into custody without a warrant.
    The law permits the Home Ministry to place criminal suspects under 
restricted residence in a remote district away from their homes for a 
2-year period (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government bans membership in unregistered political parties 
and in unregistered organizations (see Section 2.b.).
    A clause in the 1997 Anticorruption Act empowers the Attorney 
General to authorize the interception of mail and the wiretapping of 
telephones. Such information would be admissible as evidence in a 
corruption trial.
    Certain religious issues pose significant obstacles to marriage 
between Muslims and adherents of other religions (see Section 2.c.).
    Muslim couples must take premarital courses. In previous years, 
women's activists complained that the courses, as implemented, 
perpetuated gender discrimination by misinforming women of their rights 
in marriage (see Section 5). However, there were no reports during the 
year of such misinformation regarding marriage rights.
    Two state governments sought to restrict Muslim women's dress 
during the year (see Section 5).
    Singaporean newspapers and magazines may not circulate in the 
country (see Section 2.a.), despite being easily available on the 
Internet.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, some important legal 
limitations exist, and the Government restricts freedom of expression 
and intimidates most of the print and electronic media into practicing 
selfcensorship.
    The Constitution provides that freedom of speech may be restricted 
by legislation ``in the interest of security (or) public order.'' For 
example, the Sedition Act prohibits public comment on issues defined as 
sensitive, such as racial and religious matters. In practice the 
Sedition Act, the Official Secrets Act, criminal defamation laws, and 
some other laws have been used to restrict or intimidate dissenting 
political speech.
    In February 1999, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression issued a report stating that freedom of opinion was 
curtailed systematically in Malaysia. The Special Rapporteur stated 
that the Internal Security Act, the Sedition Act, and the Printing 
Presses and Publications Act were used to suppress or repress 
expression and curb peaceful assembly. He further stated that 
defamation laws ``appear to be having a very chilling effect.'' The 
Government stated that the Special Rapporteur's report was ``baseless 
and distorted.''
    The Prime Minister and other senior officials continued to ascribe 
seditious or treasonous motives to critics of government policies. 
Although many persons still criticized the Government publicly, the 
Government's statements made many persons more cautious about 
exercising their rights of free speech. For example, in November the 
Home Affairs Ministry issued several warnings to a Chinese language 
daily newspaper, the China Press, about reporting on controversial 
issues, specifically the Vision School and the Education Fund.
    In August 1999, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi 
warned that political parties that raised sensitive issues and caused 
an ``undesirable situation'' would be charged under the Sedition Act. 
However, government and ruling party officials sometimes made 
statements on sensitive racial and religious issues with no 
repercussions. For example, on the same day that the Deputy Prime 
Minister threatened to invoke the Sedition Act, he stated that voting 
for the opposition would be ``disastrous'' for ethnic Malays.
    Two prominent figures were charged under sedition statutes during 
the year. In January the Government charged attorney and opposition 
politician Karpal Singh with sedition for statements he made in court 
during his legal defense of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, 
first time that a lawyer was charged with sedition for statements made 
in court. Karpal's case came to trial in July, but it was postponed 
until May 2001. Also in January, opposition politician Marina Yusoff 
was charged with sedition for comments that she made about racial 
violence in 1969 while campaigning for Parliament in 1999. Her case was 
postponed several times; it was being heard at year's end. Both Karpal 
and Marina were charged under Section 4(1)(b) of the Sedition Act of 
1948, which carries a maximum fine of just over $1,300 (5,000 ringgit), 
or 3 years' imprisonment, or both.
    Again in January, the editor and printer of Harakah, the newspaper 
of the opposition Islamic party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), were 
charged with sedition in connection with an August 1999 Harakah article 
that quoted an opposition politician's comments on the confession of 
Sukma Darawaman, Anwar Ibrahim's codefendant in Anwar's sodomy trial. 
The printer pleaded guilty in May and was fined slightly over $1,000 
(4,000 ringgit). The editor's case is scheduled to be heard in 2001, 
although no formal date has been set.
    In September 1999 an offical of the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO), the dominant component of the ruling National 
Front coalition, lodged a police report charging the chief minister of 
the opposition-controlled state of Kelantan with sedition. The chief 
minister allegedly had said that the state's populace no longer held 
the royal family in high regard. Police announced that they had 
questioned 10 members of the opposition Islamic party about this case. 
There were no reports of further developments by year's end.
    In March the Melaka state government announced that it had 
terminated the contracts of an undetermined number of panel doctors, 
architects, and lawyers, and blacklisted contractors who allegedly were 
aligned with opposition parties. The state government also closed 
accounts in banks where the staff were accused of criticizing the 
Government. In July the Penang state government also blacklisted 
contractors for their alleged involvement in antigovernment activities, 
such as supporting or funding opposition parties. Opposition parties 
and NGO's criticized these actions as discriminatory, claiming that 
such steps were inconsistent with the demands of a democratic society.
    In March 1999, the Prime Minister said that slanderous statements 
had become a ``security problem'' and claimed that some statements 
advocated violence and assassination. Police later claimed that they 
were monitoring all slanderous statements, including news reports that 
amounted to incitement. It was unclear from the Prime Minister's and 
police officials' statements whether security concerns were confined to 
advocating violence or whether these concerns also encompassed 
legitimate criticism of the Government.
    UMNO formed a legal panel in March 1999 to identify slanderous and 
libelous statements and to take legal action against them. The panel 
subsequently sued several government critics for public statements and 
statements reported in the press. Fromer Deputy Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department Datuk Ibrahim Ali, the chairman of the panel, 
warned that those who made allegations against the Government or the 
ruling party also might face prosecution for criminal defamation. In a 
separate statement in May 1999, Datuk Ibrahim Ali said that the ruling 
party had identified 40 to 50 individuals from the opposition and 
academia who often mad defamatory statements. He reportedly said that 
UMNO wanted to ensure that the critics did not get away ``scot free.'' 
Government opponents accused the Government of using the panel to 
stifle legitimate dissent. In June 1999, UMNO secretary general Tan Sri 
Khalil Yaakob said that the panel had countered opposition slander 
successfully.
    During 2000, many government officials, opposition figures, and 
private citizens filed multimillion-dollar lawsuits for libel and 
slander. In May 1999, the Bar Council stated that the proliferation of 
multimillion-dollar libel and slander lawsuits ``would end up stifling 
the freedom of speech.'' In July the Federal Court upheld a judgment of 
over $250,000 (1 million ringgit) against a freelance journalist who 
had been sued for libel by a wealthy businessman in 1994. In September 
the Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by a Asian Edition Wall Street 
Journal correspondent against the rejection of his application to amend 
his statement of defense in a more than $10 million (40 million 
ringgit) libel suit against him. A different panel of judges also 
struck down (with costs) the correspondent's application for a stay of 
the suits against him that were pending in a lower court. Also in 
September, the New Straits Times made a public apology to a prominent 
opposition party leader for two caricatures published in the newspaper 
in 1999. The Minister in the Prime Minister's Department responsible 
for legal affairs told reporters in September that the Government would 
review the law of defamation in response to public concern over libel 
awards which, he noted, frequently exceeded damages handed down in 
personal injury cases.
    The Official Secrets Act (OSA) also restricts freedom of 
expression. In the past, The Bar Council and other NGO's have called 
for a review of certain provisions of the OSA that grant considerable 
discretion to the authorities. Opposition leaders historically have 
accused the Government of using the OSA to cover up corruption. In 
January Ezam Nor, former Anwar aide and youth chief of the opposition 
group National Justice Party, was charged under the OSA with disclosing 
to reporters secret AntiCorruption Agency (ACA) reports. Ezam stated 
publicly in August 1999 that Anwar had stored abroad documents that 
corroborated charges of corruption against senior government leaders. 
Ezam claimed that the reports showed that the ACA was not pursuing 
corruption cases against senior government officials. Ezam's case went 
to trial in August, but it was postponed until February 2001. In March 
a government official stated in Parliament that only six persons have 
been arrested under the OSA since its inception in 1972, and he claimed 
that this statistic proved that the Government does not use the OSA to 
silence critics.
    The 1984 Printing Presses and Publications Act limits press 
freedom. Under the act, domestic and foreign publications must apply 
annually to the Government for a permit. The act was amended in 1987 to 
make the publication of ``malicious news'' a punishable offense, 
expanded the Government's power to ban or restrict publications, and 
prohibited court challenges to suspension or revocation of publication 
permits. Government power over license renewal and other policies 
create an atmosphere that inhibits independent or investigative 
journalism and resulted in extensive self-censorship. In April the 
Deputy Home Minister stated in Parliament that from 1996 through March, 
action had been taken under the Act against 164 publishers. In May the 
Deputy Prime Minister stated in Parliament that the act has ``served 
its purpose'' of preserving harmony and promoting coexistence in a 
multiracial country. In August the Minister in the Prime Minister's 
Department responsible for legal affairs said that the act would not be 
repealed, even if a national press council were established to regulate 
the media.
    The English and Malay mainstream press provide generally laudatory, 
uncritical coverage of government officials and policies, and usually 
give only limited and selective coverage to political views of the 
opposition or political rivals. Editorial opinion almost always 
reflects government positions on domestic and international issues. 
Chinese-language newspapers are much freer in reporting and commenting 
on sensitive political and social issues, but they are not immune to 
government pressure. However, self-censorship and biased reporting in 
the print media was not uniform and the English-, Malay-, and Chinese-
language press all, at times, provided balanced reporting on sensitive 
issues.
    The Government often conveyed its displeasure with press reporting 
directly to a newspaper's board of directors or chief editors. In 
addition leading political figures in the ruling coalition, or 
companies controlled by them, own most major newspapers, thus limiting 
the range of views. At times the susceptibility of the press to 
government pressure has a direct and public impact on operations. For 
example, in January the group editor in chief of a local press 
conglomerate was removed after its flagship newspaper, the New Straits 
Times, carried several articles that reportedly angered the UMNO 
Supreme Council. However, the individual was appointed in September as 
chairman of Bernama, the national news agency.
    By World Press Freedom Day on May 3, 950 journalists had signed a 
petition, initiated a year earlier, calling for the repeal of the 
Printing Presses and Publications Act and the formation of an 
independent media council to regulate the press. The petition stated 
that government controls on the press had resulted in self-censorship 
and diminished the credibility of the mainstream press. The Bar Council 
issued a statement in 1999 supporting the journalists' petition. 
Although in response the Deputy Prime Minister reaffirmed his intention 
to look into the idea of a media council, no action had been taken by 
year's end.
    The Center for Independent Journalism, which was founded in May, 
issued a statement after a seminar in September on press freedom, that 
cited selfcensorship as the biggest obstacle to press freedom in the 
country. It identified the Printing Presses and Publications Act and 
fear of lawsuits as the primary causes of selfcensorship.
    The Government continued to prosecute human rights activist Irene 
Fernandez under the Printing Presses and Publications Act for charges 
that she made in 1995 of mistreatment of detainees at illegal alien 
detention centers. Fernandez's supporters accuse the Government of 
purposely prolonging the trial, the longest in the country's history, 
to harass Fernandez. As of year's end, the trial continued.
    The Government also sometimes directly restricts the dissemination 
of information that it deems embarrassing or prejudicial to national 
interests. The Government continued its policy of not allowing public 
disclosure of air pollution index-readings. In July the Minister for 
Science, Technology, and Environment Datuk Seri Law Hieng Ding 
reiterated that the Government would not release air pollution index-
readings due to fear that they would affect the tourism industry 
negatively. In February 1999, the Government forbade all state health 
departments from commenting on the outbreak of a deadly virus. The 
Government later restricted reporters' access to sites of the outbreak. 
However, the issue was reported widely.
    Publications of opposition parties, social action groups, unions, 
and other private groups actively covered opposition parties and 
frequently printed views critical of government policies. However, the 
Government retained significant influence over these publications by 
requiring annual renewal of publishing permits and limiting circulation 
only to members of the relevant organization. Several times in 1999, 
senior government leaders publicly warned the publishers of Harakah, 
the Islamic opposition party's newspaper not to print ``slanderous'' 
remarks and to limit distribution to party members. Harakah also was 
the target of several ruling party-sponsored libel suits. In December 
1999, the Home Ministry issued a letter to Harakah's publisher asking 
him to explain why Harakah should not be banned for violating the terms 
of the publishing permit. Acting on a Home Ministry directive, police 
officers raided newsstands that distributed Harakah to the public and 
confiscated many copies. Harakah stated that he would abide by the Home 
Ministry directive and the newspaper generally no longer is sold 
openly. The circulation of Harakah rivals that of mainstream 
newspapers. Harakah was the only major Malay and English language media 
forum for opposition views. In March, the Government stipulated that 
Harakah published only twice a month instead of twice a week. The 
Government failed to renew publication permits for several political 
weeklies, such as Ekslusif and Detik, and a teen magazine, Al-Wasilah. 
The Government stated that the permits of Detik and Ekslusif were not 
renewed because of their ``imbalanced reporting.''
    For most of the year, there were two exclusively on-line 
newspapers, although one of these was forced to shut down in December 
due to financial difficulties. Most major newspapers have an on-line 
edition. For example, Detik now publishes an on-line Internet edition. 
Exclusively on-line newspapers do not require publication permits; 
however, the Government denies their reporters press accreditation to 
cover government functions and ministers' press conferences, and 
refuses their admission into government buildings. During the year, 
readership of online newspapers increased markedly.
    Printers, who also must have their permits renewed annually, were 
often reluctant to print publications were critical of the Government.
    Both legal magazines (those with publishing permits) and illegal, 
that is lacking publishing permits, publications frequently printed 
criticism of the Government. In May 1999, police seized over a thousand 
copies of illegal antigovernment magazines at a printing company and 
charged the company owner with violating the Printing Presses and 
Publications Act.
    Isolated instances of violence against journalists occurred during 
the year. A news photographer reportedly was assaulted during an August 
demonstration staged by the UMNO youth wing against an ethnic Chinese 
group accused of questioning special Malay rights and privileges.
    The foreign press continued to be a target of government criticism 
for allegedly biased reporting. In February 1999, several government 
ministries announced plans to boycott three foreign publications that 
they claimed criticized the Government overzealously. In his August 
Independence Day speech, the Prime Minister stated the foreign media 
``have succeeded in discrediting us and encouraging and supporting all 
acts by any groups, including criminals, which could undermine our 
country.''
    The electronic media is restricted more tightly than the print 
media. Radio and television are almost uniformly laudatory of the 
Government. News on the opposition is restricted tightly and reported 
in a biased fashion. In July 1999, the Deputy Information Minister 
stated candidly that government television and radio channels would not 
broadcast the views of opposition parties. He said that opposition 
parties were welcome to use private news stations or apply for 
broadcasting licenses of their own. In fact the two private television 
stations have close ties to the ruling coalition and are unlikely to 
provide a forum for the opposition parties, and it is unlikely that the 
Government would grant the opposition a broadcasting license. In April 
the Deputy Information Minister stated that the opposition only would 
be allowed access to government media if the opposition ``has anything 
specific or good to say.'' The Government has not approved a 
longstanding license application for a state radio station in the 
oppositioncontrolled state of Kelantan. Every other state has such a 
station.
    A government censorship board censors films for profanity, nudity, 
sex, violence, and certain political and religious content. Television 
stations censor programming in line with government guidelines. The 
Government bans certain books for political and religious reasons or 
because of sexual or profane content. Some foreign newspapers and 
magazines are banned (see Section 1.f.) and, infrequently, foreign 
magazines or newspapers are censored, most often for sexual content. 
However, the increased prevalence of the Internet is undermining such 
restrictions. The Government maintains a ``blacklist'' of local and 
foreign performers, politicians, and religious leaders who may not 
appear on television or radio broadcasts.
    The Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA), which came into force 
on April 1, 1999, requires certain Internet and other network service 
providers to obtain a license under the CMA. In December the Government 
stated that it did not intend to impose controls on Internet use, but 
it would punish the ``misuse'' of information technology under the CMA, 
which, while prohibiting censorship, provides for ``legal action 
against those who post defamatory and false information on the 
Internet.'' The Government has not used licensing provisions under the 
CMA to interfere with Internet access or to restrict Internet content.
    Police detained four persons under the ISA in 1998 for ``cyber 
rumor-mongering.'' Police accused the four of spreading false reports 
of rioting and potential violence against Chinese Malaysians via the 
Internet. The four later were charged under a section of the Penal Code 
that prohibits statements that cause fear or alarm. One of the four was 
acquitted in April for lack of evidence. The other three cases still 
were pending at year's end. During the year, government officials made 
several contradictory comments about the desirability of censoring the 
Internet. In September the Deputy Home Affairs Minister announced that 
his ministry was drafting a new law that would allow legal action to be 
taken against those believed to be responsible for spreading 
``misleading information'' and pornography via the Internet. However, 
in the same month, the Information Minister said that the Government 
had no plans to censor the Internet. The Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department responsible for legal affairs stated in September 
that, while the Internet would not be censored, users remained subject 
to the law, and anyone who defamed another over the Internet or made 
seditious comments still could legal face action.
    The Government generally restricts remarks or publications that 
might incite racial or religious disharmony; it also attempts to 
restrict the content of sermons at government-affiliated mosques. Some 
state governments ban certain Muslim clergymen from delivering sermons 
(see Section 2.c.).
    In December 1999, Prime Minister Mahathir said that the Government 
should find ways to prevent the opposition from ``spreading lies'' at 
mosques. Also in December 1999, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah 
instructed the Religious Affairs Department to conduct background 
checks on religious speakers.
    Throughout the year, government officials and ruling coalition 
politicians complained that opposition Islamic party members were 
giving political sermons in mosques around the country. In January the 
Prime Minister's office announced that all state religious councils had 
been instructed to keep a closer watch on the use of mosques for 
political purposes. In March a government minister stated that Friday 
sermons at mosques were being monitored to prevent the spread of 
``slander and lies.'' Selangor state government officials announced 
that they were investigating mosque committee members with links to the 
opposition, and Johor state government officials said that they had 
identified several ``political'' religious leaders who had criticized 
the Government. Selangor officials threatened to expel opposition 
sympathizers from mosque committees, and in Johor state, officials 
threatened ``stern action.'' In May 24 members of the opposition 
Islamic party were banned by the Selangor state government from giving 
speeches in all mosques, government buildings, and prayer places in the 
state.
    In the past, the Government generally had respected academic 
freedom in the areas of teaching and publication. Academics are 
sometimes publicly critical of the Government. However, there is self-
censorship among public university academics whose career advancement 
and funding depend on the Government. In October the Education Ministry 
submitted the results of its inquiry into several teachers in Malacca 
who allegedly promoted antigovernment feelings by assigning political 
topics in a debate competition. The Teaching Service Commission was to 
determine whether these teachers should be dismissed; the inquiry was 
ongoing at year's end. Private institution academics also practiced 
self-censorship due to fear that the Government may revoke licenses for 
their institutions. Legislation also imposed limitations on student 
associations and student and faculty political activity (see Section 
2.b.). A university vice chancellor must approve campus demonstrations.
    The Government remained intolerant of teachers and students who 
expressed dissenting views. Throughout the year, senior government 
officials stated that teachers who opposed the Government and students 
who took part in antigovernment activities would face disciplinary 
actions, including dismissal and expulsion. In September the Minister 
in the Prime Minister's Department responsible for legal affairs warned 
that teachers who ``poisoned the minds of school children'' with 
political views during class faced the possibility of being charged 
under the Sedition Act and the Penal Code, and that students should not 
be involved in partisan politics. He asked the police to file a report 
on three teachers. In August 1999, an Education Ministry official said 
that a disciplinary panel had received reports from several states 
concerning teachers who had ``incited'' their students against the 
Government. In September 1999, an Education Ministry official said that 
the Ministry had ``acted against'' several teachers involved in 
antigovernment activities.
    The Government has long stated that students should be apolitical 
and used that assertion as a basis for denying opposition parties 
access to student forums. According to student leaders, students who 
sign antigovernment petitions sometimes are expelled or fined. In fact 
the Government enforces this policy selectively; however, it does not 
refrain from spreading government views on political issues among 
students and teachers. In September the head of an Islamic student 
group was summoned for questioning by University of Malaya authorities 
for organizing a demonstration against a Western singing group.
    In February 1999, the University of Malaya declined to renew the 
contract of Professor Chandra Muzaffar. Chandra, a well-known supporter 
of political reform and long-time government critic, charged that the 
university had fired him for political reasons. The university stated 
that it had declined to renew Chandra's contract for economic and 
personnel reasons. In June 1999, the High Court agreed to hear 
Chandra's application to reverse the university's decision. His case 
went to court in March but judgment had not been announced at year's 
end.
    In 1997 the Government prohibited academics from making any public 
statements or publishing any writings on the country's air pollution 
crisis. Academics and others openly protested this order. The gag order 
remained in effect.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government 
places significant restrictions on this right. These rights may be 
limited in the interest of security and public order, and the 1967 
Police Act requires police permits for all public assemblies except for 
workers on picket lines. The decision to grant a permit theoretically 
rests with the district police chief; however, in practice senior 
police officials and political leaders influence the grant or denial of 
some permits. Police grant permits routinely to government and ruling 
coalition supporters; however, they use a more restrictive policy with 
government critics, although the police have granted permits for many 
opposition meetings. In March the Government renewed a ban on outdoor 
public rallies in the capital that involve more than five persons.
    Opposition leaders frequently alleged that police issue permits for 
public assemblies in an unfair manner that discriminates against the 
opposition. Various state and local police departments rebutted these 
allegations by providing statistics that indicated that most requests 
for permits are granted; however, in certain sensitive cases political 
considerations clearly led to the denial of permits. For example, in 
August police denied a permit to the National Justice Party to hold a 
rally at a large stadium in Kuala Lumpur. In response the National 
Justice Party organized and held a large public demonstration on 
November 5. The Government denied the permit for this demonstration as 
well, and police blocked roads leading to the private property on which 
it was to take place. As a result, participants demonstrated on the 
roadways nearby. The police used repressive, sometimes violent, means 
to block the demonstration and to arrest participants. There were 
reports that peaceful demonstrators were teargassed, struck with 
batons, and locked in police trucks for several hours in the afternoon 
sun. In December the National Human Rights Commission opened an inquiry 
into the police response to this demonstration and took testimony in 
public hearings. Opposition politicians noted that regulations that 
required that political meetings be held indoors if no permit is 
obtained make it difficult to hold large meetings, especially in rural 
areas. Police reaction to opposition rallies that ignored the 
requirement for a permit or were held after the Government denied a 
permit varied. Opposition politicians noted that ruling coalition 
parties frequently assembled without the requisite permits. For 
example, in August a youth group of the dominant Malay Party held a 
noisy assembly outside a Chinese assembly hall during a period of 
public tension over public comments that a Chinese association had made 
concerning special Malay rights (see Section 2.c.).
    At the April, September, November, and other, smaller pro-Anwar 
opposition demonstrations in 1999, police arrested hundreds of 
demonstrators, including many peaceful demonstrators. Many of these 
demonstrators later were acquitted, a handful were convicted, sentences 
ranging from 1 to 3 months and a fine, and some cases still were 
pending at year's end. Among those arrested were many opposition party 
leaders. Police detained them under the Police Act for allegedly 
participating in an illegal assembly and under the Penal Code for 
allegedly causing a riot. All were released on bail, and they still 
were awaiting trial at year's end. In December seven members of the 
opposition were arrested and charged with rioting for stopping and 
directing to the local police headquarters a number of buses that they 
suspected were carrying unregistered voters to the polls during the 
November by-election in Lunas. All subsequently were released and were 
awaiting trial at year's end.
    In April the police mounted an operation to prevent citizens from 
participating in a Kuala Lumpur demonstration called by the opposition 
to commemorate the 1-year anniversary of Anwar Ibrahim's 1999 
conviction on corruption charges. Police set up roadblocks and 
monitored bus stations, train stations, and airports to turn back 
suspected opposition supporters. Despite these efforts, a small crowd 
of roughly 100 persons gathered on April 15 in Kuala Lumpur. The police 
dispersed the group as it moved between several locations, in some 
instances by using water cannons. Roughly half of the group was 
arrested; Amnesty International reported that many were assaulted while 
in police custody (see Section 1.c.). In the days before the April 15 
demonstration, police arrested several opposition figures. One such 
person, Tian Chua, was arrested on the day after the demonstration, 
along with his lawyer (who was released shortly afterwards). All of 
those arrested were released on bail, and they awaited trial at year's 
end.
    On August 8, a crowd of several hundred opposition supporters 
gathered outside the courthouse in downtown Kuala Lumpur at which the 
verdict in Anwar Ibrahim's sodomy trial was being announced. The 
Government declared that the gathering was illegal and warned the 
public not to attend, despite the Human Rights Commission's pleas to 
respect the right to peaceful assembly outside the courthouse. Three 
members of the commission observed the demonstration and police 
conduct. Several days later, the commission issued a statement 
declaring that in general police conduct had been professional and 
considerate of the demonstrators. Opposition leader Tian Chua and 
several others claimed that they were beaten at a police station after 
being detained by police outside the courthouse.
    In a meeting with the Human Rights Commission to discuss the August 
8 demonstration, a public assembly observer team that represented a 
coalition of seven NGO's recommended a series of reforms to improve 
police handling of peaceful assemblies. The observers presented 
photographs taken on the scene as evidence of overly aggressive 
behavior by the police. The commission stated that it would study the 
documents and pictures.
    There were several smaller demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur during 
the year. For example, a demonstration was held in January when Anwar 
Ibrahim's sodomy trial resumed after a several month break and a second 
took place in March at the National Mosque to protest government 
restrictions on the opposition newspaper Harakah. In each case, the 
police arrested some of the demonstrators and quickly broke up the 
gatherings.
    In February 1999, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion 
criticized the Government's use of various laws to curb peaceful 
assembly (see Section 2.a.).
    In July 1999, five social activists were arrested for illegal 
assembly when they tried to prevent police from demolishing a squatter 
settlement. The case still was pending at year's end.
    In April 4 of the over 50 Islamic opposition party members who were 
arrested in 1997 when they demonstrated in protest of an Israeli team's 
participation at an international cricket championship were ordered to 
testify in their own defense. In November each of the 4 was given a 
sentence of either 1 month in jail or a fine of $400 (15,000 ringgit). 
Three chose jail time and one chose to pay the fine. The three serving 
jail time were released in early December after serving abbreviated 
sentences. Charges against the others were dropped in 1999.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association; however, 
the Government places significant restrictions on this right. Certain 
statutes limited this right. Under the 1966 Societies Act, only 
registered, approved organizations of seven or more persons may 
function. The Government sometimes refuses to register organizations or 
may impose conditions when allowing a society to register. For example, 
the Government did not allow AI to set up a branch as an NGO. However, 
AI incorporated itself, and it was able to function much like an NGO. 
The Government prohibits the Communist Party and affiliated 
organizations (see Section 1.f.). The Government also has the power to 
revoke the registration of an existing society for violations of the 
act, a power that it has enforced selectively against political 
opposition groups. This threat of possible deregistration inhibits 
political activism.
    To avoid the burdensome requirements of the Societies Act, many 
NGO's register as companies under the Companies Act or as businesses 
under the Registration of Businesses Act. Amendments to the Companies 
Act passed in 1998 empowered the Registrar of Companies to refuse 
registration of a proposed company if he is satisfied that the company 
is likely to be used for any purpose prejudicial to national security 
or the public interest. The Registrar also may cancel the registration 
of an existing company and disband it on the same grounds. Opposition 
parties and NGO activists claim that the sweeping powers granted to the 
Registrar of Companies were designed to stifle criticism. The 
Government denied such charges and stated that financial irregularities 
were the amendments' main target. However, later police statements 
threateningly alluded to the status of certain NGO's under the 
Companies or Societies Acts. In 1999 the Deputy Home Minister notified 
Parliament that the Government had revoked the registration of 981 
societies under the Societies Act since 1966. No human rights NGO has 
had its registration revoked in recent years.
    In August the High Court heard an appeal from the Socialist Party 
of Malaysia, whose application to form a new political party had been 
rejected in February 1999 by the Registrar of Societies. The Registrar 
stated that information on the application form was incomplete. 
Supporters of the Socialist Party claimed that the denial was motivated 
politically and filed an appeal. The case still was pending at year's 
end.
    The Bar Council continues to be the target of government criticism 
in some instances; however, in others the Government attempted to 
collaborate with the council. In March 1999, former Deputy Minister 
Datuk Ibrahm Ali said that the Bar Council should not question the 
appointment of judges. In May 1999, Ali said that the Bar Council 
should stop meddling in government affairs. In June 1999, government 
leaders threatened to pass legislation making the Attorney General the 
head of the Bar Council. However, the Minister in the Prime Minister's 
Department, Rais Yatim, spoke at a Bar Council seminar in September on 
contempt-of-court procedures. In the past, the Government has 
threatened to expand legally the membership of the Bar Council to 
include government lawyers and legal professors. Some members of the 
Council feared that such a measure would dilute the Council's 
independence. No such measures had been implemented by year's end.
    The Universities and University Colleges Act also restricted 
freedom of association. This act mandates university approval for 
student associations and prohibits student associations, as well as 
faculty members, from engaging in political activity. However, there 
were no reports that students were suspended during the year, as had 
occurred in the past. Restrictions are not enforced as vigorously on 
students who participate in political activities in support of the 
ruling coalition. A university vice chancellor must approve campus 
demonstrations. Many students, NGO's, and opposition political parties 
called for the repeal or amendment of the act. A number of ruling 
coalition organizations and politicians also supported reexamination of 
the act, but the Government stated that the act still is necessary.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the Government places some restrictions on this 
right. Islam is the official religion; however, the practice of Islamic 
beliefs other than Sunni Islam is restricted severely. Religious 
minorities, which include large Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, and Sikh 
communities, generally worship freely, although with some restrictions. 
Government funds support an Islamic religious establishment, and it is 
official policy to ``infuse Islamic values'' into the administration of 
the country. The Government imposed Islamic religious law (Shari'a) on 
Muslims only in some matters and it does not impose Shari'a beyond the 
Muslim community. Adherence to Islam is considered intrinsic to Malay 
ethnic identity and therefore Islamic religious laws administered by 
state authorities through Islamic courts bind all ethnic Malays (and 
other Muslims) in some matters. The Government also grants funds to 
non-Islamic religions, but to a more limited degree.
    According to 1991 government census figures, the principal 
religions are: Islam (59 percent of the population, the majority of 
whom are Sunni); Buddhism (18 percent); Christianity (8 percent); 
Hinduism (6 percent); and Confucianism, Taoism, or other religions that 
originated in China (5 percent).
    For Muslims, particularly ethnic Malays, the right to leave the 
Islamic faith and adhere to another religion is a controversial 
question. The legal process of conversion is unclear; in law and in 
practice, it is very difficult for Muslims to change religions. In 
March 1999, the country's highest court ruled that secular courts have 
no jurisdiction to hear applications by Muslims to change religions. 
According to the ruling, the religious conversion of Muslims is solely 
the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts. The state of Perlis enacted a law 
that stipulated that Muslims found guilty of apostasy by a Shari'a 
court are to be sent to ``faith rehabilitation centers.'' Such a bill 
also has been proposed at the highest level of the Government. Leaders 
of the opposition Islamic Party have said that the penalty for apostasy 
should be death.
    In 1998 the Government stated that ``apostates'', that is those who 
wish to leave or have left Islam for another religion, would not face 
government punishment as long as they did not defame Islam after their 
conversion. However, a senior government official stated in September 
that a faith rehabilitation bill was being prepared that could provide 
up to a year detention in a faith rehabilitation center for Muslims 
found guilty of apostasy. Subsequently the Prime Minister stated that 
the proposed federal and Perlis state bills, both of which aroused 
considerable controversy, were under further study.
    The Government generally respects non-Muslims' right of worship; 
however, state governments carefully control the building of nonMuslim 
places of worship and the allocation of land for nonMuslim cemeteries. 
Approvals for such permits sometimes were granted very slowly. In July 
1999, the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, 
Hinduism, and Sikhism (MCCBCHS), an NGO representing minority 
religions, claimed that the guidelines required an area to have at 
least 2,000 to 5,000 adherents of a particular non-Muslim faith for a 
non-Muslim place of worship to be approved. No such requirement exists 
for Muslim places of worship. The group also argued that, under the 
guidelines, the state Islamic council must approve the establishment of 
all nonMuslim places of worship. In August after years of complaints by 
non-Islamic religious organizations about the need for Islamic 
authorities in each state to approve construction of non-Islamic 
religious institutions, the Minister of Housing and Local Government 
announced that such approval no longer would be required. According to 
press reports, the new guidelines permit a non-Islamic house of worship 
to be built in every 0.5 hectare for the use of 2,600 worshippers, or a 
house of worship for every 5,000 worshippers regardless of the size of 
the area.
    During the controversy over the proposed new guidelines on 
nonMuslim places of worship, the MCCBCHS and the Federal Territory 
Counseling and Service Center separately urged the Prime Minister to 
create a national non-Muslim religious council. Such a council was not 
established by year's end.
    In December 1999, the press reported that the new administrators of 
the state of Terengganu, the opposition Islamic party PAS, planned to 
introduce a special tax on non-Muslims. Non-Muslims expressed strong 
opposition to this proposal. State government leaders said that the 
press had distorted their plans. No special tax was imposed by year's 
end.
    The proselytizing of Muslims by members of other religions is 
prohibited strictly; persons proselytizing non-Muslims face no 
obstacles. The Government discouraged, and in practical terms forbids, 
the circulation in peninsular Malaysia of Malaylanguage translations of 
the Bible and distribution of Christian tapes and printed materials in 
Malay. However, Malaylanguage Christian materials can be found. Some 
states have laws that prohibited the use of Malay-language religious 
terms by Christians, but the authorities do not always enforce them 
actively. The distribution of Malay-language Christian materials faced 
few restrictions in east Malaysia. Most visas for foreign Christian 
clergy are approved. Beginning in March, non-Muslim representatives now 
sit on the immigration committee that approves such visa requests.
    The Government opposes what it considers to be deviant 
interpretations of Islam, maintaining that the ``deviant'' groups' 
extreme views endanger national security. In the past, the Government 
imposed restrictions on certain Islamic groups, primarily the small 
number of Shi'a. The Government continues to monitor the activities of 
the Shi'a minority, including those of 55 religious groups believed to 
be involved in deviant Islamic teachings. In August the Deputy Prime 
Minister stated that the Government had identified 44 extremist Islamic 
groups which, according to him, claimed to possess mystical powers of 
invincibility. In November the Shari'a high court in the state of 
Kelantan sentenced four persons to 3 years in jail for disregarding a 
lower court order to ``repent'' their allegedly heretical Islamic 
beliefs and ``return to the true teachings of Islam.'' The high court 
rejected their argument that Shari'a law had no jurisdiction over them 
because they had ceased to be Muslims.
    The Government periodically detains members of what it considers 
Islamic deviant sects without trial or charge under the ISA. After 
release, such detainees are subject to restrictions on their movement 
and residence. For example, in July the Government detained under the 
Internal Security Act at least 33 members of the Al-Ma'unah sect who 
reportedly were not suspected of involvement in the early July arms 
thefts. They remained under ISA detention at year's end (see Sections 
1.d. and 1.e.).
    The Government generally restricts remarks or publications that 
might incite racial or religious disharmony. This includes some 
statements and publications critical of particular religions, 
especially Islam. The Government also restricts the content of sermons 
at mosques. The Government periodically warns against those who deliver 
sermons in mosques for ``political ends'' and, occasionally, state 
governments banned certain Muslim clergymen from delivering sermons at 
mosques. In July 1999, the Negeri Sembilan state government banned a 
state religious department officer from preaching sermons because the 
officer allegedly had given a political speech during one of his 
sermons. In February 1999, the state of Selangor lifted a ban on a 
former mufti (the highest state Muslim leader) of Selangor. He 
allegedly had called the Prime Minister an apostate (see Section 2.a.). 
Throughout the year, the Government spoke out against what it 
considered the political use of mosques by the opposition Islamic Party 
PAS and several state governments, which are responsible for oversight 
of local religious matters, barred some opposition religious figures 
from speaking in mosques (see Section 2.a.).
    After the November 1999 national elections, the Government 
significantly expanded efforts to restrict the activities of the 
Islamic opposition party at mosques. Several states announced measures 
including banning opposition-affiliated imams from speaking at mosques, 
more vigorously enforcing existing restrictions on the content of 
sermons, replacing mosque leaders and governing committees thought to 
be sympathetic to the opposition, and threatening to close unauthorized 
mosques with ties to the opposition. The Government justified such 
measures as necessary to oppose the ``politicization of religion'' by 
the opposition.
    In December 1999, Prime Minister Mahathir said that ways should be 
found to prevent the opposition from ``spreading lies'' at mosques. 
Also in December 1999, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi 
directed the religious affairs department to conduct background checks 
on religious speakers to find out whether the speakers disseminated 
``wrongful information'' that may have influenced civil servants to 
stop supporting the Government. Also in December 1999, Selangor state 
government officials announced that they were investigating mosque 
committee members with links to the opposition. Officials threatened to 
expel opposition sympathizers from mosque committees. At year's end, no 
action had been taken. Also in December 1999, Johor state officials 
said that they had identified several ``political'' religious leaders 
who had criticized the Government. The state government threatened 
``stern action,'' but at year's end, no action had been taken. In 
October the Chief Minister of Kelantan, who is also the spiritual 
adviser for the opposition Islamic party PAS, was banned from speaking 
at a mosque in Selangor. The Chief Minister spoke despite the ban and 
vowed that he would continue to speak wherever he was invited. He was 
warned of prosecution if he defied the ban again. The mosque officers 
who allegedly allowed him to speak were not prosecuted, but they were 
required to attend a counseling session.
    For Muslim children, religious education according to a government-
approved curriculum is compulsory. There are no restrictions on home 
instruction.
    In July 1999, the Government announced a plan to take control of 
state religious schools. (Under the Constitution religion is a matter 
for state governments.) The chief minister of the opposition-controlled 
state of Kelantan rejected the plan. In response, former federal 
Education Minister Datuk Seri Najib said that the Government would find 
a way to take over Kelantan's religious schools. In October 1999, the 
Government announced that religious schools could choose to be 
incorporated wholly or partially into the federal school system 
beginning this year; however, at year's end, the plan had not yet been 
implemented, and its implications were unclear.
    In June the Government announced that all Muslim civil servants 
must attend religious classes, but only classes in Islam would be held. 
In addition only teachers approved by the Government would be employed.
    In January 1999, the Selangor state government announced the 
formation of a government interreligious consultative council that 
included representatives of all major religions. The council's stated 
objectives were to prevent interreligious conflict, to promote 
interreligious understanding, and to address moral and social problems 
jointly.
    The Government has a comprehensive system of preferences for ethnic 
Malays and members of a few other groups known collectively as 
``bumiputras,'' most of whom are Muslim (see Section 5).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally have the right to 
travel, live, and work where they please; however, the Government 
restricts these rights in some circumstances. The East Malaysian states 
of Sabah and Sarawak have the right to control immigration and to 
require citizens from peninsular West Malaysia and foreigners to 
present passports or national identity cards for entry. In 1998 the 
Court of Appeal ruled that Sabah and Sarawak, despite their autonomy, 
still are bound by the federal Constitution in all matters. Thus, the 
court voided Sabah's expulsion of a West Malaysian attorney who had 
been involved in several lawsuits against the state government. In May 
1999, the Sabah state government filed an appeal of the ruling, which 
is still pending. The federal Government regulates the internal 
movement of provisionally released ISA detainees (see Section 1.d.). 
The Government also uses the Restricted Residence Act to limit 
movements of those suspected of some criminal activities (see Section 
1.d.).
    The Government generally does not restrict emigration.
    Citizens must apply for the Government's permission to travel to 
Israel. Travel to Jerusalem for a religious purpose is allowed 
explicitly.
    The Government has not ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government 
rejected customary international law in this area. The Government does 
not recognize the principle of first asylum; however, it sometimes 
grants temporary refuge to asylum seekers. In September 1999, Foreign 
Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar said that ``we allow people for 
temporary stay and when that stay is over they have to go back. We have 
never granted anybody refugee status.'' The Government continues to 
refuse to acknowledge that any Indonesian illegal aliens, including 
Acehnese, have a claim to refugee status. The Government has not made a 
concerted attempt to find and detain illegal Acehnese or other 
Indonesians; however, at least two refugees recognized by the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were deported to Indonesia during the 
year. In 1998 the Government forcibly returned several hundred 
Acehnese, despite representations from the UNHCR and the international 
community and evidence that the Acehnese might face persecution upon 
return to Indonesia.
    A Human Rights Watch report published in August on the condition of 
illegal Burmese Rohingyas in the country stated that they can be 
subject to arrest and detention in immigration camps. In the report, 
former detainees made detailed allegations of deaths in these camps due 
to beatings and inhuman conditions in the 1990's (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.). The conditions in the camps remained a cause for concern; 
however, there were no reports of similar deaths during the year. After 
the Human Rights Watch report was released, the Muslim Youth Movement 
of Malaysia (ABIM) declared the report ``untrue.'' One Abim official, a 
self-exiled Rohingya, described the Government's treatment of the 
Rohingyas as ``humane.'' The Malaysian Human Rights Commission 
currently is investigating allegations made in the Human Rights Watch 
report, and it defended the Government's handling of refugee claimants 
and illegal immigrants in general. UNHCR officials stated that 
approximately 10,000 Rohingyas in the country are de facto stateless 
persons; however, the vast majority do not qualify for refugee status 
under international law. In 1999 the UNHCR received 1,473 applications 
for refugee status from Rohingya asylum seekers and granted refugee 
status in only 43 cases.
    The Government did not restrict the access of undetained asylum 
seekers to the UNHCR office and cooperated in the resettlement of some 
refugees. However, the Government only infrequently granted the UNHCR 
and other humanitarian organizations access to detained aliens. There 
were some forced expulsions of asylum seekers and refugees.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    By law citizens have the right to change their government through 
periodic elections; however, while votes generally are recorded 
accurately, there are some irregularities that affect the fairness of 
elections, and in practice opposition parties are unable to compete on 
equal terms with the governing coalition (which has held power at the 
national level since 1957) because of significant restrictions on 
campaigning, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. 
Nevertheless opposition candidates campaign actively, with some success 
in state and national elections. In the November 1999 elections, the 
opposition roughly doubled its strength to 25 percent of federal 
parliamentary seats and an opposition party retained control of the 
Kelantan state government (the opposition won control of one state 
government in the 1995 elections) and took over the state government of 
Terengganu. In December the opposition won a seat in the Kedah state 
assembly in a tightly contested by-election.
    Malaysia has a parliamentary system of government. National 
elections are required at least every 5 years and have been held 
regularly since independence in 1957. The Malay-based United Malay 
National Organization party dominates the ruling National Front 
coalition, which has ruled the country continuously since independence. 
Since 1969 the National Front coalition always has maintained at least 
a two-thirds majority in Parliament, which enabled the Government to 
amend the Constitution at will. Over the years, power increasingly has 
been concentrated in the executive branch, and the Prime Minister.
    The lack of equal access to the media was the most serious problem 
encountered by the opposition in the November 1999 elections (see 
Section 2.a.). Government officials frankly stated that government 
television and radio would not carry reporting on the opposition. The 
country's two private television stations also had virtually no 
impartial reporting on the opposition. The mainstream English-language 
and Malay-language newspapers also carried biased coverage of domestic 
politics. In addition opposition parties encountered difficulties in 
placing paid advertisements in newspapers; however, a few opposition 
advertisements did appear, after editing by the newspapers, in English- 
and Chinese- language newspapers. On-line newspapers and political 
websites, which tend to express an independent perspective, grew in 
popularity during the year.
    Opposition leaders credibly claimed that the Election Commission, 
which is responsible for holding and monitoring elections, did not 
carry out its duties impartially. The Election Commission is nominally 
independent, but perceived widely by the opposition to be under the 
control of the Government. In June 1999, Deputy Prime Minister and Home 
Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi said that there was no need to 
consult the opposition on the appointment of a new election commission 
chairman. Opposition leaders said that Prime Minister Mahathir's remark 
that same month that the Government would ``not entertain'' an 
opposition demand for a long campaign period in upcoming elections 
demonstrated the lack of independence of the Election Commission (the 
Commission has the sole power to set the length of the campaign 
period). After the 1999 elections, several government officials 
publicly disputed opposition claims that the Election Commission was 
biased. Some members of the ruling coalition charged that individual 
Commission officials supported opposition candidates. The results of 
the election were released officially in January.
    Opposition complaints of irregularities by election officials and 
allegations of other election fraud during the 1999 campaign were not 
substantiated during the year, and according to most observers, there 
was no evidence that the conduct of election officers significantly 
affected the results of the elections. Opposition leaders also 
complained that local government officials who served as election 
officers were not always neutral. For example, in July 1999, the 
opposition National Justice Party filed a complaint with the Election 
Commission, accusing a district officer in the State of Perak of 
participating in an UMNO party event. The Election Commission later 
announced that it completed its investigation, but it did not reveal 
its findings. The Government did not permit international monitoring or 
adequately allow for domestic NGO monitoring efforts during the 
elections. (The last time that foreign observers monitored elections 
was in 1990.)
    Opposition parties and some NGO's also alleged that defective 
voting rolls led to some fraudulent votes. In the Sabah state elections 
in March 1999, opposition leaders accused the ruling coalition of 
employing ``phantom'' voters (illegal aliens and other fraudulently 
documented voters). NGO's analysis of the voting roll used in the 
national elections also revealed irregularities, such as dead persons 
on the rolls, multiple voters registered under single identity card 
numbers, and other anomalies; however, according to most observers, 
there is no evidence that these irregularities significantly affected 
the results in more than a handful of races. The Government did not 
respond to postelection calls by an election-monitoring NGO for a 
national reregistration exercise to produce a clean electoral roll.
    ``Postal votes,'' or absentee ballots by police and military 
personnel and their spouses, also are a concern. The Government, citing 
security concerns, does not allow party agents to monitor absentee 
ballot boxes placed on military and police installations. Opposition 
parties questioned the rationale for such security restrictions. 
Opposition parties and NGO's have raised credible allegations of 
improper manipulation of postal votes, including statements by former 
military personnel that their ballots were filled out by others or 
under the eye of commanding officers. For the November 1999 elections, 
the Election Commission changed some procedures to allow better 
monitoring by Election Commission officers. Opposition parties 
continued to call for monitoring of postal votes by party agents. 
Election Commission officials estimated before the November election 
that roughly 235,000 postal votes would be cast. No count of the actual 
number of postal votes was published by year's end.
    The anonymity of balloting also is a potential concern. Ballots are 
marked with a serial number that could be matched against a voter's 
name. While there is no evidence that the Government ever has traced 
individual votes, some opposition leaders have alleged that the 
potential to do so has a chilling effect on some voters, particularly 
civil servants.
    Gerrymandering diluted the votes of some citizens. The Constitution 
states that parliamentary constituencies should have roughly equal 
numbers of eligible voters, although the same section states that 
greater weight should be given to rural constituencies. In practice 
these guidelines often are ignored. For example, in Sabah 
constituencies are weighted strongly against the state's large 
Christian population. Nationwide, the constitutional provision giving 
greater weight to rural constituencies greatly dilutes the voting power 
of urban residents. The single member, winner-take-all system also 
diminishes the political power of the minority groups. Because of the 
changing dynamics of ethnic politics, ethnic gerrymandering of 
parliamentary constituencies, used against the opposition in the past, 
is believed to no longer be as great an advantage to the ruling 
coalition.
    Other government measures hamper the opposition's ability to 
compete with the incumbent ruling coalition. For example, the 
Government on several occasions issued public warnings to civil 
servants, including teachers (see Section 2.a.) not to support the 
opposition. Students face certain restrictions on political activity 
(see Section 2.b.). Government leaders routinely and openly threatened 
to suspend the allocation of federal funds beyond the constitutionally 
mandated minimum to constituencies that elected opposition 
representatives. Ruling coalition Members of Parliament received a 
government allocation totaling in aggregate roughly $25 million (95 
million ringgit). Opposition Members of Parliament receive no such 
funds. In July 1999, a government minister told Parliament that the 
money only was given to ruling coalition Members of Parliament because 
it came from the Government.
    The opposition has complained in the past about restrictions on 
public assemblies during the campaign period (see Section 2.b.). 
However, in the period prior to the November 1999 elections, police did 
not implement restrictions vigorously, and the opposition held many 
large rallies. The opposition also has stated that the short official 
campaign period gives an advantage to the incumbent ruling coalition. 
However, de facto campaigning began long before the elections, and 
there is little evidence that the short official campaign period had 
much practical effect.
    In August 1999, Prime Minister Mahathir stated that the ruling 
coalition's failure to win a two-thirds majority in Parliament in 1969 
had resulted in widespread rioting and said that if a ``weak 
government'' were elected, ``the peace of the country could not be 
guaranteed.'' Opposition leaders complained that these statements were 
a threat to instigate violence if the ruling coalition should lose the 
two-thirds majority in the upcoming elections. Opposition leader Lim 
Kit Siang called on the Government to pledge to accept the results of 
the upcoming election. The Government did not respond.
    Prime Minister Mahathir said in June 1999 that he expected the 
November 1999 elections to be ``the dirtiest ever.'' For different 
reasons, the opposition expressed similar fears. The Government did not 
respond to the opposition's call for an election code to ensure that 
these elections would be free, fair, and clean. A group of NGO's formed 
an independent elections watch organization. The Election Commission 
stated that the NGO's were free to do so, but the organization was 
accorded no special privileges. (The law does not provide for 
monitoring of polling stations except by political party agents.) In 
June 1999, the Government publicly rejected the idea of foreign 
observers. The Government also rejected opposition calls for foreign 
observers in Sabah state elections in March. After the election, the 
Prime Minister continued to allege that the opposition engaged in 
unfair tactics, including slander.
    Under the electoral law, unsuccessful candidates may appeal 
election results to special election courts in instances of alleged 
fraud, vote tampering, or other infractions of electoral rules. After 
the November 1999 elections, 21 petitions were filed by losing 
candidates from both the ruling and opposition coalitions. According to 
the Elections Commission, all petitions were dismissed. In March the 
High Court ruled that the Election Commission and returning officers 
may not be named as ``necessary parties'' in petitions filed with 
election courts by unsuccessful candidates. In April the Cabinet 
approved the creation of an election appellate court to provide an 
additional opportunity to seek redress for unsuccessful candidates 
whose election petitions were denied by election courts. Also in April, 
the Cabinet approved the creation of an Election Appellate Court to 
provide an additional opportunity to seek redress for unsuccessful 
candidates whose election petitions were denied by election courts. All 
remaining election appeals from the 1999 Sabah state elections in which 
opposition parties filed objections to the results of 17 of 48 seats 
were dismissed by election courts or withdrawn by the parties during 
the year.
    In the past, within the ruling UMNO party, there had been active 
political debate. ``No-contest'' rules for leadership positions and 
generally increased intolerance of dissent limited but did not 
eliminate UMNO's role as a vehicle for public debate. However, after 
the removal of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar in 1998, intolerance of 
dissent within UMNO increased, and an extraordinary UMNO Assembly in 
1998 approved a series of measures designed to limit independent 
grassroots initiatives. During the year, there were no contests for the 
top two leadership positions in UMNO. At the UMNO General Assembly in 
May, 3 vice president slots and 25 elected seats on the Supreme Council 
were contested vigorously, with a number of candidates known not to be 
favored by party leaders. It had been announced before the General 
Assembly that there would be no contest for the party president and 
deputy president, positions held respectively by Prime Minister 
Mahathir and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah.
    Over the years, Parliament's function as a deliberative body has 
deteriorated. Legislation proposed by the Government rarely is amended 
or rejected. Legislation proposed by the opposition never is given 
serious consideration; however, during the 1999 elections, the 
opposition increased the number of seats it held. Opposition 
opportunities to hold legislation up to public scrutiny have 
diminished. The Parliament in 1995 amended its rules to strengthen the 
power of the Speaker and curb parliamentary procedures heavily used by 
the opposition. The amendments empowered the Speaker to ban members he 
considered unruly for up to 10 days, imposed limits on deputies' 
ability to pose supplementary questions and revisit nongermane issues, 
and established restrictions on the tabling of questions of public 
importance. Further measures in 1997 and 1998 limited members' 
opportunities to question and debate government policies even more 
severely. Nonetheless, government officials often faced sharp 
questioning in Parliament, although this was not always reported in 
detail in the mainstream press.
    State assemblies also limited debate. After the 1969 intercommunal 
riots, the Government abolished elected local government in favor of 
municipal committees and village chiefs appointed by state governments. 
Some politicians and NGO activists have advocated reintroduction of 
local government. Even some ruling party municipal officials have noted 
that local bodies are simply ``rubber stamps'' for the Government.
    Women face no legal limits on participation in government and 
politics; however, they remain underrepresented in government and 
politics due to social and other factors. At year's end, 2 of 28 
cabinet ministers were women. Women hold 20 of 193 seats in the elected 
lower house of Parliament, and they hold 19 of 69 seats in the 
appointed upper house. In May Datuk Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz assumed the 
post of Central Bank Governor. She is the first woman to be appointed 
to the post. On December 19, the King announced the appointment of 
Ainum Mohamed Saaid as the new Attorney General, the first woman to 
hold this position. Ainum is to serve as the Government's top legal 
advisor and as the Public Prosecutor, with wide discretionary powers 
for a 2-year term beginning on January 1, 2001. In 1998 the Minister of 
National Unity and Social Development stated that the country would not 
achieve its goal of 30 percent female representation in the Government 
by 2005. The Minister stated that the 1998 rate of participation 
(defined as the percentage of female representatives in Parliament and 
in state assemblies) was 6 to 7 percent. The Islamic opposition party 
does not allow female candidates to stand as candidates for the lower 
house; however, the Party has one female senator. In the past, it has 
supported female candidates of other parties.
    Ethnic minorities are represented in cabinet-level positions in 
Government, as well as in senior civil service positions. Nevertheless, 
the political dominance of the Malay majority means in practice that 
ethnic Malays hold the most powerful senior leadership positions. Non-
Malays fill 9 of the 26 cabinet posts and 14 of 28 deputy minister 
positions. An ethnic Chinese leader of a component party of the ruling 
coalition holds executive power in the state of Penang.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of NGO's, including the Bar Council and other public 
interest groups, devoted considerable attention to human rights. The 
Government generally tolerates their activities but often does not 
respond to their inquiries or press statements. However, Government 
officials met with NGO's on several occasions during the year. The 
results of these meetings were not made public. Government officials 
harshly criticize domestic NGO's for collaborating with foreigners, 
including international human rights organizations. However, at year's 
end, no group had been banned or decertified. In the past, public 
apathy and racial divisions (non-Malays had dominated most human rights 
NGO's) limited the effectiveness of NGO's. However, public discontent 
over the 1998 removal of and subsequent imprisonment of Deputy Prime 
Minister Anwar encouraged some NGO's to speak out against the 
Government, and it has led to the increased involvement of ethnic 
Malays in NGO activity.
    In 1998 the Government amended the Companies Act to grant the 
Registrar of Companies wide powers to block or disband organizations 
deemed prejudicial to national security or the national interest. In 
May 1999, the Government announced that it was planning to table 
amendments to the Registration of Businesses Act to enable the 
Government to track the activities and movements of organizations 
registered under the act (see Section 2.b.).
    The Government generally does not allow international human rights 
organizations to form branches; however, it generally does not restrict 
access by representatives of international human right organizations. 
AI has registered itself as a private company. A February 1999 report 
issued by the IPU on prison conditions (see Section 1.c.) noted that, 
while the Government welcomed the December 1998 investigative mission, 
the IPU delegation was not able to make important appointments and was 
not allowed to meet privately with Lim Guan Eng. Several foreign human 
rights observers have attended sessions of Anwar's two trials.
    Government officials reacted sharply to a report entitled ``Justice 
in Jeopardy: Malaysia in 2000,'' which was issued early in the year by 
the International Bar Association, the Centre for the Independence of 
Judges, and lawyers from the International Commission of Jurists, the 
Commonwealth Lawyers Association, and the International Lawyers Union. 
The report was the result of the findings of a three-man team that 
spent 10 days in Malaysia in April 1999. The report concluded that 
``the extremely powerful Executive in Malaysia has not acted with due 
regard for the essential elements of a free and democratic society 
based on the rule of law.''
    In early April, the Government announced that former Deputy Prime 
Minister Musa Hitam would head the National Human Rights Commission 
provided for in legislation passed by Parliament in July 1999. Twelve 
other members also were named, including retired jurists, consumer 
activists, and academics. The commission's functions and powers include 
promoting awareness of human rights, helping the Government to draft 
laws and regulations concerning human rights, advising the Government 
on acceding to human rights treaties, inquiring into human rights 
complaints, inspecting places of detention, and hearing witnesses and 
receiving evidence on human rights questions. The legislation that 
created the commission defines human rights as ``the fundamental 
liberties provided for'' in the federal Constitution and restricts the 
application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to those 
provisions consistent with the Constitution. In 1999 prior to the 
commission's creation, opposition leaders and NGO's, including the Bar 
Council, criticized the definition of human rights as too narrow. They 
also were skeptical of the Government's pledges that it would be 
independent. In May the commission announced four working groups: One 
to promote human rights awareness and education; a second to advise and 
assist the Government in formulating legislation and procedures; a 
third to make recommendations to the Government on accession to 
treaties and other international human rights instruments; and a fourth 
to investigate complaints of human rights violations. The commission 
received its first complaint in April from three NGO members in Penang, 
who claimed that they were mistreated by police after being arrested 
during a rentcontrol protest in February. Later in April, the 
commission announced that it would investigate reports of abuse 
received by demonstrators detained during the April 15 demonstration in 
support of Anwar Ibrahim (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In early August, 
Musa Hitam publicly supported the right of citizens to assemble 
peacefully outside the courthouse at which the verdict in Anwar 
Ibrahim's sodomy trial was to be announced (see Section 2.b.). (Police 
did not interfere with three members of the commission who observed the 
demonstrations outside the courthouse on August 8.) During the year, 
the Commission met with human rights NGO's, government ministries, 
representatives from the ruling, and opposition parties, and 
recommended that human rights issues and problems be incorporated into 
school curriculums. The commission also met several times with senior 
police officials, who agreed to allow the commission to provide human 
rights training to the police. However, the commission is not empowered 
to inquire into allegations relating to ongoing court cases. In 
December the Human Rights Commission opened an inquiry into and took 
public testimony about allegations of police misconduct during a 
November 5 rally organized by the opposition. It also must cease its 
inquiry if an allegation under investigation becomes a subject matter 
of a court.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal protection under the law and 
prohibits discrimination against citizens based on religion, race, 
descent, or place of birth; however, discrimination based on some 
factors persists. For example, government policies give preferences to 
ethnic Malays in housing, home ownership, the awarding of government 
contracts, educational scholarships, and other areas. Although neither 
the Constitution nor laws explicitly prohibit discrimination based on 
sex or disabilities, the Government has attempted to eliminate 
discrimination against women and promote greater public acceptance of 
the disabled.
    Women.--Violence against women remains a problem, although 
statistics indicated that the problem has decreased during the year. 
Reports of rape are common in the press and among women's rights groups 
and NGO's, although the Government has not released comprehensive 
statistics. In December 1999, a women's NGO issued a report that stated 
that the incidence of rape had increased 48 percent in the 5year period 
from 1993 to 1998 more than 50 percent of rape victims are under age 
16. Statistics from the Royal Malaysian Police show 1,217 reported 
cases of rape during the year. Many hospitals have set up crisis 
centers where victims of rape and domestic abuse can make reports 
without going to a police station. NGO's and political parties also 
cooperate in providing counseling for rape victims. Nonetheless, 
cultural attitudes and a perceived lack of sympathy from the largely 
male police force lead many victims not to report rapes. According to 
an NGO study involving 417 court files from 7 state capitals and Kuala 
Lumpur, even when alleged rape is reported, only one of five cases is 
heard in court. Only half of the court cases resulted in a rape 
conviction. Some rapists receive heavy punishments, including caning, 
but women's groups complain that some rapists receive inadequate 
punishments. Section 376 of the Penal Code stated that a convicted 
rapist shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than 5 
years and not more than 20 years.
    Spousal abuse has drawn considerable government, NGO, and press 
attention. Awareness of the severity and prevalence of this problem is 
growing and may be leading to a decrease in its incidence. In 1990 the 
only national survey ever conducted on battered women showed that 1.8 
million women (approximately 39 percent of respondents) above the age 
of 15 had been beaten physically by their husbands or boyfriends. A 
local women's NGO and a well-known social marketing company conducted 
the survey using a nationally representative random sampling of adults 
residing in peninsular Malaysia in 1989. However, statistics released 
at year's end by the Royal Malaysian Police show that 3,468 cases of 
domestic violence were reported during the year, which represents 
nearly a 10 percent decrease in the number of reported cases compared 
to 1999 (3,806).
    The 1996 Domestic Violence Act addresses violence against women in 
the home. However, women's groups criticized the act as inadequate and 
called for amendments to strengthen it. In their view, the act fails to 
protect women in immediate danger by requiring separate reports of 
abuse to be filed with both the Welfare Department and the police. This 
requirement causes delay in the issuance of a restraining order against 
the perpetrator. Women's rights activists also highlighted the fact 
that because the act is a part of the Penal Code, legal protection for 
victims is limited to cases in which visible evidence of physical 
injury is present, despite its interpretation to include sexual and 
psychological abuse. In April the Government announced that the 
Domestic Violence Act would be reviewed to determine weaknesses in the 
law and eliminate legal loopholes; however, the Government had taken no 
action by year's end.
    Although the Government, NGO's, and political parties have formed 
shelters and offer other assistance to battered spouses, activists 
asserted that support mechanisms remain inadequate. Police responses to 
complaints of domestic violence were more professional and sensitive 
than in previous years, but problems remained and cultural attitudes 
are still an impediment.
    Domestic violence complaints are rare in Islamic law (Shari'a) 
courts (six cases in 1997). Some Shari'a experts have urged Muslim 
women to become more aware of the provisions of Shari'a that prohibit 
spousal abuse and provide for divorces on grounds of physical cruelty. 
Nonetheless, Shari'a generally (each state has a separate code) 
prohibits wives from disobeying lawful orders of their husbands. These 
provisions often present an obstacle to women pursuing claims, 
including charges of abuse, against their husbands.
    Spousal rape is not a crime. Theoretically a man who raped his wife 
could face charges of assault; however, women's rights activists claim 
that no man has been convicted in such circumstances.
    A 1998 International Labor Organization (ILO) study estimated that 
there were roughly 40,000 to 140,000 prostitutes in the country. The 
Government strongly disputed this estimate, and the police stated that 
they would investigate NGO's that might have provided the information 
that formed the basis of the study. However, from January through 
August alone, the Royal Malaysian police arrested 2,338 foreign 
prostitutes (see Section 6.f.). Sex tourism is not legal, and the level 
of such activity is not high.
    A women's rights NGO stated in 1998 that the economic downturn had 
forced more local women into prostitution. In February 1999, the press 
reported a 1998 study by the national population and family development 
board that showed that the economic downturn had decreased the demand 
for prostitution.
    The same women's rights NGO cited government statistics showing an 
upturn in the number of arrests for prostitution. A government source 
substantiated this claim by noting that the increase in arrests was due 
to more vigorous enforcement. Police also believed that the increasing 
number of arrests was a result of greater numbers of women being 
brought to the country from countries of the former Soviet Union (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Malaysia is a source, transit, and destination country for 
trafficking in women for purposes of prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    In August 1999, the Ministry of Human Resources issued a Code of 
Practice on the Prevention and Eradication of Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace. Women's groups noted the code's detailed definition of 
sexual harassment and attempted to raise public awareness of the 
problem, but they criticized the fact that adherence to the code is 
voluntary and not legally binding. The Code of Practice has no legal 
effect and earlier plans for a sexual harassment law apparently have 
been abandoned. Women's rights activists claimed that a law on sexual 
harassment would be more effective than a code of practice. In the 
first year following the issuance of the code, the Human Resources 
Minister asked women's groups and labor unions to give the code ``a 
chance to work.'' He advocated voluntary compliance by employers and 
advised unions to incorporate policies against sexual harassment into 
their collective labor agreements. The Malaysian Employers Federation 
has criticized publicly any attempt to legislate against sexual 
harassment in the workplace, arguing that governmentimposed policies 
would unduly restrict the management of labor relations.
    Since the code was introduced in August 1999, the number of 
reported incidents of sexual harassment has risen. The Labor Department 
reported that since the initiation of the code, it received two to 
three reports of sexual harassment per week. This was a large increase 
over 1998, during which the Ministry of Human Resources received only 6 
reports of sexual harassment cases in the first 6 months of that year, 
and only a total of about 30 since 1996. However, there are still many 
cultural obstacles to women who try to pursue sexual harassment 
charges.
    Despite increased public awareness of the problem of sexual 
harassment in the workplace, the Government acknowledged in August that 
the reluctance of employers to adopt the code may force it to enact 
additional legislation regarding sexual harassment. A year after it was 
enacted, only 99 companies in the country had adopted the code. A 
coalition of 64 women's rights groups compiled a memorandum with over 
12,000 signatures proposing that the Government make the code legally 
binding. Upon receipt of the memorandum, the Human Resources Minister 
stated that his Ministry would form a committee to include women's 
rights activists, employers, union representatives, and ministry 
officials to study the request. The Government made no decision on 
whether to enact legislation against sexual harassment by year's end.
    Women continue to be the victims of legal discrimination. The 
cultural and religious traditions of the major ethnic groups also 
heavily influence the condition of women in society. In family and 
religious matters, Muslim women are subject to Shari'a. Polygyny is 
allowed and practiced to a limited degree. Islamic inheritance law 
varies by state, but it generally favors male offspring and relatives. 
However, one state, Negeri Sembilan, provides for matrilineal 
inheritance. The number of women obtaining divorces under the 
provisions of Shari'a that allow for divorce without the husband's 
consent, while small, is increasing steadily.
    In August the Deputy Prime Minister announced that mothers may now 
sign official documents on behalf of their minor children, a 
significant change from past government policy, under which only a 
father's signature legally was recognized on official documentation. 
The Government publicized the decision as an attempt to eliminate 
sexual discrimination in government policies. Women's rights activists 
pointed out that the decision recognized women's equality with men 
under the law. The policy change is likely to confer the largest 
benefit on single mothers who are estranged from their husbands. In 
announcing the change, the Deputy Prime Minister stated that existing 
legislation did not require amendment; only administrative procedure 
would change. This administrative change was implemented in December.
    There were complaints about the treatment of women by Islamic 
courts. A 1998 report on women and the law published by a coalition of 
women's NGO's defined two basic problems: prejudicial interpretation of 
Islamic family law against women; and the lack of uniformity in the 
implementation of family laws among the various states. An April 1999 
press report described complaints by NGO's and women's groups of rude 
and insensitive treatment by staff and officers of Islamic courts. In 
May 1999, the women's wing of UMNO stated that it would act to help 
accelerate and improve the handling of women's problems by Islamic 
courts.
    Muslim couples are required to take premarital courses. In previous 
years, women's activists claimed that in some instances the courses, as 
implemented, perpetuated gender discrimination by misinforming women of 
their rights in marriage. There were no reports during the year of such 
misinformation regarding marriage rights.
    State governments in Kelantan and Terrengganu, which are controlled 
by the Islamic opposition party, made efforts to restrict Muslim 
women's dress during the year. In March the Terrengganu state 
government introduced a dress code for government employees and workers 
on business premises. Terrengganu's executive counselor in charge of 
women's and non-Muslim's affairs claimed that the dress code was 
designed to protect the image of Muslim women and promote Islam as a 
way of life. Several women's NGO's criticized the state government's 
decision as depriving women of personal choice. One Muslim women's NGO 
criticized the new requirement, stating that forced compliance with a 
state-mandated dress code is not consistent with the values of the 
Koran.
    On March 23, Muslim women working in food stalls and video rental 
stores in Kelantan were fined about $8 (30 ringgit) for not wearing a 
head covering. The maximum fine for individual offenders is about $66 
(250 ringgit), and the state government warned that employers with 
repeat offenders may lose their operating licenses.
    Non-Muslim women are subject to civil (secular) law. Changes in the 
Civil Marriage and Divorce Act in the early 1980's increased the 
protection of married women's rights, especially those married under 
customary rites. The Guardianship of Women's and Infants Act was 
amended in July 1999 to give mothers equal parental rights. Four states 
extended the provisions of the amended bill to Muslim mothers. Women's 
groups urged all states to do the same. In June 1999, the Land and 
Cooperative Development Ministry announced that it was considering 
amending the Group Settlement Act to give wives of settlers a stake in 
the land awarded to their husbands. The Group Settlement Act had not 
been amended by year's end.
    Government policy supports women's rights and the Government has 
undertaken a number of initiatives to promote equality for women. 
Specifically the Government promotes the full and equal participation 
of women in education and the work force. Women are represented in 
growing numbers in the professions, but women's groups argue that the 
level of participation is still disproportionately low. In the 
scientific and medical fields, women make up more than half of all 
university graduates and the total representation of women at 
universities increased from 29 percent in 1970 to one-half of the 
student population in recent years. According to statistics released in 
June in the Government's Economic Report 2000-2001, which is published 
by the Ministry of Finance, women constitute 44 percent of the labor 
force. The proportion of women in the civil service has risen from 
roughly 33 percent in 1990 to roughly 41 percent and women occupy some 
high-ranking civil service positions. In April 1999, Malaysian Trade 
Union Congress President Zainal Rampak urged trade unions to fulfill 
the ILO policy of filling 30 percent of leadership positions with 
women; however, current statistics were not disclosed.
    Children.--The Government has demonstrated a commitment to 
children's rights and welfare; it spends roughly 20 percent of the 
national budget on education. The Government provides free education 
for children through the age of 15. Although primary education is 
deemed compulsory by the Government, there is no legal requirement or 
enforcement mechanism governing school attendance. Actual attendance at 
primary school is 96 percent. Secondary school attendance is 82 
percent. A variety of programs provide low cost health care for most 
children. An office in the Ministry of National Unity and Social 
Development oversees children's issues.
    In December Parliament passed the Child Act of 2000. The Act 
incorporates the 1989 principles of the U.N. Convention of the Rights 
of the Child, which the Government ratified in 1995. The act stipulates 
heavier punishments for child abuse, molestation, neglect, and 
abandonment. It also mandates the formation of a children's court, 
which, the Government stated, would better protect the interests of 
children. The bill allows caning, but this punishment is limited to 
male children, who may receive a maximum of 10 strokes with a ``light 
cane.'' The new law repealed three other laws governing child 
prostitution, child abuse, and delinquency, including the Women and 
Girls Protection Act, the Juvenile Courts Act, and the Child Protection 
Act.
    The Government recognizes that sexual exploitation of children and 
incest are problems. Incest in particular is a problem in rural areas. 
Child abuse receives wide coverage in the press. The Government sternly 
prosecutes cases of child abuse, and child molesters receive heavy jail 
sentences and caning. However, under the Evidence Act, the testimony of 
children is accepted only if there is corroborating evidence. This 
poses special problems for molestation cases in which the child victim 
is the only witness. Some judges and others have recommended that the 
Evidence Act be amended to accept the evidence of children and that 
courts implement special procedures to hear the testimony of children. 
The Ministry of National Unity and Social Development reported that in 
1997 there were 1,117 reported cases of child abuse, while from January 
through August 1998 there were 600 cases. In August 1999, a physician 
who studies child abuse acknowledged publicly that sexual abuse of 
children occurred in the country.
    Statutory rape occurs and is prosecuted. However, Islamic law 
provisions that consider a Muslim girl an adult after she has had her 
first menstruation sometimes complicate prosecution of statutory rape. 
Such a girl may be charged with ``khalwat'' or ``close proximity'' (the 
charge usually used to prosecute premarital or extramarital sexual 
relations), even if she is under the age of 18 and her partner is an 
adult. Thus, Shari'a sometimes punishes the victims of statutory rape. 
Moreover, Shari'a courts sometimes are more lenient with males who are 
charged with ``close proximity.'' However, in many cases Muslim men are 
charged and punished for statutory rape under secular law.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM) is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health. According to a well known women's NGO activist, 
some girls in provincial areas are subject to varying forms of FGM. 
Some Malay girls receive a tiny ritual cut to the clitoris or 
participate in a ceremony where a blade is brought close to the 
clitoris. Almost all Malay women, including Muslim women's activists, 
do not believe that this constitutes mutilation or reduces a woman's 
future capacity for sexual pleasure.
    Child prostitution exists. However, child prostitutes often are 
treated as delinquents rather than victims. In 1998 the Minister of 
National Unity and Social Development stated that 150 to 160 underage 
girls are detained each year for involvement in immoral activities and 
sent to rehabilitation centers. Authorities prosecute traffickers in 
child prostitution vigorously. Statistics for apprehension of 
traffickers are not available (see Section 6.f.).
    Child labor occurs in certain areas of the country (see Section 
6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate 
against physically disabled persons in employment, education, and 
provision of other state services. However, few public facilities are 
adapted to the needs of the disabled, and the Government has not 
mandated accessibility to transportation or public buildings for the 
disabled. In August 1999, former Minister of National Unity and Social 
Development Zaleha said that only 10 percent of residential and 
commercial buildings were ``disabled-friendly.'' In September 1999, 
Zaleha announced a cabinet decision to require that 10 percent of 
houses in all new housing projects be disabled friendly. In December 
1999, Zaleha reportedly said that ``all buildings'' would be made 
accessible to the disabled within 2 years.
    The Government increased efforts to address the needs of persons 
with disabilities during the year. In October the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government announced that the uniform building by-laws of 
1984 would be amended to ensure that all newly constructed buildings 
include a full range of facilities for the disabled, including special 
parking lots, elevators, and restrooms. In November the Human Resources 
Ministry announced plans to draft a code of ethics for employers by 
2001 to address the needs of the disabled including additional 
employment opportunities, job discrimination, and disabled-friendly 
work environments. In addition the 2001 federal budget includes several 
provisions to ease financial burdens on disabled citizens and improve 
work, education, and training opportunities. In November the Human 
Rights Commission recommended amending the Constitution's 
antidiscrimination provision to include legal protection for people 
with disabilities.
    Special education schools exist, but they are not sufficient to 
meet the needs of the disabled population. The Government and the 
general public are becoming more sensitive to the needs of the 
physically disabled. The Government has undertaken many initiatives to 
promote public acceptance of the disabled, to make public facilities 
more accessible to disabled persons, and to increase budgetary 
allotments for programs aimed at aiding them. Provisions for the 
disabled in the 2001 budget include several allowances for tax relief 
for working spouses of disabled persons, full exemption for all medical 
fees at government hospitals, and full exemption on fees for travel 
documents. All equipment designed specifically for use by disabled 
persons would also be exempt from all import duties and sales taxes. 
Recognizing that public transportation is not disabled-friendly, the 
Government is reducing the excise duty for disabled persons on locally 
made cars and motorcycles by 50 percent.
    In August 1999, an NGO representing the disabled stated that the 
disabled make up 7 percent of the population. The NGO urged the 
Government to increase its support for the disabled. Disabled persons 
do not enjoy explicit legal protection against discrimination.
    Indigenous People.--Indigenous groups and persons that is the 
descendants of the original inhabitants of peninsular Malaysia and the 
Borneo states) generally enjoy the same constitutional rights as the 
rest of the population. However, in practice federal laws pertaining to 
indigenous people vest almost total power in the minister responsible 
for indigenous people (the Minister of National Unity and Social 
Development during the year) to protect, control, and otherwise decide 
issues concerning them. As a result, indigenous people, particularly in 
peninsular Malaysia, have very little ability to participate in 
decisions.
    Under the 1954 Aboriginal People's Act (amended in 1974), 
indigenous people in peninsular Malaysia (known as Orang Asli), who had 
been granted land on a group basis, had no right to own land on an 
individual basis or to receive titles to land. The Social Development 
Ministry announced in 1996 that state governments, which make decisions 
affecting land rights, had agreed to issue titles to Orang Asli. 
Amendments were drafted to enable Orang Asli to hold titles on an 
individual basis. Finance Minister Tun Daim Zainuddin announced in May 
1999 that a total of 314,715 acres of land would be reserved for Orang 
Asli. The Government urged the states to follow up on Daim's 
announcement. The leader of a leading Orang Asli NGO welcomed the 
announcement, but urged the Government to proceed quickly. The NGO 
pointed out that the total area of land actually reserved for Orang 
Asli had declined, not increased, since 1990.
    Surveying and transfer of title apparently has proceeded very 
slowly; however, during the year a number of Orang Asli received land 
titles, and several state governments announced that land was being set 
aside for Orang Asli. The 2001 federal budget provides for a $26 
million (100 million ringgit) allotment to the Orang Asli community to 
eradicate poverty, improve education and social welfare, and improve 
infrastructure of resettlement villages. In addition National Unity and 
Social Development Minister Siti Zaharah Sulaiman announced in November 
a ``stay in school'' program to address the increasing number of school 
drop-outs in the Orang Asli community. The Government allocated $1.2 
million (4.8 million ringgit) for the project.
    The uncertainty surrounding Orang Asli land ownership makes them 
vulnerable to exploitation. There were many reports of Orang Asli who 
were cheated, misled, or otherwise exploited by land developers. In 
some cases, the Orang Asli have sued. In the state of Pahang, about 200 
Orang Asli held a protest demonstration in September over land 
disputes. The state government said that it would give serious 
attention to their complaints.
    Although state law recognizes the right of indigenous people to 
land under ``native customary rights,'' in the eastern part of the 
country, the definition and extent of these lands are in dispute. 
Indigenous people in the state of Sarawak continued to protest the 
alleged encroachment by state and private logging and plantation 
companies onto land that they consider to be theirs because of 
customary rights. Laws allowing condemnation and purchase of land did 
not require more than perfunctory notifications in newspapers to which 
indigenous people may have no access. The result was that many 
indigenous people were deprived of their traditional lands with little 
or no legal recourse. In May the Sarawak state assembly passed 
amendments to the state land code that the state government said would 
increase the rights of indigenous people to exert control over their 
traditional lands. A group of NGO's disputed the government's 
characterization of the legislation and stated that it would in fact 
further diminish the ability of indigenous peoples to defend their 
rights on land issues. Indigenous people displaced by the Bakun Dam 
project in Sarawak continue to protest the lack of transparency in the 
resettlement process, inadequate compensation for their lands and 
homes, and destruction of their traditional way of life. However, the 
state government dismissed these complaints, claiming that only the 
older generation have reservations about the resettlement program.
    In November the Human Rights Commission received complaints from 
three different groups representing the indigenous Iban and Penan 
peoples in Sarawak. The indigenous groups alleged that they were being 
victimized by logging companies illegally encroaching on their lands. 
One Penan group submitted a report of written testimonies entitled, 
``Not Development, but Theft,'' detailing how logging companies use 
police force and intimidation to appropriate land from indigenous 
communities. The Human Rights Commission pledged to investigate the 
matter with the state government of Sarawak and the indigenous 
communities. The commission also announced its intention to inquire 
about the use of police force by the logging companies (see Section 
1.c.).
    The Orang Asli, who number roughly 100,000, are the poorest group 
in the country; however, according to government officials, Orang Asli 
gradually are attaining comparable levels of standards of living as 
other citizens, and the percentage of Orang Asli who lead nomadic 
lifestyles has dropped to less than 40 percent. Government development 
projects for the Orang Asli are announced from time to time. However, 
according to press reports, the head of an NGO working with Orang Asli 
said in May that school dropout rates among Orang Asli had increased 
markedly over previous years, and the percentage of Orang Asli living 
below the poverty line was increasing as well. Several NGO's complained 
that Orang Asli were compensated inadequately after they were displaced 
by a dam project in the state of Selangor.
    The trial of a group of Iban tribesmen charged with the 1999 murder 
in Sarawak of four Chinese workers who worked for a company that was 
encroaching on their land to establish a palm oil plantation continued. 
The case still was pending in court at year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government implements 
extensive preferential programs designed to boost the economic position 
of the Malay majority, which remains poorer on average than the Chinese 
minority. Such preferential programs and policies limit opportunities 
for nonMalays in higher education, government employment, business 
permits and licenses, and ownership of land. According to the 
Government, these programs have been instrumental in ensuring ethnic 
harmony and political stability. Ethnic Indian Malaysians continued to 
lag behind in the country's economic development. The Chinese minority 
does not benefit from the preferential policies that benefit ethnic 
Malays.
    Public questioning of the preference rights of ethnic Malays is a 
sensitive issue. Senior UMNO officials have warned non-Malays against 
``playing with fire.'' In August a group of youth members of UMNO 
became unruly at a rally held outside a Chinese assembly hall in the 
wake of public comments by a Chinese association that allegedly 
questioned the granting of special rights and privileges for Malays. 
Some of the demonstrators threatened to burn down the hall. Chinese 
groups in the ruling coalition demanded action against the 
perpetrators. The Government had taken no action by year's end.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--By law most workers have the right to 
engage in trade union activity, but less than 10 percent of the work 
force is represented by one of the country's 544 trade unions. 
Exceptions include certain limited categories of workers labeled 
``confidential'' and ``managerial and executive,'' as well as defense 
and police officials. Within certain limitations, unions may organize 
workplaces, bargain collectively with employers, and associate with 
national federations. No legal barrier prevents foreign workers from 
joining a trade union; however, the Immigration Department places 
conditions on foreign workers' permits that effectively bars them from 
joining a trade union (see Section 6.e.).
    The Trade Unions Act prohibits interfering with, restraining, or 
coercing a worker in the exercise of the right to form trade unions or 
in participating in lawful trade union activities. However, the act 
restricts a union to representing workers in a ``particular 
establishment, trade, occupation, or industry or within any similar 
trades, occupations, or industries,'' contrary to International Labor 
Organization (ILO) guidelines. The Director General of Trade Unions may 
refuse to register a trade union and, in some circumstances, may also 
withdraw the registration of a trade union. When registration has been 
refused, withdrawn, or canceled, a trade union is considered an 
unlawful association. The Government justifies its overall labor 
policies by positing that a ``social compact'' exists wherein the 
Government, employer, and worker are part of an overall effort to 
create jobs, train workers, boost productivity and profitability, and 
ultimately provide the resources necessary to fund human resource 
development and a national social safety net. Trade unions from 
different industries may join in national congresses, but the 
congresses must register as societies under the Societies Act (see 
Section 2.b.).
    In January 1999, the Trade Unions Department reported that in 1998 
it had issued notices to 206 trade unions threatening them with 
deregistration for failing to submit reports of their accounts. A 
leading trade union leader said that he was ``puzzled'' by the Trade 
Union's Department statement and would seek further clarification. Also 
in February 1999, the Human Resources Minister said publicly that union 
members' complaints against union leaders were increasing, and the 
Human Resources Minister said that the Government would amend the Trade 
Unions Act to make all principal officers of a union liable if the 
union commits any wrongdoing (now only the secretary general is 
liable). There were no reports that these amendments were adopted 
during the year. Some trade unionists claimed that unions that defy 
government policies face more intense scrutiny, potentially leading to 
deregistration. However, there were no reports that unions were 
deregistered.
    In September 1999, Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) leader 
Zainal Rampak complained about delays in registering new unions, and 
said that new unions often faced delays of several years in 
registering. Zainal called on the Government to amend the Industrial 
Relations Act to allow automatic union recognition. In February Zainal 
said that approximately 100 unions had not been recognized by their 
employers, despite provisions under the Industrial Relations Act that 
require an employer to recognize a union within 21 days.
    The MTUC continued to call on the Government to ratify ILO 
Convention 87, which provides for the freedom to join a union; at 
year's end, the Government still had not done so.
    Government policy inhibits the formation of national unions in the 
electronics sector; the Government believes that enterpriselevel unions 
are more appropriate for this sector. In 1997 the MTUC dropped its 
longstanding objection to this practice, stating that it would be 
better for the workers to have the in-house unions ``than none at 
all.'' In February the Minister for Human Resources said that employers 
should not obstruct the formation of in-house unions. In November MTUC 
secretary general G. Rajasekaran expressed disappointment that 150,000 
electronics workers were still unable to organize. At that time, only 
eight in-house unions had been formed, according to the MTUC. 
Collective bargaining agreements are limited in those companies 
designated as ``pioneer status.'' According to the ILO, the Government 
has been promising to repeal this statute since 1994.
    Even in-house unions sometimes face difficulties. For example, in 
1999 an electronics company was picketed by workers several times 
during the year. Workers called on the company to end litigation and 
conclude a collective bargaining agreement that has been pending for 10 
years. Workers claimed that the company had refused to meet union 
officials, even though the Department of Trade Unions recognized the 
union.
    Unions maintain independence both from the Government and from 
political parties, but individual union members may belong to political 
parties. Although union officers by law may not hold principal offices 
in political parties, individual trade union leaders have served in 
Parliament. Trade unions are free to associate with national labor 
congresses, which exercise many of the responsibilities of national 
labor unions, although they cannot bargain for local unions. In l997 
longtime labor leader Zainal Rampak joined the ruling party, and in 
1998 he was appointed to the Senate. Some union leaders are concerned 
that the MTUC, under Zainal's leadership, is losing its independence.
    Although strikes are legal, the right to strike is restricted 
severely. The law contains a list of ``essential services'' in which 
unions must give advance notice of any industrial action. The list 
includes sectors not normally deemed essential under ILO definitions.
    The 1967 Industrial Relations Act requires the parties to notify 
the Ministry of Human Resources that a dispute exists before any 
industrial action (strike or lockout) may be taken. The Ministry's 
Industrial Relations Department then may become involved actively in 
conciliation efforts. If conciliation fails to achieve settlement, the 
Minister has the power to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court. 
Strikes or lockouts are prohibited while the dispute is before the 
Industrial Court. The Industrial Relations Act prohibits employers from 
taking retribution against a worker for participating in the lawful 
activities of a trade union. Where a strike is legal, these provisions 
would prohibit employer retribution against strikers and leaders. 
Although some trade unions questioned their effectiveness, it is not 
possible to assess fully whether these provisions are being enforced 
effectively, given the limited number of cases of alleged retribution.
    Strikes were extremely rare. In January 1999, the Deputy Human 
Resources Minister said that the (1997 and 1998) economic downturn was 
``not affecting industrial harmony'' and noted that the country still 
seldom had strikes.
    In June 130 employees of a cooking oil refinery in Johor staged a 
peaceful picket line to protest a deadlock in negotiations over a new 
collective bargaining agreement. Also in June, after a wildcat strike 
in which employees accused a Tawainese textile firm of refusing to 
recognize the union and of mistreating workers, several thousand 
workers were fired. The employer reinstated the workers after further 
protests.
    There are two national labor organizations. The MTUC is a 
federation of mainly private sector unions. The Congress of Unions of 
Employees in the Public and Civil Service (CUEPACS) is a federation of 
civil servant and teacher unions. Although the law grants public 
servants the right to organize at the level of ministries and 
departments, the Government has not responded to ILO requests for 
specific information on the numbers and categories of civil servant 
employees covered or details regarding the collective bargaining 
agreements reached. There are three national joint councils 
representing management and professional civil servants, technical 
employees, and nontechnical workers. In May 1999, various trade unions 
representing port workers announced plans to form a federation, 
potentially including 12,000 workers. There were no reports of further 
developments, and at year's end the federation was awaiting recognition 
by the federal Registrar of Trade Unions. In February the Government 
approved the establishment of a federation of airline unions that would 
represent about 20,000 employees in the aviation industry.
    In February the Minister of Human Resources said that the Ministry 
was considering extending the Workmen's Compensation Act to include 
both local and foreign domestic workers. Foreign domestic workers 
presently have no protection under the act.
    Enterprise unions can associate with international labor bodies and 
do so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have 
the legal right to organize and bargain collectively, and collective 
bargaining is widespread in those sectors where labor is organized. The 
law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union 
members and organizers. Charges of discrimination may be filed with the 
Ministry of Human Resources or the Industrial Court. Critics say that 
the Industrial Court is slow in adjudicating worker complaints when 
conciliation efforts by the Ministry of Human Resources fail. However, 
others point out that the Industrial Court almost always sides with the 
workers in disputes. In August 1999, the press reported an MTUC survey 
that indicated that employers often ignore Industrial Court judgments 
with impunity. In January the Minister of Human Resources said that 
more Industrial Court chairmen would be appointed to deal with a 
backlog of more than 100 cases and noted that the courts were so 
congested that new cases could not be scheduled until January 2001. An 
opposition politician said in March that the backlog of cases 
approached 5,000.
    The Government holds that issues of transfer, dismissal, and 
reinstatement are internal management prerogatives; therefore they are 
excluded from collective bargaining--against ILO standards. The 
Minister of Human Resources can suspend for up to 6 months any trade 
union that he deems is being used for purposes prejudicial to or 
incompatible with security or public order.
    Companies in free trade zones (FTZ's) must observe labor standards 
identical to those in the rest of the country. Many workers in FTZ 
companies are organized, especially in the textile and electrical 
products sectors. The ILO continues to object to legal restrictions on 
collective bargaining in ``pioneer industries.''
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and the Government generally 
enforces this prohibition; however, trafficking in women, and 
occasionally girls, for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem 
(see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). In theory certain laws allow the use of 
imprisonment with compulsory labor as a punishment for persons who 
express views opposed to the established order or who participate in 
strikes. The constitutional prohibition renders these laws without 
effect.
    The constitutional prohibition also applies to forced and bonded 
labor by children. Forced and bonded child labor is rare, and there 
were no cases reported during the year.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1996 Children and Young Persons (Employment) Act 
prohibits the employment of children younger than the age of 14. The 
act permits some exceptions, such as light work in a family enterprise, 
work in public entertainment, work performed for the Government in a 
school or in training institutions, or work as an approved apprentice. 
In no case, may children work more than 6 hours per day, more than 6 
days per week, or at night.
    Child labor occurs in certain areas of the country. A 1993 joint 
report by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the 
Asian and Pacific Regional Organization put the child work force at 
75,000. However, government officials maintain that this figure is 
outdated, since it was based on a nationwide survey of child labor 
undertaken in 1980, which estimated that more than 73,400 children 
between the ages of 10 and 14 were employed full time. There is no 
reliable recent estimate of the number of child workers. Most child 
laborers work informally in the plantation sector, helping their 
parents in the field. However, only adult members of the family receive 
a wage. In urban areas, child labor can be found in family food 
businesses, night markets, and small-scale industries. Government 
officials do not deny the existence of child labor in family 
businesses, but maintain that foreign workers largely have replaced 
child labor and that the Government vigorously enforces child labor 
provisions. In September the Government ratified the International 
Labor Convention 182 on the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
forms of child labor. Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited 
and generally is rare; however, occasional trafficking in girls for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage, but the Wage Councils Act provides for a minimum wage in those 
sectors or regions of the country where a need exists. Under the law, 
workers in an industry who believe that they need the protection of a 
minimum wage may request that a wage council be established. However, 
few workers are covered by minimum wages set by wage councils, and the 
Government prefers to let market forces determine wage rates. Minimum 
wages set by wage councils generally do not provide a decent standard 
of living for a worker and family. However, prevailing wages, even in 
the sectors covered by wage councils, are higher than the minimum wages 
set by the wage councils and often do provide a decent living. In May 
the Human Resources Minister said that nonunion labor would be brought 
under the wage council system. In May 1999, former Human Resources 
Minister Datuk Lim Ah Lek said that the Government was not against a 
minimum wage, but that it was not ready to set the amount at $316 
(1,200 ringgit) per month (as proposed by some unions). In June Human 
Resources Minister Fong Chan Onn reiterated that the Government was not 
opposed to a minimum wage and said that his ministry wanted to discuss 
with the MTUC the manner in which the MTUC calculated its new proposal 
for a $237 (900 ringgit) per month minimum wage.
    Plantation workers generally receive either piecework or daily 
wages. Many NGO's and union officials proposed a monthly wage for 
plantation workers. In September a support committee representing 
80,000 rubber and palm oil workers from 300 plantations called on the 
Government to set up a special cabinet committee to expedite the 
implementation of a minimum monthly wage for plantation workers. A 
spokesperson for the group said such a wage should not be less than 
$197 (750 ringgit) per month. The Government had taken no action by 
year's end.
    Under the 1955 Employment Act, working hours may not exceed 8 hours 
per day or 48 hours per workweek of 6 days. Each workweek must include 
a 24-hour rest period. The act also sets overtime rates and mandates 
public holidays, annual leave, sick leave, and maternity allowances. 
The Labor Department of the Ministry of Human Resources enforces these 
standards, but a shortage of inspectors precludes strict enforcement. 
In May the Appeals Court ruled that a company must give proper 
notification to its workers when selling its business to another 
entity. The Appeals Court ruled that compelling an employee to work for 
a new employer without offering the option to terminate the labor 
contract amounted to a form of forced labor. The Appeals Court ordered 
the employers to compensate the workers for failing to give proper 
notification of sale as prescribed by the Employment Act.
    Legal and illegal foreign workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Burma, Thailand, India, Bangladesh, and other countries constitute 
about 20 percent of the work force. These workers, who occupy a wide 
range of menial jobs in the agricultural, industrial, and service 
sectors. Workers without labor permits have no legal protection under 
labor laws, and legal workers are prevented from joining trade unions 
by restrictions imposed by the Immigration Department on their work 
permits. The MTUC stated in December 1999 that foreign workers should 
be allowed to organize, but that one of the benefits of a minimum wage 
law would be to reduce the country's dependence on foreign workers. The 
Government states that it does not ``encourage'' foreign workers to 
join unions and that labor laws are adequate to protect foreign 
workers' interests.
    Significant numbers of contract workers, including numerous illegal 
immigrants, work on plantations and in other sectors. According to 
statistics from the National Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW), 39 
percent of plantation workers are foreigners, with the vast majority 
from Indonesia and Bangladesh. Working conditions for these laborers 
compare poorly with those of direct-hire plantation workers, many of 
whom belong to the NUPW. Moreover, immigrant workers in the 
construction and other sectors, particularly if they are illegal 
aliens, generally do not have access to the system of labor 
adjudication. Government investigations into this problem have resulted 
in a number of steps to eliminate the abuse of contract labor. For 
example, besides expanding programs to regularize the status of 
immigrant workers, the Government investigates complaints of abuses, 
attempts to inform workers of their rights, encourages workers to come 
forward with their complaints, and warns employers to end abuses. Like 
other employers, labor contractors may be prosecuted for violating the 
labor laws.
    The local press reported several cases of abuse of foreign domestic 
workers. The majority of such cases involved Indonesian women. Foreign 
domestic workers have no protection under current labor laws. Some of 
the victims claimed that their employers subjected them to inhuman 
living conditions, withheld their salaries, and physically assaulted 
them. Two high-profile cases involved young Indonesian women who 
reportedly were raped multiple times by their employers. At year's end, 
no developments had been reported in these cases. Most cases of abuse 
of foreign workers are the subject of ongoing police investigations. In 
February the Government acknowledged the problem, and Minister of Human 
Resources Datuk Dr Fong Chan Onn announced that abused foreign domestic 
servants may be eligible for compensation under the 1952 Workmen's 
Compensation Act. The Cabinet commissioned a study of the issue to 
determine what measures for protection, compensation, and a legal 
course of action should be available to victims under the act. In 
October the local press reported four separate cases of physical abuse 
against foreign domestic workers that were settled when the accused 
offered compensation to the victim. Section 260 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code allows certain offenses to be ``compounded'' with the 
consent of the complainant, if the perpetrator compensates the victim. 
The Human Rights Committee of the Bar Council claimed that the 
settlement gave the public ``the overall impression that justice can be 
bought.'' A human rights NGO activist called the settlement a 
``dangerous trend.''
    In 1993 Parliament adopted an Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA), which covers all sectors of the economy, except the maritime 
sector and the military. The act established a national Occupational 
Safety and Health Council, composed of workers, employers, and 
government representatives, to set policy and coordinate occupational 
safety and health measures. It requires employers to identify risks and 
take precautions, including providing safety training to workers, and 
compels companies that have more than 40 workers to establish joint 
management-employee safety committees. The act requires workers to use 
safety equipment and to cooperate with employers to create a safe, 
healthy workplace. Trade unions maintain that relatively few committees 
have been established and, even in cases where they exist, they meet 
infrequently and generally are ineffective. In September MTUC president 
Zainal Rampak called for a review of the three-shift system in the 
electronics industry, referring to a recent study that concluded that 
the system contributed to severe stress and workplace accidents among 
the industry's mainly female work force. During the year, government 
health and safety officials defended existing legislation, claiming 
that it provides adequate safeguards for conscientious employers and 
workers.
    Work-related accidents are especially high in the plantation 
sector. According to the Human Resources Ministry, 14 percent of all 
reported industrial accidents occurred on plantations. The number of 
work-related accidents on plantations rose 6 percent in 1999, and 
statistics from the first half of the year indicated an accident rate 
comparable with the 1999 figures.
    Employers or employees that violate the OSHA are subject to 
substantial fines or imprisonment for up to 5 years. There are no 
specific statutory or regulatory provisions that provide a right for 
workers to remove themselves from dangerous workplace conditions 
without arbitrary dismissal.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits slavery; 
however, this provision has not been invoked in cases of trafficking in 
persons, and trafficking in women, and occasionally girls, for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem. The Penal Code includes 
special provisions related to trafficking for purposes of prostitution. 
Sections specifically target minors, prohibiting the sale or hire of 
anyone under 21 for purposes of prostitution. Another section prohibits 
the importing of any woman for purposes of prostitution. Punishment for 
these offenses includes a maximum 10 year prison term or a fine, to be 
determined at the discretion of the sentencing judge. In November local 
press reported that implementation of the Child Act 2000, which 
automatically repeals the 1973 Women and Girls Protection, creates a 
legal loophole that decriminalizes procuring. The specific offense of 
procurement had only been covered by the Women and Girls Protection 
Act. The press reported that the Ministry of National Unity and Social 
Development was working with the Attorney General's drafting department 
to close the loophole, but no developments were reported at year's end.
    Malaysia is a source, transit, and destination country for 
trafficking in women and girls for sexual exploitation. During the 
year, the Royal Malaysian Police arrested 3,607 foreign prostitutes, 
compared to 3,301 in 1999. Police believe that the increased number of 
arrests is a result of greater numbers of women being brought to the 
country from countries of the former Soviet Union. Most prostitutes in 
the country still come from neighboring Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Burma, Thailand, and China. These women often work as karaoke 
hostesses, ``guest relations officers,'' and masseuses. Malaysian women 
are trafficked for sexual purposes mostly to Singapore, Macau, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan, but also to Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United 
States. According to police and Chinese community leaders, Malaysian 
women who are victims of traffickers are almost exclusively ethnic 
Chinese, though ethnic Malay and ethnic Indian women work as 
prostitutes domestically. Police and NGO's believe that Chinese 
criminal syndicates are behind most of the trafficking (both incoming 
and outgoing) of women of all nationalities. The Deputy Home Minister 
stated in 1997 that 4,200 Malaysian girls and young women were reported 
missing in 1997. Political parties and NGO's estimate that a portion of 
these women and girls were victims of traffickers. Authorities 
prosecute traffickers in child prostitution vigorously.
    A few government officials may provide counterfeit documents 
illicitly to traffickers (although no specific cases were reported), 
but the Government investigates and punishes those involved in such 
cases. The Government assists underage girls and has rescued some 
kidnaped women. Police often raid venues of prostitution. For example, 
Selangor state police stated that they raided 1,230 suspected ``vice 
dens'' during 1999. However, NGO's and women's rights activists 
complain that police have no coherent policy to protect victims of 
trafficking. Rather than prosecute traffickers, police generally arrest 
or deport individual women for prostitution. Statistics for 
apprehension of traffickers are not available. In 1998 the press quoted 
an anonymous police official as saying that the country had become a 
``safe haven'' for traffickers. A police spokesman who was asked for 
official comment responded by questioning whether press reporting on 
trafficking in women was in the national interest.
    A local women's NGO is working with the Malaysian Bar Council on 
draft legislation specifically aimed at prosecuting traffickers and 
protecting victims.
                               __________

