[WPRT 106-6]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


106th Congress                                                    WMCP:
 1st Session                COMMITTEE PRINT                       106-6
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                               __________

                            WRITTEN COMMENTS

                                 ON THE

 
  EXTENSION OF NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS TO THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC 
                                REPUBLIC



                                     
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

                                     
                            NOVEMBER 4, 1999

  Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means by its staff

                               ------------

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
 60-250 CC                   WASHINGTON : 1999



                      COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

                      BILL ARCHER, Texas, Chairman

PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois            CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
BILL THOMAS, California              FORTNEY PETE STARK, California
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida           ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut        WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania
AMO HOUGHTON, New York               SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
WALLY HERGER, California             BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JIM McCRERY, Louisiana               JIM McDERMOTT, Washington
DAVE CAMP, Michigan                  GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin
JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota               JOHN LEWIS, Georgia
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa                     RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
SAM JOHNSON, Texas                   MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington            WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
MAC COLLINS, Georgia                 JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    XAVIER BECERRA, California
PHILIP S. ENGLISH, Pennsylvania      KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
WES WATKINS, Oklahoma                LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas
J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
KENNY HULSHOF, Missouri
SCOTT McINNIS, Colorado
RON LEWIS, Kentucky
MARK FOLEY, Florida

                     A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff
                  Janice Mays, Minority Chief Counsel

                                 ______

                         Subcommittee on Trade

                  PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois, Chairman

BILL THOMAS, California              SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida           CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
AMO HOUGHTON, New York               RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
DAVE CAMP, Michigan                  MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota               WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington            XAVIER BECERRA, California
WALLY HERGER, California
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa


Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public 
hearing records of the Committee on Ways and Means are also published 
in electronic form. The printed record of written comments remains the 
official version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare 
both printed and electronic versions of the hearing/written comments 
record, the process of converting between various electronic formats 
may introduce unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are 
inherent in the current publication process and should diminish as the 
process is further refined.



                            C O N T E N T S

                               __________

                                                                   Page

Advisory of July 29, 1999, announcing request for written 
  comments on the extension of normal trade relations to the Lao 
  People's Democratic Republic...................................     1

                                 ______

American Legion, John F. Sommer, Jr., letter.....................     3
Andreae, Charles, III, Andreae, Vick & Associates LLC, statement.     4
Green, Hon. Mark, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Wisconsin, statement...........................................     5
Hmong International Human Rights Watch, Chicago, IL, Xiong Chuhu, 
  statement and attachments......................................     6
Illumination Technologies, Inc., East Syracuse, NY, Teng Lee, 
  letter.........................................................     8
JBC International, James B. Clawson, letter......................    11
Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., Eau Claire, WI, Vang Pobzeb, 
  letter and attachments.........................................    12
Lao Veterans of America, Inc.:
    Philip Smith, statement......................................    22
    Wangyee Vang, Fresno, CA, letter and attachments.............    29
National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in 
  Southeast Asia, Ann Mills Griffiths, statement.................    30
Spyder Active Sports, Inc., Boulder, CO, statement...............    42
US-ASEAN Business Council, Inc., statement.......................    43
      

ADVISORY

FROM THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                         CONTACT: (202) 225-6649
July 29, 1999
No. TR-14

                      Crane Announces Request for
                  Written Comments on the Extension of
                     Normal Trade Relations to the
                    Lao People's Democratic Republic

    Congressman Philip M. Crane (R-IL), Chairman, Subcommittee on Trade 
of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced that the 
Subcommittee is requesting written public comments for the record from 
all parties interested in the extension of permanent normal trade 
relations (NTR) to the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos).
      

BACKGROUND:

      
     At present, Laos is listed in general note 3(b) of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule (HTS) among those countries that are denied normal 
tariff treatment. As a result, Lao products are subject to the higher 
tariff rates in column 2 of the HTS, which has the practical effect of 
excluding Lao products from the U.S. market. Legislation is required to 
amend the HTS in order for NTR to be extended to the products of Laos. 
Laos is not subject to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (the 
``Jackson-Vanik amendment'') because it did not become a Communist 
country until after the effective date of that law.
      
     In 1997, the United States concluded a bilateral trade agreement 
providing market access for U.S. goods and services in the Lao market 
and protection of intellectual property rights. In addition, the United 
States reached agreement with Laos in 1997 on a bilateral investment 
treaty, the first to be negotiated with a Southeast Asian country, to 
provide U.S. investors with the right of national treatment.
      
     In 1998, U.S. imports from Laos were valued at $21 million, while 
U.S. exports totaled $3.7 million. Top imports from Laos in 1998 were 
miscellaneous manufactured articles, while leading U.S. exports 
included chemicals, and machinery and transportation equipment.
      

DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS:

      
     Any person or organization wishing to submit a written statement 
for the printed record should submit six (6) single-spaced copies of 
their statement, along with an IBM compatible 3.5-inch diskette in 
WordPerfect 5.1 format, with their name, address, and comments date 
noted on label, by the close of business, Friday, September 10, 1999, 
to A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1102 Longworth House Office Building, 
Washington, D.C. 20515.
      

FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS:

      
     Each statement presented for printing to the Committee by a 
witness, any written statement or exhibit submitted for the printed 
record or any written comments in response to a request for written 
comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any statement or 
exhibit not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed, 
but will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the 
Committee.
      
     1. All statements and any accompanying exhibits for printing must 
be submitted on an IBM compatible 3.5-inch diskette in WordPerfect 5.1 
format, typed in single space and may not exceed a total of 10 pages 
including attachments. Witnesses are advised that the Committee will 
rely on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing 
record.
      
    2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not 
be accepted for printing. Instead, exhibit material should be 
referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material not meeting 
these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for 
review and use by the Committee.
      
    3. A witness appearing at a public hearing, or submitting a 
statement for the record of a public hearing, or submitting written 
comments in response to a published request for comments by the 
Committee, must include on his statement or submission a list of all 
clients, persons, or organizations on whose behalf the witness appears.
      
    4. A supplemental sheet must accompany each statement listing the 
name, company, address, telephone and fax numbers where the witness or 
the designated representative may be reached. This supplemental sheet 
will not be included in the printed record.
      
     The above restrictions and limitations apply only to material 
being submitted for printing. Statements and exhibits or supplementary 
material submitted solely for distribution to the Members, the press, 
and the public during the course of a public hearing may be submitted 
in other forms.
      

    Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on 
the World Wide Web at `HTTP://WWW.HOUSE.GOV/WAYS__MEANS/'.
      

                                


                                        American Legion    
                                       Washington, DC 20006
                                                  September 8, 1999

Honorable Philip M. Crane, Chairman
Subcommittee on Trade
House Committee on Ways and Means
1102 Longworth House Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20515

    Dear Chairman Crane:

    The American Legion opposes the granting of the Jackson-Vanik 
waiver to Laos. We believe that the Lao government is not doing as much 
as it could to seek the resolution of the POW/MIA issue. The 
opportunities offered from Jackson-Vanik to U.S. business should not be 
granted until the Lao government shows notable improvement in their 
assistance with U.S. accounting efforts.
    As with Vietnam, we believe that the United States should not let 
commercial interests take priority over the accounting of our missing 
servicemembers. The Lao will lose the incentive to increase cooperation 
with accounting efforts if they see that the current U.S. 
Administration is dedicated only in words and not in deeds.
    The Pathet Lao have yet to unilaterally provide credible 
information on American POWs last known alive in their control. 
Although U.S. officials, veterans and family organizations have for 
several years urged the Lao government to commence an oral history 
program in order to elicit information that would be helpful in 
resolving cases, questionnaires have just recently been developed and 
distributed. As of now there is no guarantee that any significant 
information will be forthcoming.
    Joint Task Force--Full Accounting is carrying out joint field 
activities in Laos in cooperation with the Lao government, although it 
is being done on a restricted--North to South--basis. The Lao have 
permitted a few exceptions to this, but for the most part hold to the 
restricted pattern of operation. Aside from the joint field activities, 
there is a paucity of unilateral cooperation on the part of the Lao 
government to provide information to resolve cases and repatriate 
remains of missing Americans.
    Unless and until the Lao government is held accountable by the 
Clinton Administration, there is no reason for Vientiane to exert any 
meaningful unilateral cooperation. Until this happens, we cannot 
support the Jackson-Vanik waiver.

            Sincerely,
                                        JOHN F. SOMMER, JR.
                                                 Executive Director
      

                                

Statement of Charles Andreae III

    Having represented clients internationally for 10 years, I 
can appreciate the value of extending Normal Trade Relations in 
an effort to promote free trade. I have seen firsthand the 
positive aspects of granting Normal Trade Relations which help 
to achieve American interests overseas.
    Laos presents new opportunities for many American 
businesses seeking to expand their foothold in Asia. These 
opportunities in the Laotian market will create new jobs in the 
United States, foster closer diplomatic relations, and enable 
Laos to continue down the path of further economic 
liberalization.
    To protect its interests in peace and stability and access 
to markets in Asia, the U.S. must create an environment that 
encourages Laos to integrate into the international system as a 
responsible member. Given population trends in Asia, Laos is 
certain to have an impact on the international system and 
American interests in Asia. For Laos to become a full 
participant in the international system and uphold 
international rules and norms, Laotian leaders must see that 
doing so will best serve Laos' interests. This can be 
accomplished only if Americans interact with, rather than 
isolate, Laos. Establishing Normal Trade Relations provides the 
interaction necessary to bring Laos into greater conformity 
with international rules and norms especially now when the 
Laotian government continues its New Economic Mechanism.
    Furthermore, by granting Normal Trade Relations to Laos, 
the United States is showing a continued commitment to the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a group which 
encompasses 500 million people with a combined $1 trillion 
dollar gross domestic product and a two way trade with the U.S. 
of over $250 billion.
    Normal Trade Relations with Laos would provide a firm 
foundation for a healthy and growing American economy. NTR 
would also help promote a stable and secure world in which 
political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic 
institutions can flourish. These interests allow the U.S. to 
maintain a system of healthy, cooperative, and politically 
vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations and Laos is 
no exception to this rule.
    NTR for Laos will play a fundamental role in advancing 
these enduring American interests in Asia. Most-favored-nation 
treatment is the normal tariff treatment that the United States 
provides to all but a handful of its trading partners. It is a 
principle which undergirds the open international trading 
system that the U.S. has labored for decades to expand. NTR has 
been, in fact, a key ingredient of America's global strategy 
since World War II and the purpose of this strategy has been to 
build a cooperative free-trade environment within which 
America's businesses and economy can prosper.
      

                                

Statement of Hon. Mark Green, a Representative in Congress from the 
State of Wisconsin

    As the Subcommittee on Trade considers this controversial 
issue, I believe it is essential that the committee members be 
aware of a serious situation involving a constituent of mine--
Mr. Houa Ly of Appleton, Wisconsin.
    Nearly five months ago, Mr. Ly disappeared near the Thai-
Lao border. According to eyewitnesses who were traveling with 
Mr. Ly, Lao government authorities are responsible for this 
disappearance.
    These eyewitnesses have shared with me the following 
account of Mr. Ly's disappearance:

          On April 19 of this year, a party of four Hmong-American 
        men--Mr. Houa Ly, Mr. Michael Vang, Mr. Neng Lee and Mr. Hue 
        Vang--were traveling in Thailand near the city of Chiang Khong. 
        The group, having been advised that the nearby Thai-Lao border 
        was open to tourists and the public, crossed the Mekong River 
        into Laos.
          Once across the border, the party split into two groups. Mr. 
        Ly and Mr. M. Vang began speaking to several men, some of whom 
        identified themselves as authorities in the Lao government. Mr. 
        Lee and Mr. H. Vang briefly left the area. When they returned, 
        Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang were missing.
          After a brief search, Mr. Lee and Mr. H. Vang witnessed Mr. 
        Ly and Mr. M. Vang being forced onto a boat by Lao men. The 
        boat, with Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang aboard, sped away on the 
        Mekong River. Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang have not been heard from 
        since.
          On May 4, upon their return to Chiang Mai, Thailand, Mr. Lee 
        and Mr. H. Vang reported this incident to the American 
        Consulate. Two days later, according to Mr. Lee and Mr. H. 
        Vang, an American official from the consulate informed them he 
        had received reports that both men had been imprisoned and that 
        Mr. Ly may have been killed.
          Subsequent independent reports have indicated that the two 
        men are currently imprisoned by Lao government authorities.

    Although the Lao government continues to deny any knowledge 
of Mr. Ly's entry into Laos or his current whereabouts, I 
believe they have not been completely forthcoming with U.S. 
authorities charged with investigating this case.
    At best, the communist Lao government has been less than 
fully cooperative in this situation. At worst, individuals who 
are authorities of the Lao government are responsible for the 
seizure--and possibly the execution--of U.S. citizens traveling 
abroad. The latter would represent a grave and reprehensible 
act against citizens of the United States.
    The Lao government's actions surrounding this case must be 
taken into account when reviewing possible Normal Trade 
Relations status for the Lao People's Democratic Republic. It 
is my belief that this case is yet another piece of a larger 
body of strong evidence demonstrating that Laos is not yet 
ready to join the family of nations enjoying NTR status with 
the United States.
      

                                

Statement of Xiong Chuhu, Executive Director, Hmong International Human 
Rights Watch, Chicago, Illinois

