[WPRT 106-6]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress WMCP:
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 106-6
_______________________________________________________________________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
__________
WRITTEN COMMENTS
ON THE
EXTENSION OF NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS TO THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
NOVEMBER 4, 1999
Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means by its staff
------------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
60-250 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
BILL ARCHER, Texas, Chairman
PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
BILL THOMAS, California FORTNEY PETE STARK, California
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania
AMO HOUGHTON, New York SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
WALLY HERGER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JIM McCRERY, Louisiana JIM McDERMOTT, Washington
DAVE CAMP, Michigan GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin
JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota JOHN LEWIS, Georgia
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
SAM JOHNSON, Texas MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
MAC COLLINS, Georgia JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio XAVIER BECERRA, California
PHILIP S. ENGLISH, Pennsylvania KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
WES WATKINS, Oklahoma LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas
J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
KENNY HULSHOF, Missouri
SCOTT McINNIS, Colorado
RON LEWIS, Kentucky
MARK FOLEY, Florida
A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff
Janice Mays, Minority Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Trade
PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois, Chairman
BILL THOMAS, California SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
AMO HOUGHTON, New York RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
DAVE CAMP, Michigan MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington XAVIER BECERRA, California
WALLY HERGER, California
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa
Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public
hearing records of the Committee on Ways and Means are also published
in electronic form. The printed record of written comments remains the
official version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare
both printed and electronic versions of the hearing/written comments
record, the process of converting between various electronic formats
may introduce unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are
inherent in the current publication process and should diminish as the
process is further refined.
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Advisory of July 29, 1999, announcing request for written
comments on the extension of normal trade relations to the Lao
People's Democratic Republic................................... 1
______
American Legion, John F. Sommer, Jr., letter..................... 3
Andreae, Charles, III, Andreae, Vick & Associates LLC, statement. 4
Green, Hon. Mark, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Wisconsin, statement........................................... 5
Hmong International Human Rights Watch, Chicago, IL, Xiong Chuhu,
statement and attachments...................................... 6
Illumination Technologies, Inc., East Syracuse, NY, Teng Lee,
letter......................................................... 8
JBC International, James B. Clawson, letter...................... 11
Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., Eau Claire, WI, Vang Pobzeb,
letter and attachments......................................... 12
Lao Veterans of America, Inc.:
Philip Smith, statement...................................... 22
Wangyee Vang, Fresno, CA, letter and attachments............. 29
National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in
Southeast Asia, Ann Mills Griffiths, statement................. 30
Spyder Active Sports, Inc., Boulder, CO, statement............... 42
US-ASEAN Business Council, Inc., statement....................... 43
ADVISORY
FROM THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: (202) 225-6649
July 29, 1999
No. TR-14
Crane Announces Request for
Written Comments on the Extension of
Normal Trade Relations to the
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Congressman Philip M. Crane (R-IL), Chairman, Subcommittee on Trade
of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced that the
Subcommittee is requesting written public comments for the record from
all parties interested in the extension of permanent normal trade
relations (NTR) to the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos).
BACKGROUND:
At present, Laos is listed in general note 3(b) of the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule (HTS) among those countries that are denied normal
tariff treatment. As a result, Lao products are subject to the higher
tariff rates in column 2 of the HTS, which has the practical effect of
excluding Lao products from the U.S. market. Legislation is required to
amend the HTS in order for NTR to be extended to the products of Laos.
Laos is not subject to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (the
``Jackson-Vanik amendment'') because it did not become a Communist
country until after the effective date of that law.
In 1997, the United States concluded a bilateral trade agreement
providing market access for U.S. goods and services in the Lao market
and protection of intellectual property rights. In addition, the United
States reached agreement with Laos in 1997 on a bilateral investment
treaty, the first to be negotiated with a Southeast Asian country, to
provide U.S. investors with the right of national treatment.
In 1998, U.S. imports from Laos were valued at $21 million, while
U.S. exports totaled $3.7 million. Top imports from Laos in 1998 were
miscellaneous manufactured articles, while leading U.S. exports
included chemicals, and machinery and transportation equipment.
DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS:
Any person or organization wishing to submit a written statement
for the printed record should submit six (6) single-spaced copies of
their statement, along with an IBM compatible 3.5-inch diskette in
WordPerfect 5.1 format, with their name, address, and comments date
noted on label, by the close of business, Friday, September 10, 1999,
to A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives, 1102 Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, D.C. 20515.
FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS:
Each statement presented for printing to the Committee by a
witness, any written statement or exhibit submitted for the printed
record or any written comments in response to a request for written
comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any statement or
exhibit not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed,
but will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the
Committee.
1. All statements and any accompanying exhibits for printing must
be submitted on an IBM compatible 3.5-inch diskette in WordPerfect 5.1
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including attachments. Witnesses are advised that the Committee will
rely on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing
record.
2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not
be accepted for printing. Instead, exhibit material should be
referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material not meeting
these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for
review and use by the Committee.
3. A witness appearing at a public hearing, or submitting a
statement for the record of a public hearing, or submitting written
comments in response to a published request for comments by the
Committee, must include on his statement or submission a list of all
clients, persons, or organizations on whose behalf the witness appears.
4. A supplemental sheet must accompany each statement listing the
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will not be included in the printed record.
The above restrictions and limitations apply only to material
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and the public during the course of a public hearing may be submitted
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Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on
the World Wide Web at `HTTP://WWW.HOUSE.GOV/WAYS__MEANS/'.
American Legion
Washington, DC 20006
September 8, 1999
Honorable Philip M. Crane, Chairman
Subcommittee on Trade
House Committee on Ways and Means
1102 Longworth House Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Chairman Crane:
The American Legion opposes the granting of the Jackson-Vanik
waiver to Laos. We believe that the Lao government is not doing as much
as it could to seek the resolution of the POW/MIA issue. The
opportunities offered from Jackson-Vanik to U.S. business should not be
granted until the Lao government shows notable improvement in their
assistance with U.S. accounting efforts.
As with Vietnam, we believe that the United States should not let
commercial interests take priority over the accounting of our missing
servicemembers. The Lao will lose the incentive to increase cooperation
with accounting efforts if they see that the current U.S.
Administration is dedicated only in words and not in deeds.
The Pathet Lao have yet to unilaterally provide credible
information on American POWs last known alive in their control.
Although U.S. officials, veterans and family organizations have for
several years urged the Lao government to commence an oral history
program in order to elicit information that would be helpful in
resolving cases, questionnaires have just recently been developed and
distributed. As of now there is no guarantee that any significant
information will be forthcoming.
Joint Task Force--Full Accounting is carrying out joint field
activities in Laos in cooperation with the Lao government, although it
is being done on a restricted--North to South--basis. The Lao have
permitted a few exceptions to this, but for the most part hold to the
restricted pattern of operation. Aside from the joint field activities,
there is a paucity of unilateral cooperation on the part of the Lao
government to provide information to resolve cases and repatriate
remains of missing Americans.
Unless and until the Lao government is held accountable by the
Clinton Administration, there is no reason for Vientiane to exert any
meaningful unilateral cooperation. Until this happens, we cannot
support the Jackson-Vanik waiver.
Sincerely,
JOHN F. SOMMER, JR.
Executive Director
Statement of Charles Andreae III
Having represented clients internationally for 10 years, I
can appreciate the value of extending Normal Trade Relations in
an effort to promote free trade. I have seen firsthand the
positive aspects of granting Normal Trade Relations which help
to achieve American interests overseas.
Laos presents new opportunities for many American
businesses seeking to expand their foothold in Asia. These
opportunities in the Laotian market will create new jobs in the
United States, foster closer diplomatic relations, and enable
Laos to continue down the path of further economic
liberalization.
To protect its interests in peace and stability and access
to markets in Asia, the U.S. must create an environment that
encourages Laos to integrate into the international system as a
responsible member. Given population trends in Asia, Laos is
certain to have an impact on the international system and
American interests in Asia. For Laos to become a full
participant in the international system and uphold
international rules and norms, Laotian leaders must see that
doing so will best serve Laos' interests. This can be
accomplished only if Americans interact with, rather than
isolate, Laos. Establishing Normal Trade Relations provides the
interaction necessary to bring Laos into greater conformity
with international rules and norms especially now when the
Laotian government continues its New Economic Mechanism.
Furthermore, by granting Normal Trade Relations to Laos,
the United States is showing a continued commitment to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a group which
encompasses 500 million people with a combined $1 trillion
dollar gross domestic product and a two way trade with the U.S.
of over $250 billion.
Normal Trade Relations with Laos would provide a firm
foundation for a healthy and growing American economy. NTR
would also help promote a stable and secure world in which
political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic
institutions can flourish. These interests allow the U.S. to
maintain a system of healthy, cooperative, and politically
vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations and Laos is
no exception to this rule.
NTR for Laos will play a fundamental role in advancing
these enduring American interests in Asia. Most-favored-nation
treatment is the normal tariff treatment that the United States
provides to all but a handful of its trading partners. It is a
principle which undergirds the open international trading
system that the U.S. has labored for decades to expand. NTR has
been, in fact, a key ingredient of America's global strategy
since World War II and the purpose of this strategy has been to
build a cooperative free-trade environment within which
America's businesses and economy can prosper.
Statement of Hon. Mark Green, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Wisconsin
As the Subcommittee on Trade considers this controversial
issue, I believe it is essential that the committee members be
aware of a serious situation involving a constituent of mine--
Mr. Houa Ly of Appleton, Wisconsin.
Nearly five months ago, Mr. Ly disappeared near the Thai-
Lao border. According to eyewitnesses who were traveling with
Mr. Ly, Lao government authorities are responsible for this
disappearance.
These eyewitnesses have shared with me the following
account of Mr. Ly's disappearance:
On April 19 of this year, a party of four Hmong-American
men--Mr. Houa Ly, Mr. Michael Vang, Mr. Neng Lee and Mr. Hue
Vang--were traveling in Thailand near the city of Chiang Khong.
The group, having been advised that the nearby Thai-Lao border
was open to tourists and the public, crossed the Mekong River
into Laos.
Once across the border, the party split into two groups. Mr.
Ly and Mr. M. Vang began speaking to several men, some of whom
identified themselves as authorities in the Lao government. Mr.
Lee and Mr. H. Vang briefly left the area. When they returned,
Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang were missing.
After a brief search, Mr. Lee and Mr. H. Vang witnessed Mr.
Ly and Mr. M. Vang being forced onto a boat by Lao men. The
boat, with Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang aboard, sped away on the
Mekong River. Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang have not been heard from
since.
On May 4, upon their return to Chiang Mai, Thailand, Mr. Lee
and Mr. H. Vang reported this incident to the American
Consulate. Two days later, according to Mr. Lee and Mr. H.
Vang, an American official from the consulate informed them he
had received reports that both men had been imprisoned and that
Mr. Ly may have been killed.
Subsequent independent reports have indicated that the two
men are currently imprisoned by Lao government authorities.
Although the Lao government continues to deny any knowledge
of Mr. Ly's entry into Laos or his current whereabouts, I
believe they have not been completely forthcoming with U.S.
authorities charged with investigating this case.
At best, the communist Lao government has been less than
fully cooperative in this situation. At worst, individuals who
are authorities of the Lao government are responsible for the
seizure--and possibly the execution--of U.S. citizens traveling
abroad. The latter would represent a grave and reprehensible
act against citizens of the United States.
The Lao government's actions surrounding this case must be
taken into account when reviewing possible Normal Trade
Relations status for the Lao People's Democratic Republic. It
is my belief that this case is yet another piece of a larger
body of strong evidence demonstrating that Laos is not yet
ready to join the family of nations enjoying NTR status with
the United States.
Statement of Xiong Chuhu, Executive Director, Hmong International Human
Rights Watch, Chicago, Illinois
Chairman Crane and Members of the Subcommittee. My name is
Xiong Chuhu, Executive Director of Hmong International Human
Rights Watch. Our organization represents Hmong victims of
human rights abuse, so everything I have to say is on their
behalf.
To understand the Hmong people's problems in Laos today it
is important to point out their role during the Vietnam War.
Since the Hmong population was located in a very strategic
place along the mountainous Laos/Vietnam border, many thousands
of Hmong were recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency to
fight against the invading North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The
Hmong became known as the C.I.A.'s ``secret army'' and were
formed into Special Guerilla Units, which were used to sabotage
enemy supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, call in bombing
strikes, and help rescue downed American pilots. This was all
done at great risk to the Hmong. Towards the end of the war,
the Hmong had suffered so greatly that they had to sacrifice
children as young as 10 years old to become soldiers, since
many of the older recruits had either been killed or wounded.
The Hmong have been credited with tying up 2-3 of the NVA's
best fighting divisions, which would otherwise have been used
to fight against American soldiers in South Vietnam.
Though the Vietnam War ended nearly 25 years ago, the
genocide of the Hmong continues to this very day throughout the
jungles of Phou Bia mountain and the surrounding countryside.
In 1975, the newly formed Lao People's Democratic Republic
(LPDR) renamed the Hmong homeland region of Phou Bia, Muang
Cha, Muang Om, and the Hmong capitol of Long Cheng (all
formerly located in Xieng Khouang province), and designated
this area Saysomboun Special Zone (See map--Attachment A). No
foreigners or international monitors have been allowed access
to this region for the past 25 years. The LPDR has used this
secluded area to launch repeated military assaults against
these displaced Hmong. Since 1975, over 40,000 Hmong have been
killed here and another 60,000 have been displaced into the
jungles of Phou Bia. The former Hmong capitol of Long Cheng has
been completely wiped out and is now overgrown with dense
forest. At present, there are still more than 10,000 Hmong
hiding out in the Phou Bia area waiting for the Hmong Killing
Fields to end (See video tape--Attachment B).
In 1979, the LPDR launched heavy military attacks and used
chemical weapons against the Hmong living in this area. Again,
in June 1990, the LPDR launched more air attacks inside
Saysomboun Special Zone. In February 1998, the LPDR began
another series of artillery attacks. The war has ended but the
Killing Fields of the Hmong continues to this very day.
Recently, the LPDR has installed 3 new military camps at Phou
Bia mountain, so the killing of the Hmong people continues on
and on. The Lao military has moved in and destroyed all the
Hmong rice fields and has turned them into mine fields. On May
25, 1998, an aircraft carrying 26 high ranking Vietnamese and
Lao military leaders crashed in Saysomboun Special Zone. They
were in the process of planning genocidal attacks against the
Hmong population taking refuge in this area. Again, in July
1999, the LPDR began launching heavy military attacks to wipe
out the total Hmong population taking refuge in the Phou Bia
jungles of Saysomboun Special Zone by the year 2000. This
ongoing genocide of the Hmong people must stop! The
international community must immediately intervene to save the
Hmong civilian population.
Although the lowland Lao have freedom of movement within
the country, this is not so for the ethnic Hmong. For example,
the Hmong at La Khai camp, Xieng Khouang province, and those in
Muang Cha, Muong Ong, and Muong Ao, Saysomboun Special Zone are
not allowed to move outside of these areas. Whoever is caught
will either be tortured, imprisoned, or killed. An example of
this is Boua Vang Lee who was killed by LPDR police officers
Thao Khaman and Thao Khamkeuth on October 20, 1996. After he
was killed, his father, his wife, his younger brother, two of
his sons, and six Hmong village chiefs sued the LPDR government
asking for 9,379,600 kip (equivalent to $13,400 U.S. dollars)
in compensation for funeral costs and the loss of his life. The
LPDR later retaliated against his family killing his wife and
crippling his little 2 year old son in January 1998, just
because of the lawsuit that was filed. Because of the
continuing intimidation by the LPDR government they can no
longer safely follow through on the case, so have asked our
organization to bring their it to the attention of the
international community. We are requesting that the LPDR should
pay $1 million in damages to cover the expenses of the funerals
and the loss of life of Boua Van Lee and See Xiong, along with
the permanent crippling of his young son and the psychological
trauma that the family has been put through and continues to
face to this very day. (See photos of Boua Van Lee and his wife
& son--Attachment C)
We are requesting that international monitors, along with
Hmong International Human Rights Watch, be granted official
unrestricted access to Saysomboun Special Zone so that the
Hmong Killing Fields may be put to an end. There has been no
durable solution to this problem for almost 25 years. Why? It
is because this issue has never been properly addressed. The
United States must play a critical role in pressuring the Lao
government to withdraw its troops from Saysomboun Special Zone
before any consideration of granting Normalized Trading status
to Laos.
The LPDR has gone all out to promote this year and next
year as ``Visit Laos Year'' to attract many foreign tourists
from different countries. It is ironic, for the past 25 years
thousands of it's own Hmong citizens are still blacklisted and
not allowed visas to enter the country. It is still impossible
for Hmong Americans to do business in Laos because of the
continuing discrimination by the Lao government. We request
that this blacklist of Hmong, who have resettled in a second or
third country, be made available to the U.S. Department of
State and Hmong International Human Rights Watch, along with
the reason why these Hmong are not allowed visas to enter the
LPDR.
Those who attempt to operate a business are later
bamboozled out of their investments and kicked out of the
country. Some good examples of this are the cases of James
Xiong (Classic Travel), Lilly Thao and Dr. Sam Thao (brick
factory), Doua Yang (foundry factory), Mr. Seng Moua and Mr.
Doua Yang (Ban Phak Seng Souk hotel), Bee Xiong (car imports to
Laos), etc. We request that these businessmen/women be brought
to testify in front of the Subcommittee on Trade so that you
can hear from their real life experiences. Our organization
would be more than glad to contact these people to testify. The
LPDR laws change from day to day on the whims of officials.
Tactics such as bribery and intimidation are a very common
practice. At the moment there are no such laws in the LPDR
which protect foreign investments. An Arbitration Committee
should be formed consisting of the U.S. and LPDR governments,
Hmong International Human Rights Watch, along with foreign
investors before any kind of Normalized Trading Relations are
established. Any type of dispute between foreign investors and
their Lao counterparts must be arbitrated under this committee.
This is the only way the investment capitol of foreigners can
truly be protected. In the past, the LPDR government and Lao
business counterparts always used various tactics to frame
foreign investors, kicking them out of the country and taking
over their business assets.
The Hmong are still being denied equal access to education.
Hmong students do not have the opportunity to travel abroad for
higher education even though many lowland Lao are allowed this
luxury. Comparing the Hmong population in the U.S. to the
lowland Lao population in the U.S. there is a noted higher
percentage of Hmong possessing high level degrees. This
achievement shows what great value the Hmong place on education
and should be reflected in the number of Hmong candidates in
Laos allowed to study abroad. At the present time, Hmong
written language is not allowed to be taught in public schools.
This should be changed so that the Hmong language can be taught
at any public school.