                            MARSHALL ISLANDS

    The Republic of the Marshall Islands, a self-governing nation under 
the Compact of Free Association with the United States, is composed of 
29 atolls and 5 islands in the central Pacific, with a total land area 
of about 70 square miles. The approximately 51,000 inhabitants are of 
Micronesian origin and concentrated primarily on Majuro and Kwajalein 
atolls. The Constitution provides for free and fair elections and 
executive and legislative branches. The legislature consists of a 33-
member Parliament (Nitijela), and a Council of Chiefs (Iroij), which 
serves a largely consultative function dealing with custom and 
traditional practice. The President is elected by majority Nitijela 
vote, and he appoints his Cabinet from its membership. The Constitution 
provides for an independent judiciary; however, past governments have 
attempted to influence the judiciary.
    Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is 
responsible for defense and national security, and the Marshall Islands 
has no external security force of its own. The national and local 
police forces have responsibility for internal security. These agencies 
honor constitutional and legal civil rights protections in executing 
their responsibilities.
    The economy depends mainly on transfer payments from the United 
States. Coconut oil and copra exports, a small amount of tourism, 
import and income taxes, and fishing licensing fees generate limited 
revenues.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. There were occasional instances of 
denial of due process for detainees. Violence against women and child 
abuse are problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly forbids such practices, and 
there were no reports that officials employed them. Security forces 
generally respect this prohibition.
    Prison conditions, while Spartan, meet minimum international 
standards.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
generally observes these prohibitions. Nonetheless, there were several 
reported cases of arbitrary detention lasting over 24 hours in which 
persons were denied their rights to be charged or released within the 
specified time, or to be informed of the charges against them.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in the past, the Government has 
attempted to influence judicial matters through legislative or 
administrative means. A foreign national former high court judge who 
had had disagreements with the previous government was terminated 
prematurely by it in June 1999 but was appointed to the Supreme Court 
in May. In January, in his inaugural address, President Note pledged to 
protect the independence of the judiciary, following the past 4 years 
during which three chief justices resigned or were terminated by the 
Government. During the year, there have been no known incidents of 
executive pressure on the judiciary.
    The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court with appellate 
jurisdiction, a High Court with general jurisdiction in civil and 
criminal matters and appellate jurisdiction over subordinate courts at 
the district and community levels, and a Traditional Rights Court with 
jurisdiction in cases involving matters of customary law and 
traditional practice.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and the 
Government generally respects this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for freedom from such 
practices, government authorities respect these prohibitions, and 
violations are subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally honors 
these rights in practice. Unlike past years, when government influence 
led to occasional self-censorship by the media in areas of political or 
cultural sensitivity, there were no known instances of self-censorship 
during the year.
    There is a privately owned weekly newspaper with articles and 
opinions in both English and the Marshallese language.
    There is one radio station, which is government owned. In the past, 
live broadcasts of the legislative session were cut when remarks were 
critical of the Government; however, this did not occur under the Note 
Government. A cable television company broadcasts a variety of foreign 
news and entertainment programs and occasional videotaped local events.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    During the year, seeking to halt an alleged spate of illegal 
entries by Chinese and other foreign nationals, the Government launched 
an alien registration drive. In addition the Government is considering 
regulations that would reserve certain types of businesses for 
citizens.
    There are no recent reports of refugees. The Government has not 
formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through 
periodic elections. The Nitijela (Parliament) and mayors are elected by 
secret ballot every 4 years with universal suffrage for citizens 18 
years of age and older. The most recent Nitijela election was held on 
November 15, 1999, and, in a record turnout, voters signaled 
dissatisfaction with the incumbent government by defeating five of the 
eight incumbent ministers seeking reelection. On January 3, President 
Kessai Note was selected unopposed by the Nitijela from among its 33 
members. The President subsequently selected 10 cabinet ministers from 
among the Nitijela members. Executive power is centralized in the 
President and his Cabinet. This group dominates the legislature as 
well. There are no restrictions on the formation of political parties. 
Political activity by foreigners is prohibited.
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in 
government and politics. One woman was elected to the Nitijela in the 
1999 elections. Society is matrilineal, and those men and women who 
exercise traditional leadership and land ownership powers derive their 
rights either from their own positions in the family, or from 
relationships deriving from their mother's and sister's lineage. 
However, urbanization and the movement of the population away from the 
lands that they control is leading to a decline in the traditional 
authority exercised by women. Women's cultural responsibilities and 
traditionally passive roles are not seen to be managerial or executive 
in nature, and women remain underrepresented in Parliament and in 
senior government positions.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    While there are no official restrictions, no local nongovernmental 
human rights organizations have been formed. No international human 
rights organization has expressed interest or concern or visited the 
country.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, 
race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, place of birth, family status or descent, and the 
Government generally respects these provisions.
    Women.--The Government identifies spousal abuse as common. Wife 
beating is not condoned in society, and most assaults occur while the 
assailant is under the influence of alcohol. The Government's health 
office provides counseling for reported spouse and child abuse cases, 
but advises that many cases go unreported. Assault is a criminal 
offense, but women involved in domestic violence are reluctant to 
prosecute spouses in the court system. Women's groups publicize women's 
issues and attempt to create a greater awareness of the rights of 
women. Violence against women outside the family occurs, and women in 
the urban centers would assume a risk by going out alone after dark.
    The inheritance of property and of traditional rank is matrilineal, 
with women occupying positions of importance within the traditional 
system. No instances of unequal pay for equal work or of sex-related 
job discrimination were reported. However, while women workers are very 
prevalent in the private sector, many of them are in low paying jobs 
with little hope of advancement.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare 
through its programs of health care and free education, but these have 
not been adequate to meet the needs of the country's sharply increasing 
population.
    It is estimated that up to 20 percent of elementary school age 
children do not attend school on a regular basis. The Government does 
not enforce the compulsory education law due to a lack of classrooms 
and teachers. The Government's enrollment report indicates that only 
two-thirds of those completing eighth grade attend high school. Of that 
number, 50 percent eventually graduate.
    Child abuse and neglect are criminal offenses; however, awareness 
of children's rights remains low among the general population. The law 
requires teachers, caregivers, and other persons to report instances of 
child abuse and exempts them from civil or criminal liability as a 
consequence of making such a report. However, there are few reports and 
few prosecutions. Child abuse and neglect are considered to be on the 
increase. Apparently contributing to the problem are the influences on 
family life and traditional values arising from increased urbanization, 
unemployment, population pressures, two-earner households, and the 
availability of alcohol and illegal gambling.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no apparent discrimination 
against disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision 
of other state services. There are no building codes, and there is no 
legislation mandating access for the disabled.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of free association in general, and the Government interprets 
this right as allowing the existence of labor unions, although none has 
been formed to date. The Constitution does not provide for the right to 
strike, and the Government has not addressed this issue.
    In mid-October, there was a weeklong strike against the government-
owned Air Marshall Islands. Although the Attorney General's Office has 
indicated that some of the strikers apparently were in violation of 
national labor laws, there has been no retaliation against any of the 
strikers. In December the airline managers were relieved of their 
duties.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no 
legislation concerning collective bargaining or trade union 
organization. However, there are no impediments to the organization of 
trade unions or to collective bargaining. Wages in the cash economy are 
determined by market factors in accordance with the minimum wage and 
other laws.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits involuntary servitude, and there is no evidence of its 
practice. The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded 
labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law does not prohibit the employment of children. 
Children typically are not employed in the wage economy, but some 
assist their families in fishing, agriculture, and other small-scale 
domestic enterprises. The law requires compulsory education for 
children from 6 to 14 years of age, but the Government does not enforce 
this law due to a lack of classrooms and teachers. There is no law or 
regulation setting a minimum age for employment of children.
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by 
children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A government-specified minimum 
wage is established by law, and it is adequate to maintain a decent 
standard of living in this subsistence economy where extended families 
are expected to help less fortunate members. The minimum wage for all 
government and private sector employees is $2.00 per hour. (The U.S. 
dollar is the national currency.) The Ministry of Resources and 
Development oversees minimum wage regulations, and its oversight has 
been deemed adequate. Foreign employees and Marshallese trainees of 
private employers who have invested in or established a business in the 
country are exempt from minimum wage requirements. This exemption does 
not affect a significant segment of the work force.
    There is no legislation concerning maximum hours of work or 
occupational safety and health. Most businesses are closed, and people 
generally refrain from work on Sunday.
    A government labor office makes recommendations to the Nitijela on 
working conditions, such as the minimum wage, legal working hours and 
overtime payments, and occupational health and safety standards in 
accordance with International Labor Organization conventions. The 
office periodically convenes board meetings that are open to the 
public. No legislation specifically gives workers the right to remove 
themselves from situations that endanger their health or safety without 
jeopardy to their continued employment, and no legislation protects 
workers who file complaints about such conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific laws concerning 
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons 
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                     FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

    The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is composed of 607 small 
islands extending over a large area of the central Pacific. Four 
states--Chuuk (formerly Truk), Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Yap--make up the 
federation. The population is estimated at 130,000, mostly of 
Micronesian origin. The four states were part of the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands and were administered by the United States from 
1947 to 1986 pursuant to an agreement with the United Nations. 
Political legitimacy rests on the popular will expressed by a majority 
vote through elections in accordance with the Constitution. There are 
three branches of government: An executive branch led by a president 
who also serves as head of state; a unicameral legislature elected from 
the four constituent states; and an independent judicial system that 
applies criminal and civil laws and procedures that closely paralleling 
those of the United States. Traditional leaders retain considerable 
influence.
    Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is 
responsible for the islands' defense. The FSM has no security forces 
apart from national police, who operate under the office of the 
Secretary of Justice, and public safety officers, who operate under the 
authority of the attorney generals of the individual state governments.
    The economy depends heavily on transfer payments from the United 
States, fishing, tourism, and subsistence agriculture.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse. Traditional customs distinguish between 
persons on the basis of social status and sex. There is growing 
evidence of increased spousal abuse and child neglect, and government 
agencies often ignore such problems due to the constraints imposed by 
traditional society. Neither the Government nor other organizations 
successfully have filled the role of the traditional extended family in 
protecting and supporting its members.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings. There was a suspicious death of a 
prisoner in custody early in the year, and a March 1999 prisoner 
suicide (see Section 1.c.). Both cases remain open but are not known to 
be under active investigation.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There was no pattern of torture or other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment. In August two off-duty policemen 
reportedly beat a foreign national at a bar in Pohnpei. Both officers 
were dismissed from the police force, and the case was referred to the 
Attorney General for prosecution.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There was a 
suspicious death of a prisoner in custody early in the year, and a 
March 1999 suicide of a prisoner (see Section 1.a.). Both cases remain 
open but are not known to be under active investigation.
    No local organizations concern themselves solely with human rights, 
and the question of prison visits by human rights monitors did not 
arise during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Legal procedures, for 
the most part patterned after U.S. law, provide for due process, which 
is carefully observed.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
    The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is appointed by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the legislature.
    Public trial is provided for in the Bill of Rights, and trials are 
conducted fairly. Juveniles may have closed hearings. Despite these 
provisions, cultural resistance to litigation and incarceration as 
methods of maintaining public order has allowed some persons to act 
with impunity. Serious cases of sexual and other assault and even 
murder have not gone to trial, and suspects routinely are released 
indefinitely. Bail, even for major crimes, usually is set low.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such arbitrary interference, and in 
practice privacy rights are respected.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
these rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. A 
new biweekly newspaper, Rohng En Pohnpei, published its first issue on 
November 30 in Pohnpei State.
    The national Government and the four states publish newsletters. 
Each of the four state governments controls a radio station that 
broadcasts primarily in the local language. One religious group 
operates a private radio station. The population of Pohnpei has 
increasing access to live satellite-televised information from around 
the world and tape-delayed broadcasts of programming by the major U.S. 
networks. However, none of the other three states has a television 
receiver station, and few residents have individual satellite dishes.
    There is an increasing level of open public discussion of social 
and governmental issues on various Internet sites. The Internet plays 
an important role in allowing citizens in the four states, as well as 
those residing outside the country, an opportunity to share views and 
opinions.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Bill of 
Rights provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. During political campaigns, citizens 
often question candidates at public meetings and social gatherings.
    The Bill of Rights provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. Formal associations are 
uncommon, but organizations for students and women exist.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The Bill 
of Rights forbids the establishment of a state religion and 
governmental restrictions on freedom of religion. Missionaries of many 
faiths work in the country without hindrance.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement within the country. It is silent on foreign travel, 
emigration, and repatriation, but in practice none of these are 
restricted.
    The three Vietnamese who fled a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
camp in Indonesia and sailed to Yap state in 1998 remain there. The 
Government has not found another country willing to accept them.
    The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees, 
asylees, or first asylum. To date there has never been a request for 
asylum in the country.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government. The Congress is 
elected by popular vote from each state; the Congress then chooses the 
President and Vice President from among its four at large senators by 
majority vote. State governors, state legislators, and municipal 
governments are elected by direct popular vote. Political campaigning 
is unrestricted. There are no established political parties, and 
political support generally is sought from family and allied clan 
groupings, as well as religious groups.
    There are no restrictions on the formation of political groups, but 
there have been no significant efforts to form political parties.
    Cultural factors in the male-dominated society have limited women's 
representation in government and politics. Although women hold midlevel 
positions at both the federal and state level, women are severely 
underrepresented in leadership roles at the highest government levels. 
The first woman to hold a national government cabinet position was 
appointed in 1999; she continues to serve as Public Defender.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There were no known requests for investigations of alleged human 
rights violations. While there are no official restrictions, no local 
groups concern themselves exclusively with human rights. However, there 
are groups that address problems concerning the rights of women and 
children.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Although the Constitution provides explicit protection against 
discrimination based on race, sex, language, or religion, there is 
extensive societal discrimination, notably discrimination and violence 
against women. Government enforcement of these constitutional 
protections is weak.
    Women.--Most violence against women occurs in the family context. 
In the traditional Micronesian extended family unit, spouses and 
children were accorded strong protections from violence, abuse, and 
neglect. Such actions were deemed offenses against the family, not just 
the individuals within them, and were addressed by a complex system of 
familial sanctions. However, with increasing urbanization and 
monetarization of the economy, greater emphasis has been placed on the 
nuclear family, and the traditional methods of coping with family 
discord are breaking down. No government agency, including the police, 
has succeeded in replacing the extended family system or in addressing 
the problem of family violence directly.
    Incidents of spousal abuse, often of increasing severity, continue 
to rise. There are no laws against domestic abuse, and there are no 
governmental or private facilities to shelter and support women in 
abusive situations. Effective prosecution of such offenses is rare. In 
many cases, the victim decides against initiating legal charges because 
she is pressured by family, is fearful of further assault, or is 
convinced that the police will not involve themselves actively in what 
is seen as a private family problem. The number of cases of physical 
and sexual assaults against women outside the family context also is 
growing. Such assaults are perpetrated against both citizens and 
foreigners. Unmarried women sometimes are considered to have invited 
such violence by living or traveling alone.
    Women have equal rights under the law, and there are no cultural or 
institutional barriers to education and employment. Women receive equal 
pay for equal work and are well represented in the lower and middle 
ranks of government. Women are active and increasingly successful in 
private business and enterprises. A National Women's Advisory Council 
has existed since 1992, and several small nongovernmental groups are 
interested in women's issues, particularly those associated with 
spousal and family violence and abuse.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare 
through its programs of health care and education; however, these 
programs have been inadequate to meet the needs of the country's 
rapidly growing population, in an environment in which the extended 
family is breaking down. In November there were at least five suicides 
of youths in Pohnpei. Health officials and religious leaders have 
proposed starting peer support and family care groups to address the 
factors that may be leading to this increase in suicides.
    A compulsory education law requires that all children begin school 
at the age of 6. Children may leave school when they reach the age of 
14 or after completing the 8th grade, whichever comes first (see 
Section 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--Neither laws nor regulations mandate 
accessibility to public buildings and services for the disabled. The 
school system has established special education classes to address 
problems encountered by those who exhibit learning disabilities, 
although such classes are completely dependent on nongovernment 
funding. Some private businesses provide handicap parking spaces and 
ramps for wheelchair access.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The law prohibits noncitizens 
from purchasing land, and the national Congress grants citizenship to 
non-Micronesians only in rare individual cases (an authority that was 
exercised during 1998, following a lapse of almost 20 years). However, 
for the most part, noncitizens share fully in the social and cultural 
life of the country.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Under the Bill of Rights, citizens 
have the right to form or join associations, and national government 
employees by law may form associations to ``present their views'' to 
the Government. However, for a variety of reasons, including the fact 
that most private sector employment is in small-scale family-owned 
business and that Micronesians are not accustomed to collective action. 
There are neither associations nor trade unions. The country is not a 
member of the International Labor Organization.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--No law deals 
specifically with trade unions or with the right to collective 
bargaining. Individual employers, the largest of which are the national 
and state governments, set wages. There were no reports of strikes, 
labor disputes, or collective bargaining agreements in the country's 
history.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
specifically prohibits involuntary servitude, and there is no evidence 
of its practice. Children are not cited specifically in this 
prohibition, but forced and bonded labor by children is not known to 
occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--There is no law establishing a minimum age for employment 
of children. While in practice there is no employment of children for 
wages, they often assist their families in subsistence farming 
activities. A compulsory education law requires all children to begin 
school at the age of 6. Children may leave school when they reach the 
age of 14 or after completing the 8th grade, whichever comes first. 
Neither the Constitution nor the law specifically prohibits forced and 
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur 
(see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The four state governments have 
established minimum wage rates for government workers. Pohnpei has a 
minimum hourly wage rate of $2.00 for government and $1.35 for private 
workers. The other three states have established minimum hourly rates 
only for government workers: $1.25 for Chuuk; $1.49 for Kosrae; and 
$0.80 for Yap. The minimum hourly wage for employment with the national 
Government is $1.68. These minimum wage structures and the wages 
customarily paid to skilled workers are sufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. The minimum wage is 
enforced through the tax system, and this mechanism is believed to be 
effective.
    There are no laws regulating hours of work (although a 40-hour 
workweek is standard practice) or prescribing standards of occupational 
safety and health. A federal regulation requires that employers provide 
a safe workplace. The Department of Health has no enforcement 
capability; working conditions vary in practice.
    Two states permit foreign laborers to work in garment manufacturing 
enterprises. The foreign laborers are paid at a lower rate than 
citizens who work at the factories, work longer hours per day, and work 
a 6-day week in contrast to the 5-day week for citizens.
    There is no law for either the public or private sector that would 
permit workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations 
without jeopardy to their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically address 
the subject of trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports 
that persons were trafficked to, from, within or through the country.
                               __________

                                MONGOLIA

    Mongolia continued its transition from a highly centralized, 
Communist-led state to a full-fledged, multiparty, parliamentary 
democracy, although these gains still must be consolidated. The Prime 
Minister is nominated by the majority party and, with the agreement of 
the President, is approved by the State Great Hural (Parliament), the 
national legislature. In July the Mongolian People's Revolutionary 
Party (MPRP), which held power from 1921 to 1996, won a sweeping 
victory in the parliamentary elections, leaving only 4 of 76 seats to 
opposition members. The transition to the new Government occurred in 
accordance with constitutional procedures, and international observers 
characterized the elections as free and fair. There are 20 political 
parties, 3 of which hold seats in the Parliament. The judiciary is 
independent.
    Security forces are under civilian control, and, although he is a 
retired general, the Minister of Defense is a civilian. The national 
police have primary responsibility for law enforcement. The military 
forces are responsible for external security, although border security 
is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs in 
peacetime. Reduced government spending continued to force downsizing of 
the military forces. The General Intelligence Agency (GIA), formerly 
the State Security Agency, is responsible for internal security; its 
head has ministerial status and reports directly to the Prime Minister. 
A parliamentary committee oversees the military forces, the police, and 
the GIA. Some members of the police on occasion committed human rights 
abuses.
    Despite reforms in the 1990's, the major economic entities remain 
under state control; however, the private sector produces over 70 
percent of the gross domestic product. The economy continued to expand 
and strengthen, and inflation stayed below 10 percent. Mongolia remains 
a poor country with a per capita income of approximately $450 per year. 
It relies heavily on foreign economic assistance. The mainstays of the 
economy continue to be copper production and other mining, livestock 
raising (which is done by a majority of the rural population), and 
related food-, wool-, and hide-processing industries, which meet both 
local needs and produce goods for export. A growing trade and small 
entrepreneurial sector in the cities provides basic consumer goods. 
Garment manufacture and minerals, especially copper, constitute the 
bulk of export earnings. Lack of transportation and other 
infrastructure, legal and regulatory deficiencies, petty corruption, 
and a small domestic market discourage foreign investment.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, problems remain in some areas. Members of the police 
at times beat prisoners and detainees. Pretrial detention and prison 
conditions are poor, and resulted in the deaths of prisoners in 
custody. Arbitrary arrest and detention are problems, as is corruption. 
There are restrictions on due process for persons arrested or suspected 
of crimes. Government attempts to enforce compliance by newspapers, 
magazines, television, and radio with moral strictures and tax laws 
were seen as an attempt to intimidate the media and have resulted in a 
degree of self-censorship by the press. During the year, lacking a 
legal framework to deal with refugees and responding to a bilateral 
agreement to return illegal immigrants to the country of origin, the 
authorities denied entry to some persons claiming refugee status. 
Official harassment of some religious groups seeking registration 
persisted. Domestic violence against women is a serious problem; 
however, efforts to assist victims increased during the year. Child 
abuse and child labor also are problems. There were some instances of 
forced labor, and some women seeking work overseas may have become 
victims of trafficking schemes. In December the Government passed 
legislation to establish a National Commission on Human Rights.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, it is suspected that the murder 
of the Minister of Infrastructure in October 1998 was politically 
motivated. Although the investigation is ongoing, the inability to 
solve this case is a major problem for the Government.
    Approximately 100 prisoners died in custody during the year, 
largely due to disease and inadequate prison management (see Section 
1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Although the Constitution forbids torture and other abuse, 
and reports of such actions diminished, members of the police in rural 
areas occasionally beat prisoners and detainees, and unnecessary force 
in the arrest process is not uncommon. Reforms undertaken by the 
Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs upon Parliament's recommendation, 
following reports by international human rights observers, have changed 
significantly the way that accused persons and prisoners are treated. 
The Ministry's Department for the Enforcement of Court Decisions now 
monitors conditions; however, the new laws and procedures have not been 
publicized widely, especially in the countryside, and citizens are not 
aware always of their rights with respect to detention and arrest.
    Pretrial detention and prison facilities are poor--including 
insufficient food, heat, and medical care--and threaten the health and 
life of inmates. Different authorities administer the pretrial 
detention system and the prison system, which creates tensions between 
the two and limits management improvements. Many inmates entered prison 
already infected with tuberculosis or contracted it in prison. With the 
help of foreign donors, the prisons continued a 1997 program for 
surveying and treating tuberculosis among inmates, bringing the number 
of cases down to 890; the percentage of inmates who die of the disease 
has decreased by 50 percent. Approximately 100 prisoners died in 
custody, largely due to disease and mismanagement by the authorities; 
this also is a 50 percent decrease from 1999. Pretrial detention 
facilities, where suspects can be held for up to 36 months, often are 
worse than the prisons and contribute significantly to the tuberculosis 
problem. Although the number of inmates has remained fairly constant, 
the seriousness of crimes has increased. Overcrowding in both prisons 
and pretrial detention facilities is common; the detention center 
population exceeds capacity by approximately 25 percent, aggravating 
management, health, and funding problems. To address these problems 
under the continuing reform process, prison inmates in the capital were 
divided into smaller groups managed by trained personnel and provided 
health and hygiene instructions. During the year, families were given 
greater access to inmates, alleviating some of the hardship in 
obtaining food and clothing. In the capital foreign donor assistance 
improved women's and juvenile facilities. Improvements in detention and 
prison conditions outside of the capital are significantly less or 
nonexistent due to lack of funding.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides that no person shall be searched, arrested, detained, or 
deprived of liberty except by law, but these protections still have not 
been codified fully, and arbitrary arrest and detention are problems. 
Under the Criminal Procedures Code, police may arrest those caught 
committing or suspected of a crime and hold them for up to 72 hours 
before the decision is made to prosecute or release. A prosecutor must 
issue a warrant for incarceration of longer duration or when the actual 
crime was not witnessed. A detainee has the right to a defense attorney 
during this period and during any subsequent stage of the legal 
process. If a defendant cannot afford a private attorney, the State 
appoints an attorney. Detainees may be released on bail with the 
agreement of the prosecutor.
    Citizens are not always aware of their rights in regard to arrest 
and detention procedures (see Section 1.c.). In June a new amnesty law 
affected 1,000 inmates and detainees by reducing the sentences of 
inmates and releasing detainees held on insufficient evidence. The 
police may detain a suspect for up to 10 months, and the prosecutor can 
authorize up to an additional 26 months of pretrial detention. However, 
over the year, the number of suspects detained for more than 6 months 
has decreased. According to administrative regulation, if a person was 
wrongly charged with a crime, the State will restore the person's 
rights and reputation and compensate him.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the courts are independent in practice, 
although corruption is a concern.
    The court system consists of local courts, provincial courts, and 
the Supreme Court. The 17-member Supreme Court is at the apex of the 
judicial system, hearing appeals from lower courts and cases involving 
alleged misconduct by high-level officials. Local courts hear mostly 
routine criminal and civil cases; provincial courts hear more serious 
cases such as rape, murder, and grand larceny and also serve as the 
appeals court for lower court decisions. The Constitutional Court, 
separate from the criminal court system, has sole jurisdiction over 
constitutional questions. The General Council of Courts, an 
administrative body within the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, 
nominates candidates for vacancies on both the Supreme and lower 
courts; the President has the power to approve or refuse such 
nominations. The Council also is charged with ensuring the rights of 
judges and providing for the independence of the judiciary. During the 
year, a human rights course became compulsory for the university law 
curriculum.
    All accused persons are provided due process, legal defense, and a 
public trial, although closed proceedings are permitted in cases 
involving state secrets, rape cases involving minors, and other cases 
provided by law. Defendants do not enjoy a presumption of innocence. 
Defendants may question witnesses and appeal decisions. There were few 
complaints about the legal system to the local office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), because most citizens still do 
not know about the organization. Complaints were usually about 
corruption in connection with civil and property cases that allegedly 
resulted in unfair court decisions. The UNHCHR staff referred these 
complaints to nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and the Ministry of 
Justice and Home Affairs.
    There were no reports of political prisoners. In a program that 
began in 1998, the State Rehabilitation Commission makes a one time 
payment to the families of those individuals who were persecuted from 
1922 through the 1960's. During the year, 1,901 persons received 
payments of from $500 to $1,000 (500,000 to 1 million tugrik) each 
under this program. More than 11,000 citizens were compensated in 1999.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that the State shall not 
interfere with the private beliefs and actions of citizens, and the 
Government generally respected these provisions in practice. The head 
of the GIA may, with the knowledge and consent of the Prime Minister, 
direct the monitoring and recording of telephone conversations. The 
extent of such monitoring is unknown. Police wiretaps must be approved 
by the Prosecutor's Office and are authorized for only 2 weeks at a 
time.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech, press, and expression, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice. An increasing variety of newspapers 
and other publications represent major political party viewpoints as 
well as independent views. The media law that went into effect in 1999 
bans censorship of public information and future legislation that would 
limit the freedom to publish and broadcast. This law also bars state 
ownership or financing of the media or media organizations. Nonetheless 
radio and television remain state-owned. The law took effect without 
agreement on regulations and procedures for the privatization of 
assets, and its implementation was difficult and controversial. Lack of 
access to information and of transparency in government continue to 
inhibit political dialog in the media, and led to media complaints.
    The new Government monitored all media for compliance with 
antiviolence, antipornography, antialcohol, and tax laws. While only 
two newspapers were closed as a result of the inspections, journalists 
saw it as an attempt at intimidation and control. The media practices 
self-censorship.
    All newspapers buy newsprint directly from private suppliers, and 
neither party-affiliated nor independent news media report difficulty 
securing an adequate supply. Due to transportation difficulties, uneven 
postal service, and fluctuations in the amount of newsprint available, 
access to a full range of publications is restricted in outlying 
regions.
    The court system places the burden of proof on the defendants in 
libel and slander cases, which stifles the free media.
    There are several television stations including a government-
financed television station with countrywide broadcasting capability, a 
limited-operation international joint venture private television 
channel, a private television station, which does not broadcast 
nationwide, a local television station controlled by the Ulaanbaatar 
mayor's office, and several radio stations in Ulaanbaatar. State-owned 
radio is particularly important as the major source of news in the 
countryside, but the one independent radio station broadcasts widely 
and there are an increasing number of small local FM stations. The 
media presents opposition and government news. Many residents of the 
country have access to television, and Ulaanbaatar residents receive 
broadcasts from China, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, the United States, and other countries by commercial satellite 
and cable television systems. An estimated 70 percent of households 
have television. The Internet is available, and there have been no 
government attempts to interfere with its use.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respected them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
conscience and religion, and the Government generally respected these 
provisions in practice; however, the law limits proselytizing, and some 
groups that sought to register have faced bureaucratic harassment. The 
Constitution explicitly recognizes the separation of church and state. 
The law regulating the relationship between church and state was passed 
in 1993 and amended in 1995. While the Ministry of Justice and Home 
Affairs is responsible for registrations, local assemblies have the 
authority to approve applications at the local level.
    Although there is no official state religion, traditionalists 
believe that Buddhism is the ``natural religion'' of the country. The 
Government has contributed to the restoration of several Buddhist 
sites. These are important religious, historical, and cultural centers. 
The Government does not subsidize the Buddhist religion otherwise.
    Under the provisions of the law, the Government may supervise and 
limit the numbers of both places of worship and clergy for organized 
religions, but there were no reports that it has done so. However, 
religious groups must register with the Ministry of Justice and Home 
Affairs. Some groups encountered harassment during the registration 
process, including random demands by midlevel city officials for 
financial contributions in return for securing legal status. Even when 
registration was completed, the same authorities threatened some 
religious groups with withdrawal of approval. The registration process 
is decentralized with several layers of bureaucracy, in which officials 
sometimes demand financial benefits in exchange for authorization. In 
addition registration in the capital may not be sufficient if a group 
intends to work in the countryside where local registration also is 
necessary. In general it appears that difficulties in registering 
primarily are the consequence of bureaucratic action by local officials 
and attempts to extort financial assistance for projects not funded by 
the city. Of the 260 temples and churches founded in the past 10 years, 
about 150 are registered, including 90 Buddhist, 40 Christian, and 4 
Baha'i, in addition to 1 Muslim mosque and other organizations.
    The law does not prohibit proselytizing, but limits it by 
forbidding use of incentives, pressure, or deceptive methods to 
introduce religion. With the opening of the country following the 1990 
democratic changes, religious groups began to arrive to provide 
humanitarian assistance and open new churches. Some friction between 
missionary groups and citizens developed because this assistance was 
mixed with proselytizing activities. Proselytizing by registered 
religious groups is allowed, although a Ministry of Education directive 
bans mixing foreign language or other training with religious teaching 
or instruction. The edict is enforced, particularly in the capital 
area. Contacts with coreligionists outside the country are allowed.
    There were no reports of religious detainees or prisoners. A report 
that in April a Christian in Bayan-Olgiy (a predominantly Muslim 
province) was imprisoned for distributing religious material was 
determined to be false.
    When draft amendments to the law that would have limited religious 
freedom were circulated by the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs in 
1999, religious organizations, human rights groups, and foreign 
diplomatic mission protested, and the Government did not pursue the 
amendments.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement within the country as well as the right to travel and return 
without restriction, and the Government generally respected these 
rights in practice. Due to unusually harsh winter weather and drought 
conditions, an increased number of persons sought shelter in the 
capital. The authorities responded by raising bureaucratic obstacles to 
qualify for residency and social benefits in the capital.
    The country is not a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Regarding 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and it has no laws for 
granting refugee status. The Constitution contains a provision that 
addresses political asylum, but there are no implementing regulations. 
The issue of granting of first asylum did not arise during the year.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. 
During the year, persons with a valid claim to refugee status were 
given safe passage to a third country. However, border control is 
governed by bilateral agreements, and some persons who were suspected 
of being illegal immigrants were denied entry.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government through periodic, free elections by secret ballot and 
universal suffrage. Presidential, parliamentary, and local elections 
are held separately. In July parliamentary elections brought the MPRP 
back into power. International observers deemed the elections generally 
free and fair, although there were some irregularities, and made 
recommendations to improve elections practices and procedures. The 
formation of the new Government highlighted constitutional questions 
concerning the President's relationship to Parliament and the 
Government, and the right of Members of Parliament to serve in the 
Government. Constitutional amendments meant to address these questions 
went into effect on July 15.
    There are 20 registered political parties; 3 are represented in the 
Parliament.
    Although there are no legal impediments to the participation of 
women or minorities in government and politics, women are 
underrepresented in government and politics. There are only 8 female 
members in the 76-member Parliament. There are no female ministers. 
Women and women's organizations are vocal in local and national 
politics and actively seek greater representation by women in 
government policymaking.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and 
responsive to their views. A human rights course is a requirement in 
the university law curriculum.
    In December Parliament passed legislation establishing a National 
Commission on Human Rights to receive complaints from both citizens and 
foreign residents. The Commission will consist of three senior civil 
servants nominated by the President, the Supreme Court, and the 
Parliament for terms of 6 years.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``no person shall be discriminated 
against on the basis of ethnic origin, language, race, age, sex, social 
origin, or status,'' and that ``men and women shall be equal in 
political, economic, social, cultural fields, and family.'' The 
Government generally enforced these provisions in practice.
    Women.--Rape and domestic abuse are illegal, and offenders can be 
prosecuted and corrected under assault laws after formal charges have 
been filed. There is no law specifically prohibiting spousal rape. 
Domestic violence against women is a serious problem. There are no 
reliable or exact statistics regarding the extent of such abuse but a 
wide range of qualified observers believe that it is common. After many 
years of government and societal denial, there is increasing public and 
media discussion of domestic violence, including spousal and child 
abuse. The large economic and societal changes underway have created 
new stresses on families, including loss of jobs, inflation, and 
lowered spending on social and educational programs. Some statistics 
show that over 70 percent of the cases of family abuse are related to 
alcohol abuse. The high rate of alcohol abuse has contributed to 
increased instances of family abuse and abandonment, and has added to 
the number of single-parent families, most of which are headed by 
women. Although women's groups advocate new statutes to cope with 
domestic violence, there is no known police or government intervention 
in cases involving violence against women beyond prosecution under 
existing assault laws after formal charges have been filed.
    The family law which went into effect in 1999 details rights and 
responsibilities regarding alimony and parents' rights, and is intended 
to bring about timely dispute settlement and avoid the causes of some 
domestic violence. The National Center Against Violence made progress 
in providing hot line services, shelters, and conducting training for 
police on how to deal with domestic violence cases and began to expand 
its work outside the capital.
    There are reports that some women and teens work in the sex trade 
in Asia and eastern Europe; an unknown number of them may have been 
trafficked (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    The Constitution provides men and women with equal rights in all 
areas and, both by law and in practice, women receive equal pay for 
equal work and have equal access to education. Women represent about 
half of the work force, and a significant number are the primary 
earners for their families. The law prohibits women from working in 
certain occupations that require heavy labor or exposure to chemicals 
that could affect infant and maternal health. The Government enforces 
these provisions. Many women occupy midlevel positions in government 
and the professions, and many are involved in the creation and 
management of new trading and manufacturing businesses.
    There is no separate government agency that oversees women's 
rights; however, there is a National Council to coordinate policy and 
women's interests among ministries and NGO's, and the Ministry of 
Social Welfare and Labor has added a Department for Women and Youth 
Issues. There are approximately 36 women's rights groups that concern 
themselves with such issues as maternal and child health, domestic 
violence and equal opportunity.
    Children.--Increased stress on the family structure and throughout 
society has had adverse effects on many children, and the Government 
has been unable to keep pace with the educational, health, and social 
needs of the most rapidly growing segment of its population, although 
it is committed to children's rights and welfare in principle. The 
Government provides children of both sexes with free, compulsory public 
education through the age of 16, although family economic needs and 
state budgetary difficulties make it difficult for some children to 
attend school. In addition there continues to be a severe shortage of 
teachers and teaching materials at all educational levels.
    The society has a long tradition of support for communal raising of 
children. The Government is more willing to admit the extent of the 
problem of orphaned children, but it lacks the resources to improve the 
welfare of children who have become the victims of larger societal and 
familial changes. NGO's continued to assist orphaned and abandoned 
children. Groups working in this field disagree on the number of street 
children; some report that the figure was 700 to 800, while others 
count all poor children who may or may not be homeless and estimate 
that it was as high as 3,000. Although evidence is limited, there are 
reports that female street children sometimes faced sexual abuse (see 
Section 6.d.). The Government provides only minimal support for the few 
shelters and orphanages that exist; those facilities must turn to 
private sources to sustain their activities.
    The family law, which took effect in 1999, stipulates the 
obligations regarding divorce, custody, and alimony to the benefit of 
the parent caring for children. It provides for more speedy resolution 
of divorce cases where the relevant agencies have determined that 
domestic violence is involved.
    There is growing awareness that child abuse, often associated with 
parental alcoholism, is a problem. In conjunction with efforts to 
counter violence against women, NGO's have begun to address the issue. 
The Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor has added a Department for 
Women and Youth Issues. Awareness of child labor as a problem is 
growing (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). The Government declared the year 
the Year of Supporting Child Development and established a National 
Committee for Children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment and education, and the Government 
provides benefits to the disabled according to the nature and severity 
of disability. Those who have been injured in industrial accidents have 
the right to be reemployed when ready to resume work. The Government 
also provides tax benefits to enterprises that hire the disabled, and 
some firms hire the disabled exclusively. There is no legislation 
mandating access for the disabled and, therefore, it is difficult for 
the disabled to participate fully in public life. Disabled citizens 
groups have demonstrated for higher government subsidies. Approximately 
30 NGO's participate in activities assisting the disabled.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution entitles all workers 
to form or join unions and professional organizations of their 
choosing. Union officials estimate that union membership dropped from 
450,000 persons in 1998 to 400,000 during the year, and was less than 
half of the workforce. Union membership decreased due to restructuring 
and privatization of former state enterprises and as increasing numbers 
of workers either became self-employed or began working at small, 
nonunionized firms. No arbitrary restrictions exist on who may be a 
union official; officers are elected by secret ballot.
    Union members have the right to strike. Those employed in essential 
services, which the Government defines as occupations critical for 
national defense and safety, including police, utility, and 
transportation workers, do not have the right to strike. During the 
year, there were approximately 50 strikes involving 4,500 workers.
    Most union members are affiliated with the Mongolian Trade Unions 
Confederation, but some are affiliated with the newer Association of 
Free Trades Unions. Both organizations have ties with international 
labor organizations and confederations in other countries.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor law, 
which went into effect in 1999, defines conditions and regulates 
relations between employers, employees, the trade unions, and the 
Government, making adjustments for the changes in the structure of the 
economy. The Government's role is limited to ensuring that the contract 
meets legal requirements as to hours and conditions of work. Wages and 
other employment issues are to be set between the employer, whether 
state or private, and the employee, with trade union input, if 
appropriate. The new labor law also streamlines the process for dealing 
with labor conflicts. The Labor Dispute Settlement Commission resolves 
disputes involving an individual; disputes involving groups are 
referred to intermediaries and arbitrators for reconciliation. If an 
employer fails to comply with a recommendation, employees may exercise 
their right to strike. The law protects the workers' right to 
participate in trade union activities without discrimination.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law specifically 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced labor by 
children; however, enforcement is intermittent. In November a foreign-
owned garment factory was discovered to be requiring employees to work 
14-hour shifts 7 days a week, deducting unreasonable sums from 
paychecks for miscellaneous expenses, and requiring 16- to 18-year-old 
workers to work excessive hours (see Section 6.d.). Some members of the 
military forces in rural areas are required to help with the fall 
harvest. In many cases, prisoners work to support the detention 
facility in which they are held, and detained alcohol abusers and petty 
criminals sometimes are required, as part of their sentences, to 
perform menial tasks such as street sweeping.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law in general prohibits children under the age of 16 
from working, although those who are 14 or 15 years of age may work up 
to 30 hours per week with parental consent. Those under 18 years of age 
may not work at night, engage in arduous work, or work in hazardous 
occupations such as mining and construction. Enforcement of these 
prohibitions, as well as all other labor regulations, is the 
responsibility of state labor inspectors assigned to regional and local 
offices. These inspectors have the authority to compel immediate 
compliance with labor legislation, but enforcement is limited due to 
the small number of labor inspectors and the growing number of 
independent enterprises. In November a foreign-owned garment factory 
was found to be employing 16- to 18-year-old workers for periods in 
excess of the legal limits (see Section 6.c.). Due to increasing 
economic pressures, there are indications that fewer children are 
staying in school until age 18, especially in the countryside. These 
children most often herd family animals, but reports of children 
working in factories or mining coal have increased. The Government 
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and generally attempts 
to enforce this prohibition (see Section 6.c.). Although evidence is 
limited, there are reports that female street children sometimes face 
sexual abuse (see Section 5). The Government is aware of this 
development and established a National Committee for Children to 
address this and other child welfare issues.
    In January the International Labor Organization (ILO) established a 
national office for the International Program on the Elimination of 
Child Labor. In October Parliament approved accession to the ILO 
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage 
established for the year is under $18 (18,000 tugrik) per month. The 
minimum wage alone is insufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. This level applies to both public and 
private sector workers and is enforced by the Ministry of Social 
Welfare and Labor. Virtually all civil servants earn more than this 
amount, and many in private businesses earn considerably more. Some 
employees receive housing benefits.
    The standard legal workweek is 40 hours, and there is a minimum 
rest period of 48 hours between workweeks. For those under 18 years of 
age, the workweek is 36 hours, and overtime work is not allowed. 
Overtime work is compensated at either double the standard hourly rate 
or by giving time off equal to the number of hours of overtime worked. 
Pregnant women and nursing mothers are prohibited by law from working 
overtime.
    Laws on labor, cooperatives, and enterprises set occupational 
health and safety standards, and the Ministry of Social Welfare and 
Labor provides enforcement. The near-total reliance on outmoded 
machinery and problems with maintenance and management lead to frequent 
industrial accidents, particularly in the mining, power, and 
construction sectors. Effective enforcement of occupational health and 
safety standards is inadequate; the labor monitoring unit's 86 
inspectors must inspect a growing number of enterprises throughout the 
country. According to the labor law, workers have the right to remove 
themselves from dangerous work situations and still retain their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit 
trafficking in persons, and there is evidence that Mongolian women and 
teenagers are working in the sex trade in Asia and Eastern Europe and 
may have been the victims of trafficking rings. The country is both a 
source and transit point for trafficking. The problem has attracted 
increased attention, and debate on its legal and social aspects is 
underway.
                               __________