    Chairman Crane and Members of the Subcommittee. My name is 
Xiong Chuhu, Executive Director of Hmong International Human 
Rights Watch. Our organization represents Hmong victims of 
human rights abuse, so everything I have to say is on their 
behalf.
    To understand the Hmong people's problems in Laos today it 
is important to point out their role during the Vietnam War. 
Since the Hmong population was located in a very strategic 
place along the mountainous Laos/Vietnam border, many thousands 
of Hmong were recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency to 
fight against the invading North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The 
Hmong became known as the C.I.A.'s ``secret army'' and were 
formed into Special Guerilla Units, which were used to sabotage 
enemy supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, call in bombing 
strikes, and help rescue downed American pilots. This was all 
done at great risk to the Hmong. Towards the end of the war, 
the Hmong had suffered so greatly that they had to sacrifice 
children as young as 10 years old to become soldiers, since 
many of the older recruits had either been killed or wounded. 
The Hmong have been credited with tying up 2-3 of the NVA's 
best fighting divisions, which would otherwise have been used 
to fight against American soldiers in South Vietnam.
    Though the Vietnam War ended nearly 25 years ago, the 
genocide of the Hmong continues to this very day throughout the 
jungles of Phou Bia mountain and the surrounding countryside.
    In 1975, the newly formed Lao People's Democratic Republic 
(LPDR) renamed the Hmong homeland region of Phou Bia, Muang 
Cha, Muang Om, and the Hmong capitol of Long Cheng (all 
formerly located in Xieng Khouang province), and designated 
this area Saysomboun Special Zone (See map--Attachment A). No 
foreigners or international monitors have been allowed access 
to this region for the past 25 years. The LPDR has used this 
secluded area to launch repeated military assaults against 
these displaced Hmong. Since 1975, over 40,000 Hmong have been 
killed here and another 60,000 have been displaced into the 
jungles of Phou Bia. The former Hmong capitol of Long Cheng has 
been completely wiped out and is now overgrown with dense 
forest. At present, there are still more than 10,000 Hmong 
hiding out in the Phou Bia area waiting for the Hmong Killing 
Fields to end (See video tape--Attachment B).
    In 1979, the LPDR launched heavy military attacks and used 
chemical weapons against the Hmong living in this area. Again, 
in June 1990, the LPDR launched more air attacks inside 
Saysomboun Special Zone. In February 1998, the LPDR began 
another series of artillery attacks. The war has ended but the 
Killing Fields of the Hmong continues to this very day. 
Recently, the LPDR has installed 3 new military camps at Phou 
Bia mountain, so the killing of the Hmong people continues on 
and on. The Lao military has moved in and destroyed all the 
Hmong rice fields and has turned them into mine fields. On May 
25, 1998, an aircraft carrying 26 high ranking Vietnamese and 
Lao military leaders crashed in Saysomboun Special Zone. They 
were in the process of planning genocidal attacks against the 
Hmong population taking refuge in this area. Again, in July 
1999, the LPDR began launching heavy military attacks to wipe 
out the total Hmong population taking refuge in the Phou Bia 
jungles of Saysomboun Special Zone by the year 2000. This 
ongoing genocide of the Hmong people must stop! The 
international community must immediately intervene to save the 
Hmong civilian population.
    Although the lowland Lao have freedom of movement within 
the country, this is not so for the ethnic Hmong. For example, 
the Hmong at La Khai camp, Xieng Khouang province, and those in 
Muang Cha, Muong Ong, and Muong Ao, Saysomboun Special Zone are 
not allowed to move outside of these areas. Whoever is caught 
will either be tortured, imprisoned, or killed. An example of 
this is Boua Vang Lee who was killed by LPDR police officers 
Thao Khaman and Thao Khamkeuth on October 20, 1996. After he 
was killed, his father, his wife, his younger brother, two of 
his sons, and six Hmong village chiefs sued the LPDR government 
asking for 9,379,600 kip (equivalent to $13,400 U.S. dollars) 
in compensation for funeral costs and the loss of his life. The 
LPDR later retaliated against his family killing his wife and 
crippling his little 2 year old son in January 1998, just 
because of the lawsuit that was filed. Because of the 
continuing intimidation by the LPDR government they can no 
longer safely follow through on the case, so have asked our 
organization to bring their it to the attention of the 
international community. We are requesting that the LPDR should 
pay $1 million in damages to cover the expenses of the funerals 
and the loss of life of Boua Van Lee and See Xiong, along with 
the permanent crippling of his young son and the psychological 
trauma that the family has been put through and continues to 
face to this very day. (See photos of Boua Van Lee and his wife 
& son--Attachment C)
    We are requesting that international monitors, along with 
Hmong International Human Rights Watch, be granted official 
unrestricted access to Saysomboun Special Zone so that the 
Hmong Killing Fields may be put to an end. There has been no 
durable solution to this problem for almost 25 years. Why? It 
is because this issue has never been properly addressed. The 
United States must play a critical role in pressuring the Lao 
government to withdraw its troops from Saysomboun Special Zone 
before any consideration of granting Normalized Trading status 
to Laos.
    The LPDR has gone all out to promote this year and next 
year as ``Visit Laos Year'' to attract many foreign tourists 
from different countries. It is ironic, for the past 25 years 
thousands of it's own Hmong citizens are still blacklisted and 
not allowed visas to enter the country. It is still impossible 
for Hmong Americans to do business in Laos because of the 
continuing discrimination by the Lao government. We request 
that this blacklist of Hmong, who have resettled in a second or 
third country, be made available to the U.S. Department of 
State and Hmong International Human Rights Watch, along with 
the reason why these Hmong are not allowed visas to enter the 
LPDR.
    Those who attempt to operate a business are later 
bamboozled out of their investments and kicked out of the 
country. Some good examples of this are the cases of James 
Xiong (Classic Travel), Lilly Thao and Dr. Sam Thao (brick 
factory), Doua Yang (foundry factory), Mr. Seng Moua and Mr. 
Doua Yang (Ban Phak Seng Souk hotel), Bee Xiong (car imports to 
Laos), etc. We request that these businessmen/women be brought 
to testify in front of the Subcommittee on Trade so that you 
can hear from their real life experiences. Our organization 
would be more than glad to contact these people to testify. The 
LPDR laws change from day to day on the whims of officials. 
Tactics such as bribery and intimidation are a very common 
practice. At the moment there are no such laws in the LPDR 
which protect foreign investments. An Arbitration Committee 
should be formed consisting of the U.S. and LPDR governments, 
Hmong International Human Rights Watch, along with foreign 
investors before any kind of Normalized Trading Relations are 
established. Any type of dispute between foreign investors and 
their Lao counterparts must be arbitrated under this committee. 
This is the only way the investment capitol of foreigners can 
truly be protected. In the past, the LPDR government and Lao 
business counterparts always used various tactics to frame 
foreign investors, kicking them out of the country and taking 
over their business assets.
    The Hmong are still being denied equal access to education. 
Hmong students do not have the opportunity to travel abroad for 
higher education even though many lowland Lao are allowed this 
luxury. Comparing the Hmong population in the U.S. to the 
lowland Lao population in the U.S. there is a noted higher 
percentage of Hmong possessing high level degrees. This 
achievement shows what great value the Hmong place on education 
and should be reflected in the number of Hmong candidates in 
Laos allowed to study abroad. At the present time, Hmong 
written language is not allowed to be taught in public schools. 
This should be changed so that the Hmong language can be taught 
at any public school.
    Discrimination against the Hmong goes beyond just party 
politics. We have documented many cases of high ranking Hmong 
LPDR officials who have either been imprisoned, tortured, 
killed, or forced to step down from their positions for no 
other reason than being ethnic Hmong. Boua Chong Lee, who is 
currently being held in a Lao prison, is a good example of 
this. He was the former LPDR military leader of Luang Prabang 
province until being forced into retirement. He stated that 
``now the situation for the Hmong in Laos is much worse than it 
was for the Hmong during French colonial times'' [quoted just 
before his arrest July 1995--videotape in the possession of 
H.I.H.R.W.]. Boua Chong Lee was severely beaten then arrested 
just because he voiced his opinion about how the LPDR treats 
the Hmong minority. Other Hmong who are currently in jail 
without a trial are: Vue Mai, Yang Va, Boua Yeng Vang, Wa Kou 
Vang, Houa Lee, and Michael Vang. These prisoners should be 
immediately released before Normal Trade Relations are granted 
to Laos. (See photos of high level prisoners who need to be 
immediately released--Attachment D)
    The lingering problem of the remaining 30,000 Hmong 
refugees living in Thailand has not been effectively addressed. 
This is because their situation is directly related to the 
current political climate in Laos. The reason these 30,000 
Hmong are now living at Wat Thamkrabok (15,000), Khet Noy 
village, Phetchaboun (6000), Tak, Chieng Rai, and other 
provinces in northern Thailand is because they left the UNHCR 
sponsored refugee camps. Why did they leave the safety of the 
refugee camps? They left the camps because of a legitimate fear 
of forced/coerced repatriation. There are also over 1100 Hmong 
refugees still living in Napho refugee camp. They too fear 
repatriation. Part of this is due to the ongoing problems Hmong 
are having with their land allocations at Ban Pha Thao. The 
UNHCR and the LPDR have also not fulfilled their promise to the 
Hmong returnees at Ban Na Saat repatriation site. In 1994, 
these refugees returned from Napho refugee camp because an 
irrigation project and electricity were promised to them by the 
UNHCR and the LPDR. They must fulfill these promises. These 
Hmong returnees are also discriminated against by special marks 
on their LPDR citizen I.D. cards, which disables them from 
fully integrating into Lao society. They cannot obtain 
government employment, nor engage in business ventures, nor 
continue higher education, plus they also have travel 
limitations. (See Hmong returnee I.D. card--Attachment E). We 
request that this discriminatory I.D. card be immediately 
abolished for the more than 27,000 repatriates before Normal 
Trading Relations with the LPDR is established. A new and non-
discriminatory I.D. card should be issued to all Laotian 
citizens.
    Before Normal Trade Relations are granted to Laos the LPDR 
must withdraw all of their troops from Saysomboun Special Zone. 
The above refugees should be escorted and protected by the UN 
Army so that they can return to their homeland at Saysomboun 
Special Zone. They should also be helped out financially with 
their resettlement.
    The major problem, and again I have to really stress this 
important point, is the unresolved issue of Vue Mai's 
disappearance in Laos. Vue Mai was the former leader of Ban 
Vinai refugee camp. He agreed to support the repatriation 
program and return to Laos only after the UNHCR had guaranteed 
his and the other returnees safety. By doing this he took an 
immense and unselfish risk so that the UNHCR's Hmong 
repatriation program would run smoothly.
    Therefore, it is essential that the United Nations 
seriously follow up on the investigation of Vue Mai's case. 
This can be done by first making use of the confidential report 
Hmong International Human Rights Watch has sent to the U.N. in 
Geneva (received by UNHCR Oct 22, 1998), which details events 
leading up to the time of Vue Mai's arrest by the LPDR's secret 
police. We are also requesting a list from the UNHCR of all the 
Hmong refugees who have repatriated to Laos, so that we can 
check to see how they are doing. Vue Mai must be released from 
prison before any attempts to Normalize Trading Relations with 
the LPDR. The Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian refugee 
problems have been solved, but the issue of the Hmong refugees 
is still not solved and never will be until Vue Mai is released 
from prison.
    Hmong International Human Rights Watch is strongly opposed to 
Normalized Trading Relations or Most Favored Nation trading status with 
the Lao People's Democratic Republic unless all of the above conditions 
are met with first.

            Sincerely,
                                               Xiong Chuhu,
                                                 Executive Director

    [Attachments are being retained in the Committee files.]
      

                                


                        Illumination Technologies, Inc.    
                                    East Syracuse, NY 13057
                                                  September 8, 1999

Chairman Philip M. Crane
Subcommittee on Trade
U.S. House of Representatives
1102 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Subject: Extension of normal trade relations (NTR) to Laos

    Dear Chairman Crane:

    I am writing you to ask for your help in seeking the extension of 
normal trade relations (NTR) for Laos.
    I am a chemist and an entrepreneur. Asia is our largest foreign 
market accounting for a third of the company's revenues. I am also a 
partner in another company, in Syracuse, specializing in developing 
advanced illumination instrumentation for use in machine vision 
applications--namely, automated manufacturing processes. I also have 
interests in other businesses. Southeast Asia is a significant market 
for the products of these enterprises that employ Americans and bring 
wealth to the US. Laos is a part of the Southeast Asian market. I plan 
to invest in Laos.
    I strongly urge you and the members of the Subcommittee on Trade to 
grant Laos normal trade relations (NTR) for the following reasons:
    The United States and Laos have maintained uninterrupted diplomatic 
relations in the last four decades. Despite severe destruction to Laos 
resulting from heavy bombardment by the US during the war, Laos has 
cooperated fully with the US in finding its MIA's and a plethora of 
other issues. NTR will foster a closer tie between the two countries.
    The US has signed a favorable trade agreement with Laos that the US 
has been unable to obtain from any other country in Southeast Asia. 
Without NTR, this trade agreement has remained ineffective. Without 
legal protection or the protection of the US, small US investors such 
as myself have been unable to invest in Laos.
    Yet, without acceptance from Congress, Laos has extended to US 
companies large economic concessions--especially in natural resources 
exploration and development--making the US the second largest investor. 
NTR will open Laos for further concessions and maintain the US as both 
a major benefactor and beneficiary of a developed Lao economy.
    Though, presently undeveloped, Laos is the crossroads of a huge 
market: China to the North, Vietnam to the East, Cambodia to the South, 
and Thailand and Burma to the West. Laos is developing a free-market 
economy. Its border is now fully open. With half a million expatriates 
of Laos as US citizens, the US is presented with a unique advantage to 
compete by utilizing her enormous economic and political assets and the 
direct link of its citizens with the citizens of Laos.
    I have seen products in the US market that were produced in Laos, 
but packaged in Thailand. As such, these products have benefited 
Thailand, but not the people of Laos and the American consumers because 
the producers in Laos were paid very little and the American consumers 
had to pay much higher prices. With NTR, these and other products can 
be made in Laos and shipped directly to the US at a better price for 
both the people of Laos and the American consumers.
    Laos' strategic location as a buffer state between China and 
Southeast Asia dictates a geopolitical consideration. Laos presents no 
threat to the US. Laos is simply an unexplored asset with a substantial 
reserve of natural resources, but sandwiched between powerful rivaled 
neighbors. A well-to-do, stable and secure Laos will create and 
preserve stability in Indochina and the region. An economically 
disadvantaged Laos will be conducive to political instability and 
vulnerable to outside destabilizing influences--specifically from 
regional contending powers. NTR will extend to Laos, in the eyes of 
other nations, the full recognition and partnership of the Superpower 
(the US). Furthermore, it will provide Laos with the necessary 
resources to solidify her economy and strengthen her territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.
    Despite the lasting effects of war, in the last 25 years, Laos has 
taken steps to improve itself:
     Adopting a constitution written by an American law expert.
     Introducing democratic reforms with a parliament and 
universal suffrage at its core. The people of Laos now choose their 
representatives. Further reforms are on the way.
     Introducing law and order as its basic operating system.
     Bringing its minorities to share power in the government.
     Joining the international community through various 
organizations, including ASEAN, thus accepting the international 
standards and codes of conduct.
     Introducing a free-market economy and establishing trade 
links with countries around the world. Laos is integrating itself into 
the global economy.
    It has to be clear that, after 1975, as the result of the flight of 
its citizens to other countries, Laos was left with an enormous brain 
drain. Its intellectual, technical and entrepreneurial capacity was 
devastated. Laos lost almost its entire educated population. The 
leadership of Laos came out of the jungles after two decades of war 
with guns and bullets, but had no experience managing a modern nation 
or economy. Laos had to start from scratch. Despite continuing security 
problems, Laos has opened up its border and striven to join the rest of 
the world. Undeniably, Laos still has much to improve. Equally 
undeniable, Laos has made substantial progress in the last 25 years 
despite enormous hardship.
    As a Hmong-American having countless number of relatives in Laos, 
only a prosperous Laos can improve the quality of their lives. Only a 
peaceful Laos can prevent human rights violations. An internationally 
involved and open Laos will be subject to international standards and 
scrutiny, thus ensuring greater freedom and better treatment to its 
citizens.
    NTR for Laos will clearly and unequivocally demonstrate not only a 
good will and a moral imperative, but moreover, an unmistakable signal 
of US's willingness to assist Laos in its painful attempt to raise the 
living standard of the people, to participate fully in the family of 
nations, and to advance democracy and stability in Laos and the entire 
region.
    I have learned that Congress failed to approve NTR for Laos the 
last time due to questions regarding human rights violations. 
Certainly, there are bound to have human rights violations in any 
country at the level of development of Laos. These issues must be 
addressed by the government of Laos. The international community must 
hold the leaders of Laos responsible. However, the larger questions 
still beg for answers:
     How can any society at subsistence level (where self-
preservation is the order of the day) avoid violence? It cannot. 
Violence breeds abuses and impedes democracy.
     How can a country confronting with the remnants of 
internal strife and external hostilities avoid the use of force and 
therefore the abuses of human rights? It cannot. Peace and security are 
the basis to uphold human rights.
     Next, how can the denial of NTR to Laos stop human rights 
violations? It cannot and in fact it promotes the abuses by depriving 
the people of Laos the means to develop and to empower themselves.
     By denying NTR to Laos, who are being penalized? 
Definitely, not the few old leaders of Laos, but the people of Laos. By 
keeping the people poor, uneducated and weak, the power of the few 
leaders is reinforced. The people of Laos ought not be held hostage 
because of the leaders of Laos. These leaders will soon be gone. The 
people of Laos will forever remain.
     What can NTR do for Laos? Laos has a very small economy 
and is considered one of the poorest countries in the world. NTR will 
foster substantial trade and investment by Hmong/Lao-Americans and 
others in Laos. By also increasing trade with the US, the people of 
Laos will earn the resources and capacity to develop Laos. Development 
is the key to the preservation of human rights and the upholding of 
democratic values.
    I was a Hmong refugee from Laos who had lost many loved ones while 
trying to escape to Thailand, I am therefore well qualified to speak 
against Laos. Yet, I believe that the people of Laos and the American 
people are best served by improving relations, but not the continuation 
of a policy of alienation and estrangement. Economic reliance on trade 
with the US will empower the US to deal more effectively with the 
government of Laos. By contributing to the development of Laos through 
strong trade relations and political engagement, the US and the Hmong/
Lao-Americans will be in a much stronger position to influence and 
shape the future of Laos.
    The large majority of the half million Hmong/Lao-Americans, like 
all Americans through history, now wish to see a better life and future 
for their fellow brothers and sisters in the old country. They also 
wish closer relations between their country, the US, and their 
motherland, Laos. NTR is a step in the right direction.
    The rate of democratic reforms in Laos rests upon the rate of its 
human resources and economic developments. NTR is essential in 
accelerating the process. I am now asking for your support and the use 
of the power of your office as Chairman to impress upon your fellow 
committee members and the members Congress to approve the extension of 
normal trade relations (NTR) to Laos.
    My profound thanks for your help.

            Respectfully,
                                                   Teng Lee
                          Chairman, Illumination Technologies, Inc.
      

                                

                                          JBC International
                                                     August 2, 1999

A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff
Committee on Ways and Means,
U.S. House of Representatives
1102 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

    Dear Mr. Singleton,

    Pursuant to the request of the Honorable Phillip M. Crane, Chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, JBC 
International submits comments in support of the extension of 
unconditional normal trade relations (NTR) to the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic.
    JBC International is a trade-consulting and lobbying firm that 
provides government relations services to businesses worldwide. We 
extend representation and advocacy services to businesses and 
governments throughout the world. JBC International builds industry and 
government coalitions to leverage trade negotiations. Most importantly, 
we promote the removal of trade barriers and the opening of foreign 
markets.
    Extending normal trade relations to the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic could only benefit the US. Laos imports approximately $3.7 
million annually in chemicals, machinery and transportation equipment 
from the United States. The Lao PDR also has several investment 
opportunities in transportation, energy, contracts, private property, 
inheritance, state banking, accounting insurance, and labor 
relationships. In addition to current import and investment 
opportunities, the government has allowed the privatization of state 
owned enterprises, which may be acquired by foreign and domestic 
organizations.
    The country also holds significant deposits of natural resources. 
Approximately 47% of the country is forested with a variety of 
commercial species which may be used easily for commercial production. 
Gem deposits include sapphire, zircon, and amethyst. Valuable mineral 
deposits include gold, iron ore, tin, potash, limestone, silver, lead, 
zinc, copper, bauxite, coal and lignite.
    The Lao PDR shares boarders with Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
China. Extending normal trade relations to Laos would increase US trade 
stability and indirectly improve opportunities for trade to neighboring 
countries and improving diplomatic relations in the region. Therefore, 
US business relations are not the only benefit of extending normal 
trade relations with the Lao People's Democratic Republic.
    We thank you for the opportunity to express our comments in support 
of the extension of normal trade relations to the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic. Extending NTR is one more important step to 
becoming a global free market economy.

            Yours Truly,
                                           James B. Clawson
                                                   Chairman and CEO
      

                                

                         Lao Human Rights Council, Inc.    
                                       Eau Claire, WI 54702
                                                  September 2, 1999

The Honorable Bill Archer, Chairman
House Ways and Means Committee

The Honorable Philip Crane, Chairman
Subcommittee on Trade

U.S. Senators, U.S. Senate

and,

Other Members of the U.S. Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

    Dear Chairmen Archer and Crane, U.S. Senators, and all Members of 
the U.S. Congress:

    On behalf of the Hmong and Lao American people and communities whom 
we represent in the United States, we are hereby inform, request and 
appeal to the U.S. Congress to reject and denounce the granting of 
``Permanent Normal Trade Relations'' (NTR) and economic and foreign 
assistance to the Communist Lao government of the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic (LPDR) because of the following reasons:
     Witnesses and other people in Laos have reported that the 
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government killed 
more than 300,000 people in Laos in the past 24 years. Those witnesses 
and other people in Laos have continued to report that the war, killing 
fields, genocide, human rights violations and oppression against Hmong 
and Lao people are still going on in the countryside in Laos today.
     Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Vietnamese 
government and the Communist Lao government are conducting ``biological 
and chemical weapons warfare'' and an ethnic cleansing war against 
Hmong and Lao people in Laos today.
     Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Vietnamese 
government, the Russian government, and other governments have been 
providing and supplying biological and chemical weapons, military 
materials, weapons, guns and equipment to the Communist Lao government 
to conduct war and genocide against Hmong and Lao people in Laos.
     Witnesses in Laos reported that Mr. Latsami Khamphoui, Mr. 
Feng Sakchittaphong, Mr. Pang Thong Chokbeengboun, Mr. Wang Kou Vang, 
Mr. Boua Yeng Vang, Mr. Nhia Yee Yang, Mr. Youa Pao Herr, Mr. Youa Her 
Vue, and Mr. Xia Dang Thao are nine (9) of the 25,000 Hmong and Lao 
political prisoners in Laos today.
     Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao 
government is seeking foreign aid and assistance in order to finance 
the Communist armed forces to conduct an ethnic cleansing war against 
people in Laos, especially the Hmong ethnic group. Therefore, the U.S. 
Congress must not grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations and economic 
and foreign assistance to the Communist Lao government.
     Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao 
government committed ``international terrorism'' against Mr. Houa Ly 
and Mr. Michael Vang in April 1999. These two gentlemen are Hmong 
American citizens.
     Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao 
government has committed ``crimes against peace and crimes against 
humanity and war crimes'' in Laos.
     The Communist Lao government has violated the Vientiane 
Agreement on Laos of 1973 and international human rights law. Witnesses 
in Laos reported that there are about 30,000 to 70,000 Vietnamese 
soldiers and advisers who assist, support, and direct the Communist Lao 
government to conduct war against Hmong and Lao people in Laos.