Discrimination against the Hmong goes beyond just party
politics. We have documented many cases of high ranking Hmong
LPDR officials who have either been imprisoned, tortured,
killed, or forced to step down from their positions for no
other reason than being ethnic Hmong. Boua Chong Lee, who is
currently being held in a Lao prison, is a good example of
this. He was the former LPDR military leader of Luang Prabang
province until being forced into retirement. He stated that
``now the situation for the Hmong in Laos is much worse than it
was for the Hmong during French colonial times'' [quoted just
before his arrest July 1995--videotape in the possession of
H.I.H.R.W.]. Boua Chong Lee was severely beaten then arrested
just because he voiced his opinion about how the LPDR treats
the Hmong minority. Other Hmong who are currently in jail
without a trial are: Vue Mai, Yang Va, Boua Yeng Vang, Wa Kou
Vang, Houa Lee, and Michael Vang. These prisoners should be
immediately released before Normal Trade Relations are granted
to Laos. (See photos of high level prisoners who need to be
immediately released--Attachment D)
The lingering problem of the remaining 30,000 Hmong
refugees living in Thailand has not been effectively addressed.
This is because their situation is directly related to the
current political climate in Laos. The reason these 30,000
Hmong are now living at Wat Thamkrabok (15,000), Khet Noy
village, Phetchaboun (6000), Tak, Chieng Rai, and other
provinces in northern Thailand is because they left the UNHCR
sponsored refugee camps. Why did they leave the safety of the
refugee camps? They left the camps because of a legitimate fear
of forced/coerced repatriation. There are also over 1100 Hmong
refugees still living in Napho refugee camp. They too fear
repatriation. Part of this is due to the ongoing problems Hmong
are having with their land allocations at Ban Pha Thao. The
UNHCR and the LPDR have also not fulfilled their promise to the
Hmong returnees at Ban Na Saat repatriation site. In 1994,
these refugees returned from Napho refugee camp because an
irrigation project and electricity were promised to them by the
UNHCR and the LPDR. They must fulfill these promises. These
Hmong returnees are also discriminated against by special marks
on their LPDR citizen I.D. cards, which disables them from
fully integrating into Lao society. They cannot obtain
government employment, nor engage in business ventures, nor
continue higher education, plus they also have travel
limitations. (See Hmong returnee I.D. card--Attachment E). We
request that this discriminatory I.D. card be immediately
abolished for the more than 27,000 repatriates before Normal
Trading Relations with the LPDR is established. A new and non-
discriminatory I.D. card should be issued to all Laotian
citizens.
Before Normal Trade Relations are granted to Laos the LPDR
must withdraw all of their troops from Saysomboun Special Zone.
The above refugees should be escorted and protected by the UN
Army so that they can return to their homeland at Saysomboun
Special Zone. They should also be helped out financially with
their resettlement.
The major problem, and again I have to really stress this
important point, is the unresolved issue of Vue Mai's
disappearance in Laos. Vue Mai was the former leader of Ban
Vinai refugee camp. He agreed to support the repatriation
program and return to Laos only after the UNHCR had guaranteed
his and the other returnees safety. By doing this he took an
immense and unselfish risk so that the UNHCR's Hmong
repatriation program would run smoothly.
Therefore, it is essential that the United Nations
seriously follow up on the investigation of Vue Mai's case.
This can be done by first making use of the confidential report
Hmong International Human Rights Watch has sent to the U.N. in
Geneva (received by UNHCR Oct 22, 1998), which details events
leading up to the time of Vue Mai's arrest by the LPDR's secret
police. We are also requesting a list from the UNHCR of all the
Hmong refugees who have repatriated to Laos, so that we can
check to see how they are doing. Vue Mai must be released from
prison before any attempts to Normalize Trading Relations with
the LPDR. The Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian refugee
problems have been solved, but the issue of the Hmong refugees
is still not solved and never will be until Vue Mai is released
from prison.
Hmong International Human Rights Watch is strongly opposed to
Normalized Trading Relations or Most Favored Nation trading status with
the Lao People's Democratic Republic unless all of the above conditions
are met with first.
Sincerely,
Xiong Chuhu,
Executive Director
[Attachments are being retained in the Committee files.]
Illumination Technologies, Inc.
East Syracuse, NY 13057
September 8, 1999
Chairman Philip M. Crane
Subcommittee on Trade
U.S. House of Representatives
1102 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Subject: Extension of normal trade relations (NTR) to Laos
Dear Chairman Crane:
I am writing you to ask for your help in seeking the extension of
normal trade relations (NTR) for Laos.
I am a chemist and an entrepreneur. Asia is our largest foreign
market accounting for a third of the company's revenues. I am also a
partner in another company, in Syracuse, specializing in developing
advanced illumination instrumentation for use in machine vision
applications--namely, automated manufacturing processes. I also have
interests in other businesses. Southeast Asia is a significant market
for the products of these enterprises that employ Americans and bring
wealth to the US. Laos is a part of the Southeast Asian market. I plan
to invest in Laos.
I strongly urge you and the members of the Subcommittee on Trade to
grant Laos normal trade relations (NTR) for the following reasons:
The United States and Laos have maintained uninterrupted diplomatic
relations in the last four decades. Despite severe destruction to Laos
resulting from heavy bombardment by the US during the war, Laos has
cooperated fully with the US in finding its MIA's and a plethora of
other issues. NTR will foster a closer tie between the two countries.
The US has signed a favorable trade agreement with Laos that the US
has been unable to obtain from any other country in Southeast Asia.
Without NTR, this trade agreement has remained ineffective. Without
legal protection or the protection of the US, small US investors such
as myself have been unable to invest in Laos.
Yet, without acceptance from Congress, Laos has extended to US
companies large economic concessions--especially in natural resources
exploration and development--making the US the second largest investor.
NTR will open Laos for further concessions and maintain the US as both
a major benefactor and beneficiary of a developed Lao economy.
Though, presently undeveloped, Laos is the crossroads of a huge
market: China to the North, Vietnam to the East, Cambodia to the South,
and Thailand and Burma to the West. Laos is developing a free-market
economy. Its border is now fully open. With half a million expatriates
of Laos as US citizens, the US is presented with a unique advantage to
compete by utilizing her enormous economic and political assets and the
direct link of its citizens with the citizens of Laos.
I have seen products in the US market that were produced in Laos,
but packaged in Thailand. As such, these products have benefited
Thailand, but not the people of Laos and the American consumers because
the producers in Laos were paid very little and the American consumers
had to pay much higher prices. With NTR, these and other products can
be made in Laos and shipped directly to the US at a better price for
both the people of Laos and the American consumers.
Laos' strategic location as a buffer state between China and
Southeast Asia dictates a geopolitical consideration. Laos presents no
threat to the US. Laos is simply an unexplored asset with a substantial
reserve of natural resources, but sandwiched between powerful rivaled
neighbors. A well-to-do, stable and secure Laos will create and
preserve stability in Indochina and the region. An economically
disadvantaged Laos will be conducive to political instability and
vulnerable to outside destabilizing influences--specifically from
regional contending powers. NTR will extend to Laos, in the eyes of
other nations, the full recognition and partnership of the Superpower
(the US). Furthermore, it will provide Laos with the necessary
resources to solidify her economy and strengthen her territorial
integrity and sovereignty.
Despite the lasting effects of war, in the last 25 years, Laos has
taken steps to improve itself:
Adopting a constitution written by an American law expert.
Introducing democratic reforms with a parliament and
universal suffrage at its core. The people of Laos now choose their
representatives. Further reforms are on the way.
Introducing law and order as its basic operating system.
Bringing its minorities to share power in the government.
Joining the international community through various
organizations, including ASEAN, thus accepting the international
standards and codes of conduct.
Introducing a free-market economy and establishing trade
links with countries around the world. Laos is integrating itself into
the global economy.
It has to be clear that, after 1975, as the result of the flight of
its citizens to other countries, Laos was left with an enormous brain
drain. Its intellectual, technical and entrepreneurial capacity was
devastated. Laos lost almost its entire educated population. The
leadership of Laos came out of the jungles after two decades of war
with guns and bullets, but had no experience managing a modern nation
or economy. Laos had to start from scratch. Despite continuing security
problems, Laos has opened up its border and striven to join the rest of
the world. Undeniably, Laos still has much to improve. Equally
undeniable, Laos has made substantial progress in the last 25 years
despite enormous hardship.
As a Hmong-American having countless number of relatives in Laos,
only a prosperous Laos can improve the quality of their lives. Only a
peaceful Laos can prevent human rights violations. An internationally
involved and open Laos will be subject to international standards and
scrutiny, thus ensuring greater freedom and better treatment to its
citizens.
NTR for Laos will clearly and unequivocally demonstrate not only a
good will and a moral imperative, but moreover, an unmistakable signal
of US's willingness to assist Laos in its painful attempt to raise the
living standard of the people, to participate fully in the family of
nations, and to advance democracy and stability in Laos and the entire
region.
I have learned that Congress failed to approve NTR for Laos the
last time due to questions regarding human rights violations.
Certainly, there are bound to have human rights violations in any
country at the level of development of Laos. These issues must be
addressed by the government of Laos. The international community must
hold the leaders of Laos responsible. However, the larger questions
still beg for answers:
How can any society at subsistence level (where self-
preservation is the order of the day) avoid violence? It cannot.
Violence breeds abuses and impedes democracy.
How can a country confronting with the remnants of
internal strife and external hostilities avoid the use of force and
therefore the abuses of human rights? It cannot. Peace and security are
the basis to uphold human rights.
Next, how can the denial of NTR to Laos stop human rights
violations? It cannot and in fact it promotes the abuses by depriving
the people of Laos the means to develop and to empower themselves.
By denying NTR to Laos, who are being penalized?
Definitely, not the few old leaders of Laos, but the people of Laos. By
keeping the people poor, uneducated and weak, the power of the few
leaders is reinforced. The people of Laos ought not be held hostage
because of the leaders of Laos. These leaders will soon be gone. The
people of Laos will forever remain.
What can NTR do for Laos? Laos has a very small economy
and is considered one of the poorest countries in the world. NTR will
foster substantial trade and investment by Hmong/Lao-Americans and
others in Laos. By also increasing trade with the US, the people of
Laos will earn the resources and capacity to develop Laos. Development
is the key to the preservation of human rights and the upholding of
democratic values.
I was a Hmong refugee from Laos who had lost many loved ones while
trying to escape to Thailand, I am therefore well qualified to speak
against Laos. Yet, I believe that the people of Laos and the American
people are best served by improving relations, but not the continuation
of a policy of alienation and estrangement. Economic reliance on trade
with the US will empower the US to deal more effectively with the
government of Laos. By contributing to the development of Laos through
strong trade relations and political engagement, the US and the Hmong/
Lao-Americans will be in a much stronger position to influence and
shape the future of Laos.
The large majority of the half million Hmong/Lao-Americans, like
all Americans through history, now wish to see a better life and future
for their fellow brothers and sisters in the old country. They also
wish closer relations between their country, the US, and their
motherland, Laos. NTR is a step in the right direction.
The rate of democratic reforms in Laos rests upon the rate of its
human resources and economic developments. NTR is essential in
accelerating the process. I am now asking for your support and the use
of the power of your office as Chairman to impress upon your fellow
committee members and the members Congress to approve the extension of
normal trade relations (NTR) to Laos.
My profound thanks for your help.
Respectfully,
Teng Lee
Chairman, Illumination Technologies, Inc.
JBC International
August 2, 1999
A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff
Committee on Ways and Means,
U.S. House of Representatives
1102 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Singleton,
Pursuant to the request of the Honorable Phillip M. Crane, Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, JBC
International submits comments in support of the extension of
unconditional normal trade relations (NTR) to the Lao People's
Democratic Republic.
JBC International is a trade-consulting and lobbying firm that
provides government relations services to businesses worldwide. We
extend representation and advocacy services to businesses and
governments throughout the world. JBC International builds industry and
government coalitions to leverage trade negotiations. Most importantly,
we promote the removal of trade barriers and the opening of foreign
markets.
Extending normal trade relations to the Lao People's Democratic
Republic could only benefit the US. Laos imports approximately $3.7
million annually in chemicals, machinery and transportation equipment
from the United States. The Lao PDR also has several investment
opportunities in transportation, energy, contracts, private property,
inheritance, state banking, accounting insurance, and labor
relationships. In addition to current import and investment
opportunities, the government has allowed the privatization of state
owned enterprises, which may be acquired by foreign and domestic
organizations.
The country also holds significant deposits of natural resources.
Approximately 47% of the country is forested with a variety of
commercial species which may be used easily for commercial production.
Gem deposits include sapphire, zircon, and amethyst. Valuable mineral
deposits include gold, iron ore, tin, potash, limestone, silver, lead,
zinc, copper, bauxite, coal and lignite.
The Lao PDR shares boarders with Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and
China. Extending normal trade relations to Laos would increase US trade
stability and indirectly improve opportunities for trade to neighboring
countries and improving diplomatic relations in the region. Therefore,
US business relations are not the only benefit of extending normal
trade relations with the Lao People's Democratic Republic.
We thank you for the opportunity to express our comments in support
of the extension of normal trade relations to the Lao People's
Democratic Republic. Extending NTR is one more important step to
becoming a global free market economy.
Yours Truly,
James B. Clawson
Chairman and CEO
Lao Human Rights Council, Inc.
Eau Claire, WI 54702
September 2, 1999
The Honorable Bill Archer, Chairman
House Ways and Means Committee
The Honorable Philip Crane, Chairman
Subcommittee on Trade
U.S. Senators, U.S. Senate
and,
Other Members of the U.S. Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Chairmen Archer and Crane, U.S. Senators, and all Members of
the U.S. Congress:
On behalf of the Hmong and Lao American people and communities whom
we represent in the United States, we are hereby inform, request and
appeal to the U.S. Congress to reject and denounce the granting of
``Permanent Normal Trade Relations'' (NTR) and economic and foreign
assistance to the Communist Lao government of the Lao People's
Democratic Republic (LPDR) because of the following reasons:
Witnesses and other people in Laos have reported that the
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government killed
more than 300,000 people in Laos in the past 24 years. Those witnesses
and other people in Laos have continued to report that the war, killing
fields, genocide, human rights violations and oppression against Hmong
and Lao people are still going on in the countryside in Laos today.
Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Vietnamese
government and the Communist Lao government are conducting ``biological
and chemical weapons warfare'' and an ethnic cleansing war against
Hmong and Lao people in Laos today.
Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Vietnamese
government, the Russian government, and other governments have been
providing and supplying biological and chemical weapons, military
materials, weapons, guns and equipment to the Communist Lao government
to conduct war and genocide against Hmong and Lao people in Laos.
Witnesses in Laos reported that Mr. Latsami Khamphoui, Mr.
Feng Sakchittaphong, Mr. Pang Thong Chokbeengboun, Mr. Wang Kou Vang,
Mr. Boua Yeng Vang, Mr. Nhia Yee Yang, Mr. Youa Pao Herr, Mr. Youa Her
Vue, and Mr. Xia Dang Thao are nine (9) of the 25,000 Hmong and Lao
political prisoners in Laos today.
Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao
government is seeking foreign aid and assistance in order to finance
the Communist armed forces to conduct an ethnic cleansing war against
people in Laos, especially the Hmong ethnic group. Therefore, the U.S.
Congress must not grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations and economic
and foreign assistance to the Communist Lao government.
Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao
government committed ``international terrorism'' against Mr. Houa Ly
and Mr. Michael Vang in April 1999. These two gentlemen are Hmong
American citizens.
Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao
government has committed ``crimes against peace and crimes against
humanity and war crimes'' in Laos.
The Communist Lao government has violated the Vientiane
Agreement on Laos of 1973 and international human rights law. Witnesses
in Laos reported that there are about 30,000 to 70,000 Vietnamese
soldiers and advisers who assist, support, and direct the Communist Lao
government to conduct war against Hmong and Lao people in Laos.
Nine-Point Proposal for Peace and Human Rights
The U.S. Congress should consider the following nine (9)-
point proposal for peace and human rights for people in Laos:
1. The U.S. Congress must not grant Permanent Normal Trade
Relations nor economic and foreign assistance to the Communist
Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government because
these two governments have committed ``war crimes, crimes
against peace and crimes against humanity'' in Laos.
2. We appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations
to demand that the Communist Lao government, Communist
Vietnamese government, Russian government and other governments
must immediately and unconditionally stop the use of biological
and chemical weapons warfare against Hmong and Laotian people
in Laos.
3. We appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations
to investigate and stop the ethnic cleansing war, genocide,
oppression and human rights violations against Hmong and
Laotian people in Laos.
4. We appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations
to bring the Communist Lao government and its Communist
leaders, officials, agents, supporters and conspirators and the
Communist Vietnamese government and Communist Vietnamese
leaders and officials to the International Military Tribunal
Court (World Court) to trial for ``war crimes, crimes against
peace, and crimes against humanity'' against Hmong and Laotian
people in Laos.
5. We appeal to the U.S. government, International Red
Cross and international relief agencies and human rights
organizations and international communities, and to the United
Nations to send food and medical supplies, and to provide other
basic human needs to those Hmong and Laotian people who escaped
and have been living in the countryside because of Communist
oppression, terrorism, genocide, the killing fields, ethnic
cleansing war, human rights violations and biological and
chemical weapons warfare committed by the Communist Lao
government and the Communist Vietnamese government.
6. We appeal to the U.S. government, United Nations, and
international human rights organizations to demand the
Communist Lao government to release Mr. Latsami Khamphoui, Feng
Sakchittaphong, Wang Kou Vang, Nhia Yee Yang, Boua Yeng Vang,
Youa Pao Herr, Youa Her Vue, Xia Dang Thao, Pang Thong
Chokbengboun, and many other thousands of Hmong and Laotian
political prisoners in Laos.
7. We appeal to the U.S. government to bring true peace,
democracy, freedom, human rights and national reconciliation to
people in Laos.
8. We appeal to the U.S. government, Royal Thai government
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
to stop the repatriation of Hmong and Laotian refugees in the
Napho Camp, Thailand, and other displaced locations inside
Thailand to return to Communist Laos because the Communist Lao
government has committed genocide, oppression and human rights
violations against Mr. Vue Mai, Chong Moua Thao, Yong Vang Lor,
Nhia Yee Yang, and many hundreds of other returnees in Laos.
We appeal to the U.S. government, Royal Thai government,
and the UNHCR to provide more food, medical supplies, and other
basic human needs to Hmong and Laotian refugees in the Napho
Camp, Thailand.
We appeal to the U.S. government, UNHCR, international
organizations, and the Communist Lao government to provide more
food, medical supplies and other basic human needs and land for
returnees in Laos.