                                 NAURU

    The Republic of Nauru, a small Pacific island with approximately 
10,500 inhabitants, gained independence in 1968, at which time it 
adopted a modified form of parliamentary democracy. Nauru has two 
levels of government, the unicameral Parliament and the Nauru Island 
Council (NIC). Parliamentary elections must be held at least 
triennially. The Parliament, consisting of 18 members from 14 
constituencies, is responsible for national and international matters. 
It elects the President, who is both Chief of State and Head of 
Government, from among its members. The NIC acts as the local 
government and is responsible for public services. The judiciary is 
independent.
    Nauru has no armed forces, although it does maintain a small police 
force (less than 100 members) under civilian control.
    The economy depends almost entirely on the country's declining 
phosphate deposits. Secondary reserves and residual mining may extend 
the productivity of its mines. The government-owned Nauru Phosphate 
Corporation (NPC) controls the mining industry. The Government places a 
large percentage of the NPC's earnings in long-term investments meant 
to support the citizenry after the phosphate reserves have been 
exhausted. The Governments of Nauru and Australia reached a $70.4 
million out-of-court settlement in 1993 for rehabilitation of the 
Nauruan lands damaged by Australian phosphate mining. Two new banks 
opened during the year. Media reports indicate that significant 
offshore deposits are associated with these new banking facilities. The 
Government is working with the Pacific Finance Technical Assistance 
Center (an International Monetary Fund facility based in Fiji) to 
update its banking regulations.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, police reportedly raided a televison station and 
confiscated a videotape in May. In the traditional culture, women 
occupy a subordinate role, with limits on their job opportunities.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits these practices, and the 
Government respects these prohibitions in practice.
    The Government attempts to provide internationally accepted minimum 
prison conditions within its limited financial means and in accordance 
with local living standards. However, prison conditions are basic, and 
food and sanitation are limited.
    There are no local human rights groups, and the question of visits 
to prisons by human rights monitors has not been raised. Visits by 
church groups and family members are permitted.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The constitutional 
prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention is honored. The 
police may hold a person for no more than 24 hours without a hearing 
before a magistrate.
    The Government does not practice forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent, and 
constitutional provisions for both a fair hearing and a public trial 
are respected. Defendants may have legal counsel, and a representative 
will be appointed when required ``in the interest of justice.'' 
However, many cases never reach the formal legal process, since 
traditional reconciliation is used--usually by choice but sometimes 
under communal (not government) pressure. Contract workers from 
Kiribati and Tuvalu are employed predominantly in the mining sector and 
do not have recourse to effective communal assistance; they are 
particularly at a disadvantage in complaints against citizens. There 
are only two trained lawyers, and many persons are represented in court 
by ``pleaders,'' trained paralegals certified by the Government.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution generally prohibits these abuses. 
Searches not sanctioned by court order are prohibited, and there is no 
surveillance of individuals or of private communications. Citizenship 
and inheritance rights are traced through the female line. Marriage 
between women and foreign males may still draw social censure. The law 
extends the right of citizenship--subject to approval by the NIC--to 
both male and female spouses, provided that marital and residency 
requirements are met.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression. News and opinion circulate freely, rapidly, and 
widely by the press and word of mouth. The country has no regular print 
media. Occasional publications include the government bulletin. The 
sole radio station is owned and operated by the Government; it 
broadcasts Radio Australia and British Broadcasting Corporation news 
reports. Local television includes Nauru TV, which is government owned, 
as well as a privately owned sports network. Police raided Nauru TV in 
May and confiscated a videotape of the vote in Parliament in which the 
President was elected. The country's Director of Media, an Australian 
national, departed the country soon afterward.
    There are no prohibitions or restrictions on academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice. No permits are required for public meetings, and there are no 
limitations on private associations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights for 
citizens, and the Government respects them in practice.
    Foreign workers must apply to their employers for permission to 
leave during the period of their contracts. They may break the contract 
and leave without permission but would lose their positions and often a 
sizable bond as a result. In most cases, foreign employees whose 
contracts are terminated by their employers must leave Nauru within 60 
days.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. No person in recent memory has applied for refugee 
status, and the Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding 
refugees, asylees, or first asylum.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have, and exercise, the right to change their government. 
Although there are no organized political parties, persons with diverse 
points of view run for and are elected to Parliament and to the NIC.
    Parliament elects the President. There was a change in government 
in April, the eighth change in government in the past 4 years. All the 
changeovers were peaceful and in accordance with the Constitution. 
Voting by secret ballot is compulsory for all citizens over the age of 
20 for parliamentary elections. There have been multiple candidates for 
all parliamentary seats during recent elections. The approximately 
3,000 guest workers have no voice in political decisions.
    There are no legal impediments to participation in politics by 
women; however women are underrepresented in government and politics. 
There are no female Members of Parliament.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no restrictions on establishing local groups that concern 
themselves specifically with human rights, but to date none has been 
formed. No allegations have been made by outside organizations of human 
rights violations in the country, nor have there been any requests for 
investigations.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Government policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, disability, language, or social status.
    Women.--The Government does not keep track of incidents of physical 
abuse against women. However, credible reports indicate that sporadic 
abuse, often aggravated by alcohol use, occurs. Families normally seek 
to reconcile such problems informally, and, if necessary, communally. 
The judiciary and the Government treat major incidents and unresolved 
family disputes seriously.
    Nauru law assures women the same freedoms and protections as men. 
The Government officially provides equal opportunities in education and 
employment, and women are free to own property and pursue private 
interests. However, in practice, societal pressures limit opportunities 
for women to exercise these rights fully. The Government has appointed 
a women's development officer to assist with the development of 
professional opportunities for women.
    Children.--The Government devotes considerable attention to the 
welfare of children, with particular stress on their health and 
educational needs. Education is compulsory until age 16. Child abuse 
statistics do not exist, but alcohol abuse sometimes leads to child 
neglect or abuse. The NIC treats child abuse as a serious communal 
matter. There were no reported cases of child abuse during the year.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no reported discrimination in 
employment, education, and the provision of state services to persons 
with disabilities. However, no legislation mandates access to public 
buildings and services for the disabled. The Government has assisted 
persons with disabilities by building access ramps to homes and 
workplaces and by purchasing office equipment adapted for persons with 
disabilities.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Nauruan Pacific island 
workers experience some discrimination. While guest workers are 
provided free housing, the shelters they are given often are maintained 
poorly and overcrowded. In the past, some guest workers alleged that 
the police rarely act on complaints they made against citizens.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of citizens to form and belong to trade unions or other 
associations. However, the country has virtually no labor laws, and 
there are no trade unions. Past efforts to form unions were discouraged 
officially. The transient nature of the mostly foreign work force and 
the relative prosperity of the citizenry also have served to hamper 
efforts to organize the labor force. The right to strike is neither 
protected, prohibited, nor limited by law. No strikes took place during 
the year. Nauru is not a member of the International Labor 
Organization. There are no prohibitions or limits on the right of 
unions to affiliate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While there are 
no legal impediments, collective bargaining does not take place. The 
private sector employs only about 1 percent of salaried workers. For 
government workers, public service regulations determine salaries, 
working hours, vacation periods, and other employment matters.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
forbids forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor 
by children, and the Government effectively enforces these 
prohibitions.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Education is compulsory until age 16; the law sets 17 as 
the minimum age of employment. The only two large employers, the 
Government and the NPC, honor this. Some children under the age of 17 
years work in the few, small, family-owned businesses. The Constitution 
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and the Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages exist for office 
workers and manual laborers and provide an adequate, if modest, 
standard of living. Most families live in simple but adequate housing, 
and almost every family owns some sort of motor vehicle. The Government 
sets the minimum yearly wage administratively for the public sector. 
Since November 1992, that rate has been $6,562 ($A9,056) for those 21 
years of age or older. The rate is progressively lower for those under 
21 years of age. Employers determine wages for foreign contract workers 
based on market conditions and the consumer price index. Usually 
foreign workers and their families receive free housing, utilities, 
medical treatment, and often a food allowance. Some noncitizen contract 
workers have complained about conditions in company living compounds. 
By regulation the workweek for office workers is 36 hours and for 
manual laborers 40 hours in both the public and private sectors. 
Neither law nor regulations stipulate a weekly rest period; however, 
most workers observe Saturdays and Sundays as holidays.
    The Government sets health and safety standards. The NPC has an 
active safety program that includes an emphasis on worker education and 
the use of safety equipment such as helmets, safety shoes, and dust 
respirators. The NPC has a safety officer who is specifically 
responsible for improving safety standards and compliance throughout 
the company.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically address 
trafficking; however, there were reports that Asian nationals were 
trafficked through the country en route to other destinations. The 
Government is investigating.
                               __________

                              NEW ZEALAND

    New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy, with executive authority 
vested in a 20-member cabinet led by the Prime Minister. The Governor-
General is Head of State. The 120member Parliament is elected in a 
mixed member proportional representation system, with 6 seats reserved 
for members of the native Maori population. The judiciary is 
independent.
    The police and defense forces are responsible to civilian officials 
and are firmly controlled by them.
    New Zealand is an efficient producer of agricultural products and 
an exporter of wool, meat, and dairy products. Tourism, forestry, 
fishing, and manufacturing recently have become significant economic 
sectors. Disparities in wealth are small but increasing. Government 
social programs offer substantial benefits to disadvantaged persons.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse. The Government has taken steps to 
address the problems of police abuse, overcrowded prisons, violence 
against women, and societal discrimination against the disabled, 
indigenous people, and Pacific islanders and Asians. Child abuse is a 
problem, and trafficking in persons is a small but growing problem.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of citizens 
living in its territories of Tokelau, Niue, and Cook Islands.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other forms of mistreatment, 
and the Government generally respects these prohibitions in practice.
    Police abuse declined slightly from 1999; however, there were 
instances of police abuse. During the year, 4.2 percent fewer 
complainants alleged misconduct by officers than during 199899. There 
were 11 cases of police misconduct that involved deaths, down from 21 
in 199798. In one such case, police in May fatally shot a Maori youth, 
leading public officials, including the Prime Minister, to urge better 
policeMaori relations. The officer, also of Maori descent, was found by 
an internal police investigation to have acted in selfdefense and was 
exonerated, which resulted in protest from the Maori community in the 
Taranaki region.
    Maori inmates constitute more than half the prison population, even 
though Maori are only 15 percent of the general population (see Section 
5). The Government sought to reduce the problem of Maori recidivism 
through Maori focus units, which integrate Maori values into the 
rehabilitation program.
    Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards; 
however, prison overcrowding is a significant and growing problem to 
which the Government is responding by building new prisons. As of 
September, the inmate population totaled 5,940, with prison bed 
capacity of about 6,000. The inmate population is projected to increase 
to about 6,040 by 2002. In September the female inmate population rose 
to over 320, exceeding the number of available beds in women's prisons. 
As a result, women were housed in men's prisons, and advocates for 
prison reform asserted that facilities for female inmates in those 
situations were inadequate. In 1999 the Government added 22 new beds 
for women at the main women's prison in Wellington. In July the new 
Auckland Central Remand Prison opened, with beds for 360 male inmates. 
Two other new prisons are scheduled to open in 2002 and 2003. 
Construction also began during the year to improve older prisons in 
Dunedin and Invercargill that would result in toilets replacing buckets 
at those prisons by mid2001.
    A highly publicized case of prisoner abuse was resolved in 
September when four inmates received substantial monetary compensation 
and an apology from the Government for an apparently isolated incident 
in 1993 in which they claimed that they were stripped and beaten in 
retaliation for attacking prison officers. A U.N. committee that 
considered the case stated that the prisoners were not tortured but 
that their treatment was cruel and degrading. Overall, assaults in 
prisons (mostly inmate on inmate) rose from 97 to 120 in 1999-2000; 
however, suicides declined from 8 to 6. Over 98 percent of prison 
officers are trained in suicide awareness.
    Special problems also exist concerning the treatment of youth 
offenders. As of 1998, 18 percent of the total inmate population was 
under the age of 20. Two special units for inmates under the age of 17 
and vulnerable 17 to 19-year-olds opened during the year. They offer a 
peer-based approach to transform behavior. In July the Government 
announced that it planned to build two new youth units and expand a 
third, increasing capacity for youth offenders by 142 beds by March 
2001.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes 
these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    There is an impartial judiciary, with the right of appeal to the 
Privy Council in London, UK, although this option rarely is invoked. 
Within the country, the Court of Appeal is the highest appellate court, 
and it determines appeals from the High Court, which has original 
jurisdiction for major crimes and important civil claims. The High 
Court also handles appeals from lower courts and reviews administrative 
actions. Remaining original jurisdiction rests with 110 judges of the 
district courts. Special courts include: The Employment Court; family 
courts; youth courts; Maori Land Court; Maori Appellate Court; and the 
Environment Court.
    The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and the judiciary 
implements this provision.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, and of academic freedom. There were no 
reported instances of restrictions of free speech as in 1999.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government provides first asylum and is a signatory to the 1951 
U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. Under its own refugee quota, the Government accepts up to 750 
UNHCR-approved refugees per year.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a 
valid claim to refugee status.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The law provides citizens with the right to change their government 
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage. Parliamentarians are elected under a mixed-member 
proportional representation system, and general elections were held in 
November 1999.
    Women and minorities are accorded full opportunity to participate 
in political life, but are underrepresented in government. In the 120-
member Parliament, 36 seats are held by women; 16 by Maori; 3 by 
members of Pacific Island origin; and 1 by a member of Asian heritage. 
The Executive Council has 26 ministers (20 within the Cabinet and 6 
outside the Cabinet) including 11 women (1 of whom is the Prime 
Minister), 4 Maori, and 1 Pacific Islander. The Cabinet has seven 
women, two Maori, and one Pacific Islander. The Prime Minister, the 
opposition leader, and the Chief Justice are women. In August Queen 
Elizabeth II of England, in her capacity as leader of the Commonwealth, 
appointed a new Governor General, also a woman, who is to take office 
in April 2001.
    Women are underrepresented in government in the dependent 
territories of the Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Niue. Of the 25 members 
of the Cook Islands Parliament, 2 are women. In Niue, 2 of 20 are 
women.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) operate without government restriction, 
investigating allegations and publishing their findings on human rights 
cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive to the views 
of these human rights groups. The Human Rights Commission, a U.N.-
accredited national human rights institution, investigates complaints 
of human rights violations and unlawful discrimination and acts as a 
conciliator. The Government also funds an independent race relations 
conciliator, who received complaints and acted as an ombudsman during 
the year.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1993 Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, religion, disability, and language, and the Government 
effectively enforces it.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem that affects all 
socioeconomic groups. A 1997 government-sponsored academic survey 
indicated that 1 woman in 7 living with a male partner was abused 
physically or sexually by the partner in the previous 12 months, and 1 
in 16 women were likely to be sexually assaulted each year. Publicity 
about domestic violence increased significantly after government 
ministers pressured a women's refuge coordinator in August not to 
publicize statistics about Maori spousal and child abuse rates. 
According to a 1994 Public Health Commission study, Maori women between 
the ages of 15 and 24 were 7 times more likely than non-Maori women to 
be hospitalized as a result of domestic assault. According to 
government statistics, in 1998 5,056 men were prosecuted for domestic 
assault, and about 1,000 more faced less serious family violence 
charges. Maori men constituted 41 percent of men convicted of 
assaulting a woman and 43 percent of men convicted of assaulting a 
child. Disproportionately high rates of domestic abuse also were 
documented among Pacific Islander families.
    The law penalizes spousal rape. The Government convicted persons on 
this charge during the year. The National Collective of Rape Crisis 
groups, a private, nonprofit organization, claimed in 1998 that the 
majority of cases go unreported each year and that, of the cases that 
are reported to the police, only 10 to 15 percent result in 
convictions. The group reported that husbands and boyfriends committed 
about 25 percent of all sexual assaults.
    The 1996 Domestic Violence Act broadened the definition of violence 
to include psychological abuse, threats, intimidation, harassment, and 
allowing children to witness psychological abuse. It expanded 
intervention measures, such as the use of protection orders; education 
programs for men, women, and children; stronger police powers to arrest 
and detain offenders; improved access to legal services for women 
eligible for legal aid; and tougher penalties for breach of a 
protection order. The family court received 22,174 applications for 
protection orders under the act from 1996 through 1997.
    The Government's strategy to prevent family violence included a 
range of objectives, such as providing victim support, incorporating 
successful innovations and proven methods from family violence centers 
into the national family violence programs (that is, the promotion of 
``best practice''), ensuring safety from violence, and implementing 
Maori-designed and delivered programs. The Government partially funded 
women's refuges, rape crisis centers, sexual abuse counseling, family 
violence networks, and violence prevention services.
    Prostitution is legal; however, organizing and recruiting women 
into prostitution is not. There were reports of abuse and the 
involuntary detention of women involved in prostitution during the year 
(see Section 6.f.). There were several credible reports that women were 
trafficked into the country and forced into prostitution (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    While the law prohibits discrimination in employment and in rates 
of pay for equal or similar work, the Government acknowledged that in 
practice a gender earnings gap persists. Statistics for the second 
quarter of the year showed that women earned 86 percent of men's 
average ordinary hourly wage, up from 84.8 percent in 1999.
    Children.--The law provides specific safeguards for children's 
rights and protection. The Government demonstrates its commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care.
    Child abuse gained significant attention during the year, 
especially after the deaths of three toddlers were linked to physical 
abuse. Publicity rose after a report by the Children's Commissioner 
blamed the 1999 death of a 4-year-old child on state agencies that had 
returned him to an abusive home. In July a toddler was killed and a 
second child suffered brain damage as a result of abuse by family 
members. In August caretakers were tried and convicted for the May 1999 
and January 2000 beating deaths of a 6-year-old and a 3-year-old child. 
During 1998 and 1999, Child, Youth, and Family Services confirmed 1,660 
cases of physical abuse, 1,375 cases of sexual abuse, and 1,414 cases 
of severe emotional abuse of children. Preliminary statistics for 1999 
and 2000 showed little change in the prevalence of abuse. In 1997, the 
most recent year for which statistics are available, 12 children under 
age 15 died in assaults, including 7 who died from child battering. The 
Government reported that Maori children are four times as likely as 
non-Maori children to require hospital care for injuries resulting from 
deliberate harm. In August the Government instituted an expanded 
program of information sharing between court and health and child 
protection agencies to identify children at risk of abuse. Under the 
program, notifications to childprotection agencies of at-risk children 
increased by 30 percent in the first month. Applications to Family 
Court under the Domestic Violence Act included protection of more than 
33,000 children.
    There are a small number of documented cases of female genital 
mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by international health 
experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health. FGM 
traditionally is not practiced in the country, but cases have been 
documented in the Somali, Sudanese, and Ethiopian immigrant 
communities. The influx of persons from countries where FGM is 
prevalent has slowed. It is illegal to perform FGM or to remove a child 
from the country to carry out the procedure. To address FGM, the 
Government sponsored public awareness campaigns, a child protection 
network, and a special clinic at the country's largest women's 
hospital.
    Incidents of trafficking in children for sexual purposes also were 
documented during the year. The Government works with the NGO, ECPAT 
NZ, to combat trafficking in children and to develop legislation that 
would criminalize trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against 
people with disabilities in employment, education, access to places and 
facilities and the provision of goods, services, and accommodation. 
Compliance with access laws, mandated by the Human Rights Act and the 
Disabled Persons Community Welfare Act, varies as business owners and 
others strive to make necessary adaptations. The Government has not 
complied fully with equal access laws prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of disability in areas such as public transportation and public 
accommodation. In 1999 the Government granted itself a partial 
exemption from sections of the Human Rights Act that concern physical 
disability. The Government must comply by December 31, 2001 with laws 
and regulations relating to discrimination based on physical 
disability. The Human Rights Commission reported during the year that 
it received more complaints of discrimination based on disability than 
any other type of discrimination. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) criticized the Government for not collecting adequate data on the 
employment of the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--Approximately 15 percent of the population 
claim at least one ancestor from the country's indigenous Maori or 
Moriori minorities. While the law prohibits discrimination against the 
indigenous population, the Government's Closing the Gaps report, 
released in May, noted the continuing disproportionate number of Maori 
included on the unemployment and welfare rolls, among the prison 
population, among school dropouts, in infant mortality statistics, and 
among single-parent households. For example, the official Maori 
unemployment rate (19 percent) is over three times that for nonMaori. 
Maori officials expressed concern over the Government's announcement in 
November that it would shift its Closing the Gaps strategy to address 
socio-economic disparities rather than race-based disparities. Maori 
inmates constitute more than half the prison population, even though 
Maori are only 15 percent of the general population. The Government 
addressed this problem through Maori focus units, which integrate Maori 
values into the rehabilitation program. A special program for Maori sex 
offenders, Kia Marama, halved the rate of recidivism among those who 
participated.
    Government policy recognizes a special role for indigenous people 
and their traditional values and customs, including cultural and 
environmental issues that have an effect on commercial development. The 
Ministry of Maori Development, in cooperation with several Maori NGO's, 
seeks to improve the status of indigenous people. A special tribunal 
continues to hear Maori tribal claims to land and other natural 
resources stemming from the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Pacific Islanders, who make up 
5 percent of the population, are not an indigenous people, but they 
experience difficulties similar to Maori. Asians, who make up under 5 
percent of the population, also experience discrimination. In August a 
citizen of Western ancestry was convicted of manslaughter for stabbing 
her Cambodian neighbor over 150 times. The judge ordered the lengthiest 
permissible sentence because of evidence that the killing was racially 
motivated. Pacific Islanders also are overrepresented in the prison 
system. They comprise only 5 percent of the general population but 
account for 10 percent of inmates.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to establish 
and join organizations of their own choosing. The principal labor 
organization is the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, a federation 
that includes unions representing various trades and locations. During 
the year, the Council of Trade Unions merged with the second-largest 
labor federation, the New Zealand Trade Union Federation. As a result, 
nearly all unionized workers are members of the Council of Trade 
Unions. A few small, independent labor unions also exist.
    Labor organization is rudimentary in the territory of Tokelau 
(population 1,500) and in the Freely Associated State of Niue 
(population 1,700). In the more developed Associated State of the Cook 
Islands (population 19,000), most workers in the public sector, the 
major employer, belong to the Cook Islands Workers' Association, an 
independent local union inspired by New Zealand models. Industrial 
relations in the Cook Islands are governed by a simplified version of 
older national legislation.
    The law protects unions from governmental interference, suspension, 
and dissolution. Unions do influence legislation and government policy. 
Some unions are affiliated with the Labor Party; others operate 
independently of political parties; all are free to support parties 
whose policies they favor. Unions often exercise the right to strike. 
Significant limitations on the right to strike were eliminated when the 
Employment Relations Act (ERA) replaced the Employment Contracts Act in 
October; unions are not limited to strikes related to the negotiation 
of a collective contract and can strike in pursuit of multiemployer 
contracts across an entire economic sector.
    In the 12 months that ended in June there were 31 work stoppages, 
involving approximately 10,400 workers and the loss of approximately 
$1.9 million ($NZ 4.6 million) in wages and salaries.
    Under the Police Act of 1958 and amendments, ``sworn police 
officers,'' that is, all uniformed and plainclothes police but 
excluding clerical and support staff, are barred from striking or 
taking any form of industrial action. However, police have freedom of 
association and the right to organize and to bargain collectively. 
Disputes that cannot be settled by negotiation between the Police 
Association and management are subject to compulsory, final-offer 
arbitration.
    The Freedom of Association Committee of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) ruled in 1994 that the Employment Contracts Act of 
1991 does not promote collective bargaining and limits the right of 
freedom of association and the right to strike in a manner inconsistent 
with ILO conventions. The Government contends that the ERA, which 
replaced the Employment Contracts Act in October, is consistent with 
ILO conventions. Discussions with the ILO to confirm this understanding 
were in progress at year's end. Sympathy strikes, secondary strikes, 
and strikes over social or political causes are illegal. In June a 
brief strike was staged by the Council on Trade Unions that expressed 
political solidarity with Fijian unionists in reaction to the overthrow 
of the government of Fiji. The Minister of Labor, who also is the 
Attorney General, did not take any enforcement action against the 
strikers or the Council.
    Unions may affiliate internationally. The New Zealand Council of 
Trade Unions is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right of workers to organize and contract 
collectively, and this right is observed in practice. During the year, 
the Government changed the law governing industrial relations 
significantly. It repealed the Employment Contracts Act of 1991 and 
replaced it with the Employment Relations Act (ERA) on October 2. The 
ERA promotes collective bargaining, strengthens unions, and requires 
that parties to an employment agreement bargain in good faith to 
achieve either a collective or individual employment agreement. The act 
also promotes mediation and attempts to reduce the need for judicial 
intervention. The law prohibits uniformed members of the armed forces 
from organizing unions and bargaining collectively.
    Unions represent fewer than 20 percent of all wage earners. Under 
the ERA, employment relationships are based on contracts. Individual 
employees and employers may choose to conduct negotiations for 
employment contracts on their own behalf, or they may authorize any 
other person or organization to do so on their behalf. Although 
choosing a union is entirely voluntary, unions have remained the most 
common agents used by workers to negotiate with employers. Employers 
must recognize a representative authorized by an employee or employees.
    The Government does not control mediation and arbitration 
procedures. The ERA strongly encourages mediation, and requires that 
the majority of employment disputes first proceed through mediation. It 
also establishes a Employment Relations Authority as an investigative 
body to establish the facts of an employment relationship dispute and 
to make a determination according to the merits of the case. The 
Authority replaces the previous Employment Tribunal. An employment 
court remains, with exclusive jurisdiction over employment matters. 
Appeals from the employment court to the court of appeal are possible. 
Firing an employee for union activities is grounds for a finding of 
unjustified dismissal and may result in reinstatement and financial 
compensation.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by 
children; however, trafficking in women and children is a problem. 
Inspection and legal penalties ensure respect for the provisions. There 
were reports of the involuntary detention of women involved in 
prostitution, and the trafficking of women for prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.). In April the Government convicted and fined the 
operators of a factory in Auckland in which workers had been exploited; 
seven Thai women escaped slave labor conditions in October 1999 (see 
Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and 
enforces this prohibition effectively; however, trafficking in children 
is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Department of Labor 
inspectors effectively enforce a ban on the employment of children 
under the age of 15 years in manufacturing, mining, and forestry. 
Children under the age of 16 may not work between the hours of 10 p.m. 
and 6 a.m. In addition to explicit restrictions on the employment of 
children, compulsory education ensures that children under the minimum 
age for leaving school (16 years) are not employed during school hours. 
By law children enrolled in school may not be employed, even outside 
school hours, if such employment would interfere with their education.
    The Government announced that it would ratify ILO Convention 182 
but did not define the worst forms of child labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law provides for a minimum 
3-week annual paid vacation and 11 paid public holidays. A 40-hour 
workweek is traditional. While the law does not provide specifically 
for a 24-hour rest period weekly, management and labor accept the 
practice, and it is the norm. The government-mandated hourly minimum 
wage of approximately $3.20 ($NZ 7.55) applies to workers 20 years of 
age and older. Combined with other regularly provided entitlements and 
welfare benefits for low-income earners, this wage generally is 
adequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. The minimum wage for younger workers is 60 percent of the adult 
minimum. A majority of the work force earns more than the minimum wage. 
The current youth minimum wage of approximately $1.90 ($NZ 4.55) 
applies to workers of ages 16 to 19. In December the Government 
announced minimum wage increases that would take effect in March 2001.
    An extensive body of law and regulations govern health and safety 
issues, notably the 1992 Health and Safety in Employment Act. Under 
this legislation, employers are obliged to provide a safe and healthy 
work environment, and employees are responsible for their own safety 
and health as well as ensuring that their actions do not harm others. 
As a result of union criticism, the act is under review by Parliament. 
Workers have the legal right to strike over health and safety issues. 
Unions, and members of the general public may file safety complaints on 
behalf of workers. Department of Labor inspectors enforce safety and 
health rules, and they have the power to shut down equipment if 
necessary. The Department of Labor standard is to investigate reports 
of unsafe or unhealthy working conditions within 24 hours of 
notification. Workers have the right to withdraw from a dangerous work 
situation without jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not address trafficking in 
persons specifically, and the applicable related crime, aiding and 
abetting the breach of immigration regulations carries relatively light 
penalties; however, prostitution is legal. Laws against child sexual 
exploitation and slavery carry penalties of up to 14 years in prison 
and recently have been used to prosecute citizens employing foreign 
prostitutes.
    Incidents of trafficking in children for sexual purposes also were 
documented during the year. The Government is working to develop 
legislation to criminalize trafficking and works with an NGO, ECPAT NZ, 
to combat trafficking in children, and a coalition in Auckland was 
established to provide information to persons at risk of being 
trafficked into the country. (see Section 5).
    Trafficking in women and children (particularly from Thailand) to 
work in the sex industry is a small but growing problem. There were 
several credible reports that women were trafficked into the country 
during the year. Domestic NGO's and the Human Rights Commission 
assisted six Thai women in repatriating to Thailand after they escaped 
forced work in the sex industry. One of the women sued in New Zealand 
to recover money that she had paid to traffickers; she claimed that the 
defendants had advertised the work as catering or agriculture. In 
October 1999, seven Thai women were freed from slave labor conditions 
in an Auckland factory (see Section 6.c.).
                               __________

                                 PALAU

    Palau, an archipelago of more than 300 islands in the Western 
Pacific with a population of approximately 18,500 that formerly was a 
U.N. trusteeship administered by the United States, became an 
independent nation in free association with the United States on 
October 1, 1994. The democratically elected government is modeled after 
that of the United States. The Constitution provides for free and fair 
elections, and executive and legislative branches. The legislature, the 
Olbiil Era Kelulau, is composed of two equal houses, the 9-member 
Senate and the 16-member House of Delegates. The country is organized 
politically into 16 states. The judiciary is independent.
    Palau has no security forces other than local police and civilian 
law enforcement personnel, all are under the firm control of civil 
authorities. Palau also has a Marine Law Enforcement Division that 
patrols its borders with assistance from the Australian Government. 
Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is responsible 
for the Republic of Palau's defense.
    With per capita gross domestic product of $7,510, Palau is a medium 
income country with a small, market-based economy largely sustained by 
transfer payments from the United States. The Government employs nearly 
half of the work force. Tourism and other service sectors account for 
most other paid employment. Tuna, harvested by foreign-operated fleets, 
is the dominant export. Several small-scale operations, employing 
foreign workers, assemble clothing from imported materials for export. 
Traditional subsistence agriculture and fishing is diminishing as 
people move to the city in search of employment. Also an increasing 
number of Chinese farmers operate vegetable farms that compete with 
indigenous farmers; most indigenous farmers work and sell what they 
produce from their own land.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Traditional 
customs sustain a value system that discriminates between persons on 
the basis of social status and sex. The loosening ties of the extended 
family and the increasing abuse of alcohol and other drugs are major 
contributing factors that lead to instances of domestic violence and 
child neglect. Societal discrimination against certain foreign workers, 
who account for nearly 30 percent of the population and 46 percent of 
the paid work force, is also a serious problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The judiciary comprises the Supreme Court, the National Court, and 
the Court of Common Pleas. The President appoints judges to the Supreme 
Court and National Court from a list recommended by the Judicial 
Nominating Commission. Appointments are for life.
    The Government has an independent special prosecutor and an 
independent public defender system. The Constitution provides for the 
right to a fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces 
this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees, 
asylees, or first asylum, and government practice remains undefined. 
However, there were no reports of the forced expulsion of anyone having 
a valid claim to refugee status.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    There are no legal impediments to women participating in government 
and politics; however, women are severely underrepresented in 
government. As a result of the 1996 general elections, a woman gained a 
Senate seat for the first time. Women hold office in 10 of the 16 state 
legislatures, where they constitute 7 percent of the membership.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government has a history of openness to a variety of human 
rights groups without restriction. Government officials have met with 
representatives of these groups and foreign officials regarding the 
civil rights of foreign minority workers. Government officials 
generally are cooperative and responsive to their views. The Palau Red 
Cross Society opened its office in 1996; having satisfied all 
requirements, the Society has applications pending for full membership 
in the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, 
race, place of origin, language, religion or belief, social status, or 
clan affiliation, and the Government generally respects these 
provisions.
    Women.--There are occasional incidents of violence against women, 
mainly domestic abuse. Alcohol and other drug abuse increasingly 
contribute to this problem. According to the Attorney General's office, 
the Government's Public Health Office, and women's groups, only a few 
such cases are reported to the authorities every year, but many more 
are believed to be unreported. Although assault is a criminal offense, 
women are reluctant to prosecute their spouses.
    The inheritance of property and of traditional rank is matrilineal, 
with women occupying positions of importance within the traditional 
system. Women serve by presidential appointment as bureau directors for 
women's interests, human resources, and clinical services. There were 
no reported instances of unequal pay for equal work or sex-related job 
discrimination.
    In 1993 local women's groups organized an annual women's conference 
that focuses on women's and children's issues including health, 
education, drug abuse, prostitution, and traditional customs and 
values. Each year government officials including the President, Vice 
President, ministers, and traditional chiefs have participated in the 
conference to discuss these issues. Women's group leaders and 
government officials agree that changes are needed to improve the 
country's educational system and to reduce drug use among youth.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. There is no societal pattern of abuse 
directed against children. Child prostitution is neither accepted 
within the culture nor practiced. There is no difference in the 
treatment of girls and boys in educational opportunities, or in the 
availability of scholarships to attend postsecondary education abroad. 
Girls and boys receive equal treatment in health care services.
    Child abuse is thought to be uncommon, and there have been few 
child abuse prosecutions. While children's rights generally are 
respected, there were reports of several instances of child neglect, 
which is a byproduct of the breakdown of the extended family.
    Government officials and representatives from nongovernmental 
organizations agree that changes are needed to improve the educational 
system and to reduce drug abuse among youth.
    People with Disabilities.--The National Code includes a Disabled 
Persons Antidiscrimination Act and a Handicapped Children Act. No 
instances of discrimination against the disabled were reported. In 1998 
a law requiring building access for the disabled was passed. The public 
schools have established special education programs to address problems 
encountered by those with disabilities.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Palauans are prohibited 
from purchasing land or obtaining citizenship. The rapid increase in 
the number of foreign workers, who now constitute nearly 30 percent of 
the population and 46 percent of the work force, is viewed negatively 
by a majority of citizens. Foreign residents are subject to some forms 
of discrimination and are targets of petty, and sometimes violent, 
crimes, as well as other random acts against person and property. 
Credible complaints are made by foreign residents that crimes against 
non-Palauans are not pursued or persecuted by authorities with the same 
vigor as crimes against citizens. Certain foreign nationals experience 
generalized discrimination in employment, pay, housing, education, and 
access to social services, although such discrimination is prohibited 
by law. While precise data is lacking, there continue to be anecdotal 
reports about abuse of workers' civil rights perpetrated against 
domestic helpers, bar girls, construction laborers, and other 
semiskilled workers, the majority of whom are from the Philippines, 
China, and Bangladesh. The most common abuses identified are 
misrepresentation of contract terms and conditions of employment, 
withholding of pay or benefits, and, sometimes, physical abuse. In a 
number of instances, local authorities have taken corrective action 
when alerted by social service and religious organizations to which 
foreign workers have turned for assistance. Nonetheless, foreign 
workers often are reluctant to seek legal redress for fear of losing 
their employment and, thus, permission to remain in the country.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of all persons to assemble peacefully or to associate with others 
for any lawful purpose, including the right to organize and to bargain 
collectively. There are no active employee organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution does not provide for the right to strike, and the 
Government has not addressed this issue. There is no legislation 
concerning collective bargaining or trade union organizations, although 
there are no legal impediments to either. Wages in the cash economy are 
determined by market factors.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude except to punish crime. The 
law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, 
but such practices are not known to occur. Instances were reported of 
foreign workers, especially domestic helpers and unskilled laborers, 
who were forced to do jobs different from those for which they were 
recruited. The freedom of foreign workers to leave employment 
situations not to their liking may be hindered by physical barriers or 
the withholding of passports and return tickets to their country of 
recruitment.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution states that the Government shall protect 
children from exploitation, and children are protected by the general 
constitutional prohibition against forced and bonded labor (see Section 
6.c.). There is no minimum age for employment. Children typically are 
not employed in the wage economy, but some assist their families with 
fishing, agriculture, and other small-scale family enterprises. The law 
requires compulsory education for children between 6 and 17 years of 
age, and the Government generally enforces this law. By regulation no 
foreigner under the age of 21 may be admitted into the country for 
employment purposes.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In July 1998, Palau passed its 
first minimum wage law. The law sets the minimum wage at $2.50 per 
hour, effective January 1; foreign workers are exempt from the minimum 
wage law. This amount appears to be sufficient, given the level of 
economic development, to provide a worker and his family with a decent 
standard of living. Anecdotal evidence indicates that unskilled workers 
for commercial firms are paid only $1.50 to $2.00 per hour. However, 
foreign workers usually are provided, in addition to their wages, with 
basic accommodations and food at no or nominal cost. Although these 
wages are low, the country continues to attract large numbers of 
foreign workers from the Philippines, China, and Bangladesh. There are 
more than 6,000 foreign nationals with work permits in the country, 
two-thirds from the Philippines. Philippine-based illegal recruiters 
who falsified the workers' documents recruited a majority of the 
workers from the Philippines. These falsified documents eventually lead 
to problems between employers and employees. In 1998 the Philippines 
opened an embassy in Koror and informed the Government and the public 
about the Philippine Government recruiting office with responsibility 
for overseeing Philippine workers overseas and issuing overseas working 
permits. The Embassy has been working closely with the Government's 
Labor Division to resolve the problems created by the falsified 
documents, and has interceded in several cases involving allegations of 
worker abuse during the year, and also has assisted in the repatriation 
of several workers.
    As the number of foreign workers increases, there continue to be 
increasing numbers of reports of mistreatment of such workers by their 
employers. These incidents of alleged mistreatment are common knowledge 
among the general public but rarely are reported to law enforcement 
authorities by the foreign workers themselves due to fear of their 
employers. Some types of mistreatment that foreign workers consistently 
complain about are: Physical and verbal abuse; working overtime and on 
days off without pay; withholding monthly salary; deductions from 
salary for the amount of airfare; and substandard housing. Some workers 
also complained that they are not given enough food. The foreign 
workers most likely to be abused are those who work under contracts and 
earn between $100 and $300 a month as domestic helpers, construction 
workers, farmers, waitresses, beauticians, and hostesses in karaoke 
bars and massage parlors. Under the terms of their contracts, they also 
are to be provided room and board and air travel from their home 
country to Palau and back after the termination of their contracts. It 
generally is assumed that legislators specifically exempted contract 
workers in the 1998 minimum wage bill to ensure a continued supply of 
low cost labor in industries that the legislators often control.
    There is no legislation concerning maximum hours of work, although 
most businesses are closed on either Saturday or Sunday. The Division 
of Labor has established some regulations regarding conditions of 
employment for nonresident workers. The Division may inspect the 
conditions of the workplace and employer-provided housing on specific 
complaint of the employees, but actual enforcement is sporadic; working 
conditions vary in practice. No legislation specifically gives workers 
the right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their 
health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment, and no 
legislation protects workers who file complaints about such conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits trafficking 
in persons, and there are no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                            PAPUA NEW GUINEA

    Papua New Guinea (PNG), which comprises some 1,000 tribes and over 
800 distinct languages in a population of about 4 million, has a 
federal parliamentary system, based on universal adult suffrage with 
periodic free and fair elections. The judiciary is independent.
    The Government has constitutional authority over the Defense Force 
(PNGDF), the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), and 
intelligence organizations. Members of the police force committed 
serious human rights abuses.
    The economy relies heavily on the export of minerals, hydrocarbons, 
tropical timber, and tree crops such as coffee, cocoa, and copra, and 
is sensitive to changes in world commodity prices. During the year, the 
national currency, the PNG kina, strengthened due in part to the 
Government's economic reforms. Later in the year, slack commodity 
prices and rising fuel costs undermined the kina's external value and 
slowed economic growth. Poor performance by the public health and 
education systems are among the country's most important challenges. 
Crime, especially in urban areas, is a growing problem. Approximately 
85 percent of the population resides in isolated villages and engages 
in subsistence and smallholder agriculture. For a majority of citizens, 
income and educational levels are low and infant and maternal mortality 
rates are high.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Police 
committed extrajudicial killings, beat suspects, and engaged in 
excessively punitive and violent raids. The Government on occasion 
investigated allegations of abuse and prosecuted those believed 
responsible. Prison conditions in several areas continued to be poor. 
Court understaffing reduced court sittings and increased pretrial 
detention periods for many persons. Police infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights. The Government continued to limit freedom of assembly 
in the form of marches or demonstrations, and imposed some restrictions 
on freedom of movement. Extensive violence and discrimination against 
women are problems, and abuse of children appears to be growing. 
Discrimination against the disabled persists, and violence between 
tribes remains a serious problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Several instances of 
killing by police were reported during the year. According to police 
reports, most occurred during gunfights with criminal suspects who were 
resisting arrest. However, in at least one case in Port Moresby, police 
beat a youth to death in front of bystanders. In another Port Moresby 
case, police apprehended an intoxicated man, and his corpse 
subsequently was discovered in an isolated area.
    All police shootings are investigated by the police department's 
internal affairs office and reviewed by a coroner's court. If the court 
finds that the shooting was unjustifiable or due to negligence, the 
police officers involved are tried. Families of persons killed or 
injured by police in such circumstances also may challenge the 
coroner's finding in the National Court, with the assistance of the 
Public Solicitor's Office. Cases of accidental shootings of bystanders 
by police during police operations also are investigated and reviewed 
by a coroner's court.
    No human right violations were reported in connection with military 
operations during the year. However, although four soldiers suspected 
of complicity in the killing of Bougainville Transitional Government 
Premier Theodore Miriung in 1996 were questioned by police in 1999, no 
arrests were made and no further progress has been reported.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and other cruel or 
degrading treatment or punishment; however, police often beat suspects 
during arrests and allowed members of the public to beat suspects as 
well. During the year, policemen in various localities were charged 
with raping female detainees.
    Prison conditions are poor. The prison system suffers from serious 
underfunding, which results in the deterioration of infrastructure and 
poor delivery of services. Three prisons in which conditions previously 
were described as ``life threatening'' remained closed because of 
unsanitary conditions; prisoners in some of those areas are confined in 
crowded conditions in police stations. Some prisons, particularly those 
in urban areas, are seriously overcrowded. Prison guards' living 
conditions are as poor as those of the prisoners. During the year, 
there were several prison escapes. Overcrowding is exacerbated in rural 
areas by infrequent court sessions and bail restrictions for certain 
crimes (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The courts generally 
enforce constitutional protections against arbitrary arrest and 
detention. In 1994 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional portions of 
the 1993 Internal Security Act which were inconsistent with due process 
provisions of the Constitution. Under 1993 amendments to the Bail Act 
and the Criminal Code, only National or Supreme Court judges may grant 
bail to persons charged with willful murder or aggravated robbery. In 
all other cases, the police or magistrates may grant bail. Suspects who 
are arrested have the right to legal counsel, to be informed of the 
charges against them, and to have their arrests subjected to judicial 
review.
    Due to limited police and judicial resources and a high crime rate, 
suspects often are held in pretrial detention for a long time, 
particularly in rural areas. Pretrial remand is subject to strict 
judicial review through continuing pretrial consultations, especially 
at the National Court level. However, cases frequently are delayed for 
months awaiting results of police investigations. Additionally circuit 
court sittings were infrequent because of a shortage of judges and 
budget difficulties, delaying both the trial process and the rendering 
of decisions. Some detainees have been held in jail for as long as 2 
years because of the shortage of judges. An increase in the number of 
full-time judges, which was granted in September, is expected to 
improve the situation.
    After Parliament named Sir Mekere Morauta Prime Minister in July 
1999, government departments issued orders preventing foreign advisers 
to the former government from leaving the country. To date the 
authorities have shown no legal basis for these actions, and they were 
dropped after court reviews.
    Exile is prohibited by the Constitution and is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the courts are independent of executive, 
legislative, and military authorities.
    The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal and has original 
jurisdiction on constitutional matters. The National Court hears most 
cases and appeals from the lower district courts established at the 
provincial level. There are also village courts headed by lay persons, 
who judge minor offenses under both customary and statutory law.
    The legal system is based on English common law. The Constitution 
provides for due process, including a public trial, and the court 
system generally enforces these provisions. Defendants have the right 
to an attorney. Legal counsel is provided by the Public Solicitor's 
office for those accused of ``serious offenses'' who are unable to 
afford counsel. Serious offenses are defined as charges for which a 
sentence of 2 years or more is the norm. Defendants and their attorneys 
may confront witnesses, present evidence, plead cases, and appeal 
convictions. The shortage of judges creates delays both in the process 
of trials and in the rendering of decisions (see Section 1.d.).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The authorities generally respect citizens' privacy 
rights, although there were instances of abuse, such as police 
destruction of property in May (see Section 1.c.). In January a large 
force of heavily armed police searched the home of a man accused of a 
nonviolent offense. He protested to the court that the search 
procedures were politically inspired. The court agreed and found police 
methods excessive and contrary to constitutional protections of 
privacy.
    Although provisions in the Constitution require warrants, the 
police continued to conduct warrantless searches and raids.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for free 
speech, including freedom of the media, and the Government generally 
respects these freedoms in practice.
    The media provided independent coverage and analysis of major 
issues, including accusations of corruption and immoral behavior 
directed at leading political figures.
    The combined circulation of 2 daily English-language newspapers is 
less than 60,000. Two weekly newspapers, one in English and one in 
Pidgin (the national lingua franca), also are published. All freely 
express a variety of editorial viewpoints and report on controversial 
issues such as alleged abuses by police and security forces, cases of 
alleged corruption by government officials, and political opposition 
views. A Malaysian firm, which has invested heavily in the country's 
timber industry, owns one of the dailies; the newspaper publishes 
little on the controversial subjects of logging and forestry, but it is 
generally independent and unbiased on other issues.
    The television broadcasting company, EM-TV, is independent. 
Television reception is limited mostly to the capital and provincial 
centers. The government-owned National Broadcasting Corporation owns 
two radio networks whose effectiveness is limited by inadequate funding 
and deteriorating equipment. A privately owned radio network, NAU-FM, 
is popular in Port Moresby and is expanding to other areas of the 
country.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government limits this 
right in practice. Public demonstrations require police approval and 
14-days' notice. Police assert that they fear violence from unruly 
spectators and rarely give approval.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. Associations that 
wish to open a bank account and conduct financial transactions are 
required to register for this purpose. The process of registration may 
be slowed by bureaucratic inefficiency, but there is no policy of 
denying registration. International affiliation of church and civic 
groups is permitted freely.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government usually does not restrict 
freedom of movement within and outside the country. However, after 
taking office in 1999, the present Government, with no legal basis, 
prevented foreigners engaged as advisers by the previous government 
from leaving the country (see Section 1.d.). A reservation to the 1951 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees regarding the 
issuance of travel documents restricted the travel of some Irian Jayans 
residing in a refugee camp in the western part of the country.
    Movement within Bougainville is free for all groups. Internally 
displaced persons are free to return to their homes, and virtually all 
have done so. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), there are very few persons who meet the criteria for refugee 
status. The Solomon Islands Red Cross reports that other 
Bougainvillians who sheltered there have been returning home and none 
remained under its care. Those remaining are employed professionals. 
The Government negotiated agreements with the Government of the Solomon 
Islands to establish the means for traditional border crossers in 
southern Bougainville and the northern Solomon Islands to pass easily 
between the two countries.
    Although a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government has not enacted 
enabling legislation. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR, and has 
not forced any persons to return to countries where they feared 
persecution. The Government provides first asylum for approximately 
3,500 persons who fled from the neighboring Indonesian province of 
Irian Jaya (also known as Papua or West Papua). An equal number reside 
in informal, unrecognized camps adjacent to the border with Indonesia. 
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR in assisting the Irian Jayans 
who live in the East Awin refugee camp in Western Province and has 
administered the camp since 1996, when the UNHCR office closed. The 
UNHCR began to reduce the scale of its operations in Western Province 
in 1999 and coordinates the voluntary return of refugees to their homes 
in Irian Jaya. However, late in the year there was an upsurge in the 
number of border crossers coming from Irian Jaya. The Government has a 
policy of limited integration for Irian Jayans with certain skills or 
other qualifications, who are accorded limited residency status and are 
permitted to leave the refugee settlement. During 1999 the Government 
distributed over 1,500 permissive residency certificates to Irian Jaya 
refugees. Irian Jayans who chose not to apply for permissive residency 
returned to Indonesia on a voluntary basis under the supervision of the 
Government and the UNHCR. Those who violate conditions of their 
residency can be repatriated. There were no known forced repatriations 
of Irian Jayans to Indonesia. Several thousand traditional border 
crossers live in the border area and move freely between the two 
countries. According to the UNHCR, 171 Irian Jayans from the East Awin 
refugee camp were repatriated to Indonesia's Irian Jaya Province under 
UNHCR auspices.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens freely exercise their right to change the government 
through direct elections with a secret ballot and universal adult 
suffrage. Voters elect a unicameral parliament with 109 members from 
all 19 provinces and the National Capital District. Any citizen can 
stand for election. Because of the high number of candidates for 
Parliament, some members have won election with less than 10 percent of 
the total votes cast.
    The most recent general election was held in June 1997. Of the 109 
seats in Parliament, 55 seats changed hands. A coalition government, 
led by Prime Minister Bill Skate, was formed following the election. In 
July 1999, faced with a threatened vote of no confidence, Prime 
Minister Skate resigned, and the Parliament subsequently elected Sir 
Mekere Morauta as Prime Minister.
    The law provides that a losing candidate may dispute the election 
of the winning candidate by filing a petition with the National Court. 
Such petitions may question actions of the candidate and his supporters 
or allege malfeasance by the election officials. The procedure is fair, 
but is time consuming and expensive both to initiate and to defend. 
Following the 1997 election, 88 such petitions were filed. The majority 
of complaints were made against winning candidates or their supporters. 
The court accepted 40 of the petitions for trial. Some of these cases 
still are undecided.
    Although there are no legal barriers to the participation of women 
in political life, they are underrepresented in government and 
politics. Two women were elected to the 109-member Parliament in the 
1997 elections.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no official barriers to the formation of human rights 
groups. The Government cooperates with human rights nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's), but sometimes is slow in responding to their 
requests for information. The International and Community Rights 
Advocacy Forum, formed in 1993, concentrated on human rights and the 
environment.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal protection under the law 
irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, color, 
creed, religion, or sex. Despite these constitutional and other legal 
provisions, women often face discrimination.
    Extreme geographic diversity prevents any one tribe or clan from 
dominating the country. The democratically elected government, based on 
loose coalitions, consistently has avoided favoring any group. 
Skirmishes and conflicts tend to be based on disputes between clans 
over issues such as boundaries, land ownership, injuries, and insults 
suffered by one clan at the hands of another; they are not ethnically 
based. In the past, clan and tribal warfare was ritualized and fought 
with traditional weapons; the availability of firearms has made such 
conflicts deadlier.
    Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence and 
gang rape, is a serious and prevalent problem. Traditional village 
mores, which served as deterrents, are weakening and are largely absent 
when youths move from their village to a larger town or to the capital. 
Although rape is punishable by imprisonment, and sentences are imposed 
when assailants are found guilty, few assailants are apprehended. The 
willingness of some communities to settle incidents of rape through 
material compensation rather than criminal prosecutions makes the crime 
difficult to combat. Domestic violence, such as wife beating, also is 
common and is a crime. However, since most communities view domestic 
violence as a private matter, and few victims press charges, 
prosecutions are rare.
    Violence committed against women by other women frequently stems 
from domestic disputes. In areas where polygyny is still customary, an 
increasing number of women have been charged with the murder of another 
of their husband's wives. According to one report, 65 percent of women 
in prison are there for attacking or killing another woman.
    The Constitution and laws have provisions for extensive rights for 
women dealing with family, marriage, and property issues. Some women 
have achieved senior positions in business, the professions, and civil 
service. However, traditional patterns of discrimination against women 
persist. Many women, even in urban areas, are considered second-class 
citizens. Village courts tend to impose jail terms on women found 
guilty of adultery, while penalizing men lightly or not at all. 
Circuit-riding National Court justices frequently annulled such village 
court sentences. In 1996 the Government approved amendments to the 
Village Courts Act requiring that orders for imprisonment be endorsed 
by a district court before they take effect. Polygyny and the custom of 
paying a bride price tend to reinforce the view that women are 
property.
    In addition to the purchase of women as brides, women also are 
sometimes given as compensation to settle disputes between clans. The 
courts have ruled that such settlements are a denial of the women's 
constitutional rights.
    According to statistics published in the U.N. Development Program's 
1999 report on human development, women are gaining rapidly on men in 
literacy and education. Adult literacy has risen to 73 percent of the 
population. Sixty-five percent of women are literate, trailing men by 
21 percent. There are 15 percent fewer girls in primary schools than 
boys. Maternal mortality levels remain relatively high at 930 deaths 
per 100,000 live births.
    There is an Office of Women's Affairs in the Office of Church and 
Family Services of the Ministry of Provincial Affairs.
    Children.--The Government did not dedicate significant resources to 
protecting the rights and welfare of children. Most programs to protect 
and develop youth and children are operated by NGO's and religious 
organizations. Many government programs are underfunded. In the past, 
children have been well cared for within the family and under 
traditional clan and village controls. However, preliminary, small-
scale studies indicate that this situation has changed over the last 
decade, especially in areas where households have become isolated from 
the extended family support system and depend on the cash economy for a 
livelihood. According to a report prepared by the Government and 
UNICEF, the sexual abuse of children is believed to be prevalent. 
Because of the geographic isolation and remoteness of many villages, 
malnutrition and infant mortality rates are very high. More than 60 of 
every 1,000 children born do not survive their first year.
    People with Disabilities.--Through the National Board for the 
Disabled, the Government provides funds to a number of NGO's that 
provide services to the disabled. The Government does not provide 
programs or services directly. Services and health care for the 
disabled, except for those provided by the traditional clan and family 
system, do not exist in several of the country's provinces. There is no 
legislation mandating accessibility for the disabled. Disabled persons 
face discrimination in education, training, and employment. Most 
disabled persons do not find training or work outside the family 
structure.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The right to form and join labor 
unions is provided by law, subject to registration by the Department of 
Industrial Relations. The Government does not use registration to 
control unions. However, an unregistered union has no legal standing 
with the Department of Labor and Employment or before the courts and 
thus cannot operate effectively. About half of the 250,000 wage earners 
in the formal economy are organized and are members of approximately 50 
trade unions. Most of the unions representing private-sector workers 
are associated with the Trade Unions Congress. The Public Employees 
Association represents an estimated 23,000 persons employed by 
national, provincial, and municipal governments, or one-third of the 
public sector work force. Unions are independent of the Government and 
of political parties.
    There were no government efforts to hinder either public or private 
sector unions from exercising their right to strike. However, there 
were no noteworthy strikes during the year. In 1999 the courts ruled 
that both the union and the national airline had acted illegally during 
a strike that year. The airline complied with a court order to rehire 
mechanics who had been dismissed during the strike.
    Unions may affiliate freely with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for the right to engage in collective bargaining 
and to join industrial organizations. These rights are exercised 
freely. Under the law, the Government has discretionary power to cancel 
arbitration awards or declare wage agreements void when they are 
contrary to government policy. This law was criticized by the 
International Labor Organization in 1994. The law prohibits antiunion 
discrimination by employers against union leaders, members, and 
organizers. The Department of Industrial Relations and the courts are 
involved in dispute settlement. Wages above the minimum wage are set 
through negotiations between employers and employees or their 
respective industrial organizations.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
forbids slavery and all forms of forced, compulsory, or bonded labor, 
including that performed by children, and there were no reports of such 
practices.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Employment Act establishes the minimum working age as 
18. However, children between the ages of 11 and 18 may be employed in 
a family-related business or enterprise provided they have parental 
permission, a medical clearance, and a work permit from a labor office. 
This type of employment is rare, except in subsistence agriculture. 
Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited and is not known to 
occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages for the private 
sector are set by the Minimum Wage Board, a quasi-governmental body 
with labor and employer representatives. The Board made a determination 
in 1992, which is still valid, that reduced the minimum wage for newly 
hired urban workers to the level of the minimum wage for rural workers. 
Also in 1992, the national youth wage, for new entrants into the labor 
force between 16 and 21 years of age, was set at 75 percent of the 
adult minimum wage. The adult minimum wage of $9.87 (22.96 kina) per 
week does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family who live solely on the cash economy. The Minimum Wage Board 
reconvened in mid-year to review the current minimum wage and made no 
change. Although the Department of Labor and Employment and the courts 
attempt to enforce the minimum wage law, enforcement is not effective 
due to a lack of resources. Minimum wage levels, allowances, rest 
periods, holiday leave, and overtime are regulated by law. The law 
limits the workweek to 42 hours per week in urban areas and 44 hours 
per week in rural areas. The law provides for at least one rest period 
of 24 consecutive hours every week. Enforcement is lax.
    Enforcement of the Industrial Health and Safety Law and related 
regulations is the responsibility of the Department of Labor and 
Employment. The law requires that work sites be inspected on a regular 
basis. However, due to a shortage of inspectors, inspections take place 
only when requested by workers or unions. Workers' ability to remove 
themselves from hazardous working conditions varies by workplace. 
Unionized workers have some measure of protection in such situations.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution does not prohibit 
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons 
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                              PHILIPPINES