             Nine-Point Proposal for Peace and Human Rights

    The U.S. Congress should consider the following nine (9)-
point proposal for peace and human rights for people in Laos:
    1. The U.S. Congress must not grant Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations nor economic and foreign assistance to the Communist 
Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government because 
these two governments have committed ``war crimes, crimes 
against peace and crimes against humanity'' in Laos.
    2. We appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations 
to demand that the Communist Lao government, Communist 
Vietnamese government, Russian government and other governments 
must immediately and unconditionally stop the use of biological 
and chemical weapons warfare against Hmong and Laotian people 
in Laos.
    3. We appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations 
to investigate and stop the ethnic cleansing war, genocide, 
oppression and human rights violations against Hmong and 
Laotian people in Laos.
    4. We appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations 
to bring the Communist Lao government and its Communist 
leaders, officials, agents, supporters and conspirators and the 
Communist Vietnamese government and Communist Vietnamese 
leaders and officials to the International Military Tribunal 
Court (World Court) to trial for ``war crimes, crimes against 
peace, and crimes against humanity'' against Hmong and Laotian 
people in Laos.
    5. We appeal to the U.S. government, International Red 
Cross and international relief agencies and human rights 
organizations and international communities, and to the United 
Nations to send food and medical supplies, and to provide other 
basic human needs to those Hmong and Laotian people who escaped 
and have been living in the countryside because of Communist 
oppression, terrorism, genocide, the killing fields, ethnic 
cleansing war, human rights violations and biological and 
chemical weapons warfare committed by the Communist Lao 
government and the Communist Vietnamese government.
    6. We appeal to the U.S. government, United Nations, and 
international human rights organizations to demand the 
Communist Lao government to release Mr. Latsami Khamphoui, Feng 
Sakchittaphong, Wang Kou Vang, Nhia Yee Yang, Boua Yeng Vang, 
Youa Pao Herr, Youa Her Vue, Xia Dang Thao, Pang Thong 
Chokbengboun, and many other thousands of Hmong and Laotian 
political prisoners in Laos.
    7. We appeal to the U.S. government to bring true peace, 
democracy, freedom, human rights and national reconciliation to 
people in Laos.
    8. We appeal to the U.S. government, Royal Thai government 
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
to stop the repatriation of Hmong and Laotian refugees in the 
Napho Camp, Thailand, and other displaced locations inside 
Thailand to return to Communist Laos because the Communist Lao 
government has committed genocide, oppression and human rights 
violations against Mr. Vue Mai, Chong Moua Thao, Yong Vang Lor, 
Nhia Yee Yang, and many hundreds of other returnees in Laos.
    We appeal to the U.S. government, Royal Thai government, 
and the UNHCR to provide more food, medical supplies, and other 
basic human needs to Hmong and Laotian refugees in the Napho 
Camp, Thailand.
    We appeal to the U.S. government, UNHCR, international 
organizations, and the Communist Lao government to provide more 
food, medical supplies and other basic human needs and land for 
returnees in Laos.
    9. We appeal to the U.S. government to continue opening the 
door of opportunity for Hmong and Laotian refugees in the Napho 
Refugee Camp, Thailand, to resettle in the United States 
because of political reasons, family reunification, and 
genocide in Laos.
    Between June and July 1999, the delegation of the Lao Human 
Rights Council, Inc., in the United States went to the border 
between Thailand and Laos. People, witnesses and returnees from 
Laos met with us. They reported and certified that the 
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese 
government have conducted war and genocide against Hmong and 
Lao people because of the legacy of Hmong-American relations, 
cooperation, and connection during the Cold War. Witnesses in 
Laos reported that the Communist Lao government has imprisoned 
Mr. Xia Dang Thao, Nhia Yee Yang and more than 300 Hmong 
returnees in Laos. Witnesses said the Communist Lao authorities 
arrested and tortured and killed Mr. Vue Mai, a leader of Hmong 
returnees in Laos. Those witnesses reported that officials of 
the Communist Lao government, U.S. Embassy, and United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Laos did not report 
the true situation in Laos to the U.S. Congress and the rest of 
the world. People in Laos appealed to the Lao Human Rights 
Council, Inc., to report to the U.S. Congress and the rest of 
the world that the Communist Lao government and Communist 
Vietnamese government cooperate together to exterminate and 
kill Hmong people. They said the war, genocide, killing fields, 
and human rights violations against people in Laos, especially 
the Hmong people, are going on in the countryside. This is the 
true situation in Laos.
    Thank you so much for your consideration of the above proposals for 
true peace, human rights, justice and liberty and democracy.

            Respectfully,
                                            Dr. Vang Pobzeb
                                                 Executive Director

Enclosure
      

                                


Appendix I

Reasons and Request for Justice and to Stop Genocide, Human Rights 
Violations and War in Laos

       Lao Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos
                                                      March 1, 1999

The U.S. Government

The United Nations

    Dear U.S. Government and the United Nations:

    I am former Captain Nhia Herr Vang. I am 62 years old. From 1961 to 
1975, I served in the Special Forces (SGU), under Regiment 25, 
Battalion 225, Company 2252, Second Military Region, under General Vang 
Pao and the American CIA in Laos during the Vietnam War.
    As I am aware, between 1958 and 1960, American CIA advisors and 
officials contacted and requested General Vang Pao to recruit and lead 
Hmong and Lao people to cooperate with the U.S. government to stop the 
aggression and expansion of Communism throughout Southeast Asia. 
Therefore, we cooperated with the U.S. government.
    In 1973, the Paris Peace Agreements on Indochina and the Vientiane 
Peace Agreement on Laos required that all foreign soldiers and advisors 
withdraw completely from Laos. These agreements state that the 
political and military problems in Laos have to be solved by Lao 
people.
    The U.S. government complied with these agreements. The U.S. 
government completely withdrew all its advisors and soldiers from Laos. 
However, to the contrary, the Communist Vietnamese government did not 
comply with these two agreements.
    In May 1975, the Communist Vietnamese soldiers and the Communist 
Pathet Lao soldiers cooperatively took over the Kingdom of Laos with 
armed forces and aggression. After the Communist Vietnamese government 
and Communist Lao Movement took over Laos, they exterminated, 
oppressed, suppressed, killed and imprisoned many thousands of SGU 
soldiers and officials of the American CIA and Royal Lao government and 
other people in Laos. The Communist Lao government and the Communist 
Vietnamese government arrested, rounded up and sent many thousands of 
soldiers, officials and other people to death in many reeducation camps 
and concentration camps in Laos.
    In the area I occupied, in June 1975, I was arrested and forced to 
be reeducated in Seminar Camp where I stayed for four days. 
Fortunately, I escaped from the reeducation camp.
    Genocide, human rights violations, war and extermination by the 
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government 
against CIA soldiers, officials and other people in Laos were causal 
factors and reasons for people in Laos to form the Democratic Movement 
to fight against Communist aggression and oppression in Laos. Our 
struggles are self-defense for survival, freedom, democracy and human 
rights.
    In my village, the Communist Lao and Vietnamese soldiers tortured 
and killed two Hmong families composed of ten people. The heads of 
these two families and victims were CIA and SGU soldiers. Therefore, 
people in my village and many other locations in Laos formed the 
Democratic Movement to defend ourselves for survival.
    Between 1975 and 1976, the Communist Lao government and Communist 
Vietnamese government and soldiers used biological and chemical weapons 
to kill many CIA and SGU soldiers, officials and other people in Laos. 
Many more people suffered. Many people died. Therefore, about 1,000 
Hmong people surrendered to the Communist Lao government. The Communist 
Lao government arrested, imprisoned, tortured and killed those people. 
About 500 Hmong people fled Laos to Thailand and they sought 
resettlement in the United States.
    According to our statistical figure, there were 8,000 Hmong people 
in the village of Phou Ma Thao, Muang Mouk, Xieng Khouang Province, in 
1975. In 1999, there are 1,500 people who survived and live in this 
village because the Communist Lao and Vietnamese soldiers killed more 
than 6,000 people in this one village.
    According to many reliable reports of many witnesses in Laos, the 
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government have 
killed about 300,000 people in Laos between 1975 and 1999. Of these 
victims, more than 40,000 were former CIA and SGU soldiers and 
officials of the CIA and Royal Lao government. The Communist Lao and 
Vietnamese soldiers burned and destroyed villages, houses, forests, 
farms and animals. They killed Hmong and Lao people and animals using 
biological and chemical weapons.
    In 1998 and 1999, there are more than five (5) Vietnamese military 
divisions stationed inside Laos. The Vietnamese soldiers are direct, 
support and assist the Communist Lao government to conduct the war, 
genocide and biological and chemical warfare against people in Laos. 
There has been neither peace nor stability inside Laos for the past 24 
years, because the Communist Vietnamese government and Communist Lao 
government is violating the Paris Peace Agreements on Indochina and the 
Vientiane Peace Agreement on Laos of 1973.
    Because of the inhuman atrocities against our people by the 
Communist Lao government, I am calling upon the U.S. government and the 
United Nations to recognize that the Communist Lao government and 
Communist Vietnamese government have violated the Charter of the United 
Nations and the international human rights laws and principles.

                 Nine-Point Proposal for Peace in Laos

    In order to bring a true peace, justice, human rights and 
stability to Laos, we people in Laos propose the following 
nine-point proposal to the U.S. government and the United 
Nations to consider:
    1. To request the twelve (12) signatories (nations) and the 
United Nations who signed and witnessed the Paris Peace 
Agreements on Indochina on March 2, 1973, to guarantee and 
bring a true peace to Laos.
    2. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to 
demand that the Communist Lao government and Communist 
Vietnamese government must immediately stop the war, genocide 
and human rights violations against people in Laos.
    3. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to 
demand that all the Vietnamese soldiers and advisors must 
withdraw from Laos immediately and unconditionally.
    4. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to 
send international peacekeeping forces to stop the war and keep 
the peace and to supervise free elections in Laos.
    5. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to 
bring a true peace, justice and human rights to Laos.
    6. To request the Royal Lao family, Dr. Khamphai Abhay, 
General Vang Pao, General Thonglith Chokbengboun and many other 
Laotian leaders to return to Laos in order to guarantee and 
maintain peace and stability for people in Laos.
    7. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to 
establish a ``safe haven zone'' and ``liberation zone'' for 
people, including the freedom fighters in Laos. The 
international communities should provide medicine, food and 
other basic human needs to people in these zones.
    8. To request the U.S. government, the United Nations, and 
international human rights organizations to send investigators 
to investigate, monitor and stop genocide and human rights 
violations in Laos.
    9. If all steps above fail to bring peace to Laos, the U.S. 
government and the United Nations must give an opportunity for 
CIA and SGU soldiers, officials and their family members and 
associates in Laos to seek political asylum and resettlement in 
the United States because of political reasons, genocide, human 
rights violations and war by the Communist Lao government and 
Communist Vietnamese government in Laos.
    On behalf of the Lao Democratic Movement and Freedom 
Fighters in Laos, I appeal to and request the U.S. government 
and the United Nations to consider the above proposals to save 
the lives of people in Laos. We need the U.S. government and 
the United Nations to bring a true peace, justice, human 
rights, and stability to Laos.
    We hope to receive assistance and support from the U.S. government 
and the United Nations in the near future.

            Respectfully requested and submitted:

                              Signed by Mr. Nhia Herr Vang,
    Leader of the Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos.

cc: (1) U.S. government.
 (2) United Nations
 (3) Royal Lao Family
 (4) Dr. Khamphai Abhay
 (5) General Vang Pao
 (6) General Thonglith Chokbengboun
 (7) Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., USA
 (8) United Lao Movement for Democracy, USA
 (9) United Lao Movement for Human Rights and Democracy in France
 (10) International human rights organizations

Notice: The above English version is a translation from the Lao 
language which was signed by Mr. Nhia Herr Vang, a leader of the Lao 
Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos.
      

                                


Appendix II

Affidavit and Statement of Mr. Blia Yang Chang to the U.S. Government 
and the United Nations on the True Situation in Laos

March 9, 1999

    Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

     I am Mr. Blia Yang Chang. I am a former political prisoner 
in the Sam Khe political prison in Vientiane area, Laos, from 
September 10, 1997 to October 1, 1998. I was a captain and 
soldier under the American CIA and General Vang Pao in Laos 
from 1961 to 1975. Many thousands of people in Laos and I were 
happy to serve the U.S. government during the Vietnam War.
     I would like to report the following on the true situation 
in Laos to the government of the United States; government of 
France, government of the United Kingdom; the United Nations 
and international community; and international human rights 
organizations as follows:

                        War and Genocide in Laos

     1. In May 1975, the U.S. government withdrew from Laos 
completely. The U.S. government did not inform our Hmong and 
Laotian soldiers about the change of its foreign policy in Laos 
and Southeast Asia. Many thousands of Hmong and Laotian 
soldiers and civilians were arrested, imprisoned, and murdered 
or executed by the Communist Lao government and the Communist 
Vietnamese government and soldiers. The Communist government 
sent the King, Queen and many thousands of people to death in 
many concentration camps in Laos in the past two decades.
     In 1975, many thousands of people, including myself, could 
not escape to Thailand. We were subject to arrest, imprisonment 
and death by the Communist Lao soldiers and North Vietnamese 
soldiers. We saw the Communist soldiers kill many people in 
Muang Cha and many of the villages in Xieng Khouang Province, 
Laos.
     2. As a result, I and many thousands of other people 
escaped to Mount Bia (Phoum Bia) in Xieng Khouang Province. I 
stayed in Mount Bia from 1975 to 1996. I saw the communist Lao 
and Communist Vietnamese soldiers massacre and kill more than 
500 Hmong people in Mount Bia. The Communist soldiers used 
heavy guns and other weapons, and warplanes, to kill many 
thousands of people in many other locations. The Communist 
Vietnamese government and Communist Lao government used Soviet 
warplanes to drop many chemical weapons and bombs to kill many 
thousands of Hmong people in Mount Bia and many other locations 
in Xieng Khouang Province and many other provinces in Laos. I 
saw the Soviet warplanes drop many chemical weapons and bombs 
to kill Hmong and Laotian people in Laos.
     3. The Communist Lao government and the Communist 
Vietnamese government and soldiers launched and have been 
conducting war, genocide, human rights violations, oppression, 
and ethnic cleansing warfare against our Hmong and Laotian 
people in Xieng Khouang Province and many other provinces in 
Laos from 1975 to the present time in 1999. In 1975, the 
Vietnam War was over for the U.S. government and American 
people, but the war is not yet over for Hmong and Laotian 
people.
     4. The Communist Vietnamese government did not withdraw 
its Communist troops and soldiers from Laos. In 1999, there are 
still many thousands of Vietnamese soldiers, advisors and other 
Vietnamese people in Laos. The Vietnamese soldiers changed from 
military uniforms to civilian clothes and uniforms. Therefore, 
foreigners in Laos do not understand who are Laotians and who 
are Vietnamese people. The Communist Vietnamese government and 
Russian government have continuously supplied military 
materials, equipment, guns and weapons to the Communist Lao 
government to conduct war against people in Laos from 1975 
until today.
     5. Today, there is a war going ion in Mount Bia and other 
locations in Xieng Khouang Province and many other provinces in 
Laos. The Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese 
government and soldiers continue to carry on war against Hmong 
and Laotian people in Laos.
     6. Many thousands of former CIA soldiers and their family 
members and other people have continued to escape to the 
countryside in order to avoid the genocide, persecution and 
imprisonment which are being committed by the Communist Lao 
government. Many people have died in the countryside from 
hunger, disease and war.
     7. The Communist Lao government has continued to issue 
announcements and propaganda throughout Laos that those Hmong 
and Laotian people who escaped to the countryside can and 
should come back to live peacefully with the Communist Lao 
government without punishment and without revenge. Therefore, 
in 1996, I brought a document of amnesty which the Communist 
Lao government issued to me and to other people. We surrendered 
to the Communist authorities. I came to live in peace with my 
family members of the village of Phoum Ghan II, Vientiane area. 
However, on September 10, 1997, the Communist Lao authorities 
arrested and imprisoned me. Mr. Ya Xiong Chang and Nhia Lue 
Chang were also arrested and imprisoned by the Communist Lao 
government.
     The Communist Lao government imprisoned us at the Sam Khe 
concentration camp, Vientiane area, Laos. I witnessed that 
there were more than 250 Hmong and Laotian political prisoners 
in the Sam Khe concentration camp and in other political 
prisons in the Vientiane area. There are many thousands of 
Hmong and Laotian political prisoners in Laos. Conditions and 
food in the prison are the worst. Prisoners do not get enough 
food to eat and do not get clean water to drink.
     8. Many other people in Laos and myself estimate that the 
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese 
government and soldiers have killed more than 300,000 people in 
Laos in the past 23 years. The war and killing fields in Laos 
are still going on in the countryside in Laos.
     9. The true situation in Laos is that the Communist Lao 
government and Communist Vietnamese government and soldiers 
have been cooperating together to carry on war, genocide, human 
rights violations, oppression and killing fields against Hmong 
and Laotian people in Laos. The people in Laos need peace, 
freedom, democracy, human rights, food, basic human needs, 
medicine, and economic development. The people in Laos do not 
need war, genocide, oppression and human rights violations.