9. We appeal to the U.S. government to continue opening the
door of opportunity for Hmong and Laotian refugees in the Napho
Refugee Camp, Thailand, to resettle in the United States
because of political reasons, family reunification, and
genocide in Laos.
Between June and July 1999, the delegation of the Lao Human
Rights Council, Inc., in the United States went to the border
between Thailand and Laos. People, witnesses and returnees from
Laos met with us. They reported and certified that the
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese
government have conducted war and genocide against Hmong and
Lao people because of the legacy of Hmong-American relations,
cooperation, and connection during the Cold War. Witnesses in
Laos reported that the Communist Lao government has imprisoned
Mr. Xia Dang Thao, Nhia Yee Yang and more than 300 Hmong
returnees in Laos. Witnesses said the Communist Lao authorities
arrested and tortured and killed Mr. Vue Mai, a leader of Hmong
returnees in Laos. Those witnesses reported that officials of
the Communist Lao government, U.S. Embassy, and United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Laos did not report
the true situation in Laos to the U.S. Congress and the rest of
the world. People in Laos appealed to the Lao Human Rights
Council, Inc., to report to the U.S. Congress and the rest of
the world that the Communist Lao government and Communist
Vietnamese government cooperate together to exterminate and
kill Hmong people. They said the war, genocide, killing fields,
and human rights violations against people in Laos, especially
the Hmong people, are going on in the countryside. This is the
true situation in Laos.
Thank you so much for your consideration of the above proposals for
true peace, human rights, justice and liberty and democracy.
Respectfully,
Dr. Vang Pobzeb
Executive Director
Enclosure
Appendix I
Reasons and Request for Justice and to Stop Genocide, Human Rights
Violations and War in Laos
Lao Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos
March 1, 1999
The U.S. Government
The United Nations
Dear U.S. Government and the United Nations:
I am former Captain Nhia Herr Vang. I am 62 years old. From 1961 to
1975, I served in the Special Forces (SGU), under Regiment 25,
Battalion 225, Company 2252, Second Military Region, under General Vang
Pao and the American CIA in Laos during the Vietnam War.
As I am aware, between 1958 and 1960, American CIA advisors and
officials contacted and requested General Vang Pao to recruit and lead
Hmong and Lao people to cooperate with the U.S. government to stop the
aggression and expansion of Communism throughout Southeast Asia.
Therefore, we cooperated with the U.S. government.
In 1973, the Paris Peace Agreements on Indochina and the Vientiane
Peace Agreement on Laos required that all foreign soldiers and advisors
withdraw completely from Laos. These agreements state that the
political and military problems in Laos have to be solved by Lao
people.
The U.S. government complied with these agreements. The U.S.
government completely withdrew all its advisors and soldiers from Laos.
However, to the contrary, the Communist Vietnamese government did not
comply with these two agreements.
In May 1975, the Communist Vietnamese soldiers and the Communist
Pathet Lao soldiers cooperatively took over the Kingdom of Laos with
armed forces and aggression. After the Communist Vietnamese government
and Communist Lao Movement took over Laos, they exterminated,
oppressed, suppressed, killed and imprisoned many thousands of SGU
soldiers and officials of the American CIA and Royal Lao government and
other people in Laos. The Communist Lao government and the Communist
Vietnamese government arrested, rounded up and sent many thousands of
soldiers, officials and other people to death in many reeducation camps
and concentration camps in Laos.
In the area I occupied, in June 1975, I was arrested and forced to
be reeducated in Seminar Camp where I stayed for four days.
Fortunately, I escaped from the reeducation camp.
Genocide, human rights violations, war and extermination by the
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government
against CIA soldiers, officials and other people in Laos were causal
factors and reasons for people in Laos to form the Democratic Movement
to fight against Communist aggression and oppression in Laos. Our
struggles are self-defense for survival, freedom, democracy and human
rights.
In my village, the Communist Lao and Vietnamese soldiers tortured
and killed two Hmong families composed of ten people. The heads of
these two families and victims were CIA and SGU soldiers. Therefore,
people in my village and many other locations in Laos formed the
Democratic Movement to defend ourselves for survival.
Between 1975 and 1976, the Communist Lao government and Communist
Vietnamese government and soldiers used biological and chemical weapons
to kill many CIA and SGU soldiers, officials and other people in Laos.
Many more people suffered. Many people died. Therefore, about 1,000
Hmong people surrendered to the Communist Lao government. The Communist
Lao government arrested, imprisoned, tortured and killed those people.
About 500 Hmong people fled Laos to Thailand and they sought
resettlement in the United States.
According to our statistical figure, there were 8,000 Hmong people
in the village of Phou Ma Thao, Muang Mouk, Xieng Khouang Province, in
1975. In 1999, there are 1,500 people who survived and live in this
village because the Communist Lao and Vietnamese soldiers killed more
than 6,000 people in this one village.
According to many reliable reports of many witnesses in Laos, the
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government have
killed about 300,000 people in Laos between 1975 and 1999. Of these
victims, more than 40,000 were former CIA and SGU soldiers and
officials of the CIA and Royal Lao government. The Communist Lao and
Vietnamese soldiers burned and destroyed villages, houses, forests,
farms and animals. They killed Hmong and Lao people and animals using
biological and chemical weapons.
In 1998 and 1999, there are more than five (5) Vietnamese military
divisions stationed inside Laos. The Vietnamese soldiers are direct,
support and assist the Communist Lao government to conduct the war,
genocide and biological and chemical warfare against people in Laos.
There has been neither peace nor stability inside Laos for the past 24
years, because the Communist Vietnamese government and Communist Lao
government is violating the Paris Peace Agreements on Indochina and the
Vientiane Peace Agreement on Laos of 1973.
Because of the inhuman atrocities against our people by the
Communist Lao government, I am calling upon the U.S. government and the
United Nations to recognize that the Communist Lao government and
Communist Vietnamese government have violated the Charter of the United
Nations and the international human rights laws and principles.
Nine-Point Proposal for Peace in Laos
In order to bring a true peace, justice, human rights and
stability to Laos, we people in Laos propose the following
nine-point proposal to the U.S. government and the United
Nations to consider:
1. To request the twelve (12) signatories (nations) and the
United Nations who signed and witnessed the Paris Peace
Agreements on Indochina on March 2, 1973, to guarantee and
bring a true peace to Laos.
2. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to
demand that the Communist Lao government and Communist
Vietnamese government must immediately stop the war, genocide
and human rights violations against people in Laos.
3. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to
demand that all the Vietnamese soldiers and advisors must
withdraw from Laos immediately and unconditionally.
4. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to
send international peacekeeping forces to stop the war and keep
the peace and to supervise free elections in Laos.
5. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to
bring a true peace, justice and human rights to Laos.
6. To request the Royal Lao family, Dr. Khamphai Abhay,
General Vang Pao, General Thonglith Chokbengboun and many other
Laotian leaders to return to Laos in order to guarantee and
maintain peace and stability for people in Laos.
7. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to
establish a ``safe haven zone'' and ``liberation zone'' for
people, including the freedom fighters in Laos. The
international communities should provide medicine, food and
other basic human needs to people in these zones.
8. To request the U.S. government, the United Nations, and
international human rights organizations to send investigators
to investigate, monitor and stop genocide and human rights
violations in Laos.
9. If all steps above fail to bring peace to Laos, the U.S.
government and the United Nations must give an opportunity for
CIA and SGU soldiers, officials and their family members and
associates in Laos to seek political asylum and resettlement in
the United States because of political reasons, genocide, human
rights violations and war by the Communist Lao government and
Communist Vietnamese government in Laos.
On behalf of the Lao Democratic Movement and Freedom
Fighters in Laos, I appeal to and request the U.S. government
and the United Nations to consider the above proposals to save
the lives of people in Laos. We need the U.S. government and
the United Nations to bring a true peace, justice, human
rights, and stability to Laos.
We hope to receive assistance and support from the U.S. government
and the United Nations in the near future.
Respectfully requested and submitted:
Signed by Mr. Nhia Herr Vang,
Leader of the Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos.
cc: (1) U.S. government.
(2) United Nations
(3) Royal Lao Family
(4) Dr. Khamphai Abhay
(5) General Vang Pao
(6) General Thonglith Chokbengboun
(7) Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., USA
(8) United Lao Movement for Democracy, USA
(9) United Lao Movement for Human Rights and Democracy in France
(10) International human rights organizations
Notice: The above English version is a translation from the Lao
language which was signed by Mr. Nhia Herr Vang, a leader of the Lao
Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos.
Appendix II
Affidavit and Statement of Mr. Blia Yang Chang to the U.S. Government
and the United Nations on the True Situation in Laos
March 9, 1999
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:
I am Mr. Blia Yang Chang. I am a former political prisoner
in the Sam Khe political prison in Vientiane area, Laos, from
September 10, 1997 to October 1, 1998. I was a captain and
soldier under the American CIA and General Vang Pao in Laos
from 1961 to 1975. Many thousands of people in Laos and I were
happy to serve the U.S. government during the Vietnam War.
I would like to report the following on the true situation
in Laos to the government of the United States; government of
France, government of the United Kingdom; the United Nations
and international community; and international human rights
organizations as follows:
War and Genocide in Laos
1. In May 1975, the U.S. government withdrew from Laos
completely. The U.S. government did not inform our Hmong and
Laotian soldiers about the change of its foreign policy in Laos
and Southeast Asia. Many thousands of Hmong and Laotian
soldiers and civilians were arrested, imprisoned, and murdered
or executed by the Communist Lao government and the Communist
Vietnamese government and soldiers. The Communist government
sent the King, Queen and many thousands of people to death in
many concentration camps in Laos in the past two decades.
In 1975, many thousands of people, including myself, could
not escape to Thailand. We were subject to arrest, imprisonment
and death by the Communist Lao soldiers and North Vietnamese
soldiers. We saw the Communist soldiers kill many people in
Muang Cha and many of the villages in Xieng Khouang Province,
Laos.
2. As a result, I and many thousands of other people
escaped to Mount Bia (Phoum Bia) in Xieng Khouang Province. I
stayed in Mount Bia from 1975 to 1996. I saw the communist Lao
and Communist Vietnamese soldiers massacre and kill more than
500 Hmong people in Mount Bia. The Communist soldiers used
heavy guns and other weapons, and warplanes, to kill many
thousands of people in many other locations. The Communist
Vietnamese government and Communist Lao government used Soviet
warplanes to drop many chemical weapons and bombs to kill many
thousands of Hmong people in Mount Bia and many other locations
in Xieng Khouang Province and many other provinces in Laos. I
saw the Soviet warplanes drop many chemical weapons and bombs
to kill Hmong and Laotian people in Laos.
3. The Communist Lao government and the Communist
Vietnamese government and soldiers launched and have been
conducting war, genocide, human rights violations, oppression,
and ethnic cleansing warfare against our Hmong and Laotian
people in Xieng Khouang Province and many other provinces in
Laos from 1975 to the present time in 1999. In 1975, the
Vietnam War was over for the U.S. government and American
people, but the war is not yet over for Hmong and Laotian
people.
4. The Communist Vietnamese government did not withdraw
its Communist troops and soldiers from Laos. In 1999, there are
still many thousands of Vietnamese soldiers, advisors and other
Vietnamese people in Laos. The Vietnamese soldiers changed from
military uniforms to civilian clothes and uniforms. Therefore,
foreigners in Laos do not understand who are Laotians and who
are Vietnamese people. The Communist Vietnamese government and
Russian government have continuously supplied military
materials, equipment, guns and weapons to the Communist Lao
government to conduct war against people in Laos from 1975
until today.
5. Today, there is a war going ion in Mount Bia and other
locations in Xieng Khouang Province and many other provinces in
Laos. The Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese
government and soldiers continue to carry on war against Hmong
and Laotian people in Laos.
6. Many thousands of former CIA soldiers and their family
members and other people have continued to escape to the
countryside in order to avoid the genocide, persecution and
imprisonment which are being committed by the Communist Lao
government. Many people have died in the countryside from
hunger, disease and war.
7. The Communist Lao government has continued to issue
announcements and propaganda throughout Laos that those Hmong
and Laotian people who escaped to the countryside can and
should come back to live peacefully with the Communist Lao
government without punishment and without revenge. Therefore,
in 1996, I brought a document of amnesty which the Communist
Lao government issued to me and to other people. We surrendered
to the Communist authorities. I came to live in peace with my
family members of the village of Phoum Ghan II, Vientiane area.
However, on September 10, 1997, the Communist Lao authorities
arrested and imprisoned me. Mr. Ya Xiong Chang and Nhia Lue
Chang were also arrested and imprisoned by the Communist Lao
government.
The Communist Lao government imprisoned us at the Sam Khe
concentration camp, Vientiane area, Laos. I witnessed that
there were more than 250 Hmong and Laotian political prisoners
in the Sam Khe concentration camp and in other political
prisons in the Vientiane area. There are many thousands of
Hmong and Laotian political prisoners in Laos. Conditions and
food in the prison are the worst. Prisoners do not get enough
food to eat and do not get clean water to drink.
8. Many other people in Laos and myself estimate that the
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese
government and soldiers have killed more than 300,000 people in
Laos in the past 23 years. The war and killing fields in Laos
are still going on in the countryside in Laos.
9. The true situation in Laos is that the Communist Lao
government and Communist Vietnamese government and soldiers
have been cooperating together to carry on war, genocide, human
rights violations, oppression and killing fields against Hmong
and Laotian people in Laos. The people in Laos need peace,
freedom, democracy, human rights, food, basic human needs,
medicine, and economic development. The people in Laos do not
need war, genocide, oppression and human rights violations.
Five-Point Peace Proposal for Laos
Therefore, as I am a former Hmong political prisoner in
Laos and a friend of the U.S. government, I would like to
propose the following five points to the U.S. government and
the United Nations and international rights organizations to
consider for peace for the people in Laos:
1. The people in Laos and I appeal that the U.S.
government and the United Nations must demand that the
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese
government and soldiers stop the war, genocide, human rights
violations and biological and chemical weapons warfare against
Hmong and Laotian people in Laos.
2. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government
and the United Nations to bring a true peace, democracy,
freedom and human rights to the people in Laos.
3. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government
and the United Nations to pressure the Communist Vietnamese
government to withdraw all its soldiers and advisors from Laos
completely and unconditionally.
4. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government,
the United Nations and international humanitarian agencies to
bring food, basic human needs, clothes, and medicine to Hmong
and Laotian people in the countryside who escaped to there in
order to avoid genocide and punishment.
5. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government
and the United Nations and international human rights
organizations to send delegates and representatives to Laos on
fact-finding missions on the problems of genocide, human rights
violations, war and peace in Laos.
I swear and certify that the above statements and reports are true
and correct. I tell and report the true situation in Laos to the U.S.
Congress, U.S. government, American people and the United Nations.
Respectfully,
Name: Mr. Blia Yang Chang
Signature:
Notice: This English version is a translation from the verbal Hmong
language of Mr. Blia Yang Chang.
Appendix III
Hmong Refugees Request Human Rights from U.S. Government
Napho Forced Repatriation Camp
Nakhon Phanom Province, Thailand, No. 014
June 2, 1999
Dear President Bill Clinton, President of the United States:
Dear Members of the U.S. Congress and Senators, Washington, D.C.:
Dear General Vang Pao, Hmong Leader:
Dear Dr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, Inc. in the United
States:
We, the Hmong refugees in the Napho Forced Repatriation Camp,
Nakhon Phanom Province, Thailand, are writing this letter and petition
to you regarding the problems of Hmong refugees in this camp. The
purpose of this letter is to request true human rights and freedom. We
request resettlement in the United States. Our requests, purposes and
reasons are as follows:
1. On April 19-20, 1999, officials of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from Laos and Thailand and the Thai
government have announced in the Napho refugee camp in Thailand that
there is peace in Laos and are pressuring Hmong refugees in this camp
to register to return to Laos. These officials have announced that each
refugee who voluntarily registers to return to Laos will receive at
least $100 from the U.S. government and 2,000 baht (Thai currency) as
well as other assistance and support, in order to pressure refugees to
return to Laos. However, they also announced that those refugees who
refuse to register for voluntary repatriation from the Napho Camp,
Thailand to Laos will not receive any assistance and help from the
UNHCR and other parties involved in the repatriation to Laos. The
officials stated that the Napho refugee camp will be closed down in
1999 and that they will force refugees from Thailand to Laos in 1999.
2. We Hmong refugees respectfully ask the Royal Thai government and
you to recognize that between May and June 1987, General Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh, Thai Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces,
contracted and used Hmong refugees in Thailand to cooperate in helping
the Royal Thai government fight against the Communist Lao government
during the Thai-Lao border war in the three villages and Luong Kao,
border between Laos and Thailand. Major Chong Her Xiong was our
military commander (company 201) who led more than 250 Hmong soldiers
in cooperation with the Thai armed forces (company 6). We cooperated
with the Thai government to help to defend its national security and
sovereignty. The Thai government won the war because of our support and
cooperation. Therefore, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh gave videotape
equipment, 30,000 baht in Thai currency, and many other awards to our
Hmong soldiers.
Therefore, we Hmong refugees are not willing to return to Laos,
because we fear that the Communist Lao government shall imprison and
kill us because of the above reasons.
3. The Communist Vietnamese government sent about 70,000 Vietnamese
soldiers to cooperate with the Communist Lao government to wage war,
genocide, ethnic cleansing warfare, and human rights violations against
people in Laos. Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, and
continuing in 1999, the Communist Vietnamese government and Communist
Lao government has killed more than 300,000 people in Laos. The
``killing fields'' in Laos are still going on in 1999. The Communist
Lao government has imprisoned 25,000 to 30,000 people in Laos, and
continues to arrest, imprison and kill more Hmong and Lao people in
1999 without fair trials or reasons. These arrests, imprisonments and
deaths are evidence that the Communist Lao government has been
exterminating ethnic groups, especially Hmong people.
4. In 1993, the Communist Lao government arrested, imprisoned,
tortured and killed Mr. Vue Mai, a leader of Hmong returnees in Laos.
On April 6, 1999, the Communist Lao government arrested and imprisoned
Mr. Vang Thai Xiong, another group leader of Hmong returnees in Laos.
There are many other cases which are similar to the cases of Vue Mai
and Vang Thai Xiong in Laos.
We Hmong refugees in the Napho Camp, Thailand, are political
refugees. We are former soldiers and family members of former soldiers
and associates of the U.S. government and CIA during the Vietnam War.
Therefore, we declare that we shall not return to death in Communist
Laos.
5. We Hmong refugees appeal to the UNHCR, Thai government and the
U.S. government to solve our problems in Thailand in accordance with
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of the United
Nations. Chapter 1 and Article 1 of the Convention defines who are
``refugees'' (please see the Convention of 1951). We are legal refugees
and political refugees under the definition of the 1951 Convention.