    The Philippines is a democratic republic with an elected President, 
an elected bicameral legislature, and a functioning political party 
system. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The 
President from 1998 through year's end was Joseph Estrada. In November 
the House of Representatives sent to the Senate articles of impeachment 
of President Estrada, citing bribery and corruption and other 
violations of the Constitution. His trial in the Senate began on 
December 7 and continued at year's end. An organized Communist 
insurgent group operates in many regions of the country. A large Muslim 
separatist group operates mainly in parts of the south. Many armed 
clashes took place during the year; several involved serious human 
rights abuses by both sides. Negotiations between the Government and 
both insurgent groups were stalemated at year's end. The judiciary is 
independent, but suffers from inefficiency and corruption.
    The Department of National Defense (DND) directs the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP), and the Department of Interior and Local 
Government (DILG) has authority over the civilian Philippine National 
Police (PNP). The AFP, which has primary responsibility for 
counterinsurgency operations, also is involved in traditional law 
enforcement efforts, including the pursuit of kidnapers, whose actions 
are a chronic criminal problem. Some members of the security forces, 
including police, soldiers, and local civilian militias, committed 
human rights abuses, often during counterinsurgency operations.
    The Philippines has a market-based, mixed economy. Agriculture 
contributes about 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), but 
accounts for more than 40 percent of employment. Principal crops 
include corn, sugar, and rice, most of which are consumed domestically. 
Export crops include coconut products and fruits. Manufacturing, 
particularly electronics and electronic components, accounts for nearly 
twothirds of export receipts, although the rate of growth in 
electronics exports slowed considerably during the year. Annual per 
capita GDP was approximately $999. Income distribution is highly 
skewed: The richest 30 percent of families earned nearly two-thirds of 
national income, while the poorest 30 percent received only 9.3 percent 
of national income, according to the most recent (1997) Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey. Urban incomes averaged 2.43 times rural 
incomes. Overseas worker remittances, estimated at $6 billion per year, 
are a major source of foreign exchange.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of citizens; 
however, there were serious problems in some areas. Members of the 
security services were responsible for extrajudicial killings, 
disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Other 
physical abuse of suspects and detainees and police corruption remain 
problems. The Government's Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 
established under the 1987 Constitution, again described the PNP as the 
worst abuser of human rights. Police leaders at times appeared to 
sanction extrajudicial killings and brutality as expedient means of 
fighting crime. The Government took some steps to stop military and 
police abuses; however, such actions were not sufficiently effective. 
Government forces were responsible for disappearances. Prison 
conditions are harsh. The Government was ineffective in reforming law 
enforcement and legal institutions. The court system, with its poorly 
paid, overburdened judges and prosecutors, remained susceptible to 
corruption and to the influence of the wealthy and powerful and often 
failed to provide due process and equal justice for others. The courts 
were hindered by backlogs, limited resources, and a lack of judges. 
Long delays in trials were common. The authorities failed to prosecute 
many persons who broke the law, and some persons committed abuses with 
impunity. The Government at times infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights. The Government in some cases supported the forcible 
displacement of squatters from their illegal urban dwellings to make 
way for industrial and real estate development projects, often leading 
to disputes and human rights complaints.
    An estimated 5 to 6 million citizens living abroad effectively are 
disenfranchised because the Government has not enacted a system of 
absentee voting, as required by the Constitution. Some local military 
and police forces harassed human rights activists. The CHR, whose 
primary mission is to investigate complaints of human rights 
violations, expanded the local monitoring system; at mid-year there 
were more than 14,000 local human rights officers nationwide, up by 
more than 1,000 from 1999. Although this is an improvement, CHR 
monitoring and investigation remain inadequate.
    Violence and discrimination against women and abuse of children 
continued to be serious problems. Discrimination against indigenous 
people and Muslims persists. The law places restrictions on worker 
rights. Rural poverty is the major cause of the continuing child labor 
problem, which the Government has addressed only partially. Forced 
labor in the informal sector, the practice of using forced underage 
workers in domestic servitude, and forced child prostitution were 
problems. Trafficking in women and children was a serious problem.
    The New People's Army (NPA), the main Communist insurgent group, 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the main Muslim insurgent 
group, both committed serious human rights abuses, including 
extrajudicial killings, kidnapings, torture, and detentions. The NPA's 
use of children as armed combatants and noncombatants continued to 
increase significantly. Fighting between the AFP and the MILF resulted 
in the large-scale displacement of noncombatants. Various factions of 
the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) committed numerous kidnapings, 
prompting government rescue efforts and the consequent displacement of 
civilians.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police and military 
forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. The CHR investigated 
115 extrajudicial killings during the first half of the year, compared 
with 283 in all of 1999. The CHR includes killings by antigovernment 
insurgents in its investigations. The nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) claimed that as of 
November 15, 91 civilians were killed for political reasons; 28 of 
these persons reportedly were victims of extrajudicial executions 
carried out by government forces.
    In combating criminal organizations, police personnel sometimes 
resorted to summary execution of suspects, or ``salvaging.'' Police 
spokesmen later reportedly claimed that these killings were an 
unavoidable result of the exchange of gunfire with suspects or of 
escape attempts. The CHR reported that members of the PNP were the 
alleged perpetrators of 27.5 percent of the human rights violations 
involving deaths that it investigated during the first 6 months of the 
year.
    To curtail police and military abuses, the Government, working with 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other 
international organizations, expanded human rights training programs 
during the year. The AFP requires human rights and humanitarian law 
training for all officers and enlisted personnel, including former Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants and for the more than 
30,000 members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units 
(CAFGU's). CAFGU's were implicated in many past human rights abuses. 
The CHR also reviews and certifies the human rights records of AFP 
members being considered for promotion.
    In May a police cadet at the National Policy Academy died as a 
result of cadet hazing permitted by instructors. Six instructors were 
reprimanded and given 6-month suspensions (see Section 1.c.).
    Four police officers were charged with the June 7 killing of a 
motorcycle rider in Gapan, Nueva Ecjia. Reportedly the death was 
connected with illegal drug protection.
    On June 8 in Manila, police killed a Muslim scholar during an 
exchange of gunfire. Police stated that the victim was an MILF 
commander trained in the use of explosives and had fired first.
    On July 9, police arrested two Manila police officers who were in 
possession of the body of a pedicab driver who reportedly had resisted 
their extortion demands. Three witnesses to the forcible abduction by 
police later were reported missing.
    On July 17, Police officers shot and killed a murder suspect in 
Tupi, South Cotabato, after he had surrendered. Following an 
investigation, eight officers were charged with the killing.
    On October 4, a PNP officer shot and killed a handcuffed suspect 
who had been arrested for attempted homicide. Police stated that the 
suspect was carrying a concealed weapon.
    On November 17, a radio journalist in Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur 
was killed by gunmen. The journalist's radio broadcasts reportedly had 
angered the police, the military forces, the MILF, and other citizens, 
who had sued him for libel.
    On November 30, residents of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, found two 
headless bodies, one of which was wearing handcuffs traced to the PNP.
    On December 4, the mayor of Dona Remedios Trindad, Bulacan, was 
killed, together with two assistants. Four police officers were 
detained, but were not charged by year's end. Police have exonerated 
the NPA. Earlier in the year, the previous mayor was killed in another 
ambush; that case also remained unsolved at year's end.
    Reported killings by Communist insurgents during the year were 
numerous.
    In April the NPA claimed responsibility for the killing of a former 
AFP officer in Tarlac City. It stated that the killing was an 
``execution'' for the killing of an NPA officer in 1980.
    In May the NPA admitted responsibility for the February 6 killing 
of the mayor of San Teodoro, Mindoro Oriental, a former intelligence 
officer in the AFP.
    No NPA killings from 1999 or earlier years were closed during the 
year. Like many extrajudicial killings, killings attributed to the NPA 
often remain unsolved, or are dismissed for lack of evidence.
    On June 5, MILF soldiers attempted to kill the mayor of Cabacan, 
North Cotabato. The mayor escaped but two of his bodyguards were 
killed.
    On June 15, the NPA attacked and killed seven AFP soldiers and one 
CAFGU in Maslong, Eastern Samar. The soldiers were investigating the 
killing of a farmer by suspected NPA rebels. A CHR investigation found 
that the bodies of some of the AFP soldiers had been mutilated.
    On June 21, NPA rebels attacked a police patrol in Tagbilaran, 
Bohol; they killed one police officer.
    An NPA attack on June 27 in Jones, Isabela, resulted in the killing 
of 13 AFP members on a medical mission. A female NPA member reportedly 
admitted responsibility during interrogation.
    On July 2, one AFP soldier and 7 NPA members, including 1 boy 
estimated to be 10 years of age, were killed in an encounter in Danao, 
Bohol.
    On July 5 in Antipolo, Rizal, the NPA killed a woman, calling their 
action an execution. The local NPA command stated that the victim was a 
police informant and was involved in trafficking in persons for the 
purpose of prostitution.
    On July 21 in Bulusan, Sorsogon, NPA members shot and killed a 
police officer in his home.
    On August 21, 17 AFP soldiers were killed in an attack in 
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental. On September 5, the Government filed 
murder charges against a former priest who was an NPA member.
    The AFP reported that three soldiers had been tortured and killed 
by the MILF in October in Maguindanao.
    In February the AFP discovered mass graves in Cagayan de Oro City. 
Officials believe that the more than 100 victims were killed by the NPA 
during the mid-1980's.
    b. Disappearance.--Government forces were responsible for 
disappearances. The CHR investigated 12 disappearances in the first 
half of the year, compared with 11 in all of 1999; the TFDP reported 12 
disappearances through November. The domestic NGO, Families of Victims 
of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), reported the disappearance of five 
suspected members of the MILF and six suspected members of the NPA. 
FIND reported that as of October, 1,678 cases of disappearance remained 
unsolved; some date back to the Marcos period that ended in 1986.
    The courts and the police have failed to address complaints of 
victims' families concerning numerous past disappearances. FIND and 
Amnesty International's Manila office continued to support the efforts 
of the victims' families' to press charges, but in most cases evidence 
and documentation are unavailable. Court inaction on these cases 
contributes to a climate of impunity that undermines confidence in the 
justice system.
    Three witnesses to a reported forcible abduction by police 
disappeared in July (see Section 1.a.).
    In November a public relations agent and his driver disappeared. 
The agent allegedly possessed information damaging to the President in 
connection with his impeachment by the House of Representatives.
    The ASG is a kidnap-for-ransom terrorist group that purports to 
seek an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines. On March 
20, an ASG faction attacked an AFP detachment on Basilan Island, 
kidnaped a Catholic priest, a school principal, and 50 teachers and 
students. In April the captors killed six hostages, including the 
priest. After the eventual release of some hostages and the turnover of 
others to the MILF, investigations revealed that some of the victims 
had been tortured and mutilated (see Section 1.c.). Two of the teachers 
had been beheaded, and the priest had been shot in the back (see 
Section 1.g.).
    In April another ASG faction kidnaped 21 foreign tourists, foreign 
workers, and some citizens in Sabah, Malaysia, then transported them to 
Jolo Island in Sulu province. Unsuccessful rescue efforts by the 
military forces in May resulted in injuries to the hostages. According 
to one male hostage, a female hostage was raped by her captors. In July 
13 Filipino Christian evangelists who visited the site to pray for the 
hostages themselves were taken captive. Several journalists reporting 
on the situation also were captured and released. In September an 
unsuccessful AFP attack to free the hostages reportedly involved 
indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas and numerous deaths and 
injuries to civilians (see Section 1.g.). All but one of the hostages 
were rescued or released, or had escaped from June through October. 
Several reportedly were released after payment of ransom. One hostage 
remained in custody at year's end. Another foreign hostage, kidnaped in 
August by a different ASG faction, also remained in custody at year's 
end.
    In November in Sumisip, Basilan, an ASG faction kidnaped a teacher 
and her four children. The captors abandoned two of the children, then 
released the others later in November following intervention by local 
officials.
    In February the NPA abducted a police officer in Tagbilaran, Bohol. 
He was released in December in Negros Oriental, suffering from a skin 
disease.
    In August the NPA reportedly abducted a man in San Fernando, 
Camarines Sur. A former NPA commander stated that the abduction may 
have involved the victim's past involvement with the NPA and that the 
victim may have been ``tried'' in an NPA ``people's court.''
    An AFP officer and a PNP inspector kidnaped by the NPA in July and 
October 1999 respectively still were being held in southern Luzon at 
year's end. There were reports that the NPA had ordered the killing of 
the AFP officer for ``crimes against the people.''
    Various factions of the ASG committed kidnapings for ransom. In 
September 3 ASG members were sentenced to life imprisonment for a 1992 
kidnaping.
    The MILF was responsible for disappearances.
    In February the AFP discovered mass graves in Cagayan de Oro 
province. Officials believe that they are the bodies of more than 100 
persons killed by the NPA during the mid-1980's.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading.--Treatment or 
Punishment
    The Constitution prohibits torture, and evidence obtained through 
its use is legally inadmissible in court; however, members of the 
security forces and police continued to use torture and otherwise abuse 
suspects and detainees. The CHR provides the police with human rights 
training, including primers on the rights of suspects. Such training 
became mandatory in 1995. However, police awareness of the rights of 
those in custody remains poor. Common forms of abuse during arrest and 
interrogation included striking detainees with clubs and threatening 
them with guns.
    In June the CHR issued an advisory concerning the treatment of 
suspects in police custody. It described the torture of suspects held 
in connection with bombings in Manila in May. Relatives of the suspects 
had complained that suspects were beaten and that one suspect had had 
his hands bound and his face covered with a plastic bag during 
interrogation. The PNP denied these allegations.
    Amnesty International reported that torture was widespread in the 
country.
    In July the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local 
Government dismissed 136 cadets at the National Policy Academy for 
complicity in the fatal hazing of a fellow cadet in May (see Section 
1.a.). An investigation by the National Police Commission led to 
reports that instructors forced police recruits to engage in sex acts 
with each other and to perform other hazing rituals. Six instructors 
were reprimanded and given 6-month suspensions. The PNP investigated 
215 officers for human rights abuses during the year. Of these, 57 led 
to prosecutions. The PNP has dismissed 70 officers for human rights 
abuses since 1993.
    In July according to the CHR, PNP officers brutally beat members of 
a group that had assembled to protest the President's State of the 
Nation address (see Section 2.b.).
    Prison conditions are harsh. Provincial jails and prisons are 
overcrowded, have limited exercise and sanitary facilities, and provide 
prisoners with an inadequate diet. Administrators budget a daily 
subsistence allowance of about $0.60 (30 pesos). Prison inmates often 
depend on their families for food because of the insufficient 
subsistence allowance. Male and female inmates are held in separate 
facilities, overseen by guards of the same sex. The exception is the 
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation detention facility, which 
segregates male and female inmates; however, both are overseen by male 
guards. Children sometimes are held in facilities not fully segregated 
from adult male inmates. There were reports that guards abused 
prisoners. Female prisoners in particular are at risk of sexual 
assault.
    The CHR conducted a nationwide investigation of prison facilities 
early in the year. In July it issued an advisory opinion that cited 
inhuman conditions in jails and prisons in many parts of the country. 
It stated that the Manila city jail was unfit for human habitation, 
housing 3,400 inmates in facilities designed to hold 1,000 inmates. 
Such conditions, according to the CHR, contributed to violence among 
inmates. It also stated that 27 inmates at the Manila jail should have 
been confined at a psychiatric facility and that convicted prisoners 
are commingled with inmates awaiting trial.
    Official corruption is a serious problem in the prison system. Jail 
administrators reportedly delegate authority to maintain order to 
senior inmates. Some prominent prisoners and jailed celebrities receive 
preferential treatment. Favored inmates reportedly enjoy access to 
outside contacts, enabling them to trade in prostitution and drugs. In 
April the DILG Secretary ordered disciplinary action against prison 
personnel for having provided special treatment to 31 incarcerated 
former police officers. These prisoners, in exchange for cash payments 
to guards, reportedly were able to leave the facility almost at will.
    According to the penal authorities, there were 23,621 persons held 
in national and regional prisons. Many others were detained in local 
jails at the discretion of local law enforcement authorities without 
benefit of a trial.
    International monitoring groups and the ICRC are allowed free 
access to jails and prisons. There were no reports that prisoners died 
due to prison conditions or mistreatment during the year.
    The AFP reported that three soldiers had been tortured and killed 
by the MILF in October in Maguindanao (see Section 1.a.).
    In November NPA members shot and injured a sugar plantation union 
leader and a policeman in Tarlac City. Prior to the attack, the union 
leader had led a rally at the regional office of the Department of 
Agrarian Reform to protest the plantation owners' stock distribution 
plans (see Section 6.a.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
requires a judicial determination of probable cause before issuance of 
an arrest warrant and prohibits holding prisoners incommunicado or in 
secret places of detention; however, police in some cases arrested and 
detained citizens arbitrarily. The CHR investigated 87 cases of illegal 
arrest and detention during the first half of the year, compared with 
124 in 1999. The TFDP documented 669 politically motivated arrests by 
the Government. The Government denies that there are any political 
detainees.
    Detainees have the right to a judicial review of the legality of 
their detention and, except for offenses punishable by a life sentence 
or death (when evidence of guilt is strong), the right to bail. 
Authorities are required to file charges within 12 to 36 hours of 
arrests made without warrants, depending on the seriousness of the 
crime for which the arrest was made.
    In May a series of bomb detonations in Metro Manila killed one 
person and injured approximately 30 others (see Section 1.g). No person 
or group claimed responsibility. The PNP arrested 26 Muslim suspects, 
including one police officer, for one of the bombings. Only one person 
of those arrested was named in the search warrant. CHR investigators 
and private attorneys were refused immediate access to the detainees. 
In June police charged them with the illegal possession of firearms; 
their attorneys claimed that police had planted the evidence. They 
continued to be held without pretrial hearing 6 months following their 
arrests.
    Suspects in a shopping mall bombing in May were charged with 
illegal possession of firearms; their attorneys claimed that police had 
planted the evidence. They awaited trial at year's end. There were 
reported attempts by authorities to deny attorneys immediate access to 
their clients (see Section 1.g.).
    The NPA and MILF were responsible for a significant number of 
arbitrary arrests and detentions, often in connection with informal 
courts set up to try military personnel, police, local politicians, and 
civilians for ``crimes against the people'' (see Section 1.e.).
    Forced exile is illegal and is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judicial system suffers from 
corruption and inefficiency. Personal ties undermine the commitment of 
some government employees to ensuring due process and equal justice, 
resulting in impunity for those who commit offenses but are rich and 
influential.
    The national court system consists of four levels: Local and 
regional trial courts; a national Court of Appeals divided into 17 
divisions; a 15-member Supreme Court; and an informal local system for 
arbitrating or mediating certain problems outside the formal court 
system. The Sandiganbayan, the Government's anticorruption court, hears 
criminal cases of misconduct brought against senior officials. A 
Shari'a court system, with jurisdiction over domestic and contractual 
relations among Muslim citizens, operates in some Mindanao provinces.
    The Constitution provides that those accused of crimes be informed 
of the charges against them, have the right to counsel, and be provided 
a speedy and public trial. Defendants are presumed innocent and have 
the right to confront witnesses against them, to present evidence, and 
to appeal convictions. The authorities respect the right of defendants 
to be represented by a lawyer, although poverty often inhibits a 
defendant's access to effective legal representation. The public 
attorney's office is staffed by highly skilled and motivated defense 
lawyers, but the workload is great and resources are scarce.
    Legal experts inside and outside the justice system also criticize 
personal and professional relationships between some judges and 
individual or corporate litigants. Some lawyers act as ``case fixers,'' 
gaining the favor of judges and other court officials and allegedly 
bribing some witnesses. It is illegal to settle criminal cases out of 
court, but the practice of reaching an ``amicable settlement'' is 
routine. Such settlements may result in impunity for wealthy or 
influential defendants.
    The pace of justice is slow. The court system is unable to assure 
detained persons expeditious trials. There is a widelyrecognized need 
for more prosecutors, judges, and courtrooms. Of 1,445 trial court 
judgeships nationwide, 685 remained vacant at year's end due to a lack 
of qualified applicants. Vacancies in provincial capitals are 
unattractive to many jurists. In addition judges' salaries often are 
considered too low in comparison with salaries in other opportunities. 
Low pay also renders some prosecutors susceptible to corruption.
    According to the Constitution, cases are to be resolved within set 
time limits once submitted for decision: 24 months for the Supreme 
Court; 12 months for the court of appeals; and 3 months for lower 
courts. There are no time limits for trials. Because of numerous 
technical delays and the frequent failure of judges and prosecutors to 
appear, trials can last many months.
    Officials in the Labor and Social Welfare Departments claim that 
prosecutors often fail to follow up on cases involving child labor 
violations (see Section 6.d.).
    Amnesty International criticized many of the court proceedings that 
resulted in death sentences, stating that the judicial system does not 
ensure the rights of defendants to due process and legal 
representation. At times defendants in such cases lacked attorneys to 
assist them when they were arrested, indicted, and brought to trial. By 
law the Supreme Court reviews all death sentences. During the year, the 
Court overturned several convictions and commuted several death 
sentences to life imprisonment. In December the President announced 
that he intended to commute the death sentences of more than 1,300 
prisoners; later in the month, the Government reverted to the policy of 
granting commutations on a casebycase basis.
    Indemnification claims for alleged human rights abuses during the 
Ferdinand Marcos era, which ended in 1986, remain unresolved.
    Although Shari'a courts do not have criminal jurisdiction, the MILF 
asserts that its Islamic law courts do. There were no reports of 
executions resulting from MILF court decisions during the year.
    The NPA continued to try military personnel, police, local 
politicians, and civilians in its informal courts for ``crimes against 
the people'' and to execute some of those whom it ``convicted.''
    The TFDP reported that the Government held at least 277 political 
prisoners at the end of October, compared with 160 held at the end of 
1999. The Government contends that prisoners whom NGO's claim were 
jailed for political reasons were in fact convicted of common crimes. 
Frequently political prisoners counted by the TFDP were convicted of 
the illegal possession of firearms. In fact the TFDP includes on its 
list of political prisoners two Communist rebels convicted of the 1989 
terrorist killing of a foreign military assistance officer. The TFDP 
asserts that the authorities deliberately ``criminalize'' cases 
involving political offenders in order to detract from public sympathy 
for political prisoners. There are differences of opinion even within 
the CHR; some members of the commission believe that certain persons 
are incarcerated for political reasons, but other members believe that 
the same persons are guilty of common crimes.
    The Government permits access to political prisoners by 
international humanitarian organizations.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that a judge may issue 
search warrants on a finding of probable cause; however, while 
restrictions on search and seizure within private homes generally are 
respected, searches without warrants do occur. Judges have declared 
evidence obtained illegally to be inadmissible.
    In August the CHR stated that the PNP conducted random searches of 
persons for illegal firearms at checkpoints in Metro Manila in 
violations of citizens' privacy rights.
    The PNP conducted covert monitoring of persons who sought removal 
of the President. The PNP stated that it was monitoring for possible 
seditious acts. Persons critical of the President asserted that the 
Government conducted illegal wiretaps of the telephones of the 
political opposition.
    The forcible displacement of urban ``squatters'' to make room for 
infrastructure and commercial developments continued during the year. 
Squatters make up at least 30 percent of the country's urban 
population. The law provides certain protections for squatters; 
eviction is often difficult, especially because politicians generally 
recognize squatters' voting power. In many instances, the Government 
did not offer relocation sites to displaced families, as required by 
law. The NGO Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families and 
Communities (ECDFC) reported 2 mass displacements due to government 
demolition of houses for economic purposes. Some 85 families were 
displaced in January in Saragani, Mindanao, and 200 families were 
displaced in September in Pasig City, Metro Manila. On July 10, a 
garbage landslide in heavy rain at the Payatas dumpsite in Quezon City 
resulted in the deaths of more than 230 persons.
    Armed clashes between the AFP and the MILF displaced an estimated 
750 thousand to 1 million persons in 203,000 families in 578 
communities in Mindanao (see Section 1.g.).
    The TFDP documented 50 community demolitions involving 15,662 
houses through November 15. Some involved military clashes in Mindanao.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Intensified AFP clashes with the main remaining 
Islamic insurgent group, the MILF, continued to inflict hardships on 
civilians. Most of the fighting took place in central Mindanao 
provinces and was related to the control of territory, a key issue in 
peace negotiations between the Government and the MILF. Displaced 
civilians feared being caught in the crossfire or becoming casualties 
of artillery exchanges or bombings near their areas of residence.
    In May a CHR investigation reported that both government troops and 
rebel groups were responsible for numerous violations of the rights of 
noncombatants, including women and children, during the intense 
fighting between the AFP and MILF that escalated sharply in March. The 
abuses included the killing of civilians due to indiscriminate bombing, 
torture and inhuman treatment of prisoners, and restrictions on the 
movement of civilians.
    In May gunfire from AFP helicopters used in counterinsurgency 
operations injured several civilians.
    In intense fighting in central Mindanao during April and May, 
government forces reportedly shot and killed 16 Muslims whom they 
suspected were MILF sympathizers. They also reportedly killed four 
noncombatants at a village in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. In August there 
were additional reports of unwarranted force, killings, and injuries to 
civilians.
    According to Amnesty International, indiscriminate bombing of the 
civilian population on Jolo Island during the Government's efforts in 
September and October to free foreign and Filipino hostages held by the 
terrorist ASG resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths (see Section 
1.b.). The Government initially refused to allow the CHR to 
investigate, citing security concerns. Three days after the rescue 
operation bagan, the Government reported that 4 noncombatants had been 
accidentally killed. There also were persistent but uncorroborated 
reports of summary executions and arbitrary arrests by the AFP. The 
CHR's investigators were neither able to confirm nor disprove these 
reports. The Government ordered a news blackout and cut communications 
and transportation links to Jolo in order to isolate the ASG 
terrorists. There has been no independent confirmation of government 
figures or AI claims; however, humanitarian workers who visited Jolo 
found no evidence of significant civilian casualities from the bombing.
    Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced in the fighting 
between the AFP and the MILF. TFDP, acting of behalf of victims of the 
fighting, filed charges of human rights abuses with the CHR involving 
destruction of property and the treatment of refugees against both the 
AFP and the MILF.
    In October the AFP reported that in armed conflict with the MILF 
from May through July in central Mindanao, there were 477 deaths of 
noncombatants and a total of 922 casualties. Some of these persons were 
killed in crossfire between the forces or died fleeing the fighting. At 
least 242 persons, most of them children, died due to poor health 
conditions resulting from the military operations. Most died in 1 of 
the 436 evacuation centers, which were able to accommodate only 
slightly more than half the noncombatant refugees. Poor sanitation led 
to disease, and lack of food led to malnutrition. Water was 
insufficient and unsafe to drink. Many children developed diarrhea, 
dysentery, and respiratory ailments. Most of the children who died in 
the evacuation camps were under 2 years of age. Nearly 100,000 
noncombatants, mostly Muslims, remained in evacuation centers as of 
mid-October. In May the centers had held an estimated 700,000 persons.
    In October the Government reported that nearly 750,000 persons had 
been displaced in 14 provinces as a result of the AFP-MILF fighting. 
International and domestic NGO's estimated that the total number of 
displaced civilians was closer to 1 million. The ECDFC estimated that 
203,000 families in 578 communities in Mindanao were displaced during 
the year as a result of 42 separate incidents. Both the AFP and the 
MILF accused each other of targeting civilian populations and 
restricting civilian food supplies.
    In May a series of bomb detonations in Metro Manila killed 1 person 
and injured approximately 30 others. No person or group claimed 
responsibility. The PNP arrested 26 Muslim suspects, including one 
police officer, for one of the bombings.
    On July 22, 13 noncombatants were killed in 16 others were injured 
in an attack in Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. Police and CHR investigators 
assigned responsibility to CAGFU members recently fired from their jobs 
at a plantation where the killings took place; a group of 20 armed 
persons had fired on the victims.
    Nearly 6,700 houses and 3 municipal halls were destroyed, as were 
31 places of worship and 42 schools in ASG operations. Late in the 
year, the military forces began to rebuild houses, schools, and 
mosques.
    On February 10, one civilian was killed and 19 others were injured 
in a bombing of a department store in Carmen, North Cotabato. Police 
blamed the MILF.
    On February 25, 41 civilians were killed and scores were injured in 
two bomb detonations in Ozamis City. Police blamed the MILF and CPP/
NDF.
    On March 17, an MILF attack on the town of Kauswagan, Lanao del 
Norte, killed at least 29 noncombatants.
    On May 3, five bombs were detonated in General Santos City; the 
explosions killed 3 noncombatants and injured 10. The Government blamed 
the MILF.
    On May 6, 6 persons were killed and 37 wounded from the detonation 
of bombs in buses in Surigao City and Butuan, Agusan del Norte. The 
Government blamed the MILF.
    On May 23, three persons died in a bombing in General Santos City. 
A second bomb in the same city on June 24 killed two persons. Police 
arrested two MILF members for these actions in July.
    The Government placed responsibility on the MILF for mass killings 
on July 16 in Bumbaran, Lanao del Sur Province. Approximately 33 
civilians, all Christians, were forced by armed men into a Muslim 
prayer house in the early morning. After a nearby battle during the 
day, armed persons fired on the civilians in custody, killing 21 and 
injuring 9. The casualties included a pregnant woman and five children. 
After a subsequent investigation, the CHR stated that the perpetrators 
could have been non-MILF separatists posing as MILF members, and may 
have been renegade former members of the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) (see Section 5).
    An NPA attack on September 30 in Davao City killed six civilians, 
as well as an AFP soldier and three CAFGU's. On the same day on the 
border of Davao City and Daval del Norte, the NPA killed nine 
civilians. The National Democratic Front (NDF) claimed responsibility 
but blamed the government military forces for using the civilians as 
``human shields.'' The NDF is the political arm of the Communist Party 
of the Philippines, while the NPA is the armed wing. In December two 
NPA members were charged with murder; charges against two others were 
dropped for lack of evidence.
    On September 23, 10 suspected MILF guerrillas killed 7 members of a 
family in Tangkal, Lanao del Norte.
    On September 25, 3 students were killed and 10 injured in a bomb 
blast in Kabacan, North Cotabato. The Government blamed the MILF.
    On November 7, MILF guerrillas who reportedly were assisting a 
kidnaping group attacked the prison in General Santos City. They killed 
1 inmate and injured 1 guard in the process of freeing 68 inmates.
    On November 9, a bomb detonated in a market in General Santos City, 
killing one person. The Government blamed the MILF.
    On December 6, according to an AFP report, MILF rebels killed three 
farmers by firing squad in Carmen, North Cotabato. The killing occurred 
as the AFP was attacking an MILF position elsewhere in Carmen.
    The PNP alleges that the MILF is responsible for five bomb 
detonations in a 2-hour period on December 30 in Metro Manila. The 
explosions killed 20 civilians, and 2 police officers were killed while 
attempting to defuse one of the bombs that exploded.
    In fighting between government forces and the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) medical and relief workers were denied access to affected areas 
because their safety could not be assured. AI reported that 
approximately 80,000 civilians were forced to flee their homes in 
September as the Government waged an all-out effort to free the 
hostages on Jolo (see Section 1.b.). In November the Government 
reported that more than 107,000 persons from 19,000 families had been 
displaced in Sulu.
    Conditions in the 21 evacuation centers were poor, leading to 
disease and deaths among those displaced in the fighting. In November 
the AFP reported that 6 civilians had died in the course of the armed 
conflict with the ASG on Jolo, and that 65 homes had been destroyed. 
Domestic NGO's believe that the figures are much higher.
    The ASG reportedly was responsible for detonating three grenades on 
May 18 in a market in Jolo. Seven persons were killed and three were 
injured.
    In a December attack in Lamitan, Basilan, suspected members of the 
ASG killed three persons and injured five others.
    On December 28 in Jolo, Sulu, armed persons believed to be ASG 
members killed a Catholic priest, his driver, and two other persons.
    Communist insurgencies such as the NPA intensified attacks on 
government forces, government offices, and private business facilities 
in Bukidnon province, Metro Manila, and other locations during the 
year. The NPA makes regular use of minors in its operations (see 
Section 5).
    In January an AFP chaplain was abducted by NPA guerrillas, some as 
young as 14, and held captive for nearly 2 weeks before being released.
    On March 2, a member of the Communist Revolutionary Proletarian 
Army (RPA) reportedly threw a hand grenade into a government office in 
Makati, Metro Manila.
    In March a 12-year old NPA rebel was captured by the AFP in Bontoc, 
Southern Leyte, during a raid in which the boy's parents (both NPA 
leaders) and 13-year-old sister were killed. The boy told authorities 
he had become an NPA fighter at age 9 and had since become a recruiter 
himself. He said that there were 20 minors15 boys and 5 girlsin his 
unit. The boy, who stated that he had taken part in at least 12 
ambushes, demonstrated adult proficiency as a soldier.
    In March a 12-year old boy escaped from the NPA and surrendered to 
the AFP in Kiamba, Sarangani. The boy reportedly told authorities that 
while in first grade, an NPA recruiter threatened to kill him if he did 
not join. He stated that he did not receive payments that the recruiter 
had promised, and was not given sufficient food while working as an 
errand boy in the mountains.
    On July 2, a 14-year old suspected NPA fighter was killed along 
with 7 NPA members in a clash with the AFP in Trinidad, Bohol. In 
December the AFP rescued a 10-year-old NPA member after a skirmish in 
Motiong, Western Samar.
    The PNP identified the Alex Boncayo Brigade, a Communist assassin 
group, as being responsible for the killing of a business executive on 
November 24 in Bacoor, Cavite.
    On December 2, the Communist insurgent group Rebolusyonaryong hukbo 
ng Bayan (RHB) accused the insurgent NPA of the execution of a high-
ranking cadre in Mexico, Pampanga. The killing reportedly took place in 
the presence of the victim's wife, children, and neighbors. In a 
written statement, the RHB, which has broken away from the Communist 
Party of the Philippines (CPP), stated that the NPA wanted to 
``exterminate genuine revolutionaries.'' Two days later, the NPA 
claimed responsibility for the killing and in a written statement 
stated that the RHB cadre had been executed for grave crimes against 
the revolutionary movement.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice. In November a radio journalist in 
Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur was killed by gunmen. The journalist's 
radio broadcasts reportedly had angered the police, the military 
forces, the MILF, and other citizens, who had sued him for libel (see 
Section 1.a.).
    In April the mayor of Bacolod City ordered the closure of a local 
radio station for operating without a business permit. Radio 
journalists charged that the mayor's actual motive was to silence 
criticism of his administration. The station resumed operations several 
days later, and the city government filed libel charges against the 
journalists.
    The Philippine Press Institute is active in helping to investigate 
cases of harassment of journalists.
    In February a bomb exploded outside the gates of a Catholic-run 
radio station in Cotabato City, injuring seven persons. Police believe 
that the target was a Muslim broadcaster who had been ``sentenced to 
death'' by an MILF revolutionary court for blasphemy of Islam. One 
month later, the journalist survived an attack in which two of his 
bodyguards were killed. The MILF, which criticized the broadcaster, 
denied involvement but stated that individual MILF members could have 
been responsible for unauthorized actions. In December the radio 
station again was bombed by unknown persons; one person was injured.
    On December 25, a bomb exploded in the home of a radio broadcaster 
in General Santos City, injuring five persons. The broadcaster, a 
Muslim scholar, had received death threats for criticism of MILF 
guerrilla activities.
    ASG terrorists captured 16 journalists on Jolo during June and 
July. All were released after payment of ransom (see Sections 1.b. and 
1.g.).
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the 
Government generally respects these rights in practice. In July the PNP 
dispersed a peaceful assembly of persons protesting the President's 
State of the Nation address. The CHR stated that law enforcement agents 
had violently deprived activists of their right to conduct a public 
protest. PNP officers, according to the CHR, brutally beat protesters, 
including some who had been taken into custody or who posed no threat 
to officers. At least 10 persons were injured, and 36 persons were 
arbitrarily arrested and later released without charge.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
However, in June the insurgent MILF accused the AFP of desecrating two 
mosques in Davao Oriental by using them as sleeping quarters.
    In July many Muslims complained of the Government's disrespect for 
Muslim religious practices when the President celebrated an AFP 
military victory by holding a pork and beer feast at the MILF's former 
headquarters at Camp Abubakar.
    In a September assault on the terrorist ASG to rescue foreign and 
Filipino hostages held on Jolo Island, military forces reportedly 
raided a mosque, tore pages from the Koran, and arrested eight Muslims 
for the illegal possession of firearms. The Catholic Bishops Conference 
of the Philippines strongly criticized the raid. The mayor of Jolo 
strenuously denied that the AFP had desecrated the mosque.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy the freedom to change 
their places of residence and employment. Travel abroad is limited only 
in rare circumstances, such as when a citizen's court case is pending. 
Government authorities discourage travel by vulnerable workers such as 
young women to areas where they face personal risk (see Section 6.f.). 
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) seeks to limit 
departures for work abroad to only those persons whom the POEA 
certifies as qualified for the jobs. An estimated 5 to 6 million 
citizens work overseas and remit money home. Such remittances amount to 
nearly 10 percent of the gross national product.
    There is no comprehensive legislation that provides for granting 
refugee and asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. The Refugee Unit in the Department of Justice determines 
which asylum seekers qualify as refugees; such determinations in 
practice serve to implement many of the basic provisions of the 1951 
U.N. Convention.
    The Government provides first asylum.
    The Government continued to allow approximately 1,800 asylum 
seekers from Vietnam to remain in the country. All had been ``screened 
out'' from refugee status. Most live on Palawan Island or in major 
urban areas. There is significant popular support, particularly from 
the Roman Catholic Church, for allowing permanent residency for those 
asylum seekers who do not wish to repatriate and are ineligible for 
resettlement in other countries. The Government continued to encourage 
voluntary repatriation of such asylum seekers. The Government has not 
ruled out forcible repatriation.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
    to Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through 
periodic elections that largely are free and fair and held on the basis 
of universal suffrage. However, Congress has yet to enact a system for 
absentee voting, which is required by the Constitution. This affects an 
estimated 5 to 6 million eligible voters, or about 10 percent of the 
electorate, most of whom are expatriates. The party of President 
Estrada continued to hold majorities in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.
    In October a group of citizens filed an impeachment complaint 
against the President. In November the House of Representatives sent 
articles of impeachment to the Senate, charging the President with 
bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust, and culpable 
violation of the Constitution. His trial began in December and 
continued through year's end.
    There are no restrictions in law or practice on participation by 
women and members of minorities in politics; however, women are 
underrepresented in government and politics. The Vice President is a 
woman. At year's end, there were two female cabinet-level officials. 
There are 4 women in the 22-member Senate, and 26 women in the 222-
member House of Representatives. Three of the 15 members of the Supreme 
Court are women.
    Along with many other citizens, Muslims argue that the method of 
election of senators from a nationwide list favors the established 
political figures from the Manila area, to the disadvantage of Muslims. 
Election of senators by region would require a constitutional 
amendment; such an amendment is favored by many Muslims and members of 
other disadvantaged groups who are underrepresented in the national 
legislature. There are no Muslim senators or cabinet members. However, 
the House of Representatives has nine Muslim Members, including some 
elected from Christian majority districts. Muslims hold few senior 
government positions, and there is little or no effort to institute 
corrective measures.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
    Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
    of Human Rights
    A large, diverse group of human rights NGO's operated without 
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 
human rights cases. Many government officials, including those of the 
CHR, are responsive to NGO views. Many domestic NGO's were critical of 
the Estrada administration's human rights record; these NGO's also had 
criticized previous presidents' human rights records.
    The Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, a leading NGO 
network, effectively monitors human rights problems and seeks redress 
through its contacts with government agencies, the Congress, and the 
CHR. Human rights activists continued to encounter minor harassment, 
mainly from police or military units or detachments based in the 
locality in which incidents took place.
    The CHR further augmented the system of barangay (neighborhood) 
human rights officers who process and coordinate human rights 
complaints, reporting to regional CHR offices. There were more than 
14,000 local human rights officers at mid-year, compared with 
approximately 13,000 at the end of 1999. The CHR expanded its regional 
operations during the year. At year's end, there were 14 regional and 6 
subregional offices, with more than 400 CHR officers in the field. 
Despite this increase, CHR monitoring and investigation remain 
inadequate.

Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion,
    Disability, Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women, children, 
and members of minorities; however, implementation of constitutional 
protections at times is hindered by the lack of specific regulations 
and by budgetary constraints.
    Women.--Violence against women, particularly domestic violence, 
remains a serious societal problem. Rape is illegal and in certain 
cases punishable by death. Spousal rape and abuse also are illegal, but 
enforcement is ineffective. Women's advocates cite the lack of laws on 
domestic violence, double standards of morality, and a traditional 
societal reluctance to discuss private family affairs as some of the 
reasons for domestic violence. The absence of divorce under the law and 
limited job opportunities combine to limit the ability of both poor and 
wealthy women to escape destructive relationships.
    The PNP and Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) 
both maintain women's help desks to assist victims of violence against 
women and to encourage the reporting of crimes. Their role was 
strengthened further by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who 
until October 12 served concurrently as the secretary of the DSWD and 
continued to give women's issues a high public profile during the year. 
Many PNP stations included female officers. With the assistance of 
NGO's, additional male officers received gender sensitivity training to 
deal with victims of sexual crimes and domestic violence.
    In October a regional trial court in Davao City handed down the 
country's first conviction for marital rape. Rape continued to be a 
major problem; the number of rape cases reported to the police has 
risen by about 16 percent annually since 1992. The PNP reported that it 
investigated 3,145 cases of rape during the year; most of the alleged 
perpetrators were arrested. However, some women's groups stated that 
courts' imposition of death sentences for rape convictions might 
inhibit some victims from pressing charges. The number of prisoners 
awaiting execution for rape exceeds the number awaiting execution for 
murder.
    Many women suffer exposure to violence through their recruitment, 
often through deception, into prostitution (see Section 6.f.). Although 
illegal, prostitution remains widespread. A 1998 International Labor 
Organization (ILO) study estimated that 500,000 women are engaged in 
prostitution within the country. Most work independently or in small 
brothels rather than in prominent ``entertainment clubs.'' Penalties 
for the offense are light, but detained prostitutes are subjected to 
administrative indignities. There were reports of forced prostitution 
of children (see Section 6.c.). The Antivagrancy Act often is used by 
police officers as a pretext to extort money from prostitutes; those 
unable to pay may be subjected to sexual abuse. Hotel and travel 
industry leaders continued to refuse to honor their pledges to 
cooperate with a code endorsed by international tourism groups to stop 
sex tourism.
    Local officials condone a climate of impunity for those who exploit 
prostitutes--both the ``entertainment club'' owners and their patrons. 
Highly publicized official campaigns to close clubs and brothels fail 
to rescue young women from the abuse because the offending 
establishments usually are back in business a few days after such 
raids. The penalties for such actions are not considered sufficient to 
deter those who exploit prostitutes.
    The DSWD continued to provide temporary shelter and counseling to 
women trapped in prostitution, but officials believe that this helped 
only a small number of victims of illicit recruitment (see Section 
6.f.). DSWD officials noted that the number rescued failed to reflect 
the true extent of the prostitution problem since it reflected only 
those who obtained temporary shelter and counseling through the DSWD 
and local governments. NGO's argue that the Government first should 
address the abuses of dislocation and homelessness in order to address 
effectively the problem of women's exposure to the structural violence 
inherent in prostitution.
    Trafficking in women and children for forced prostitution and 
forced labor are problems (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment in the workplace also continues to be a problem. 
It is thought to be widespread yet underreported due to victims' fear 
of losing their jobs. Harassment by managers in ``special economic 
zones'' (SEZ's) is thought to be a common practice. Most of the female 
employees in SEZ's are economic migrants who are required to work long 
hours and have no independent workers organization to assist with 
filing complaints. Women also are hired as contractual employees 
without benefits in the pressing and sewing industry. Many are 
subjected to long hours in inadequately ventilated facilities.
    In law but not always in practice, women have most of the rights 
and protections accorded to men. The Presidential Commission on the 
Role of Filipino Women seeks to coordinate programs for women, working 
closely with NGO's such as the 10 millionmember Presidential Council of 
Women in the Philippines. More women than men enter secondary and 
tertiary education. Unemployment rates for women are consistently 
higher than for men. Women's salaries averaged about 47 percent lower 
than their male counterparts'. Except for government service and jobs 
in government-owned or government-controlled corporations, women 
continued to face discrimination in employment.
    In this predominantly Roman Catholic nation, Church opposition to 
divorce is strong. Nonetheless, changes in the legal code have made 
marriage annulment fairly easy and increasingly common. However, the 
legal cost precluded this option for many women. The practice of 
``unofficial divorce'' (permanent separation) was common among 
lowerincome couples. In such cases, the wife usually is left with the 
children, and the husband provides little or no financial support.
    Children.--Several government agencies have programs devoted to the 
education, welfare, and development of children. Nevertheless, children 
faced serious problems in their development. In April the NGO Helen 
Keller International reported that 30 to 40 percent of preschool 
children in the 4-province Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 
suffered from malnutrition. Most of the children were in villages in 
Maguinidanao, Lanao del Sur, and Tawi-Tawi provinces, the scene of 
heavy insurgent combat.
    Family poverty forces many children throughout the country to drop 
out of school; only about 65 percent of children complete the grade 6. 
This attrition rises with grade level. Public primary and secondary 
schools are free of tuition charges; however, poor families are unable 
to meet numerous peripheral costs for uniforms, school supplies, shoes, 
and transportation. The Asian Development Bank has expressed concern 
over an apparent growing inequity in educational opportunity as public 
spending per pupil declines. In the 1980's, public spending covered 80 
percent of the cost of elementary education; however, this share 
declined to only 69 percent by the mid-1990's.
    Widespread poverty forces many young children to work. The 
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) worked with the ILO and NGO's 
to address the problem of child labor. According to UNICEF and ILO 
studies, some 2 million children were exposed to hazardous working 
environments such as in quarries, mines, and at docksides in order to 
earn their living (see Section 6.d.). Forced prostitution and 
trafficking in children for the purpose of forced prostitution are 
problems (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., 6.f.).
    Studies by the Government and international organizations indicate 
that there are at least 44,000 street children and possibly as many as 
100,000 nationwide. Welfare officials believe that the number is 
increasing as a result of widespread unemployment in rural areas. Many 
street children apparently are abandoned children engaged in scavenging 
or begging.
    The family court system that was instituted in 1998 has helped 
expedite juvenile and domestic relations cases and served to strengthen 
safeguards against the sale and trafficking of children abroad. 
Previously, less specialized courts had tended to regard children as 
extensions and property of the parents and to favor parental authority 
over the rights of a child.
    Greater public awareness eroded traditional reticence to report 
abuses against children. DSWD offices cared for children who were the 
victims of rape. The problem of foreign pedophiles continued to be 
reported in the press. The Government continued to prosecute accused 
pedophiles.
    In September the Government signed the Optional Protocol on the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography. Despite government efforts 
at law enforcement and expanded children's programs, it is estimated 
that some 60,000 children are involved in the commercial sex industry. 
Most of these children were girls, and nearly all have dropped out of 
school. Children in the ``entertainment industry'' work long (10 to 
12), odd hours from evening until early morning. Typically they come 
from families with unemployed or irregularly employed parents.
    The NPA's use of children as armed combatants and noncombatants 
continued. According to UNICEF and AFP estimates, 3 percent of the more 
than 10,000 members of the NPA are boys and girls under the age of 18. 
However, from 20 to 25 percent of NPA new recruits reportedly are 
children. The NPA admits that members from 15 to 18 years of age are 
assigned to self-defense and noncombat duties and that in the event of 
``enemy aggression or encroachment,'' weapons would be distributed to 
the oldest children first. In February the NPA announced that it would 
no longer accept recruits under the age of 18, based on instructions 
from the NDF (see Section 1.g.). The NDF instruction stated, however, 
that minors could still serve in noncombat positions.
    According the international NGO, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers, the MILF recruited children as young as 13 years of age to 
serve as reserve forces.
    On March 21, several government agencies, including the AFP and 
PNP, signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on the handling and 
treatment of children involved in armed conflict. The MOA provides for 
the procedure to be followed from the time of rescue or surrender of 
the child until he or she is turned over to the DSWD for care and 
assistance. The MOA represents a shift in perspective, treating child 
insurgents as victims to be rescued and rehabilitated, rather than as 
enemies to be neutralized and prosecuted.
    As of October, the Government reported that 86 minors serving in 
the NPA had surrendered or been captured during the year. In November 
the PNP warned parents that the NPA was using false promises to lure 
minors to join.
    People with Disabilities.--The law provides for equal physical 
access for the disabled to all public buildings and establishments and 
for ``the rehabilitation, self development, and self-reliance of 
disabled persons and their integration into the mainstream of 
society.'' Advocates for the rights of the disabled contend that the 
law has been ineffective because implementing regulations have not been 
published, and because government programs are palliative rather than 
focused on reintegration. Reportedly only about 2 percent of an 
estimated 3.5 million disabled citizens received access to services.
    Indigenous People.--Indigenous people live throughout the country 
but primarily in the mountainous areas of northern and central Luzon 
and Mindanao. They account for about 18 percent of the national 
population. Although no specific laws discriminate against indigenous 
people, the remoteness of the areas that many inhabit and cultural bias 
prevent their full integration into society. Indigenous children suffer 
from lack of basic services, health, and education. Because they 
inhabit mountainous areas also favored by guerrillas, indigenous people 
suffer disproportionately from counterinsurgency operations.
    The 1997 Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, which was intended to 
implement constitutional provisions to protect indigenous people, 
established a National Commission on Indigenous People, which is 
staffed by tribal members empowered to award certificates of title to 
lands claimed by over 12 million indigenous people in the country. It 
awards such ``ancestral domain lands'' on the basis of communal rather 
than individual ownership, impeding sale of the lands by tribal 
leaders. The law requires a process of ``informed'' consultation and 
written consent by the indigenous group to allow mining on tribal 
lands. The law also assigns the indigenous groups the responsibility to 
preserve forest, watershed, and biodiversity areas in their domains 
from inappropriate development. However, the Government has been slow 
to implement the legislation, since it faces strong opposition from 
mining and agribusiness interests.
    Other measures have affected indigenous communities in adverse 
ways. The 1995 Mining Act promoted mining operations, hydroelectric 
dams, and other large-scale projects that forced indigenous people to 
relocate and abandon farming and hunting land that they have used for 
generations.
    Indigenous people continued to face legal threats to their claims 
to ancestral lands from developers, mining interests, and local 
political interests. The Higaonon people in Mindanao continue to be 
deprived of portions of their ancestral land by a powerful local 
landowning family that forced their removal through a violent 
demolition conducted by the PNP and private security forces in 1997. 
The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines continues to express 
concern over the effects of existing and planned large-scale mining on 
the livelihood of the many indigenous people of Mindanao.
    Religious Minorities.--About 5 million Muslims, who constitute 7 
percent of the population, reside principally in Mindanao and nearby 
islands and are the largest single minority group in the country. 
Historically they have been alienated from the dominant Christian 
majority, and government efforts to integrate Muslims into the 
political and economic fabric of the country have met with only limited 
success. The national culture, with its emphasis on familial, tribal, 
and regional loyalties, creates informal barriers whereby access to 
jobs or resources is provided first to those of one's own family or 
group. Muslims continue to be underrepresented in senior civilian and 
military positions. Provinces in Mindanao that are predominantly Muslim 
lag behind the rest of the region in almost all aspects of 
socioeconomic development.
    Christian-Muslim relations were extremely strained during the year, 
due mainly to the intense fighting between the AFP and the insurgent 
MILF in Mindanao, hostage-taking by the terrorist ASG, and bombings in 
Mindanao and throughout the country. Brief, fruitless negotiations 
between the Government and the MILF were overshadowed by the military 
conflict. However, government efforts to reintegrate former Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) insurgents into society continued with 
some success. The planned plebiscite for an expanded Autonomous Region 
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) contemplated in the 1996 peace agreement 
between the Government and the MNLF again was postponed, as was a new 
election for ARMM officials.
    In June, following persistent reports that troops operating against 
Muslim separatists in Mindanao had desecrated mosques, the Secretary of 
National Defense ordered the AFP to refrain from such action. The DND 
issued codeofconduct instructions that included provisions that 
military offensives could not be begun during Muslim prayer hours 
``unless absolutely required.''
    The Government placed responsibility on the MILF for mass killings 
on July 16 in Bumbaran, Lanao del Sur Province. Approximately 33 
civilians, all Christians, were forced by soldiers into a Muslim prayer 
house in the early morning. After a nearby battle during the day 
between the MILF and government forces, armed persons fired on the 
civilians in custody, killing 21 persons and injuring 9 others. The 
casualties included a pregnant woman and five children. After a 
subsequent investigation, the CHR stated that the perpetrators could 
have been non-MILF separatists posing as MILF members, and may have 
been renegade former members of the MNLF (see Section 1.g.).
    On August 27, unidentified persons attacked a vehicle and killed 12 
passengers, all Muslims, in Carmen, North Cotabato. The national 
Government blamed the MILF, but the provincial governor stated that 
those responsible may have been civilians seeking revenge on Muslims 
(see Section 1.g.).
    On December 28 in Jolo, Sulu, armed persons believed to be ASG 
members killed a Catholic priest, his driver, and two other persons 
(see Section 1.g.).

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and laws provide for 
the right of workers, including public employees, to form and join 
trade unions; however, while this right is exercised in practice, 
aspects of the public sector organization law restrict and discourage 
organizing. Trade unions are independent of the Government and 
generally free of political party control. Unions have the right to 
form or join federations or other labor groups.
    Although unions claimed to have organized about 12 percent of the 
total work force of 31 million, only about 540,000 workers, or about 
14.5 percent of union members, are covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. According to the DOLE Bureau of Labor Relations, the number 
of new union registrations has fallen continuously since 1995. The 
number of firms, primarily large employers, using ``contractual'' labor 
continued to grow.
    Subject to certain procedural restrictions, strikes in the private 
sector are legal. However, unions are required to provide strike 
notice, respect mandatory cooling-off periods, and obtain majority 
member approval before calling a strike. By law the reason for striking 
must be relevant to the labor contract or the law, and all means of 
reconciliation must be exhausted. The Secretary of Labor and Employment 
can intervene in some labor disputes by ``assuming jurisdiction'' and 
mandating a settlement if the Secretary decides that the industry 
involved in the strike is ``vital to national security.''
    In September port workers at the international container terminal 
in Manila struck in protest against illegal dismissals. One worker was 
killed, reportedly by company security guards, in violence that 
occurred when striking workers attempted to enter the company compound. 
The union reported that it observed nonunion workers at work in the 
compound. The strike ended when the National Labor Relations Commission 
(NLRC) issued a backtowork order.
    According the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), union officials can be dismissed and imprisoned for a maximum 
of 3 years for taking part in illegal strikes.
    Most strikes are legal. According to the ICFTU, union officials can 
be dismissed and imprisoned for a maximum of 3 years for taking part in 
illegal strikes. However, there are no recent reported cases in which 
this provision was enforced.
    Legislation that the ILO Committee of Experts criticized for 
placing undue restrictions on the right to strike in nonessential 
services remained unchanged. The Committee remained concerned by the 
imposition of penalties in cases where strikes were deemed illegal, by 
the restrictions on the right of government workers to strike, and by 
some restrictions on the right to organize and form a bargaining unit 
in conflict with ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association.
    The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) reported 60 
strikes during the year, compared with 58 strikes the previous year. 
There were 320,000 workdays lost to strikes, compared with 229,000 in 
1999. The average duration of strikes increased to 26 days during the 
year from 20 days in 1999.
    In March militant labor leaders who were conducting a religious 
service at a hotel against which they were striking were arrested when 
they refused police orders to disperse. Some protesters reportedly were 
injured, and 17 persons were arrested. In May 20 union members were 
arrested at the same hotel when police declared their picket line 
unlawful because it hindered the entrance of hotel guests.
    In November NPA members shot and injured a sugar plantation union 
leader and a policeman in Tarlac City. Prior to the attack, the union 
leader had led a rally at the regional office of the Department of 
Agrarian Reform to protest the plantation owners' stock distribution 
plans (see Section 1.c.).
    Longshoremen in Cebu returned to work without violent incidents 
during the year.
    There again were unpublished reports of routine management 
intimidation of union members.
    Unions have the right to affiliate with international trade union 
confederations and trade secretariats. Two of the largest trade union 
centers, the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and the Federation 
of Free Workers, are affiliated with the ICFTU and the World 
Confederation of Labor, respectively.
    The ICFTU complained that a union can be registered only if it 
represents at least 20 percent of workers in a bargaining unit, and 
that the law requires what it considers to be an excessively high 
number of unions before a federation or national center can be formed.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for the right to organize and bargain 
collectively. The Labor Code provides for this right for employees both 
in the private sector and in governmentowned or controlled 
corporations. A similar right is afforded to most government workers, 
but senior employees, members of the military forces, and essential 
public service workers are not eligible.
    Allegations of intimidation and discrimination in connection with 
union activities are grounds for review as possible unfair labor 
practices before the quasi-judicial NLRC. However, unions often stated 
that widespread ignorance of basic standards and rights is a major 
obstacle to union organization. Before disputes reach the NLRC, the 
DOLE provides the services of the NCMB, which settles most of the 
unfair labor practice disputes raised as grounds for strikes before the 
strikes can be declared.
    An appeal submitted by the four Taiwanese companies located in 
export processing zones against orders for union elections to be held 
was still pending with the Labor Secretary. A total of 187 union 
officials were fined; there were no reports that these persons were 
reinstated.
    Labor law is uniform throughout the country, including the 
industrial zones, where tax benefits encourage the growth of export 
industries. However, local political leaders and officials who govern 
these special economic zones have tried to frustrate union organizing 
efforts by maintaining ``union free/strike free'' policies. A conflict 
over interpretation of the SEZ law's provisions for labor inspection 
has created further obstacles to enforcement of workers' rights to 
organize. Despite objections from the DOLE, SEZ local directors claim 
authority to conduct their own inspections as part of the zones' 
privileges intended by Congress. Hiring often is controlled tightly 
through ``SEZ labor centers,'' in which political ties to local figures 
play a role in gaining job eligibility. Despite sporadic labor unrest 
and some organizing efforts, union successes in the SEZ's have been few 
and marginal. Some mainstream unions avoid a major unionizing effort in 
the lowerwage SEZ industries, such as the garment industry. They 
consider it unpromising in view of both the organizers' restricted 
access to the closely guarded zones and the rapid turnover of the 
young, mainly female staff who work on shortterm contracts in the 
zones' many electronics and garment factories.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is 
prohibited, including forced and bonded labor by children; however, 
despite the Government's generally effective prohibition of forced 
labor, there were some reports of forced or bonded labor by children, 
mainly in prostitution and other areas of the informal sector, as well 
as trafficking in women and children for forced prostitution. Over 
300,000 children 17 years of age or younger work as family domestic 
workers, for whom the minimum age is 15. Some recruiters reportedly 
bring girls between the ages of 13 and 17 to work in Manila or Cebu 
homes under terms that involve a ``loan'' advanced to their parents 
that the children are obliged to repay through their work. The DOLE 
continued to address the problem of underage workers in family work 
settings by prosecutions and fines of violators (see Sections 6.d. and 
6.f.). Some children reportedly worked to help their parents repay 
loans from planters. Trafficking in women and children for the purposes 
of prostitution and forced labor also are problems (see Section 6.f.).
    In July a 15-year-old worker reportedly escaped from a rice mill in 
Tayug, Pangasinan. The youth stated in an affidavit that he had been 
recruited by an employment agency and promised a job in Manila. Instead 
he was sent to the rice mill, where he was forced to work 12 hours per 
day, 7 days per week. The owner of the mill had been fined in January 
for employing eight minors (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age 
of 15, except under the direct and sole responsibility of parents or 
guardians, or where employment in cinema, theater, radio, or television 
is essential to the integrity of the production. The Labor Code allows 
employment of those between the ages of 15 and 18 for such hours and 
periods of the day as are determined by the Secretary of Labor but 
forbids the employment of persons under 18 years of age in hazardous or 
dangerous work. However, a significant number of children are employed 
in the informal sector of the urban economy or as unpaid family workers 
in rural areas. According to a 1995 survey, there are at least 3.7 
million working children, approximately 2 million of whom are exposed 
to hazardous working environments.
    There are few child labor violations in the formal manufacturing 
sector. Most child labor is in the informal sector, most often in 
family settings, and the Government rarely if ever seeks to prosecute a 
poor family because they have a working child. However, children 
reportedly continue to be employed illegally on the docks of some 
Mindanao and Visayan ports. Working at a piece rate in the unloading of 
bulk cargo, the children earn far less than adults would demand for the 
same work even though they are exposed to harmful dust and chemicals in 
the ships' holds.
    Employment of children as divers in dangerous conditions on coral 
reef fishing vessels reportedly continued. The ILO-IPEC (International 
Program on the Elimination of Child Labor) project to address this 
question was ongoing at year's end.
    In Mindanao plantations growing bananas for export frequently used 
children as day laborers in trimming and fertilizing plants and 
clearing irrigation ditches.
    In October the Government ratified ILO Convention 182. The 
Government banned hazardous work by children in 1973, and in 1999 the 
DOLE issued an updated list of hazardous and deleterious work that is 
prohibited for persons under the age of 18. Legislation pending in the 
Congress would consolidate child labor laws and increase penalties for 
violations. The DOLE and other agencies continue to work closely with 
UNICEF and the ILO-IPEC to reduce violations of child labor laws.
    The DOLE works with domestic NGO's to educate communities on child 
labor and provides counseling and other activities for children. It 
uses fines and criminal prosecutions for child labor violations in the 
formal sector, such as manufacturing. During the year, it rescued 132 
child workers in 64 operations. The rescued children were working in 
factories, as domestic helpers, or as sex workers. In addition routine 
inspections through November revealed 31 establishments nationwide that 
employed a total of 50 children. About 35 of the minors rescued 
received back wages and other benefits from employers after 
intervention by the DOLE. Of the DOLE's 253 inspectors, only 22 have 
received training on child labor inspections.
    The DOLE reported that it had begun to investigate reports that 
more than 17,000 children were engaged in hazardous work in the 
Cordillera Administrative Region. Most of the children reportedly 
worked in the mining and quarrying industry under supervision of their 
parents.
    The DOLE continued to address the problem of underage workers in 
family work settings by prosecutions and fines of violators. The DOLE 
also works with NGO's and international organizations
    such as the UNICEF and ILO-IPEC to assist children to return to 
school. The DOLE also rescues child workers; the DSWD then assists them 
in obtaining social services.
    The Department of Education, Culture, and Sport participates in an 
interagency effort to return dropout children to school.
    In March the owner of a piggery and poultry farm in Bulacan was 
convicted of the violation of child labor laws.
    In March a massage parlor in Baguio City was found to be employing 
a minor. The mayor ordered the establishment closed.
    In June the DOLE and DSWD rescued 36 minors, mostly Muslims from 
Mindanao, from employment in a candle factory in Valenzuela City, Metro 
Manila. The raid was prompted by complaints filed by 62 other Muslims 
who had fled the factory earlier.
    In October a recruitment agency was raided by police, resulting in 
the rescue of 331 women and girls, some of them under the age of 21. 
The agency reportedly had been trafficking in women under 21 to work as 
entertainers in foreign countries, in violation of the law (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, 
despite government enforcement efforts, there were reports of its use, 
mainly in the informal sector and prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Tripartite regional wage boards 
set minimum wages. A round of wage increases was implemented in all 
regions of the country late in the year. The highest rates are in the 
National Capital Region (NCR) and the lowest in rural regions. The 
minimum daily wage for NCR nonagricultural workers is about $5.50 (250 
pesos), which does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker 
and family. At this pay level, at least two family members would have 
to work full-time to support a family of six above the level of the 
Government's minimum daily cost of living for the Manila area. The 
lowest minimum wages are in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, 
where the daily agricultural wage is approximately $2.90 (131 pesos). 
Large numbers of workers receive less than the minimum wage set for 
their area.
    Regional wage board orders cover all private sector workers except 
domestic servants and other persons employed in the personal service of 
another. Boards outside the NCR exempted some employers because of 
factors such as establishment size, industry sector, involvement with 
exports, financial distress, and level of capitalization. These 
exemptions excluded substantial additional numbers of workers from 
coverage under the law. Unions have filed complaints about the minimum 
wage exemption policies.
    Violation of minimum wage standards is common. Many firms hire 
employees at below the minimum apprentice rates, even if there is no 
approved training in their productionline work. DOLE officials estimate 
a 30 to 40 percent noncompliance rate with the minimum wage requirement 
and acknowledge that the shortage of inspectors makes the law difficult 
to enforce. In addition to fines, the Government also makes use of 
administrative procedures and moral suasion to encourage voluntary 
employer correction of violations.
    By law the standard legal workweek is 48 hours for most categories 
of industrial workers and 40 hours for government workers, with an 8-
hour per day limit. An overtime rate of 125 percent of the hourly rate 
is mandated on ordinary days and 130 percent on rest days and holidays. 
The law mandates a full day of rest weekly. However, there is no legal 
limit on the number of overtime hours that an employer may require. 
Enforcement of work week hours is managed through periodic inspections 
by the DOLE.
    Several NGO's seek to protect the rights of the country's 5 to 6 
million overseas workers. The Government places financial sanctions and 
criminal charges on domestic recruiting agencies that are found guilty 
of unfair labor practices. Although the Philippine Overseas Employment 
Agency has registered and supervised domestic recruiters' practices 
successfully, the Government largely is unable to ensure workers' 
protection overseas. It seeks cooperation from receiving countries and 
proposes migrant worker rights conventions in international forums. The 
Government also provides assistance through its diplomatic missions in 
countries with substantial numbers of migrant workers. In May the 
President approved the establishment of a pension fund for overseas 
workers, special hospital and counseling services for the workers' 
families, and reintegration services, including housing and livelihood 
assistance.
    The law provides for a comprehensive set of occupational safety and 
health standards exists in the law. The DOLE has responsibility for 
policy formulation and review of these standards, but with fewer than 
300 inspectors nationwide, actual enforcement often is carried out by 
local authorities. DOLE officials acknowledge that their 253 inspectors 
are not adequate for the number of work sites in need of visits. 
Statistics on actual work-related accidents and illnesses are 
incomplete, as incidents (especially in agriculture) are underreported. 
Workers do not have a legally protected right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit 
trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women and children is a 
serious problem. The Government used five laws against related illegal 
commerce to address trafficking. The Philippines is a source, 
destination, and a transit point for trafficking in persons. Of those 
persons trafficking through the country, many are from China, bound for 
Pacific island nations.
    Many women seek employment overseas and are particularly vulnerable 
to exploitation by unethical recruiters who promise attractive jobs or, 
in some cases, arrange marriages with foreign men. Some eventually work 
as prostitutes or suffer abuse by their foreign employers or husbands. 
Those recruited to work as maids, entertainers, or models overseas may 
be forced to participate in public shows or dances where nudity and the 
prospect of sex are the principal attractions to clients. Other persons 
knowingly accept questionable jobs to support parents, children, or 
siblings with their remittances. There were reports of forced 
prostitution of children (see Section 6.c.).
    In June the DOLE and DSWD rescued 36 minors, mostly Muslims from 
Mindanao, from employment in a candle factory in Valenzuela City, Metro 
Manila. The raid was prompted by complaints filed by 62 other Muslims 
who had fled the factory earlier (see Section 6.d.).
    In October a recruitment agency was raided by police, resulting in 
the rescue of 331 women and girls, some of them under the age of 21. 
The agency reportedly had been trafficking in women under 21 to work as 
entertainers in foreign countries, in violation of the law (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    There were no prosecutions for trafficking in humans during the 
year; however, in August two women suspected of trafficking in children 
were charged with violations of the Passport Law.
    Within the country, child trafficking by illegal recruiters often 
brought children from poor rural areas to low-paying jobs in cities. 
Over 300,000 children 17 years of age and younger work as family 
domestic workers, for whom the minimum age is 15. Some recruiters 
reportedly bring girls between the ages of 13 and 17 to work in Manila 
or Cebu homes under terms that involve a ``loan'' advanced to their 
parents that the children are obliged to repay through their work. The 
DOLE continued to address the problem of underage workers in family 
work settings by prosecutions and fines of violators (see Section 6.c. 
and 6.d.).
    The DSWD, which is the lead agency in public assistance to victims 
of trafficking, continued to provide temporary shelter and counseling 
to women trapped in prostitution, but officials believe that this 
helped only a small number of victims of illicit recruitment (see 
Section 5). It also offered livelihood skills development and other 
services. DSWD officials noted that the number rescued failed to 
reflect the true extent of the prostitution problem since it reflected 
only those who obtained temporary shelter and counseling through the 
DSWD and local governments.
    The 1995 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act was enacted to 
provide the Government with greater financial resources and improved 
authority to combat such problems. However, NGO's believe that these 
measures have not been adequate since traffickers remain numerous and 
effective in luring women with promises of lucrative overseas 
contracts.
    The Government's NCRFW is the lead agency on women's issues, 
including trafficking. Its principal function is to coordinate the 
implementation of government programs on the integration of women in 
national development. It monitors compliance with laws on equal 
treatment and protection of women and serves as a clearinghouse for 
related information.
    In 1999 the Department of Foreign Affairs established an internal 
task force on trafficking in humans. Within the DOLE, the Bureau of 
Women's Affairs, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, and the 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) work on different 
aspects of the trafficking problem. The POEA, an attached agency of the 
DOLE, continued its efforts to end illegal recruiting. As of August, it 
had closed 125 firms for illegal recruitment. It also has raised the 
age, educational requirements, and professional standards for young 
women seeking jobs abroad and tried to discourage employment migration. 
Several Cabinet departments, presidential commissions, and legislators 
also are involved in vigorous public awareness campaigns.
    The CHR investigates violations of the rights of trafficking 
victims and establishes cases for prosecution. It conducts public 
information and sectoral education campaigns, and provides human rights 
training for other government agencies, including the PNP.
    The Government, in cooperation with the U.N. Center for 
International Crime Prevention and the U.N. Interregional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute, also is implementing a demonstration 
project in the country aimed at improving interagency coordination, 
strengthening law enforcement, and developing strategies to assist 
victims.
    In March a Manila meeting of the Asian Regional Initiative Against 
Trafficking (ARIAT) developed a Regional Plan of Action on trafficking 
in persons, especially in women and children. ARIAT was the first 
regional meeting to address all problems related to trafficking in 
persons. The Regional Action Plan includes strategies for combating 
trafficking from the AsiaPacific Region as well as to and within the 
region.
                               __________