                   Five-Point Peace Proposal for Laos

     Therefore, as I am a former Hmong political prisoner in 
Laos and a friend of the U.S. government, I would like to 
propose the following five points to the U.S. government and 
the United Nations and international rights organizations to 
consider for peace for the people in Laos:
     1. The people in Laos and I appeal that the U.S. 
government and the United Nations must demand that the 
Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese 
government and soldiers stop the war, genocide, human rights 
violations and biological and chemical weapons warfare against 
Hmong and Laotian people in Laos.
     2. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government 
and the United Nations to bring a true peace, democracy, 
freedom and human rights to the people in Laos.
     3. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government 
and the United Nations to pressure the Communist Vietnamese 
government to withdraw all its soldiers and advisors from Laos 
completely and unconditionally.
     4. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government, 
the United Nations and international humanitarian agencies to 
bring food, basic human needs, clothes, and medicine to Hmong 
and Laotian people in the countryside who escaped to there in 
order to avoid genocide and punishment.
     5. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government 
and the United Nations and international human rights 
organizations to send delegates and representatives to Laos on 
fact-finding missions on the problems of genocide, human rights 
violations, war and peace in Laos.
     I swear and certify that the above statements and reports are true 
and correct. I tell and report the true situation in Laos to the U.S. 
Congress, U.S. government, American people and the United Nations.

             Respectfully,

     Name: Mr. Blia Yang Chang
     Signature:

Notice: This English version is a translation from the verbal Hmong 
language of Mr. Blia Yang Chang.
      

                                


Appendix III

Hmong Refugees Request Human Rights from U.S. Government

                         Napho Forced Repatriation Camp    
                  Nakhon Phanom Province, Thailand, No. 014
                                                       June 2, 1999

    Dear President Bill Clinton, President of the United States:

    Dear Members of the U.S. Congress and Senators, Washington, D.C.:

    Dear General Vang Pao, Hmong Leader:

    Dear Dr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, Inc. in the United 
States:

    We, the Hmong refugees in the Napho Forced Repatriation Camp, 
Nakhon Phanom Province, Thailand, are writing this letter and petition 
to you regarding the problems of Hmong refugees in this camp. The 
purpose of this letter is to request true human rights and freedom. We 
request resettlement in the United States. Our requests, purposes and 
reasons are as follows:
    1. On April 19-20, 1999, officials of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from Laos and Thailand and the Thai 
government have announced in the Napho refugee camp in Thailand that 
there is peace in Laos and are pressuring Hmong refugees in this camp 
to register to return to Laos. These officials have announced that each 
refugee who voluntarily registers to return to Laos will receive at 
least $100 from the U.S. government and 2,000 baht (Thai currency) as 
well as other assistance and support, in order to pressure refugees to 
return to Laos. However, they also announced that those refugees who 
refuse to register for voluntary repatriation from the Napho Camp, 
Thailand to Laos will not receive any assistance and help from the 
UNHCR and other parties involved in the repatriation to Laos. The 
officials stated that the Napho refugee camp will be closed down in 
1999 and that they will force refugees from Thailand to Laos in 1999.
    2. We Hmong refugees respectfully ask the Royal Thai government and 
you to recognize that between May and June 1987, General Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh, Thai Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces, 
contracted and used Hmong refugees in Thailand to cooperate in helping 
the Royal Thai government fight against the Communist Lao government 
during the Thai-Lao border war in the three villages and Luong Kao, 
border between Laos and Thailand. Major Chong Her Xiong was our 
military commander (company 201) who led more than 250 Hmong soldiers 
in cooperation with the Thai armed forces (company 6). We cooperated 
with the Thai government to help to defend its national security and 
sovereignty. The Thai government won the war because of our support and 
cooperation. Therefore, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh gave videotape 
equipment, 30,000 baht in Thai currency, and many other awards to our 
Hmong soldiers.
     Therefore, we Hmong refugees are not willing to return to Laos, 
because we fear that the Communist Lao government shall imprison and 
kill us because of the above reasons.
    3. The Communist Vietnamese government sent about 70,000 Vietnamese 
soldiers to cooperate with the Communist Lao government to wage war, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing warfare, and human rights violations against 
people in Laos. Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, and 
continuing in 1999, the Communist Vietnamese government and Communist 
Lao government has killed more than 300,000 people in Laos. The 
``killing fields'' in Laos are still going on in 1999. The Communist 
Lao government has imprisoned 25,000 to 30,000 people in Laos, and 
continues to arrest, imprison and kill more Hmong and Lao people in 
1999 without fair trials or reasons. These arrests, imprisonments and 
deaths are evidence that the Communist Lao government has been 
exterminating ethnic groups, especially Hmong people.
    4. In 1993, the Communist Lao government arrested, imprisoned, 
tortured and killed Mr. Vue Mai, a leader of Hmong returnees in Laos. 
On April 6, 1999, the Communist Lao government arrested and imprisoned 
Mr. Vang Thai Xiong, another group leader of Hmong returnees in Laos. 
There are many other cases which are similar to the cases of Vue Mai 
and Vang Thai Xiong in Laos.
     We Hmong refugees in the Napho Camp, Thailand, are political 
refugees. We are former soldiers and family members of former soldiers 
and associates of the U.S. government and CIA during the Vietnam War. 
Therefore, we declare that we shall not return to death in Communist 
Laos.
    5. We Hmong refugees appeal to the UNHCR, Thai government and the 
U.S. government to solve our problems in Thailand in accordance with 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of the United 
Nations. Chapter 1 and Article 1 of the Convention defines who are 
``refugees'' (please see the Convention of 1951). We are legal refugees 
and political refugees under the definition of the 1951 Convention.
    6. There are 1,286 Hmong and Lao refugees in the Napho Camp, 
Thailand, who endorsed and agreed with this petition and letter.
    We appeal to Dr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., to 
bring our requests to the U.S. government, the UNHCR, and the Thai 
government for consideration of our requests for human rights. Thank 
you for your help and assistance.

             Respectfully submitted and requested,

      Written and signed by representatives of refugees on 
 behalf of 1,286 Hmong and Lao refugees in the Napho Camp, 
                                                   Thailand

    Signed by:


      1.     Mr. Xiong Nhia Koua, Leader of Hmong refugees, Napho Camp,
              Thailand (BV04019).
      2.     Mr. Vang Fai Dang, Leader of Hmong refugees, Napho Camp,
              Thailand (Refugee Status, ID, ST 197) and Mr. Thak Keo
              Vimxay.


 Heads of Families of Refugees who Endorsed and Supported this Petition
                           and Letter include:

                           Name                      Refugee Status

      3.     Mr. Nou Ly Vang.................  (CA 03324)
      4.     Mrs. Chang Kia..................  (CB 200368)
      5.     Mr. Chong Shoua Vang............  (ST 198)
      6.     Mr. Vang Koua...................  (BV 07742)
      7.     Mr. Lo Pao Lor..................  (NP 16616)
      8.     Mr. Xay Yee Chang...............  (CA 4005)
      9.     Mr. Tong Yang...................  (BSC 0172)
     10.     Mr. Xay Shoua Xiong.............  (BV 03085)
     11.     Mr. Shoua Lo Xiong..............  (BN 1710)
     12.     Mr. Xay Seng Xiong..............  (BV 07577)
     13.     Mr. Ly Fong Xiong...............  (CA 04706)
     14.     Mr. Youa Teng Thao..............  (BV 02521)
     15.     Mr. Yang Tou....................  (BV 0330)
     16.     Mr. Shoua Thao..................  (NN 16628)
     17.     Mr. Xai Thao....................  (NP 016627)
     18.     Mr. Oua Thai....................  (NP 16716)
     19.     Mr. Xai Thao Xiong..............  (BN 09036)
     20.     Mr. Mai Lor.....................  (ST 01949)
     21.     Mrs. Youa Her...................  (BV 08530)
     22.     Mr. Chao Thao...................  (CA 05594)
     23.     Mr. Ka Xiong....................  (CA 05600)
     24.     Mr. Seng Shoua Xiong............  (BV 4078)
     25.     Mr. Yee Her.....................  (BN 09179)
     26.     Mr. Wang Neng Thao..............  (CA 3217)
     27.     Mr. Chong Xiong Chang...........  (CA 4003)
     28.     Mr. Vang Thao...................  (BV 10325)
     29.     Mr. Xai Toua Chang..............  (BV 1914)
     30.     Mrs. Yia Ly.....................  (CB 200669)
     31.     Mr. Cha Ly......................  (BV 8941)

    Notice: The above English version is a translation from the 
original Lao language which was written and signed by the above 
witnesses. Mr. Xiong Nhia Koua and Vang Fai Dang and the other 29 heads 
of families of refugees above requested resettlement in the United 
States. They declared that they shall not return to Laos because of 
political reasons.
      

                                


Appendix IV

 Request for Human Rights and Democracy

                                                       July 4, 1999

    Dear President of the United States,
    U.S. Congress
    General Vang Pao
    Mr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, USA

    I am Mr. Moua Yia. I am 42 years old. I am a leader of the 
Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Phou Bia (Mount Bia), Laos. 
I am hereby reporting on the true situations in Laos from 1975 to 1999 
to you.
    The true situations in Laos for the past 24 years and also in 1999 
are that the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese 
government have continued to commit war, genocide, human rights 
violations, oppression, extermination, ethnic cleansing war and 
biological and chemical weapons warfare against Hmong and Lao people in 
Laos.
    On October 12, 1975, the Communist Lao government arrested, 
tortured and killed my father, Mr. Nhia Toua Moua, a 45-year-old leader 
of the village. The Communist Lao government also tortured and killed 
four CIA soldiers, including Mr. Moua Bee, 35 years old; Mr. Boua Fue 
Moua, 38 years old; Mr. Moua Xiong, 33 years old; and Mr. Youa Lue Lor, 
37 years old. The Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese 
government have cooperated to kill many thousands of Lao and Hmong 
people in Laos because of the legacy of the Hmong-American relations 
during the Vietnam war.
    The Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government 
killed about 350,000 people in Laos in the past 24 years. The war, 
genocide, human rights violations and biological and chemical weapons 
warfare against Hmong people are still going on in Laos in 1999.
    Therefore, I respectfully request the U.S. government to stop the 
war in Laos and to save the lives of our people, because we do not want 
to die by war anymore.
    We are former soldiers under the American CIA and General Vang Pao. 
Therefore, we request that the U.S. government must save our lives. We 
do not want to die by the Communist war. We need peace, democracy and 
human rights like the American people and other people in the world 
have.
    We appeal to and request the U.S. government and international 
human rights organizations to stop the war, genocide and human rights 
violations against people in Laos. Thank you so much.

            Respectfully requested,
                                   Signed by Mr. Moua Yia
                                           Leader of the Democratic 
                                               Movement and Freedom 
                                               Fighters
                                           Phou Bia (Mount Bia), Xieng
                                           Khouang Province, Laos

cc: (1) The U.S. government
(2) U.S. Congress
(3) General Vang Pao
(4) Mr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., USA

    Notice: The above English version is a translation from the Lao 
language, which was written and signed by Mr. Moua Yia on July 4, 1999.
      

                                

    Note: This document is translated ``The Laotian Paper'' 
from a Lao version to English version by a Christian Missionary 
at Louang Prabang, Laos.

Appendix V

THE LAOTIAN PAPER

                                                  February 10, 1998

Mr. Khamtai Siphandon
Prime Minister
Office of the Chairman
Council of Ministers
Vientiane, Laos

    To Prime Minister Siphandon

    From: The Laotian People

    This letter is sent to you to demand that you immediately order 
your troops to cease fire against the Lao people in the Northern, 
Central and Southern provinces of Laos. You cannot hide the fact that 
from December 1, 1997 to the present time, countless of innocent 
Laotian men, women, and children in those provinces have been killed by 
your government's 105 mm guns, chemicals, air raids, and by other 
military attacks. We have witnesses that on January 28-29, 1998 you 
ordered Russian-made B8 helicopters to drop lethal chemicals on the 
Lao-Hmong at Phoubia, Phaphai, Phoula, Phou La Phao, Mouang Cha, Mouang 
Mok, and other areas in Xiengkhouang province. These drops of red and 
yellow chemicals and the poisoning of specific water sources have 
immediately killed thousands of Lao civilians, including men, women and 
children. Furthermore, your troops captured large groups of women and 
children. All the children were killed immediately. The women were 
raped and killed by your soldiers who left them dead and naked.
    Mr. Prime Minister, you and your colleagues cannot afford to pay 
the price for this genocide. We were born in Laos and are Lao citizens. 
We claim the rights for life and to live freely in our own country. For 
twenty-two years, the Pathet Lao regime has conducted genocide against 
the Laotian people. We demand that you and your fellow leaders 
immediately withdraw your troops which were deployed to murder Lao 
civilians in the regions mentioned above. These killings must be 
immediately stopped. Otherwise, you and your colleagues must bear 
responsibility and all the consequences.
    Be aware, that once the truth is brought to the attention of the 
international community, you and your cohorts will be held responsible 
for this genocide by millions of Lao citizens as well as the 
international community. We, the survivors of your genocide have 
concrete evidence, and we are willing to testify before our fellow Lao 
citizens and the world, that you and your cohorts are conducting the 
most bloodthirsty murder campaign against your own citizens and the 
greatest violation of human rights in our history.
    Mr. Prime Minister, the Laotian people have suffered enough from 
decades of war. We want a government that respects peace, human rights 
and which is able to stimulate economic development for the benefit of 
the people. We do not deserve any more of the crazy and bloody war that 
you and your cohorts created. The Laotian people deserve to live in 
peace.
    You will not win and will not be able to totally wipe out the 
civilians whom you consider your opposition. We, the Lao citizens, give 
you and your colleagues our last warning to either cease fire 
immediately or we will have no choice but to assert our rights as 
citizens to condemn your administration and bring you before an 
international court of law. When this happens, you and your fellow 
leaders cannot deny responsible for what you have done to the Laotian 
people.
    This letter is executed in Laos this 10th day of February 1998 by 
the Laotian people, your fellow countrymen.

            Representative of the Lao People
                                          Bounchan Sodabanh

cc: Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos
US Department of State
US Committee on Foreign Affairs Relation
US Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs
US Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand
Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of China
United Nations
Headquarters of ASEAN
World Bank
Asian Development Bank
Amnesty International
International Human Rights Organizations
Lao Human Rights Council in America
National and International Media Organizations
All Whom It May Concern
      

                                


Statement of Philip Smith, Washington, D.C., Director, Lao Veterans of 
America, Inc.

    Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you, as well as the 
honorable Members of the Trade Subcommittee, for the special 
invitation extended to the Lao Veterans of America to submit 
comments today in the U.S. House of Representatives regarding 
Laos. We appreciate your role in the debate over whether or not 
to extend Normal Trade Relations (NTR) to the regime currently 
ruling Laos, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR).
    We believe that the freedom-loving people of Laos will 
benefit, one bright day in the future, from your devotion to 
the democratic institutions and deliberative processes that 
have made America a great nation and a leader in the 
international community. Indeed, our deepest prayers and 
aspirations are to help to give voice in this testimony to the 
vast silent majority of the population in Laos--the countless 
individuals living in despair, poverty, discrimination and 
oppression in the LPDR because of decades of misguided policies 
forced upon them by a militaristic regime that has bankrupt the 
people, like the peoples of Eastern Europe under Communism, 
both economically and spiritually.

                  I. About the Lao Veterans of America

    The Lao Veterans of America (LVA) is a non-profit veterans 
organization created to educate the general public and U.S. 
policymakers about the historic contributions made by the Lao 
and Hmong veterans of the U.S. Secret Army in Laos who served 
with U.S. clandestine and military forces during the Vietnam 
War. The LVA was founded and established with visionary 
leadership from Colonel Wangyee Vang and a very dedicated group 
of individuals. It enjoys an active advisory board and the 
participation of many distinguished American leaders, including 
many Members of Congress as well as those who served in senior 
policymaking positions during the Vietnam War. Major General 
Vang Pao and General Thonglit Chokbenboun are Honorary Co-
Chairmen of the LVA. The Lao Veterans of America has chapters 
throughout the United States and represents over 60, 000 
Laotian-Americans and their families. It has been recognized 
repeatedly by the U.S. Congress, Administration officials and 
the news media for its outstanding contributions to U.S. 
national security interests during the Vietnam War as well as 
its ongoing positive work in Washington, D.C., Southeast Asia 
and communities throughout the United States. For nearly a 
decade, the Lao Veterans of America, working in cooperation 
with other like-minded organizations that share similar goals, 
has played a significant role in helping to shape U.S. policy 
toward Southeast Asia as well as domestic policy toward the 
Lao-America and Hmong-American community. The LVA has had a 
major impact in the public arena and participated in the 
national dialogue regarding vital issues, including, but not 
limited to: 1.) organizing numerous research and U.S. 
Congressional fact-finding missions to Southeast Asia; 2.) 
hosting the first national recognition ceremonies for the Hmong 
veterans and their families, including the awarding of 
Congressional citations and the establishment of a memorial in 
Arlington National Ceremony; 3.) opposing the forced 
repatriation of Laotian refugees in Southeast Asia and bringing 
thousands of additional veterans and their families to the 
United States; 4.) encouraging Congress to successfully 
introduce and develop support for legislation granting 
citizenship to Hmong and Lao veterans of the U.S. Secret Army; 
5.) urging Congress to introduce legislation that helped to 
successfully restore SSI to the Hmong and Lao veterans and 
their communities; and, 6.) playing a leadership role in the 
effort to urge Congress to reject the granting of MFN and NTR 
trade status to the LPDR regime by working to educate Members 
of Congress about the current situation in Laos and requesting 
that they continue to reject the granting of normal trade 
status to the regime in Laos until it undertakes basic economic 
and political reforms.
    In July and August of this year, the Lao Veterans of 
America conducted two major research missions to Southeast Asia 
in cooperation with Members of Congress, Southeast Asian 
government officials as well as various non-governmental 
organizations. Some of the research mission findings are 
contained in this testimony.