6. There are 1,286 Hmong and Lao refugees in the Napho Camp,
Thailand, who endorsed and agreed with this petition and letter.
We appeal to Dr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., to
bring our requests to the U.S. government, the UNHCR, and the Thai
government for consideration of our requests for human rights. Thank
you for your help and assistance.
Respectfully submitted and requested,
Written and signed by representatives of refugees on
behalf of 1,286 Hmong and Lao refugees in the Napho Camp,
Thailand
Signed by:
1. Mr. Xiong Nhia Koua, Leader of Hmong refugees, Napho Camp,
Thailand (BV04019).
2. Mr. Vang Fai Dang, Leader of Hmong refugees, Napho Camp,
Thailand (Refugee Status, ID, ST 197) and Mr. Thak Keo
Vimxay.
Heads of Families of Refugees who Endorsed and Supported this Petition
and Letter include:
Name Refugee Status
3. Mr. Nou Ly Vang................. (CA 03324)
4. Mrs. Chang Kia.................. (CB 200368)
5. Mr. Chong Shoua Vang............ (ST 198)
6. Mr. Vang Koua................... (BV 07742)
7. Mr. Lo Pao Lor.................. (NP 16616)
8. Mr. Xay Yee Chang............... (CA 4005)
9. Mr. Tong Yang................... (BSC 0172)
10. Mr. Xay Shoua Xiong............. (BV 03085)
11. Mr. Shoua Lo Xiong.............. (BN 1710)
12. Mr. Xay Seng Xiong.............. (BV 07577)
13. Mr. Ly Fong Xiong............... (CA 04706)
14. Mr. Youa Teng Thao.............. (BV 02521)
15. Mr. Yang Tou.................... (BV 0330)
16. Mr. Shoua Thao.................. (NN 16628)
17. Mr. Xai Thao.................... (NP 016627)
18. Mr. Oua Thai.................... (NP 16716)
19. Mr. Xai Thao Xiong.............. (BN 09036)
20. Mr. Mai Lor..................... (ST 01949)
21. Mrs. Youa Her................... (BV 08530)
22. Mr. Chao Thao................... (CA 05594)
23. Mr. Ka Xiong.................... (CA 05600)
24. Mr. Seng Shoua Xiong............ (BV 4078)
25. Mr. Yee Her..................... (BN 09179)
26. Mr. Wang Neng Thao.............. (CA 3217)
27. Mr. Chong Xiong Chang........... (CA 4003)
28. Mr. Vang Thao................... (BV 10325)
29. Mr. Xai Toua Chang.............. (BV 1914)
30. Mrs. Yia Ly..................... (CB 200669)
31. Mr. Cha Ly...................... (BV 8941)
Notice: The above English version is a translation from the
original Lao language which was written and signed by the above
witnesses. Mr. Xiong Nhia Koua and Vang Fai Dang and the other 29 heads
of families of refugees above requested resettlement in the United
States. They declared that they shall not return to Laos because of
political reasons.
Appendix IV
Request for Human Rights and Democracy
July 4, 1999
Dear President of the United States,
U.S. Congress
General Vang Pao
Mr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, USA
I am Mr. Moua Yia. I am 42 years old. I am a leader of the
Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Phou Bia (Mount Bia), Laos.
I am hereby reporting on the true situations in Laos from 1975 to 1999
to you.
The true situations in Laos for the past 24 years and also in 1999
are that the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese
government have continued to commit war, genocide, human rights
violations, oppression, extermination, ethnic cleansing war and
biological and chemical weapons warfare against Hmong and Lao people in
Laos.
On October 12, 1975, the Communist Lao government arrested,
tortured and killed my father, Mr. Nhia Toua Moua, a 45-year-old leader
of the village. The Communist Lao government also tortured and killed
four CIA soldiers, including Mr. Moua Bee, 35 years old; Mr. Boua Fue
Moua, 38 years old; Mr. Moua Xiong, 33 years old; and Mr. Youa Lue Lor,
37 years old. The Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese
government have cooperated to kill many thousands of Lao and Hmong
people in Laos because of the legacy of the Hmong-American relations
during the Vietnam war.
The Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government
killed about 350,000 people in Laos in the past 24 years. The war,
genocide, human rights violations and biological and chemical weapons
warfare against Hmong people are still going on in Laos in 1999.
Therefore, I respectfully request the U.S. government to stop the
war in Laos and to save the lives of our people, because we do not want
to die by war anymore.
We are former soldiers under the American CIA and General Vang Pao.
Therefore, we request that the U.S. government must save our lives. We
do not want to die by the Communist war. We need peace, democracy and
human rights like the American people and other people in the world
have.
We appeal to and request the U.S. government and international
human rights organizations to stop the war, genocide and human rights
violations against people in Laos. Thank you so much.
Respectfully requested,
Signed by Mr. Moua Yia
Leader of the Democratic
Movement and Freedom
Fighters
Phou Bia (Mount Bia), Xieng
Khouang Province, Laos
cc: (1) The U.S. government
(2) U.S. Congress
(3) General Vang Pao
(4) Mr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., USA
Notice: The above English version is a translation from the Lao
language, which was written and signed by Mr. Moua Yia on July 4, 1999.
Note: This document is translated ``The Laotian Paper''
from a Lao version to English version by a Christian Missionary
at Louang Prabang, Laos.
Appendix V
THE LAOTIAN PAPER
February 10, 1998
Mr. Khamtai Siphandon
Prime Minister
Office of the Chairman
Council of Ministers
Vientiane, Laos
To Prime Minister Siphandon
From: The Laotian People
This letter is sent to you to demand that you immediately order
your troops to cease fire against the Lao people in the Northern,
Central and Southern provinces of Laos. You cannot hide the fact that
from December 1, 1997 to the present time, countless of innocent
Laotian men, women, and children in those provinces have been killed by
your government's 105 mm guns, chemicals, air raids, and by other
military attacks. We have witnesses that on January 28-29, 1998 you
ordered Russian-made B8 helicopters to drop lethal chemicals on the
Lao-Hmong at Phoubia, Phaphai, Phoula, Phou La Phao, Mouang Cha, Mouang
Mok, and other areas in Xiengkhouang province. These drops of red and
yellow chemicals and the poisoning of specific water sources have
immediately killed thousands of Lao civilians, including men, women and
children. Furthermore, your troops captured large groups of women and
children. All the children were killed immediately. The women were
raped and killed by your soldiers who left them dead and naked.
Mr. Prime Minister, you and your colleagues cannot afford to pay
the price for this genocide. We were born in Laos and are Lao citizens.
We claim the rights for life and to live freely in our own country. For
twenty-two years, the Pathet Lao regime has conducted genocide against
the Laotian people. We demand that you and your fellow leaders
immediately withdraw your troops which were deployed to murder Lao
civilians in the regions mentioned above. These killings must be
immediately stopped. Otherwise, you and your colleagues must bear
responsibility and all the consequences.
Be aware, that once the truth is brought to the attention of the
international community, you and your cohorts will be held responsible
for this genocide by millions of Lao citizens as well as the
international community. We, the survivors of your genocide have
concrete evidence, and we are willing to testify before our fellow Lao
citizens and the world, that you and your cohorts are conducting the
most bloodthirsty murder campaign against your own citizens and the
greatest violation of human rights in our history.
Mr. Prime Minister, the Laotian people have suffered enough from
decades of war. We want a government that respects peace, human rights
and which is able to stimulate economic development for the benefit of
the people. We do not deserve any more of the crazy and bloody war that
you and your cohorts created. The Laotian people deserve to live in
peace.
You will not win and will not be able to totally wipe out the
civilians whom you consider your opposition. We, the Lao citizens, give
you and your colleagues our last warning to either cease fire
immediately or we will have no choice but to assert our rights as
citizens to condemn your administration and bring you before an
international court of law. When this happens, you and your fellow
leaders cannot deny responsible for what you have done to the Laotian
people.
This letter is executed in Laos this 10th day of February 1998 by
the Laotian people, your fellow countrymen.
Representative of the Lao People
Bounchan Sodabanh
cc: Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos
US Department of State
US Committee on Foreign Affairs Relation
US Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs
US Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand
Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of China
United Nations
Headquarters of ASEAN
World Bank
Asian Development Bank
Amnesty International
International Human Rights Organizations
Lao Human Rights Council in America
National and International Media Organizations
All Whom It May Concern
Statement of Philip Smith, Washington, D.C., Director, Lao Veterans of
America, Inc.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you, as well as the
honorable Members of the Trade Subcommittee, for the special
invitation extended to the Lao Veterans of America to submit
comments today in the U.S. House of Representatives regarding
Laos. We appreciate your role in the debate over whether or not
to extend Normal Trade Relations (NTR) to the regime currently
ruling Laos, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR).
We believe that the freedom-loving people of Laos will
benefit, one bright day in the future, from your devotion to
the democratic institutions and deliberative processes that
have made America a great nation and a leader in the
international community. Indeed, our deepest prayers and
aspirations are to help to give voice in this testimony to the
vast silent majority of the population in Laos--the countless
individuals living in despair, poverty, discrimination and
oppression in the LPDR because of decades of misguided policies
forced upon them by a militaristic regime that has bankrupt the
people, like the peoples of Eastern Europe under Communism,
both economically and spiritually.
I. About the Lao Veterans of America
The Lao Veterans of America (LVA) is a non-profit veterans
organization created to educate the general public and U.S.
policymakers about the historic contributions made by the Lao
and Hmong veterans of the U.S. Secret Army in Laos who served
with U.S. clandestine and military forces during the Vietnam
War. The LVA was founded and established with visionary
leadership from Colonel Wangyee Vang and a very dedicated group
of individuals. It enjoys an active advisory board and the
participation of many distinguished American leaders, including
many Members of Congress as well as those who served in senior
policymaking positions during the Vietnam War. Major General
Vang Pao and General Thonglit Chokbenboun are Honorary Co-
Chairmen of the LVA. The Lao Veterans of America has chapters
throughout the United States and represents over 60, 000
Laotian-Americans and their families. It has been recognized
repeatedly by the U.S. Congress, Administration officials and
the news media for its outstanding contributions to U.S.
national security interests during the Vietnam War as well as
its ongoing positive work in Washington, D.C., Southeast Asia
and communities throughout the United States. For nearly a
decade, the Lao Veterans of America, working in cooperation
with other like-minded organizations that share similar goals,
has played a significant role in helping to shape U.S. policy
toward Southeast Asia as well as domestic policy toward the
Lao-America and Hmong-American community. The LVA has had a
major impact in the public arena and participated in the
national dialogue regarding vital issues, including, but not
limited to: 1.) organizing numerous research and U.S.
Congressional fact-finding missions to Southeast Asia; 2.)
hosting the first national recognition ceremonies for the Hmong
veterans and their families, including the awarding of
Congressional citations and the establishment of a memorial in
Arlington National Ceremony; 3.) opposing the forced
repatriation of Laotian refugees in Southeast Asia and bringing
thousands of additional veterans and their families to the
United States; 4.) encouraging Congress to successfully
introduce and develop support for legislation granting
citizenship to Hmong and Lao veterans of the U.S. Secret Army;
5.) urging Congress to introduce legislation that helped to
successfully restore SSI to the Hmong and Lao veterans and
their communities; and, 6.) playing a leadership role in the
effort to urge Congress to reject the granting of MFN and NTR
trade status to the LPDR regime by working to educate Members
of Congress about the current situation in Laos and requesting
that they continue to reject the granting of normal trade
status to the regime in Laos until it undertakes basic economic
and political reforms.
In July and August of this year, the Lao Veterans of
America conducted two major research missions to Southeast Asia
in cooperation with Members of Congress, Southeast Asian
government officials as well as various non-governmental
organizations. Some of the research mission findings are
contained in this testimony.
II. The LPDR's Failed Efforts To Gain Special Trading Status in Recent
Years
Mr. Chairman, in 1997, the LPDR aggressively sought for the
first time--in a bold step, unprecedented since the collapse of
Laos to the communists in 1975--what was then called Most
Favored Nation (MFN) trade status from the U.S. Congress.
Hitherto, granting MFN or NTR trade status to the LPDR regime
had not been considered by Congress given the regime's horrific
record on numerous issues. It is important to note that by
1997, the Lao communists were in a desperate situation and
fearful that--like their former Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern
Europe--events would spin out of control and they would lose
their domestic grip on power to the forces of freedom, reform
and market economics. In the face of deplorable, and steadily
worsening economic conditions in the LPDR, the regime went
abroad begging for financial aid, first from its former Cold
War allies, including remarkably Cuba (whom, astonishingly, the
LPDR actually asked for economic assistance from its nearly
bankrupt ally--predictably, without result), and then, in
desperation, from the United States. Sadly, Laos under the
communists had become an economic basket case broken from
decades of corruption and mismanagement in a Soviet-style
command economy as well as the political and economic collapse
of it largest foreign aid patron, the former Soviet Union. The
U.S. Department of State, instead of pressing for systemic
political and economic reform in Laos when significant
potential leverage existed at the end of the Cold War and the
difficult years for the regime that followed, apparently simply
urged the LPDR to increase its efforts, in cooperation with the
State Department, to obtain MFN trade status from the U.S.
Congress. Moreover, the State Department worked to provide
other forms of U.S. assistance to the Lao communists.
Astonishingly, no significant conditions to encourage political
and economic reform were placed on the LPDR regime by the U.S.
Department of State in return for these generous concessions
and Administration efforts to help obtain MFN trade status from
Congress. Instead the State Department seemed to turn a blind
eye to the regime's excesses and aggressively defended the LPDR
and its policies from its critics in the United States and
abroad.
Hiring for the first time an American lobbyist, the LPDR
vigorously pursued its effort to obtain MFN trade status on
Capitol Hill with a number of its allies in the business as
well as the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) community in
Washington, D.C. White-washing the horrific ongoing nature of
the LPDR and its behavior, they seemed overly eager to curry
favor, with elements of the ruling elite in the Lao regime.
The LPDR regime and its allies in Washington, D.C., as well
as some elements within the State Department, also vigorously
worked to attempt to discredit and smear the work of
organizations, activists, journalists and ordinary public-
spirited individuals in America and abroad concerned about the
plight and ongoing suffering of the Lao people; some of those
targeted included people who had lost family or loved ones in
Laos because of the regime's brutality. These efforts on the
part of the LPDR failed miserably and, in fact, backfired on
the regime's plans to obtain MFN trade status. The apparent
worst enemy of the Lao government, in terms of its efforts to
obtain MFN trade status for the first time seemed to be the Lao
government itself. It continued to engage in reckless and
unbridled behavior with regard to international norms and the
mistreatment of its own people. For example, it was even so
imprudent at the time as to crackdown publicly on religious
practice, arresting and imprisoning dozens of Christians in
Laos, including American missionaries. Moreover, the LPDR
regime strangely sought to justify its inexcusable actions with
a bizarrely worded press release posted on its Embassy's
internet site in Washington, D.C.; this after over fifty
Members of Congress signed a letter in protest to the religious
crackdown against the Christians in Laos.
Mr. Chairman, tens of thousands of Lao and Hmong-Americans
across the United States and internationally rallied against
the LPDR regime and its efforts to obtain MFN trade status in
the 105th Congress. News reports filled the American press as
well as the international media about opposition to the LPDR's
trade efforts by the Hmong and Lao people. The Lao Veterans of
America was pleased to help in this regard as well as to urge
Members of Congress to review the situation more closely and to
organize, for the first time, an actual hearing exclusively on
the situation in Laos from the perspective of the victims. It
is to the credit of many in the U.S. Congress that sound
reason, the light of factual information, and the enduring
values that have made America the great nation that it is, were
finally able to prevail and pierce the dark deception of the
LPDR's propaganda and disinformation effort in Washington, D.C.
In July 1997, on the same day that the MFN legislation for Laos
was voted on by the Trade Subcommittee, the first hearing since
the Vietnam War was held in Congress regarding the situation in
Laos. The Congressional Human Rights Caucus in cooperation with
the House International Relations Committee, under the combined
leadership of Chairman Ben Gilman, Congressman Tom Lantos,
Congressman John Porter, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher,
Subcommittee Chairman Chris Smith, Congressman Bruce Vento and
Congressman George Radanovich organized and hosted this
important hearing. Lao and Hmong victims and survivors of the
LPDR's brutality and atrocities testified about their
experiences before the Congress. Also providing testimony were
noted experts on the current situation in Laos such as T. Kumar
from Amnesty International and Colonel Wangyee Vang, National
President of the Lao Veterans of America.
III. Opposition by the Lao Veterans of America and the Vast Majority of
Lao and Hmong-Americans to the Granting of NTR Trade Status to the Lao
Regime
Mr. Chairman, undoubtedly in our view, and in the
sentiments firmly held by the vast majority of Lao and Hmong-
Americans, it would be premature and unconscionable for the
U.S. Congress to provide the LPDR regime in Laos with Normal
Trade Relations (NTR) at this time. Although highly coveted by
the Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party (LPRP)--particularly its
coercive state organs of control, including its military and
security forces, whose morbid Stalinist institutions would be
transfused with fresh supplies of foreign investment capital--
such a move by Congress to grant NTR status to Laos would
clearly not be in the interest of either the people of Laos or
the United States in the current dispensation. We base our
staunch opposition to granting NTR to the Lao government on the
significant body of information regarding the ongoing rogue
conduct of the LPDR regime, which includes, but is not limited
to, the following points listed below.
IV. Overview of the Regime in Laos--The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic
(LPDR)--A Threat to Civil Society in Communities in South East Asia,
the United States and the Internationally.
The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR) is a one-party
communist state ruled by the Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party
(LPRP). The LPRP exercises absolute control over the State and
its institutions. It is intolerant of political diversity and
the existence of political and religious groups or
organizations with differing viewpoints. The communist party
enjoys a monopoly on power at all levels of society in Laos.
All other political parties outlawed. Military and security
forces consume a disproportionately large amount of the State's
annual budget and are tasked with crushing all forms of free
thought that might emerge to challenge the policies or power of
the State or its leadership--including political, religious,
social and economic thought. The LPDR retains close working
relationships on security and other maters with rogue, or
Stalinist regimes in North Korea and Cuba. For example, in
1995, the government of Laos took a delivery of 20 busts of its
communist Party founder, Kaysone Phomvihane from North Korea--
whose sculptors produced similar busts of the former Korean
Dictator Kim IL-Sung. Currently, these busts are being placed
in newly constructed memorial squares in all of the provincial
capitals of Laos as well as other LPDR designated locations
throughout the country. It is, therefore, no surprise that the
LPDR remains one of the most corrupt, repressive and backward
nations in Southeast Asia and, indeed, the world. In the last
decade, the LPDR and its leadership have become more obsessed
with absolute control of the State, and have heighten coercive
efforts against political, ethnic and religious dissidents and
opposition groups in Laos, especially after the Berlin Wall was
brought down and the economic and political collapse of its
chief patron--the former Soviet Union.