                                 SAMOA

    Samoa is a parliamentary democracy that incorporates certain 
traditional practices into its legislative system. The Constitution of 
this Pacific island country of approximately 170,000 persons provides 
for a head of state; a unicameral legislature composed of family heads, 
or ``matai,'' who are elected by universal suffrage; the protection of 
land rights and traditional titles; and other fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Executive authority is vested in the Head of State with the 
Government administered by the Cabinet, which consists of the Prime 
Minister and 12 ministers chosen by him. All laws passed by the 
Legislative Assembly need the approval of the Head of State, Malietoa 
Tanumafili II, who holds the position for life. The Legislative 
Assembly is to elect his successors for 5-year terms. The judiciary is 
independent.
    The country does not have a defense force. The small national 
police force is controlled by the Government but has little effect 
beyond Apia, the capital city. Enforcement of rules and security within 
individual villages is vested in the ``fono'' (Council of Matai), which 
settles most internal disputes. Judgments by the fono usually involve 
fines or, more rarely, banishment from the village.
    The country is poor with a market-based economy in which more than 
60 percent of the work force are employed in the agricultural sector. 
Fish, kava, and coconut products are the principal exports. The small 
industrial sector is dominated by a Japanese factory that assembles 
automotive electrical parts for export. The Government continues an 
effort to promote tourism. Per capita gross domestic product is $1,100 
per year. The country is heavily dependent on foreign aid and on 
remittances sent to family members by the more than 100,000 Samoans 
living overseas.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens. Principal human rights abuses arise from political 
discrimination against women and nonmatai, and violence against women 
and children. Societal pressures and customary law may interfere with 
the ability to conduct fair trials. Those who do not conform to 
accepted societal values may face pressure, threats, violence, and 
banishment. There are some restrictions on freedom of speech, press, 
and religion. An August Supreme Court ruling ordered government-
controlled media to allow opposition parties access, and in July the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may not be used to 
infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech, assembly, or 
association.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    Three persons were convicted and sentenced to death for the July 
1999 murder of Minister of Public Works Luaglau Levaula Kamu: The 
former Minister of Women's Affairs Luagalau Levaulu Kama; his son, 
Eletise Leafa Vitale; and the former Minister of Telecommunications, 
Toi Aokuso Cain. The Head of State commuted the death sentences to life 
in prison for all three.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials practiced them.
    Although jail conditions are fairly basic with respect to food and 
sanitation, they appear to meet minimum international standards, and 
there have been no reports of abuses in prisons. While there are human 
rights groups, the question of monitoring prison conditions by them has 
not arisen. Prison visits by family members and church representatives 
are permitted.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes 
these prohibitions. However, villages are governed by customary law, 
and the fono may mete out banishment when deemed necessary. Banishment 
is one of the harshest forms of punishment in this collective society. 
Civil courts have overruled banishment orders. In July the Supreme 
Court ordered the reinstatement of 32 persons who were banished from a 
village for practicing a religion other than that traditionally 
practiced in the village (see Section 2.c.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and this is 
honored by the official court system. However, many civil and criminal 
matters are not handled by courts but by village fono, which vary 
considerably both in their decisionmaking style and in the number of 
matai involved in the decisions. The 1990 Village Fono Act gives legal 
recognition to the decisions of the fono and provides for limited 
recourse of appeal to the Lands and Titles Courts and to the Supreme 
Court. In July the Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may 
not be used to infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech, 
assembly, or association (see Section 2.c.).
    The judiciary consists of the magistrates' courts, the coroners' 
courts, and the Lands and Titles Court, with the High or Supreme Court 
at the apex of the system.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law provides substantive and procedural safeguards 
from invasion of the home or seizure of property, including a 
requirement for search warrants, which are issued by the judicial 
branch. However, there is little or no privacy in villages. While 
village officials by law must have permission to enter homes, there can 
be substantial societal pressure to grant such permission.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice. In August the Supreme Court 
overturned a 1997 ban by the then Prime Minister on coverage of the 
leader of the opposition on state-run radio and television stations. In 
practice the Government's ban largely had been symbolic, since 
opposition statements received prominent coverage in the private news 
media. In July the Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may 
not be used to infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech, 
assembly, or association (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
    The Newspapers and Printers Act and the Defamation Act require 
journalists to reveal their sources in the event of a defamation suit 
against them. There has been no court case requiring that these acts be 
invoked.
    In February the Supreme Court dismissed a petition brought by 
government-owned Polynesian Airlines against the independent newspaper 
the Samoa Observer that asked the court to jail the newspaper's 
editors. In 1999 the Supreme Court had granted Polynesian Airlines an 
injunction to prevent the newspaper from publishing news about the 
company's expenses for senior staff, and the airline filed the petition 
in response to a subsequent editorial about the incident.
    Two English-language newspapers and a number of Samoan-language 
newspapers are printed regularly. The Government operates a radio 
station and the sole television station. There are two private radio 
stations, and a satellite-cable system is now available in parts of 
Apia. Television from American Samoa is readily available. Internet use 
is expanding rapidly, both as a news source, and as a means of two-way 
communication; there has been no government interference with its use.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice. In July the Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may 
not be used to infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech, 
assembly, or association (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion along with freedom of thought and conscience, and the 
Government generally respects these rights in practice; however, local 
officials at times infringe on these rights.
    The preamble to the Constitution acknowledges ``an Independent 
State based on Christian principles and Samoan custom and traditions.'' 
Nevertheless, while Christianity is constitutionally favored, there is 
no official or state denomination.
    Although the Constitution grants each person the right to change 
religion or belief and to worship or teach religion alone or with 
others, in practice the matai often choose the religious denomination 
of the aiga (extended family). Despite the constitutional protection, 
village councils--in the name of maintaining social harmony within the 
village--sometimes banish or punish families that do not adhere to the 
prevailing religious belief in the village.
    In June the Supreme Court ordered the release of 42 Bible study 
group members, whom their village fono had ordered jailed because they 
violated a village law banning practice of any but the village 
majority's religion.
    In July the Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may not 
be used to infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech, 
assembly, or association. The plaintiffs had complained that the 
village matai in Saipipi village had prohibited them from conducting 
Bible classes or church services on the village's communal land and 
limited the number of churches allowed in the village (see Section 
1.d.).
    Missionaries operate freely, either as part of one of the 
established churches, or by conducting independent revival meetings. 
The major denominations (for example, Congregational, Methodist, 
Catholic, and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints) that are 
present in the country also have missionaries. There is an independent 
Christian radio and television station.
    The Constitution provides freedom from unwanted religious 
indoctrination in schools but gives each denomination or religion the 
right to establish its own schools; these provisions are adhered to in 
practice. There are both religious and public schools; the public 
schools do not have religious instruction as part of their curriculum. 
There are pastoral schools in most villages to provide religious 
instruction following school hours.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
internal movement, but in practice some citizens have been banished 
either from village activities or completely from their villages. The 
Government actively supports emigration as a ``safety valve'' for 
pressures of a growing population, especially for potentially 
rebellious youths, and because it generates foreign income through 
remittances. There are an estimated 100,000 Samoans living abroad and 
their remittances make an important contribution to the national 
economy. The Government does not restrict foreign travel arbitrarily or 
the right of citizens to return from abroad.
    Samoa has not had any refugees or asylum seekers. It is a signatory 
to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; 
however, the Government has not enacted enabling legislation or 
formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum. 
However, the authorities have indicated that they would conform to 
international norms if such cases should arise.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government through direct, 
multiparty elections; however, women's political rights are restricted 
by the fact that few of them are matai. While all citizens above the 
age of 21 may vote, the right to run for 47 of the 49 seats in the 
Legislative Assembly remains the prerogative of the approximately 
25,000 matai, 95 percent of whom are men. The remaining two seats are 
reserved for citizens not of Samoan heritage. Matai continue to control 
local government through the village fono, which are open to them 
alone.
    The political process is more a function of personal leadership 
characteristics than of party. The Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) 
has dominated the political process, winning five consecutive elections 
since 1982. The 1996 general elections again gave the HRPP a majority, 
but in 1998 ill health forced then-Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana 
to resign. The HRPP caucus selected former Deputy Prime Minister 
Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi as Acting Prime Minister. Tofilau died in 
March 1999, and Tuilaepa became Prime Minister. Although candidates are 
free to propose themselves for electoral office, in practice they 
require the approval of the village high chiefs. Those who ran in the 
1996 elections despite fono objections faced ostracism and even 
banishment from their village. Following the 1996 elections, there were 
multiple charges of fraud and bribery. Four elections subsequently were 
overturned by the Supreme Court, and by-elections were held.
    Elections are scheduled for April 2001, and Parliament is 
considering an amendment to the Elections Law, which would require 
anyone planning to run to have resided in the country continuously for 
3 years.
    There are no prohibitions on the formation of opposition parties, 
and there are a total of five political parties, two of which are 
represented in Parliament.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however, 
they occasionally reach high public office. The 12-member Cabinet has 1 
female member, and women hold 3 of the 49 seats in the Legislative 
Assembly.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operated without government 
restriction. Government officials usually are cooperative.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, disability, language, or social status. Society is 
homogeneous with no significant ethnic minorities. Politics and culture 
are the product of a heritage of chiefly privilege and power, and 
members of certain families have some advantages. While there is 
discrimination against women and nonmatai who only occasionally may 
reach high office, women (and particularly female matai) play an 
important role in society.
    Women.--While the law prohibits the abuse of women, social custom 
tolerates their physical abuse within the home. The role and rights of 
the village fono and tradition prevent police from interfering in 
instances of domestic violence, unless there is a complaint from the 
victim--which village custom strongly discourages. While police receive 
some complaints from abused women, domestic violence offenders 
typically are punished by village councils, but only if the abuse is 
considered extreme (i.e., visible signs of physical abuse). The village 
religious leader also may intervene in domestic disputes.
    The State punishes persons responsible for extreme assault cases, 
including by imprisonment.
    Many cases of rape still go unreported because tradition and custom 
discourage such reporting. Despite such discouragement, the authorities 
note a greater number of reported cases of rape, as women slowly become 
more forthcoming with the police. Rape cases that reach the courts are 
treated seriously. Convicted offenders often are given relatively stiff 
sentences of several years' imprisonment.
    The traditional subordinate role of women is changing, albeit 
slowly, especially in the more conservative parts of society. The 
Ministry of Women's Affairs oversees and helps secure the rights of 
women.
    Children.--The Government has made a strong commitment to the 
welfare of children through the implementation of various youth 
programs by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. 
Education is free and compulsory through age 16. Law and tradition 
prohibit severe abuse of children, but tradition tolerates corporal 
punishment. The police have noted an increase in reported cases of 
child abuse, which was attributed to citizens becoming more aware of 
the need to report physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of children.
    Three behavior modification camps for expatriate children with 
emotional or behavior problems exist in the country. They are not 
supervised closely, but are not known to be abusive to the children in 
their care.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government has passed no legislation 
pertaining to the status of disabled persons or regarding accessibility 
for the disabled. Tradition dictates that the family cares for a 
disabled person, and this custom is observed widely in practice.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers legally have unrestricted 
rights to establish and join organizations of their own choosing. There 
are two trade unions in the country. The Samoa National Union, 
organized in 1994, is a six-member association that includes workers 
from the three major banks. A second union represents members at the 
sole factory in the country. Both unions are independent of the 
Government and political parties. There are no laws specific to union 
activity. The Commissioner of Labor adjudicates any cases of 
retribution against strikers or union leaders on a case-by-case basis.
    The Public Service Association, which represents government workers 
(an increasingly important sector of the work force), also functions as 
a union. The Supreme Court has upheld the right of government workers 
to strike, subject to certain restrictions imposed principally for 
reasons of public safety. Workers in the private sector have the right 
to strike, but there were no strikes during the year. The Public 
Service Association freely maintains relations with international 
bodies and participates in bilateral exchanges.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While workers 
have the legal right to engage in collective bargaining, they seldom 
have practiced it, due to the novelty of union activity and the 
inexperience of union leaders. The Public Service Association engages 
in collective bargaining on behalf of government workers, including 
bargaining on wages. In June the Nurses Union successfully negotiated a 
modest pay increase.
    An advisory commission to the Minister of Labor sets minimum wages. 
Wages in the private sector are determined by competitive demand for 
the required skills. Any antiunion discrimination case would be 
reported to and adjudicated by the Commissioner of Labor. Arbitration 
and mediation procedures are in place to resolve labor disputes, 
although such disputes rarely arise.
    Labor law and practice in the one export processing zone are the 
same as in the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor is 
prohibited by law, and the Government respects this prohibition in 
practice; however, in this collective society persons, including 
minors, frequently are called upon to work for their villages. Most 
persons do so willingly; however, the matai may compel those who do not 
(see Section 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Under the 1972 Labor and Employment Act (LEA), as amended, 
it is illegal to employ children under 15 years of age except in ``safe 
and light work.'' The Commissioner of Labor refers complaints about 
illegal child labor to the Attorney General for enforcement. Children 
frequently are seen vending goods and food on Apia street corners. 
Although the practice constitutes a violation of the LEA, local 
officials mostly tolerate and overlook it. There are no reports of 
bonded labor by children, but the LEA does not apply to service 
rendered to the matai, some of whom require children to work for the 
village, primarily on village farms (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The LEA established for the 
private sector a 40-hour workweek and an hourly minimum wage of $0.47 
(WS$ 1.40). This minimum wage suffices for a basic standard of living 
for worker and family when supplemented by the subsistence farming and 
fishing in which most families engage. The act provides that no worker 
should be required to work for more than 40 hours in any week.
    The act also establishes certain rudimentary safety and health 
standards, which the Attorney General is responsible for enforcing. 
However, independent observers report that the safety laws are not 
enforced strictly except when accidents highlight noncompliance. Many 
agricultural workers, among others, are inadequately protected from 
pesticides and other dangers to health. Government education programs 
are addressing these concerns. The act does not apply to service 
rendered to the matai. While the act does not specifically address the 
right of workers to remove themselves from a dangerous work situation, 
a report of such a case to the Commissioner of Labor would prompt an 
investigation, without jeopardy to continued employment. Government 
employees are covered under different and more stringent regulations, 
which are enforced adequately by the Public Service Commission.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                               SINGAPORE

    Singapore is a parliamentary republic in which politics is 
dominated overwhelmingly by the People's Action Party (PAP), which has 
held power uninterruptedly since Singapore gained autonomy from the 
United Kingdom in 1959. Opposition parties exist and regularly contest 
elections; however, the PAP holds 80 of 83 elected parliamentary seats 
(1 is vacant) and all ministerial positions. Elections take place at 
regular, constitutionally mandated intervals. The judiciary is 
efficient and constitutionally independent; however, there has been a 
perception that it reflects the views of the executive in politically 
sensitive cases as government leaders historically have utilized court 
proceedings, in particular defamation suits, against political 
opponents and critics.
    The police are responsible for routine security within the country 
and for the protection of the borders, including action against illegal 
immigrants and patrolling the island's territorial waters. The military 
forces are responsible for external defense. The Internal Security 
Department (ISD) in the Ministry of Home Affairs is authorized by the 
Internal Security Act (ISA) to counter such perceived threats to the 
nation's security as espionage, international terrorism, threats to 
racial and religious harmony, and subversion. The Government's use of 
the ISA to control what it considers serious security threats has 
decreased. The civilian Government maintains tight control over all 
security activities. There were reports that members of the security 
forces occasionally committed human rights abuses.
    Singapore has a free market economic system. Financial and business 
services industries, manufacturing of semiconductors and 
telecommunications equipment, and petroleum refining and petrochemical 
production are key sectors of the economy. The Government has 
liberalized broadly market access for telecommunications and financial 
services providers. Economic growth increased to an estimated 10.1 
percent during the year, improving on the 5.6 percent registered in 
1999. Per capita gross domestic product was estimated at $23,383. 
Wealth is distributed broadly and the unemployment rate is low.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were significant problems in some areas. The 
Government has wide powers to limit citizens' rights and to handicap 
political opposition. There were occasional instances of police abuse; 
however, the Government investigates and punishes those found guilty, 
and the media fully cover allegations of mistreatment. Caning, in 
addition to imprisonment, is a routine punishment for numerous 
offenses. The Government continues to rely on preventive detention to 
deal with espionage, organized crime, and narcotics. The authorities 
sometimes infringe on citizens' privacy rights.
    The Government did not change the wide array of laws and government 
practices, or the informal methods of government influence, that 
continue to restrict freedom of speech and the press significantly and 
limit other civil and political rights. Government intimidation and 
pressure to conform result in the practice of self-censorship among 
journalists. Government leaders historically have utilized court 
proceedings, in particular defamation suits, against political 
opponents and critics. These suits, which consistently have been 
decided in favor of government plaintiffs, have chilled political 
speech and action, and created a perception that the ruling party uses 
the judicial system for political purposes. While no new defamation 
suits were filed during the year, some opposition leaders remain at 
risk of bankruptcy because of efforts by ruling party members to 
collect damages awarded in previous years. In June an opposition party 
leader lost a legal appeal to forestall payment of damages stemming 
from a 1998 defamation lawsuit filed against him by PAP members. There 
was a moderate level of ongoing debate in newspapers and Internet chat 
groups on various public issues, and the Government established a 
Speakers' Corner in a public park to facilitate the ability of persons 
to speak in public on a range of issues. However, government 
restrictions on such persons still inhibited their ability to speak 
freely. The Government significantly restricts freedom of assembly and 
association. Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church are banned; 
however, freedom of religion otherwise generally is respected. There is 
some legal discrimination against women, which affects benefits for 
children and husbands in limited cases. The Government has moved 
actively to counter societal discrimination against women and 
minorities, but violence and some discrimination against women and 
reports of trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution 
persist. Foreign workers are vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, there were occasional 
instances of police mistreatment of detainees, and there were a few 
reports of police abuse during the year. The media report fully on 
allegations of police abuse of those arrested, and the Government takes 
action against abusers. The press reported that approximately 10 law 
enforcement officers were jailed for using excessive force on prisoners 
and suspects since 1995. In March a court disallowed the confession of 
a youth who had alleged that police beat him to force his confession to 
the sale of pirated video disks after a January 1999 arrest. The court 
ruled that it could not be certain that the admission was made 
voluntarily. In 1999 56 complaints of police abuse of detainees were 
filed, of which 7 were substantiated.
    The Penal Code mandates caning, in addition to imprisonment, as 
punishment for some 30 offenses involving the use of violence or threat 
of violence against a person, such as rape and robbery, and also for 
such nonviolent offenses as vandalism, drug trafficking, and violation 
of immigration laws. Caning is discretionary for convictions on other 
charges involving the use of criminal force, such as kidnaping, or 
voluntarily causing grievous hurt. Women, men over age 50 or under age 
16, and those determined unfit by a medical officer are exempted from 
punishment by caning. Although current statistics are not available, 
caning is a commonly administered punishment within the stipulations of 
the law. Prison conditions generally are good and meet minimum 
international standards.
    The Government does not allow human rights monitors to visit 
prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides that, 
in most instances, arrests are to be carried out following the issuance 
of an authorized warrant; however, some laws provide for arrests 
without warrants. Those arrested must be charged before a magistrate 
within 48 hours. The great majority of those arrested are charged 
expeditiously and brought to trial. Those who face criminal charges are 
allowed counsel, and the Law Society of Singapore administers a 
criminal legal aid plan for those who cannot afford to hire an 
attorney. A functioning system of bail exists for persons who are 
charged. In death penalty cases, the Supreme Court appoints two 
attorneys for defendants who are unable to afford their own counsel.
    Some laws--the Internal Security Act (ISA), the Criminal Law 
(Temporary Provisions) Act (CLA), the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA), and 
the Undesirable Publications Act (UPA)--have provisions for arrest 
without warrant. The ISA historically is employed primarily against 
suspected Communist-related security threats. The CLA historically has 
been employed primarily against suspected organized crime (i.e., mainly 
secret society activities), and drug trafficking; however, it also has 
been used against suspected espionage activities. Opposition 
politicians have called for the abolition of the ISA, but the 
Government has rejected these calls, claiming that citizens accept the 
act as an element of the nation's security.
    The ISA and the CLA permit preventive detention without trial for 
the protection of public security or safety or the maintenance of 
public order. The ISA gives broad discretion to the Minister for Home 
Affairs to order detention without charges at the direction of the 
President, if the latter determines that a person poses a threat to 
national security. The initial detention may be for up to 2 years and 
may be renewed without limitation for additional periods up to 2 years 
at a time. Detainees have a right to be informed of the grounds for 
their detention and are entitled to counsel. However, they have no 
right to challenge the substantive basis for their detention through 
the courts. The ISA specifically excludes recourse to the normal 
judicial system for review of a detention order made under its 
authority. Instead detainees may make representations to an advisory 
board, headed by a Supreme Court justice, which reviews each detainee's 
case periodically and must make a recommendation to the President 
within 3 months of the initial detention. The President may concur with 
the advisory board's recommendation that a detainee be released prior 
to the expiration of the detention order but is not obligated to do so.
    No one was detained under the ISA from 1989 through 1996. Two 
persons were detained in 1997, and four in 1998, all for alleged 
espionage. As of August, only one of these persons remained in 
detention; four had been released by the end of 1998. There were no 
reports of any new detentions under the ISA during the year.
    The CLA comes up for renewal every 5 years; it was strengthened and 
extended for another 5 years in April 1999. Under its provisions, the 
Minister for Home Affairs may order preventive detention, with the 
concurrence of the Public Prosecutor, for an initial period of 1 year, 
and the President may extend detention for additional periods up to 1 
year at a time. The Minister must provide a written statement of the 
grounds for detention to the Criminal Law Advisory Committee (CLAC) 
within 28 days of making the order. The CLAC then reviews the case at a 
private hearing. CLAC rules require detainees to be notified of the 
grounds of their detention at least 10 days prior to the hearing. The 
detainee may represent himself or be represented by a lawyer. After the 
hearing, the Committee makes a written recommendation to the President, 
who may cancel, confirm, or amend the detention order. However, persons 
detained under the CLA may have recourse to the courts via an 
application of a writ of habeas corpus. Persons detained without trial 
under the CLA are entitled to counsel but only may challenge the 
substantive basis for their detention to the CLAC. The CLA is used 
almost exclusively in cases involving narcotics and secret criminal 
societies and has not been used for political purposes. According to 
official figures, less than 400 persons were detained under the 
provisions of the CLA through June, a decrease from the 450 persons 
detained at the end of 1998.
    Persons who allege mistreatment under detention may bring criminal 
charges against government officials who are alleged to have committed 
such acts; there were no reports during the year that persons were 
discouraged from making such accusations by fear of official 
retaliation (see Section 1.e.).
    Both the ISA and the CLA contain provisions that allow for such 
modified forms of detention as curfews, residence limitations, 
requirements to report regularly to the authorities, limitations on 
travel, or, in the case of the ISA, restrictions on political 
activities and association.
    The MDA permits detention without trial. Under the MDA, the 
director of the CNB also may commit--without trial--suspected drug 
abusers to a drug rehabilitation center for up to 3 years. At the end 
of 1998, almost 5,000 persons were detained under the provisions of the 
MDA for treatment and rehabilitation. Under the Intoxicating Substances 
Act, the CNB director may order the treatment for rehabilitation of a 
person believed to be an inhalant drug abuser for up to 6 months.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects the 
prohibition in practice.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this 
provision; however, laws that limit judicial review allow for some 
restrictions in practice. Some judicial officials, especially Supreme 
Court judges, have ties to the ruling party and its leaders. However, 
these ties generally do not appear to influence the judiciary's 
independence. The President appoints judges to the Supreme Court on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister in consultation with the Chief 
Justice. The President also appoints subordinate court judges on the 
recommendation of the Chief Justice. The term of appointment is 
determined by the Legal Service Commission, of which the Chief Justice 
is the chairman. The 1989 constitutional amendments that eliminated 
judicial review of the objective grounds for detention under the ISA 
and subversion laws allow the Government to restrict, or even 
eliminate, judicial review in such cases and thereby restrict, on 
vaguely defined national security grounds, the scope of certain 
fundamental liberties provided for in the Constitution. Under the ISA 
and the CLA, the President and the Minister of Home Affairs have 
substantial de facto judicial power, which explicitly (in the case of 
the ISA) or implicitly (in the case of the CLA) excludes normal 
judicial review.
    Government leaders historically have used court proceedings, in 
particular defamation suits, against political opponents and critics 
(see Sections 2.a. and 3.). Both this practice and consistent awards in 
favor of government plaintiffs have raised questions about the 
relationship between the Government and the judiciary and led to a 
perception that the judiciary reflects the views of the executive in 
politically sensitive cases. Two cases from the most recent elections--
defamation actions against Workers' Party (WP) politicians Tang Liang 
Hong and J.B. Jeyaretnam for statements they made during the campaign 
(see Sections 2.a. and 3)--perpetuated the perception of undue judicial 
sympathy for government plaintiffs.
    The judicial system has two levels of courts: The Supreme Court, 
which includes the High Court and the Court of Appeal; and the 
subordinate courts. Subordinate court judges and magistrates, as well 
as public prosecutors, are civil servants whose specific assignments 
are determined by the Legal Service Commission, which can decide on job 
transfers to any of several legal service departments. The subordinate 
courts handle the great majority of civil and criminal cases in the 
first instance. The High Court may hear any civil or criminal case, 
although it generally limits itself to civil matters involving 
substantial claims and criminal matters carrying the death penalty or 
imprisonment of more than 10 years. The Court of Appeal is the highest 
and final court of review for matters decided in the subordinate courts 
or the High Court. In addition the law provides for Islamic courts 
whose authority is limited to Islamic family law.
    If they wish, Supreme Court Justices may remain in office until the 
mandatory retirement age of 65, after which they may continue to serve 
at the Government's discretion for brief, renewable terms at full 
salary. The Constitution has a provision for the Prime Minister or the 
Chief Justice to convene a tribunal in order to remove a justice ``on 
the ground of misbehavior or inability...to properly discharge the 
functions'' of office, but it has never been used.
    The judicial system provides citizens with an efficient judicial 
process. In normal cases, the Criminal Procedures Code provides that a 
charge against a defendant must be read and explained to him as soon as 
it is framed by the prosecution or the magistrate. Defendants enjoy a 
presumption of innocence and the right of appeal, in most cases. They 
have the right to be present at their trials, to be represented by an 
attorney, to confront witnesses against them, to provide witnesses and 
evidence on their own behalf, and to review government-held evidence 
relevant to their cases. Trials are public and by judge. There are no 
jury trials.
    The Constitution extends these rights to all citizens. However, 
persons detained under the ISA or CLA are not entitled to a public 
trial. In addition proceedings of the advisory board under the ISA and 
CLA are not public (see Section 1.d.).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government generally respects the privacy of homes 
and families; however, it has a pervasive influence over civic and 
economic life and sometimes uses its wide discretionary powers to 
infringe on these rights. Normally, the police must have a warrant 
issued by a magistrate's court to conduct a search. However, they may 
search a person, home, or property without a warrant if they decide 
that such a search is necessary to preserve evidence. The Government 
has wide discretionary powers under the ISA, CLA, MDA, and UPA to 
conduct searches without a warrant if it determines that national 
security, public safety or order, or the public interest are at issue. 
Defendants may request judicial review of such searches.
    Divisions of the Government's law enforcement agencies, including 
the Internal Security Department and the Corrupt Practices 
Investigation Board, have wide networks for gathering information and 
highly sophisticated capabilities to monitor telephone and other 
private conversations and conduct surveillance. It is believed that the 
authorities routinely monitor telephone conversations and use of the 
Internet; however, there were no confirmed reports of such practices 
during the year. The law permits government monitoring of Internet use. 
In April 1999, the Ministry of Home Affairs probed the computers of 
200,000 customers of an Internet service provider (ISP) for evidence of 
a computer virus infection. After a public controversy, the Ministry 
announced in May 1999 that it would reject future requests to conduct 
such probes, and the National Information Technology Committee within 
the Ministry of Home Affairs developed guidelines for ISP conduct later 
that year. It is widely believed that the authorities routinely 
conducted surveillance on some opposition politicians and other 
government critics; however, no such reports were substantiated during 
the year.
    The Government is active in some areas normally considered private, 
in pursuit of what it considers the public interest. For example the 
Government continues to enforce ethnic ratios for publicly subsidized 
housing, where the majority of citizens live and own their own units, 
designed to achieve an ethnic mix more or less in proportion to that in 
the society at large.
    The Government does not permit the import of newspapers from 
Malaysia and bans or restricts the import of other publications (see 
Section 2.a.). However, it does not block Internet access to these 
publications.
    Malaysian and Indonesian television and radio programming may be 
received, but satellite dishes are banned, with few exceptions. The 
Government stated that it would review the restriction on satellite 
dishes in 2002 (see Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and expression but permits official restrictions on 
these rights, and in practice the Government significantly restricts 
freedom of speech and of the press. The Government's authoritarian 
style has fostered an atmosphere inimical to fully free speech and the 
press. Government intimidation and pressure to conform result in the 
practice of self-censorship among journalists; however, there was some 
limited progress towards greater openness during the year, including a 
moderate level of ongoing debate in newspapers and Internet chat groups 
on various public issues.
    Under the ISA, the Government may restrict or to place conditions 
on publications that incite violence, that counsel disobedience to the 
law, that might arouse tensions among the various segments of the 
population (races, religions, and language groups), or that might 
threaten national interests, national security, or public order. While 
the ISA rarely has been invoked recently, political opposition and 
criticism remain restricted by the Government's power to define these 
restrictive powers broadly. Occasional government references during 
controversies to speech that it considers ``out-of-bounds'' are 
understood to be implicit threats to invoke the ISA; however, these 
limits are not codified, and journalists and others generally believe 
that these limitations have shifted toward greater tolerance in recent 
years.
    Government leaders often have challenged publicly the legitimacy of 
political speech articulated outside what they call the ``Western 
model'' of journalism, in which the Government claims that the media 
report news from their perspective, rather than to act responsibly, 
which generally is understood to mean to support the goals of the 
elected leadership and preserve social and religious harmony. In 
addition strict defamation and press laws and the Government's 
demonstrated willingness to defend vigorously against what it considers 
personal attacks of officials, have led journalists sometimes to 
refrain from publishing items about issues such as alleged government 
corruption, nepotism, or a compliant judiciary.
    The Government strongly influences both the print and the 
electronic media. Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. (SPH), a private 
holding company with close ties to the Government, owns all general 
circulation newspapers in the four official languages--English, 
Chinese, Malay, and Tamil. The Government must approve, and can remove, 
the holders of SPH management shares, who have the power to appoint or 
dismiss all directors or staff. The Government also may remove citizens 
as stockholders. As a result, while newspapers print a large and 
diverse selection of articles from domestic and foreign sources, their 
editorials, coverage of domestic events, and coverage of sensitive 
foreign relations issues closely reflect government policies and the 
opinions of government leaders.
    However, columnists' opinions, editorials, and letters to the 
editor express a range of opinions on public issues. For example, there 
was an active and often critical public debate in the print media over 
the Government's decision in late June to link the salaries of 
government ministers to top private sector salaries. The importation of 
some publications is barred, although a wide range of international 
magazines and newspapers may be purchased uncensored; however, 
newspapers printed in Malaysia may not be imported (see Section 1.f.).
    Government leaders from time to time have used defamation lawsuits 
or the threat of such actions to discourage public criticism and 
intimidate opposition politicians and the press. There were no new 
defamation cases filed by ruling party figures during the year. 
Nevertheless, the unbroken success of government leaders' suits has 
fostered caution about political speech among the public and a culture 
of selfcensorship within the news media, and has demonstrated the 
danger of engaging in opposition politics. At year's end, Workers' 
Party (WP) secretary general J.B. Jeyaretnam, a nominated M.P., 
remained in danger of bankruptcy due to failure to pay damages ordered 
against him in several individual law suits. A declaration of 
bankruptcy would result in the forfeiture of his parliamentary seat. 
The Prime Minister and foreign minister did not pursue collection of 
the judgments against Jeyaretnam during the year. However, the WP 
leader was declared bankrupt briefly in May until he made a payment to 
two plaintiffs; in June he lost his legal appeals to forestall payment 
to eight other plaintiffs. Both cases stemmed from an article in a WP 
publication that criticized the organizers of Tamil Week, an event that 
promoted the use of the Tamil language. In 1998 a court ruled that 
Jeyaretnam is responsible as the editor of the publication.
    In November Parliament amended the Public Entertainment Act. The 
revisions included changing the act's title to the Public Entertainment 
and Meetings Act (PEMA). Both before and after these revisions, a 
permit is required under the law for virtually any form of public 
speech or entertainment. After the revisions, permits no longer are 
required to hold a garden party. In September police denied a permit to 
an opposition MP to speak at a dinner that his party organized. The 
1999 convictions of Chee Soon Juan, Secretary-General of the opposition 
Singapore Democratic Party, for giving two public speeches without a 
permit sparked widespread discussion in the press by the public and 
officials regarding the possibility for relaxing these restrictions. 
Chee had asserted that he had no alternative but to violate the act, 
since his earlier applications under the PEA either were refused or 
approved so late that the event had to be canceled.
    Members of an independent political discussion group proposed in a 
newspaper article the creation of free speech areas patterned after the 
``Speakers' Corner'' found in Hyde Park, in London, England. After 
first refusing to consider this suggestion, the Government later 
decided to institute a Speakers' Corner; however, government 
restrictions on speakers still limited their abilities to speak freely. 
Prospective speakers, who must be citizens, must show their 
identification cards and register in advance with police, but need not 
obtain a public entertainment license (see Section 2.b.). Speakers must 
register their intention to speak 30 days in advance. A list of 
registered speakers is posted on a notice board outside the police 
station. While speech topics are not required to be declared in 
advance, the government regulations governing the Speakers' Corner 
state that, ``the speech should not be religious in nature and should 
not have the potential to cause feelings of enmity, ill will, or 
hostility between different racial or religious groups.'' A variety of 
persons, including politicians, social activists, and ordinary 
citizens, availed themselves of Speakers' Corner during the year.
    The government-linked holding company, Singapore International 
Media Pte Ltd., has a near monopoly on radio and television 
broadcasting. Subsidiaries operate all 4 broadcast television channels 
and 10 of the 15 domestic radio stations. Of the five remaining radio 
stations, four are owned by organizations with close government 
affiliation--two by the Singapore Armed Forces Reservists' Association 
(SAFRA) and two by the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC). Only one, 
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, is completely 
independent of the Government. Some Malaysian and Indonesian television 
and radio programming can be received, but satellite dishes are banned, 
with few exceptions (see Section 1.f.).
    An increasing number of foreign media operations are located within 
the country. A 1990 law requires foreign publications that report on 
politics and current events in Southeast Asia to register and post a 
$141,000 (SD234,000) bond and name a person in the country to accept 
legal service. These requirements strengthen the Government's control 
over foreign media. Under amendments to the Newspaper and Printing 
Presses Act, the Government may limit the circulation of foreign 
publications that it determines interfere in domestic politics. Also, 
in 1999 the Government announced that foreign electronic media must 
meet the same reporting standards as foreign print media. However, this 
requirement has not been enforced. The weekly circulation of the Asian 
Wall Street Journal (AWSJ), Asiaweek, and the Far Eastern Economic 
Review (FEER), all foreign publications, is limited (or ``gazetted''). 
The fact that the Government gradually has raised the allowed weekly 
circulation of the FEER and Asiaweek corresponding more or less to 
actual demand allows the Government to maintain this aspect of control 
over the press while still maintaining the appearance of flexibility. 
The Government may ban the circulation of domestic and foreign 
publications under provisions of the ISA and the UPA (see Section 
1.f.).
    The authorities censor movies, television programs, video 
materials, computer games, and music. The Singapore Broadcasting 
Authority (SBA), established in 1994 to regulate and promote the 
broadcasting industry, develops censorship standards with the help of a 
citizen advisory panel. The ISA, the UPA, and the Films Act allow the 
ban, seizure, censorship, or restriction of written, visual, or musical 
materials if the SBA determines that they threaten the stability of the 
State, are pro-Communist, contravene moral norms, are pornographic, 
show excessive or gratuitous sex and violence, glamorize or promote 
drug use, or incite racial, religious, or linguistic animosities. Polls 
indicate that there is strong public support for continued censorship 
of sex and violence in films. There is a list of banned films, which is 
not made public. Certain films that might be barred from general 
release may be allowed limited showings, either censored or uncensored, 
with a special rating.
    The UPA was amended in 1998 to include compact discs, sound 
recordings, pictures, and computer-generated drawings, and to raise the 
fine for distribution or possession of banned publications. The list of 
banned English-language publications consists primarily of sexually 
oriented materials, but also includes some religious and political 
publications. The Films Act was amended in 1998 to ban political 
advertising using films or videos. The Government justified the ban as 
protecting politics from sensationalism, innuendo, and inaccuracy, but 
one effect was to restrict further an already limited range of what was 
deemed acceptable political discourse (see Section 3). Opposition 
politician Chee Soon Juan alleged in 1999 that prominent bookstores, 
pressured by the Government, refused to carry copies of a book he 
authored. He also alleged that, after his book was printed in Malaysia, 
the Government would not allow its import.
    Since 1996 the SBA has regulated access to material on the 
Internet, using a framework of web site licenses to encourage 
accountability and responsible use of the Internet. It also regulates 
Internet material by licensing Internet service providers who install 
``proxy servers'' through which local users must route their Internet 
connections. Such services act as a filter for content that the 
Government considers objectionable and can block access to certain 
sites. While the Government does not consider regulation of the 
Internet to be censorship, the SBA directs service providers to block 
access to web pages that, in the Government's view, undermine public 
security, national defense, racial and religious harmony, and public 
morals. The SBA in 1996 ordered Internet service providers to block 
access to some sites, most or all of which the Government believed are 
pornographic; however, the list of blocked sites is difficult to verify 
since it is not a matter of public record. In 1997 the SBA announced a 
new Internet Code of Practice to further clarify what types of material 
were forbidden and specify the responsibilities of Internet providers. 
The SBA stated that it had no intention of monitoring Internet or 
electronic mail use but intended to block access to material that 
contained pornography or excessive violence or that incited racial or 
religious hatred (see Section 1.f.).
    All public institutions of higher education and political research 
institutions are linked closely to the Government. Although faculty 
members technically are not government employees, in practice they are 
subject to potential government influence. Academics speak and publish 
widely, and engage in debate on social and political issues. However, 
they are aware that public comments outside the classroom or academic 
publications that venture into the prohibited areas--criticism of 
political leaders or sensitive social and economic policies, or 
comments that might disturb ethnic or religious harmony or that appear 
to advocate partisan political views--could subject them to sanctions. 
Publications by local academics and members of research institutions 
rarely deviate substantially from government views.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
grants citizens the right of peaceful assembly but permits Parliament 
to impose restrictions ``as it considers necessary or expedient'' in 
the interest of security, and the Government restricts this right in 
practice. Assemblies of more than five persons in public, including 
political meetings and rallies, must have police permission. 
Spontaneous public gatherings or demonstrations virtually are unknown. 
The Government closely monitors political gatherings regardless of the 
number of persons present. Persons who wish to speak at a public 
function, excluding functions provided by or under the auspices of the 
Government, must obtain a public entertainment license from the police. 
Opposition politicians routinely experienced delays before being 
notified of the decision on their applications, although the Government 
claims that the delays come only when the applications were submitted 
late (see Section 2.a.). In May authorities denied approval for a forum 
on gays and lesbians, citing the illegality of homosexual acts. On 
December 31, police arrested and later charged 15 Falun Gong adherents 
for conducting protest without a permit; only 2 of those arrested were 
Singapore citizens. The 15 persons arrested had participated in an 
assembly of 60 Falun Gong members who sought to draw attention to the 
arrest and killing of Falun Gong members in China. The group had not 
sought a permit, asserting that police had not responded to their 
previous efforts to obtain permits.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association but permits 
Parliament to impose restrictions that ``it considers necessary or 
expedient'' in the interest of security, and the Government restricts 
this right in practice. Most associations, societies, clubs, religious 
groups, and other organizations with more than 10 members must be 
registered with the Government under the Societies Act. The Government 
denies registration to groups that it believes are likely to have been 
formed to assemble for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to 
public peace, welfare, or public order (see Section 2.c.). The 
Government has absolute discretion in applying this broad, vague 
language to register or dissolve societies. The Government prohibits 
organized political activities except by organizations registered as 
political parties. This prohibition limits opposition activities, and, 
along with other factors, contributes to restrict the scope of 
unofficial political expression and action (see Section 3). The 
prohibition affects the PAP less because of its long domination of the 
Government and its overwhelming parliamentary majority; the PAP is able 
to use nonpolitical organizations such as residential committees and 
neighborhood groups for political purposes far more extensively than 
can opposition political parties.
    There are few nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), apart from 
ostensibly nonpolitical organizations such as religious groups, 
ethnically-affiliated organizations, and providers of welfare services. 
The dominant role of the Government in almost every facet of life and 
the limiting effect of the law on the formation of publicly active 
organizations are, in large part, responsible for this situation. 
However, during 1999 a group of NGO's formed what they called ``the 
Working Committee'' as an umbrella group through which various NGO's 
could exchange information and cooperate to promote the development of 
civil society.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, the Government bans some religious groups. The Constitution 
provides that every citizen or person in the country has a 
constitutional right to profess, practice, or propagate his religious 
belief so long as such activities do not breach any other laws relating 
to public order, public health, or morality.
    There is no state religion. However, all religious groups are 
subject to government scrutiny and must be registered legally under the 
Societies Act. The 1990 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), 
which was prompted by actions that the Government perceived as threats 
to religious harmony, including aggressive and ``insensitive'' 
proselytizing and the ``mixing of religion and politics,'' made illegal 
what the Government deems to be the inappropriate involvement of 
religious groups and officials in political affairs. It gave the 
Government the power to restrict officials and members of religious 
groups and institutions from carrying out political activities, 
criticizing the Government, creating ``ill-will'' between religious 
groups or carrying out subversive activities. The act also prohibits 
judicial review of its enforcement or of any possible denial of rights 
arising from it.
    The Government plays an active, but limited, role in religious 
affairs. It does not tolerate speech or actions, including ostensibly 
religious speech or actions, that affect racial and religious harmony, 
and sometimes issues restraining orders barring persons from taking 
part in such activities. The Presidential Council for Religious Harmony 
must review such orders, and make recommendations to the President on 
whether to confirm, cancel, or alter a restraining order. The 
Presidential Council also examines all pending legislation to ensure 
that it is not disadvantageous to a particular group, reports to the 
Government on matters that affect any racial or religious community, 
and investigates complaints. The Government also attempts to ensure 
that citizens have ready access to religious organizations that are 
associated traditionally with their ethnic groups by assisting 
religious institutions to find space in publicly subsidized housing, in 
which the great majority of citizens live. The Government maintains a 
semiofficial relationship with the Muslim community through the Islamic 
Religious Council (MUIS), which was established under the 
Administration of Muslim Law Act. The MUIS advises the Government on 
the Muslim community's concerns and has some regulatory authority over 
Muslim religious matters. The Government facilitates financial 
assistance to build and maintain mosques.
    Under the Societies Act, the Government has banned meetings of 
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church. The Government 
deregistered and banned Jehovah's Witnesses in 1972 on the grounds that 
its roughly 2,000 members refuse to perform military service (which is 
obligatory for all male citizens), salute the flag, or swear oaths of 
allegiance to the State. The Government regards such refusal as 
prejudicial to public welfare and order. While the Government has not 
outlawed the profession or propagation of the beliefs of Jehovah's 
Witnesses and does not arrest members merely for being believers, the 
result of deregistration has been to make meetings of Jehovah's 
Witnesses illegal. The Government also has banned all written materials 
published by the Jehovah's Witnesses' publishing affiliates, the 
International Bible Students Association and the Watch Tower Bible and 
Tract Society. In practice this has led to the confiscation of Bibles 
published by the group, even though publishing Bibles has not been 
outlawed.
    The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World 
Christianity, also known as the Unification Church, was dissolved in 
1982 by the Minister for Home Affairs. Missionaries, with the exception 
of members of Jehovah's Witnesses and representatives of the 
Unification Church, are permitted to work and to publish and distribute 
religious texts. However, while the Government does not prohibit 
evangelical activities in practice, it discourages activities that 
might upset the balance of intercommunal relations.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants citizens the 
right to move freely throughout the country; however, while the 
Government generally respects this right in practice, it limits it in a 
few respects. For example, citizens' choice of where to live may be 
limited by the Government's policy of assuring ethnic balance in 
publicly subsidized housing, in which the great majority of citizens 
live (see Section 1.f.). The Government requires all citizens and 
permanent residents over the age of 15 to register and to carry 
identification cards. The Government may refuse to issue a passport and 
has done so in the case of former ISA detainees. Under the ISA, a 
detainee's movement may be restricted, although this provision normally 
is a part of the process of relaxing the conditions of detention and 
has been used very seldom in recent years.
    The right of voluntary repatriation is extended to holders of 
national passports. The Government actively encourages citizens living 
overseas to return home or at least to maintain active ties with the 
country. A provision of law for the possible loss of citizenship by 
Singaporeans who reside outside the country for more than 10 years 
consecutively seldom is used.
    Male citizens who still have national service reserve obligations 
(normally until age 40 for enlisted men and age 50 for officers) must 
advise the Ministry of Defense if they plan to travel abroad for less 
than 6 months, and must receive an exit permit for trips over 6 months. 
Beginning at age 11, boys' passports are valid for up to 6 months' 
duration. Males who are eligible for national service must obtain an 
exit permit for travel abroad of more than 6 months, with the exception 
of travel to peninsular Malaysia on a restricted passport.
    The law stipulates that former members of the Communist Party of 
Malaya (CPM) residing outside the country must apply to the Government 
to be allowed to return. They must renounce communism, sever all 
organizational ties with the CPM, and pledge not to engage in 
activities prejudicial to the State's internal security. In addition 
the law requires them to submit to interview by the Internal Security 
Department and to any restrictive conditions imposed on them.
    The law does not include provision for granting refugee or asylee 
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not grant 
first asylum. However, the authorities usually permit persons who make 
claims for asylum to have their status determined by the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for possible resettlement elsewhere. 
There were no reports that persons were returned forcibly to a country 
where they feared persecution. A 1998 government statement that 
migrants from countries in the region experiencing economic crisis 
would not be accorded refugee status is not known to have resulted in 
the return of any persons having a well-founded fear of persecution. A 
small number of ethnic Chinese persons from Indonesia often enter the 
country as visitors for temporary stays during episodes of racial or 
religious strife in that country.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully through democratic means. Opposition parties are 
free to contest elections, and the voting and votecounting systems are 
fair, accurate, and free from tampering; however, the PAP, which has 
held power continuously and overwhelmingly for over 3 decades, uses the 
Government's extensive powers to place formidable obstacles in the path 
of political opponents. The PAP has maintained its political dominance 
in part by developing genuine voter support through honest, effective 
administration and its strong record in bringing economic prosperity to 
the country, and in part by manipulating the electoral framework, 
intimidating organized political opposition, and circumscribing the 
bounds of legitimate political discourse and action. It attempts to 
intimidate the members of the opposition through the threat of libel 
suits and the subsequent loss of their political future, since large 
judgments in libel suits can lead to bankruptcy, and under the law 
bankrupt persons are ineligible to sit in Parliament. The belief that 
the Government may directly or indirectly harm the employment prospects 
of opposition supporters curtails opposition political activity; 
however, there were few allegations of such retaliation. As a result of 
these and other factors, opposition parties have been unable to 
challenge seriously the PAP's domination of the political system since 
the late 1960's. The PAP claims that the lack of an effective 
opposition is due to disorganization, lack of leadership, and lack of 
persuasive alternative policies.
    Singapore has a parliamentary system in which the majority party in 
Parliament has the authority to constitute the Government, which is 
headed by a Prime Minister. Parliamentary elections may be called at 
any time but must be held no later than 5 years from the date a new 
parliament first sits. The PAP holds 80 of 83 elected seats; the 
opposition Singapore People's Party and the Workers' Party each held 1 
seat. One seat, won by the PAP in the 1997 election, is vacant. The 
Workers Party (WP) holds one ``nonconstituency'' seat based on a 
constitutional amendment that assures at least three opposition members 
in Parliament even if fewer than three actually are elected. In 
addition, the Government nominates and the President appoints 
``prominent citizens'' to serve as nominated members of parliament 
(N.M.P.'s) for 2-year terms. Nine N.M.P.'s currently sit in Parliament. 
Nonconstituency members' and N.M.P.'s voting rights are restricted.
    The country's economic success and generally honest, effective 
government under the PAP has helped the PAP maintain voter support. The 
party has an extensive grassroots system and a carefully selected, 
highly disciplined membership, including M.P.'s who maintain close 
contact with their constituents, which is responsive to constituent 
needs and delivers effective government services. The recent 
development of governmentorganized and predominantly publicly-funded 
CDC's to promote community development and cohesion and to provide 
welfare and other assistance services, strengthens the PAP, which 
dominates these CDC's even in opposition-held constituencies. However, 
the PAP, which virtually is synonymous with the Government, has used 
the threat to withdraw benefits as a means of assuring popular support. 
For example, during the 1997 election campaign, the Prime Minister and 
other senior government officials pointedly warned voters that 
precincts that elected opposition candidates would have the lowest 
priority in government plans to upgrade public housing facilities. This 
threat heightened concerns among some observers about voters' genuine 
freedom to change their government.
    The PAP also maintains its complete control of the political 
process by other means, including patronage; strong political influence 
over the press and the courts; and restrictions on opposition political 
activities. Often these means are fully in keeping with the law and the 
normal prerogatives of government, but the overall effect (and, many 
argue, ultimate purpose) is to disadvantage and weaken the political 
opposition. The Government altered the boundaries of election districts 
in 1996, 3 months before the 1997 elections. Since 1988 it has changed 
74 of 83 singleseat constituencies into group representational 
constituencies (GRC's) of three, four, five, or six parliamentary 
seats, where the party with a plurality wins all the seats. According 
to the Constitution, such changes are permitted to ensure ethnic 
minority representation in Parliament, since each GRC candidate list 
must contain at least one Malay, Indian, or other ethnic minority 
candidate. However, these changes made it more difficult for opposition 
parties, all of which have very limited memberships, to fill 
multimember candidate lists, especially when one member must be an 
ethnic minority. The PAP does not suffer from this disadvantage.
    Although political parties legally are free to organize, they 
operate under the same limitations that apply to all organizations, and 
the authorities impose strict regulations on their constitutions, 
fundraising, and accountability. Government regulations hinder attempts 
by opposition parties to rent office space in government housing or to 
establish community foundations. In addition government influence 
extends in varying degrees to academic, community service, and other 
NGO's.
    A 1998 amendment to the Films Act that banned political films and 
recorded televised programs put opposition parties at a disadvantage. 
The ban, ostensibly to prevent the sensationalist or emotional effect 
that video or film productions could have on political issues, applied 
to the PAP as well as opposition parties. Nonetheless, it had the 
effect of denying opposition parties, which already receive far less 
coverage than does the PAP in the government-influenced press and 
media, a potential outlet for their political messages (see Section 
2.a.).
    The threat of civil libel or slander suits, which government 
leaders have used consistently against political opponents and critics, 
continued to have a stifling effect on the full expression of political 
opinion and to disadvantage the formal political opposition (see 
Section 2.a.). Large judgments in libel suits can lead to bankruptcy, 
and under the law bankrupt persons are ineligible to sit in Parliament. 
The Penal Code also provides for criminal defamation offenses; however, 
there were no reports that it was used for political purposes during 
the year.
    Following the 1997 elections, a group of senior PAP leaders sued 
defeated WP candidate Tang Liang Hong for defamation based on Tang's 
claims during and after the election. Tang fled the country citing 
death threats and remains abroad. The WP Secretary General and M.P. 
J.B. Jeyaretnam and another WP official remained at risk of bankruptcy 
due to ongoing efforts to collect on damages awarded in previous years 
(see Section 2.a.).
    The Government also sometimes uses parliamentary censure or the 
threat of censure to humiliate or intimidate opposition leaders.
    Government entities also have used libel or slander suits, and 
dismissal from positions in government-related entities, to intimidate 
prominent opposition politicians.
    The Government also has placed significant obstacles in the way of 
opposition political figures' candidacy for the presidency, a largely 
ceremonial position that nonetheless has significant budget oversight 
powers, as well as some powers over civil service appointments and 
internal security affairs. For example, opposition members are much 
less likely to be able to satisfy the requirement that they have 
experience in managing the financial affairs of a large institution, 
since many of the country's large institutions are government-run or 
linked to the government. In the 1999 presidential election, only the 
Government's candidate was ruled in compliance with all the legal 
requirements; therefore in accordance with the law, actual voting was 
canceled, and S.R. Nathan was declared the duly elected President. 
Opposition political figures have claimed that such strict compliance 
requirements weaken opposition parties.
    There is no legal bar to the participation of women in political 
life; however, women are underrepresented in government and politics. 
Women hold 4 of the 83 elected parliamentary seats and 2 of the 9 
N.M.P. seats. There are no female ministers.
    There is no restriction in law or practice against minorities 
voting or participating in politics; they actively participate in the 
political process and are well represented throughout the Government, 
except in some sensitive military positions. Malays make up about 15 
percent of the general population and hold about the same percentage of 
regularly elected seats in Parliament. Indians make up about 7 percent 
of the general population and hold about 10 percent of the regularly 
elected seats in Parliament. Minority representation in Parliament is, 
in part, the result of a legal requirement that candidate slates in 
every multi-seat constituency must have at least one minority 
representative.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no NGO's that actively and openly monitor alleged human 
rights violations. This situation is consistent with the general lack 
of NGO's and the Government's dominance of society. While the 
Government does not formally prohibit them, efforts by independent 
organizations to investigate and evaluate government human rights 
policies would face the same obstacles as those faced by opposition 
political parties.
    In the past, the Government denied that international organizations 
had any competence to look into human rights matters in the country 
and, for years, barred Amnesty International (AI) from visiting the 
country. However, in 1997 and 1999, the Government permitted both AI 
and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) to observe legal 
proceedings against two opposition politicians. The ICJ'S and AI'S 
criticisms of these cases were reported fully in the local press, and 
the Government responded vigorously in the press, alleging bias and 
citing alleged factual errors.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law 
and entitled to the equal protection of the law, and the Government 
carries out these provisions in practice. The Constitution contains no 
explicit provision providing equal rights for women and minorities. 
Mindful of the country's history of intercommunal tension, the 
Government takes affirmative measures to ensure racial, ethnic, 
religious, and cultural nondiscrimination. Social, economic, and 
cultural benefits and facilities are available to all citizens 
regardless of race, religion, or sex.
    Women.--There is no evidence of any widespread practice of violence 
or abuse against women. The Penal Code and the Women's Charter protect 
women against domestic violence and sexual or physical harassment. A 
battered wife can obtain court orders barring the spouse from the home 
until the court is satisfied that he has ceased his aggressive 
behavior. Court orders for protection against violent family members 
have increased in recent years, partially because of a 1997 amendment 
to the Women's Charter Act that broadened the definition of violence to 
include intimidation, continual harassment, or restraint against one's 
will. The Penal Code prescribes mandatory caning and a minimum 
imprisonment of 2 years for conviction on a charge of ``outraging 
modesty'' that causes the victim fear of death or injury. The press 
gives fairly prominent coverage to instances of abuse or violence 
against women. There are several organizations that provide assistance 
to abused women. The Association of Women for Action and Research 
(AWARE) has a hotline that offers counseling and legal advice. The 
Family Protection Unit documents physical and psychological abuse, and 
provides counseling and legal services to abused women. In July 1999, 
the Council of Women's Organizations established a crisis center for 
abused persons. The Star shelter accepts children, women, and men, and 
can accommodate up to 30 persons.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a limited 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Women enjoy the same legal rights as men in most areas, including 
civil liberties, employment, commercial activity, and education. The 
Women's Charter, enacted in 1961, gives women, among other rights, the 
right to own property, conduct trade, and receive divorce settlements. 
Muslim women enjoy most of the rights and protections of the Women's 
Charter. For the most part, Muslim marriage law falls under the 
administration of the Muslim Law Act, which empowers the Shari'a court 
to oversee such matters. Those laws allow Muslim men to practice 
polygyny. Both men and women have the right to unilateral divorce; 
however, women face significant difficulties in initiating unilateral 
divorce proceedings, which often prevents them from pursuing 
proceedings.
    Women constitute 42 percent of the labor force and are well 
represented in many professions but hold few leadership positions in 
the private sector. They still hold the preponderance of lowwage jobs 
such as clerks and secretaries. The average salary of women is only 75 
percent of that of men (compared with 68 percent 10 years ago). 
Observers note that the wage differential is smaller in professional 
jobs, and attribute much of the overall wage disparity to average lower 
educational qualifications by women, and to fewer years of job 
experience by women due to family commitments, rather than 
discrimination.
    Some areas of discrimination remain. Children born overseas to 
female citizens are not granted citizenship automatically, while those 
of male citizens are. Female civil service employees who are married do 
not receive health benefits for their spouses and dependents as do male 
government employees. However, for the first time, beginning on January 
2, female citizens were able to sponsor their noncitizen husbands for 
citizenship.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. Access to public education and medical care 
is equal for all children in society. In October the Government enacted 
legislation that would make 6 years of education in public schools 
compulsory by 2003. Although school attendance has not been compulsory, 
virtually 100 percent of children are enrolled through grade 6 and the 
dropout rate for secondary school is low. The Children and Young 
Persons Act establishes protective services for orphaned, abused, 
disabled, or refractory children, and creates a juvenile court system. 
The Ministry of Community Development works closely with the National 
Council for Social Services to oversee children's welfare cases. 
Voluntary organizations operate most of the homes for children, while 
the Government funds up to 50 percent of all child costs, which include 
normal living expenses and overhead, as well as expenses for special 
schooling, health care, or supervisory needs.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government implemented a 
comprehensive code on barrier-free accessibility in 1990, which 
established standards for facilities for the physically disabled in all 
new buildings and mandated the progressive upgrading of older 
structures. Although there is no legislation that addresses the issue 
of equal opportunities for the disabled in education or employment, the 
National Council of Social Services, in conjunction with various 
voluntary associations, provides an extensive job training and 
placement program for the disabled. Informal provisions in education 
have permitted university matriculation for visually impaired, deaf, 
and physically disabled students. The Government allows a $2,400 
(S$4,000) tax deduction for families with a disabled person. Press 
coverage of the activities and achievements of the disabled is 
extensive.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Malays constitute 
approximately 15 percent of the total population. The Constitution 
acknowledges them as ``the indigenous people of Singapore'' and charges 
the Government to support and promote their political, educational, 
religious, economic, social, cultural, and language interests. Ethnic 
Malays have not reached the educational or socioeconomic levels 
achieved by the ethnic Chinese majority, the ethnic Indian minority, or 
the Eurasian community. Malays remain underrepresented at the uppermost 
rungs of the corporate ladder, and, some have claimed, in certain 
sectors of government and the military, a reflection of their 
historically lower education and economic position, but also a result 
of employment discrimination. During 1999 there was great debate over 
the fact that advertisements often specify ethnicity and gender 
requirements or require fluent Mandarin speakers. The Government 
responded by issuing ``guidelines'' that called for eliminating 
language referring to age, gender, or ethnicity; restrictive language 
that referred to attributes relevant to a job, such as ``Chinese 
speaker'' or ``physically strong'' remains acceptable. These guidelines 
generally are obeyed.
    In November the Government reacted negatively to a draft proposal 
by a leading Malay/Muslim group that sought ``collective leadership'' 
in that community. The group proposed broadened community participation 
in issues that affected Muslims. Government leaders stated that the 
proposal risked ethnic polarization and warned against attempting to 
implement it.
    A January 1999 revision in the Chinese language curriculum in the 
country's schools, which expanded opportunities for higher Chinese 
language ignited a longstanding debate over the perceived objective of 
creating a ``Chinese elite.'' The Government has taken steps to 
encourage greater educational achievement among Malay students as a key 
to economic advancement. The Government revised proposed compulsory 
legislation to address concerns of Malays that Islamic religious 
schools (madrasahs) would be adversely affected. The Government 
proposed to exempt madrasah students from compulsory attendance in 
national schools provided that the students meet minimum standards in 
core secular subjects such as science, mathematics and English.
    The Presidential Council on Minority Rights examines all pending 
bills to ensure that they are not disadvantageous to a particular 
group. It also reports to the Government on matters affecting any 
racial or religious community and investigates complaints.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides all 
citizens with the right to form associations, including trade unions; 
however, Parliament may impose restrictions based on security, public 
order, or morality grounds. The right of association is delimited by 
the Societies Act and by labor and education laws and regulations. 
Under these laws, any group consisting of 10 or more persons is 
required to register with the Government. The Trade Unions Act 
authorizes the formation of unions with broad rights, albeit with some 
narrow restrictions, such as prohibitions on the unionization of 
uniformed employees. According to government statistics, the national 
labor force comprises about 2 million workers, approximately 290,000 of 
whom are represented by 76 unions. Due primarily to mergers, the number 
of unions dropped slightly from 1999; however, the number of union 
members rose. Of the 76 unions, 67 (which represent virtually all of 
the union members), are affiliated with the National Trades Union 
Congress (NTUC), an umbrella organization that has a close relationship 
with the Government.
    The NTUC unabashedly acknowledges that its interests are closely 
linked with those of the ruling PAP, a relationship often described by 
both as ``symbiotic.'' For example, the NTUC secretary general (SG), 
Lim Boon Heng, a PAP M.P., is Minister without Portfolio and was 
formerly Second Minister for Trade and Industry. His predecessor, Ong 
Teng Cheong, the country's first elected President (1993-99) was 
simultaneously NTUC SG and Deputy Prime Minister. It is common for 
young PAP M.P.'s to be given leadership positions in the NTUC or a 
member union. NTUC policy prohibits union members who actively support 
opposition parties from holding office in affiliated unions. While the 
NTUC is financially independent of the PAP, with income generated by 
NTUC-owned businesses, the NTUC and the PAP share the same ideology and 
work closely with management in support of nonconfrontational labor 
relations.
    Workers, other than those in essential services, have the legal 
right to strike but rarely do so. No strikes have occurred since 1986. 
Most disagreements are resolved through informal consultations with the 
Ministry of Manpower. If conciliation fails, the disputing parties 
usually submit their case to the Industrial Arbitration Court, which 
has representatives from labor, management, and the Government. Besides 
these labor dispute mechanisms and the close working relationship and 
shared views among labor, management, and the Government, the 
maintenance of labor peace has been a product of high economic growth 
rates, regular wage increases, and a high degree of job mobility in a 
virtual full-employment economy. In addition the widely held view that 
labor conflict would undermine the country's economic competitiveness 
and attractiveness to investors, and a cultural aversion to 
confrontation help to maintain a harmonious labor situation.
    The NTUC is free to associate regionally and internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is a normal part of labor-management relations in the 
industrial sector. Agreements between management and labor are renewed 
every 2 to 3 years, although wage increases are negotiated annually. 
Yearly guidelines on raises and bonus pay issued by the National Wages 
Council (NWC), a group composed of labor, management, and government 
representatives, serve as the starting point for bargaining agreements. 
In 1999, in response to the economic downturn, the Government adopted 
an NWC proposal in which, subject to negotiation in each enterprise, up 
to ten percent of salaries would be considered ``variable,'' allowing 
companies to eliminate that portion of pay if financial problems 
necessitated it.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor 
by children, and generally enforces this provision effectively. Under 
sections of the Destitute Persons Act, any indigent person may be 
required to reside in a welfare home and engage in suitable work. The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the coercive 
terms of this act, which includes penal sanctions, as not in compliance 
with the ILO Convention on Forced Labor. The Government maintains that 
the act is social legislation that provides for the shelter, care, and 
protection of destitute persons, and that work programs are designed to 
reintegrate individuals into society.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Government enforces the Employment Act, which 
prohibits the employment of children under the age of 12. Although 
schooling is not compulsory, virtually 100 percent of school age 
children attend school (see Section 5). Restrictions on the employment 
of children between the ages of 12 and 17 are rigorous and enforced 
fully. Children under the age of 15 are prohibited from employment in 
any industrial undertakings. Exceptions include family enterprises; 
children may work in an industrial undertaking in which only members of 
the same family are employed. A child who is 12 years old or above may 
be engaged in ``light work suited to his capacity.'' A medical officer 
must certify suitability for such light work. Employers must notify the 
Commissioner of Labor within 30 days of hiring a child between the ages 
of 14 and 16 and must attach medical certification of fitness for 
employment. The incidence of children taking up permanent employment is 
low, and abuses are almost nonexistent. The Government prohibits forced 
and bonded labor by children and enforces this provision effectively 
(see Section 6.c.).
    Ministry of Manpower regulations prohibit night employment of 
children and restrict industrial work for children between the ages of 
14 and 16 to no more than 7 hours a day, including the hours spent in 
school. Children may not work on commercial vessels, with any machinery 
in motion, on live electrical apparatus lacking effective insulation, 
or in any underground job. The Minister of Manpower effectively 
enforces these laws and regulations.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no laws or regulations 
on minimum wages or unemployment compensation. However, the National 
Wages Council, a tripartite body consisting of Government, labor, and 
business, monitors the economy and makes annual recommendations to the 
Government concerning wage guidelines. The labor market offers good 
working conditions and relatively high wages, which provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family.
    The Employment Act sets the standard legal workweek at 44 hours and 
provides for 1 rest day each week.
    Because of a domestic labor shortage, approximately 600,000 foreign 
workers are employed legally, constituting about 30 percent of the 
total work force. There are no reliable estimates of the number of 
foreigners working illegally. Most foreign workers are unskilled 
laborers and household servants from other Asian countries. Foreign 
workers face no legal wage discrimination. However, they are 
concentrated in low-wage, low-skill jobs and often are required to work 
long hours. Most foreign construction workers live on-site in 
substandard conditions. Although the great majority of the more than 
100,000 maids (mainly from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka) 
work under clearly outlined contracts, their low wages, their 
dependence on their employers for food and lodging, and the fact that 
they often live and work relatively isolated from the rest of society 
make them vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse. In 1998 Parliament 
passed an amendment to the Penal Code, in response to a reported 
increase in cases of maid abuse, which raised the punishment for 
confining or sexually or physically abusing a maid. The authorities 
have fined or imprisoned employers who have abused domestics, often 
with great publicity. Authorities described a sharp fall in 
substantiated cases of abuse of foreign domestics, from 157 cases in 
1997 to 82 cases in 1999, as evidence that the 1998 legal change and 
vigorous prosecutions had reduced the problem.
    Most maids work 6 days per week from very early morning until late 
in the evening. Many contracts allow only 1 day off per month. 
Contracts often stipulate that, even when she is ostensibly not 
working, a maid must remain on the premises except for official duties 
or on her day off. According to Ministry of Manpower Statistics, wages 
average around $250 per month (not including free room and board). 
Maids must often put aside most or all of their wages for the first 
several months of employment to reimburse their placement agents. Work 
permits for low-wage workers stipulate the cancellation of such permits 
if workers apply to marry or marry a citizen or permanent resident.
    Although many lower paid foreign workers not covered under the 
Employment Act are ineligible for the limited free legal assistance 
that is available to citizens, the Ministry of Manpower also offers 
mediation services for all employees, foreign or local. The Government 
allows complainants to seek legal redress.
    The Ministry of Manpower effectively enforces laws and regulations 
establishing working conditions and comprehensive occupational safety 
and health laws. Enforcement procedures, coupled with the promotion of 
educational and training programs, have been implemented to reduce the 
frequency of job-related accidents. While a worker has the right under 
the Employment Act to remove himself from a dangerous work situation, 
his right to continued employment depends upon an investigation of the 
circumstances by the Ministry of Manpower.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The three major laws that govern 
trafficking and prostitution are the Women's Charter, the Children and 
Young Person's Act, and the Penal Code. The laws make trafficking in 
women and children--whether or not it is related to prostitution--
punishable by up to 5 years' imprisonment, a $5,800 (SD10,000) fine, 
and caning. The Penal Code covers trafficking and wrongful constraint 
of men.
    There is evidence that the country is a destination for trafficking 
in women for the purpose of prostitution, primarily from Thailand and 
Malaysia. Police reportedly conduct raids about once a month in an 
effort to maintain some control over the situation.
    One local NGO offers sex workers counseling services; it is not 
empowered to provide protection.
                               __________