II. The LPDR's Failed Efforts To Gain Special Trading Status in Recent 
                                 Years

    Mr. Chairman, in 1997, the LPDR aggressively sought for the 
first time--in a bold step, unprecedented since the collapse of 
Laos to the communists in 1975--what was then called Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) trade status from the U.S. Congress. 
Hitherto, granting MFN or NTR trade status to the LPDR regime 
had not been considered by Congress given the regime's horrific 
record on numerous issues. It is important to note that by 
1997, the Lao communists were in a desperate situation and 
fearful that--like their former Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern 
Europe--events would spin out of control and they would lose 
their domestic grip on power to the forces of freedom, reform 
and market economics. In the face of deplorable, and steadily 
worsening economic conditions in the LPDR, the regime went 
abroad begging for financial aid, first from its former Cold 
War allies, including remarkably Cuba (whom, astonishingly, the 
LPDR actually asked for economic assistance from its nearly 
bankrupt ally--predictably, without result), and then, in 
desperation, from the United States. Sadly, Laos under the 
communists had become an economic basket case broken from 
decades of corruption and mismanagement in a Soviet-style 
command economy as well as the political and economic collapse 
of it largest foreign aid patron, the former Soviet Union. The 
U.S. Department of State, instead of pressing for systemic 
political and economic reform in Laos when significant 
potential leverage existed at the end of the Cold War and the 
difficult years for the regime that followed, apparently simply 
urged the LPDR to increase its efforts, in cooperation with the 
State Department, to obtain MFN trade status from the U.S. 
Congress. Moreover, the State Department worked to provide 
other forms of U.S. assistance to the Lao communists. 
Astonishingly, no significant conditions to encourage political 
and economic reform were placed on the LPDR regime by the U.S. 
Department of State in return for these generous concessions 
and Administration efforts to help obtain MFN trade status from 
Congress. Instead the State Department seemed to turn a blind 
eye to the regime's excesses and aggressively defended the LPDR 
and its policies from its critics in the United States and 
abroad.
    Hiring for the first time an American lobbyist, the LPDR 
vigorously pursued its effort to obtain MFN trade status on 
Capitol Hill with a number of its allies in the business as 
well as the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) community in 
Washington, D.C. White-washing the horrific ongoing nature of 
the LPDR and its behavior, they seemed overly eager to curry 
favor, with elements of the ruling elite in the Lao regime.
    The LPDR regime and its allies in Washington, D.C., as well 
as some elements within the State Department, also vigorously 
worked to attempt to discredit and smear the work of 
organizations, activists, journalists and ordinary public-
spirited individuals in America and abroad concerned about the 
plight and ongoing suffering of the Lao people; some of those 
targeted included people who had lost family or loved ones in 
Laos because of the regime's brutality. These efforts on the 
part of the LPDR failed miserably and, in fact, backfired on 
the regime's plans to obtain MFN trade status. The apparent 
worst enemy of the Lao government, in terms of its efforts to 
obtain MFN trade status for the first time seemed to be the Lao 
government itself. It continued to engage in reckless and 
unbridled behavior with regard to international norms and the 
mistreatment of its own people. For example, it was even so 
imprudent at the time as to crackdown publicly on religious 
practice, arresting and imprisoning dozens of Christians in 
Laos, including American missionaries. Moreover, the LPDR 
regime strangely sought to justify its inexcusable actions with 
a bizarrely worded press release posted on its Embassy's 
internet site in Washington, D.C.; this after over fifty 
Members of Congress signed a letter in protest to the religious 
crackdown against the Christians in Laos.
    Mr. Chairman, tens of thousands of Lao and Hmong-Americans 
across the United States and internationally rallied against 
the LPDR regime and its efforts to obtain MFN trade status in 
the 105th Congress. News reports filled the American press as 
well as the international media about opposition to the LPDR's 
trade efforts by the Hmong and Lao people. The Lao Veterans of 
America was pleased to help in this regard as well as to urge 
Members of Congress to review the situation more closely and to 
organize, for the first time, an actual hearing exclusively on 
the situation in Laos from the perspective of the victims. It 
is to the credit of many in the U.S. Congress that sound 
reason, the light of factual information, and the enduring 
values that have made America the great nation that it is, were 
finally able to prevail and pierce the dark deception of the 
LPDR's propaganda and disinformation effort in Washington, D.C. 
In July 1997, on the same day that the MFN legislation for Laos 
was voted on by the Trade Subcommittee, the first hearing since 
the Vietnam War was held in Congress regarding the situation in 
Laos. The Congressional Human Rights Caucus in cooperation with 
the House International Relations Committee, under the combined 
leadership of Chairman Ben Gilman, Congressman Tom Lantos, 
Congressman John Porter, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, 
Subcommittee Chairman Chris Smith, Congressman Bruce Vento and 
Congressman George Radanovich organized and hosted this 
important hearing. Lao and Hmong victims and survivors of the 
LPDR's brutality and atrocities testified about their 
experiences before the Congress. Also providing testimony were 
noted experts on the current situation in Laos such as T. Kumar 
from Amnesty International and Colonel Wangyee Vang, National 
President of the Lao Veterans of America.

III. Opposition by the Lao Veterans of America and the Vast Majority of 
Lao and Hmong-Americans to the Granting of NTR Trade Status to the Lao 
                                 Regime

    Mr. Chairman, undoubtedly in our view, and in the 
sentiments firmly held by the vast majority of Lao and Hmong-
Americans, it would be premature and unconscionable for the 
U.S. Congress to provide the LPDR regime in Laos with Normal 
Trade Relations (NTR) at this time. Although highly coveted by 
the Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party (LPRP)--particularly its 
coercive state organs of control, including its military and 
security forces, whose morbid Stalinist institutions would be 
transfused with fresh supplies of foreign investment capital--
such a move by Congress to grant NTR status to Laos would 
clearly not be in the interest of either the people of Laos or 
the United States in the current dispensation. We base our 
staunch opposition to granting NTR to the Lao government on the 
significant body of information regarding the ongoing rogue 
conduct of the LPDR regime, which includes, but is not limited 
to, the following points listed below.

IV. Overview of the Regime in Laos--The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic 
 (LPDR)--A Threat to Civil Society in Communities in South East Asia, 
              the United States and the Internationally. 

    The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR) is a one-party 
communist state ruled by the Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party 
(LPRP). The LPRP exercises absolute control over the State and 
its institutions. It is intolerant of political diversity and 
the existence of political and religious groups or 
organizations with differing viewpoints. The communist party 
enjoys a monopoly on power at all levels of society in Laos. 
All other political parties outlawed. Military and security 
forces consume a disproportionately large amount of the State's 
annual budget and are tasked with crushing all forms of free 
thought that might emerge to challenge the policies or power of 
the State or its leadership--including political, religious, 
social and economic thought. The LPDR retains close working 
relationships on security and other maters with rogue, or 
Stalinist regimes in North Korea and Cuba. For example, in 
1995, the government of Laos took a delivery of 20 busts of its 
communist Party founder, Kaysone Phomvihane from North Korea--
whose sculptors produced similar busts of the former Korean 
Dictator Kim IL-Sung. Currently, these busts are being placed 
in newly constructed memorial squares in all of the provincial 
capitals of Laos as well as other LPDR designated locations 
throughout the country. It is, therefore, no surprise that the 
LPDR remains one of the most corrupt, repressive and backward 
nations in Southeast Asia and, indeed, the world. In the last 
decade, the LPDR and its leadership have become more obsessed 
with absolute control of the State, and have heighten coercive 
efforts against political, ethnic and religious dissidents and 
opposition groups in Laos, especially after the Berlin Wall was 
brought down and the economic and political collapse of its 
chief patron--the former Soviet Union.
    LPDR military and security forces engage in ethnic and 
political cleansing of dissident and minority elements who 
challenge the LPRP's policies or leadership. Dissidents or 
members of suspect ethnic minorities are often jailed or 
executed extrajudicially--many simply disappear. Independent 
human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Asia 
Watch are barred from Laos by the government. Foreign 
journalists are assigned ``minders'' by the LPDR security 
services to monitor their movements and activities. Frequent 
reports by Lao and Hmong families living in the United States 
or abroad regarding allegations of the persecution or killings 
of their relatives still residing in Laos by the regime are 
sometimes difficult to confirm independently because of these 
restrictions and the often secretive nature of the LPDR regime.

 V. Ongoing Ethnic Cleansing Operations by the LPDR Regime Against the 
                Hmong and Other Minority Groups in Laos.

    There are numerous and ongoing large-scale and small-unit 
ethnic cleansing operations being conducted by the LPDR 
military and security forces against Hmong, Khmu, Mien and 
other minority enclaves in Laos. Accurate numbers as to the 
casualties killed and wounded in Laos by the government remain 
elusive due to the closed nature of the LPDR regime as well as 
the remoteness of the regions and the primitive conditions that 
exist in many parts of Laos. In the 1990s, however, 
conservative estimates place the number of minority people 
killed annually in Laos by the government in these operations 
at several thousand. Numbers were far higher on an annual basis 
in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s following the 
collapse of the Royal Lao government and the takeover by the 
communists in 1975. In the 1980s, large-scale operations by 
Vietnamese military forces in Laos, in coordination with LPDR 
security forces, probably accounted for the deaths of tens of 
thousands of Hmong and other minority peoples on an annual 
basis. Moreover, tens of thousands of Hmong and Lao people also 
fled the country as refugees across the Mekong River to 
Thailand during these years.
    Mr. Chairman, currently military operations are being 
conducted by the LPDR in northern Xieng Khouang Province, Laos, 
against some 8,000 Hmong people that are largely surrounded in 
two major defensive pockets. International Relations Committee 
Chairman Benjamin Gilman raised serious concerns about this 
issue with Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of Thailand in August 
of this year after his staff conducted research interviews with 
Hmong leaders and representatives from this area. Thai 
officials and key leaders in the United States Congress remain 
concerned about the possible need to provide humanitarian 
assistance for a potential refugee influx that the ongoing LPDR 
ethnic cleansing operations might generate.
    In Southern Xieng Khouang Province (including what the LPDR 
established as the ``Xiasomboun Special Zone''), Bolikhamsai 
Province and Khammuan Province, Laos, some 1500 Hmong are being 
hunted by special LPDR ethnic cleansing units tasked with 
exterminating them.
    In the Southern panhandle of Laos, hundreds of Khmu people 
who oppose the LPDR's policies are subjected to military 
attacks by the regime that have claimed the lives of hundreds 
of people over the last several years. Many have begun to take 
up arms against the government or flee to the jungle in self-
defense.
    Mr. Chairman, currently, in 1999, it is estimated that at 
least 12,000 minority people are currently in imminent danger 
of extermination in Laos by LPDR ethnic cleansing units. The 
Hmong people continue to be singled out for attack by the LPDR 
which still often mistrusts them, given their role in support 
of anti-communist efforts with U.S. clandestine and military 
forces during the Vietnam War. The main targets of ethnic 
cleansing by the LPDR regime are almost exclusively civilians 
living in villages in various remote areas of Laos--where 
people wish to live in freedom, and resistance and opposition 
forces continue to seek safe-haven from the regime. Current, 
LPDR tactics do not seek to discriminate between civilian and 
resistance targets. Suspect or unspecified ethnic minority 
groups in their traditional rural or mountain homelands are 
attacked by military and security forces with the apparent 
intent to kill all of the inhabitants. Entire villages are 
attacked indiscriminately with seemingly no regard for civilian 
lives--especially those of women and children who, if they 
survive the initial attack, are often raped, mutilated or 
summarily executed. For such operations, the LPDR routinely 
deploys for airborne support its older, but still quite lethal, 
Soviet-built MI-6 and MI-8 ``HIP-E'' attack helicopters--in 
tactical combat formations of four to six helicopters--
sometimes equipped with 57 mm rocket pods, machine guns and 
cluster munitions. It is also worthy to note that the LPDR is 
deploying, in larger numbers, ethnic battalions of communist or 
conscripted Hmong and other minorities against people of their 
own ethnicity in an effort to obtain better intelligence as 
well as divide and conquer these groups. Currently, one 
battalion each of communist or conscripted Hmong are reportedly 
deployed in Xieng Khouang and Khammuan provinces respectively 
to assist LPDR ethnic cleansing units with their operations.
    LPDR troops often suffer from severe discipline problems 
and low morale due to conscription and lack of pay for months 
on end. These problems have been exacerbated in recent years 
with the economic crisis in Laos. Consequently, LPDR troops are 
frequently known to loot, plunder and rape in many of the areas 
where they operate. The military and security forces are thus 
viewed with ever increasing suspicion, contempt and hostility 
by many Lao people. Underground political and armed opposition 
groups continue to develop and grow in such an environment.
    Astonishingly, the LPDR regime apparently continues to 
aggressively desire military support and senior-level advice 
from Vietnam for its military operations against the Hmong 
people in Xieng Khouang Province. On May 31, 1998, the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that the Voice of 
Vietnam in Hanoi had announced the crash in Xieng Khouang 
Province, Laos, of a very senior delegation of Vietnamese 
military officials, on May 25, headed by Lt. General Dao Trong 
Lich who was the Deputy Minister of National Defense as well as 
the Chief of Staff of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) and a 
member of the Central Committee of the communist Party. Twelve 
(12) additional senior Vietnamese military officials died in 
the crash including a number of top Generals commanding various 
military regions in Vietnam, the Chief of the Vietnam Military 
Attache Office in the LPDR, Colonel Le Van Han, as well as 
Colonel Hoang Binh Quan, Deputy Commander of the Border Defense 
Forces. It is important to note that Hmong resistance units 
operating in defense of their people in Xieng Khouang Province 
reported shooting down this aircraft in Laos with small arms 
fire from AK-47s, after the aircraft had circled in an apparent 
reconnaissance effort following a major LPDR offensive against 
the Hmong. Lowland Lao and Lao minority groups opposed to the 
LPDR, including many Hmong, also report the regime's ongoing 
reliance on Vietnamese advisors, troops and weapons.
    Mr. Chairman, it is also important to note that there 
continues to be numerous credible eye-witness reports of the 
use of various types of chemical agents by the LPDR against 
crops, livestock and civilians in Laos, particularly in 
mountainous areas inhabited by the Hmong and other minorities. 
These reports detail the use of chemical defoliants against 
food crops cultivated by rural people living outside the 
control of the government. They also discuss lethal and non-
lethal gases delivered either by aircraft, or in some cases 
mortar or artillery shells. Various reports from reliable 
sources also describe toxic chemicals used by LPDR special 
operations units to contaminate and poison the water supply in 
wells and upstream in creeks that run through Hmong and 
minority villages--in areas that are not under the military 
control of the LPDR regime.

         VI. Ongoing Religious Persecution by the LPDR Regime.

    Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, freedom of religion does not 
exist in the LPDR. Thousands of Lao Buddhists and Christians 
have been arrested and jailed since the regime took power 
simply because of their religious convictions. Arrests have 
intensified in 1998 and 1999. Amnesty International reports 
that at least forty-five (45) prisoners of conscience were 
arrested in 1998 for the practice of their religious beliefs. 
Amnesty documents that at least forty-four (44) people were 
arrested in January, including thirty-nine (39) Lao, three (3) 
American citizens as well as one (1) French and one (1) Thai 
national. This occurred at a Bible study meeting in the house 
of Sy Yilatchai in the capital of Laos, Vientiane, organized by 
the Church of Christ.
    Amnesty International further reports that Father Tito 
Banchong Thopayong, a Catholic Priest, was arrested by Lao 
authorities in Bokeo province. The reported official reason by 
the LPDR for his arrest, according to Amnesty, was the teaching 
of religion without permission. He had been the assistant 
parish priest at the Catholic Cathedral in Vientiane and was 
also reportedly arrested and imprisoned for several years 
during the 1980s for his religious activities.
    Mr. Chairman, in recent years the LPDR in cooperation with 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has undertaken a major 
new campaign to eradicate Christianity among the Hmong and 
other hill tribes in Laos and Vietnam. Anti-Christian 
literature is being circulated by LPRP cadres and LPDR 
officials. Regime crackdowns are in full swing. The Hmong, long 
marginalized, discriminated against, and targeted for ethnic 
cleansing by the communists, are responding to the message of 
hope and charity that they receive from Christian missionaries 
and overseas Christian radio broadcasts. Tens of thousands are 
converting to Christianity in Laos and Vietnam in defiance to 
the government. However, they will continue to pay a high price 
for their faith as thousands are now being rounded up for 
arrest, interrogation, imprisonment, torture--and worse. Time 
Magazine's most recent edition (Asia Edition, Sept. 13, 1999) 
offers a disturbing picture of the terrible new plight 
potentially facing so many Hmong people and other minority 
Christians in Vietnam in an article entitled ``God vs. the 
Cadres.''
    Mr. Chairman, the LPDR continues to harass and oppress the 
faithful who do not register with the government or who meet in 
private to worship so as to avoid government scrutiny. The 
State Department's first report of global religious liberty, 
issued just this week by Robert Seiple, former President of 
Eastern College and Ambassador at large for international 
religious freedom, cites the fact that Buddhist Monks in Laos 
are required to undergo mandatory Marxist-Leninist training. 
Indeed, the LPDR maintains a tight grip on all Buddhist temples 
and monitors closely the activities of Buddhist monks 
throughout the country. The Buddhist clergy and faithful are 
strictly prohibited from speaking out against the LPDR regime 
or government policies, no matter how unjust.

  VII. Ongoing Persecution of Political Dissidents by the LPDR Regime.

    Mr. Chairman, the ongoing persecution of political 
dissidents in Laos by the LPDR is a major problem documented in 
part by Amnesty International and others. Recent interviews 
with ethnic lowland Lao political dissidents as well as 
intellectuals and minority dissidents confirm the continued 
violent intolerance of the regime toward free thought, dissent 
and political pluralism. Intellectuals and political dissidents 
who advocate even basic changes toward democracy or political 
power sharing are, if the do not disappear or are not executed 
extrajudicially at the hands of security forces, simply 
imprisoned for lengthy periods of time under the harshest of 
conditions. Prominent cases publicized by Amnesty 
International, such as that of the three Lao prisoners of 
conscience held in Prison Camp 7 in a remote area of Houa Phanh 
Province, are clearly symbolic. They represent the mere tip of 
the iceberg in terms of political dissidents and prisoners of 
conscience held for long periods in the Lao gulag system.