LPDR military and security forces engage in ethnic and
political cleansing of dissident and minority elements who
challenge the LPRP's policies or leadership. Dissidents or
members of suspect ethnic minorities are often jailed or
executed extrajudicially--many simply disappear. Independent
human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Asia
Watch are barred from Laos by the government. Foreign
journalists are assigned ``minders'' by the LPDR security
services to monitor their movements and activities. Frequent
reports by Lao and Hmong families living in the United States
or abroad regarding allegations of the persecution or killings
of their relatives still residing in Laos by the regime are
sometimes difficult to confirm independently because of these
restrictions and the often secretive nature of the LPDR regime.
V. Ongoing Ethnic Cleansing Operations by the LPDR Regime Against the
Hmong and Other Minority Groups in Laos.
There are numerous and ongoing large-scale and small-unit
ethnic cleansing operations being conducted by the LPDR
military and security forces against Hmong, Khmu, Mien and
other minority enclaves in Laos. Accurate numbers as to the
casualties killed and wounded in Laos by the government remain
elusive due to the closed nature of the LPDR regime as well as
the remoteness of the regions and the primitive conditions that
exist in many parts of Laos. In the 1990s, however,
conservative estimates place the number of minority people
killed annually in Laos by the government in these operations
at several thousand. Numbers were far higher on an annual basis
in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s following the
collapse of the Royal Lao government and the takeover by the
communists in 1975. In the 1980s, large-scale operations by
Vietnamese military forces in Laos, in coordination with LPDR
security forces, probably accounted for the deaths of tens of
thousands of Hmong and other minority peoples on an annual
basis. Moreover, tens of thousands of Hmong and Lao people also
fled the country as refugees across the Mekong River to
Thailand during these years.
Mr. Chairman, currently military operations are being
conducted by the LPDR in northern Xieng Khouang Province, Laos,
against some 8,000 Hmong people that are largely surrounded in
two major defensive pockets. International Relations Committee
Chairman Benjamin Gilman raised serious concerns about this
issue with Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of Thailand in August
of this year after his staff conducted research interviews with
Hmong leaders and representatives from this area. Thai
officials and key leaders in the United States Congress remain
concerned about the possible need to provide humanitarian
assistance for a potential refugee influx that the ongoing LPDR
ethnic cleansing operations might generate.
In Southern Xieng Khouang Province (including what the LPDR
established as the ``Xiasomboun Special Zone''), Bolikhamsai
Province and Khammuan Province, Laos, some 1500 Hmong are being
hunted by special LPDR ethnic cleansing units tasked with
exterminating them.
In the Southern panhandle of Laos, hundreds of Khmu people
who oppose the LPDR's policies are subjected to military
attacks by the regime that have claimed the lives of hundreds
of people over the last several years. Many have begun to take
up arms against the government or flee to the jungle in self-
defense.
Mr. Chairman, currently, in 1999, it is estimated that at
least 12,000 minority people are currently in imminent danger
of extermination in Laos by LPDR ethnic cleansing units. The
Hmong people continue to be singled out for attack by the LPDR
which still often mistrusts them, given their role in support
of anti-communist efforts with U.S. clandestine and military
forces during the Vietnam War. The main targets of ethnic
cleansing by the LPDR regime are almost exclusively civilians
living in villages in various remote areas of Laos--where
people wish to live in freedom, and resistance and opposition
forces continue to seek safe-haven from the regime. Current,
LPDR tactics do not seek to discriminate between civilian and
resistance targets. Suspect or unspecified ethnic minority
groups in their traditional rural or mountain homelands are
attacked by military and security forces with the apparent
intent to kill all of the inhabitants. Entire villages are
attacked indiscriminately with seemingly no regard for civilian
lives--especially those of women and children who, if they
survive the initial attack, are often raped, mutilated or
summarily executed. For such operations, the LPDR routinely
deploys for airborne support its older, but still quite lethal,
Soviet-built MI-6 and MI-8 ``HIP-E'' attack helicopters--in
tactical combat formations of four to six helicopters--
sometimes equipped with 57 mm rocket pods, machine guns and
cluster munitions. It is also worthy to note that the LPDR is
deploying, in larger numbers, ethnic battalions of communist or
conscripted Hmong and other minorities against people of their
own ethnicity in an effort to obtain better intelligence as
well as divide and conquer these groups. Currently, one
battalion each of communist or conscripted Hmong are reportedly
deployed in Xieng Khouang and Khammuan provinces respectively
to assist LPDR ethnic cleansing units with their operations.
LPDR troops often suffer from severe discipline problems
and low morale due to conscription and lack of pay for months
on end. These problems have been exacerbated in recent years
with the economic crisis in Laos. Consequently, LPDR troops are
frequently known to loot, plunder and rape in many of the areas
where they operate. The military and security forces are thus
viewed with ever increasing suspicion, contempt and hostility
by many Lao people. Underground political and armed opposition
groups continue to develop and grow in such an environment.
Astonishingly, the LPDR regime apparently continues to
aggressively desire military support and senior-level advice
from Vietnam for its military operations against the Hmong
people in Xieng Khouang Province. On May 31, 1998, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that the Voice of
Vietnam in Hanoi had announced the crash in Xieng Khouang
Province, Laos, of a very senior delegation of Vietnamese
military officials, on May 25, headed by Lt. General Dao Trong
Lich who was the Deputy Minister of National Defense as well as
the Chief of Staff of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) and a
member of the Central Committee of the communist Party. Twelve
(12) additional senior Vietnamese military officials died in
the crash including a number of top Generals commanding various
military regions in Vietnam, the Chief of the Vietnam Military
Attache Office in the LPDR, Colonel Le Van Han, as well as
Colonel Hoang Binh Quan, Deputy Commander of the Border Defense
Forces. It is important to note that Hmong resistance units
operating in defense of their people in Xieng Khouang Province
reported shooting down this aircraft in Laos with small arms
fire from AK-47s, after the aircraft had circled in an apparent
reconnaissance effort following a major LPDR offensive against
the Hmong. Lowland Lao and Lao minority groups opposed to the
LPDR, including many Hmong, also report the regime's ongoing
reliance on Vietnamese advisors, troops and weapons.
Mr. Chairman, it is also important to note that there
continues to be numerous credible eye-witness reports of the
use of various types of chemical agents by the LPDR against
crops, livestock and civilians in Laos, particularly in
mountainous areas inhabited by the Hmong and other minorities.
These reports detail the use of chemical defoliants against
food crops cultivated by rural people living outside the
control of the government. They also discuss lethal and non-
lethal gases delivered either by aircraft, or in some cases
mortar or artillery shells. Various reports from reliable
sources also describe toxic chemicals used by LPDR special
operations units to contaminate and poison the water supply in
wells and upstream in creeks that run through Hmong and
minority villages--in areas that are not under the military
control of the LPDR regime.
VI. Ongoing Religious Persecution by the LPDR Regime.
Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, freedom of religion does not
exist in the LPDR. Thousands of Lao Buddhists and Christians
have been arrested and jailed since the regime took power
simply because of their religious convictions. Arrests have
intensified in 1998 and 1999. Amnesty International reports
that at least forty-five (45) prisoners of conscience were
arrested in 1998 for the practice of their religious beliefs.
Amnesty documents that at least forty-four (44) people were
arrested in January, including thirty-nine (39) Lao, three (3)
American citizens as well as one (1) French and one (1) Thai
national. This occurred at a Bible study meeting in the house
of Sy Yilatchai in the capital of Laos, Vientiane, organized by
the Church of Christ.
Amnesty International further reports that Father Tito
Banchong Thopayong, a Catholic Priest, was arrested by Lao
authorities in Bokeo province. The reported official reason by
the LPDR for his arrest, according to Amnesty, was the teaching
of religion without permission. He had been the assistant
parish priest at the Catholic Cathedral in Vientiane and was
also reportedly arrested and imprisoned for several years
during the 1980s for his religious activities.
Mr. Chairman, in recent years the LPDR in cooperation with
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has undertaken a major
new campaign to eradicate Christianity among the Hmong and
other hill tribes in Laos and Vietnam. Anti-Christian
literature is being circulated by LPRP cadres and LPDR
officials. Regime crackdowns are in full swing. The Hmong, long
marginalized, discriminated against, and targeted for ethnic
cleansing by the communists, are responding to the message of
hope and charity that they receive from Christian missionaries
and overseas Christian radio broadcasts. Tens of thousands are
converting to Christianity in Laos and Vietnam in defiance to
the government. However, they will continue to pay a high price
for their faith as thousands are now being rounded up for
arrest, interrogation, imprisonment, torture--and worse. Time
Magazine's most recent edition (Asia Edition, Sept. 13, 1999)
offers a disturbing picture of the terrible new plight
potentially facing so many Hmong people and other minority
Christians in Vietnam in an article entitled ``God vs. the
Cadres.''
Mr. Chairman, the LPDR continues to harass and oppress the
faithful who do not register with the government or who meet in
private to worship so as to avoid government scrutiny. The
State Department's first report of global religious liberty,
issued just this week by Robert Seiple, former President of
Eastern College and Ambassador at large for international
religious freedom, cites the fact that Buddhist Monks in Laos
are required to undergo mandatory Marxist-Leninist training.
Indeed, the LPDR maintains a tight grip on all Buddhist temples
and monitors closely the activities of Buddhist monks
throughout the country. The Buddhist clergy and faithful are
strictly prohibited from speaking out against the LPDR regime
or government policies, no matter how unjust.
VII. Ongoing Persecution of Political Dissidents by the LPDR Regime.
Mr. Chairman, the ongoing persecution of political
dissidents in Laos by the LPDR is a major problem documented in
part by Amnesty International and others. Recent interviews
with ethnic lowland Lao political dissidents as well as
intellectuals and minority dissidents confirm the continued
violent intolerance of the regime toward free thought, dissent
and political pluralism. Intellectuals and political dissidents
who advocate even basic changes toward democracy or political
power sharing are, if the do not disappear or are not executed
extrajudicially at the hands of security forces, simply
imprisoned for lengthy periods of time under the harshest of
conditions. Prominent cases publicized by Amnesty
International, such as that of the three Lao prisoners of
conscience held in Prison Camp 7 in a remote area of Houa Phanh
Province, are clearly symbolic. They represent the mere tip of
the iceberg in terms of political dissidents and prisoners of
conscience held for long periods in the Lao gulag system.
VIII. Accountability for the Disappearance of American Citizens in Laos
and Prominent Hmong and Lao Refugees Repatriated to the LPDR.
On April 19, 1999, two U.S. citizens of Hmong-American
descent, Mr. Houa Ly and Mr. Michael Vang, were abducted by Lao
security forces while traveling to Laos near the Thai/Lao
border on the Mekong River near Chiang Khong. American
eyewitness survivors of the abduction, non-governmental sources
investigating the incident, as well as Thai military and
intelligence officials, have confirmed that the two Americans
were indeed abducted by the LPDR authorities. Both men have not
been heard from since, despite a two-page Congressional letter
drafted by Congressman Mark Green and signed by five Members of
Congress. Signatories to the May 19, 1999, letter to Secretary
of State Madeline Albright included International Relations
Committee Chairman Ben Gilman as well as Human Rights
Subcommittee Chairman Chris Smith. It requested immediate
action to assist in recovering the two men if their are alive--
or alternatively if they are dead for their bodies to be
returned. Congressman George Radonovich likewise initiated a
major investigation into the case and developed efforts to seek
to recover the two missing Americans or their remains. Thai
military and intelligence sources, responding to Rep.
Radanovich's investigation efforts, have stated that the two
Hmong-Americans were likely tortured under interrogation and
summarily executed by LPDR security forces.
Mr. Chairman, in the face of an overwhelming body of
evidence, the LPDR regimes flatly denies abducting the two
Americans and has recently accused the Voice of America (VOA)
Lao Service of slandering it for reporting about the case.
Surviving family members of the victims, including their
spouses and children, continue to press the U.S. Congress to
obtain more concrete answers from the LPDR. Forthcoming
legislation is expected from a bipartisan group of Congressmen
and Senators regarding the case.
Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time prominent Hmong
have disappeared in Laos. Hmong leader Vue Mai and many others
repatriated from refugee camps in Thailand have likewise
disappeared without a trace in Laos in recent years.
Independent journalists, including Marc Kaufman of the
Philadelphia Inquirer, and numerous Congressional research
missions have confirmed the LPDR's apparent role in the
mistreatment, disappearance and killings of Hmong and Lao
refugees in the Laos.
IX. Ongoing LPDR Silence on the Fate of the King and Queen of Laos and
Members of the Royal Family
Mr. Chairman, the beloved King and Queen of Laos were part
of the ancient and proud traditions of the Kingdom of Laos--the
Kingdom of A Million Elephants. Like the King and Queen of
Thailand, the Royal Family are still held in the highest
respect by so many people. His Royal Majesty King Savang
Vatthana and Her Royal Majesty Queen Khamponi, as well as key
Members of the Royal Family, disappeared in the Lao gulag
system soon after the communist's seized power. To this day,
despite the outpouring of national emotion and reconciliation
in Russia regarding the murder of the last Czar and his family
by the Soviets, and appeals by many in the Lao Diaspora, the
LPDR has refused to come to terms with its past and the fate of
the Royal family. Not even the location, time or means of the
assumed deaths of Royal Family members are known.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Congress should not consider
granting MFN to the LPDR regime until it provides truthful and
complete information about the fate of the Royal Family and
provides to the people of Laos the final remains of the King
and Queen.
X. LPDR State Sponsored Drug Production and Trafficking
Mr. Chairman, it is critical to note that the LPDR remains
one of the world's largest producers of opium. Traditionally
cultivated by the Hmong and other highland peoples of Southeast
Asia, the LPDR military and security forces now oversee and
control the production and trafficking of narcotics in Laos.
Senior LPDR military and security officials have developed more
extensive and sophisticated networks of narcotics smuggling and
distribution through Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, China and
Burma. They have successfully worked to establish and expand
international narcotics trafficking networks in the United
States and abroad--with growing influence in the Lao Diaspora
community in California, Minnesota and elsewhere. The threat to
civil society in communities throughout Laos, Vietnam and the
United States as a result of LPDR narcotics trafficking is
growing. Associated social ills, including the corruption of
public officials and government employees, increased crime,
child prostitution, AIDS/HIV transmission and the corrosive
activities of organized criminal syndicates appear to be
rapidly following on the footsteps of these developments in
many communities in Southeast Asia and internationally.
XI. Systemic Corruption in the LPDR, Disregard for the Rule of Law as
well as Economic Mismanagement, are a Threat to U.S. Taxpayers and
American Investment.
Mr. Chairman, numerous small and medium-sized investors and
companies have been scammed or their investments and assets in
the LPDR confiscated or stolen by Lao authorities. Indeed, the
LPDR has consistently demonstrated contempt for the rule of
law--both domestically and internationally. It suffers both
from the lack of the existence of the rule of law in terms of
the day-to-day functioning of the State as well as simple
respect for it. There is no independent judiciary. Judges and
courts are notorious instruments of the LPRP and the LPDR--
including the private financial interests of various officials.
Often, they are hopelessly corrupted with threats of coercive
action, bribes and kickbacks from LPRP and LPDR officials. The
remnants of civil society in Laos is now run largely by
organized criminal elements--individuals and families--
operating under the guise of communist party officialdom.
Systemic political and economic corruption are still grossly
exacerbated in Laos by its leadership's control of the command
economy and natural resources.
The current situation in Laos in terms of the legal
environment for business as well as the economic and political
situation represent a significant risk to the U.S. taxpayers
and investors in the LPDR. Moreover, in the past year, with the
ongoing effects of corruption and economic mismanagement in the
economy, as well as the lingering problems caused by the Asian
economic downturn which originated in Thailand, the LPDR's
currency, the Kip, has plummeted to record lows against the
U.S. dollar and the Thai Baht, as well as other international
currencies. The currency used in Laos is no longer the official
currency, but is now largely the Baht and the U.S. dollar. Kip
bank notes officially issued by the LPDR are viewed by the Lao
people with increasing suspicion and now trade at between 8,000
and 9,000 to the U.S. dollar. Consumer prices have doubled
since 1997 in Laos. Major infrastructure and development
projects, including large bridge and railroad projects across
the Mekong River supported by international investors, have
apparently been put on hold in Laos.
On August 12, 1999, the Bangkok Post ran a major piece
regarding the dramatic reshuffling of key LPDR officials in
charge of economic and financial affairs. The piece provided a
shocking analysis of the deplorable economic situation in Laos
that both experts and diplomats say show the country is in deep
trouble with increasing pressure on General Sisavath
Keobounphanh, the Prime Minister, to pull Laos out of its
current crisis. Notably, General Sisavath has articulated his
efforts at concentrating on curbing imports to Laos in order to
save the countries depleted foreign reserves. At this time, it
would appear that extending NTR trade status to the LPDR would
likely be a one-way street in terms of trade with America. The
LPDR would export to the United States with very little likely
being purchased by Laos from America.
Mr. Chairman, extending NTR trade relations to the LPDR
regime in Laos is clearly premature for so many compelling
reasons. I would urge the Trade Subcommittee to reject the
granting of NTR to the LPDR regime in 1999, and for the
duration of the 106th Congress. Economic and political reforms
are badly needed in Laos; it would behoove the U.S. Congress to
continue to request and expect such changes, particularly on
behalf of the Hmong and the other suffering peoples of Laos,
prior to its granting Laos NTR trade status.
Thank You.
Lao Veterans of America, Inc.
Fresno, CA 93727
September 7, 1999
Congressman Philip M. Crane, Chairman
Ways and Means Subcommittee On Trade
233 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-1308
Dear Congressman Crane:
I am writing this letter to you and your committee regarding our
continued strong objections to the extension of permanent normal trade
relations to the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos). The Lao
Veterans of America, 55,000 strong including 11,000 plus Hmong and
Ethnic Lao veterans wives, widows and children have in the past,
furnished evidence to the media, to historians, and congress regarding
past persecution of Hmong and ethnic Lao by the Lao Peoples Democratic
Republic (LPDR) after the Vietnam war. I have attached letters of
congressional concern, news articles and other information pertinent to
this subject. New evidence of killings and persecutions come to the
attention of our organization on a regular basis from our membership.