                            SOLOMON ISLANDS

    Solomon Islands, with a population of approximately 450,000, is an 
archipelago stretching over 840 miles in the South Pacific. The 
Government is a modified parliamentary system consisting of a single-
chamber legislative assembly of 50 members. Executive authority is 
vested in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The Prime Minister, 
elected by a majority vote of Parliament, selects his own Cabinet. 
Parliament was elected most recently in free and fair elections in 
August 1997. However, in 1998 tensions between two of the main ethnic 
groups in the country--the Malaitans and the Guadalcanalese--resulted 
in violence. Throughout 1999 Guadalcanalese militants forced thousands 
of Malaitans residing on Guadalcanal from their homes. Beginning in 
January, Malaitan militants stole large quantities of weapons from the 
police and actively began to combat the Guadalcanalese. The conflict 
continued to escalate, and on June 5, armed Malaitan militants, 
reportedly assisted by paramilitary police officers acting without 
authorization, took over Honiara, the capital. Following their takeover 
of the capital, the Malaitan militants forced the then-Prime Minister, 
Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, to resign, and Parliament chose a new Prime 
Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, under duress. A new government, known as 
the Coalition for National Unity, Reconciliation, and Peace, was 
formed. The Government has sought to restore peace, but its success has 
been limited due to its weakness--both political and institutional--and 
the perception that its leaders are beholden to one of the conflicting 
parties. The judiciary is independent.
    A police force of approximately 900 persons under civilian control 
is responsible for law enforcement, internal security, and border 
security. Over the past year, the police force began to disintegrate 
and since the June takeover of Honiara by Malaitan militants, it has 
not functioned as an effective institution.
    About 75 percent of the population engage to some extent in 
subsistence farming and fishing and have little involvement in the cash 
economy. With the breakdown of law and order, the formal sector of the 
economy is on the brink of collapse. Commercial activities, which 
included some plantation production of copra, cocoa, and palm oil, one 
fish cannery, a gold mine on Guadalcanal, and small resort and diving 
enterprises, have ceased to operate; only the logging industry 
continued to operate. An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 persons have fled 
their homes. Electricity and telecommunications services face severe 
difficulties, but continued to function.
    Basic individual rights are provided for in the Constitution, and 
until the eruption of armed conflict between Guadlacanalese and 
Malaitan militants, generally were respected by authorities, and were 
defended by an independent judiciary; however, the armed conflict 
between Malaitan and Guadalcanalese militants led to a serious 
deterioration of the human rights situation. Many current and former 
police officers, mostly believed to be from two national police units 
dominated by Malaitans, sided with armed Malaitan political groups, and 
police and militants from both sides committed numerous human rights 
abuses, including killings, abductions, torture, rape, forced 
displacement, looting, and the burning of homes. Militants prevented 
Red Cross officials and volunteers from taking food and medical 
supplies to rural clinics, leaving 60,000 persons in rural areas 
without access to medical care, nutritional supplements, and fuel. 
During the year, the successive governments failed to encourage any 
judicial or independent investigation of human rights abuses that had 
occurred during the violence, contributing to a climate of impunity. On 
October 15, representatives of the central Government, provincial 
governments, and the opposing armed militant groups signed a peace 
agreement, which, among other things, includes a general amnesty for 
members of the police who committed criminal acts in the course of the 
armed conflict after June 5. In accordance with the agreement, a team 
of international observers has been in the country since November to 
verify the relinquishing of weapons and to monitor implementation of 
the peace. At year's end, hundreds of weapons had not been 
relinquished, and a stable peace had not been secured.
    Violence and discrimination against women continued to be problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Since June 5, the 
police forces effectively have been disarmed and the service no longer 
functions on the islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal. Amnesty 
International (AI) reports that according to the previous government, 
75 percent of the country's 897 police officers were Malaitan. Many 
Malaitan police officers participated in abuses committed by Malaitan 
militants. In 1998 and 1999, when the police were battling the 
Guadalcanalese militants, police officers were involved in 
extrajudicial killing and unwarranted use of lethal force against 
civilians. In September 1999, AI reported that several paramilitary 
police officers in a speedboat shot and injured a man near shore; they 
followed him onto the shore, dragged him back into the water, and 
reportedly beat him to death with a paddle. There also have been 
reports that police in some areas of Guadalcanal have declined to stop 
or investigate abuses by Guadalcanalese militants, have cooperated with 
them, or have fled from atacks by Guadalcanalese militants, in order to 
protect their own security. AI reported that displaced persons state 
that they fled their homes because they feared police operations as 
much as the activities of the Guadalcanalese armed groups.
    Both the Ulufa'alu and Sogavare Governments were unable to stop the 
violence, and did little to investigate or prosecute those responsible 
for killings and other abuses, contributing to an atmosphere of 
impunity. According to AI there is an apparent lack of accountability 
for police officers involved in killings, and only one police officer 
has been charged and convicted in connection with events during the 
conflict.
    There is no reliable estimate of the total number of civilians 
killed, missing or presumed dead as a result of attacks attributed to 
Malaitan and Guadalcanalese militants, although AI reported that at 
least 25 persons, including several civilians, were killed between 
early June and early July. In April unidentified gunmen entered a 
village south of Honiara's international airport and shot three 
persons, including a 7-year-old boy and a 20-year-old man, as they 
tried to flee. On April 21, a Guadalcanalese man reportedly was 
abducted by Malaitan militants in Honiara and taken to a nearby 
Malaitan militant camp, where he was beaten and hung by the ankles and 
wrists with wire. His body was reportedly found later in a Malaitan 
suburb of Honiara (see Section 1.c.). On May 5, the decapitated body of 
Davidson Mare was found in a marketplace in Honiara; Mare, a 
Guadalcanalese, is believed to have been killed by Malaitan militants. 
Four days later, the partial remains of a Malaitan man believed killed 
in retaliation for Mare's murder were found at a roadblock run by 
Guadalcanalese militants near Honiara. In late June, two Malaitan men 
were captured by Guadalcanalese militants outside Honiara. 
Subsequently, the men, who showed signs of beatings, were paraded 
through the captors' villages, killed, and buried. On July 10, Malaitan 
militants forced their way into Honiara's central hospital and murdered 
two Guadalcanalese militants who were being treated for wounds 
sustained in combat the previous day. On July 13, gunmen dressed in 
Malaitan militant or paramilitary police uniforms reportedly attacked a 
medical clinic in Visale, killing an elderly man and a teenage boy. 
Other victims died as a result of torture (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances due to the actions of government officials. However, 
many Malaitan police officers have joined the Malaitan militants and 
have participated in their activities. Since the violence began in 
1998, more than 50 persons have been abducted and possibly killed by 
militants. In early July, AI reports that Cathoic catechist Juan Bosco 
disappeared in Honiara after allegedly being abducted by Malaitan 
militants and taken to a Malaitan camp. Several persons reported seeing 
him brutally beaten. On July 4, Walter Tavai, a Guadalcanalese 
villager, reportedly was abducted from his home near Honiara by 
Malaitan militants and taken to a Malaitan militant camp. Witnesses 
state that he was beaten to death by militants at the camp; his body 
has not been found. In January the Government formed a Committee on 
Missing Persons. However, its work was hampered by the reluctance of 
witnesses to come forward and by the ongoing conflict. The Committee's 
final report and recommendations to the Government, submitted in April, 
were not made public.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--These practices are prohibited by law; however, there were 
numerous reports that police tortured and mistreated persons. Until 
June complaints of excessive use of force by police when making 
arrests, as well as other complaints about police behavior, were 
handled by an internal police department investigations office or by 
the courts. In 1998 the police opened a public complaints office in the 
capital. These offices ceased to function after June 5, as part of the 
general disintegration of the national police force.
    Throughout the year, there were numerous reports of acts of torture 
and mistreatment attributed to both Malaitan and Guadalcanalese 
militants, and to members of the police. Honiara residents told AI that 
it was common knowledge that abducted Malaitans had been taken to a 
camp widely known as a ``panel beating shop'' where they were beaten by 
Guadalcanalese militants. Malaitan encampments near Honiara, as well as 
in the former Guadalcanal provincial government headquarters, also 
reportedly are used for the torture of captured Guadalcanalese and the 
punishment of Malaitans. On April 21, a Guadalcanalese man reportedly 
was abducted by Malaitan militants in Honiara and taken to a nearby 
Malaitan militant camp, where he was beaten and hung by the ankles and 
wrists with wire. His body was later reportedly found in an Malaitan 
suburb of Honiara (see Section 1.a.). In June two Malaitan security 
guards reportedly were abducted by Guadalcanalese militants, beaten, 
paraded through Guadalcanalese villages, and killed near Honiara (see 
Section 1.a.).
    Many homes have been looted and burned by both Guadalcanalese and 
Malaitan militants during the conflict; at times police reportedly have 
assisted militants. Twenty homes were burned in Independence Valley, 
Honiara in late July, according to press reports. This followed the 
burning of homes in Matanikau and Tasahe areas of Honiara.
    Conditions in the only prison still in use during the year 
generally met minimum international standards, although for several 
months it was overcrowded. Following the outbreak of militant attacks, 
the rural prison in Guadalcanal was closed, and the prisoners were 
moved to the prison in Honiara for their safety. However, due to the 
influx of prisoners from the minimum-security prison and additional 
arrests due to the strife, the prison population exceeded the capacity 
of the prison. Several cells built for four persons held six, and a 
number of prisoners slept dormitory style on the floor of the covered 
inner courtyard of one of the prison buildings. The female wing of the 
prison was used for male prisoners, and the sole female prisoner was 
housed in the warden's conference room, next to the jail reception 
area. Malaitan militants closed the prison in Honiara on June 18 
following the escape of approximately 20 Guadalcanalese inmates and the 
subsequent release of all remaining prisoners by the Malaitans. Police 
made no move to recapture the inmates, some of whom reportedly joined 
the militants. A new prison complex, slated for completion in 1997, was 
to have provided separate facilities for short-, medium-, and long-term 
prisoners, as well as for juvenile offenders. It remained uncompleted 
at year's end due to a lack of funds. Prior to June, a government-
appointed Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy, composed of church and 
social leaders, recommended pardons for rehabilitated prisoners. At 
year's end, the prison was reopened.
    Prior to the closure of the prisons, the Government permitted 
prison visits by human rights monitors. An International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) team in Honiara monitored the prisons regularly, 
and in 1999 Amnesty International visited the prison as well. However, 
between June 15 and June 18, Malaitan militants refused to allow ICRC 
monitors into the prison in Honiara. Some prisoners later showed signs 
of beatings.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions in practice. However, the large number of 
cases before the courts has resulted in long delays before cases go to 
trial. This has meant that some prisoners have endured long periods of 
pretrial detention.
    Militants from both sides arbitrarily detained persons; it is not 
known how many persons were arbitrarily detained during the year.
    Exile is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary and it is independent in practice, but the courts 
are hampered by a lack of resources and threats against the lives of 
judges and prosecutors.
    The judicial system consists of a High Court and magistrates' 
courts. Accused persons are entitled to counsel. However, in 1999, the 
public solicitor, who is charged with providing counsel to persons who 
cannot afford a private attorney, reported that due to limited 
resources, his office could accept only those cases in which persons 
faced serious charges or those involving the protection of children. 
The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality of 
arrests. Officials found to have violated civil liberties are subject 
to fines and jail sentences.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    Both the Ulufa'alu and Sogavare Governments have been unable to 
stop the violence, and have done little to investigate or prosecute 
those responsible for killings and other abuses, contributing to an 
atmosphere of impunity. According to AI there is an apparent lack of 
accountability for police officers involved in killings, and only one 
police officer has been charged and convicted in connection with events 
during the conflict.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--These rights are protected by law, and the Government 
generally respected these rights in practice. However, with the 
breakdown of law and order, there was widespread looting and burning of 
homes in rural Guadalcanal, including by police (see Section 1.c.).
    Militants from all sides motivated by resentment, retaliation, and 
criminal opportunism forced long-time inhabitants from their homes. 
Many of those forced out were not affiliated with the respective 
militant movements or even members of the combating ethnic groups.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Since the ethnic conflict began in 1998, both 
Guadalcanalese and Malaitan militants have used excessive force and 
committed numerous abuses against civilians, at times aided by or 
permitted to function by the police. Since June Malaitan militants have 
blocked the free and safe passage of relief supplies, food, and fuel, 
as well as access by humanitarian organizations to Guadalcanal. Red 
Cross volunteers and relief workers have reported being threatened, 
harassed, even shot at by both Guadalcanalese and Malaitan militants.
    In June Malaitan militants in a police patrol boat used a heavy 
machine gun to support an attack on Guadalcanalese positions near 
Alligator Creek, killing perhaps six Guadalcanalese militants. 
Following this action, the militants used the weapon to fire 
indiscriminately on civilian targets near Teneru, far from the actual 
scene of the fighting. In July as many as 20 persons in paramilitary 
police uniforms attacked a rural medical clinic on Guadalcanal, killing 
an old man and a teenage boy, both noncombatants. Since the violent 
phase of the conflict on Guadalcanal began in 1998, some 30,000 
Malaitans, Guadalcanalese, and Western Province persons living on 
Guadalcanal have been displaced from their homes (see Section 2.d.).
    AI reports that Guadalcanalese militants included a number of child 
soldiers (see Sections 5, and 6.d.).
    In 1999 there were reports that police killed noncombatants while 
shooting indiscriminately at villages.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government generally respects 
the constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and of the press. 
In September the Government ordered the national airline and the press 
not to report the kidnaping of a pilot, on the grounds that it might 
incite further violence or ethnic hatred. During the year, print and 
broadcast media continued to operate on a regular basis.
    The media comprise the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation 
(SIBC), a statutory body that comes directly under the Prime Minister's 
office and whose radio broadcasts are heard throughout the country; a 
privately owned FM radio station; and three privately owned weekly or 
semiweekly newspapers. Given the high rate of illiteracy, the SIBC is 
more influential than the print media. The Department of Information in 
the Prime Minister's office publishes a monthly newspaper, which is 
strongly progovernment. At least two nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's) publish periodic news journals; their environmental reporting 
frequently is critical of the Government's logging policy and foreign 
logging companies' practices. A private company transmits one 
Australian television channel to the country. The system incorporates 
occasional government press conferences in its program.
    During the year, militants threatened the print and broadcast media 
with increasing frequency; however, no journalists are known to have 
been killed or injured.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of assembly and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Demonstrators must obtain permits.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, and, in the 
past, this right was respected; however, in February the Government 
formally outlawed the Malaitan militant groups; Guadalcanalese militant 
groups were outlawed in 1999. This ban was suspended in May.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the Government respects this provision in practice.
    In general the Government does not subsidize religion. Several 
schools and health services in the country were built by and continue 
to be operated by religious organizations. There are schools sponsored 
by Roman Catholics, the Church of Melanesia, the United Church 
(Methodist), the South Sea Evangelical Church, and Seventh-Day 
Adventists. Upon independence the Government recognized that it had 
neither the funds nor the personnel to take over these institutions and 
agreed to subsidize partially their operations. The Government also 
pays the salaries of most teachers and health staff in the national 
education system.
    All religious institutions are required to register with the 
Government; however, there is no evidence that registration has been 
denied to any group.
    The public school curriculum includes 30 minutes daily of religious 
instruction, the content of which is agreed upon by the Christian 
churches; students whose parents do not wish them to attend the class 
are excused. However, the Government does not subsidize church schools 
that do not align their curriculums with governmental criteria. There 
is mutual understanding between the Government and the churches but no 
formal memorandum of understanding. Although theoretically non-
Christian religions can be taught in the schools, there is no such 
instruction at present.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places no restrictions on 
the movement of citizens within or out of the country. However, the 
militants have demanded that the people indigenous to each island be 
given authority to determine who may or may not enter their island. 
Native-born citizens may not be deprived of citizenship on any grounds.
    Since the violent phase of the conflict on Guadalcanal began in 
1998, an estimated 30,000 Malaitans, Guadalcanalese, and Western 
Province persons living on Guadacanal have been displaced from their 
homes as a result of armed conflict and intimidation; 3,000 or more 
have been dispaced since June. The U.N. estimated that in 1999 some 
15,000 to 20,000 Malaitans (one fifth of the population of Guadalcanal) 
were displaced, the majority of whom evacuated to Malaita, while as 
many as 12,000 Guadalcanalese fled their homes for other parts of that 
island. The Government provided very limited help to internally 
displaced persons, who generally relied on their extended families and 
subsistence farming for survival. The national Red Cross Society, 
funded by the European Union, provided some assistance.
    Police on Malaita reportedly are unable to offer protection to 
displaced Malaitans on the island since Malaitan militants raided a 
police armory in January and set up headquarters on the island. 
Malaitan militants reportedly have forced displaced Malaitan families 
to ``contribute'' money or food to support the militants. Telephone 
communication with Malaita has been cut off since Guadalcanalese 
militants destroyed a transmitter on May 18.
    Displaced persons on Guadalcanal also lack effective police 
protection, since most local police were evacuated as a result of 
Guadalcanalese militant raids in 1999.
    Although a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government has not enacted 
domestic legislation or procedures for making formal refugee 
determinations. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Red Cross in determining 
refugee status, and has not returned persons to a country where they 
fear persecution.
    The Government provided first asylum to persons from Papua New 
Guinea's Bougainville Island, who fled the conflict that started there 
in 1989. Following the 1998 peace settlement, many have returned home. 
According to the UNHCR, there are less than 50 persons from 
Bougainville in the country who meet the criteria for refugee status. 
In September 1999, the Solomon Islands Red Cross reported that 
Bougainvillians sheltering in the country, who were not considered 
refugees, had been returning to Bougainville during 1999. Most of those 
who remained were employed professionals, and none were in Red Cross 
care shelters.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens had the right to change their government through periodic 
free and fair elections. Suffrage is universal for those 18 years of 
age and over. The Government is a modified parliamentary system 
consisting of a single-chamber legislative assembly of 50 members. 
Executive authority is vested in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. 
The Prime Minister, elected by a majority vote of Parliament, selects 
his own Cabinet. Since independence in 1978, there have been five 
parliamentary elections, most recently in August 1997, and several 
elections for provincial and local councils. On four occasions, changes 
of government resulted from either parliamentary votes of no confidence 
or the resignation of the Prime Minister. However, in 1998 tensions 
between two of the main ethnic groups in the country--the Malaitans and 
the Guadalcanalese--resulted in violence. Throughout 1999 
Guadalcanalese militants forced thousands of Malaitans residing on 
Guadalcanal from their homes. Beginning in January, Malaitan militants 
stole large quantities of weapons from the police and began to actively 
combat the Guadalcanalese. The conflict continued to escalate, and on 
June 5, armed Malaitan militants reportedly assisted by paramilitary 
police officers acting without authorization, took over Honiara, the 
capital. After the takeover, the Malaitan militants forced Prime 
Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu to resign. Parliament selected a new 
Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, under duress. A new government, the 
Coalition for National Unity, Reconciliation, and Peace was formed 
after the new Prime Minister was selected. Since June the police have 
not operated as an effective force, and there is no governmental 
institution that can effectively address the ongoing violence.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Traditional 
male dominance has limited the role of women in government. Although 14 
women ran for Parliament in the 1997 elections, only 1, an incumbent, 
was elected.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no restrictions on the formation of local organizations 
to monitor and report on human rights. The Solomon Islands Development 
Trust has both development and human rights objectives. The ICRC has an 
office in Honiara, and an Amnesty International team visited the 
country in mid-August. The Government cooperated with human rights 
organizations to the best of its ability, and requested assistance from 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in formulating policies to 
restore peace and justice.
    Red Cross volunteers and relief workers have reported being 
threatened, harassed, even shot at, and prevented from carrying out 
relief work by both Guadalcanalese and Malaitan militants.
    There is a constitutionally provided ombudsman, with the power of 
subpoena, who can investigate complaints of official abuse, 
mistreatment, or unfair treatment. The Ombudsman's Office did not 
report any incidents involving interference with these rights. While 
the Ombudsman's Office has potentially far-ranging powers, it is 
limited by a shortage of resources.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides that no person--regardless of race, place 
of origin, political opinion, color, creed, or disability--shall be 
treated in a discriminatory manner in respect of access to public 
places. The Constitution further prohibits any laws that would have 
discriminatory effects and provides that no person should be treated in 
a discriminatory manner by anyone acting in an official capacity. 
Despite constitutional and legal protections, women remain the victims 
of discrimination in this tradition-based society. Unemployment is 
high, and there are limited job opportunities for the disabled.
    Women.--While actual statistics are scarce, incidents of wife 
beating and wife abuse appear to be common. In the rare cases that are 
reported, charges often are dropped by the women before the court 
appearance or are settled out of court. The magistrates' courts deal 
with physical abuse of women as with any other assault, although 
prosecutions are rare. In part due to the breakdown in law and order, 
and the lack of a police force after June, women and teenage girls in 
particular are vulnerable to abuse including rape, and many rapes have 
been reported since the ethnic conflict began in 1998.
    The law accords women equal legal rights. However, in this 
traditional society men are dominant, and women are limited to 
customary family roles. This situation has prevented women from taking 
more active roles in economic and political life. A shortage of jobs 
inhibits the entry of women into the work force. The majority of women 
are illiterate; this is attributed in large part to cultural barriers. 
The National Council of Women and other NGO's have attempted to make 
women more aware of their legal rights through seminars, workshops, and 
other activities. The Government's Women Development Division also 
addresses women's issues.
    Children.--Within the limits of its resources, the Government is 
committed to the welfare and protection of the rights of children. 
There is no compulsory education, and, according to some estimates, 
only 60 percent of school-age children have access to primary 
education; the percentages of those attending secondary and tertiary 
institutions are much smaller. Children are respected and protected 
within the traditional extended family system, in accordance with a 
family's financial resources and access to services. As a result, 
virtually no children are homeless or abandoned. Although some cases of 
child abuse are reported, there is no societal pattern of abuse. The 
Constitution grants children the same general rights and protection as 
adults. Existing laws are designed to protect children from sexual 
abuse, child labor, and neglect. According to AI, Guadalcanalese 
militants included a number of child soldiers (see Section 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--There is no law or national policy on 
the disabled, and no legislation mandates access for the disabled. 
Their protection and care are left to the traditional extended family 
and nongovernmental organizations. With high unemployment countrywide 
and few jobs available in the formal sector, most disabled persons, 
particularly those in rural areas, do not find work outside the family 
structure. The Solomon Islands Red Cross continued to conduct private 
fund-raising efforts to build a new national center for disabled 
children.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is composed of over 
27 islands with approximately 70 language groups. In the precolonial 
era, these groups existed in a state of endemic warfare with one 
another, and even today many islanders see themselves first as members 
of a clan, next as inhabitants of their natal island, and only third as 
citizens of their nation. Over the past century, and particularly since 
World War II, many persons from the poor, heavily populated island of 
Malaita have settled on Guadalcanal, the island on which the capital of 
Honiara is located. The tensions and resentment between the 
Guadalcanalese and the Malaitans on Guadalcanal culminated in violence 
beginning in late 1998 (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 1.f., 1.g., and 
2.d.). In 1998 Guadalcanalese militants began a campaign of threats and 
intimidation against Malaitans on Guadalcanal. Scores of Malaitans have 
been killed and injured by Guadalcanalese militants. Since 1998 
approximately 30,000 persons, mainly Malaitans, have fled their homes 
as a result of the conflict. Civilians have been the victims of abuses 
by both sides; such abuses reportedly included abductions, torture, 
rape, forced resettlement, looting, and burning homes.
    Beginning in January, Malaitan militants began seizing weapons from 
the police; many police officers (who are largely Malaitans) joined the 
Malaitan militants. On June 5, Malaitan militants took over the capital 
of Honiara (which is largely populated by Malaitans), forced the Prime 
Minister to resign, and forced Parliament to choose another Prime 
Minister.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution implicitly 
recognizes the right of workers to form or join unions, to choose their 
own representatives, to determine and pursue their own views and 
policies, and to engage in political activities. The courts have 
confirmed these rights. Only about 10 to 15 percent of the population 
participate in the formal sector of the economy. Approximately 60 to 70 
percent of wage earners are organized (90 percent of employees in the 
public sector and about 50 percent of those in the private sector).
    The law permits strikes. Disputes are usually referred quickly to 
the Trade Disputes Panel (TDP) for arbitration, either before or during 
a strike. In practice the small percentage of the work force in formal 
employment means that employers have ample replacement workers if 
disputes are not resolved quickly. However, employees are protected 
from arbitrary dismissal or lockout while the TDP is deliberating. 
Since 1998 ethnic tensions and conflict on Guadalcanal, the most 
economically developed island in the country, seriously have disrupted 
economic activity and have resulted in the loss of many formal 
employment opportunities. Mainstays of the cash economy such as the 
Solomon Taiyo fish cannery and the country's only gold mine have closed 
as a result of the conflict. In June 1999, Solomon Islands Plantation 
Ltd. closed its facilities following attacks on its workers. About 
2,000 employees were evacuated. Militants have prevented the return of 
the work force, 60 percent of whom are Malaitan.
    Unions are free to affiliate internationally, and the largest trade 
union, the Solomon Islands' National Union of Workers, is affiliated 
with the World Federation of Trade Unions, the South Pacific Oceanic 
Council of Trade Unions, and the Commonwealth Trade Union Congress.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Trade 
Disputes Act of 1981 provides for the rights to organize and to bargain 
collectively, and unions exercise these rights frequently.
    Wages and conditions of employment are determined by collective 
bargaining. If a dispute between labor and management cannot be settled 
between the two sides, it is referred to the TDP for arbitration. The 
three-member TDP, composed of a chairman appointed by the judiciary, a 
labor representative, and a business representative, is independent and 
neutral.
    The law protects workers against antiunion activity, and there are 
no areas where union activity is officially discouraged.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor, including forced and bonded labor by children, 
and, except as part of a court sentence or order, this prohibition is 
observed.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law forbids labor by children under the age of 12, 
except light agricultural or domestic work performed in the company of 
parents. Children under age 15 are barred from work in industry or on 
ships; those under age 18 may not work underground or in mines. The 
Labor Division of the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry is 
responsible for enforcing child labor laws. Given low wages and high 
unemployment, there is little incentive to employ child labor.
    AI reports that the Guadalcanalese militant forces include 
children.
    Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited constitutionally 
and is not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage rate is $0.31 
per hour (1.50 Solomon Islands dollars) for all workers except those in 
the fishing and agricultural sectors, who receive $0.25 (1.25 Solomon 
Islands dollars). The legal minimum wage is not sufficient to support 
an urban family living entirely on the cash economy. However, most 
families are not dependent solely on wages for their livelihoods.
    The Labor Act of 1969, as amended, and the Employment Act of 1981, 
as well as other laws, regulate premium pay, sick leave, the right to 
paid vacations, and other conditions of service. The standard workweek 
is 45 hours and is limited to 6 days per week. There are provisions for 
premium pay for overtime and holiday work and for maternity leave.
    Malaria is endemic in the country and affects the health of many 
employees. Agricultural workers have a high risk of contracting 
malaria.
    Both an active labor movement and an independent judiciary ensure 
widespread enforcement of labor laws in major state and private 
enterprises. The Commissioner of Labor, the Public Prosecutor, and the 
police are responsible for enforcing labor laws; however, they usually 
react to complaints rather than routinely monitor adherence to the law. 
The extent to which the law is enforced in smaller establishments and 
in the subsistence sector is unclear. Safety and health laws appear to 
be adequate. The Safety at Work Act requires employers to provide a 
safe working environment and forbids retribution against an employee 
who seeks protection under labor regulations or removes himself from a 
hazardous job site.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution does not prohibit 
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons 
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                THAILAND

    Thailand is a democratically governed constitutional monarchy that 
until 1992 had a history of military coups and powerful bureaucratic 
influences on political life. Since 1992 there have been five national 
multiparty elections, which transferred power to successive governments 
through peaceful, democratic processes. The King exerts strong informal 
influence but never has used his constitutionally mandated power to 
veto legislation or dissolve the elected House of Representatives. 
There is a bicameral Parliament. The coalition Government, led by Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai's Democrat Party, was formed in 1997. General 
elections were scheduled for January 2001. The judiciary is 
independent, but is subject to corruption.
    The security forces have wide-ranging legal powers, derived 
primarily from past militarily controlled administrations. Since 1992 
the armed forces have become increasingly professional and increasingly 
subject to civilian control. Their influence in politics has been 
diminishing. The Royal Thai Police have primary responsibility for 
internal security and law enforcement. Elements of both the armed 
forces and the police have a reputation for corruption. Some members of 
the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
    Thailand is a newly industrializing country with a market-based 
economy and strong tradition of private enterprise, although state 
enterprises play a significant role in some sectors. A financial crisis 
that began in July 1997 led to a severe contraction in the economy 
lasting through early 1999. The economy resumed moderate growth in 
early 1999; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is estimated at 4 
percent for 2000. Annual per capita income, which peaked at $3,000 in 
1996, is approximately $2,000, although depreciation of the local 
currency during the crisis magnified the decline. Roughly 60 percent of 
the population remains rural and agricultural, although agriculture 
only accounts for approximately 10 percent of GDP. Rice and other 
agricultural and fisheries products are important exports, as are 
electrical goods, textiles, and automobiles. Government efforts to 
narrow the gap between urban and rural living standards have met with 
only mixed success, and the Government increasingly focused on 
education and investment promotion in poor areas to reduce disparities 
in income distribution. Even though government regulation generally 
provides protection for individual economic interests, including 
property rights, a lack of transparency in bureaucratic decisionmaking 
and a gap between regulation and enforcement sometimes leads to uneven 
treatment of some firms and institutions. Some areas of Government 
remain subject to corruption.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, significant problems remain in several areas. Police 
officers killed a number of criminal suspects while attempting to 
apprehend them and killed suspects in custody. The Government remained 
reluctant to prosecute vigorously those who committed such abuses, 
resulting in a climate of impunity.
    Police occasionally beat suspects, at times to coerce confessions. 
An ingrained culture of corruption persists in many parts of the 
civilian bureaucracy and in the security forces. Routine demands for 
bribes undermine the rule of law and permit the continuation of various 
illegal activities such as income tax evasion, illegal gambling, drug 
violations, goods smuggling, trafficking in persons, and prostitution. 
Enforcement of a broad range of laws and regulations by police 
continued to be noticeably lax.
    Conditions in prison and immigration detention facilities are poor 
due to severe overcrowding. However, conditions improved somewhat at 
the Bangkok Immigration Detention Center during the year. Lengthy 
pretrial detention and the prolonged detention of some aliens remain 
problems. The judiciary suffers from corruption and at times security 
forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The media practiced some 
self-censorship, and there were some restrictions on freedom of 
movement. The Government hindered the activity of some human rights 
groups.
    The 1997 Constitution increased legal protections for women and the 
disabled; however, some inequities in the law remain. Violence against 
women and societal discrimination against women are problems. 
Trafficking in women and children and forced prostitution are serious 
problems. Societal discrimination against hilltribes and religious and 
ethnic minorities persists.
    There were reports of forced labor and child labor.
    The 1997 Constitution contains provisions designed to combat 
corruption and increase government accountability, transparency, and 
public participation in the political process. The Government has 
adopted implementing legislation to bring government practice in line 
with these reforms over the last 3 years.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated killings by government agents; 
however, legal organizations, reputable nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's), and the press continued to report that some police officers 
used unwarranted lethal force in apprehending criminal suspects. Armed 
alleged drug traffickers in particular continued to confront and 
threaten police officers violently, and officers used deadly force 
during some arrest attempts. Police killed several criminal suspects 
while in custody. New procedures that regulate the investigation of 
deaths in custody went into place in June.
    Following the armed seizure of the Ratchaburi provincial hospital 
by 10 Burmese dissidents in January, military and police forces entered 
the hospital to free the more than 700 patients, staff, and visitors 
held as hostages and to secure the premises. In the raid, government 
forces killed the hostagetakers; no hostages were injured. In media 
reports after the incident, some hostages claimed that the Burmese 
gunmen had been apprehended and disarmed before the security forces 
killed them; no evidence corroborated this claim. The Government, 
including the Prime Minister, denied the claims and maintained that the 
Burmese were killed during the course of the raid. Despite calls by the 
press for an investigation, the Government conducted no public 
investigation, and no other evidence to corroborate claims of abuse was 
presented.
    In May 11 police officers were sentenced to life in prison or death 
for their roles in the 1994 killings of 4 Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
officials.
    The two senior police officers arrested in the June 1999 Nonthaburi 
abduction and killing of a suspected car thief remain free on bail, and 
the court case was still pending at year's end. The Department of 
Corrections exonerated the prison guards accused in the June 1999 
killings of three would-be escapees from Udon Thani provincial prison. 
The Department of Corrections also found no criminal behavior in the 
January 1998 killing of four prisoners escaping from Bangkok remand 
prison. Both cases are closed.
    Previously the Government investigated some extrajudicial killings; 
however, in the past, it prosecuted few police or military officers 
accused of such abuses. A senior prosecutor in 1999 stated that 99 
percent of all cases in which government officials were accused of 
extrajudicial killings were dropped on the basis of insufficient 
evidence. Senior prosecutors and legal associations claimed that most 
cases eventually were dismissed because regulations outlined in the 
Criminal Code required public prosecutors to rely exclusively upon the 
recommendations of the police when determining whether to bring a case 
for criminal prosecution. Initial inquiries were carried out by police 
officers, often the same units responsible for the killing. Credible 
sources reported that police investigators routinely determined that 
police took no wrongful action. Routine exoneration of police officers 
contributed to a climate of impunity that is a significant factor in 
preventing any major change in police behavior. It also discourages 
relatives of victims from pressing for prosecution. However, in June a 
new procedure for investigating suspicious deaths, including deaths 
occurring while the individual is in custody, took effect and is part 
of the amended Criminal Procedure Code. It requires, among other 
things, that the prosecutor, a forensic pathologist, and a local 
administrator participate in the investigation and that family members 
may have legal representation at the inquests.
    Families rarely take advantage of a provision in the law that 
allows them to bring personal lawsuits against police officers for 
criminal action during arrest. If pursued by the family, the case is 
handled by the same office--in some instances by the same prosecutor--
who already has ruled that no criminal action occurred. There is no 
information available to determine how many cases are settled out of 
court. However, in cases in which suits are filed, the official charged 
often compensates the family of the deceased, and the lawsuit is 
waived.
    The Government continued to prosecute two cases of suspected 
extrajudicial killing from 1996. By year's end, the Attorney General 
had not yet decided whether to proceed with murder charges against the 
police officer implicated in the 1996 Supan Buri killing of six 
suspected drug dealers. The trial of the police officer charged in the 
1996 killing of farmer activist Joon Bhoonkhuntod was still in progress 
in December.
    In December 1999, The Court dismissed the murder charges in the 
1996 case of the suspected political killing of environmental protester 
Thong-in Kaewwattha.
    In November police intercepted and assaulted a vehicle in 
Kanchanaburi province that was commandeered by 9 Burmese persons who 
had been convicted of violent felonies in Thailand and were fleeing 
toward Burma. The escapees were armed, had critically wounded one 
prison official, and had taken hostages. In the course of rescuing the 
hostages, security forces killed all the escapees. One hostage was 
killed in the shooting.
    There were 11 killings of political canvassers during the election 
campaigns leading up to the January 2001 general election and March 
2001 Senate elections. All the victims worked for all political 
parties, and all the killings allegedly were politically motivated. 
Police arrested several persons in connection with the killings, and 
investigations continued at year's end. Legal organizations, reputable 
NGO's, and the press reported that some police officers used 
unwarranted lethal force in apprehending criminal suspects.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    As a result of a freedom of information request by the victims' 
families, the Government in May released the Defense Ministry's report 
on the military forces' suppression of political demonstrations in May 
1992. The report provided no new information on the whereabouts of the 
remaining 38 prodemocracy protesters still listed as missing. Most, if 
not all, are presumed by family members and NGO's to be dead.
    The results of a government investigation into the 1991 
disappearance of Labor Congress of Thailand president Thanong Po-an 
conducted by the House Justice and Human Rights Standing Committee have 
never been released to the public.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and the Criminal Code forbid torture and 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, NGO's 
and legal organizations continue to report that some members of the 
police occasionally beat suspects in order to coerce confessions. 
Authorities also investigated police officers accused of raping and 
extorting sex from female suspects in detention.
    In January the Ministry of Defense reported that an Army Lieutenant 
was convicted of July 1999 sexual crimes against a group of Burmese 
refugee women, but the lieutenant received only a 1year suspended 
sentence.
    Some NGO's accused police of using excessive force in July when 
demonstrators engaged in a long-term protest against the Government 
attempted to enter Government House by force. This compound contains 
the Prime Minister's office. Other participants in the protest said 
that the police had acted professionally. The police also maintained 
that they acted with restraint to protect government property. 
Approximately 20 persons sustained minor injuries.
    Among junior police officers, corruption remains widespread. In 
September residents of Nakhon Si Thammarat rioted in response to 
frequent demands for bribes by traffic police. Police officials 
complain that low pay for members of police forces makes them 
susceptible to bribes.
    Some corrupt police and soldiers are involved in prostitution and 
trafficking in women and children (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    Prison conditions are poor but in general they do not threaten the 
life or health of inmates. Already severe prison overcrowding worsened 
during the year. Sleeping accommodations and access to medical care 
remain areas of concern that require continued attention. Medical care 
in prisons is inadequate. To care for a total prison population of 
219,176 inmates in 168 prisons that have a total design capacity of 
100,000 prisoners, the Corrections Department employs only 17 full-time 
doctors and 7 full-time dentists.
    Prison authorities sometimes used solitary confinement to punish 
difficult prisoners. They also used heavy leg irons without apparent 
cause. Credible sources continued to report that prisoners captured in 
escape attempts were beaten severely.
    Poor conditions in Bangkok's Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Center 
(IDC) improved somewhat during the year, but conditions in provincial 
detention centers remained very poor. There were no reports that 
detainees transferred to Bangkok arrived in a debilitated state as in 
1999. Immigration detention facilities are not administered by the 
Department of Corrections and are not subject to many of the 
regulations that govern the regular prison system. The number of long-
term immigrant detainees declined due to a 1998 MOI policy that allows 
illegal immigrants arrested in border areas to be deported without 
first being sent to an immigration detention center, but some 
foreigners still face trial delays of up to 6 months. Despite the drop 
in the detainee population, overcrowding and shortages of food and 
water in the immigration detention centers remain significant problems. 
Early in the year, the Department of Corrections suspended plans to 
construct two additional prisons for women accused of drugrelated 
offenses.
    Access to prisons is not restricted, and the Government permits 
visits by human rights monitors and the Thai International Red Cross.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--With few exceptions, 
including crimes in progress, the law requires police officers making 
an arrest to have warrants, and authorities respect this provision in 
practice. Under the Constitution, persons must be informed of likely 
charges against them immediately after arrest and must be allowed to 
inform someone of their arrest. Detainees have a right to have a lawyer 
present during questioning, and the police generally respected this 
right in practice during the year. Foreign prisoners sometimes are 
forced to sign confessions without benefit of a competent translator.
    Police also are required to submit criminal cases to prosecutors 
for the filing of court charges within 48 hours of arrest. However, 
lawyers report that the police rarely bring their cases to court within 
this period since the Criminal Procedure Code allows an extension 
period of up to 3 days. Police also may seek court permission to hold 
suspects for additional periods (up to a maximum of 82 days for the 
most serious offenses) to carry out investigations. In addition laws 
and regulations place any offense for which the maximum penalty is less 
than 3 years under the jurisdiction of the district courts, which have 
special procedures. In these cases, police are required to submit cases 
to public prosecutors within 72 hours of arrest. There is a functioning 
bail system.
    The only legal basis for detention by the police without specific 
charges for long periods (up to 480 days) is the AntiCommunist 
Activities Act, which authorities did not invoke during the year. In 
March the Government approved legislation to abrogate this law (see 
Section 2.a.); the new legislation is to become effective in June 2001.
    Of more than 200,000 prison inmates, approximately 78,000 were 
charged with narcotics violations. Approximately 27 percent of the 
total prison population were pretrial detainees. Pretrial detainees 
usually are not segregated from the general prison population. 
According to one lawyers' association, pretrial detainees are held an 
average of 60 days.
    The Government does not use exile as a means of political control.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary generally is 
regarded as independent, it is subject to corruption and has a 
reputation for venality.
    The civilian judicial system has three levels of courts: Courts of 
first instance; courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court. A separate 
military court hears criminal and civil cases pertaining to military 
personnel as well as those brought during periods of martial law. There 
is no right to appeal military court decisions. The Constitutional 
Court, charged with interpreting the Constitution, began operating in 
1998; the Court provides a mechanism to implement the Constitution 
fully. The courts became fully independent of the Ministry of Justice 
in August. Islamic (Shari'a) courts provide due process and hear only 
civil cases concerning members of the Muslim minority. Access to courts 
or administrative bodies to seek redress is provided for and respected.
    There is no trial by jury. Trials for misdemeanors are decided by a 
single judge, and more serious cases require two or more judges. While 
most trials are public, the court may order a trial closed. This is 
done most often in cases involving national security or the royal 
family. Career civil service judges preside over the courts. Judicial 
appointments and judicial bodies are not subject to parliamentary 
review.
    The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence. 
Defendants tried in ordinary criminal courts enjoy a broad range of 
legal rights, including access to a lawyer of their choosing. A 
government program provides free legal advice to the poor, but indigent 
defendants are not provided with counsel at public expense 
automatically. Most free legal aid comes from private groups, including 
the Thai Lawyers Association and the Thai Women Lawyers Association.
    There were no reports of political prisoners. Sorayut 
Sakunnanasantisat, a Muslim mullah convicted of offenses against the 
monarchy and of violating national security for leading a political 
protest in 1990, was released from prison in December 1999.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the rights, and the 
Government generally respects them in practice. With few exceptions, 
including crimes in progress, the Constitution requires police to 
obtain a warrant from a court prior to conducting a search. However, 
the procedures for issuing warrants are not standardized, primarily 
because various laws such as the Criminal Procedure Code and internal 
government regulations, including those that apply to the police 
department, have not been amended to comply with the Constitution. The 
laws must be amended to comply with the Constitution by 2002.
    Lawyers' associations reported that police at times endorsed blank 
search warrants or used legitimate warrants to conduct intrusive 
searches outside the stated evidentiary domain. NGO's concerned with 
the welfare of highlanders reported that police and military units 
carried out several warrantless searches of villages for narcotics in 
northern provinces during the year. This type of operation is permitted 
under both the Constitution and the Narcotics Prevention and 
Suppression Act of 1976 in cases in which there is reasonable suspicion 
and an urgent search is deemed necessary. However, some academic groups 
claimed that the searches were arbitrary and violated the villagers' 
civil rights. The AntiCommunist Activities Act, which had allowed 
officials engaged in ``Communist suppression operations'' to conduct 
searches without warrants, was abrogated in March (see Section 1.d.).
    The Director of the Telephone Organization of Thailand resigned in 
June following disclosure of illegal wiretaps on the residential 
telephone of Wira Somkhwamkhit, an anticorruption activist (see Section 
4).
    Security services monitor persons who espouse extremist or highly 
controversial views, including foreign visitors.
    NGO's concerned with the welfare of women had reported in the past 
that hospital and district officials sometimes changed the 
identification of unwed expectant mothers from ``Miss'' to ``Mrs.,'' 
although it is illegal to do so and despite the fact that the women 
possessed no marriage or divorce certificates. Lacking these documents, 
the women could encounter difficulties in obtaining official documents 
needed for some business and government transactions. In 1995 the MOI 
warned clerks against making such an error.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for, and 
citizens generally enjoy, a large measure of freedom of speech and of 
the press, and the Government generally respects these rights in 
practice. However, the Government may restrict these rights to preserve 
national security, maintain public order, preserve the rights of 
others, and protect public morals. In practice this rarely has been 
done. Laws that prohibit criticism of the royal family (lese majeste), 
threats to national security, or speech likely to incite disturbances 
or insult Buddhism remain in place under the Constitution.
    The Constitution makes it unlawful for the Government to censor, 
ban, license, or restrict print or broadcast media, except by specific 
legislation in times of crisis. While newspapers and periodicals 
practice some selfcensorship, especially with regard to the monarchy 
and national security problems, media criticism of political parties, 
public figures, and the Government is common and vigorous. Journalists 
generally are free to comment on governmental activities without fear 
of official reprisal.
    During the year, there were two cases of suspected intimidation of 
the press. In April the Editor in Chief of the Chiang Mai daily 
newspaper Pak Nua was shot and seriously wounded in an attempted 
murder, but recovered. Police arrested four soldiers, all of whom were 
detained without bail. One civilian suspect was not arrested. The 
editor believes that his repeated critical reporting on the local 
government led to the assault. His statements have implicated several 
local government officials. The case is under investigation. The 
Government and the Prime Minister strongly criticized the murder 
attempt.
    In August unknown persons detonated a bomb at the front gate of the 
home of the crime editor of the sensationalist Bangkok daily newspaper 
Khao Sod, causing only property damage. The editor wrote a daily column 
that used innuendo to combat both organization crime and police 
corruption. No one claimed responsibility for the bombing.
    Under the 1941 Printing and Advertisement Act, the Royal Thai 
Police Special Branch issued warnings to publications for various 
violations such as disturbing the peace, interfering with public 
safety, or offending public morals. The 1941 Act permits police closure 
of newspapers or printing presses in times of war or national 
emergency, but only with a court order. No such closures occurred 
during the year. Legislation was proposed in 1998 to revoke the act. 
The Juridical Council approved the revocation of the act, but final 
revocation awaits approval by the Council of State.
    An antipornography law allows police to restrict or confiscate 
printed publications and other materials deemed obscene; the 
interpretation generally is limited to hard-core pornographic material.
    Domestic publications continued to present a wide range of 
political and social commentary. Unless critical of the royal family or 
the monarchy, foreign and domestic books normally are not censored and 
circulate freely. Police have the authority to ban the importation of 
publications but generally do not exercise it. In March the Government 
set a date of June 2001 to abolish the 1952 AntiCommunist Activities 
Act, which had been created to counter the threat of Communism through 
media restriction.
    Radio and television stations enjoy the same constitutional 
protections of freedom of expression and speech as the print media. All 
radio and television stations are licensed by the Government, and most 
are operated under the direct or indirect oversight of the Government 
or the armed forces. Radio and television station profits are retained 
by organizations that control frequencies, such as government 
ministries, universities, and the military services. The military 
services retain 40 to 50 radio and television frequencies for national 
security purposes, despite civilian government assurance that the 
military services may use all broadcasting frequencies in the event of 
a national emergency without the need to own them.
    Radio stations must renew their licenses every year, and their 
signals are broadcast via government transmitters. They are required by 
law to broadcast government-produced newscasts twice daily, 30 minutes 
each in the morning and evening.
    There is one cable television network. It enjoys almost complete 
autonomy under the indirect oversight of the Mass Communications 
Authority of Thailand. In addition a wholly independent ultra-
highfrequency television station (ITV) managed by a private consortium 
including the outspoken Nation Multimedia Group had operated since 
1996. In May it was purchased by another corporation affiliated with 
Thai Rak Thai Party leader Thaksin Shinawatra. One new 24hour, 
independent all news station, operated by former owners of ITV, began 
broadcasting exclusively on cable television in June.
    Programmers generally are free to determine the nature and content 
of television broadcasts. However, as with the print media, self-
censorship exists. Stations occasionally censor or ``black out'' 
portions of programming that they deem politically sensitive or 
pornographic. A censorship board exists in the Prime Minister's office, 
but it rarely restricts television or radio broadcasts.
    The Constitution calls for the liberalization of the broadcast 
media and the establishment of an independent National Broadcasting 
Commission (NBC) to oversee frequency management; it expects to be 
operational in April 2001. The seven Commission members are expected to 
be selected from four broad categories: Government, broadcasting, 
NGO's, and universities. The NBC is authorized to redistribute 
frequencies previously controlled by the Government to eligible 
organizations or individuals in the country. The media criticized the 
proposed implementation regulations, arguing that they contain broad 
censorship powers and allows the Government to retain a large number of 
its frequencies.
    Under the 1930 Film Act, theater owners and broadcasters must 
submit films that they plan to show to the film censorship board for 
review. The board may require that portions of the film be removed, or 
it may ban the film. Reasons for censoring films include violating 
moral and cultural norms and disturbing the public order and national 
security. Theater owners and broadcasters frequently censor films 
themselves before submitting them to the board. According to the office 
of the Film Censorship Board, 176 films were submitted for review in 
1999, the most recent year available. Two films were banned in 1999.
    Activity on the Internet remains unregulated.
    The Constitution provides for the right to engage in academic 
pursuits, and academic freedom is respected. The Ministry of Education 
edits public school textbooks. No textbooks were censored during the 
year.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
generally respected this right in practice. Permits are not required 
for private meetings or gatherings unless held on public property or 
organized by foreign nationals; these are granted routinely.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respected this right in practice. Private 
associations must register with the Government; such registration is 
approved routinely.
    In November in Ubon Ratchathani province, villagers allegedly paid 
by the Government's electric power authority violently dispersed a 
longstanding protest by the Assembly of the Poor and other persons at 
the Pak Mun dam. The villagers seriously injured 4 protesters and 
burned more than 500 temporary shelters. A police investigation was in 
progress at year's end (see Section 1.c.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is protected by law, 
and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, 
it restricts the missionary activities of some groups. The Constitution 
requires that the monarch be a Buddhist. The state religion is in 
effect Therevada Buddhism; however, it is not designated as such.
    The Constitution requires the Government ``to patronize and protect 
Buddhism and other religions.'' The State subsidizes the activities of 
the three largest religious communities (Buddhist, Islamic, and 
Christian). Since mid1999 the Government has provided more than $49 
million (2 billion baht) to support Buddhist and Muslim institutes of 
higher education; to fund religious education programs in public and 
private schools; to provide daily allowances for monks and Muslim 
clerics who hold administrative and senior ecclesiastical posts; and to 
subsidize travel and health care for monks and Muslim clerics. This 
figure also includes an annual budget for the renovation and repair of 
Buddhist temples and Muslim mosques, the maintenance of historic 
Buddhist sites, and the daily upkeep of the Central Mosque in Pattani.
    The Government plays an active role in religious affairs. The 
Religious Affairs Department (RAD), which is located in the Ministry of 
Education, registers religious organizations. In order to be 
registered, a religious organization first must be accepted into an 
officially recognized ecclesiastical group. There were seven groups, 
including one for the Buddhist community, one for the Muslim community, 
one for the Catholic community, and for Protestant denominations. 
Government registration confers some benefits, including access to 
state subsidies, tax-exempt status, and preferential allocation of 
resident visas for organization officials. Although some activities of 
groups that have not been accepted into one of the existing recognized 
groups have been restricted, in general unregistered religious 
organizations operate freely. There were no reports of the extortion of 
unregistered groups by local officials during the year.
    Under the provisions of the Religious Organizations Act of 1969, 
the Department of Religious Affairs recognizes a new religion if a 
national census shows that it has at least 5,000 adherents, has a 
uniquely recognizable theology, and is not politically active. However, 
since 1984 the Government has maintained a policy of not recognizing 
any new religious faiths. This has restricted the activities of some 
groups that have not been accepted into one of the existing religious 
governing bodies on doctrinal or other grounds.
    Religious instruction is required in public schools at both the 
primary (grades 1 through 6) and secondary (grades 7 through 12) 
education levels. Students at the primary level are required to take 80 
hours of instruction per academic year in religious studies classes. 
Instruction is limited to Buddhism and Islam. During the year, some 
parts of the country with large Muslim student populations do not have 
Muslim studies courses. Muslim students in these schools generally were 
directed to school libraries to participate in Muslim self-study 
courses.
    National identity cards produced by the MOI included the religious 
affiliation of the holder. The change was implemented in 1999 in 
response to the demands of parliamentarians who wanted easier 
identification of persons who required Muslim burial. Persons who fail 
or choose not to indicate religious affiliation in their applications 
may be issued cards without religious information.
    The Government permitted foreign missionary groups to work freely 
throughout the country, although it also maintained policies that 
favored proselytizing by citizens.
    The number of foreign missionaries officially registered with the 
Government is limited to a quota that originally was established by the 
RAD in 1982. There were no reports that foreign missionaries were 
deported or harassed for working without registration, although the 
activities of Muslim professors and clerics were subjected 
disproportionately to scrutiny on national security grounds because of 
continued government concern about the potential resurgence of Muslim 
separatist activities in the south.
    Laws prohibiting speech likely to insult Buddhism remain in place 
under the 1997 Constitution. The police, who have legal authority under 
the Printing and Advertisement Act of 1941 to issue written warnings or 
orders suspending the publication or distribution of printed materials 
considered offensive to public morals, did not use it to restrict the 
publication or distribution of religious literature during the year. 
The act requires all theater owners and broadcasters to submit films 
scheduled for screening to a government film censorship board for 
review (see Section 2.a.).
    Muslim female civil servants are not permitted to wear headscarves 
when dressed in civil servant uniforms.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
of citizens to change their residence or workplace, and authorities 
generally respect this right in practice; however, there were some 
exceptions. Longstanding written restrictions on the travel and 
domicile of certain Vietnamese resident aliens who immigrated to 
Thailand in 1945 and 1946, and Chinese who immigrated between 1953 and 
1961, remain in place. In addition other long-term noncitizen 
residents, including several hundred tribal people, officially are 
required to seek permission from local authorities or the army for 
foreign or domestic travel. In practice authorities rarely enforce 
these restrictive measures, and registered resident aliens move freely 
within the country.
    During the year, the Government permitted a total of 99,974 
Burmese, Cambodian, and Lao workers already in the country to hold 
manual labor jobs in 18 sectors. These persons were permitted to work 
and to move freely in 37 of the 76 provinces. The Government deported 
163,966 migrant workers and families during the year. However, NGO's 
reported that a large number of those deported later returned to the 
country.
    The country is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the 
Government continued to provide first asylum to small numbers of 
Vietnamese and Lao asylum seekers pending their resettlement in other 
countries as well as to persons unable to meet the refugee definition 
pending arrangements to return them to their countries of origin.
    Along the border with Burma, the Government generally followed its 
policy of providing first asylum to new arrivals, referred to as 
displaced persons. Provincial screening committees determine 
eligibility to enter the refugee border camps based upon very narrow 
criteria, limited to those who flee actual fighting rather than on 
broader grounds of persecution on the basis of race, religion, ethnic 
group, social class, or political opinion. Consequently, several 
thousand asylum seekers from Burma, primarily of the Karen ethnic 
group, who resided in Thailand but previously were not acknowledged as 
refugees, were given refugee status during the year and were permitted 
to receive assistance and protection in designated refugee camps.
    The Government and the UNHCR do not extend displaced person status 
to the large number of the Shan ethnic minority members who have 
crossed the border into the country from Burma but who have not 
requested refugee status.
    In June and August, the Government repatriated 116 Burmese deemed 
ineligible for assistance in the camps. The UNHCR unsuccessfully 
appealed on behalf of those asylum seekers.
    Most of those returned to Burma in mid-year reportedly have 
returned to the camps.
    There is no legislation regarding the treatment of refugees. 
However, the Government has continued to permit the UNHCR to exercise 
its mandate with regard to small numbers of Vietnamese and Lao asylum 
seekers awaiting repatriation. The Government also upheld its 1998 
decision to allow the UNHCR to play a formal role in monitoring and 
providing protection to about 130,000 refugees from Burma, mostly 
ethnic minorities, in more than a dozen sites near the border with 
Burma. The UNHCR's previous mandate had been limited to a few hundred 
ethnic Burman students at the Burmese Center, formerly known as the 
Burmese Student Safe Area, located in Ratchaburi province. The 
Government continued to restrict access to the Center to those persons 
from Burma to whom the UNHCR had accorded refugee status.
    After the October 1999 takeover of the Embassy of Burma in Bangkok 
by Burmese dissidents, the Government accelerated the pace of third-
country resettlement of Burmese students. Since then more than 1,200 
have been resettled in nine countries.
    The Government also continued to allow NGO's to provide food, 
medical services, housing, and other services to Burmese refugees near 
the border. Government officials periodically arrested Burmese outside 
designated camps as illegal aliens, including some recognized as 
``persons of concern'' by the UNHCR.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to choose or 
change their government peacefully through free and fair elections 
based on universal suffrage. Voting is compulsory. Eligible voters who 
fail to exercise their voting responsibilities, except for those 
excused on reasonable grounds, are subject to the loss of certain 
rights, including the right to be a candidate in future elections. 
However, the Constitution prohibits Buddhist monks and nuns from 
seeking public office. Citizens last exercised this right in an 
election in 1996 that generally was viewed as free, but was marred by 
widespread vote buying, a recurrent problem. Peaceful transitions have 
marked all changes of government since 1992.
    The campaign for the January 2001 general election was free and 
fair, but was marred by alleged vote-buying. Monitoring by the Election 
Commission established by the Constitution lessened the most egregious 
offenses observed in past campaigns.
    The country is a democratically governed constitutional monarchy 
that until 1992 had a history of military coups and powerful 
bureaucratic influences on political life. Since 1992 there have been 
five national multiparty elections, which transferred power to 
successive governments through peaceful, democratic processes. The King 
exerts strong informal influence but has never has used his 
constitutionally mandated power to veto legislation or dissolve the 
elected House of Representatives. There is a bicameral Parliament. The 
coalition Government, led by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai's Democrat 
Party, was formed in 1997. General elections were scheduled for January 
2001.
    In August the first directly elected Senate took office. The Senate 
election required multiple rounds of voting for some districts because 
the Election Commission voided some results due to perceived 
irregularities such as evidence of vote-buying. The election provided a 
first test of new election laws. In October the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the Election Commission could disqualify a candidate whom 
the Commission finds guilty of electoral irregularities.
    While there are no legal restrictions on their political 
participation, women generally are underrepresented in national 
politics, especially at senior levels. There was essentially no change 
in the number of women assigned or elected to positions of leadership. 
There are 15 women among the 264 members of the House of 
Representatives; in the 200member Senate, 21 Senators are women.
    Of the Parliament elected in 1996, there were 22 women among the 
393 members of the House of Representatives. On average less than 10 
percent of Parliament members have been women; however, this figure has 
risen steadily. Following the resignation of one woman from the Cabinet 
to compete in the election for Bangkok Governor, there are two women in 
the 48member Cabinet. On average approximately 5 percent of Cabinet 
members in recent years have been women. Although over half of civil 
service employees are women, few hold senior positions.
    No laws prohibit the participation of ethnic minorities, but few 
hold positions of authority in national politics. Muslims from the 
south hold significant elected posts in the Government, although they 
continue to be underrepresented in local and provincial government 
positions, which are appointed by the central Government. There were 8 
Muslim Members of the Senate and 17 Muslim Members in the 1996 
Parliament, including Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of local, domestic, and international human rights 
organizations work on controversial problems without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases freely. Government officials generally were cooperative 
and responsive to their views; however, at times the Government 
hindered the activity of a few human rights groups.
    Very few NGO's are accorded tax-exempt status, and this sometimes 
hampers the ability of domestic human rights organizations to secure 
adequate funding.
    The independent National Counter Corruption Commission began an 
investigation into the wiretap surveillance of the telephone of Wira 
Somkwamkhit, Chairman of the People's Rights Protection Group, an 
anticorruption NGO. Wira had been investigating corruption charges 
against thenDeputy Prime Minister Sanan Khrachonprasat, who was forced 
to resign after the Commission found that he had falsified financial 
statements.
    In reaction to the 1999 seizure of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok 
and the January seizure of the Ratchaburi Hospital by Burmese 
dissidents, the security forces stepped up enforcement against NGO's 
working with Burmese exiles. Some NGO's reported that authorities 
closed their offices, seized their property, and arrested several 
activists. In November and December, two foreign activists who worked 
with NGO's to help Burmese exile groups were denied entry into the 
country on the basis of the national interest clause of the Immigration 
Act.
    The Constitution mandates the establishment of a permanent 11member 
National Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The newly elected Senate had 
selected 9 of its 11 members by year's end from the list of 22 nominees 
made by the previous Senate. The Commission when operational would 
operate as a separate government entity to prepare an annual evaluation 
of the human rights situation for the National Assembly, propose 
policies and recommendations for amending laws to the National 
Assembly, promote measures to educate citizens on human rights, and 
investigate human rights abuses.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law without 
respect to race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status. 
In practice some discrimination exists, and government enforcement of 
equal protection statutes is uneven.
    Women.--Domestic abuse continues to be a serious problem affecting 
the welfare of many women; reliable reports indicate that domestic 
abuse occurs across all social classes. Specific laws concerning 
domestic violence have not been enacted. Spousal and child abuse are 
covered by assault provisions in the Criminal Code, but rules of 
evidence often make prosecuting such cases difficult. Police do not 
enforce laws against such violence vigorously, and domestic violence 
often goes unreported because many victims and authorities continue to 
regard domestic abuse as a private, not a legal, matter. NGO's 
supported programs designed to aid victims, including emergency 
hotlines, temporary shelters, counseling services, and a television 
program designed to increase awareness of domestic violence, HIV/AIDS, 
and other women's issues. The Government's ``one-stop'' crisis centers 
in state-run hospitals established to care for abused women and 
children continued operation but faced budget difficulties.
    Under the Criminal Code rape is illegal. However, a husband may not 
be prosecuted for spousal rape. In 1998 the Government proposed changes 
to the Criminal Code that would redefine the term rape to include 
marital rape. The proposed changes were pending at year's end.
    According to credible sources, rapes and domestic assaults are 
underreported, in part because law enforcement agencies are widely 
perceived to be incapable of bringing perpetrators to justice. Since 
1994 police have sought to change this perception and encourage women 
to report sexual crimes through the use of teams of female police 
officers that operate in metropolitan Bangkok police stations, with a 
total of 20 female investigators. The police expanded this program to 
three provinces by adding an additional 9 female officers.
    Prostitution is illegal but flourishes. It is culturally ingrained 
and often is protected by local officials with a commercial interest in 
it (see Sections 1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.). Trafficking in women and 
children is a serious problem. Government and NGO estimates of the 
number of women and children engaged in prostitution vary widely. Many 
NGO's and government departments report a figure of 200,000 persons, 
which is considered a conservative estimate. This figure includes 
children under age 18 and foreigners. In border areas, there were 
reports that women were forced into prostitution, but the number of 
such cases is difficult to determine. The majority of prostitutes are 
not kept under physical constraint, but a large number labor under debt 
bondage (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The 1996 Prostitution Prevention 
and Suppression Act makes child prostitution illegal and states that 
customers who patronize child prostitutes are subject to criminal 
sanctions. Parents who allow a child to enter the trade also are 
subject to criminal sanctions, but prosecutions remained low. NGO's and 
government agencies provide shelter, rehabilitation, and reintegration 
programs for children and women involved in the sex industry.
    The 1998 Labor Protection Law made sexual harassment illegal for 
the first time, but covers only persons working in the private sector. 
NGO's claim that the term is vague and that such ambiguity makes the 
prosecution of harassment claims difficult. No sexual harassment cases 
were prosecuted under the act during the year.
    The Constitution has six gender-related articles designed to 
provide women with equal rights and protections, but some inequalities 
in the law remain. A man may sue for divorce on the grounds that his 
wife committed adultery, but a woman faces the additional legal burden 
of proving that her husband has acknowledged publicly another women as 
his wife.
    Women have equal access to higher education, and more than half of 
university graduates each year are women. However, police and military 
academies (except for the nursing academy) do not accept female 
students, although a significant number of instructors at the military 
academies are women. Women constitute 44 percent of the labor force and 
hold an increasing share of professional positions, and government 
regulations require employers to pay equal wages and benefits for equal 
work regardless of gender. Women are able to own and manage businesses 
freely. Discrimination in hiring is common, and there is a significant 
gap between the average salaries earned by men and women because women 
are concentrated in lower-paying jobs. In practice women also receive 
lower pay for equal work in virtually all sectors of the economy.
    The Constitution includes an article that specifies that onethird 
of the members of the new National Human Rights Commission be women. 
The Women and Constitution Network, a league of 35 women's 
organizations, advocates for legal reforms to address legal inequities 
in the treatment of women. It continues to play an important role in 
securing the inclusion of gender equality clauses in legislation that 
create new government organizations mandated by the 1997 Constitution.
    Children.--In recent years, the Government took steps to promote 
the rights and welfare of children. The Constitution provides for the 
right of access to free public education through grade 12, and the 
Government mandates 9 years of compulsory education. An estimated 23 
percent of children complete grade 6, and 10 percent complete grade 12. 
The Government's 1997 Social Welfare Plan for Underprivileged People 
doubled the budget for children's programs for 1997-2001, compared with 
the previous 5year plan. Although special juvenile courts and detention 
centers exist in 29 provinces, children are tried in the same courts 
and detained with adults in the rest of the country.
    Child labor remains a problem, and some international 
organizations, government-funded research organizations, and news media 
continued to report on the large number of children leaving school for 
economic reasons (see Section 6.d.).
    The Criminal Code provides for the protection of children from 
abuse, and laws on rape and abandonment provide for harsher penalties 
if the victim is a child. However, as with domestic abuse, police are 
reluctant to investigate abuse cases, and rules of evidence make 
prosecution of child abuse cases difficult. In September legislation 
designed to protect witnesses, victims, and offenders under the age of 
18 came into effect. The new procedures allow children to give evidence 
on videotape and in private surroundings in the presence of a 
psychologist, psychiatrist, or other social worker. Persons charged 
with pedophilia would be charged under appropriate age of consent and 
prostitution laws. Victims' testimony is handled under the provisions 
of the Child Friendly Procedure Act.
    Child prostitution, including forced prostitution and trafficking 
in children, is a serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The 
Government, university researchers, and NGO's estimate that there are 
as many as 30,000 to 40,000 prostitutes under the age of 18.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government has enacted legislation 
designed to ensure access to public facilities and to prohibit 
employment and education discrimination against the disabled; however, 
it has not enforced these laws effectively. An estimated 110,000 
disabled children attend school, with 60,000 to 70,000 enrolled in 
about 4,000 regular public schools that have been equipped to 
accommodate students with physical disabilities. Nationwide, there are 
8 governmentoperated and 10 NGO-operated training centers for the 
disabled. However, with little education, very few disabled adults are 
able to find employment. Many of those who do find employment report 
being subjected to wage discrimination. The law requires that private 
firms hire 1 disabled person for every 200 other workers or contribute 
to a fund that benefits the disabled, but this provision has not been 
enforced since it came into effect in 1994. Some state enterprises 
maintain discriminatory hiring policies.
    The Constitution mandates access to public buildings for the 
disabled, but laws implementing the provisions have not yet been 
enacted. The 1999 regulation that makes compliance mandatory was not 
enforced during the year. Disabled persons who register with the 
Government are entitled to free medical examinations, wheelchairs, and 
crutches.
    Indigenous People.--In May the MOI redefined the category of hill 
tribe residents eligible for citizenship to include previously 
undocumented tribal people, now collectively called ``highlanders''. 
The new regulations also ease the requirement to establish citizenship. 
The new definition includes persons who formerly were defined either as 
indigenous or migrants. The new regulations also ease the requirement 
to establish citizenship by allowing a wider range of evidence and 
empowering local officials to decide cases. In August the Government 
agreed to grant citizenship to descendants of certain groups of 
resident aliens. Those without proper documentation, who account for 
approximately half the estimated 700,000 to 880,000 such persons, still 
face restrictions on their movement, may not own land, and are not 
protected by labor laws, including minimum wage requirements. They 
sometimes are denied adequate education and health care. Those residing 
in national parks or wildlife sanctuaries sometimes are subject to 
eviction. As noncitizen residents, they also are barred from 
participating in the political process.
    Societal discrimination, arising from widely held beliefs that hill 
tribe members are involved in drug trafficking and forms of 
environmental degradation, continued. In June and August, a group of 
villagers attacked a Hmong orchard that allegedly encroached into an 
environmentally protected area. Hill tribes occasionally were subjected 
to indiscriminate searches of villages for illegal drugs (see Section 
1.f.).
    Religious Minorities.--There were no reports of violence against 
members of religious minorities, but some societal discrimination 
remains. Muslims, who represent up to 10 percent of the country's 
population nationwide, and constitute the majority in four of the five 
southernmost provinces that border Malaysia, experienced some 
discrimination. The Government continued to address the problem by 
maintaining longstanding policies designed to integrate Muslim 
communities into society through developmental efforts and expanded 
educational opportunities.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Sino-Thai population is 
well integrated and does not face discrimination. However, about 50,000 
former Chinese soldiers and dependents of a Kuomintang army that fled 
China after the Communist takeover and approximately 45,000 Vietnamese 
immigrants who reside in five northeastern provinces live under a set 
of laws and regulations that restrict their movement, residence, 
education, and occupation; however, these laws rarely are enforced (see 
Section 2.d.). According to Government sources, over 22,600 children of 
Vietnamese immigrants and 6,209 children of Chinese Kuomintang 
immigrants from these groups have been naturalized.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1975 Labor Relations Act grants 
freedom of association to all private sector workers, who have the 
right to form and join unions of their choosing without prior 
authorization; to decide on the constitutions and rules of these 
associations and unions; to express their views without government or 
employer interference; to confederate with other unions; to receive 
protection from discrimination, dissolution, suspension, or termination 
by any outside authority because of union activities; and to have 
employee representation in direct negotiations with employers. However, 
no law explicitly protects workers from discrimination who have 
participated in organizing new unions that have not been registered 
officially. Union leaders reported that employers often discriminate 
against workers seeking to organize unions. During the year, employers 
used loopholes in the Labor Relations Act to fire union leaders prior 
to government certification of new unions. The Government had not 
amended this legislation by year's end.
    The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions criticized a 
draft revision of the Labor Relations Act, claiming that it restricted 
union rights. The Department of Labor's subsequent revision awaited 
presentation to the new Parliament at year's end.
    In February 1999, the Government enacted the State Enterprise Labor 
Relations Act (SELRA), which provides public sector employees in state 
enterprises the same workers' trade union rights to organize as exist 
in the private sector. SELRA prohibits lockouts by employers and 
strikes by state enterprise workers. It took effect in April 1999.
    Less than 2 percent of the total work force, but nearly 11 percent 
of industrial workers, are unionized. Cultural traditions, 
unfamiliarity with the concept of industrial relations, efforts by the 
Government to diminish union cohesiveness, and the share of total 
employment that is agricultural often are cited as reasons for low 
rates of labor organization.
    State enterprise unions do not have the right to join private 
sector federations. However, unofficial contacts between public and 
private sector unions continue, and the Government has not interfered 
with these relationships.
    The Government has the authority to restrict private sector strikes 
that would ``affect national security or cause severe negative 
repercussions for the population at large,'' although it seldom invokes 
this provision and did not do so during the year. Labor law also 
forbids strikes in ``essential services,'' defined much more broadly 
than in the International Labor Organization (ILO) criteria, and 
includes sectors such as telecommunications, electricity, water supply, 
and public transportation as essential services. No strikes were 
disapproved during the year.
    Some corrupt private sector union leaders have been exploited by 
politicians or employers, but public unions generally operate 
independently of the Government and other organizations. Internal 
conflicts, corruption, and a lack of influential leadership continued 
to weaken the labor movement.
    Unions are free to associate internationally with other trade 
organizations, and they maintain a wide variety of such affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor 
Relations Act recognizes the right of private sector workers to 
organize and bargain collectively and defines the mechanisms for such 
negotiations and for government-assisted conciliation and arbitration 
in cases under dispute. In practice genuine collective bargaining 
occurs only in a small fraction of workplaces and in most instances 
continues to be characterized by a lack of sophistication on the part 
of employee groups and autocratic attitudes on the part of employers. 
Wage increases for most workers come as a result of increases in the 
minimum wage, rather than as a result of collective bargaining. The 
process of setting minimum wages locally through provincial tripartite 
committees may further limit union influence; many of these provincial 
committees have excluded labor representatives and have placed factory 
managers on the wage committees to represent worker interests.
    The Government sets wages for both civil servants and state 
enterprise employees under SELRA. A system of labor courts created in 
1980 exercises judicial review over most aspects of labor law for the 
private sector. Workers also may seek redress for grievances through 
the Tripartite Labor Relations Committee. Redress of grievances for 
state-enterprise workers is handled by the State Enterprise Relations 
Committee. Labor leaders generally were satisfied with the treatment 
that their concerns received in these forums, although they complained 
that union leaders dismissed unjustly usually are awarded only monetary 
compensation.
    No separate labor legislation applies in the nine export processing 
zones, in which wages and working conditions often are better than 
national norms because of the preponderance of Western and Japan-based 
multinational firms.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor except in the case of national 
emergency, war, or martial law; however, while these provisions 
generally are enforced in the formal sector, forced labor in the 
informal sector remains a problem. The law specifically prohibits 
forced or bonded labor by children (see Section 6.d.). During the year, 
there were reports of sweatshops in which employers prevented workers 
from leaving the premises. There are no estimates of the number of such 
sweatshops, but the growing number of illegal aliens from Burma, 
Cambodia, and Laos increases the opportunities for such abuse. 
Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of prostitution also 
remains a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--In 1998 the Government raised the legal minimum age for 
employment to 15 years. The law permits the employment of children 
between the ages of 15 and 18 only in ``light work,'' where the lifting 
of heavy loads and exposure to toxic materials or dangerous equipment 
or situations is restricted. The employment of children at night (from 
10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), or in places in which alcohol is served, is 
prohibited by law. Children, perhaps more than 1 million children 
nationwide, work on family farms. NGO's report that 2 to 4 percent of 
children between the ages of 6 and 14 work in urban employment and are 
at risk of labor abuse. Most underage workers in urban areas work in 
the service sector, primarily at gasoline stations and restaurants. 
Child labor is not evident in larger foreign-owned or Thai 
exportoriented factories. However, no comprehensive survey of child 
labor in smaller enterprises exists, since NGO's do not have access to 
shop house factories. The DOL employed 803 fulltime inspection officers 
during the year. Enforcement of child labor laws is not rigorous, and 
inspectors usually respond to specific public complaints, reports of 
absences by teachers, or reports in newspapers. Their inclination when 
dealing with violators is to negotiate promises of better future 
behavior, rather than to seek prosecution and punishment. The law 
prohibits all forms of child labor and implicitly includes forced or 
bonded labor by children (see Section 6.c.). The Government attempted 
to address the problem of child labor in 1998 by extending compulsory 
education from 6 to 9 years (see Section 5); however, the Primary 
Education Act has not been amended to implement this provision.
    The Government worked to define worst forms of child labor in ILO 
Convention 182 and indicated its readiness to ratify the Convention in 
January 2001.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage ranges from 
$3.30 to $4.12 (133 to 165 baht) per day, depending on the cost of 
living in various provinces. This wage is not adequate to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. With extended family 
members' financial contributions, the minimum wage provides the basis 
for a marginally adequate overall standard of living. However, 
nationwide, more than half of workers receive less than the minimum 
wage, especially in rural provinces. Despite encouragement of employees 
to report violations to labor inspectors, the enforcement of minimum-
wage laws is mixed.
    Unskilled migrant workers as well as illegal aliens often work for 
wages that are significantly lower than the minimum wage. The minimum 
wage does not apply to undocumented hill tribe members, who also are 
not protected by other labor laws. The Ministry of Labor is responsible 
for ensuring that employers adhere to minimum wage requirements, but 
workers in rural provinces frequently are reported to receive less than 
the minimum wage.
    In 1998 the Government mandated a uniform maximum workweek of 48 
hours, with a limit on overtime of 35 hours per week. Employees engaged 
in ``dangerous'' work, such as in the chemical, mining, or other 
industries involving heavy machinery, may work a maximum of 35 hours 
per week. The petrochemical industry is excluded from these 
regulations.
    Work permits for immigrant laborers initially are granted for 1 
year, and routinely are extended for a second year. The Government 
deported 163,996 illegal workers during the year, most of them to 
Cambodia and Burma. The press criticized this program as ineffective, 
and NGO's reported that a large number of those deported return soon 
thereafter.
    Working conditions vary widely. The rate of injury from industrial 
accidents has remained relatively constant over the last 10 years at 
4.5 percent of the total work force. The MOL stated that the average 
annual rate of workrelated deaths was 15 per 100,000 workers. 
Occupational diseases rarely are diagnosed or compensated, and few 
doctors or clinics specialize in occupational diseases. In medium-sized 
and large factories, government health and safety standards often are 
applied, but enforcement of safety standards is lax. In the large 
informal sector, health and safety protections are substandard.
    Provisions of the Labor Protection Act include expanded protection 
for pregnant workers with prohibitions on working night shifts, 
overtime, or holidays, as well as for those working with dangerous 
machinery or on boats.
    The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare promulgates health and 
safety regulations regarding conditions of work. Labor inspectors are 
responsible for enforcement of health and safety regulations; the 
strictest penalty is 6 months' imprisonment. Provisions in the Labor 
Protection Law include the establishment of welfare committees, which 
include worker representatives, in factories employing over 50 persons. 
These committees are to set and review health and safety conditions in 
each factory. There is no law affording job protection to employees who 
remove themselves from dangerous work situations. Master Toy Works 
employees protested unsafe working conditions in April. In October the 
factory closed, and its 279 laid-off workers received the mandatory 
compensation of $750 (30,000 baht) each.
    Courts continued to hear witnesses' testimony in the case of the 
1993 Kader Toy Factory fire.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in women 
and children; however, the country is a source, transit place, and 
destination for trafficking in women and children for of a variety of 
purposes that include indentured servitude and forced labor and 
prostitution (see Section 5); such trafficking is a serious problem. 
Government and NGO estimates of the number of women and children 
engaged in prostitution vary widely. Many NGO's and government 
departments report a figure of 200,000 persons, which is considered a 
conservative estimate. This figure includes children under the age of 
18 and foreigners.
    The Government, university researchers, and NGO's estimate that 
there are as many as 30,000 to 40,000 prostitutes under the age of 18. 
The Prostitution Prevention and Suppression Act of 1996 made child 
prostitution illegal and provided for criminal punishments for those 
who use child prostitutes. Parents who allow a child to enter the trade 
also are punishable. The Government reported that it had convicted 36 
parents under this clause in the first half of the year. The 1997 
Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and Children Act 
increased the penalties for trafficking in women and children for the 
purposes of prostitution or slave labor, and provided for wide powers 
of search and assistance to victims. The authorities occasionally 
utilized these powers during the year, but the number of prosecutions 
remained minimal. A moneylaundering law became effective in August 1999 
and included provisions to enable authorities to confiscate the assets 
of persons convicted of trafficking or engaging in the business of 
prostitution. NGO's and government agencies continued to provide 
shelter, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs for children and 
women involved in the sex industry during the year. However, there 
continue to be credible reports that some corrupt police, military, and 
government officials are involved in trafficking (see Sections 1.c., 5, 
and 6.c.). There were no reported arrests of officials for trafficking 
during the year.
    There were NGO reports of some women being forced into 
prostitution, usually in remote border areas but also in major cities. 
The accuracy of such reports and the numbers of persons involved are 
difficult to determine; however, coerced prostitution exists and is 
believed to involve women from hill tribes and women from neighboring 
countries. NGO's have reported that Burmese, Lao, Cambodian, and 
Chinese women continue to be trafficked, in some cases reportedly 
abducted, for prostitution. Vietnamese and Russian citizens also 
reportedly were trafficked to Thailand in smaller numbers. According to 
domestic NGO's, girls between the ages of 12 and 18 continued to be 
trafficked from Burma, southern China, and Laos to work in the 
commercial sex industry. Persons trafficked from China generally were 
in transit to other countries. Reportedly as many as 8,000 women were 
trafficked from Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet Republics for 
work in the sex industry in the country by year's end. This figure 
represents a substantial increase from 1999.
    Because foreign women frequently are unable to speak the Thai 
language and are considered illegal immigrants, these women are 
vulnerable to physical abuse and exploitation. Some women are lured 
into the country with promises of jobs as waitresses or domestic 
helpers, but are forced to work as prostitutes. Illegal immigrants have 
no rights to legal counsel or health care if arrested (see Section 
2.d.). The amnesty provisions available under UNHCR auspices do not 
apply to such women. In June 1999, a memorandum of understanding 
between the Government and several domestic NGO's provided for some 
detailed police procedures to ameliorate the problem of trafficked 
persons detained by the authorities. The agreement stated that the 
training of police officers would include instructions to treat such 
persons as victims of human trafficking rather than as illegal 
immigrant workers. Rather than being deported, they become the 
responsibility of the Public Welfare Department.
    The majority of prostitutes are not kept under physical constraint, 
but a large number work in debt bondage. Brothel procurers reportedly 
advance parents a substantial sum against their daughter's future 
earnings, frequently without the consent of the young woman involved. 
The women are then obligated to work in a brothel to repay the loan.
    Thai women also are trafficked to other countries to work in the 
sex trade. Many Thai women are enticed to work in Japan with offers of 
lucrative legitimate employment, only to be forced into the sex 
industry upon their arrival; many others reportedly know that they will 
work in the sex trade. However, since trafficked women virtually always 
are misled or lied to by the agents who convince them to leave 
Thailand, whether or not they understand the nature of the work in 
which they are to be engaged, they generally do not understand the 
debts that they will be forced to repay, the amount of time it will 
take to repay the debts, or the conditions of employment to which they 
will be subjected to upon arrival. According to Human Rights Watch, the 
passports of Thai women trafficked to work in ``dating'' bars usually 
are confiscated by their ``employers,'' who also demand repayment for 
the cost of their ``purchase.'' Typically they are charged $25,000 to 
$40,000 (3 million to 5 million yen; 1.1 million to 1.7 million baht); 
their living expenses and expenses for medical care (when provided by 
the employer) and other necessities, and ``fines'' for misbehavior are 
added on to the original ``debt'' over time. How the ``debt'' is 
calculated is left to employers; the process is not transparent, and 
employers reportedly often use the ``debt'' to coerce additional unpaid 
labor from trafficked women. Employers also may ``resell'' or threaten 
to ``resell'' troublesome women or women found to be HIV positive, 
thereby increasing the debt that they must repay and possibly worsening 
their working conditions. In order to repay the ``debts'' they incur, 
trafficked women often must work long hours (often with no days off) 
for several months, essentially without pay. Many women are not allowed 
to refuse clients, even those known to be physically abusive. Most Thai 
women trafficked into the sex trade have their movements strictly 
controlled by their ``employers'' while they work off their debt, and 
are threatened with reprisals, perhaps through members of organized 
criminal groups, to themselves or their families if they try to escape. 
Employers often isolate the women, subject them to constant 
surveillance, and use violence to punish them for disobedience. Most 
trafficked women also know that they are subject to arrest by Japanese 
authorities if found without their passports or other identification 
documents. Few speak Japanese well, making escape even more difficult.
                               __________