VIII. Accountability for the Disappearance of American Citizens in Laos 
     and Prominent Hmong and Lao Refugees Repatriated to the LPDR.

    On April 19, 1999, two U.S. citizens of Hmong-American 
descent, Mr. Houa Ly and Mr. Michael Vang, were abducted by Lao 
security forces while traveling to Laos near the Thai/Lao 
border on the Mekong River near Chiang Khong. American 
eyewitness survivors of the abduction, non-governmental sources 
investigating the incident, as well as Thai military and 
intelligence officials, have confirmed that the two Americans 
were indeed abducted by the LPDR authorities. Both men have not 
been heard from since, despite a two-page Congressional letter 
drafted by Congressman Mark Green and signed by five Members of 
Congress. Signatories to the May 19, 1999, letter to Secretary 
of State Madeline Albright included International Relations 
Committee Chairman Ben Gilman as well as Human Rights 
Subcommittee Chairman Chris Smith. It requested immediate 
action to assist in recovering the two men if their are alive--
or alternatively if they are dead for their bodies to be 
returned. Congressman George Radonovich likewise initiated a 
major investigation into the case and developed efforts to seek 
to recover the two missing Americans or their remains. Thai 
military and intelligence sources, responding to Rep. 
Radanovich's investigation efforts, have stated that the two 
Hmong-Americans were likely tortured under interrogation and 
summarily executed by LPDR security forces.
    Mr. Chairman, in the face of an overwhelming body of 
evidence, the LPDR regimes flatly denies abducting the two 
Americans and has recently accused the Voice of America (VOA) 
Lao Service of slandering it for reporting about the case. 
Surviving family members of the victims, including their 
spouses and children, continue to press the U.S. Congress to 
obtain more concrete answers from the LPDR. Forthcoming 
legislation is expected from a bipartisan group of Congressmen 
and Senators regarding the case.
    Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time prominent Hmong 
have disappeared in Laos. Hmong leader Vue Mai and many others 
repatriated from refugee camps in Thailand have likewise 
disappeared without a trace in Laos in recent years. 
Independent journalists, including Marc Kaufman of the 
Philadelphia Inquirer, and numerous Congressional research 
missions have confirmed the LPDR's apparent role in the 
mistreatment, disappearance and killings of Hmong and Lao 
refugees in the Laos.

IX. Ongoing LPDR Silence on the Fate of the King and Queen of Laos and 
                      Members of the Royal Family

    Mr. Chairman, the beloved King and Queen of Laos were part 
of the ancient and proud traditions of the Kingdom of Laos--the 
Kingdom of A Million Elephants. Like the King and Queen of 
Thailand, the Royal Family are still held in the highest 
respect by so many people. His Royal Majesty King Savang 
Vatthana and Her Royal Majesty Queen Khamponi, as well as key 
Members of the Royal Family, disappeared in the Lao gulag 
system soon after the communist's seized power. To this day, 
despite the outpouring of national emotion and reconciliation 
in Russia regarding the murder of the last Czar and his family 
by the Soviets, and appeals by many in the Lao Diaspora, the 
LPDR has refused to come to terms with its past and the fate of 
the Royal family. Not even the location, time or means of the 
assumed deaths of Royal Family members are known.
    Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Congress should not consider 
granting MFN to the LPDR regime until it provides truthful and 
complete information about the fate of the Royal Family and 
provides to the people of Laos the final remains of the King 
and Queen.

        X. LPDR State Sponsored Drug Production and Trafficking

    Mr. Chairman, it is critical to note that the LPDR remains 
one of the world's largest producers of opium. Traditionally 
cultivated by the Hmong and other highland peoples of Southeast 
Asia, the LPDR military and security forces now oversee and 
control the production and trafficking of narcotics in Laos. 
Senior LPDR military and security officials have developed more 
extensive and sophisticated networks of narcotics smuggling and 
distribution through Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, China and 
Burma. They have successfully worked to establish and expand 
international narcotics trafficking networks in the United 
States and abroad--with growing influence in the Lao Diaspora 
community in California, Minnesota and elsewhere. The threat to 
civil society in communities throughout Laos, Vietnam and the 
United States as a result of LPDR narcotics trafficking is 
growing. Associated social ills, including the corruption of 
public officials and government employees, increased crime, 
child prostitution, AIDS/HIV transmission and the corrosive 
activities of organized criminal syndicates appear to be 
rapidly following on the footsteps of these developments in 
many communities in Southeast Asia and internationally.

 XI. Systemic Corruption in the LPDR, Disregard for the Rule of Law as 
  well as Economic Mismanagement, are a Threat to U.S. Taxpayers and 
                          American Investment.

    Mr. Chairman, numerous small and medium-sized investors and 
companies have been scammed or their investments and assets in 
the LPDR confiscated or stolen by Lao authorities. Indeed, the 
LPDR has consistently demonstrated contempt for the rule of 
law--both domestically and internationally. It suffers both 
from the lack of the existence of the rule of law in terms of 
the day-to-day functioning of the State as well as simple 
respect for it. There is no independent judiciary. Judges and 
courts are notorious instruments of the LPRP and the LPDR--
including the private financial interests of various officials. 
Often, they are hopelessly corrupted with threats of coercive 
action, bribes and kickbacks from LPRP and LPDR officials. The 
remnants of civil society in Laos is now run largely by 
organized criminal elements--individuals and families--
operating under the guise of communist party officialdom. 
Systemic political and economic corruption are still grossly 
exacerbated in Laos by its leadership's control of the command 
economy and natural resources.
    The current situation in Laos in terms of the legal 
environment for business as well as the economic and political 
situation represent a significant risk to the U.S. taxpayers 
and investors in the LPDR. Moreover, in the past year, with the 
ongoing effects of corruption and economic mismanagement in the 
economy, as well as the lingering problems caused by the Asian 
economic downturn which originated in Thailand, the LPDR's 
currency, the Kip, has plummeted to record lows against the 
U.S. dollar and the Thai Baht, as well as other international 
currencies. The currency used in Laos is no longer the official 
currency, but is now largely the Baht and the U.S. dollar. Kip 
bank notes officially issued by the LPDR are viewed by the Lao 
people with increasing suspicion and now trade at between 8,000 
and 9,000 to the U.S. dollar. Consumer prices have doubled 
since 1997 in Laos. Major infrastructure and development 
projects, including large bridge and railroad projects across 
the Mekong River supported by international investors, have 
apparently been put on hold in Laos.
    On August 12, 1999, the Bangkok Post ran a major piece 
regarding the dramatic reshuffling of key LPDR officials in 
charge of economic and financial affairs. The piece provided a 
shocking analysis of the deplorable economic situation in Laos 
that both experts and diplomats say show the country is in deep 
trouble with increasing pressure on General Sisavath 
Keobounphanh, the Prime Minister, to pull Laos out of its 
current crisis. Notably, General Sisavath has articulated his 
efforts at concentrating on curbing imports to Laos in order to 
save the countries depleted foreign reserves. At this time, it 
would appear that extending NTR trade status to the LPDR would 
likely be a one-way street in terms of trade with America. The 
LPDR would export to the United States with very little likely 
being purchased by Laos from America.
    Mr. Chairman, extending NTR trade relations to the LPDR 
regime in Laos is clearly premature for so many compelling 
reasons. I would urge the Trade Subcommittee to reject the 
granting of NTR to the LPDR regime in 1999, and for the 
duration of the 106th Congress. Economic and political reforms 
are badly needed in Laos; it would behoove the U.S. Congress to 
continue to request and expect such changes, particularly on 
behalf of the Hmong and the other suffering peoples of Laos, 
prior to its granting Laos NTR trade status.
    Thank You.
      

                                


                          Lao Veterans of America, Inc.    
                                           Fresno, CA 93727
                                                  September 7, 1999

Congressman Philip M. Crane, Chairman
Ways and Means Subcommittee On Trade
233 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-1308

    Dear Congressman Crane:

    I am writing this letter to you and your committee regarding our 
continued strong objections to the extension of permanent normal trade 
relations to the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos). The Lao 
Veterans of America, 55,000 strong including 11,000 plus Hmong and 
Ethnic Lao veterans wives, widows and children have in the past, 
furnished evidence to the media, to historians, and congress regarding 
past persecution of Hmong and ethnic Lao by the Lao Peoples Democratic 
Republic (LPDR) after the Vietnam war. I have attached letters of 
congressional concern, news articles and other information pertinent to 
this subject. New evidence of killings and persecutions come to the 
attention of our organization on a regular basis from our membership. 
This information consists of cassette tapes smuggled out of Laos and 
both verbal and written reports from individuals who have visited Laos 
within the past year. These visits confirm that ethnic cleansing by the 
LPDR has not stopped. Examples of this ethnic cleansing include 
continued use of poison gas, indiscriminate killing of innocent 
civilians, disappearances of former soldiers who supported the United 
States during the Vietnam war and imprisonment of Christians for 
conducting religious services. Of particular concern are reports, from 
independent sources, that the LPDR has hired 6 to 8 man teams to 
infiltrate Hmong village areas and seed the trails and area with land 
mines. These reports discussed deaths and loss of limbs that resulted 
from this tactic. We also understand the LPDR sponsors and pays these 
teams. Individuals who have witnessed these recent atrocities and know 
of these activities as well as the cassette tapes mentioned would be 
made available to your committee upon your request.
    We believe the current Lao government has not changed nor does it 
intend to. The fact that no basic rights exist today in Laos, that Laos 
is a well documented exporter of heroin to the United States, and that 
the Heritage Foundation still ranks Laos as one of the most repressed 
economies of the world add to the above reasons for our objection to 
normal trade status with Laos. Laos today still has no human rights 
organizations operating in the area where atrocity reports continue. 
Ambassador Chamberlin stated in a St. Paul Pioneer Press 1998 interview 
that killing still continues and the Lao government is unresponsive. We 
therefore believe that the United States government still does not have 
the true picture of this ethnic cleansing in remote areas of Laos. 
Finally, testimony before human rights congressional committees is 
available, as well, for your consideration.
    In behalf of all Hmong veterans and their families as well as other 
ethnic Lao groups who fought for this government we ask that you 
continue to withhold normal trade relations until basic human rights 
are restored and monitored in Laos. Only continued pressure on this 
dictatorship government will save lives that have not yet been lost. 
Rewarding The LPDR with normal trade relations will mean that past 
lives, lives given in support of the United States, will have been 
sacrificed in vain.
    Thank you for your consideration of our comments.

            Sincerely,
                                               Wangyee Vang
                                                 National President

    [Attachments are being retained in the Committee files.]
      

                                


Statement of Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director, National League 
of POW/MIA Families

    Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee......I welcome this 
opportunity to submit a statement on behalf of the Vietnam War 
POW/MIA families. The timing is vital, and congressional 
attention could be helpful.
    The National League of POW/MIA Families supports Normal 
Trade Relations with Laos. Our position was formalized by vote 
of the families many years ago, conditioned on continued and 
increased cooperation by the Lao Government on POW/MIA 
accounting issues. Though it was then entitled MFN, rather than 
NTR, our support then and now is based on the fact that Lao 
Government cooperation to account for missing Americans has 
continued to increase and become more effective. Unlike 
Vietnam, there is little evidence that the Lao Government has 
purposely manipulated the accounting of our relatives for 
political and economic gain, but rather responded to a US 
concerning with hope of reciprocity. Yes, they expect and 
receive compensation for their efforts, just as Vietnam, 
Cambodia, China, Russia and other countries from which such 
cooperation is requested.
    With limited resources and massive obstacles to overcome, 
Laos' cooperation to account for missing Americans is making 
progress, still much too slowly, but steady and predictable in 
terms of answers for the families. Could more be done? Of 
course, and we continue to press for greater cooperation, 
especially in terms of oral history interviews of current and 
former officials who may have direct knowledge, a sensitive 
matter for the Lao Government. There is also more than could be 
done to locate and provide the limited archival records that 
may exist. Vice Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Somsavad 
Lengsavad pledged to increase such efforts when we met in May 
of this year. Laos' record demonstrates that pledges and 
commitments are implemented, albeit slowly, but implementation 
occurs and results come.
    Throughout the years since the National League of POW/MIA 
Families was formed in May 1970, there have been many 
difficulties and obstacles. The POW/MIA issue from the Vietnam 
War, as compared to other wars, is very different. Not only was 
there no timely U. S. access to the battlefields, but the US 
faced a national Vietnamese policy of well orchestrated 
exploitation of the issue for their political and economic 
objectives.
    The greatest challenges came during the immediate postwar 
period, and they were very tough to overcome. Then, from 1981-
92, the primary US objective with Vietnam was accounting as 
fully as possible for America's POW/MIAs, anticipating that 
satisfactory resolution could allow the United States and 
Vietnam to move toward normal relations after a Cambodia 
settlement. During this period significant accountability 
occurred.
    The Clinton Administration has rhetorically taken the same 
public stance regarding highest priority on resolving the POW/
MIA issue, and some objectives are being met. The process of 
joint cooperation is bringing some success, especially in Laos, 
but POW/MIA accounting from Vietnam has been minimal when 
compared to long-established expectations.
    The most glaring challenge the League now faces is US 
policy that continues to lavishly praise Vietnamese 
cooperation, without unilateral actions by Hanoi to account for 
Americans. Such actions include repatriation of remains that 
cannot be recovered in the field and accounting for last known 
alive discrepancy (LKA) cases, linked directly to archival data 
which Vietnam continues to withhold.
    Today, 2,054 Americans are still missing and unaccounted 
for from the Vietnam War, though there are approximately 200 
``sets'' of Vietnam War-related remains in varying stages of 
the identification process. About half of the 2,054 Americans 
were originally carried as POW or MIA; the other half were 
original status KIA/BNR, or killed-in-action/body-not-
recovered.
    Statistical data surrounding this issue changes constantly, 
but one crucial, though seldom mentioned fact is the US must 
turn to Vietnam to account for almost 95% of all missing 
Americans, regardless of where the loss occurred. In Laos, 
where 442 are still missing, over 80% were lost in areas under 
Vietnamese control at the time; in Cambodia, the figure is 90% 
of the 74 US losses. There are also 8 Americans still 
unaccounted for from the Vietnam War whose incidents occurred 
in the territorial waters of the PRC.
    The League definition of accountability, long ago accepted 
officially as well, is the missing man returned alive, or his 
identifiable remains or convincing evidence as to why neither 
is possible, in which case the individual's name stays on the 
list as unaccounted for, but there is little to no expectation 
of further information or remains recovery.
    Our expectations, based upon official information and other 
evidence, have long been realistic. We accept the nature of war 
that does not allow answers on all the missing. Knowing the 
historical record, understanding the volume of intelligence 
data and having witnessed Hanoi's manipulation of the issue for 
decades, the League also recognizes approaches that work, 
versus those that do not.
    In May of this year, a League delegation met with senior 
officials in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, urging steps that each 
country, especially Vietnam, could take unilaterally to 
facilitate answers. We also sought improvements in the 
bilateral and multilateral cooperative process, a necessary 
element due to Vietnam's control of the areas where most US 
losses occurred. The results were encouraging, and we issued a 
full report that was given to the families at our 30th Annual 
Meeting in June. A copy of our trip report is attached to this 
statement. Almost unbelievably, steps since taken by the 
administration have served to undercut, rather than reinforce 
the need for implementation of pledges and agreements made by 
these three governments.
    The administration's failure to seriously follow-up 
initiatives that could be useful in achieving what they claim 
is the highest priority of bilateral relations with Vietnam--
POW/MIA accounting--may relate to their real highest priority--
NTR with Vietnam before the end of this year. It is no secret 
that US Ambassador to Vietnam Pete Peterson has been very 
actively engaged in lobbying his former colleagues in the House 
and Senate on that subject. It is also no secret that the 
Clinton Administration has consistently rejected use of any 
leverage, political or economic, to achieve POW/MIA and other 
humanitarian objectives.
    The League's opposition to NTR for Vietnam is not 
ideological, but based upon Hanoi's failure thus far to resume 
unilateral actions that could account for scores of missing 
Americans. Manipulation of this issue has been a consistent 
pattern coming from Hanoi--from Vietnam's leadership, not the 
Vietnamese people. To objective observers, Hanoi's record over 
the years proves our point. There is apparent unwillingness, 
however, by most current US officials to recognize and accept 
the historical pattern as valid, including Hanoi's failure to 
account for the most obvious cases of Americans last known to 
be alive.
    Official US statements now refer to last known alive cases 
as ``down to 43'' from 196, with no reference to the fact that 
the remains of less than 50 of these men have been returned and 
identified or are believed to be in the identification process. 
The others, if dead, should be the easiest to account for by 
returning remains, not the hardest, as alleged by Ambassador 
Peterson and others in this administration, since they 
obviously were not destroyed in an aircraft crash.
    Administration officials also consistently ignore a direct 
1985 admission by a member of the Vietnamese Politburo to a 
White House official that hundreds of remains were being 
withheld. Since 1990, Vietnam has failed to renew unilateral 
repatriation of stored remains, and, ironically, US policy-
makers seem to accept the Politburo's failure to authorize such 
full cooperation as somehow proving that there are no more 
available. Why? Presumably because acknowledging that Vietnam 
is withholding remains and information, rather than ``fully 
cooperating in good faith'' as President Clinton most recently 
certified to Congress, is counter to the administration's real 
objective--NTR regardless of the cost to achieving POW/MIA and 
other humanitarian objectives. We would welcome sufficient 
unilateral actions by Vietnam that would allow us to support 
NTR for them as we do for Laos.
    Despite this reality, the POW/MIA families continue to 
support broad-based humanitarian aid to the people of Vietnam, 
as we do the Lao and Cambodian peoples. We also support a 
rational policy to meet Vietnam's political and economic 
objectives--as they meet ours in terms of accounting for 
missing Americans--not payment in advance in the naive hope 
that Vietnam will respond in good faith.
    We continue to support Normal Trade Relations with Laos, 
confident that the Lao Government will honor its commitments. 
We urge Congress to support this step, while scrutinizing the 
same favorable treatment for Vietnam until and unless the 
Politburo resumes and increases unilateral actions to account 
for America's POW/MIAs.
    Thank you.
      