This information consists of cassette tapes smuggled out of Laos and
both verbal and written reports from individuals who have visited Laos
within the past year. These visits confirm that ethnic cleansing by the
LPDR has not stopped. Examples of this ethnic cleansing include
continued use of poison gas, indiscriminate killing of innocent
civilians, disappearances of former soldiers who supported the United
States during the Vietnam war and imprisonment of Christians for
conducting religious services. Of particular concern are reports, from
independent sources, that the LPDR has hired 6 to 8 man teams to
infiltrate Hmong village areas and seed the trails and area with land
mines. These reports discussed deaths and loss of limbs that resulted
from this tactic. We also understand the LPDR sponsors and pays these
teams. Individuals who have witnessed these recent atrocities and know
of these activities as well as the cassette tapes mentioned would be
made available to your committee upon your request.
We believe the current Lao government has not changed nor does it
intend to. The fact that no basic rights exist today in Laos, that Laos
is a well documented exporter of heroin to the United States, and that
the Heritage Foundation still ranks Laos as one of the most repressed
economies of the world add to the above reasons for our objection to
normal trade status with Laos. Laos today still has no human rights
organizations operating in the area where atrocity reports continue.
Ambassador Chamberlin stated in a St. Paul Pioneer Press 1998 interview
that killing still continues and the Lao government is unresponsive. We
therefore believe that the United States government still does not have
the true picture of this ethnic cleansing in remote areas of Laos.
Finally, testimony before human rights congressional committees is
available, as well, for your consideration.
In behalf of all Hmong veterans and their families as well as other
ethnic Lao groups who fought for this government we ask that you
continue to withhold normal trade relations until basic human rights
are restored and monitored in Laos. Only continued pressure on this
dictatorship government will save lives that have not yet been lost.
Rewarding The LPDR with normal trade relations will mean that past
lives, lives given in support of the United States, will have been
sacrificed in vain.
Thank you for your consideration of our comments.
Sincerely,
Wangyee Vang
National President
[Attachments are being retained in the Committee files.]
Statement of Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director, National League
of POW/MIA Families
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee......I welcome this
opportunity to submit a statement on behalf of the Vietnam War
POW/MIA families. The timing is vital, and congressional
attention could be helpful.
The National League of POW/MIA Families supports Normal
Trade Relations with Laos. Our position was formalized by vote
of the families many years ago, conditioned on continued and
increased cooperation by the Lao Government on POW/MIA
accounting issues. Though it was then entitled MFN, rather than
NTR, our support then and now is based on the fact that Lao
Government cooperation to account for missing Americans has
continued to increase and become more effective. Unlike
Vietnam, there is little evidence that the Lao Government has
purposely manipulated the accounting of our relatives for
political and economic gain, but rather responded to a US
concerning with hope of reciprocity. Yes, they expect and
receive compensation for their efforts, just as Vietnam,
Cambodia, China, Russia and other countries from which such
cooperation is requested.
With limited resources and massive obstacles to overcome,
Laos' cooperation to account for missing Americans is making
progress, still much too slowly, but steady and predictable in
terms of answers for the families. Could more be done? Of
course, and we continue to press for greater cooperation,
especially in terms of oral history interviews of current and
former officials who may have direct knowledge, a sensitive
matter for the Lao Government. There is also more than could be
done to locate and provide the limited archival records that
may exist. Vice Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Somsavad
Lengsavad pledged to increase such efforts when we met in May
of this year. Laos' record demonstrates that pledges and
commitments are implemented, albeit slowly, but implementation
occurs and results come.
Throughout the years since the National League of POW/MIA
Families was formed in May 1970, there have been many
difficulties and obstacles. The POW/MIA issue from the Vietnam
War, as compared to other wars, is very different. Not only was
there no timely U. S. access to the battlefields, but the US
faced a national Vietnamese policy of well orchestrated
exploitation of the issue for their political and economic
objectives.
The greatest challenges came during the immediate postwar
period, and they were very tough to overcome. Then, from 1981-
92, the primary US objective with Vietnam was accounting as
fully as possible for America's POW/MIAs, anticipating that
satisfactory resolution could allow the United States and
Vietnam to move toward normal relations after a Cambodia
settlement. During this period significant accountability
occurred.
The Clinton Administration has rhetorically taken the same
public stance regarding highest priority on resolving the POW/
MIA issue, and some objectives are being met. The process of
joint cooperation is bringing some success, especially in Laos,
but POW/MIA accounting from Vietnam has been minimal when
compared to long-established expectations.
The most glaring challenge the League now faces is US
policy that continues to lavishly praise Vietnamese
cooperation, without unilateral actions by Hanoi to account for
Americans. Such actions include repatriation of remains that
cannot be recovered in the field and accounting for last known
alive discrepancy (LKA) cases, linked directly to archival data
which Vietnam continues to withhold.
Today, 2,054 Americans are still missing and unaccounted
for from the Vietnam War, though there are approximately 200
``sets'' of Vietnam War-related remains in varying stages of
the identification process. About half of the 2,054 Americans
were originally carried as POW or MIA; the other half were
original status KIA/BNR, or killed-in-action/body-not-
recovered.
Statistical data surrounding this issue changes constantly,
but one crucial, though seldom mentioned fact is the US must
turn to Vietnam to account for almost 95% of all missing
Americans, regardless of where the loss occurred. In Laos,
where 442 are still missing, over 80% were lost in areas under
Vietnamese control at the time; in Cambodia, the figure is 90%
of the 74 US losses. There are also 8 Americans still
unaccounted for from the Vietnam War whose incidents occurred
in the territorial waters of the PRC.
The League definition of accountability, long ago accepted
officially as well, is the missing man returned alive, or his
identifiable remains or convincing evidence as to why neither
is possible, in which case the individual's name stays on the
list as unaccounted for, but there is little to no expectation
of further information or remains recovery.
Our expectations, based upon official information and other
evidence, have long been realistic. We accept the nature of war
that does not allow answers on all the missing. Knowing the
historical record, understanding the volume of intelligence
data and having witnessed Hanoi's manipulation of the issue for
decades, the League also recognizes approaches that work,
versus those that do not.
In May of this year, a League delegation met with senior
officials in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, urging steps that each
country, especially Vietnam, could take unilaterally to
facilitate answers. We also sought improvements in the
bilateral and multilateral cooperative process, a necessary
element due to Vietnam's control of the areas where most US
losses occurred. The results were encouraging, and we issued a
full report that was given to the families at our 30th Annual
Meeting in June. A copy of our trip report is attached to this
statement. Almost unbelievably, steps since taken by the
administration have served to undercut, rather than reinforce
the need for implementation of pledges and agreements made by
these three governments.
The administration's failure to seriously follow-up
initiatives that could be useful in achieving what they claim
is the highest priority of bilateral relations with Vietnam--
POW/MIA accounting--may relate to their real highest priority--
NTR with Vietnam before the end of this year. It is no secret
that US Ambassador to Vietnam Pete Peterson has been very
actively engaged in lobbying his former colleagues in the House
and Senate on that subject. It is also no secret that the
Clinton Administration has consistently rejected use of any
leverage, political or economic, to achieve POW/MIA and other
humanitarian objectives.
The League's opposition to NTR for Vietnam is not
ideological, but based upon Hanoi's failure thus far to resume
unilateral actions that could account for scores of missing
Americans. Manipulation of this issue has been a consistent
pattern coming from Hanoi--from Vietnam's leadership, not the
Vietnamese people. To objective observers, Hanoi's record over
the years proves our point. There is apparent unwillingness,
however, by most current US officials to recognize and accept
the historical pattern as valid, including Hanoi's failure to
account for the most obvious cases of Americans last known to
be alive.
Official US statements now refer to last known alive cases
as ``down to 43'' from 196, with no reference to the fact that
the remains of less than 50 of these men have been returned and
identified or are believed to be in the identification process.
The others, if dead, should be the easiest to account for by
returning remains, not the hardest, as alleged by Ambassador
Peterson and others in this administration, since they
obviously were not destroyed in an aircraft crash.
Administration officials also consistently ignore a direct
1985 admission by a member of the Vietnamese Politburo to a
White House official that hundreds of remains were being
withheld. Since 1990, Vietnam has failed to renew unilateral
repatriation of stored remains, and, ironically, US policy-
makers seem to accept the Politburo's failure to authorize such
full cooperation as somehow proving that there are no more
available. Why? Presumably because acknowledging that Vietnam
is withholding remains and information, rather than ``fully
cooperating in good faith'' as President Clinton most recently
certified to Congress, is counter to the administration's real
objective--NTR regardless of the cost to achieving POW/MIA and
other humanitarian objectives. We would welcome sufficient
unilateral actions by Vietnam that would allow us to support
NTR for them as we do for Laos.
Despite this reality, the POW/MIA families continue to
support broad-based humanitarian aid to the people of Vietnam,
as we do the Lao and Cambodian peoples. We also support a
rational policy to meet Vietnam's political and economic
objectives--as they meet ours in terms of accounting for
missing Americans--not payment in advance in the naive hope
that Vietnam will respond in good faith.
We continue to support Normal Trade Relations with Laos,
confident that the Lao Government will honor its commitments.
We urge Congress to support this step, while scrutinizing the
same favorable treatment for Vietnam until and unless the
Politburo resumes and increases unilateral actions to account
for America's POW/MIAs.
Thank you.
LEAGUE DELEGATION TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
A delegation of the National League of POW/MIA Families
visited Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from May 11-22. In
Thailand, the Delegation met with US diplomatic officials,
Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) Stony Beach personnel. The visit to
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia reinforced to senior officials in
each country the families' views regarding the status of
efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for
America's POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. Representing all of
the families were Chairman of the Board Jo Anne Shirley and
Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths. Richard T. Childress,
National Security Council (NSC) Director of Asian Affairs from
1981-89, during both Reagan terms, and a Vietnam veteran,
agreed to the unanimous request of the League's Board of
Directors to serve as adviser on this mission.
In each country, the delegation was briefed by US Embassy,
Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel. Prior to departure, the
Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO), JTF-FA and the Central
Identification Laboratory (CILHI) were very helpful in
preparing updates on material that was utilized during the
trip. The logistic support provided by all US Government
organizations/agencies was invaluable, ensuring that the League
Delegation's mission was carried out smoothly.
BACKGROUND
This was the fourth League Delegation since the end of the
Vietnam War in 1975. The first was in 1982, just after it was
apparent that priority would be raised in the Reagan
Administration. From 1983-1993, the League's Executive Director
represented the POW/MIA families on numerous US Government
delegations in which Childress also participated until 1989,
including those led by former Presidential Emissary/Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey, USA-Retired. A
League Delegation in 1994 was comprised of former Chairman of
the Board Sue Scott, Board member Colleen Shine and the
Executive Director, who also participated in 1994 and 1995
missions led by Presidential Emissary Hershel Gober, then, as
now, the Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
A League Delegation in May of 1997 included Board Chairman
Jo Anne Shirley, Board member/returned POW LTC David Gray, Jr.,
USAF-Retired, and the Executive Director. At that time, it was
the Board's view that the League should attempt to send a
delegation every two years to conduct an on-the-scene
assessment of efforts and to ensure that all governments
involved understand the families' views. In January of this
year, the Board made the final decision on the current mission,
and, fortunately, the timing coincided with Childress' travel
on business in the region. He graciously altered his schedule
to hold over in Bangkok awaiting the League delegates' arrival
before all embarked to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
TIMING AND PURPOSE
The League has had both policy and operational concerns for
the past several years. Our concerns stem from the destruction
of POW/MIA criteria in the ``roadmap'' on normalization of
relations with Vietnam, the abolition of the POW/MIA
Interagency Group, the consistently glowing remarks on the
status of the issue from policy officials who are truly
unfamiliar with the issue, the lack of integration of the issue
into US foreign policy, the ``turf battles'' among US
Government agencies and organizations with POW/MIA
responsibilities, senior-level downgrading of accountability
expectations, and the lack of new initiatives to move this
issue toward resolution.
This state of affairs has generated perceptions by
Vietnamese and, to a lesser extent, Lao and Cambodian officials
that the US Government and, by extension, the American public
is satisfied that all that could possibly be done is either
underway or completed. While the families, informed veterans,
some in Congress, and many current and former officials know
this is not true, the perception hampers implementation of what
is stated as a highest priority.
Since President Clinton has repeatedly certified to
Congress that Vietnam is ``fully cooperating in good faith'' to
resolve the issue, or similar such language, it was considered
very important to convey to senior Vietnamese, Lao and
Cambodian leaders the families' views on what we consider full
cooperation, to reinforce the positive aspects of the
government-to-government efforts, and provide our frank
assessment of where improvements are needed. It was also timely
to conduct an assessment due to the Clinton Administration's
publication of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE); the
declassified summary seriously downgraded, even dismissed,
earlier intelligence assessments on which long-standing
accounting expectations have been based. The League Delegation
also sought firsthand knowledge from participants in the joint
accounting process, both US officials and those of Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia.
The Clinton Administration is moving to reach a trade
agreement with Vietnam and grant Normal Trade Relations, or
NTR, (previously Most Favored Nation status) by the end of this
year. Therefore, the Delegation looked closely at the level of
Vietnamese cooperation, as well as that of Laos and Cambodia.
Other priorities included seeking improvements in the
accounting process--the US Government's approach to both joint
activities and unilateral efforts by the governments of
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia--to ensure that all available assets
and resources, including DIA's POW/MIA team, Stony Beach, are
being fully utilized to expedite and increase accounting
results.
In the view of the League, veterans, former and current US
officials, and key Members of Congress, cooperation in ``full
faith'' requires renewed unilateral actions by Vietnam. The
Delegation reinforced this position, as well as the continuing
need for joint field operations, particularly in Laos. Joint
field activities alone cannot achieve the fullest possible
accounting; increased unilateral effort by Vietnam is required,
including effort to locate and return identifiable remains.
Without such effort, ``full faith'' cooperation by that
government is not a sustainable conclusion.
We believe we made progress on all of these issues, but
ultimate success will be dependent upon effective follow-up by
the US Government and a sincere effort by the governments of
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to carry out the welcome commitments
made to us, as outlined in this report. We found some very
dedicated, hard-working military and civilian personnel in JTF-
FA, Stony Beach and on the US Embassy staffs who care deeply
about their mission.
We also found evidence of ``turf wars'' that are hampering
the most effective pursuit of the issue and attitudes among
some that simply reflect the current administration's policy of
pursuing the issue without interfacing with other priorities.
These problems are of concern, and the League is providing
specific recommendations to our government. We believe the
executive branch can solve them and that is our expectation.
Such problems are unnecessary obstacles to a truly effective
effort and waste some of the considerable resources dedicated
to obtaining the fullest possible accounting.
While this and other trips cost the League significant
resources, we believe they are worthwhile, an attitude
expressed to us by officials of all governments. By providing
continuity of objective expectations and a critique by the
families on a regular basis, we can bring new ideas and,
hopefully, revitalization of government-to-government efforts
which we support as the only possible means to receive answers.
THAILAND
In Bangkok, final preparations were made for discussions in
Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. The Delegation met with the US
Ambassador to Thailand, Richard Hechlinger, DIA's Stony Beach
Chief COL K.C. Marshment, USA, and LTC Jeff Smith, USAF, JTF-FA
Detachment 1 Commander. The support and assistance provided by
JTF-FA and Stony Beach immediately prior to departure for Hanoi
are deeply appreciated and were most helpful. Another
significant contribution during the time in Bangkok was the
gracious hospitality of Ambassador Hechlinger in making his
official Guest House available for the League's use, saving the
League funds otherwise necessary for the trip.
VIETNAM
The first meeting was at the US Embassy with US Ambassador
to Vietnam Douglas ``Pete'' Peterson, during which the
Ambassador provided his views on bilateral interests in general
as well as where he feels things currently stand on the issue.
The League Delegation conveyed to the Ambassador the purpose
and approach to be pursued while in Hanoi. This was followed by
a lengthy, very interesting session at JTF-FA Detachment 2,
commanded by LTC Matt Martin, USA. The level of knowledge and
the depth of the briefing on current JTF operations was
helpful, as was the direct interchange between all
participants. The support of MSgt Ron Ward, a skilled
Vietnamese linguist, was greatly appreciated, including an
added requirement to make adjustments to an already full
schedule.
The Delegation would have gained useful insights from a
proposed visit to the site of an ongoing underwater excavation,
but time requirements precluded accepting the invitation. The
need to first meet with appropriate senior officials and lay
out the concerns and initiatives, then discuss in greater
detail and provide suggestions for implementation to
representatives of the Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing
Persons (VNOSMP), allow time for policy-level Vietnamese
consideration, and then a wrap-up meeting with VNOSMP, at which
the League Delegation would hear the consensus response of the
Vietnamese Government, precluded spending an entire day
traveling to and observing a joint field operation.
Meetings were held with three senior Vietnamese officials--
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Dinh Bin, Vice Minister
of National Defense LTG Tran Hanh, and Vice Minister of Public
Security Services (prior Ministry of Interior) Nguyen Khanh
Toan. Each discussion focused on the need to find solutions to
problems that are impeding efforts to achieve the fullest
possible accounting. The Delegation defined that objective,
shared by all involved, as the man returned alive, or his
identifiable remains or convincing evidence as to why neither
is possible. It was clearly noted that archival records, while
of intense interest to many in the US and elsewhere, become
critical to the families only in the absence of the man alive,
his identifiable remains or if such records provide leads that
can determine fate or recover remains.
The League noted that since the trade embargo was ended in
1994 and bilateral relations were normalized in 1995, the
expected increase in accounting results had not occurred. The
League urged further expansion of unilateral efforts to locate
remains, archives and sources of information, including on
cases of Americans missing in Laos and Cambodia. (According to
US officials, unilateral investigative efforts in Laos are
bringing increasingly useful information.)
Five specific areas were raised as warranting attention.
These included the need for renewed unilateral efforts,
provision of archives regarding incidents in Laos and Cambodia,
expanded research to locate additional records on cases in
Vietnam, improved use of assets and resources, and the need to
expedite the step-by-step investigative process to facilitate
more rapid results. Each Vice Minister was asked to support
later, more detailed talks with VNOSMP members.
The Delegation noted a growing sense of impatience and
urgency on the part of family members and American veterans due
to the passage of time and advancing ages of both family
members and sources. The League expressed concern that
opportunities are being missed, since despite increased
military-to-military contacts between the two countries,
dedicated Stony Beach assets have not been fully utilized on
POW/MIA matters. Noting that US Government sensitivity and
reluctance could stem from lack of knowledge regarding history
and the origin of defining the issue as humanitarian, the
League clarified that all US officials with POW/MIA
responsibilities, including Stony Beach personnel, have only
one agenda--the accounting for missing Americans--and expressed
the hope that Vietnam would welcome use of all qualified
personnel, including DIA's Stony Beach, who could help focus
the effort to bring increased results.