                                 TONGA

    The Kingdom of Tonga consists of 169 small islands scattered over a 
wide area of the South Pacific. Most of the approximately 105,000 
inhabitants are Polynesian. Tonga is a constitutional monarchy in which 
political life is dominated by the King, the nobility, and a few 
prominent commoners. The judiciary is independent.
    The security apparatus is composed of the Tonga Defense Services 
(TDS) and a police force. The 430-man TDS force is responsible to and 
controlled by the Minister of Defense.
    The economy is based primarily on the cultivation of tropical and 
semitropical crops. Demand for imported goods and products has led to a 
substantial trade deficit. This deficit has been offset largely by 
remittances from Tongans employed abroad, overseas aid, and, to a 
lesser degree, tourism.
    The Government's human rights record was generally poor in several 
areas, and the principal human rights abuse remains severe restrictions 
on the right of citizens to change their government. A relatively small 
group of commoners vocally challenges the Constitution, arguing for a 
more representative and accountable government. At times the 
authorities infringed on freedom of speech and of the press. Some women 
suffer from domestic violence, and discrimination limits the 
opportunities available to women. There were some incidents of racial 
violence.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other such treatment, and there were no reports of such 
practices. Prison conditions are Spartan but in accordance with local 
living standards. Church representatives and family members are 
permitted to visit prisoners. No nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) 
attempted human rights monitoring visits to prisons, and the 
permissibility of such visits has not arisen.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
proscribes arbitrary arrest or detention and provides for the right to 
judicial determination of the legality of arrest; these provisions are 
observed in practice. There is no preventive detention, although there 
are no statutory limits to the length of time a suspect may be held 
prior to being charged. The law does not limit access by counsel and 
family members to detained persons.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary, whose top judges 
have been expatriates, is independent of the King and the executive 
branch.
    The court system consists of the Supreme Court (which has original 
jurisdiction over all major cases), the police magistrates' courts, a 
general court, a court martial for the TDS, a court tribunal for the 
police force, and a court of review for the Inland Revenue Department. 
In addition the Court of Appeals, as the appellate court of last 
resort, is the highest court. The King's Privy Council presides over 
cases relating to disputes over titles of nobility and estate 
boundaries. The King has the right to commute a death sentence in cases 
of murder or treason.
    The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and the 
Government respects this in practice. A court may not summon anyone 
without providing the person a written indictment stating the offenses 
the person is accused of committing. Defendants are entitled to 
counsel, and lawyers have free access to defendants.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--By law and in practice, no one may enter or search the 
home of another or remove any item unless in possession of a warrant 
issued by a magistrate. Neither the State nor political organizations 
intrude arbitrarily into a person's private life.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, at times the authorities 
infringed on these rights.
    There are two weekly newspapers (one of which is government owned) 
and one privately owned national magazine. There is one privately owned 
television station, and in July a government-owned station began 
broadcasting. The Government owns one AM and one FM radio station. 
Three FM stations (one purely religious) are run privately. While there 
is generally little editorializing in the government-owned media, 
opposition opinion appears regularly alongside government statements 
and letters. A privately owned newspaper, Kele'a, openly criticized the 
Government without interference. Defamation suits brought by government 
officials and other individuals against media outlets for allowing 
interviewees to voice allegedly defamatory remarks--which are permitted 
in some circumstances under the law--may have the practical effect of 
limiting freedom of speech. However, the national media from time to 
time carries comments critical of government practices and policies, 
including some made by prominent citizens.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. No person in recent memory has applied for refugee 
status, and the Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding 
refugees, asylees, or first asylum.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the ability to change their leaders or the 
system of government. The King and 33 hereditary nobles dominate 
political life. They assert authority largely through control of 
substantial landholdings and their dominant numbers in the Legislative 
Assembly (Parliament). While the Constitution allows the monarch broad 
powers, many of which do not require the legislative branch's 
endorsement, the King sometimes permits ``the system'' to operate 
without his guidance. The King appoints the Prime Minister and appoints 
and presides over the Privy Council (called the Cabinet when the King 
is not presiding), which makes major policy decisions. Currently the 
Cabinet is made up of nine ministers and two governors; it includes 
both nobles and commoners, who serve at the King's pleasure.
    The unicameral legislature, the Legislative Assembly, consists of 
the Cabinet, nine nobles elected by their peers, and nine people's 
representatives elected by the general population. The King appoints 
the Speaker from among the representatives of the nobles. In January 
the King appointed his son, Prince Ulukalala Lavaka Ata, as Prime 
Minister. The new Prime Minister also holds five other ministerial 
portfolios, including those of defense and foreign affairs.
    Cabinet members and nobles usually vote as a bloc; however, votes 
related to impeachment charges against a commoner member of the Cabinet 
demonstrated that nobles and people's representatives can override the 
Cabinet's wishes at times.
    In recent years, a number of persons both inside and outside the 
establishment have called for democratic change, usually emphasizing 
the importance of more government accountability. Very few challenge 
the retention of the monarchy; the King is greatly respected. A 
prodemocracy movement continued, although it currently lacks formal 
structure due to differences of views among its leaders. All nine 
current people's representatives advocate various degrees of democratic 
reform. Proposals for constitutional revision tend to center on the 
popular election of all parliamentarians, with the parliamentarians 
then selecting their speaker.
    Women are severely underrepresented in government and politics. 
There are no female Members of Parliament, although there have been in 
the past.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no legal barriers to the formation of local NGO's that 
concern themselves with human rights. Some local NGO's include among 
their interests human rights problems, although none undertakes 
investigations of alleged violations. No outside organizations are 
known to have made requests to investigate alleged human rights 
violations.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Social, cultural, and economic facilities are available to all 
citizens regardless of race or religion. However, members of the 
hereditary nobility have substantial advantages. These include control 
over most of the land and a generally privileged status. Nonetheless, 
it is possible for commoners to rise to cabinet positions in government 
and to accumulate great wealth and status in the private sector.
    Women.--Domestic violence seldom is publicized, but it is a 
problem. Incidents of wife beating generally are addressed in 
traditional ways within families or by village elders. Such abuse is 
seldom reported to the police. Abused wives sometimes return to their 
families if mediation fails.
    The country is male dominated, and women generally occupy a 
subordinate role. For a woman to rise to a position of leadership, she 
usually needs to have the support of the nobility or to possess 
exceptional talent. The King's mother reigned for many years, and a 
royal princess is one of the country's most prominent businesspersons. 
Some female commoners hold senior leadership positions in business.
    Some village women, with help from NGO's, led local development 
projects.
    The Government has a women's unit in the Prime Minister's office. 
Although some NGO's initially viewed this unit with suspicion, it 
appeared to be functioning cooperatively with them. Many young, 
educated women still consider the unit to be ineffective. A government-
sponsored National Council of Women is making positive contributions.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's human rights 
and welfare and provides commensurate funding for children's welfare 
within the context of the total resources available to the State. Child 
abuse, if it occurs, is rare and has not become a source of concern in 
a society where the extended family participates in child rearing.
    Education has been compulsory since 1882. Although it is sometimes 
criticized as being of poor quality, education is provided for all 
children through Form 6 (high school). Compliance rates are good.
    People with Disabilities.--No mandated provisions for accessibility 
to buildings and services for the disabled exist. There were no known 
complaints of discrimination in employment, education, or provision of 
other state services. The education of children with special needs has 
been a longstanding priority of the Queen.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In June a member of the royal 
family commented publicly on what he called the country's ``racially 
based land laws,'' and stated that a previous spate of violence against 
Chinese-owned shops was racially motivated. Late in the year, a local 
official announced that Chinese-owned stores were banned from his 
district on the western side of the country.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form unions 
under the 1964 Trade Union Act, but to date no unions have been formed, 
presumably because of the small size of the wage economy and the lack 
of a perceived need for unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Since no unions 
have been formed, collective bargaining is not practiced. There is no 
legislation permitting and protecting collective bargaining or the 
right to organize. Labor laws and regulations are enforced in all 
sectors of the economy, including in the two small export enhancement 
zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced labor including forced and bonded labor by children, and it is 
not practiced.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Child labor is not used in the wage economy, although 
there is no legislation prohibiting it. The Government prohibits forced 
and bonded labor by children and enforces this prohibition effectively 
(see Section 6.c.).
    Education has been compulsory since 1882, and it is provided for 
all children through Form 6 (high school).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage law, 
although there are government guidelines for wage levels. Labor laws 
and regulations, enforced by the Ministry of Labor, Commerce, and 
Industry, limit the workweek to 40 hours. The Ministry of Labor 
enforced laws and regulations reasonably well in the wage sector of the 
economy, particularly on the main island of Tongatapu. Enforcement in 
agriculture and on the outer islands is limited by isolation.
    Industrial accidents are rare, since few industries exist that 
would expose workers to significant danger. Due to these factors, 
little or no work has been done on industrial safety standards.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically address 
trafficking; however, there were no reports that persons were 
trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                 TUVALU

    Tuvalu, with a population of approximately 10,000 primarily 
Polynesian persons, occupies a land area of a little more than 10 
square miles on 9 atolls in the central South Pacific. Independent 
since 1978, its Constitution provides for a Westminster-style 
parliamentary democracy. The Head of State is the British Queen, 
represented by the Governor General, who must be a Tuvaluan citizen. 
The judiciary is independent.
    A 32-member police constabulary, the only security force, is 
responsible to and effectively controlled by civilian authority.
    The primarily subsistence economy relies mainly on coconuts, taro, 
and fishing. With donor assistance, Tuvalu has developed a well-managed 
trust fund, which is supplemented by significant annual payments for 
use of its international telephone-dialing prefix. An agreement for use 
of the country's Internet address is expected to increase national 
revenues significantly. Remittances from Tuvaluans working abroad as 
well as the sale of postage stamps and of fishing licenses to foreign 
vessels provide additional foreign exchange. The country's isolation 
and meager natural resources limit the prospects for economic 
development.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and society is generally egalitarian; however, social 
behavior, as determined by custom and tradition, is considered as 
important as the law, is ensured by village elders, and leads to some 
discrimination. In the traditional culture of the islands, women occupy 
a subordinate role, with limits on their job opportunities.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and inhuman or degrading 
punishment, and there were no reported instances of such practices. 
Local hereditary elders exercise considerable traditional authority--
including the seldom-invoked right to inflict corporal punishment for 
infringing customary rules, which can be at odds with the national law.
    Prison facilities consist of several holding cells at the back of 
the police station. There have been no serious crimes within the memory 
of local officials. It is rare for a prisoner to spend as long as a 
week in a cell; more commonly, a person is incarcerated overnight 
because of drunkenness. While prison conditions are somewhat Spartan as 
regards to food and sanitation, complaints seem to be minimal or 
nonexistent.
    Since there are no local human rights groups, the question of 
prison monitoring by them has not arisen. Visits by church groups and 
family members are permitted.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and it is free of governmental interference.
    The judicial system consists of the higher courts: the Privy 
Council, the Court of Appeal, and the High Court; and the lower courts: 
the senior and resident magistrates, the island courts, and the land 
courts. The Chief Justice, who is also Chief Justice of Nauru, sits on 
the High Court about once a year.
    The right to a fair public trial is ensured by law and observed in 
practice. The Constitution provides that accused persons must be 
informed of the nature of the offenses with which they are charged and 
be provided the time and facilities required to prepare a defense. The 
right to confront witnesses, present evidence, and appeal convictions 
is provided by law. Procedural safeguards are based on English common 
law. An independent people's lawyer is required by statute. The 
services of this public defender are available to all citizens without 
charge.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect such prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides these 
rights, and the Government respects these provisions and academic 
freedom in practice.
    The one radio station is under government control.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly and association, and there are no 
significant restrictions in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for this right, 
and the Government respects it in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel within the 
country and abroad. The Government does not restrict repatriation.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. No 
person in recent memory has applied for refugee status, and the 
Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding refugees, 
asylees, or first asylum.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens freely and directly elect a 12-member unicameral 
Parliament whose normal term is 4 years. Each of the country's nine 
atolls is administered by a six-person council, also elected by 
universal suffrage to 4-year terms. The minimum voting age is 18 years.
    The Cabinet consists of the Prime Minister, elected by secret 
ballot from among the Members of Parliament, and up to four other 
ministers, appointed and removed from office by the Governor General 
with the advice of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister may appoint 
or dismiss the Governor General on behalf of the British monarch. The 
Prime Minister may be removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no 
confidence. The Government of former Education Minister Ionatana has 
been in power since April 1999. There are no formal political parties.
    For cultural reasons, women are underrepresented in politics. At 
present there are no female Members of Parliament.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There have been no allegations of human rights violations by the 
Government and no known requests for investigations. While no known 
barriers block their establishment, there are no local nongovernmental 
organizations concerned with human rights.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
creed, sex, or national origin, and the Government generally respects 
these prohibitions. However, the traditional culture has limited 
women's job opportunities.
    Women.--Violence against women is rare. If wife beating occurs, it 
is infrequent and has not become a source of societal concern.
    Women increasingly hold positions in the health and education 
sectors and also are more active politically.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's human rights 
and welfare and provides commensurate funding for children's welfare 
within the context of its total available resources. Education is 
compulsory for children from 6 through 13 years of age. There are no 
reports of child abuse.
    In March a fire destroyed a girls' boarding school, with 17 
fatalities. A government investigation is underway to ensure that no 
negligence occurred, and the Government undertook to improve safety 
standards at schools.
    People with Disabilities.--Although there are no mandated 
accessibility provisions for the disabled, there are no known reports 
of discrimination in employment, education, or provision of other state 
services.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers are free to organize unions 
and choose their own labor representatives, but most of the population 
lacks permanent employment and is engaged in subsistence activity. The 
law provides for the right to strike, but no strike has ever been 
recorded.
    In the public sector, civil servants, teachers, and nurses--who 
total less than 1,000 employees--are grouped into associations that do 
not have the status of unions. The only registered trade union, the 
Tuvalu Seamen's Union, has about 600 members, who work on foreign 
merchant vessels. Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The 
Seamen's Union is a member of the International Transportation Workers' 
Federation.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1978 
Industrial Relations Code provides for conciliation, arbitration, and 
settlement procedures in cases of labor disputes. Although there are 
provisions for collective bargaining, the practice in the private 
sector is for wages to be set by employers. For both the private and 
public sectors, the legal procedures for resolving labor disputes are 
seldom used; instead, the two sides normally engage in 
nonconfrontational deliberations in the local multipurpose meeting 
hall.
    Tuvalu is not a member of the International Labor Organization.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1978 Employment 
Law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and 
there have been no reports of either being practiced.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Employment Law prohibits children under the age of 14 
from working. Education is compulsory for children from 6 through 13 
years of age. The law also prohibits children under 15 years of age 
from industrial employment or work on any ship and stipulates that 
children under the age of 18 years are not allowed to enter into formal 
contracts, including work contracts. Children rarely are employed 
outside the traditional economy. The Government prohibits forced and 
bonded labor by children and enforces this prohibition effectively (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage, set 
administratively by the Government, is sufficient to allow a worker and 
family in the wage economy to maintain a decent standard of living. The 
present biweekly minimum wage in the public (government) sector is 
$67.60 ($A130). This rate applies regardless of sex and age. In most 
cases, the private sector adopts the same minimum wage rate.
    The Labor Office may specify the days and hours of work for workers 
in various industries. The workday by law is set at 8 hours. The 
majority of workers are outside the wage economy. The law provides for 
rudimentary health and safety standards. It requires employers to 
provide an adequate potable water supply, basic sanitary facilities, 
and medical care. Specific provisions of the law provide for the 
protection of female workers. The Ministry of Labor, Works, and 
Communications is responsible for the enforcement of these regulations, 
but it is able to provide only minimum enforcement.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits procurement within 
and across borders for purposes of prostitution, but does not 
specifically mention trafficking. However, there were no reports that 
persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                VANUATU

    Vanuatu, a small South Pacific island nation of approximately 
183,000 persons that was ruled jointly by Britain and France as the 
Condominium of New Hebrides prior to its independence in 1980, has a 
parliamentary form of government: The 52-member Parliament elects the 
Prime Minister, as the Head of the Government and the President who is 
the Head of State. The latter's powers are largely ceremonial, except 
when acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Political 
legitimacy is based on majority rule. The courts normally are 
independent of executive interference.
    The civilian authorities control the small police force and its 
paramilitary wing, the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF). Under current 
regulations, the police commissioner commands the entire force, 
including the VMF.
    Subsistence farming and fishing are the principal livelihood for 
more than 80 percent of the population. There is also some production 
of cash crops including copra, and cocoa, as well as cattle farming. 
The service sector provides most formal employment, primarily in 
government, tourism, and an offshore financial center, and represents 
the largest component of the country's gross domestic product.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Poor prison 
conditions, an extremely slow judicial process, and violence and 
discrimination against women were the major problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Constitutional provisions against torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment usually are observed in practice and 
enforced by the courts.
    In November 1999, based on a lack of evidence, the presiding 
magistrate dismissed the case against 18 police officers charged with 
intentional assault of rioters in Port Vila in January 1998. At year's 
end, a Supreme Court review of the decision was pending.
    Prison conditions are poor. The central prison in Port Vila is 
dilapidated and not reliably secured. There are approximately 40 
prisoners, all men. Inmates are treated humanely, to the extent allowed 
by the meager resources of the prison service.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and there were no reports of 
such arrests. Arrest is by warrant.
    The constitutional provision that suspects must be informed of the 
charges against them and given a speedy hearing before a judge is 
observed in practice.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the courts are normally free of military or 
executive interference. However, in 1996 the Government dismissed the 
foreign Chief Justice prior to the end of his appointment. In 1998 the 
Acting Chief Justice, who argued that his predecessor's dismissal 
constituted unconstitutional interference with the judiciary, sponsored 
a ``joint declaration'' of judges and magistrates on ``the basic 
principles on the independence of the judiciary'' to remind the 
executive branch of the principle of judicial independence. There were 
no reports of interference with the judiciary by the present 
Government.
    Magistrates' courts deal with most routine legal matters. There is 
also a Supreme Court, and above the Supreme Court an Appeals Court with 
three judges, two of whom are appointed by the President and chosen 
from among Supreme Court judges in other South Pacific nations as 
required.
    The judicial system is based on British law. The courts uphold 
constitutional provisions for a fair public trial, a presumption of 
innocence until guilt is proven, a prohibition against double jeopardy, 
a right of judicial determination of the validity of arrest or 
detention, and a right of appeal to an appellate court.
    Judges, prosecutors, and the police all complain about large 
backlogs of cases in the courts due to a lack of resources. For example 
most of the members of the VMF accused of kidnaping public officials in 
the course of a mutiny in 1996 still are awaiting trial. Procedures 
were changed during the year to allow the public prosecutor to present 
new cases to the magistrates more frequently, but the limited number of 
qualified judges and prosecutors remains a serious problem.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--There were no reports of arbitrary interference with 
privacy, family, home, or correspondence.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respected these 
provisions in practice.
    The Government controls much of the country's media, including a 
weekly newspaper, one AM and one FM radio station, and a limited-
service television station confined to the capital, Port Vila, which 
provides English and French news service three times a week. There is 
one independent newspaper published semiweekly and another weekly 
newspaper published by a political party.
    Throughout the year, both the government-owned and the independent 
press reported criticisms of political leaders freely and apparently 
without hindrance. Some individual politicians and their supporters are 
sensitive to public criticism and sometimes threatened the media, but 
without any apparent effect on press freedom. Correspondents for 
international media also are allowed to report without interference.
    The Government respects academic freedom. Vanuatu has three 
institutions of higher education--a teachers college, an agricultural 
school, and an annex of the University of the South Pacific.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the 
Government respects these rights in practice. Permits must be obtained 
to hold public demonstrations and rallies; they are granted routinely.
    The Government does not restrict the formation of political parties 
or other groups.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the Government respected it in practice. Missionaries of various 
Christian denominations work without restriction. The 1995 Religious 
Bodies Act, which requires religious organizations to register with the 
Government, was never signed by the President and was never enforced, 
although some churches registered under the act voluntarily. Although 
the act has not been repealed by Parliament, and technically remains in 
force, it remains dormant and its constitutionality is in question.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--All citizens are free to travel 
internally and to leave and return to the country without restrictions.
    The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees, 
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum 
has never arisen.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for parliamentary elections every 4 
years, through which citizens can freely change their government. 
Parliamentary majorities have been unstable, with legislators spending 
much time and energy accumulating support for votes of confidence. The 
last national elections were held in March 1998. In November 1999, 
Barak Sope of the Melanesian Progressive Party assembled a 
parliamentary majority and formed the Government.
    Outside observers consider the 1998 elections to have been 
generally free and fair. A total of 216 candidates contested 52 seats. 
Voter turnout was 63.6 percent.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Traditional 
attitudes, in which men are dominant and women frequently are limited 
to customary family roles, hamper women from taking a more active role 
in economic and political life. Six women, including the sole sitting 
female member, ran for Parliament in 1998; none were elected.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no restrictions on the formation of local human rights 
organizations. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), such as the 
National Council of Women and the Family Health Association, include 
human rights education as part of their programs.
    A new Ombudsman's Act was passed by Parliament in November 1998 in 
the wake of parliamentary anger over vigorous investigations of 
corruption by the Ombudsman under the previous act. Among other 
provisions it requires that members of the Ombudsman's staff be 
appointed by the Public Service Commission rather than by the Ombudsman 
and that persons interviewed by the Ombudsman may have legal 
representation present at the interview.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for fundamental rights and freedoms for 
all persons and prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, place of 
origin, religious or traditional beliefs, political opinions, language, 
or sex; however, women remain victims of discrimination in this 
tradition-based society.
    Women.--Violence against women, particularly wife beating, is 
common, although no accurate statistics exist. Courts occasionally 
prosecute offenders using common law assault as a basis for 
prosecution, since there are no specific laws against wife beating. 
However, most cases of violence against women, including rape, go 
unreported because women, particularly in rural areas, are ignorant of 
their rights or fear further abuse. In addition police are frequently 
reluctant to intervene in what are considered to be domestic matters.
    While women have equal rights under the law, they are only slowly 
emerging from a traditional culture characterized by male dominance, a 
general reluctance to educate women, and a widespread belief that women 
should devote themselves primarily to childbearing. During the year, in 
the course of a downsizing in the public service, a disproportionate 
number of women's positions were abolished. Policies to guide the 
Department of Home Affairs in protecting and furthering the rights of 
women currently are being drafted under the Government's reform 
program.
    The majority of women enter into marriage through ``bride-price 
payment,'' a practice that encourages men to view women as property. 
Women also are inhibited by tradition from owning land, and at least 
one women's advocate believes this limitation underpins their secondary 
status. Many female leaders view village chiefs as a major obstacle to 
attaining social, political, and economic rights for women. Women 
interested in running for public office get encouragement and help from 
an NGO, Vanuatu Women in Politics (VANWIP). Four of the six women who 
ran for Parliament in the 1998 election ran under the VANWIP banner.
    Children.--Although the Government has made education a priority, 
access to education is limited, and school attendance is not 
compulsory. Children are protected within the traditional extended 
family system. Members of the extended family, particularly paternal 
uncles, play an active role in a child's development. As a result, 
virtually no children are homeless or abandoned. NGO's and law 
enforcement agencies report increased complaints of incest and rape of 
children, although no statistics are available.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no known governmental or 
national policy on the disabled and no legislation mandating access for 
them. Their protection and care is left to the traditional extended 
family and to voluntary NGO's. Due to high rates of unemployment, there 
are few jobs available for the disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most of the population is made 
up of Melanesians. Small minorities of Chinese, Fijians, Vietnamese, 
Tongans, and Europeans generally are concentrated in two towns and on a 
few plantations. Most of the land belongs to indigenous tribes that 
inhabit it, and it cannot be sold, although it sometimes is leased to 
others. However, within the limits of this system of land tenure, there 
were no reports of discrimination against noncitizens. There is no 
evidence to suggest a pattern of ethnic discrimination in the provision 
of the limited basic services that the Government provides.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the 
right to organize unions.
    Approximately 25,000 persons participate in the formal economy as 
wage earners. There are five trade unions. The unions are grouped under 
an umbrella organization, the Vanuatu Council of Trade Unions (VCTU). 
The trade unions are independent of the Government.
    The high percentage of the population still engaged in subsistence 
agriculture and fishing deters extensive union activity. In addition 
membership in the Vanuatu Public Servants Union fell dramatically 
following the Government's wholesale dismissal of hundreds of full-time 
public servants during a protracted general strike in 1994. The Supreme 
Court in 1994 ruled that the union had not complied with its own rules 
when it undertook the general strike and declared the strike illegal. 
Combined union membership in the private and public sectors is 
approximately 1,000.
    The law prohibits retribution if a strike is legal. In the case of 
private-sector employees, violations would be referred to the Labor 
Department for conciliation and arbitration. In the public sector, the 
Public Service Commission would handle violations.
    In 1995 Parliament passed a law requiring unions to give 30 days' 
notice of intent to strike, with a list of the names of intending 
strikers.
    There was no significant strike activity during the year.
    Unions may not affiliate with international labor federations 
without government permission. The VCTU is a member of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions exercise 
the right to organize and bargain collectively. Labor unions negotiate 
wages and conditions directly with management. If the two sides cannot 
agree, the matter is referred to a three-member arbitration board 
appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs. The board consists of one 
representative from organized labor, one from management, and the 
senior magistrate of the magistrate's court. While a dispute is before 
the board, labor may not strike and management may not dismiss union 
employees. However, unions and management generally reach agreement on 
wages without having to refer the matter to arbitration. Complaints of 
antiunion discrimination are referred to the Commissioner of Labor. 
While the law does not require union recognition, once a union is 
recognized, it does prohibit antiunion discrimination.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by 
children, and there were no reports that either adults or children were 
subject to forced, bonded, or compulsory labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits children under 12 years of age from 
working outside of family-owned agricultural production, where many 
children assist their parents. There were no reports of forced or 
bonded labor by children, which is prohibited by law (see Section 
6.c.). The employment of children from 12 to 18 years of age is 
restricted by occupational category and conditions of labor, that is, 
restrictions on employment in the shipping industry and on nighttime 
employment. The Labor Department effectively enforces these laws.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A legislated minimum wage is 
enforced effectively by the Labor Department. Since 1995 it has been a 
flat rate of approximately $143 (16,000 vatu) per month for both urban 
and rural workers. The minimum wage does not support an urban family 
living entirely on the cash economy. Most families are not dependent 
solely on wages for their livelihoods.
    Various laws regulate benefits such as sick leave, annual 
vacations, and other conditions of employment, including a 44-hour 
maximum workweek, with at least one 24-hour rest period weekly. An 
Employment Act, enforced by the Labor Department, includes provisions 
for safety standards. However, the 1987 safety and health legislation 
is inadequate to protect workers engaged in logging, agriculture, 
construction, and manufacturing, and the single inspector attached to 
the Labor Department is hard pressed to enforce the act fully. Workers 
have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations 
without jeopardy to their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution does not specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that 
persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                VIETNAM