                                

LEAGUE DELEGATION TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

    A delegation of the National League of POW/MIA Families 
visited Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from May 11-22. In 
Thailand, the Delegation met with US diplomatic officials, 
Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) Stony Beach personnel. The visit to 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia reinforced to senior officials in 
each country the families' views regarding the status of 
efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for 
America's POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. Representing all of 
the families were Chairman of the Board Jo Anne Shirley and 
Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths. Richard T. Childress, 
National Security Council (NSC) Director of Asian Affairs from 
1981-89, during both Reagan terms, and a Vietnam veteran, 
agreed to the unanimous request of the League's Board of 
Directors to serve as adviser on this mission.
    In each country, the delegation was briefed by US Embassy, 
Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel. Prior to departure, the 
Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO), JTF-FA and the Central 
Identification Laboratory (CILHI) were very helpful in 
preparing updates on material that was utilized during the 
trip. The logistic support provided by all US Government 
organizations/agencies was invaluable, ensuring that the League 
Delegation's mission was carried out smoothly.

                               BACKGROUND

    This was the fourth League Delegation since the end of the 
Vietnam War in 1975. The first was in 1982, just after it was 
apparent that priority would be raised in the Reagan 
Administration. From 1983-1993, the League's Executive Director 
represented the POW/MIA families on numerous US Government 
delegations in which Childress also participated until 1989, 
including those led by former Presidential Emissary/Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey, USA-Retired. A 
League Delegation in 1994 was comprised of former Chairman of 
the Board Sue Scott, Board member Colleen Shine and the 
Executive Director, who also participated in 1994 and 1995 
missions led by Presidential Emissary Hershel Gober, then, as 
now, the Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
    A League Delegation in May of 1997 included Board Chairman 
Jo Anne Shirley, Board member/returned POW LTC David Gray, Jr., 
USAF-Retired, and the Executive Director. At that time, it was 
the Board's view that the League should attempt to send a 
delegation every two years to conduct an on-the-scene 
assessment of efforts and to ensure that all governments 
involved understand the families' views. In January of this 
year, the Board made the final decision on the current mission, 
and, fortunately, the timing coincided with Childress' travel 
on business in the region. He graciously altered his schedule 
to hold over in Bangkok awaiting the League delegates' arrival 
before all embarked to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

                           TIMING AND PURPOSE

    The League has had both policy and operational concerns for 
the past several years. Our concerns stem from the destruction 
of POW/MIA criteria in the ``roadmap'' on normalization of 
relations with Vietnam, the abolition of the POW/MIA 
Interagency Group, the consistently glowing remarks on the 
status of the issue from policy officials who are truly 
unfamiliar with the issue, the lack of integration of the issue 
into US foreign policy, the ``turf battles'' among US 
Government agencies and organizations with POW/MIA 
responsibilities, senior-level downgrading of accountability 
expectations, and the lack of new initiatives to move this 
issue toward resolution.
    This state of affairs has generated perceptions by 
Vietnamese and, to a lesser extent, Lao and Cambodian officials 
that the US Government and, by extension, the American public 
is satisfied that all that could possibly be done is either 
underway or completed. While the families, informed veterans, 
some in Congress, and many current and former officials know 
this is not true, the perception hampers implementation of what 
is stated as a highest priority.
    Since President Clinton has repeatedly certified to 
Congress that Vietnam is ``fully cooperating in good faith'' to 
resolve the issue, or similar such language, it was considered 
very important to convey to senior Vietnamese, Lao and 
Cambodian leaders the families' views on what we consider full 
cooperation, to reinforce the positive aspects of the 
government-to-government efforts, and provide our frank 
assessment of where improvements are needed. It was also timely 
to conduct an assessment due to the Clinton Administration's 
publication of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE); the 
declassified summary seriously downgraded, even dismissed, 
earlier intelligence assessments on which long-standing 
accounting expectations have been based. The League Delegation 
also sought firsthand knowledge from participants in the joint 
accounting process, both US officials and those of Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia.
    The Clinton Administration is moving to reach a trade 
agreement with Vietnam and grant Normal Trade Relations, or 
NTR, (previously Most Favored Nation status) by the end of this 
year. Therefore, the Delegation looked closely at the level of 
Vietnamese cooperation, as well as that of Laos and Cambodia. 
Other priorities included seeking improvements in the 
accounting process--the US Government's approach to both joint 
activities and unilateral efforts by the governments of 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia--to ensure that all available assets 
and resources, including DIA's POW/MIA team, Stony Beach, are 
being fully utilized to expedite and increase accounting 
results.
    In the view of the League, veterans, former and current US 
officials, and key Members of Congress, cooperation in ``full 
faith'' requires renewed unilateral actions by Vietnam. The 
Delegation reinforced this position, as well as the continuing 
need for joint field operations, particularly in Laos. Joint 
field activities alone cannot achieve the fullest possible 
accounting; increased unilateral effort by Vietnam is required, 
including effort to locate and return identifiable remains. 
Without such effort, ``full faith'' cooperation by that 
government is not a sustainable conclusion.
    We believe we made progress on all of these issues, but 
ultimate success will be dependent upon effective follow-up by 
the US Government and a sincere effort by the governments of 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to carry out the welcome commitments 
made to us, as outlined in this report. We found some very 
dedicated, hard-working military and civilian personnel in JTF-
FA, Stony Beach and on the US Embassy staffs who care deeply 
about their mission.
    We also found evidence of ``turf wars'' that are hampering 
the most effective pursuit of the issue and attitudes among 
some that simply reflect the current administration's policy of 
pursuing the issue without interfacing with other priorities. 
These problems are of concern, and the League is providing 
specific recommendations to our government. We believe the 
executive branch can solve them and that is our expectation. 
Such problems are unnecessary obstacles to a truly effective 
effort and waste some of the considerable resources dedicated 
to obtaining the fullest possible accounting.
    While this and other trips cost the League significant 
resources, we believe they are worthwhile, an attitude 
expressed to us by officials of all governments. By providing 
continuity of objective expectations and a critique by the 
families on a regular basis, we can bring new ideas and, 
hopefully, revitalization of government-to-government efforts 
which we support as the only possible means to receive answers.

                                THAILAND

    In Bangkok, final preparations were made for discussions in 
Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. The Delegation met with the US 
Ambassador to Thailand, Richard Hechlinger, DIA's Stony Beach 
Chief COL K.C. Marshment, USA, and LTC Jeff Smith, USAF, JTF-FA 
Detachment 1 Commander. The support and assistance provided by 
JTF-FA and Stony Beach immediately prior to departure for Hanoi 
are deeply appreciated and were most helpful. Another 
significant contribution during the time in Bangkok was the 
gracious hospitality of Ambassador Hechlinger in making his 
official Guest House available for the League's use, saving the 
League funds otherwise necessary for the trip.

                                VIETNAM

    The first meeting was at the US Embassy with US Ambassador 
to Vietnam Douglas ``Pete'' Peterson, during which the 
Ambassador provided his views on bilateral interests in general 
as well as where he feels things currently stand on the issue. 
The League Delegation conveyed to the Ambassador the purpose 
and approach to be pursued while in Hanoi. This was followed by 
a lengthy, very interesting session at JTF-FA Detachment 2, 
commanded by LTC Matt Martin, USA. The level of knowledge and 
the depth of the briefing on current JTF operations was 
helpful, as was the direct interchange between all 
participants. The support of MSgt Ron Ward, a skilled 
Vietnamese linguist, was greatly appreciated, including an 
added requirement to make adjustments to an already full 
schedule.
    The Delegation would have gained useful insights from a 
proposed visit to the site of an ongoing underwater excavation, 
but time requirements precluded accepting the invitation. The 
need to first meet with appropriate senior officials and lay 
out the concerns and initiatives, then discuss in greater 
detail and provide suggestions for implementation to 
representatives of the Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing 
Persons (VNOSMP), allow time for policy-level Vietnamese 
consideration, and then a wrap-up meeting with VNOSMP, at which 
the League Delegation would hear the consensus response of the 
Vietnamese Government, precluded spending an entire day 
traveling to and observing a joint field operation.
    Meetings were held with three senior Vietnamese officials--
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Dinh Bin, Vice Minister 
of National Defense LTG Tran Hanh, and Vice Minister of Public 
Security Services (prior Ministry of Interior) Nguyen Khanh 
Toan. Each discussion focused on the need to find solutions to 
problems that are impeding efforts to achieve the fullest 
possible accounting. The Delegation defined that objective, 
shared by all involved, as the man returned alive, or his 
identifiable remains or convincing evidence as to why neither 
is possible. It was clearly noted that archival records, while 
of intense interest to many in the US and elsewhere, become 
critical to the families only in the absence of the man alive, 
his identifiable remains or if such records provide leads that 
can determine fate or recover remains.
    The League noted that since the trade embargo was ended in 
1994 and bilateral relations were normalized in 1995, the 
expected increase in accounting results had not occurred. The 
League urged further expansion of unilateral efforts to locate 
remains, archives and sources of information, including on 
cases of Americans missing in Laos and Cambodia. (According to 
US officials, unilateral investigative efforts in Laos are 
bringing increasingly useful information.)
    Five specific areas were raised as warranting attention. 
These included the need for renewed unilateral efforts, 
provision of archives regarding incidents in Laos and Cambodia, 
expanded research to locate additional records on cases in 
Vietnam, improved use of assets and resources, and the need to 
expedite the step-by-step investigative process to facilitate 
more rapid results. Each Vice Minister was asked to support 
later, more detailed talks with VNOSMP members.
    The Delegation noted a growing sense of impatience and 
urgency on the part of family members and American veterans due 
to the passage of time and advancing ages of both family 
members and sources. The League expressed concern that 
opportunities are being missed, since despite increased 
military-to-military contacts between the two countries, 
dedicated Stony Beach assets have not been fully utilized on 
POW/MIA matters. Noting that US Government sensitivity and 
reluctance could stem from lack of knowledge regarding history 
and the origin of defining the issue as humanitarian, the 
League clarified that all US officials with POW/MIA 
responsibilities, including Stony Beach personnel, have only 
one agenda--the accounting for missing Americans--and expressed 
the hope that Vietnam would welcome use of all qualified 
personnel, including DIA's Stony Beach, who could help focus 
the effort to bring increased results.
    Finally, the Delegation expressed appreciation for some 
improvements in joint operations since the first excavation in 
1985, but noted concerns that the step-by-step approach on case 
resolution may be a reflection of process overtaking results. 
Following a well-received explanation of historical 
negotiations and initiatives by the League's adviser--what 
worked and what didn't work--there was clear understanding and 
acknowledgment by senior Vietnamese that more can and should be 
done. The League expressed confidence that Vietnam could 
unilaterally take significant steps to expedite answers.
    All of the Ministers stated their government's commitment 
to continue cooperating fully with the United States on a 
humanitarian basis, separate from other issues, and offered 
assurances that Vietnam is doing its best to provide support 
and assistance. They rejected any suggestion to the contrary, 
but noted that they could and would work harder and encouraged 
further dialogue with VNOSMP to discuss initiatives that could 
move the process forward.
    The Ministers also stated their understanding of the need 
to expedite results in view of the advancing years of both 
family members and potential sources. They added, however, the 
notion that the work is becoming harder since the ``easiest 
cases'' had been resolved, leaving both governments with the 
``most difficult cases'' still requiring attention. This was a 
recurring theme that the League is not yet convinced is 
supportable without greater unilateral Vietnamese initiative.
    Vice Foreign Minister Bin was very familiar with the status 
of the issue. He indicated that all visiting delegations--
congressional and veteran--have commended Vietnam's cooperation 
and assistance. He noted that although the Vietnamese people 
had suffered tremendous losses, they help with the accounting 
effort out of a spirit of cooperation and humanitarian concern. 
As anticipated, and reflecting some US Government public 
statements, Minister Bin noted that only 43 Last Known Alive 
(LKA) cases remain under investigation. However, as the League 
indicated in its updated material, relatively few have been 
accounted for through return of identifiable remains and only 
10 remains now at CILHI are believed to relate to Americans 
previously listed as LKA cases. Further, fate determinations, 
important as they are, do not resolve the accounting issue.
    Vice Minister Hanh (MND) was equally well versed and voiced 
many of the same points, as did Vice Minister Toan. Both 
characterized the decrease in remains repatriated as 
``realistic'' since the easy cases had long ago been solved, a 
consistent theme. Minister Hanh noted that there are increasing 
problems as the VNOSMP seeks cooperation of local citizens, 
citing the extent of effort made to investigate the Phou Pha 
Thi (Lima Site 85) incident and that a primary witness to that 
incident, now 75 years old, is unwilling to participate 
further. Despite these realities, Vice Minister Hanh welcomed 
the list of problem areas that the League believes should be 
central and pledged to work with the US to address them.
    The initial working session with the VNOSMP, chaired by Mr. 
Nguyen Ba Hung, Deputy Director of North American Affairs, 
focused in greater detail on the key areas raised to the Vice 
Ministers. After first explaining that the League's primary 
purpose was to seek solutions, not cast aspersions or place 
blame, greater detail was provided regarding the areas that 
need attention, and League suggestions on specific initiatives 
to be discussed.
    In exploring the area of archival research, the League 
pointed out examples: Politburo records, service level 
intelligence documents, and documents such as the Group 559 
Summary of incidents along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, that raise 
logical questions, rather than bring answers. Indicating our 
view that the archival effort is incomplete and requires 
further effort, the League suggested various approaches for 
consideration. It was apparent from the reaction of long-
standing VNOSMP members that official US explanations to the 
League and the public since 1992 have been inadequate in 
describing efforts that took place in the early 1990s; the US 
Government needs to ensure that the families are fully 
informed.
    The VNOSMP Chairman indicated that archival research was 
allowed precisely because the SRV understands that documents 
are crucial when remains are not available. A senior VNOSMP 
official provided details about the nature of efforts by the 
joint Archival Research Team (ART) from 1992-95, a thorough 
description that was helpful, informative and appreciated. Many 
of the details provided by the Vietnamese were unknown to the 
League Delegation, thus the families. The League has requested 
a full rundown on the ART effort from 1992-95. (Poor 
communication by the US Government can be directly attributed 
to the Clinton Administration's decision to terminate the POW/
MIA Interagency Group in which the League Executive Director 
participated as a full member from its formation in 1980 until 
terminated in 1993.)
    The League raised a serious concern that films turned over 
to German television producers for commercial purposes had not 
been fully reviewed by the US. The Vietnamese acknowledged the 
potential problem and said that these and all other films will 
now be jointly screened before release.
    On the subject of further efforts on archival research to 
help resolve incidents that occurred in areas of Laos and 
Cambodia where Vietnamese forces operated during the war, the 
League proposed consideration of four-party discussions between 
officials of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and the United States. 
Noting first that any such multilateral conference would 
require structure and an agenda agreed upon by all parties on 
an equal basis, the League suggested that the initial topic 
should be archival research and noted our intention to raise 
the concept during upcoming discussions in Laos and Cambodia. 
VNOSMP's reaction was positive, but their apparent first 
priority was to focus on resolving difficulties that arise in 
dealing with the border cases.
    The first session with VNOSMP ended by their noting that 
although a great deal of work had been done, as evidenced by 
the lengthy description of actions by the ART, Vietnam has 
continued archival research and turned over additional 
documents since the ART's work had ended. The VNOSMP Chairman 
pledged to continue the effort, both unilaterally and jointly, 
and to revitalize the previous ART effort, offering to 
coordinate a specific plan with JTF Detachment 2.
    VNOSMP also appealed for more US continuity by extending 
the tour of the JTF Detachment Commander from one to two years. 
Further, they stated that the current pace of Joint Field 
Activities (JFAs) interferes with unilateral efforts that they 
wish to accomplish, noting that the previous schedule of 30-day 
breaks between JFAs no longer applies. The VNOSMP suggested 
efforts need to be made to decrease unnecessary field work to 
allow more time for periods devoted exclusively to unilateral 
work. They specifically stated that they want to do more 
unilaterally and asked that this message to be brought back.
    At the wrap-up meeting the following day, the official 
Vietnamese Government position on the five points raised by the 
League was provided, initially in an oral presentation and 
formalized in writing, dated Hanoi, 14 May 1999, in a document 
entitled ``REGARDING THE 5 AREAS OF CONCERN AND PROPOSALS OF 
THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF US MIA FAMILIES.''
    In addressing the five specific areas raised by the League, 
VNOSMP expressed appreciation for the suggestions that they 
view as a ``reflection of the concern and great responsibility 
of the League's leadership.'' VNOSMP went on to state that the 
suggestions would ``enable the VNOSMP and the US agency seeking 
missing Americans, our direct contact of which is the MIA 
office in Hanoi, to seriously research and examine the 
process'' of efforts to account for Americans still missing 
from the war. League areas of concern are provided below in 
bold type, followed by the official Vietnamese response and 
League comments.
    Unilateral repatriation of remains essentially halted in 
1990. The League wishes to explore ways to reenergize these 
efforts and has developed some ideas. We look forward to 
discussing them, to include the repatriation of remains and 
remains fragments, and soliciting Vietnamese ideas as well.
    While joint operations have improved in very positive ways 
since the first excavation in 1985, the League has concerns 
that the incremental, step by step approach in research is a 
reflection of process overtaking results. We are convinced that 
Vietnam can take significant steps unilaterally to identify 
site locations for more immediate excavation, bypassing some of 
the ponderous incremental investigative steps now being 
conducted bilaterally.
    SRV On Unilateral Vietnamese Efforts: ``VNOSMP completely 
agrees with the League's proposal that in the unilateral 
process, Vietnam's specialists will be proactive in developing 
investigation requirements provided by the US, with the 
objective of attaining the best results.'' The VNOSMP also 
pledged to ``increase unilateral activities such as 
investigations, recovery of remains which citizens voluntarily 
provide, site surveys, archival documents relating to US 
personnel missing from the war, searching for witnesses, etc. 
In this process, VNOSMP will consider as a priority the task of 
finding the fullest possible answers to discrepancy and last 
known alive cases, paying attention to the cases that the 
League is concerned about in the `Blue Book Document' handed 
over to the VNOSMP in 1994, updated in the `Black Book 
Document' handed over to the VNOSMP during the League 
Chairman's and Executive Director's visit to Vietnam from 12 to 
14 May 1999.''
    Comment: The League has long maintained that renewed and 
increased unilateral efforts by Vietnam are needed. A 
``proactive'' Vietnamese effort, if seriously implemented, 
would expedite concrete accounting results and bring greater 
efficiency to the joint field operations; however, as can be 
noted, there is still too much emphasis on leads provided by 
the US.
    SRV on Recovering and Repatriation of Remains--``The VNOSMP 
will continue to increase encouraging Vietnamese citizens to 
turn over missing American service member's remains, through 
veterans organizations and other societal organizations at the 
local area throughout the nation in order to collect 
information and remains associated with individual American 
service members missing from the war.''
    Comment: In the oral presentation, the Vietnamese 
acknowledged previous remains recovery and storage in various 
locations that were the most accessible and turned over 
unilaterally. Hopefully, this new commitment will bring forward 
those remains not yet repatriated. Since 1986, the Government 
of Vietnam has made occasional public announcements urging 
citizens to cooperate in searching for American remains and has 
published official directives through People's Army of Vietnam 
and Communist Party channels. This current commitment, in 
response to the League's suggestions, extends to a broader 
audience and provides a logical vehicle for expanded unilateral 
efforts that can bring forward increased accounting results. 
The Vietnamese also noted their efforts to block remains 
trading which they try to balance with encouraging the 
voluntary turnover of remains by citizens.
    85-90% of losses in Laos and Cambodia were in areas under 
PAVN control. The League has made requests to Vietnamese 
officials on numerous occasions to provide such records. 
Officials from Laos and Cambodia, as well as US officials, have 
made similar requests for many years with no response. The 
League has developed ideas concerning this problem which we 
look forward to discussing, and we are also eager to solicit 
Vietnam's solutions.
    On Trilateral Cooperation/Four-Party Conference--``The 
VNOSMP pledges to continue active cooperation with Laos and 
Cambodia in resolving the cases along the Vietnam-Laos border 
as well as the Vietnamese-Cambodian border; agree with the 
League's idea that holding a trilateral technical meeting 
between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with the participation of a 
US government representative is crucial to raising 
effectiveness and cooperation, since these cases remaining are 
the most difficult.''
    Comment: Whether ``technical'' or policy level, or a 
combination, a Four Party Conference to address specific 
concerns will, of necessity, require policy level endorsement 
by each government. (The concept for such a conference is 
discussed later in this report.) The first ``trilateral'' 
conference, hosted by Vietnam in 1995, did not include 
Cambodia. While some of the border cases are difficult, they 
are made more so by Vietnam's failure to date to provide 
relevant documents, despite requests from the US, Lao and 
Cambodian governments. Vietnamese concerns on border 
coordination do not address the archival gap raised by the 
League in the context of a Four Party Conference. Vietnam has 
identified some sources and made them available for interview, 
but not to the extent necessary to increase results that 
greater effort could produce.
    The archival research effort is incomplete and raises more 
questions than answers. The League has developed discussion 
topics and ideas that we look forward to exploring with 
Vietnamese officials.
    SRV on Archival Research: ``The VNOSMP will continue 
efforts to find files and documents associated with American 
personnel missing from the war, and if found will turn them 
over to the US government.''
    Comment: Recognizing that there are cases where remains 
will not be recoverable, the quality of cooperation on this 
important aspect of the accounting effort is crucial and needs 
improvement. Lao and Cambodian officials recognize that success 
in the accounting effort in their two countries depends in 
large measure upon obtaining relevant files and access to 
firsthand sources of information who served in the areas where 
incidents occurred. While some progress has been made in this 
area, the vast majority of files and documents thus far 
received pertain to returned POWs, not Americans still missing.
    Diplomatic relations has been restored and military to 
military contacts are developing. These are positive steps, but 
exchanges in the context of resolving the POW/MIA issue have 
not been fully utilized. Much of the reluctance on the US side, 
mistakenly in the League's opinion, relates to misunderstanding 
the origin of defining this issue as humanitarian and not being 
aware of past history. The League has some ideas on this 
subject that we wish to discuss, and solicit Vietnamese ideas 
on this as well.
    SRV on Full Utilization of Resources: ``The component of US 
MIA teams operating in Vietnam which the US sends to Vietnam 
must have the aim and objective of searching for missing 
American service members only, absolutely no other work, and 
must follow every rule and law of Vietnam.''
    Comment: In their oral presentation, the Vietnamese stated 
that the integration of teams was no problem as long as team 
members only do ``MIA work,'' a welcome statement. This subject 
was raised due to some US Government reluctance to allow 
trained collectors in Stony Beach to participate on teams 
conducting in-country investigations. Since 1992, the members 
of DIA's Stony Beach team have rarely participated, thus 
squandering the experience, language and training to maximize 
time spent on and the quality of field investigations and 
surveys.
    Vietnam's agreement (and later agreement by the Lao 
Government) to permit personnel sent by the US Government, so 
long as their mission is limited strictly to POW/MIA matters, 
clears the way for renewed Stony Beach involvement. The 
Cambodian Government has allowed the US to use whatever 
resources it deems appropriate to pursue answers on America's 
POW/MIAs and has cooperated closely with DIA's Stony Beach 
team. Hopefully, there will be no further excuses from the US 
Government for not using all available assets to achieve the 
fullest possible accounting.
    Assessment: Vietnam's specific commitments are welcome, as 
was the frank, open dialogue. Implementation and results will 
be the key to gauging their seriousness since countless 
promises have been made and broken in the past. Implementation 
of these pledges should be closely monitored by the US 
Government and Congress and will be closely watched by the 
League. Results must be reported accurately by all involved to 
the families and the American people. The League hopes to 
report later that the commitments are being carried out and 
greater results are forthcoming.
    Assessment (continued): The Four-Party Conference offers an 
opportunity to expand the accounting process into new areas of 
cooperation. To succeed, all parties must give careful 
consideration to structuring sessions so that they will be 
productive for the issue and useful in moving the accounting 
effort in a positive direction. This League initiative is 
intended to break the endless passing of papers which the 
Vietnamese also indicated has little utility. Properly 
structured, this initiative can result in real exchanges on 
potential solutions and information that increases accounting--
the key measure of success for us.