Finally, the Delegation expressed appreciation for some
improvements in joint operations since the first excavation in
1985, but noted concerns that the step-by-step approach on case
resolution may be a reflection of process overtaking results.
Following a well-received explanation of historical
negotiations and initiatives by the League's adviser--what
worked and what didn't work--there was clear understanding and
acknowledgment by senior Vietnamese that more can and should be
done. The League expressed confidence that Vietnam could
unilaterally take significant steps to expedite answers.
All of the Ministers stated their government's commitment
to continue cooperating fully with the United States on a
humanitarian basis, separate from other issues, and offered
assurances that Vietnam is doing its best to provide support
and assistance. They rejected any suggestion to the contrary,
but noted that they could and would work harder and encouraged
further dialogue with VNOSMP to discuss initiatives that could
move the process forward.
The Ministers also stated their understanding of the need
to expedite results in view of the advancing years of both
family members and potential sources. They added, however, the
notion that the work is becoming harder since the ``easiest
cases'' had been resolved, leaving both governments with the
``most difficult cases'' still requiring attention. This was a
recurring theme that the League is not yet convinced is
supportable without greater unilateral Vietnamese initiative.
Vice Foreign Minister Bin was very familiar with the status
of the issue. He indicated that all visiting delegations--
congressional and veteran--have commended Vietnam's cooperation
and assistance. He noted that although the Vietnamese people
had suffered tremendous losses, they help with the accounting
effort out of a spirit of cooperation and humanitarian concern.
As anticipated, and reflecting some US Government public
statements, Minister Bin noted that only 43 Last Known Alive
(LKA) cases remain under investigation. However, as the League
indicated in its updated material, relatively few have been
accounted for through return of identifiable remains and only
10 remains now at CILHI are believed to relate to Americans
previously listed as LKA cases. Further, fate determinations,
important as they are, do not resolve the accounting issue.
Vice Minister Hanh (MND) was equally well versed and voiced
many of the same points, as did Vice Minister Toan. Both
characterized the decrease in remains repatriated as
``realistic'' since the easy cases had long ago been solved, a
consistent theme. Minister Hanh noted that there are increasing
problems as the VNOSMP seeks cooperation of local citizens,
citing the extent of effort made to investigate the Phou Pha
Thi (Lima Site 85) incident and that a primary witness to that
incident, now 75 years old, is unwilling to participate
further. Despite these realities, Vice Minister Hanh welcomed
the list of problem areas that the League believes should be
central and pledged to work with the US to address them.
The initial working session with the VNOSMP, chaired by Mr.
Nguyen Ba Hung, Deputy Director of North American Affairs,
focused in greater detail on the key areas raised to the Vice
Ministers. After first explaining that the League's primary
purpose was to seek solutions, not cast aspersions or place
blame, greater detail was provided regarding the areas that
need attention, and League suggestions on specific initiatives
to be discussed.
In exploring the area of archival research, the League
pointed out examples: Politburo records, service level
intelligence documents, and documents such as the Group 559
Summary of incidents along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, that raise
logical questions, rather than bring answers. Indicating our
view that the archival effort is incomplete and requires
further effort, the League suggested various approaches for
consideration. It was apparent from the reaction of long-
standing VNOSMP members that official US explanations to the
League and the public since 1992 have been inadequate in
describing efforts that took place in the early 1990s; the US
Government needs to ensure that the families are fully
informed.
The VNOSMP Chairman indicated that archival research was
allowed precisely because the SRV understands that documents
are crucial when remains are not available. A senior VNOSMP
official provided details about the nature of efforts by the
joint Archival Research Team (ART) from 1992-95, a thorough
description that was helpful, informative and appreciated. Many
of the details provided by the Vietnamese were unknown to the
League Delegation, thus the families. The League has requested
a full rundown on the ART effort from 1992-95. (Poor
communication by the US Government can be directly attributed
to the Clinton Administration's decision to terminate the POW/
MIA Interagency Group in which the League Executive Director
participated as a full member from its formation in 1980 until
terminated in 1993.)
The League raised a serious concern that films turned over
to German television producers for commercial purposes had not
been fully reviewed by the US. The Vietnamese acknowledged the
potential problem and said that these and all other films will
now be jointly screened before release.
On the subject of further efforts on archival research to
help resolve incidents that occurred in areas of Laos and
Cambodia where Vietnamese forces operated during the war, the
League proposed consideration of four-party discussions between
officials of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and the United States.
Noting first that any such multilateral conference would
require structure and an agenda agreed upon by all parties on
an equal basis, the League suggested that the initial topic
should be archival research and noted our intention to raise
the concept during upcoming discussions in Laos and Cambodia.
VNOSMP's reaction was positive, but their apparent first
priority was to focus on resolving difficulties that arise in
dealing with the border cases.
The first session with VNOSMP ended by their noting that
although a great deal of work had been done, as evidenced by
the lengthy description of actions by the ART, Vietnam has
continued archival research and turned over additional
documents since the ART's work had ended. The VNOSMP Chairman
pledged to continue the effort, both unilaterally and jointly,
and to revitalize the previous ART effort, offering to
coordinate a specific plan with JTF Detachment 2.
VNOSMP also appealed for more US continuity by extending
the tour of the JTF Detachment Commander from one to two years.
Further, they stated that the current pace of Joint Field
Activities (JFAs) interferes with unilateral efforts that they
wish to accomplish, noting that the previous schedule of 30-day
breaks between JFAs no longer applies. The VNOSMP suggested
efforts need to be made to decrease unnecessary field work to
allow more time for periods devoted exclusively to unilateral
work. They specifically stated that they want to do more
unilaterally and asked that this message to be brought back.
At the wrap-up meeting the following day, the official
Vietnamese Government position on the five points raised by the
League was provided, initially in an oral presentation and
formalized in writing, dated Hanoi, 14 May 1999, in a document
entitled ``REGARDING THE 5 AREAS OF CONCERN AND PROPOSALS OF
THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF US MIA FAMILIES.''
In addressing the five specific areas raised by the League,
VNOSMP expressed appreciation for the suggestions that they
view as a ``reflection of the concern and great responsibility
of the League's leadership.'' VNOSMP went on to state that the
suggestions would ``enable the VNOSMP and the US agency seeking
missing Americans, our direct contact of which is the MIA
office in Hanoi, to seriously research and examine the
process'' of efforts to account for Americans still missing
from the war. League areas of concern are provided below in
bold type, followed by the official Vietnamese response and
League comments.
Unilateral repatriation of remains essentially halted in
1990. The League wishes to explore ways to reenergize these
efforts and has developed some ideas. We look forward to
discussing them, to include the repatriation of remains and
remains fragments, and soliciting Vietnamese ideas as well.
While joint operations have improved in very positive ways
since the first excavation in 1985, the League has concerns
that the incremental, step by step approach in research is a
reflection of process overtaking results. We are convinced that
Vietnam can take significant steps unilaterally to identify
site locations for more immediate excavation, bypassing some of
the ponderous incremental investigative steps now being
conducted bilaterally.
SRV On Unilateral Vietnamese Efforts: ``VNOSMP completely
agrees with the League's proposal that in the unilateral
process, Vietnam's specialists will be proactive in developing
investigation requirements provided by the US, with the
objective of attaining the best results.'' The VNOSMP also
pledged to ``increase unilateral activities such as
investigations, recovery of remains which citizens voluntarily
provide, site surveys, archival documents relating to US
personnel missing from the war, searching for witnesses, etc.
In this process, VNOSMP will consider as a priority the task of
finding the fullest possible answers to discrepancy and last
known alive cases, paying attention to the cases that the
League is concerned about in the `Blue Book Document' handed
over to the VNOSMP in 1994, updated in the `Black Book
Document' handed over to the VNOSMP during the League
Chairman's and Executive Director's visit to Vietnam from 12 to
14 May 1999.''
Comment: The League has long maintained that renewed and
increased unilateral efforts by Vietnam are needed. A
``proactive'' Vietnamese effort, if seriously implemented,
would expedite concrete accounting results and bring greater
efficiency to the joint field operations; however, as can be
noted, there is still too much emphasis on leads provided by
the US.
SRV on Recovering and Repatriation of Remains--``The VNOSMP
will continue to increase encouraging Vietnamese citizens to
turn over missing American service member's remains, through
veterans organizations and other societal organizations at the
local area throughout the nation in order to collect
information and remains associated with individual American
service members missing from the war.''
Comment: In the oral presentation, the Vietnamese
acknowledged previous remains recovery and storage in various
locations that were the most accessible and turned over
unilaterally. Hopefully, this new commitment will bring forward
those remains not yet repatriated. Since 1986, the Government
of Vietnam has made occasional public announcements urging
citizens to cooperate in searching for American remains and has
published official directives through People's Army of Vietnam
and Communist Party channels. This current commitment, in
response to the League's suggestions, extends to a broader
audience and provides a logical vehicle for expanded unilateral
efforts that can bring forward increased accounting results.
The Vietnamese also noted their efforts to block remains
trading which they try to balance with encouraging the
voluntary turnover of remains by citizens.
85-90% of losses in Laos and Cambodia were in areas under
PAVN control. The League has made requests to Vietnamese
officials on numerous occasions to provide such records.
Officials from Laos and Cambodia, as well as US officials, have
made similar requests for many years with no response. The
League has developed ideas concerning this problem which we
look forward to discussing, and we are also eager to solicit
Vietnam's solutions.
On Trilateral Cooperation/Four-Party Conference--``The
VNOSMP pledges to continue active cooperation with Laos and
Cambodia in resolving the cases along the Vietnam-Laos border
as well as the Vietnamese-Cambodian border; agree with the
League's idea that holding a trilateral technical meeting
between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with the participation of a
US government representative is crucial to raising
effectiveness and cooperation, since these cases remaining are
the most difficult.''
Comment: Whether ``technical'' or policy level, or a
combination, a Four Party Conference to address specific
concerns will, of necessity, require policy level endorsement
by each government. (The concept for such a conference is
discussed later in this report.) The first ``trilateral''
conference, hosted by Vietnam in 1995, did not include
Cambodia. While some of the border cases are difficult, they
are made more so by Vietnam's failure to date to provide
relevant documents, despite requests from the US, Lao and
Cambodian governments. Vietnamese concerns on border
coordination do not address the archival gap raised by the
League in the context of a Four Party Conference. Vietnam has
identified some sources and made them available for interview,
but not to the extent necessary to increase results that
greater effort could produce.
The archival research effort is incomplete and raises more
questions than answers. The League has developed discussion
topics and ideas that we look forward to exploring with
Vietnamese officials.
SRV on Archival Research: ``The VNOSMP will continue
efforts to find files and documents associated with American
personnel missing from the war, and if found will turn them
over to the US government.''
Comment: Recognizing that there are cases where remains
will not be recoverable, the quality of cooperation on this
important aspect of the accounting effort is crucial and needs
improvement. Lao and Cambodian officials recognize that success
in the accounting effort in their two countries depends in
large measure upon obtaining relevant files and access to
firsthand sources of information who served in the areas where
incidents occurred. While some progress has been made in this
area, the vast majority of files and documents thus far
received pertain to returned POWs, not Americans still missing.
Diplomatic relations has been restored and military to
military contacts are developing. These are positive steps, but
exchanges in the context of resolving the POW/MIA issue have
not been fully utilized. Much of the reluctance on the US side,
mistakenly in the League's opinion, relates to misunderstanding
the origin of defining this issue as humanitarian and not being
aware of past history. The League has some ideas on this
subject that we wish to discuss, and solicit Vietnamese ideas
on this as well.
SRV on Full Utilization of Resources: ``The component of US
MIA teams operating in Vietnam which the US sends to Vietnam
must have the aim and objective of searching for missing
American service members only, absolutely no other work, and
must follow every rule and law of Vietnam.''
Comment: In their oral presentation, the Vietnamese stated
that the integration of teams was no problem as long as team
members only do ``MIA work,'' a welcome statement. This subject
was raised due to some US Government reluctance to allow
trained collectors in Stony Beach to participate on teams
conducting in-country investigations. Since 1992, the members
of DIA's Stony Beach team have rarely participated, thus
squandering the experience, language and training to maximize
time spent on and the quality of field investigations and
surveys.
Vietnam's agreement (and later agreement by the Lao
Government) to permit personnel sent by the US Government, so
long as their mission is limited strictly to POW/MIA matters,
clears the way for renewed Stony Beach involvement. The
Cambodian Government has allowed the US to use whatever
resources it deems appropriate to pursue answers on America's
POW/MIAs and has cooperated closely with DIA's Stony Beach
team. Hopefully, there will be no further excuses from the US
Government for not using all available assets to achieve the
fullest possible accounting.
Assessment: Vietnam's specific commitments are welcome, as
was the frank, open dialogue. Implementation and results will
be the key to gauging their seriousness since countless
promises have been made and broken in the past. Implementation
of these pledges should be closely monitored by the US
Government and Congress and will be closely watched by the
League. Results must be reported accurately by all involved to
the families and the American people. The League hopes to
report later that the commitments are being carried out and
greater results are forthcoming.
Assessment (continued): The Four-Party Conference offers an
opportunity to expand the accounting process into new areas of
cooperation. To succeed, all parties must give careful
consideration to structuring sessions so that they will be
productive for the issue and useful in moving the accounting
effort in a positive direction. This League initiative is
intended to break the endless passing of papers which the
Vietnamese also indicated has little utility. Properly
structured, this initiative can result in real exchanges on
potential solutions and information that increases accounting--
the key measure of success for us.
LAOS
The League Delegation first met with US Ambassador to Laos
Wendy Chamberlin to get an update on her views regarding the
broader spectrum of US-Lao relations; she assessed the level of
POW/MIA cooperation as increasingly responsive, helpful and
productive. In preparation for subsequent discussions with
senior Lao officials, the Delegation also met with and was
briefed by LTC Bob Gahagin, USA, Commander of JTF-FA Detachment
3, and other members of the JTF and US Embassy staff. These
sessions, including extended time with JTF-FA Detachment 3
personnel, were most helpful and appreciated, as was the
hospitality of Ambassador Chamberlin in accommodating the
League Delegation at her official residence, as she did in
1997. The Ambassador also hosted a dinner in the League
Delegation's honor, inviting Lao guests.
The most senior meeting with the Lao Government was held
with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Somsavad
Lengsavad. The League Delegation met with this key official for
cordial and very constructive discussions. Ambassador
Chamberlin, LTC Gahagin and JTF linguist/specialist Bill
Gadoury accompanied the League representatives. Informal
discussions were also held with H.E. Soubanh Srithirath,
Minister to the President's Office (former Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs), who hosted a private luncheon.
The same general points were raised in each official
meeting, and the Delegation appreciated discussions with LTG Ai
Soulignaseng, Vice Minister of National Defense (MND) and COL
Sisophon Bangonesengdet (known to the League since 1982), MND
Director of the Foreign Relations Department. Detailed talks
were held with Mr. Amphone Phiphacphommachanh, Acting Director
General, Department of European and American Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Lao ADHOC (POW/MIA) Committee.
Mr. Amphone also graciously hosted a dinner for the League
Delegation.
The League expressed appreciation to Deputy Prime Minister
Somsavad for the significant progress achieved through
bilateral cooperation over the years since the first post-war
League delegation in 1982. Improvements in the joint field
operations, initiated in 1985, were recognized, as was the
increased flexibility and positive attitude now evident on the
part of Lao officials. Noting the continuing need for the
process to be studied and improved, the League suggested that
the Lao Government should also continue seeking ways to
expedite results.
Several specific areas were then addressed, including the
increase in Lao unilateral investigations, cited as a very
positive step on which many future efforts depend. Noting that
such efforts are key to identifying relevant archival
materials, obtaining information from current and former Lao
officials with personal knowledge of U.S. losses, and
conducting advance preparation for joint field operations, the
League requested an increase of 2-3 people to the Lao team. Now
numbering only 10 Lao officials, the League suggested that it
is extremely difficult for so few to handle all unilateral Lao
efforts and expressed the hope that the request would receive
serious consideration.
Noting that since the Delegation's arrival in Vientiane a
Lao citizen had brought remains to the US Embassy and turned
them in, the Delegation expressed appreciation for the Lao
Government's assistance in encouraging such humanitarian
actions. A request was made for further announcements to be
made on a regular basis, using channels of communication at
every level.
Another area of concern raised by the League is the need
for Lao language specialists that are often difficult for the
US Government to identify and hire. Recognizing that there had
been sensitivity in the past to using such personnel, the
League expressed the view that due to the passage of years and
long-standing US Government support of continued improvements
in bilateral relations, such sensitivities should no longer
pose any obstacle. The League urged understanding of this
problem by the Lao Government and requested acceptance of
ethnic Lao-Americans to ensure that positions can be filled
with the most qualified personnel. It was pointed out that
assistance by such linguists is critical not only to accomplish
successful joint investigations and excavations, but also to
facilitate the medical treatment of Lao citizens that is
conducted during each joint field activity.
Raising the need to maximize effectiveness during joint
field operations, the League also requested utilization of all
resources, including those with language and collection
qualifications, and consideration of expanding the total number
of US officials from 40 to 50 during the months when conditions
are best. In this context, and recognizing the limited
resources of the Lao Government, the expansion in number was
encouraged due to the backlog of excavations now pending, with
the passage of time decreasing the likelihood of answers.
Noting that the League Delegation had just come from
meetings with senior officials in Hanoi, the key Vietnamese
commitments that relate to Laos were explained, including
Vietnam's agreement to the proposed Four Party Conference to
deal with specific concerns, such as resolution of the border
cases. Also noted was the fact that the League's only interest
is in documents that relate to the POW/MIA issue, both policy
concerning handling of POWs and remains, and information that
could help resolve individual cases. Lao views on the concept
of the Four Party Conference were also requested. LTG Ay
indicated that the Ministry of Defense had held meetings and
seminars to explore ways to help in the accounting effort and
that this is a continuous process. He noted that the terrain in
Vietnam is easier to deal with than in Laos. On documents, LTG
Ay said they need them from Vietnam and hope to obtain more.
Deputy Prime Minister Somsavat provided assurance of the
Lao Government's continuing commitment to do its best to
resolve the issue, noting that such cooperation is not linked
to any other issues. The Minister seemed pleased that the Lao
unilateral team was viewed as productive by the League and the
US Government, a view with which he agreed, and pledged to
intensify such efforts. (In a later working session, the Lao
indicated that they have begun oral history interviews at the
local level, described as a ``bottom-up'' approach.) Somsavad
agreed to consider additional personnel, but added that there
is a limit to the number of Foreign Ministry personnel and that
existing requirements were already heavy, with too few people
to handle them. In response, the League suggested assigning
additional military personnel for this purpose, a suggestion
Minister Somsavad agreed to consider.