    The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a one-party state, ruled and 
controlled by the Vietnamese Communist Party (CPV). The CPV's 
constitutionally mandated leading role and the occupancy of all senior 
government positions by party members ensure the primacy of party 
Politburo guidelines and enable the Party to set the broad parameters 
of national policy. In recent years, the party has reduced gradually 
its formal involvement in government operations and allowed the 
Government to exercise significant discretion in implementing policy. 
The National Assembly remains subject to party direction; however, the 
Government made progress in strengthening the capacity of the 450-
member National Assembly and in reforming the bureaucracy. The National 
Assembly, chosen in elections in which most candidates are approved by 
the Party (only about 85 percent of delegates are party members) played 
an increasingly independent role as a forum for local and provincial 
concerns and as a critic of local and national corruption and 
inefficiency. The Assembly was more active in revising legislation, 
criticizing officials' performance, screening ministerial and other 
senior candidate appointments, and dismissing senior officers. The 
judiciary remains subservient to the CPV and to external pressure and 
influence by the Government.
    The military services, including the border defense force, are 
responsible for defense against external threats. The military forces 
are assuming a less prominent role as the ultimate guarantor of 
internal security, which is primarily the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). However, in some remote areas, the 
military forces are the primary government agency, providing 
infrastructure and all public safety functions, including maintaining 
public order in the event of civil unrest. The Government continued to 
restrict significantly civil liberties on grounds of national security 
and societal stability. The MPS controls the police, a special national 
security investigative agency, and other units that maintain internal 
security. It enforces laws and regulations that significantly restrict 
individual liberties and violate other human rights. It also maintains 
a system of household registration and block wardens to monitor the 
population, concentrating on those suspected of engaging, or being 
likely to engage in, unauthorized political activities. However, this 
system has become less obvious and pervasive in its intrusion into most 
citizens' Daily lives. Members of the public security forces committed 
human rights abuses.
    Vietnam is a very poor country of 79 million persons undergoing 
transition from a centrally planned to a marketoriented economy. 
Estimated annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is $375, 
continuing an improving trend through the 1990's. While the Asian 
financial crisis caused a significant slowdown, with trade and foreign 
investment declining markedly, economic growth officially was estimated 
at 6.7 percent in 2000. Agriculture, primarily wet rice cultivation, 
employs 70 percent of the labor force, and accounts for 24 percent of 
total output. Industry and construction contribute 34 percent, while 
services account for 42 percent. Disbursed official development 
assistance in 1999 was $970 million, roughly 4 percent of GDP. 
Particularly in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, economic reforms have 
raised the standard of living and reduced party and governmental 
control over, and intrusion into, citizens' daily lives. Reforms have 
created a popular expectation in urban areas of continued social, 
legal, educational, and physical improvements. For many large rural 
populations close to larger cities, this is also true. However, many 
citizens in isolated rural areas, especially members of ethnic 
minorities in the northern uplands, central highlands, and the north 
central coastal regions continue to live in extreme poverty. Gains from 
agricultural reform in recent years have improved the lives of many 
farmers, but the rural poverty level is approximately 30 percent.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
was some measurable improvement in a few areas, serious problems 
remain. The Government continued to repress basic political and some 
religious freedoms and numerous abuses by the Government continue. 
Although the CPV continued its efforts to strengthen the mechanism for 
citizens to petition the Government with complaints, the Government 
continued to deny citizens the right to change their government. Prison 
conditions remain harsh, particularly in some isolated provinces. 
Police sometimes beat suspects during arrest and arbitrarily arrested 
and detained citizens, including detention for peaceful expression of 
political and religious views. The judiciary is not independent, and 
the Government denied some citizens the right to fair and expeditious 
trials. The Government continued to hold a number of political 
prisoners. Several political and religious prisoners were freed in two 
general amnesties during the yearjournalist and poet Nguyen Ngoc Tan, 
Catholic priest Mai Huu Nghi, and Hmong Protestant minister Vu Gian 
Thao in April and Cao Daiist Le Kim Bien and Protestant house church 
leader Nguyen Thi Thuy in September. The Government restricts citizens' 
privacy rights, although the trend toward reduced government 
interference in the daily lives of most citizens continued. The 
Government significantly restricts freedom of speech, the press, 
assembly, and association. The Government continued its longstanding 
policy of not tolerating most types of public dissent; however, it made 
exceptions in some instances. For example, a number of persons 
continued to circulate letters that were highly critical of senior 
leaders and called for political reform; these authors were subjected 
to close surveillance by public security forces. The Government allowed 
citizens somewhat greater freedom of expression and assembly to express 
grievances, including by delegates in the National Assembly, citizens 
in local forums with delegates, and small groups of protesters outside 
government offices. In Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, and other cities, 
several ``sit-in'' demonstrations, some involving dozens of protesters 
camped in front of government buildings for weeks at a time, were 
permitted. In Ho Chi Minh City, the Government stopped such 
demonstrations late in the year. The Government prohibits independent 
political, labor, and social organizations; such organizations exist 
only under government control. The Government restricts freedom of 
religion and significantly restricts the operation of religious 
organizations other than those entities approved by the State. 
Dissident groups of Buddhists, Hoa Hao, and Protestants, in particular, 
faced harassment by authorities. In June a festival gathering of up to 
300,000 Hoa Hao in An Giang province took place with official 
permission, and in August an estimated 100,000 Roman Catholics attended 
the annual La Vang pilgrimage. The Government imposes some limits on 
freedom of movement. The Government does not permit local private human 
rights organizations to form or operate. Violence and societal 
discrimination against women remained problems. Child prostitution is a 
problem. Government and societal discrimination against some ethnic 
minorities is a continuing problem. The Government restricts worker 
rights, such as freedom of association, although the Government is 
cooperating with the International Labor Organization (ILO) and 
international donors to improve implementation of provisions of the 
Labor Law. Child labor is a problem. There were reports that children 
worked in exploitative situations and that prisons required inmates to 
work for little or no pay. Trafficking in women and children for the 
purpose of prostitution within the country and abroad continued to be 
serious problems, and there were reports of the trafficking of women to 
mainland China and Taiwan for arranged and forced marriages. The 
Government made efforts to combat these problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no known 
politically motivated killings. Little information was available on the 
extent of deaths in police custody or on official investigations into 
such incidents.
    There were no reports of deaths of inmates due to prison conditions 
during the year.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits physical abuse; however, police beat 
persons, including suspects during arrests, and also beat street 
children in their attempts to get them off the streets. There were no 
known reports of torture of detainees. Little information is available 
on the extent of police brutality during interrogations.
    Prison conditions are harsh. Conditions generally did not threaten 
the lives of prisoners. There were no reported differences in male and 
female death rates in prison. Overcrowding, insufficient diet, and poor 
sanitation remained serious problems. Prison guards sometimes treat 
prisoners badly and frequently beat them. Solitary confinement is a 
problem. Conditions in pretrial detention reportedly were particularly 
harsh, and there were credible reports that authorities sometimes 
denied inmates access to sunlight, exercise, and reading material. The 
pretrial detention system provides few amenities. Prisoners who await 
trial and remain ``under investigation'' sometimes experience harsher 
conditions than those convicted and sentenced. After trial, a prisoner 
is sent to a different location, and conditions often improve in 
instances in which a prisoner has money.
    Most prisoners had access to basic health care and, for those with 
money, to supplemental food and medicine. However, some political and 
other prisoners were denied visitation rights, and there were reports 
that some prisons required inmates to work for little or no pay (see 
Section 6.c.). Prisoners sentenced to hard labor complained that their 
diet and medical care were insufficient to sustain health, especially 
in remote, diseaseridden areas. There were credible reports that three 
political and religious prisoners with serious medical conditions are 
held under harsh conditions in remote prisons, such as Xuan Loc prison 
z30a in an isolated part of Dong Nai province, with limited medical 
care.
    The Government did not permit independent monitoring of its prison 
and detention system.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued 
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily, including arrest and 
detention for the peaceful expression of their political and religious 
views. The Criminal Procedure Code provides for various rights of 
detainees, including time limits on pretrial detention and the right of 
the accused to have a lawyer present during interrogation; however, in 
practice the authorities often ignored these legal safeguards. 
Moreover, a directive on administrative detention gives security 
officials broad powers if they believe that a suspect is a threat to 
``national security.''
    A revised Criminal Code came into effect on July 1 and with it a 
number of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to conform to the 
new code. The Criminal Procedure Code was amended to shorten the time 
for investigations and reinvestigation. It also places more strict 
limits (12 months) on the time allowed for the procuracy to end its 
investigation, and allows less time for the judge's panel to rule on a 
case. By shortening investigation and trial time, the procedure code 
also limits the time in which officials can interfere in the 
investigation process. Prior to formal charge, a detainee has a 
statutory right to contact with an attorney or to notify family 
members. However, in most cases, police inform family of the person's 
whereabouts.
    The Government continued to utilize its 1997 decree on 
``administrative detention,'' which gives authorities extremely broad 
powers to place persons under surveillance and to monitor citizens 
closely. Government officials refer to this decree as the 
``administrative probation'' decree. The decree allows the MPS to 
detain a person without trial. The regulations define administrative 
detention as an administrative penalty imposed on persons over the age 
of 18 who break the law and violate national security, as determined by 
the definition of crimes in the Criminal Code, but whose offenses are 
not yet at the level that warrants ``criminal responsibility.'' The 
detention can last from 6 months to 2 years; persons under 
administrative detention must live and work in designated places, and 
remain subject to the ``management and education of the local 
administration and people.'' The MPS is the lead agency in implementing 
the decree and uses these measures mainly against suspected political 
dissidents.
    To put someone on probation, the chairperson of a district people's 
committee first collects dossiers on the persons recommended for 
detention, then submits the dossiers to the chairperson of the 
Provincial People's Committee for a final decision. The district 
police, people's committees, wards, and townships all help collect 
information for the dossier. The dossier includes a person's curriculum 
vitae, his or her past criminal record, as well as any comments from 
the people's committee, the Fatherland Front, and the district police. 
The chairperson of the Provincial People's Committee uses the 
information to make a final decision on the detention. The Government 
claims that the decree's restriction on movement does not constitute a 
detention, but merely puts a person on probation; however, by limiting 
a person's movement to his or her residence, and allowing travel 
outside that area only with government approval, the measure 
effectively constitutes detention without the benefit of trial.
    The Supreme People's Procuracy approves the issuance of arrest 
warrants, but law enforcement officials appear able to arrest and 
incarcerate persons without presenting arrest warrants. Once arrested, 
detainees often are held for periods of up to 1 year without formal 
charges or trial. In general time spent in pretrial detention counts 
toward time served upon conviction and sentencing.
    The MPS prohibits contact between a detainee and his lawyer as long 
as the procurator's office is investigating the case, which may be up 
to 1 year. In April police in Dalat confiscated the computer and 
writing materials belonging to dissident writer Ha Sy Phu (Nguyen Xuan 
Tu). Ha was required to remain in his home during investigation, 
although he was not charged with any crime by year's end. He remained 
isolated from outside contact throughout this period.
    Persons arrested for the peaceful expression of views opposed to 
official policy were subject to charge under any one of several 
provisions in the Criminal Code that outlaw acts against the state.
    At year's end, 3 Cao Dai believers remain imprisoned. In March An 
Giang province police detained eight Hoa Hao believers and blocked 
roadways and waterways to forestall incidents in connection with the 
death anniversary of the group's founder (see Section 2.c.).
    Prisoners who are ``under investigation'' sometimes experience 
harsher conditions than those who have been convicted and sentenced to 
prison terms (see Section 1.c.). No official statistics are available 
on the percentage of the prison population that consists of pretrial 
detainees or the average period of time that such detainees have been 
held.
    It is difficult to determine the exact number of political 
detainees, in part because the Government usually does not publicize 
such arrests and because the Government does not consider these persons 
to be detained for political reasons.
    The Government continued to isolate certain political and religious 
dissidents by placing restrictions on the movements of some dissidents 
and by pressuring the supporters and family members of others. For the 
past 6 years, Thich Huyen Quang, the Supreme Patriarch of the banned 
Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), has been at a pagoda in 
Quang Ngai province under conditions resembling administrative 
detention. From 1981 until 1994, he was held at another pagoda in that 
province. In March 1999 he was visited by senior UBCV leader Thich 
Quang Do for the first time in 18 years, but after 3 days of meetings 
both were held for questioning by police, and Thich Quang Do was 
escorted by police to his pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City. Thich Huyen Quang 
has confirmed that he must request permission before leaving the pagoda 
and is not allowed to lead prayers or participate in worship activities 
as a monk. He is able to receive visits from sympathetic monks and lay 
person supporters relatively frequently. After meeting with him, 
visitors often are questioned by police. Thich Huyen Quang has called 
for the Government to recognize the UBCV. Government officials 
reportedly suggested that he move to Hanoi, where more modern medical 
facilities are available, but he has refused (see Section 2.c.).
    Dissident Nguyen Dan Que and his family members in Ho Chi Minh City 
continued to be questioned by police. Their telephone service continued 
to be suspended periodically, and the family's Internet account was cut 
off following the publication abroad of several of his writings 
critical of the Government.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
independence of judges and jurors; however, in practice the Party 
controls the courts closely at all levels, selecting judges primarily 
for their political reliability. Constitutional safeguards are 
significantly lacking. Credible reports indicate that party officials, 
including top leaders, instruct courts how to rule on politically 
important cases. CPV and government officials may exert influence over 
court decisions by pressuring both the lay assessors and the judges who 
sit on a panel together to decide cases. The CPV has strong influence 
over high-profile cases, or in cases where a person is charged with 
challenging or harming the CPV or the State. The National Assembly 
votes for judicial candidates that are presented by the President for 
Supreme People's Court (SPC) president and Supreme People's Procurator. 
The National Assembly also controls the judiciary's budget, including 
judges' salaries, while the executive branch pays judges' salaries at 
the local level. By contrast the procuracy, also a separate branch that 
reports to the National Assembly, has a unified line of command and 
controls its own budget. The President appoints all other judges.
    The system of appointing judges and lay assessors also reflects the 
lack of judicial independence. Court panels at all levels include 
judges and lay assessors. However, while lay assessors help decide 
cases, they have no legal training. District and provincial people's 
councils appoint the lay assessors at the lower levels. The standing 
committee of the National Assembly appoints and discharges the SPC lay 
assessors. The Fatherland Front must approve candidates for SPC lay 
assessors. The President appoints the District People's Council and 
Provincial People's Council judges to 5year terms. The President also 
appoints SPC judges at the suggestion of the central selection council. 
The CPV's influence over the courts is amplified both because the 
people's councils appoint the lay assessors, and because the judges 
serve limited terms and are subject to review.
    The judiciary consists of the Supreme People's Court, the local 
people's courts, military tribunals, and other tribunals established by 
law. Each district throughout the country has a district people's 
court, which serves as the court of first instance for most domestic, 
civil, and criminal cases. Each province has a Provincial People's 
Court, which serves as the appellate forum for district court cases, as 
well as courts of first instance for other cases. The SPC is the 
highest court of appeal and review. The Ministry of Justice administers 
most district and provincial courts, and the National Assembly 
administers the SPC. The judiciary also includes military tribunals, 
economic courts, labor courts, and administrative courts that resolve 
disputes in those specialized fields. Administrative courts deal with 
complaints by citizens about official abuse and corruption. The 
economic and administrative courts have addressed few cases since their 
creation in 1994 and 1995, respectively. Local mass organizations, such 
as those under the Fatherland Front, are empowered to deal with minor 
breaches of law or disputes. In addition the CPV and Government have 
set up special committees to help resolve local disputes.
    The Supreme People's Procuracy has unchecked power to bring charges 
against the accused and serves as prosecutor during trials. A judging 
council, made up of a judge and one or more people's jurors (lay 
judges), determines guilt or innocence and also passes sentence on the 
convicted. The relevant people's council appoints people's jurors, who 
are required to have high moral standards but need not have legal 
training. The legal institutional framework and legal culture, which 
favor the procuracy over the judiciary and preserve a presumption of 
guilt in criminal cases, constitute a major obstacle to free and fair 
trials. Although the Constitution asserts that citizens are innocent 
until proven guilty, in practice this principle often is ignored. A 
Western legal expert who analyzed the court system during the year 
found that more than 95 percent of the persons who are charged with a 
crime are convicted.
    Many judges and other court officials lacked adequate legal 
training, and the Government conducted training programs to address 
this problem. A number of foreign governments and the United Nations 
Development Program provided assistance to the Government to strengthen 
rule of law and develop a more effective judiciary. However, the lack 
of openness in the judicial process and the continuing lack of 
independence of the judiciary undermined the Government's efforts to 
develop a fair, effective judicial system.
    The July Criminal Code amendments define crime more precisely than 
the 1999 code. The new code provides two or three levels of punishment 
for each crime, depending on the crime's seriousness and circumstances. 
The new code provides punishment brackets for a larger percentage of 
the crimes; less than 10 percent have no punishment bracket at all. The 
changes were intended to discourage abuse by law enforcement officials, 
allow courts to render verdicts and punishments more appropriate to the 
particular offense, hinder arbitrary sentencing by judicial panels, and 
allow crime to be punished more uniformly.
    There is a shortage of trained lawyers and judges and no 
independent bar association. At the Supreme Court level, there is a 10 
to 20 percent shortage of qualified judges; at the provincial level, 
the shortage ranges from 30 to 40 percent, according to a U.N. 
official. Low salaries hinder development of a trained judiciary. The 
few judges who have formal legal training often have studied abroad in 
countries with Socialist legal traditions and are slow to change. Young 
educated judges have little influence within the system.
    Although the Constitution provides for legal counsel for persons 
accused of criminal offenses, the scarcity of lawyers makes this 
provision impossible to enforce. With few qualified attorneys, the 
procurator often handles both the prosecution and the defense. With so 
few lawyers and so many defendants, legal counsel frequently is of 
little help to the defendant. Consistent with its Marxist-Leninist 
political system, the Government requires that the Vietnamese Bar 
Association be a subordinate part of the Vietnam Fatherland Front 
(VFF), the mass front organization controlled by the Communist Party. 
At the provincial level, the Bar Association is subordinate to 
representatives of the central Government, the VFF, the provincial 
people's council, and people's committee.
    Trials generally are open to the public; however, judicial 
authorities sometimes closed trials or strictly limited attendance in 
sensitive cases. Defendants have the right to be present at their trial 
and to have a lawyer. The defendant or the defense lawyer have the 
right to cross-examine witnesses. However, in political cases, there 
are credible reports that defendants are not allowed access to 
government evidence in advance of the trial, to cross-examine 
witnesses, or to challenge statements. Little information is available 
on the extent to which defendants and their lawyers have time to 
prepare for trials. Those convicted have the right to appeal.
    The December 1999 conviction of Nguyen Thi Thuy, a Protestant house 
church leader in Phu Tho province sentenced to 1 year in prison for 
``interfering with an officer doing his duty,'' was upheld on appeal 
despite claims by her defense lawyer that she had been arrested for her 
religious activities. She was released in September in a national 
prisoner amnesty.
    The Government continued to imprison persons for the peaceful 
expression of dissenting religious and political views. There are no 
reliable estimates of the number of political prisoners, in part 
because the Government usually does not publicize such arrests, and 
sometimes conducts closed trials and sentencing sessions. Amnesty 
International stated that there are more than 20 prisoners sentenced 
for political reasons. Other sources estimated that as of October there 
were up to 150 political prisoners. However, many of the names included 
on these lists are difficult to verify. The number of confirmed 
political prisoners is much lower than the number publicized. For 
example, one prisoner released in April from Xuan Loc prison z30a in 
Dong Nai province circulated a list of 55 persons whom he described as 
political prisoners. While this report may be credible, there is not 
sufficient identification or information about these persons to confirm 
that they are in fact political prisoners. The Government claims that 
it does not hold any political and religious prisoners and that persons 
described as political prisoners were convicted of violating national 
security laws.
    A total of more than 15,000 prisoners reportedly were granted 
amnesty during the year or released from their sentences early for good 
behavior. In April journalist and poet Nguyen Ngoc Tan was released. 
Most of those released were common criminals. Among those believed to 
be imprisoned at year's end for peaceful political activities are: 
Political activists Nguyen Dinh Huy and Pham Hong Tho, Truong Van Thuc, 
Nguyen Chau Lan, Tran Van Be Cao, Tran Nguyen Hon, and Le Van Mong.
    No current information is available concerning imprisoned 
dissidents Nguyen Van Thuan and Le Duc Vaong who were arrested in 1998.
    The Government does not allow access by humanitarian organizations 
to political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of 
home and correspondence; however, the Government restricts this right 
significantly. It operates a nationwide system of surveillance and 
control through household registration and block wardens who use 
informants to keep track of individuals' activities. The authorities 
continued to monitor citizens but with less vigor and thoroughness than 
in the past. The authorities largely focused on persons whom they 
regarded as having dissident views or views critical of the Government, 
or whom they suspected of involvement in unauthorized political or 
religious activities. Citizens formally are required to register with 
police when they leave home, remain in another location overnight, or 
when they change their residence (see Section 2.d.). However, these 
requirements rarely are enforced; many citizens move around the country 
to seek work or to visit family and friends without being monitored 
closely, and many families who sought employment moved to other 
locations without prior government permission. However, there were 
reports that some ``spontaneous migrant'' families have been unable to 
obtain household registration or residence permits in their new 
locations, causing them serious legal and administrative problems. In 
urban areas, most citizens were free to maintain contact and work with 
foreigners, but police questioned some individual citizens and families 
of citizens with extensive or close relations with foreigners. The 
Government also exerts control over citizens who work for foreign 
organizations by requiring that citizens be screened and hired through 
a government service bureau. However, many foreign organizations hire 
their own personnel and only ``register'' them with the service bureau.
    The Government opened and censored targeted persons' mail, 
confiscated packages, and monitored telephone, electronic mail, and 
facsimile transmissions. However, this practice appears sporadic and is 
not applied consistently. Citizens' membership in mass organizations 
remained voluntary, but often is important for career advancement. 
Membership in the CPV remains an aid to advancement in the Government 
or in state companies and is vital for promotion to senior levels of 
the Government. At the same time, diversification of the economy has 
made membership in CPVcontrolled mass organizations and the CPV less 
essential to financial and social advancement.
    Groups of protesters in Ho Chi Minh City claimed that local 
officials compensated them inadequately for land that the Government 
seized for various public purposes. The protesters had come from 
several Mekong Delta provinces and from Ho Chi Minh City.
    The Government continued to implement a family planning policy that 
urges all families to have no more than two children; this policy 
emphasizes exhortation rather than coercion. In principle the 
Government can deny promotions and salary increases to government 
employees with more than two children, and local regulations permit 
fines based on the cost of extra social services incurred by a larger 
family. These penalties rarely are enforced. There is anecdotal 
evidence that party members are more likely to be penalized than 
nonparty members.
    Foreign language periodicals are widely available in cities. The 
Government occasionally censors articles about the country in 
periodicals that are available for sale.
    The Government monitors e-mail, searching the text for sensitive 
key words, and regulates Internet content (see Section 2.a.).
    By law access to satellite television was limited to top officials, 
foreigners, luxury hotels, and the press. The law was not enforced 
uniformly, and some persons in urban and rural areas have access via 
home satellite equipment. The Government generally did not limit access 
to international radio; however, it jammed Radio Free Asia.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government 
significantly restricts these freedoms, especially concerning political 
and religious subjects. Reporters and editors practice selfcensorship 
concerning sensitive subjects. A new press law, passed by the National 
Assembly in May 1999, provides for monetary damages to be paid by 
journalists to individuals or organizations who are harmed by 
reporting, regardless of whether the reports are true or false. This 
law poses a threat to investigative reporting. For example, in 
September the Capital Youth newspaper in Hanoi was sued by the Haiphong 
Agricultural Materials and Transport Company for harming its prestige 
with a series of investigative articles about the company's operations. 
The case had not gone to trial by year's end. Several media continued 
to test the limits of government press restriction by publishing 
articles that criticized actions by party and government officials; 
however, the freedom to criticize the Communist Party and its highest 
leadership remains restricted.
    Both the Constitution and the Criminal Code include broad national 
security and antidefamation provisions that the Government used to 
restrict such freedoms severely. The Party and Government tolerate 
public discussion and permit somewhat more criticism than in the past. 
In December 1999, the Government established a mechanism for citizens 
to petition the Government with complaints. Citizens could and did 
complain openly about inefficient government, administrative 
procedures, corruption, and economic policy. However, the Government 
imposed limits in these areas as well. Senior government and party 
leaders traveled to several provinces to try to resolve citizen 
complaints.
    The Government requires journalists to obtain approval from the 
Ministry of Culture and Information before providing any information to 
foreign journalists.
    Retired general and war hero Tran Do was expelled from the 
Communist Party in January 1999 after he refused to cease circulating 
writings critical of the party and the Government. Friends of Tran Do 
reported that they were able to visit him in his home, and police 
surveillance of him lessened by mid-year.
    The Government continued to prohibit free speech that strayed 
outside narrow limits to question the role of the party, criticize 
individual government leaders, promote pluralism or multiparty 
democracy, or question the regime's policies on sensitive matters such 
as human rights. The few persons who dared to speak out on these 
matters in recent years, such as Nguyen Dan Que and Thich Quang do, 
were subjected to periodic questioning and close monitoring by security 
officials. There continued to be an ambiguous line between what 
constituted private speech about sensitive matters, which the 
authorities would tolerate, and public speech in those areas, which 
they would not. Several authors whose works attracted official censure 
in past years continued to be denied permission to publish, to speak 
publicly, or to travel abroad. Security forces continue to harass 
novelist Duong Thu Huong intermittently, and authorities would not 
allow her to travel abroad. However, Huong is allowed to meet with some 
foreigners and Vietnamese colleagues. Some persons who express 
dissident opinions on religious or political issues also are not 
allowed to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
    The Party, the Government, and party-controlled mass organizations 
controlled all print and electronic media. The Government exercises 
oversight through the Ministry of Culture and Information, supplemented 
by pervasive party guidance and national security legislation 
sufficiently broad to ensure effective self-censorship in the domestic 
media. With apparent party approval, several newspapers published 
reports during the year on highlevel government corruption and 
mismanagement as well as sometimes-heated debate on economic policy. 
The Government occasionally censors articles about the country in 
foreign periodicals that are sold in the country. The Government 
generally did not limit access to international radio, except to Radio 
Free Asia, which it jammed (see Section l.f.). In July thousands of 
explicit comic books imported from Korea were destroyed by customs 
officials.
    Foreign journalists must be approved by the Foreign Ministry's 
Press Center and must be based in Hanoi. A visiting Western freelance 
journalist was detained and expelled in April after seeking to 
interview political dissident Nguyen Dan Que at his home in Ho Chi Minh 
City. The number of foreign staff allowed each foreign media 
organization is limited, and most Vietnamese staff who work for foreign 
media are provided by the Foreign Ministry. The Press Center monitors 
journalists' activities and decides on a case-by-case basis whether to 
approve their interview, photograph, film, or travel requests, all of 
which must be submitted 5 days in advance. The Government censored 
television footage and sometimes delayed export of footage by several 
days, such as during coverage in April of the 25th anniversary of the 
end of war.
    The Government allowed artists broader latitude than in past years 
in choosing the themes of their works, although artists are not allowed 
to exhibit works of art that censors regard as criticizing or 
ridiculing the Government or the Party. Many artists received 
permission to exhibit their works abroad, receiving exit permits to 
attend the exhibits and export permits to send their works out of the 
country.
    The Government allows access to the Internet; however, it owns and 
controls the country's only Internet access provider, Vietnam Data 
Communications. Five Internet service providers compete for 
subscribers. The Government postal department reports that there are 
82,000 Internet subscribers and an increasing number of cyber cafes in 
major cities. High prices for owning computers and Internet access 
limit home usage, and the Government keeps access fees high to 
discourage Internet use. However, in cyber cafes and universities, 
students and many other persons have wide access to the Internet, 
although much self-censorship keeps many customers away from sensitive 
sites of a political nature. The Government uses firewalls to block 
access to some sites operated by Vietnamese exile groups abroad. 
Vietnam Data Communications is authorized by the Government to monitor 
the sites that subscribers access. Police suspended telephone service 
and thus Internet access for Nguyen Dan Que in Ho Chi Minh City and 
Nguyen Thanh Giang in Hanoi after they circulated articles critical of 
the Government (see Section 1.d.), but they have continued to 
communicate with friends and supporters through cellular telephones.
    The French nongovernmental organization (NGO) Reporters Sans 
Frontieres, which monitors freedom of speech and treatment of the press 
worldwide, placed the country on its list of 20 countries that it 
deemed ``enemies of the Internet.''
    The Government permitted a more open flow of information within the 
country and into the country from abroad, including the university 
system. Foreign academic professionals temporarily working at 
universities can discuss nonpolitical issues widely and freely in the 
classroom. Government monitors regularly attended, without official 
notification, classes taught by foreigners and citizens. Academic 
publications usually reflected the views of the Party and the 
Government and exhibited greater freedom for differing views on 
nonpolitical subjects than for political ones.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The right of 
assembly is restricted in law and practice, and the Government 
restricts and monitors all forms of public protest. Persons who wish to 
gather in a group are required to apply for a permit, which local 
authorities can issue or deny arbitrarily. However, persons routinely 
gather in informal groups without government interference. During the 
year, there were a number of protests (from 10 to 25 persons) outside 
government and party office buildings and the National Assembly hall. 
These protests, which technically were illegal, usually focused on 
local land compensation grievances, and the authorities generally 
allowed them to run their course without interference. The protesters 
claimed, among other grievances, that local officials had compensated 
them inadequately for land seized by local governments for various 
purposes (see Section 1.f.). One group of 30 protesters demonstrated 
peacefully in public in Hanoi outside the home of a senior CPV 
official. From March until November in Ho Chi Minh City, there were 
demonstrations of up to 125 protesters. In general the Government does 
not permit demonstrations that could be seen as having a political 
purpose. The Government was more tolerant than in the past of 
occasional demonstrations by citizens about specific grievances against 
local officials and tolerated extended demonstrations in some cases. 
Several ``sit-in'' demonstrations in Ho Chi Minh City involved dozens 
of persons who remained on the sidewalks opposite government offices 
for weeks at a time. However, in midNovember, police removed these 
demonstrators and prohibited further demonstrations. On at least two 
occasions later in the year, police blocked attempts by protesters to 
reestablish themselves at that location. The Government allowed large 
gatherings of Roman Catholic and Hoa Hao religious believers for 
preapproved festivals (see Section 2.c.).
    The Government restricts freedom of association. With a few 
exceptions, the Government prohibits the establishment of private, 
independent organizations, insisting that persons work within 
established, party-controlled organizations, often under the aegis of 
the Fatherland Front. Citizens are prohibited from establishing 
independent organizations such as political parties, labor unions, and 
religious or veterans' organizations. Such organizations exist only 
under government control.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Both the Constitution and government 
decrees provide for freedom of worship; however, the Government 
continued to restrict significantly those organized activities of 
religious groups that it declared to be at variance with state laws and 
policies. The Government generally allowed persons to practice 
individual worship in the religion of their choice, and participation 
in religious activities throughout the country continued to grow 
significantly. However, government regulations control religious 
hierarchies and organized religious activities, in part because the 
Communist Party fears that organized religion may weaken its authority 
and influence by serving as political, social, and spiritual 
alternatives to the authority of the central Government.
    The Government requires religious groups to be registered and uses 
this process to control and monitor church organizations. Officially 
recognized religious organizations are able to operate openly, and they 
must consult with the Government about their religious operations, 
although not about their religious tenets of faith. In general 
religious organizations are confined to dealing specifically with 
spiritual and organizational matters. The Government holds conferences 
to discuss and publicize its religion decrees.
    Religious organizations must obtain government permission to hold 
training seminars, conventions, and celebrations outside the regular 
religious calendar, to build or remodel places of worship, to engage in 
charitable activities or operate religious schools, and to train, 
ordain, promote, or transfer clergy. Many of these restrictive powers 
lie principally with provincial or city people's committees, and local 
treatment of religious persons varied widely. In some areas such as Ho 
Chi Minh City, local officials allowed religious persons wide latitude 
in practicing their faith, including allowing some educational and 
humanitarian activities. However, in other areas such as the northwest 
provinces, local officials allowed believers little discretion in the 
practice of their faith. In general religious groups faced difficulty 
in obtaining teaching materials, expanding training facilities, 
publishing religious materials, and expanding the clergy in training in 
response to the increased demand from congregations.
    Buddhism is the dominant religious belief, and three-fourths of the 
population are at least nominally Buddhist.
    The Government officially recognizes Buddhist, Roman Catholic, 
Protestant, Hoa Hao, and Muslim religious organizations. However, some 
Buddhists, Protestants, and Hoa Hao believers do not recognize or 
participate in the governmentapproved associations and thus are not 
considered legal by the authorities.
    For example, the Government requires all Buddhist monks to work 
under a party-controlled umbrella organization, the Central Buddhist 
Church of Vietnam. The Government opposed efforts by the non-
government-sanctioned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) to 
operate independently, and tension between the Government and the UBCV 
continued. Several prominent UBCV monks, including Thich Quang Do, were 
released in wide-ranging government amnesties in September and October 
1998; however, the Government continued to harass members of the UBCV 
and prevent their conducting independent religious activities, 
particularly outside of their pagodas.
    The Government continued to isolate certain political and religious 
dissidents by placing restrictions on the movements of some dissidents 
and by pressuring the supporters and family members of others. For the 
past 6 years, Thich Huyen Quang, the Supreme Patriarch of the UBCV, has 
been held at a pagoda in Quang Ngai province under conditions 
resembling administrative detention. From 1981 until 1994, he was held 
at another pagoda in that province. In 1999 he was visited by senior 
UBCV leader Thich Quang Do for the first time in 18 years, but after 3 
days of meetings both were held for questioning by police, and Thich 
Quang Do was escorted by police to his pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City. 
Thich Huyen Quang has confirmed that he must request permission before 
leaving the pagoda and is not allowed to lead prayers or participate in 
worship activities as a monk. He is able to receive visits from 
sympathetic monks, sometimes several per week; UBCV monk Thich Khong 
Thanh visited in November 1999. After meeting with Thich Huyen Quang, 
visitors frequently are questioned by police. Thich Huyen Quang has 
called for the Government to recognize the UBCV. Local officials 
suggested that Thich Huyen Quang move to Hanoi where more modern 
medical facilities are available, but he refused. On July 5, the police 
and an official from the provincial committee for religion interrogated 
Quang concerning a letter that he wrote that criticized the Government 
and called on the Party and State to repent for their past mistakes. 
The letter was publicized on the Internet by the official information 
service of the UBCV based in France just before April 30, the 25th 
anniversary of national reunification.
    Buddhist monks in Hue complained that petitions to local 
authorities for permission to repair or renovate pagodas go unanswered.
    The local Catholic Church hierarchy remained frustrated by the 
Government's restrictions but has learned to accommodate itself to them 
for many years. A number of clergy reported a modest easing of 
government control over church activities in certain dioceses during 
the year. In some locales, local government officials allowed Catholic 
Church officials to participate in religious education and charitable 
activities. However, in many areas, officials strictly prohibited these 
activities. In recent years, the Government eased its efforts to 
control the Roman Catholic hierarchy by relaxing the requirements that 
all clergy belong to the government-controlled Catholic Patriotic 
Association. Few clergy actually belonged to this association.
    The degree of government control of church activities varied 
greatly among localities. In some areas, especially in the south, 
churches and religious groups operated kindergartens and engaged in a 
variety of humanitarian projects. A priest, Pham Minh Tri, and a lay 
brother, Mai Huu Nghi, belonging to the Congregation of the Mother 
Coredemptrix reportedly remain imprisoned.
    The Government allowed many bishops and priests to travel freely 
within their dioceses and allowed greater, but still restricted, 
freedom for travel outside these areas, particularly in many ethnic 
areas. The Government discourages priests as well as Buddhist monks 
from entering Son La, Lai Chau, and some other border provinces. Upon 
return from international travel during the year, citizens, including 
clergy, officially were required to surrender their passports; this law 
is enforced unevenly. Some persons who express dissident opinions on 
religious or political issues are not allowed to travel abroad (see 
Section 2.d.). Seminaries throughout the country have approximately 500 
students enrolled. The Government limits the Church to operating 6 
major seminaries and to recruit new seminarians only every 2 years. All 
students must be approved by the Government, both upon entering the 
seminary and prior to their ordination as priests. The Church believes 
that the number of graduating students is insufficient to support the 
growing Catholic population.
    The network of Tin Lanh (Good News) churches, originally founded by 
the Christian and Missionary Alliance early in the 20th century, 
generally operated with greater freedom than did the house churches. 
The roughly 300 Tin Lanh churches in the country are concentrated in 
the major cities, including Ho Chi Minh City, Danang, Hanoi, and 
lowland areas. Some 15 Tin Lanh churches in the northern provinces are 
the only officially recognized Protestant churches. At year's end, the 
Government and Protestant church leaders in the south were engaged in 
discussions that could lead to future official recognition for their 
churches.
    There were credible reports that up to a dozen Hmong Protestants 
continued to be imprisoned in Lai Chau and other northwestern provinces 
for religious reasons.
    More than half the country's Protestants belong to a large number 
of unregistered evangelical ``house churches'' that operate in members' 
homes or in rural villages, many of them in ethnic minority areas. 
Members of Protestant house churches, particularly in the northwestern 
provinces, continued to face severe restrictions on religious freedom. 
There were multiple reports that local police beat Protestants during 
detention or questioning in the central highlands and central coastal 
provinces. Credible reports from multiple sources stated that up to a 
dozen Hmong Protestants were imprisoned, primarily in Lai Chau 
province, for ``teaching religion illegally'' or ``abusing the rights 
of a citizen to cause social unrest.'' These included Va Sinh Giay, 
Vang Sua Giang, Phang A Dong, Ly A Cho, and Ma Van Chinh. A number of 
others were released during the year, including Vu Giang Thao, Sung Seo 
Chinh, Ho A Tong, and Giang A To, who were freed from prison in April. 
The Government also stated that Vang Gia Chua and Sinh Pay Pao were 
released (see Section 1.e.).
    Cao Daist Le Kim Bien was released in September in a prisoner 
amnesty. Bien's Cao Daist colleague Pham Cong Hien was released in 
October after completing a 2-year sentence. The two had been imprisoned 
since October 1998, when they requested to meet with visiting U.N. 
Special Rapporteur Amor.
    The December 1999 conviction of Nguyen Thi Thuy, a Protestant house 
church leader in Phu Tho province sentenced to 1 year in prison for 
``interfering with an officer doing his duty,'' was upheld on appeal 
despite claims by her defense lawyer that she was arrested for her 
religious activities. She was released in the September national day 
amnesty, 1 month prior to the scheduled end of her sentence.
    Reports from believers indicated that Protestant church attendance 
grew substantially, especially among the house churches, despite 
continued government restrictions on proselytizing activities. The 
Government restricts Protestant congregations from cooperating on joint 
religious observances or other activities, although in some localities 
there was greater freedom to do so. Membership in house churches 
reportedly continued to grow.
    The Government conferred legal recognition on Cao Daism in 1997 
after a government-controlled committee wrote a new Cao Dai 
constitution and elected a new Cao Dai Executive Council. The 
governmentapproved Executive Council controls the affairs and manages 
the operations, the hierarchy, and clergy of the Cao Dai faith. 
However, numerous Cao Dai believers and clergy actively have challenged 
the edicts of the Executive Council, stating that they are not faithful 
to Cao Dai principles and tradition. Early in the year, the Executive 
Council and clergy came to an agreement on the modification of 
traditional rites that are performed during rituals for clerical 
promotion that had been banned by the Government. The compromise 
changed a part of the rite that the Government had deemed to be 
``superstitious,'' but maintained enough ``spiritual direction'' in the 
rite to be acceptable to Cao Dai principles. Many Cao Dai followers and 
clergy initially objected to the tradition, but later accepted it. The 
agreement resulted in the promotion of several hundred clerics, the 
first promotions in more than 25 years. However, the Government has 
prohibited ordination into the Cao Dai priesthood since 1975, and 
continued to do so throughout the year. Three Cao Daists, Lam Thai The, 
Do Hoang Giam, and Van Hoa Vui, who were arrested several years ago, 
remain imprisoned in Xuan Loc prison in Dong Nai province.
    Hoa Hao followers are concentrated in the Mekong Delta, 
particularly in provinces such as An Giang, where the Hoa Hao were 
dominant as a political and religious force before 1975. The Hoa Hao 
faced restrictions on their religious and political activities after 
1975 because of their previous armed opposition to the Communist 
forces. After 1975 all administrative offices, places of worship, and 
social and cultural institutions connected to the faith were closed, 
thereby limiting public religious functions. However, believers 
continue to practice their religion at home. The lack of access to 
public gathering places contributed to the Hoa Hao community's 
isolation and fragmentation. In 1999 following official recognition of 
a Hoa Hao religious organization, up to 500,000 Hoa Hao believers 
gathered for a religious festival in An Giang province in the largest 
Hoa Hao gathering since 1975. The second of these traditional annual 
gatherings drew approximately 300,000 persons in June. The authorities 
continued to restrict the distribution of the sacred scriptures of the 
Hoa Hao, and believers say that a number of church leaders continue to 
be detained. Hoa Hao leader Me Minh Triet, who was arrested several 
years ago, remained in prison at year's end.
    In March police in An Giang arrested eight Hoa Hao believers for 
planning to organize a commemoration of the death anniversary of the 
group's founder. Police also placed Hoa Hao elder Ha Hai under house 
arrest in An Giang province and blocked roads and waterways to prevent 
large numbers of persons from gathering at the founder's ancestral home 
and pagoda for the anniversary. This anniversary had not yet been 
approved as an official anniversary or commemoration day by the 
Government or the Hoa Hao Council. Many Hoa Hao believers consider this 
to be an important date, and because of this and other disputes have 
refused to recognize the Hoa Hao Council. Of the eight persons 
arrested, three subsequently were released. The remaining five were 
tried in September and received prison terms of from 1 to 3 years. One 
of the three who were released, Vo Van Buu, also known as Nguyen Van 
Buu, was arrested again in June together with his wife, Mai Thi Dung. 
In September Buu was tried and sentence to 30 months in prison. Dung 
was tried and sentenced to 18 months' house arrest. Later in the 
September, Dung slashed her stomach in protest. She was hospitalized, 
then released the following day.
    A total of 13 other Hoa Hao followers were arrested in March in a 
separate incident unrelated to the founder's death anniversary. Eight 
of these persons subsequently were released. Three were tried in May 
and the other two were tried in June. All were convicted and received 
sentences of from 12 to 30 months' imprisonment.
    In May police in An Giang province also arrested Hoa Hao followers 
Le Huu Hoa. He remained in prison at year's end.
    In November five Hoa Haoists who reside in An Giang province were 
detained In Ho Chi Minh City for planning a demonstration there. Two of 
them, Ha Hai and Mai Thi Dung officially were under house arrest in An 
Giang province at the time. Three of the detainees subsequently were 
returned to An Giang province and released. Mai Thi Dung again was 
placed under house arrest in An Giang province. Ha Hai was returned to 
prison in An Giang province and awaited trial at year's end.
    In December Le Quang Liem, a Hoa Hao elder who resides in Ho Chi 
Minh City, organized a group of from 400 to 500 persons to march in 
procession to the Hoa Hao founder's ancestral home and pagoda in 
commemoration of the founder's birth anniversary. When police blocked 
the procession, a fight ensued and a number of Liem's group were 
injured. The police made no arrests.
    The Muslim Association of Vietnam was banned in 1975 but authorized 
again in 1992. It is the only official Muslim organization. Association 
leaders say that they are able to practice their faith, including daily 
prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to 
Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The Government no longer has a policy of 
restricting exit permits to prevent Muslims from making the hajj. Small 
numbers have been able to participate in the hajj each year.
    The Government does not favor a particular religion. In some 
respects, conditions for religious freedom improved over 1999. In many 
areas, religious activity and observance increased; however, at the 
same time, government restrictions remained. Worshipers in several 
Buddhist, Catholic, and Cao Dai centers of worship reported that they 
believed that undercover government observers attended worship services 
and monitored the activities of the congregation and the clergy. 
Protestant and Hoa Hao services occasionally were disrupted by local 
police.
    Operational and organizational restrictions on the hierarchies and 
clergy of most religious groups remain in place. While there were 
releases of some religious prisoners, detention and imprisonment of 
other persons for the illegal practice of their religion continued.
    In April 1999, the Government issued a new decree on religion that 
prescribes the rights and responsibilities of religious believers. 
Similar to the Government's 1991 decree on religion, the decree also 
states for the first time that no religious organization can reclaim 
lands or properties taken over by the State following the end of the 
1954 war against French rule and the 1975 Communist victory in the 
south. The decree also states that persons formerly detained or 
imprisoned must obtain special permission from the authorities before 
they may resume religious activities.
    There were credible reports in both 1999 and 2000 that Hmong 
Protestant Christians in several northwestern villages were forced to 
recant their faith. The Penal Code, as amended in 1997, established 
penalties for offenses that are defined only vaguely, including 
``attempting to undermine national unity'' by promoting ``division 
between religious believers and nonbelievers.'' In some cases, 
particularly involving Hmong Protestants, when authorities charge 
persons with practicing religion illegally, they do so using provisions 
of the Penal Code that allow for jail terms up to 3 years for ``abusing 
freedom of speech, press, or religion.'' There were reports that 
officials fabricated evidence, and some of the provisions of the law 
used to convict religious prisoners contradict international covenants 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
    The Government bans and actively discourages participation in 
``illegal'' religious groups, including the UBCV, Protestant house 
churches, and an unapproved Hoa Hao group. The Government restricts the 
number of clergy that the Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, and Cao Dai 
churches may train. Restrictions are placed on the numbers of Buddhist 
monks and Catholic seminarians. Protestants are not allowed to operate 
a seminary or to ordain new clergy.
    Police authorities routinely question persons who hold dissident 
religious or political views, such as UBCV monks and Hoa Hao leaders.
    The Government restricts and monitors all forms of public assembly, 
including assembly for religious activities. On some occasions, large 
religious gatherings have been allowed, such as the annual celebrations 
at La Vang. Within the past 2 years, the Hoa Hao also have been allowed 
to hold large public gatherings.
    Religious and organizational activities by UBCV monks are illegal, 
and all UBCV activities outside private temple worship are proscribed. 
In February a group of Hoa Hao believers led by Le Quang Liem 
established an association separate from the government-sanctioned Hoa 
Hao Committee. Their petitions to the Government for official 
recognition were unsuccessful. Protestant groups in central and 
southern provinces also petitioned for official recognition, but met 
with a favorable response from the Government. Serious discussions were 
underway at year's end regarding the drafting of a new charter that 
could lead to future official recognition.
    Most evangelical house churches do not attempt to register because 
they believe that their applications would be denied, and they want to 
avoid government control.
    The Government generally does not permit religious instruction in 
public schools. However, in some provinces, religious instruction is 
allowed outside regular classroom hours. Khmer Buddhists and Cham 
Muslims routinely hold religious (and language) instruction after 
regular school hours.
    The Government restricts persons who belong to dissident and 
unofficial religious groups from speaking about their beliefs. It 
officially requires all religious publishing to be done by government-
approved publishing houses. Many Buddhist sacred scriptures, Bibles, 
and other religious texts and publications are printed by government-
sanctioned organizations and allowed to be distributed to believers. 
The Government allows and in some cases encourages links with 
coreligionists in other countries when the religious groups are 
approved by the Government. The Government actively discourages 
contacts between the illegal UBCV and its foreign Buddhist supporters, 
and between illegal Protestants, such as the house churches, and their 
foreign supporters. Contacts between the Vatican and the domestic 
Catholic Church are permitted, and the Government maintains a regular, 
active dialog with the Vatican on a range of issues, including 
organizational activities, the prospect of establishing diplomatic 
relations, and a possible papal visit. The Government allows religious 
travel for some, but not all, religious persons; Muslims are able to 
undertake the hajj, and many Buddhist and Catholic Church officials 
also have been able to travel abroad. Persons who hold dissident 
religious opinions generally are not approved for foreign travel.
    The Government does not designate persons' religions on passports, 
although citizens' ``family books,'' which are household identification 
books, list religious and ethnic affiliation.
    The law prohibits foreign missionaries from operating in the 
country. Proselytizing by citizens is restricted to regularly scheduled 
religious services in recognized places of worship. Immigrants and 
noncitizens must comply with the law when practicing their religions. 
Catholic and Protestant foreigners exercise leadership in worship 
services that are reserved for foreigners.
    The Government's Office on Religious Affairs hosts periodic 
meetings to address religious issues according to governmentapproved 
agendas that bring together leaders of diverse religious traditions.
    Adherence to a religious faith generally does not disadvantage 
persons in civil, economic, and secular life, although it likely would 
prevent advancement to the highest government and military ranks. 
Avowed religious practice bars membership in the Communist Party, 
although anecdotal reports indicate that a handful of the 2 million 
Communist Party members are religious believers.
    The Government remained sensitive about international and 
nongovernmental organization investigations. In October 1998, U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance Amor visited Hanoi, Ho Chi 
Minh City, Hue, and Tay Ninh province. He met with government officials 
and representatives of the governmentsanctioned Central Buddhist 
Church, the Catholic Church, Cao Dai, a Protestant church, and the 
small Muslim community. However, security officials prevented Amor from 
meeting several senior representatives of the nongovernmentsanctioned 
UBCV, including Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do, despite his 
repeated requests to do so.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some limits on 
freedom of movement. Most citizens enjoyed freedom of movement within 
the country; however, some local authorities required members of ethnic 
minority groups to obtain permission to travel outside certain highland 
areas. Officially, citizens had to obtain permission to change their 
residence (see Section 1.f.). In practice many persons continued to 
move without approval, especially migrant or itinerant laborers moving 
from rural areas to cities in search of work. However, moving without 
permission restricted their ability to obtain legal residence permits. 
Holders of foreign passports must register to stay in private homes. In 
practice visitors of Vietnamese origin from overseas do not appear to 
have problems with this requirement and are allowed to stay with family 
and friends. Other foreigners complain that they are not allowed to do 
so.
    The Government employs internal isolation to restrict the movement 
of political and religious dissidents (see Section 1.d.). The 
Government continued to use its 1997 decree on administrative detention 
to restrict where citizens live and work (see Section 1.f.).
    Foreigners generally are free to travel throughout the country, 
except in some areas restricted on grounds of national security. The 
Government retained the right to approve travel to border areas, to 
some areas in the central highlands, and to some islands, but in 
practice foreigners can travel to most border areas without prior 
approval. However, on several occasions, local police detained and 
fined foreigners whom police found had ventured too close to 
international borders and other sensitive military areas.
    Although the Government no longer required citizens traveling 
abroad to obtain exit or reentry visas, the Government sometimes 
prevents persons from traveling by refusing to issue passports to 
persons who wished to travel. Persons who depart the country using 
passports marked dinh cu or ``resettlement'' appear to need a reentry 
permit to return.
    Some persons who publicly or privately have expressed dissident 
opinions on religious or political issues are not allowed to travel 
abroad (see Section 2.c.).
    Citizens must demonstrate eligibility to emigrate to another 
country and show sponsorship abroad before the Government issues 
passports for emigration. Persons who emigrate under refugee status are 
required to have a letter of introduction from the Ministry of Public 
Security in order to obtain a passport. Citizens' access to passports 
sometimes was constrained by factors outside the law, such as bribery 
and corruption. Refugee and immigrant visa applicants sometimes 
encountered local officials who arbitrarily delayed or denied passports 
based on personal animosities or on the officials' perception that an 
applicant did not meet program criteria, or in order to extort a bribe.
    Because citizens who live overseas are considered a valuable 
potential source of foreign exchange and expertise for the country but 
also a potential security threat, the Government generally encourages 
them to visit but monitors many of them carefully.
    The United States continued to process immigrants and refugee 
applicants for admission and resettlement, including Amerasians, former 
reeducation camp detainees, and family reunification cases. There are 
some concerns that some members of minority ethnic groups, particularly 
nonethnic Vietnamese such as the Montagnards, may not have ready access 
to these programs. The Government denied passports for emigration to 
certain Montagnard applicants.
    The Government generally permits citizens who emigrate to return to 
visit, but it considers them Vietnamese citizens and therefore subject 
to the obligations of a Vietnamese citizen under the law, even if they 
have adopted another country's citizenship. The Government no longer 
requires reentry visas for citizens holding regular passports but who 
reside in another country. Holders of Vietnamese passports marked dinh 
cu or ``resettlement'' appear to need a reentry visa. However, 
emigrants are not permitted to use Vietnamese passports after they 
adopt other citizenship.
    Vietnam and the United States continued to work together on the 
Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees Program (ROVR) in 
processing the residual ROVR persons who had returned from refugee 
camps elsewhere in southeast Asia. This program is nearing completion.
    The Constitution allows consideration of asylum under certain 
circumstances for foreigners persecuted abroad. Otherwise, the country 
does not have provisions for the granting of asylum or refugee status 
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government 
cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Party 
control over the selection of candidates in elections for the National 
Assembly, the presidency, the prime ministership, and local government 
undermines this right. All authority and political power is vested in 
the CPV; political opposition movements and other political parties are 
not tolerated. The CPV central committee is the supreme decisionmaking 
body in the nation, with the Politburo as the locus of policymaking. A 
standing board, consisting of the five most senior members of the 
Politburo, oversees daytoday implementation of leadership directives. 
Senior advisors to the Party, including the former party general 
secretary, President, and Prime Minister, also continue to exert 
significant influence on Politburo decisionmaking. The Government 
limited public debate and criticism to certain aspects of individual, 
state, or party performance determined by the CPV itself. No public 
challenge to the legitimacy of the oneparty State is permitted; 
however, there were isolated instances of unsanctioned letters from 
private citizens critical of the Government that circulated publicly 
(see Section 2.a.).
    Eligible citizens are required to vote in elections, although there 
is no penalty for not voting. Citizens elect the members of the 
National Assembly, ostensibly the main legislative body, but the Party 
must approve all candidates, most of whom are Party members. Most 
National Assembly members belong to the CPV; 15 percent do not. Three 
members of the assembly are selfnominated independents, not nominated 
by the partycontrolled Vietnam Fatherland Front, even though it 
approved their candidacies.
    The National Assembly, although subject to the control of the Party 
(all of its senior leaders are party members), played an increasingly 
independent role, as a forum for the expression of local and provincial 
concerns and as a critic of corruption and inefficiency. However, the 
National Assembly generally does not initiate legislation and may not 
pass legislation that the Party opposes. Party officials occupied most 
senior government and National Assembly positions and continued to have 
the final say on key issues. During the year, the National Assembly 
continued to engage in vigorous debate on economic, legal, and social 
issues, including a business enterprise law and a press law. 
Legislators questioned and criticized ministers in sessions broadcast 
live on television.
    The law provides the opportunity for equal participation in 
politics by women and minority groups; however, in practice they are 
underrepresented. Most of the top leaders are men. There is one woman 
in the Politburo. Women are better represented in the National 
Assembly, where more than onefourth of the 450 members are women. Women 
hold some important positions. The Vice President is a woman, as are 
several ministers and vice ministers.
    The President of the National Assembly, who is also a Politburo 
standing committee member, is a member of an ethnic minority.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not permit private, local human rights 
organizations to form or operate. It generally prohibits private 
citizens from contacting international human rights organizations, 
although some dissidents were able to do so despite opposition from the 
Government. The Government permitted the UNHCR and international 
visitors to monitor implementation of its repatriation commitments 
under the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) and carried on a limited 
dialog with foreign human rights organizations based outside the 
country.
    The Government generally was willing to discuss human rights 
problems bilaterally with some other governments if such discussions 
take place under the rubric of ``exchanges of ideas'' rather than as 
``investigations.'' Several foreign governments held official talks 
during the year concerning human rights.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on gender, 
ethnicity, religion, or social class; however, enforcement of these 
prohibitions was uneven. Persons formerly interned in reeducation camps 
on the basis of pre-l975 association with the government of the former 
Republic of Vietnam continued to report varying levels of 
discrimination as they and their families sought access to housing, 
education, and employment. Some military veterans of the former 
Republic of Vietnam still face economic hardship as a result of 
employment restrictions and discrimination, but none are known to be 
incarcerated for their activities after 1975. These veterans and their 
families generally are unable to obtain employment with the Government. 
This prohibition is less restrictive than in past years because of the 
growth in private sector job opportunities.
    Women.--International NGO workers and many women reported that 
domestic violence against women was common. The law addresses the 
problem of domestic violence, and officials increasingly acknowledge 
the problem; however, authorities do not enforce the law effectively. 
Many divorces reportedly are due to domestic violence, but many women 
likely remain in abusive marriages rather than confront the stigma and 
economic uncertainty of divorce.
    Prostitution, although officially illegal, appears to be tolerated 
widely. Some women are forced to work as prostitutes. The Ho Chi Minh 
City people's committee recently has acknowledged that more than 10,000 
women in the city engaged in prostitution. Hanoi, the port cities of 
Danang and Haiphong, and smaller cities such as Can Tho and Nha Trang 
also have large numbers of women engaged in prostitution. There are 
reports that some exploiters in Ho Chi Minh City addicted young girls 
to heroin and forced them to work as prostitutes to earn money for 
drugs. Many more women are compelled to work as prostitutes because of 
poverty, a lack of other employment opportunities, or because they are 
victimized by false promises of lucrative work (see Section 6.f.). The 
Vietnam Women's Union and Youth Union, as well as international and 
domestic NGO's, are engaged actively in education and rehabilitation 
programs to combat these abuses.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution, both 
domestically and internationally, is a serious problem (see Section 
6.f.). Women and girls are trafficked from southern delta and highland 
provinces to Cambodia, and from northern provinces into China. There 
are reports that some women from Ho Chi Minh City and the Mekong Delta 
who married men from Taiwan were forced into prostitution after their 
arrival in Taiwan. Women and girls frequently are misled by promises of 
wellpaying jobs in those places.
    While there is no legal discrimination, women face deeply ingrained 
societal discrimination. Despite extensive provisions in the 
Constitution, in legislation, and in regulations that mandate equal 
treatment, and although some women occupy high government posts, few 
women compete effectively for higher status positions. The Government 
has ratified ILO conventions on Equal Remuneration and Discrimination 
in Employment. The Constitution provides that women and men must 
receive equal pay for equal work; however, the Government does not 
enforce this provision. Very poor women, especially in rural areas but 
also in cities, perform menial work in construction, waste removal, and 
other jobs for extremely low wages. Despite the large body of 
legislation and regulations devoted to the protection of women's rights 
in marriage as well as in the workplace, and Labor Law provisions that 
call for preferential treatment of women, women do not always receive 
equal treatment. Nevertheless, women play an important role in the 
economy and are widely engaged in business and in social and 
educational institutions. Opportunities for young professional women 
have increased markedly, with greater numbers entering the civil 
service, universities, and the private sector.
    The party-controlled Women's Union has a broad agenda to promote 
women's rights, including political, economic, and legal equality, and 
protection from spousal abuse. The Women's Union operates micro-credit 
consumer finance programs and other programs to promote the advancement 
of women. International NGO's and other international organizations 
regard the union as effective, but they and Women's Union 
representatives believe that much time is required to overcome societal 
attitudes that relegate women to lower status than men. The Government 
also has a committee for the advancement of women, which coordinates 
intraministerial programs that affect women.
    Children.--International organizations reported that despite the 
Government's promotion of child protection and welfare, children 
increasingly were at risk of economic exploitation. While education is 
compulsory through the age of 14, the authorities did not enforce the 
requirement, especially in rural areas where government and family 
budgets for education are strained. Thousands of children work in 
exploitative child labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). These practices 
occur almost exclusively in private, small-scale, or family 
enterprises. The Government continued a nationwide immunization 
campaign, and the governmentcontrolled press regularly stressed the 
importance of health and education for all children. Reports from 
domestic sources indicate that responsible officials generally took 
these goals seriously but were constrained by severely limited budgets. 
According to the World Bank, despite growth in incomes over the past 
decade, severe malnutrition remains an entrenched problem; about 45 
percent of children under 5 years of age suffer from stunted growth.
    Widespread poverty contributed to continued child prostitution, 
especially of girls, but also some boys as well, in major cities. Many 
prostitutes in Ho Chi Minh City are girls between the ages of 15 and 
17. One NGO advocate stated that some child prostitutes, such as those 
from abusive homes, are forced into prostitution for economic reasons, 
having few other choices available to them. There are reports that some 
exploiters in Ho Chi Minh City addicted young girls to heroin and 
forced them to work as prostitutes to earn money for drugs.
    Some children are trafficked domestically, and others are 
trafficked to foreign destinations for the purpose of forced 
prostitution. Although statistics are not reliable, children are 
trafficked from southern delta and highland provinces to Cambodia, and 
from northern provinces into China. Government agencies were engaged in 
combating these abuses, and municipal and NGO groups organized 
publicity campaigns to warn of predatory child sex abusers in resort 
areas (see Section 6.f.). The Vietnam Women's Union and Youth Union are 
especially active in drawing attention to these problems and helping 
with education programs to warn vulnerable families of the dangers of 
deception by those who would lure young women and children into 
prostitution. Press reports documented the conviction and imprisonment 
of some traffickers (see Section 6.f.).
    Street children are vulnerable to abuse and sometimes are slapped 
and harassed by police (see Section 1.c.).
    People with Disabilities.--Government provision of services to the 
disabled is limited, and the Government provides little official 
protection or effective support for the disabled. Government agencies 
responsible for services to the disabled worked with domestic and 
foreign groups to ``identify measures'' to provide protection, support, 
and physical access for the disabled. Implementation is hampered by 
limited budgets. The 1995 Labor Law requires the State to protect the 
rights and encourage the employment of the disabled. It includes 
provisions for preferential treatment of firms that recruit disabled 
persons for training or apprenticeship and a special levy on firms that 
do not employ disabled workers. It is uncertain whether the Government 
enforces these provisions. The Government permitted international 
groups to assist persons disabled by war or by subsequent accidents 
involving unexploded ordnance and has developed indigenous prosthetics-
manufacturing capabilities. There are no laws mandating physical access 
to buildings.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the Government states 
that it is opposed to discrimination against ethnic minorities, 
societal discrimination against minorities is widespread. In addition 
there continued to be credible reports that local officials sometimes 
restricted ethnic minority access to some types of employment and 
educational opportunities. The Government continued to implement 
policies designed to narrow the gap in the standard of living between 
ethnic groups living in the highlands and richer lowland ethnic 
Vietnamese by granting preferential treatment to domestic and foreign 
companies that invest in highland areas. The stated goal of government 
resettlement policy in mountainous provinces is for disadvantaged 
minorities to relocate from inaccessible villages to locations where 
basic services are easier to provide; however, the effect of the policy 
sometimes has been to dilute the political and social solidarity of 
these groups. Moreover, large-scale government-sponsored as well as 
spontaneous migration of ethnic Vietnamese to the central highlands 
have diluted further the indigenous culture and traditional heritage of 
the minorities located there. The Government continued to repress some 
highland minorities, particularly the Hmong, for practicing their 
religion without official approval (see Section 2.c.).
    In August about 150 members of the Ede ethnic minority attacked a 
village of ethnic majority Vietnamese (Kinh) who had migrated into the 
area where they lived; the Ede injured four ethnic Vietnamese and 
destroyed several homes. The attack underscored increased tensions that 
have resulted from the migration of ethnic Vietnamese to areas that 
traditionally were populated by ethnic minorities.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are controlled by the 
Party and have only nominal independence; however, union leaders 
influence some key decisions, such as on health, safety, and minimum 
wage standards. Workers are not free to join or form unions of their 
choosing; such action requires approval from the local office of the 
Partycontrolled Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL), and any 
union that forms must affiliate with the VGCL. The VGCL is the umbrella 
organization under which all local trade unions must operate. It claims 
that it represents 95 percent of public sector workers and 90 percent 
of workers in state-owned enterprises. In 1999 the Government stated 
that trade unions had not fulfilled their role of protecting workers in 
foreigninvested companies, many of whom it claimed did not respect 
labor regulations. The VGCL asserted that authorities did not prosecute 
some violations of the Labor Law.
    About 500,000 union members work in the private sector, including 
foreignbased enterprises. The vast majority of the work force live in 
rural areas, is engaged in small-scale farming, and is not unionized.
    The 1994 Labor Law requires the federation of labor at the 
provincial level to establish unions within 6 months at all new 
enterprises with more than 10 employees as well as at existing 
enterprises that operate without trade unions. Management of those 
companies is required by law to accept and cooperate with those unions. 
In addition, while the Labor Law states that all enterprise level and 
professional trade unions are affiliated with the VGCL, in practice 
hundreds of unaffiliated ``labor associations'' have been organized in 
occupations such as those of taxi, motorcycle and cyclo drivers, cooks, 
and market porters. Foreign governments and international 
organizations, such as the ILO and other U.N. system organizations, 
provide technical assistance and training to the Ministry of Labor, 
Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the VGCL.
    The Labor Law provides for the right to strike under certain 
circumstances. The law requires that management and labor resolve labor 
disputes through the enterprise's own labor conciliation council. 
However, many labor organizations failed to establish labor 
conciliation councils. In the case of the absence of a labor 
conciliation council or if one fails to resolve a labor dispute, it is 
referred to the provincial labor arbitration council. If the council's 
decision is unsatisfactory to the union or if the province does not 
have an arbitration council, unions have the right to appeal to the 
provincial people's labor arbitration council. However, such councils 
do not exist in some provinces. Labor courts, a division of the 
people's courts, heard approximately 500 cases between their inception 
in mid-1996 and mid-1999; most cited wrongful dismissal and matters of 
labor discipline. Since 1995 the Labor Ministry has organized hundreds 
of training courses on the Labor Law for its staff and for managers of 
large enterprises. The ILO and the U.N. Development Program are 
cooperating on a large multiyear technical assistance program to 
strengthen Labor Law implementation.
    The government-controlled labor unions stipulate written procedures 
for managing labor disputes that permit unresolved disputes to be 
arbitrated before a court. Unions have the right to appeal a council 
decision to the provincial people's court and the right to strike.
    There were 72 strikes during the year. Approximately 450 strikes 
have been reported since 1993, primarily against foreign-owned or joint 
venture companies, but some involved state-owned and private firms. The 
majority took place in Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai province, and other 
southern provinces. Most strikes are symbolic and last 1 or 2 days. 
Strikes are caused by disputes over wages and related problems, 
including late payment of overtime pay and inappropriate labor 
discipline. Although most of the strikes did not follow an authorized 
conciliation and arbitration process, and thus were of questionable 
legitimacy, the Government tolerated the strikes and did not take 
action against the strikers. Although the VGCL or its affiliate unions 
did not sanction these strikes officially, many were supported 
unofficially at the local and provincial levels of the VGCL. The Labor 
Law prohibits retribution against strikers, and there were no credible 
reports of such retribution. In some cases, the Government disciplined 
employers for illegal practices that led to strikes.
    The Labor Law prohibits strikes at enterprises that serve the 
public and those considered by the Government to be important to the 
national economy and defense. A subsequent decree defined these 
enterprises to be those involved in: Electricity production; post and 
telecommunications; railway, maritime, and air transportation; banking; 
public works; and the oil and gas industry. The law also grants the 
Prime Minister the right to suspend a strike considered detrimental to 
the national economy or public safety. Strikes are prohibited in 54 
occupational sectors and businesses.
    Individual unions legally are not free to affiliate with, join, or 
participate in, international labor bodies, and they do not do so in 
practice. However, the VGCL has relations with 95 labor organizations 
in 70 countries, and the VGCL's president traveled internationally, 
including to Western industrial countries, on labor matters.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers must 
have the approval of the provincial or metropolitan branch of the VGCL 
in order to organize unions in their enterprises. The Labor Law 
provides that party-approved unions have the right to bargain 
collectively on behalf of workers. It also provides for collective 
labor agreements that cover employees and employers. Since 1999 
collective bargaining became more important. Many contracts were 
negotiated that ended the practice of annual renewal, and multiyear 
contracts have become more common despite initial resistance from 
foreign companies. Labor leaders became more active in supporting their 
workers by agreeing in 1999 to place more workplace issues in 
collective bargaining agreements. Issues previously not covered in 
contracts, such as work on Sundays, have been spelled out so that 
companies cannot order workers to work a seventh day. As the country 
transitions away from central planning, market forces play a much more 
important role in determining wages. The Labor Law prohibits antiunion 
discrimination on the part of employers against employees who seek to 
organize.
    The growing number of export processing zones and industrial zones 
are governed by the same labor laws as the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Law 
prohibits all forms of forced and bonded labor, including such labor by 
children; however, there were reports that thousands of children work 
in exploitative situations (see Section 6.d.). Some women are forced 
into prostitution, and trafficking in women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). Children were 
trafficked both domestically and internationally and forced to work as 
prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). A study of child labor in Ho Chi 
Minh City found cases in which poor families had entered into ``verbal 
agreements'' with employers, who put the families' children to work; 
their salaries generally are sent to their parents.
    The Government denies the use of prison labor without compensation; 
however, prisoners routinely are required to work, producing food and 
other goods used in prisons for little or no pay. Officials state that 
juveniles in Education and Nourishment Centers, which function much as 
reform schools or juvenile detention centers do elsewhere, are assigned 
work for ``educational purposes'' that does not generate income.
    Late in 1999, the Government issued an ordinance requiring all 
adult citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 for men and between 18 and 
35 for women to perform 10 days of annual public labor. However, the 
ordinance permits citizens to excuse themselves from this obligation by 
finding a substitute or paying a fee. While some have alleged that such 
laborers were recruited to construct the Ho Chi Minh Highway, the 
Government issued a decree in October that gives the force of law to 
its existing policy that all labor on this project must be voluntary 
and paid. Foreign diplomats urged labor officials to consult with ILO 
experts as to whether the ordinance and its implementation constitute 
forced labor under internationally recognized standards. There is a 
long local tradition under which persons living along floodprone levees 
voluntarily help to build or repair the ubiquitous and centuriesold 
flood control system.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Law prohibits most child labor but allows 
exceptions for certain types of work. It sets the minimum age for 
employment at 18 years of age, but enterprises may hire children 
between the ages of 15 and 18 if the firm obtains special permission 
from their parents and the MOLISA. However, a widelypublicized MOLISA 
survey found that about 40,000 children between the ages of 8 and 14 
years of age worked part-time or full-time in violation of the Labor 
Law. That estimate may be low, since most of these children worked in 
the informal sector. An employer must ensure that young workers do not 
undertake hazardous work or work that would harm their physical or 
mental development. Prohibited occupations are specified in the Labor 
Law. Children may work a maximum of 7 hours per day and 42 hours per 
week and must receive special health care. Restrictions on working in 
hazardous operations apply to persons under the age of 18. However, 
authorities do not have sufficient resources to enforce these 
regulations; international donor assistance targets this problem.
    The Labor Law permits children to register at trade training 
centers, a form of vocational training, from the age of 13.
    There were no reports that state-owned enterprises or companies 
with foreign investors used child labor.
    In rural areas, children work primarily on family farms and in 
other agricultural activities. They can begin working as young as 6 
years of age and are expected to work as adults by the time they are 15 
years of age. In urban areas, children also may work in family-owned 
small businesses. Compulsory education laws are not enforced 
effectively in rural areas, where children are needed to work in 
agriculture. However, the culture's strong emphasis on education leads 
parents who can send children to school to do so, rather than allow 
them to work. Many urban schools operate two sessions, allowing 
children to attend classes and to work.
    In 1997 the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) announced that children 
below the age of 16 faced increased risk of economic exploitation. In 
1997 UNICEF cited evidence of children working in gold mines and as 
domestic servants, or working up to 14 hours per day in hazardous 
conditions for meager pay or no pay. The ILO stated that some street 
children both in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi participate in night 
education courses.
    Government officials have the power to fine and, in cases of 
Criminal Code violations, prosecute employers who violate child Labor 
Laws. While the Government commits insufficient resources to enforce 
laws providing for children's labor safety, especially for children 
working in mines and as domestic servants, it has detected cases of 
child exploitation, removed the children from the exploitative 
situations and disciplined the employers. In a 1999 case in which 
children were working in a private sector gold mine, the Government 
prosecuted and convicted those responsible.
    In November The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on Worst 
Forms of Child Labor.
    The Labor Law prohibits force and bonded labor by children; 
however, thousands of children work in exploitative situations, and 
children were trafficked both domestically and internationally for the 
purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law requires the 
Government to set a minimum wage, which is adjusted for inflation and 
other economic changes. The official monthly minimum wage for foreign-
investment joint ventures is $45 (637,650 dong) in Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City, and $40 (566,800 dong) elsewhere. The Government can exempt 
temporarily certain joint ventures from paying the minimum wage during 
the first months of an enterprise's operations, or if the enterprise is 
located in a very remote area, but the minimum wage in these cases can 
be no lower than $30 (425,100 dong). Stateowned enterprises 
consistently pay above the official monthly minimum wage of $13 
(180,000 dong). These minimum wages are inadequate to provide a worker 
and family with a decent standard of living. A decreasing number of 
workers receive government-subsidized housing. However, many workers 
receive bonuses and supplement incomes by engaging in second-job 
entrepreneurial activities, and households often include more than one 
wage earner. The Government enforces the minimum wage only at foreign 
and major Vietnamese firms. A recent ILO study found that minimum wage 
requirements are well applied in all sectors, with the exception of 
smaller private sector enterprises.
    In October 1999, the Government reduced the length of the workweek 
for government employees and employees of companies in the state sector 
from 48 hours to 40 hours. The Government encourages the private 
business sector and foreign and international organizations that employ 
Vietnamese workers to reduce the number of hours in the work week but 
has not made mandatory.
    The Labor Law sets working hours at a maximum of 8 hours per day, 
with a mandatory 24-hour break each week. Additional hours require 
overtime pay at 1.5 times the regular wage and 2 times the regular wage 
on holidays. The law limits compulsory overtime to 4 hours per week and 
200 hours per year. Annual leave with full pay for various types of 
work also is prescribed by the law. The ILO has pointed out that the 
limit of 200 hours a year of overtime work is too low, and that workers 
and employers should have the right to agree to a greater amount of 
overtime work. It is uncertain how well the Government enforces these 
provisions.
    According to the law, a female employee who is to be married, is 
pregnant, is on maternity leave, or is raising a child under 1 year of 
age cannot be dismissed unless the enterprise is closed. Female 
employees who are at least 7 months pregnant or are raising a child 
under 1 year of age cannot work overtime, at night, or in distant 
locations.
    The Labor Law requires the Government to promulgate rules and 
regulations that ensure worker safety. The Ministry of Labor, in 
coordination with local people's committees and labor unions, is 
charged with enforcing the regulations. In practice enforcement is 
inadequate because of the Ministry's inadequate funding and a shortage 
of trained enforcement personnel. The VGCL reported that there are 300 
labor inspectors in the country but that at least 600 are needed. There 
is growing evidence that workers, through labor unions, have been 
effective in improving working conditions. In 1994 the Government 
ratified ILO Convention 155 on occupational safety and health.
    Some foreign companies with operations in the country have 
established independent monitoring of problems at their factories. In 
some instances, they used NGO's and other nonprofit organizations to 
monitor workplace conditions and report abuses to the Ministry of 
Labor.
    The Labor Code provides that workers may remove themselves from 
hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prescribes harsh 
punishment for persons convicted of trafficking in women and children; 
however, some women are forced to work as prostitutes, and trafficking 
in women and children for the purpose of forced prostitution, both 
domestically and internationally, is a serious problem. The Government, 
international NGO's, and the press reported an increase in recent years 
in trafficking in women. Women and girls are trafficked from the Mekong 
Delta and highland provinces into Cambodia and from northern provinces 
into China. There are reports that some women from Ho Chi Minh City and 
the Mekong Delta who married men from Taiwan were forced into 
prostitution after their arrival in Taiwan. Women and girls are misled 
by promises of well-paying jobs in those places.
    Prostitution, although officially illegal, is tolerated widely. The 
Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee recently acknowledged that more 
than 10,000 women in the city engage in prostitution. Hanoi and the 
port cities of Danang and Haiphong also have large numbers of women 
engaged in prostitution. There are reports that some persons in Ho Chi 
Minh City addicted young girls to heroin, then forced them to work as 
prostitutes to earn money to support their drug addiction. Many more 
women are compelled to work as prostitutes because of poverty, a lack 
of other employment opportunities, or because they are victimized by 
false promises of lucrative work. The government-affiliated Vietnam 
Women's Union and Youth Union, as well as international and domestic 
NGO's, are engaged actively in education and rehabilitation programs to 
combat these abuses.
    The Government is working with international NGO's to supplement 
law enforcement measures and is cooperating with other national 
governments to prevent trafficking. In September it signed an agreement 
with the government of Australia stating a mutual commitment to combat 
trafficking in women and children.
    Organized groups, including duplicitous job recruiters, lure poor, 
often rural, women with promises of jobs or marriage and force them to 
work as prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Press and NGO reports 
noted that some women were kidnaped and transported to China and other 
countries against their will, where they were sold into forced 
marriages. The Government and the Vietnam Women's Union addressed this 
problem by a program of public information to warn women and girls of 
these dangers and by repatriation programs to help female returnees. 
The Government also increased its efforts to prosecute traffickers.
    There is reported trafficking in women to the Macau Special 
Administrative Region of China with the assistance of organizations in 
China that are ostensibly marriage service bureaus, international labor 
organizations, and travel agencies. After arrival women can be forced 
into conditions similar to indentured servitude; some may be forced 
into prostitution.
    Children also are trafficked domestically and overseas to work as 
prostitutes. MOLISA, the Vietnamese Committee for the Protection and 
Care of Children, and the Vietnam Women's Union were engaged in efforts 
to combat this abuse. One NGO advocate has estimated that the average 
age of trafficked girls was between 15 and 17 years; many were 
trafficked to Cambodia and China.
    Some traffickers have been convicted and imprisoned. The Vietnam 
Women's Union and Youth Union's programs, as well as state-owned media, 
publicized the problem. Women's Union advocacy and rehabilitation 
efforts help women and girls who have been trafficked.
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