The Minister was pleased to see progress from official
efforts to encourage Lao citizens to cooperate by providing
information and remains, and agreed to make further such
announcements on a regular basis, using established channels
throughout the country. He discussed the concept of a meeting
of officials from various levels that he would convene and
allow US Government representatives to lay out their concerns
and ideas--a welcome initiative which needs follow-up by the US
Government.
Minister Somsavad qualified his acceptance of skilled
language specialists by stating that such officials should
focus solely on POW/MIA and adhere to Lao law and customs, but
agreed that the Lao Government was willing to determine
suitability with the US. The request to expand the US team
beyond the 40 per joint field operation was rejected, noting
that the joint field teams have now increased efficiency, even
completing operations ahead of schedule, thus there appeared to
be no need for any expansion at this time.
The Minister endorsed the concept of the Four Party
Conference, noting the Lao Government's previous offer to serve
as host. Concerning archival research and documents, the
Minister acknowledged that Lao records are incomplete, but
indicated that the Lao ADHOC (POW/MIA) Committee could focus on
further archival research in phase two of its efforts, once its
reviews of wartime film at national and provincial levels have
concluded. Minister Somsavad also stated that Vietnamese
records should be relevant and useful, indicating that prior
Lao Government requests had gone unanswered, but would be
renewed.
Assessment: The strategy for discussions with the Lao
Government posed entirely different challenges from those faced
in Vietnam. The decision-making process in Laos on POW/MIA
matters is now focused on His Excellency Somsavad Lengsavad,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, thus
discussions with him came as the final, wrap-up meeting. The
exchanges at every level were cordial, straightforward and
sensitive to the need of the families for answers as rapidly as
possible. Minister Somsavad was open to League proposals and
had the authority to respond, with no requirement for further
consultations.
The League Delegation was pleased with the initiative to
host a Lao officials meeting and with positive responses on the
concept for the Four Party Conference, expanding the Lao
unilateral team, and willingness to accept ethnic Lao American
team members so long as they focus solely on POW/MIA matters
and are sensitive to their surroundings. US Government follow-
up is needed to get additional personnel assigned to Lao
unilateral efforts, to operationalize the Lao officials
meeting, and to structure the Four Party Conference. In view of
existing requirements and anticipated increases, the Lao need
to be more flexible on the number of US personnel allowed in-
country for joint field operations. As is always the case, the
League will be closely monitoring Lao and US Government
implementation.
CAMBODIA
Though there are only 74 Americans still missing and
unaccounted for in Cambodia, this devastated country, by all
known assessments, including the League's, ``fully cooperates
in good faith'' with the US on efforts to account for missing
Americans. Since inception of the cooperative process in 1992,
Cambodian officials have consistently provided outstanding
cooperation, conducting unilateral actions to assist and
support joint field operations in every way requested by the
United States.
Background: Prime Minister Hun Sen, then serving as the
Cambodian Foreign Minister, agreed to the League's 1984 request
to accept the case files of all Americans then missing and
unaccounted for in Cambodia, pledging to do what he could on a
humanitarian basis. (This occurred long before there was
recognition of Cambodia, then still occupied by Vietnam, much
less government-to-government cooperation in the field.) Since
that time, JTF-FA and CILHI have conducted site excavations
whenever and wherever a location was confirmed, often under
very difficult circumstances.
There has also been close cooperation with DIA's Stony
Beach Team in conducting investigations and archival research,
unless interrupted by US Government sensitivity. The tragic
plight of the Cambodian people under the Khmer Rouge regime
from 1975-78, as well as political turbulence since that time,
has complicated efforts to account for Americans still missing
in that country, as has the fact that 90% of the losses in
Cambodia occurred in Vietnamese-controlled areas. Despite these
obstacles, the Cambodian Government has made available senior
historians and other officials, including a very active POW/MIA
Committee, to pursue whatever leads and avenues have been
suggested by the US.
The League appreciates the hospitality afforded by US
Charge d'Affaires Carol Rodley in hosting a reception for the
League Delegation at the Ambassador's Residence (Ambassador Ken
Quinn was out of the country), as well as the support and
information provided by US Defense Attache COL Bill McMillan,
USA, COL K.C. Marshment, USA, Stony Beach Team Chief, and LTC
Jeff Smith, USAF, JTF-FA, and other members of the US Embassy
staff in Phnom Penh. The brief visit to Cambodia was filled
with important and useful meetings, resulting in positive
responses and firm commitments.
Immediately after arrival at the airport in Phnom Penh, the
League Delegation went directly to meet with Prime Minister Hun
Sen at his residence, accompanied by Charge d'Affaires Carol
Rodley and other US officials. The League Delegation first
expressed sincere appreciation for the outstanding support and
cooperation since inception of bilateral cooperation, despite
the multiple tragedies and loss of loved ones that the
Cambodian people have suffered.
The League recognized some of the difficulties found in
working to account for Americans missing in Cambodia,
especially the fact that 90% of the US losses occurred in areas
then under Vietnamese control. Noting the importance of
trilateral cooperation on these border cases, the Prime
Minister was again urged to raise the need for archival
documents and witnesses during future contacts with his
counterpart, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Khai.
In the context of pursuing information and leads on
individual cases, the League presented a partial list of
Vietnamese officials who had served in Cambodia and would
likely be known to current and former Cambodian officials,
requesting that unilateral Cambodian efforts be made to locate
them for interviews. (The list was a duplicate of that provided
to senior Vietnamese officials in the hope that the two
governments would cooperate in locating these individuals.)
Referring to the Prime Minister's previous letter in answer
to the League's January request, the Delegation expressed
appreciation for his pledge to seek information from former
Khmer Rouge officials. Noting that unilateral Cambodian
interviews are more likely to succeed in screening such
individuals for relevant information, the League suggested that
follow-up interviews by the US could then occur, as needed. A
request was made that these efforts proceed as quickly as
possible in view of the advancing age of sources and family
members who long for answers.
Recognizing the need for trilateral and multilateral
cooperation, particularly with archival research, the League
proposed the concept of the Four Party Conference and requested
the Prime Minister's views, noting that the subject had also
been raised in Hanoi and Vientiane.
Finally, the League expressed regret over the lack of a
more active US Government POW/MIA effort in Cambodia over the
last two years, noting the rationale for decreased activity as
being a reflection of political and safety concerns by some,
not decreased interest. The League expressed optimism that an
active program would now resume and gratitude that H.E. Chey
Saphon was still eager to participate, noting his long-standing
relationships with Vietnamese and Lao historians as especially
helpful.
Prime Minister Hun Sen first briefed some present (who did
not know) on the history of cooperation between the League and
Cambodia, stating his commitment to continue doing whatever is
needed to assist and that he considers cooperation on this
issue as a responsibility. He noted that the Cambodian people
have suffered and lost so many family members that they
understand and want to help on a humanitarian basis. He also
expressed sensitivity to the hardship of uncertainty,
mentioning that he had written a song about the subject of
missing loved ones.
On the subject of trilateral cooperation, the Prime
Minister stated that after 1970, the border areas were mostly
under Vietnamese control. He stated that Vietnam also would
have information on cases in Laos, thus the importance of
trilateral cooperation, adding that during that time forces
were traveling back and forth along the border. He noted that
within the week, he would be meeting with the Vietnamese Prime
Minister and would use that opportunity, as he had before, to
personally raise the need for Vietnam's assistance on archival
records and ask him to urge the Vietnamese people to cooperate.
In that same context, Prime Minister Hun Sen stated his
strong support for the Four Party Conference, indicating that
Cambodia would host the first such meeting, after consulting
with Vietnam and Laos. He noted that trilateral meetings had
been held in the past, but not yet the four parties all
together. The Prime Minister stated his intention to assign his
son (1999 graduate of West Point Military Academy) to the
Cambodian POW/MIA Committee. He expressed his hope that his son
might be able to participate in organizing the Four Party
Conference during the summer months before returning to New
York to continue his education, pursuing a graduate degree in
economics.
The Prime Minister agreed with the need for getting access
to former Khmer Rouge officials, noting that some may have
information and pledged to take advantage of opportunities to
obtain answers. He indicated that in the case of highly visible
Khmer Rouge, such as Duch and Ta Mok, their attorneys would
need to be present for interviews, but expressed hope that the
humanitarian mission would allow them to be questioned about US
MIAs. He pledged that they would make every effort to locate
sources of information and expressed appreciation for the list
that the League had provided.
The Prime Minister also stated that LTG Pol Saroeun, head
of the POW/MIA Committee, having persuaded KR defections from
Pailin, has responsibility for the mission and the ability to
get information from the Khmer Rouge immediately as Deputy
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the
Joint Staff. He added LTG Saroeun also is tasked with reforming
the Cambodian military forces, can write orders for them, and
is publicly well known and admired by the Cambodian people.
Comment: The Prime Minister was cordial, expansive and
responded positively to all suggestions and requests. The
importance of gaining Vietnam's cooperation was a theme that
Prime Minister Hun Sen reinforced in several instances. The
League responded that he and other Cambodian officials likely
have unique influence with the Vietnamese leadership that
neither the League nor the US Government possesses. In dealing
with Vietnam and Laos, implementation of the commitments of all
governments involved, including the US, must be closely watched
to ensure follow-through and to measure results. In Cambodia,
commitments are honored and implemented unless the US
Government does not follow through, as has been the case during
the long delay. Hopefully, that situation is now resolved,
implementation can and will occur without further impediment,
and progress will result.
The same key points were raised with HRH Prince Norodom
Ranariddh, President of the National Assembly, who also has a
well-established history of support for the League's efforts.
In addition to expressing appreciation for his personal support
and that of the Cambodian government, the League suggested
introduction of a Joint Resolution of the National Assembly and
the Senate offering full bipartisan support for obtaining the
fullest possible accounting for missing US personnel.
Prince Ranariddh immediately agreed to introduce the
resolution and was confident that there would be no problem
with passage in either the National Assembly or the Senate,
stating his intention to call His Excellency (H.E.) Chea Sim,
President of the Senate. He stated his plan to visit Hanoi the
next week for meetings with the entire leadership, during which
he would raise the need for their full cooperation on the cases
of Americans still unaccounted for in Cambodia.
Comment: As in the past, His Highness was most cordial and
responsive. The discussions made clear that Cambodia's
cooperation on POW/MIAs spans the breadth of all parties in the
newly formed coalition government, assurance that was welcome
to the League Delegation, though anticipated.
H.E. Chea Sim, President of the Senate, was attentive to
the League's concerns, as in prior meetings. He expressed
appreciation for the League's recognition of Cambodia's efforts
to assist and agreed to work with Prince Ranariddh to ensure
that a Joint Resolution is passed in the Senate. He stated his
full confidence in LTG Pol Saroeun and Chey Saphon, historian,
to implement the Four Party Conference, for which he also
stated full support. (Since returning from the trip, H.E. Chea
Sim has already sent a letter to the League stating his strong
support for our ``noble mission'' and readiness of the Royal
Cambodian Government to cooperate closely, plus ``undertake
further steps to address the concerns of POW/MIA families.''
Their Excellencies Sar Kheng and You Hockry, Co-Ministers
of Interior, were gracious in time and attention during the
League Delegation's presentation that covered the same key
points. (The two ministers had met with League Delegations in
the past.) Minister Sar Kheng stated that Cambodia would
continue to cooperate fully, that there were no internal
obstacles since the issue is viewed as humanitarian, and that
implementation has enabled the two countries to build trust.
Since the Ministers indicated that they also plan an imminent
trip to Hanoi, the League Delegation asked them to raise the
need for Vietnam's cooperation with their counterpart,
Vietnamese Minister of Public Security Le Minh Huong, a request
which was met with a positive response.
The League hosted a working lunch with LTG Pol Saroeun,
H.E. Sieng Lapresse, Major General Phoung Siphan, BG Kim Chan
Nee and other members of the Cambodian POW/MIA Committee.
Senior members of the POW/MIA Committee were present at most of
the meetings with the Cambodian Ministers; therefore, informal
discussions over lunch were most helpful. (Since the League
Delegation returned, LTG Saroeun has already initiated contact
to propose hosting the first session of the Four Party
Conference.)
The final meeting in Cambodia was with H.E. Chey Saphon,
the designated historian of the Royal Cambodian Government who
has worked closely with DIA's Stony Beach over the last few
years. The League Delegation expressed appreciation for his
personal dedication to obtaining answers for the families and
for his hospitality in welcoming us to his personal residence.
The Delegation indicated to Chey Saphon full confidence that
his assistance is a key element of trilateral and four-party
cooperation and expressed gratitude for his willingness to
exert efforts on the difficult task of locating relevant
archives and sources of information.
Noting with sadness the loss of his colleague, Lao
historian Sisana Sisane, the League indicated that such
longstanding relationships with officials in Vietnam and Laos
are potentially very useful, but time is short since all are
aging.
Mr. Chey Saphon indicated he is eager to continue his work
with US officials and that he has already begun a renewed
effort. He stated that he had worked closely with counterpart
historians in Laos and Vietnam and was impressed with the scope
of Vietnamese Government archives. He recognized the problem
with passage of time and the need to move as quickly as
possible. Referring to the aging of sources, League Adviser
Richard Childress remarked to Chey Saphon, ``Each time an old
man dies, a library burns,'' a sentiment with which Chey Saphon
agreed.
Assessment: The seriousness of the Royal Cambodian
Government and its POW/MIA Committee, including H.E. Chey
Saphon, stands as an example of full cooperation, yet there is
much more that can be done and, in the League Delegation's
view, will be pursued by responsible Cambodian officials. Undue
caution on the US side was equally evident, especially in light
of the humanitarian nature of the issue as recognized by
Congress and others. The Delegation believes, however, that
adjustments are being made to better utilize all assets and
resources, following establishment of the new Royal Cambodian
Government. These are welcome changes that will continue to be
closely watched by the League, and further delays for less than
valid reasons will be strongly opposed. Now that the political
situation has stabilized, there should be no further excuses
for failing to permit qualified US personnel to visit Cambodia
whenever the need arises.
Statement of Spyder Active Sports, Inc., Boulder, Colorado
Spyder Active Sports, Inc. is a wholesaler of ski clothing.
We are known within the ski industry to produce high quality
apparel to meet the rigorous demands of the ski athlete and
environment.
Spyder currently sources our cotton t-neck manufacturing in
Laos. We plan to continue our sourcing at this factory and are
submitting this statement in support of an extension of
``normal trade relations'' to the Lao People's Democratic
Republic (Laos).
Statement of US-ASEAN Business Council, Inc.
The US-ASEAN Business Council is the premier national
organization in the United States representing private-sector
interests in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
The Council appreciates this opportunity to express its support
of the extension of permanent normal trade relations (NTR) to
the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR).
ECONOMIC TRENDS AND OUTLOOK
In 1986 the Lao PDR adopted the New Economic Mechanism
(NEM). The NEM was an economic reform package transforming
economic activity from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy, decentralizing economic decision making, and
stimulating private sector to take an active role. An economic
system based on market principle was included in the 1991 Lao
PDR constitution. Key market liberalization efforts include:
decontrol of prices and distribution of goods and services,
elimination of subsidies, establishment of a market determined
exchange rate, reform of the tax and tariff system, enactment
of a new Central Bank Law, refinements in money and credit
management and Foreign Investment Law passage. The government
has also restructured administrative authority for economic,
financial and development management--the Ministry of Finance
manages fiscal affairs, and the Committee for Planning and
Cooperation manages development.
The adjustment of the economy over the past ten years of
the NEM has been helped by the many structural and policy
changes, which have had a positive overall impact on the
economy. The government recognizes the need for further
adjustment for economic growth to take place and further
market-based activities to develop. The government expressed
its commitment to further market based development at the
February 1993 annual ordinary session of the National Assembly.
The major macroeconomics components of the government's
strategy are to strive towards a stable macroeconomics
environment consisting of: stabilizing domestic price and
exchange rate, reducing the fiscal deficit, increasing and
mobilizing savings, strengthening financial markets,
strengthening mother and child health care, reducing government
involvement in the private sector, undertaking civil service
reform, and further implementing privatization.
Over the period 1994 to 1996, Lao GDP economic growth rates
averaged over 7 percent. Since mid-1996, however, according to
the 1999 Investment Climate Statement, issued by the United
States Government, ``the pace of reform has slowed considerably
since mid-1996,'' and ``Laos's economic performance, aggravated
by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, has suffered accordingly.''
The GDP growth rate fell to 4 percent in 1998. Growth in 1999
will be dependent on the performance of the agricultural sector
which employs 85 percent of the work force. Some improvement
may come from the European Union's decision to grant GSP status
to Lao garments, but, according to the 1999 Investment Climate
Statement, ``greater growth in this sector is hampered by the
absence of normal trade relations with the United States.''
US-LAO RELATIONS
In recent years, the United States and the Lao PDR have
worked hard to build a mutually beneficial relationship. In
addition to strong cooperation on POW/MIA issues and anti-drug
trafficking exercises, the government of Laos and the US
Government initialed a bilateral investment treaty in 1997. It
has taken major steps to open the country's economy to foreign
trade and investment and made the necessary economic changes
which paved the way for its admission to ASEAN. The Lao PDR
signed an agreement with the US Overseas Private Investment
Corporation in March 1996. In 1998 Laos signed an agreement
with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency that is
awaiting final ratification by the National Assembly.
Accordingly, the Lao PDR seeks normal trading relations
with the United States. Extension of NTR status would enable
Laos to develop its economy in a better fashion and strengthen
the liberalization taking place. Moreover, the granting of NTR
would signal the United States' continuing interest in the
ASEAN group. ASEAN comprises 500 million people, with a $1
trillion GDP, two way trade with the US of over $250 billion in
the year 2000 and designation as the US's third largest
overseas trading partner.
Currently, US-Lao trade is a relatively low level, with
exports to the US in the period Jan-Oct. 1998 at $19 million
(general customs); $15 million (c.i.f.) for the same period;
and imports from the US into Laos, $3 million from Jan.-Oct.
1998 (Source: US Embassy, Vientiane). Granting of NTR status
would support expansion of such trade and would likely
encourage others to take a closer look at ASEAN's newest
member. Since the country is at such a different level of
economic development from the United States, few US industries
would be immediately affected by the move. Conversely, as Laos
becomes more integrated with its regional neighbors, the
country will provide a strong market for US goods. NTR status
for Los will likely also contribute to higher standards of
living for the Lao people. In summary, granting NTR status to
Laos would result in gains for all countries and people
concerned.
The US-ASEAN Business Council fully supports the granting
of NTR status to the Lao PDR and will continue to work on
promoting further normalization of commercial relations between
our two countries.