                                  LAOS

    The League Delegation first met with US Ambassador to Laos 
Wendy Chamberlin to get an update on her views regarding the 
broader spectrum of US-Lao relations; she assessed the level of 
POW/MIA cooperation as increasingly responsive, helpful and 
productive. In preparation for subsequent discussions with 
senior Lao officials, the Delegation also met with and was 
briefed by LTC Bob Gahagin, USA, Commander of JTF-FA Detachment 
3, and other members of the JTF and US Embassy staff. These 
sessions, including extended time with JTF-FA Detachment 3 
personnel, were most helpful and appreciated, as was the 
hospitality of Ambassador Chamberlin in accommodating the 
League Delegation at her official residence, as she did in 
1997. The Ambassador also hosted a dinner in the League 
Delegation's honor, inviting Lao guests.
    The most senior meeting with the Lao Government was held 
with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Somsavad 
Lengsavad. The League Delegation met with this key official for 
cordial and very constructive discussions. Ambassador 
Chamberlin, LTC Gahagin and JTF linguist/specialist Bill 
Gadoury accompanied the League representatives. Informal 
discussions were also held with H.E. Soubanh Srithirath, 
Minister to the President's Office (former Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs), who hosted a private luncheon.
    The same general points were raised in each official 
meeting, and the Delegation appreciated discussions with LTG Ai 
Soulignaseng, Vice Minister of National Defense (MND) and COL 
Sisophon Bangonesengdet (known to the League since 1982), MND 
Director of the Foreign Relations Department. Detailed talks 
were held with Mr. Amphone Phiphacphommachanh, Acting Director 
General, Department of European and American Affairs, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Lao ADHOC (POW/MIA) Committee. 
Mr. Amphone also graciously hosted a dinner for the League 
Delegation.
    The League expressed appreciation to Deputy Prime Minister 
Somsavad for the significant progress achieved through 
bilateral cooperation over the years since the first post-war 
League delegation in 1982. Improvements in the joint field 
operations, initiated in 1985, were recognized, as was the 
increased flexibility and positive attitude now evident on the 
part of Lao officials. Noting the continuing need for the 
process to be studied and improved, the League suggested that 
the Lao Government should also continue seeking ways to 
expedite results.
    Several specific areas were then addressed, including the 
increase in Lao unilateral investigations, cited as a very 
positive step on which many future efforts depend. Noting that 
such efforts are key to identifying relevant archival 
materials, obtaining information from current and former Lao 
officials with personal knowledge of U.S. losses, and 
conducting advance preparation for joint field operations, the 
League requested an increase of 2-3 people to the Lao team. Now 
numbering only 10 Lao officials, the League suggested that it 
is extremely difficult for so few to handle all unilateral Lao 
efforts and expressed the hope that the request would receive 
serious consideration.
    Noting that since the Delegation's arrival in Vientiane a 
Lao citizen had brought remains to the US Embassy and turned 
them in, the Delegation expressed appreciation for the Lao 
Government's assistance in encouraging such humanitarian 
actions. A request was made for further announcements to be 
made on a regular basis, using channels of communication at 
every level.
    Another area of concern raised by the League is the need 
for Lao language specialists that are often difficult for the 
US Government to identify and hire. Recognizing that there had 
been sensitivity in the past to using such personnel, the 
League expressed the view that due to the passage of years and 
long-standing US Government support of continued improvements 
in bilateral relations, such sensitivities should no longer 
pose any obstacle. The League urged understanding of this 
problem by the Lao Government and requested acceptance of 
ethnic Lao-Americans to ensure that positions can be filled 
with the most qualified personnel. It was pointed out that 
assistance by such linguists is critical not only to accomplish 
successful joint investigations and excavations, but also to 
facilitate the medical treatment of Lao citizens that is 
conducted during each joint field activity.
    Raising the need to maximize effectiveness during joint 
field operations, the League also requested utilization of all 
resources, including those with language and collection 
qualifications, and consideration of expanding the total number 
of US officials from 40 to 50 during the months when conditions 
are best. In this context, and recognizing the limited 
resources of the Lao Government, the expansion in number was 
encouraged due to the backlog of excavations now pending, with 
the passage of time decreasing the likelihood of answers.
    Noting that the League Delegation had just come from 
meetings with senior officials in Hanoi, the key Vietnamese 
commitments that relate to Laos were explained, including 
Vietnam's agreement to the proposed Four Party Conference to 
deal with specific concerns, such as resolution of the border 
cases. Also noted was the fact that the League's only interest 
is in documents that relate to the POW/MIA issue, both policy 
concerning handling of POWs and remains, and information that 
could help resolve individual cases. Lao views on the concept 
of the Four Party Conference were also requested. LTG Ay 
indicated that the Ministry of Defense had held meetings and 
seminars to explore ways to help in the accounting effort and 
that this is a continuous process. He noted that the terrain in 
Vietnam is easier to deal with than in Laos. On documents, LTG 
Ay said they need them from Vietnam and hope to obtain more.
    Deputy Prime Minister Somsavat provided assurance of the 
Lao Government's continuing commitment to do its best to 
resolve the issue, noting that such cooperation is not linked 
to any other issues. The Minister seemed pleased that the Lao 
unilateral team was viewed as productive by the League and the 
US Government, a view with which he agreed, and pledged to 
intensify such efforts. (In a later working session, the Lao 
indicated that they have begun oral history interviews at the 
local level, described as a ``bottom-up'' approach.) Somsavad 
agreed to consider additional personnel, but added that there 
is a limit to the number of Foreign Ministry personnel and that 
existing requirements were already heavy, with too few people 
to handle them. In response, the League suggested assigning 
additional military personnel for this purpose, a suggestion 
Minister Somsavad agreed to consider.
    The Minister was pleased to see progress from official 
efforts to encourage Lao citizens to cooperate by providing 
information and remains, and agreed to make further such 
announcements on a regular basis, using established channels 
throughout the country. He discussed the concept of a meeting 
of officials from various levels that he would convene and 
allow US Government representatives to lay out their concerns 
and ideas--a welcome initiative which needs follow-up by the US 
Government.
    Minister Somsavad qualified his acceptance of skilled 
language specialists by stating that such officials should 
focus solely on POW/MIA and adhere to Lao law and customs, but 
agreed that the Lao Government was willing to determine 
suitability with the US. The request to expand the US team 
beyond the 40 per joint field operation was rejected, noting 
that the joint field teams have now increased efficiency, even 
completing operations ahead of schedule, thus there appeared to 
be no need for any expansion at this time.
    The Minister endorsed the concept of the Four Party 
Conference, noting the Lao Government's previous offer to serve 
as host. Concerning archival research and documents, the 
Minister acknowledged that Lao records are incomplete, but 
indicated that the Lao ADHOC (POW/MIA) Committee could focus on 
further archival research in phase two of its efforts, once its 
reviews of wartime film at national and provincial levels have 
concluded. Minister Somsavad also stated that Vietnamese 
records should be relevant and useful, indicating that prior 
Lao Government requests had gone unanswered, but would be 
renewed.
    Assessment: The strategy for discussions with the Lao 
Government posed entirely different challenges from those faced 
in Vietnam. The decision-making process in Laos on POW/MIA 
matters is now focused on His Excellency Somsavad Lengsavad, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, thus 
discussions with him came as the final, wrap-up meeting. The 
exchanges at every level were cordial, straightforward and 
sensitive to the need of the families for answers as rapidly as 
possible. Minister Somsavad was open to League proposals and 
had the authority to respond, with no requirement for further 
consultations.
    The League Delegation was pleased with the initiative to 
host a Lao officials meeting and with positive responses on the 
concept for the Four Party Conference, expanding the Lao 
unilateral team, and willingness to accept ethnic Lao American 
team members so long as they focus solely on POW/MIA matters 
and are sensitive to their surroundings. US Government follow-
up is needed to get additional personnel assigned to Lao 
unilateral efforts, to operationalize the Lao officials 
meeting, and to structure the Four Party Conference. In view of 
existing requirements and anticipated increases, the Lao need 
to be more flexible on the number of US personnel allowed in-
country for joint field operations. As is always the case, the 
League will be closely monitoring Lao and US Government 
implementation.

                                CAMBODIA

    Though there are only 74 Americans still missing and 
unaccounted for in Cambodia, this devastated country, by all 
known assessments, including the League's, ``fully cooperates 
in good faith'' with the US on efforts to account for missing 
Americans. Since inception of the cooperative process in 1992, 
Cambodian officials have consistently provided outstanding 
cooperation, conducting unilateral actions to assist and 
support joint field operations in every way requested by the 
United States.
    Background: Prime Minister Hun Sen, then serving as the 
Cambodian Foreign Minister, agreed to the League's 1984 request 
to accept the case files of all Americans then missing and 
unaccounted for in Cambodia, pledging to do what he could on a 
humanitarian basis. (This occurred long before there was 
recognition of Cambodia, then still occupied by Vietnam, much 
less government-to-government cooperation in the field.) Since 
that time, JTF-FA and CILHI have conducted site excavations 
whenever and wherever a location was confirmed, often under 
very difficult circumstances.
    There has also been close cooperation with DIA's Stony 
Beach Team in conducting investigations and archival research, 
unless interrupted by US Government sensitivity. The tragic 
plight of the Cambodian people under the Khmer Rouge regime 
from 1975-78, as well as political turbulence since that time, 
has complicated efforts to account for Americans still missing 
in that country, as has the fact that 90% of the losses in 
Cambodia occurred in Vietnamese-controlled areas. Despite these 
obstacles, the Cambodian Government has made available senior 
historians and other officials, including a very active POW/MIA 
Committee, to pursue whatever leads and avenues have been 
suggested by the US.
    The League appreciates the hospitality afforded by US 
Charge d'Affaires Carol Rodley in hosting a reception for the 
League Delegation at the Ambassador's Residence (Ambassador Ken 
Quinn was out of the country), as well as the support and 
information provided by US Defense Attache COL Bill McMillan, 
USA, COL K.C. Marshment, USA, Stony Beach Team Chief, and LTC 
Jeff Smith, USAF, JTF-FA, and other members of the US Embassy 
staff in Phnom Penh. The brief visit to Cambodia was filled 
with important and useful meetings, resulting in positive 
responses and firm commitments.
    Immediately after arrival at the airport in Phnom Penh, the 
League Delegation went directly to meet with Prime Minister Hun 
Sen at his residence, accompanied by Charge d'Affaires Carol 
Rodley and other US officials. The League Delegation first 
expressed sincere appreciation for the outstanding support and 
cooperation since inception of bilateral cooperation, despite 
the multiple tragedies and loss of loved ones that the 
Cambodian people have suffered.
    The League recognized some of the difficulties found in 
working to account for Americans missing in Cambodia, 
especially the fact that 90% of the US losses occurred in areas 
then under Vietnamese control. Noting the importance of 
trilateral cooperation on these border cases, the Prime 
Minister was again urged to raise the need for archival 
documents and witnesses during future contacts with his 
counterpart, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Khai.
    In the context of pursuing information and leads on 
individual cases, the League presented a partial list of 
Vietnamese officials who had served in Cambodia and would 
likely be known to current and former Cambodian officials, 
requesting that unilateral Cambodian efforts be made to locate 
them for interviews. (The list was a duplicate of that provided 
to senior Vietnamese officials in the hope that the two 
governments would cooperate in locating these individuals.)
    Referring to the Prime Minister's previous letter in answer 
to the League's January request, the Delegation expressed 
appreciation for his pledge to seek information from former 
Khmer Rouge officials. Noting that unilateral Cambodian 
interviews are more likely to succeed in screening such 
individuals for relevant information, the League suggested that 
follow-up interviews by the US could then occur, as needed. A 
request was made that these efforts proceed as quickly as 
possible in view of the advancing age of sources and family 
members who long for answers.
    Recognizing the need for trilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, particularly with archival research, the League 
proposed the concept of the Four Party Conference and requested 
the Prime Minister's views, noting that the subject had also 
been raised in Hanoi and Vientiane.
    Finally, the League expressed regret over the lack of a 
more active US Government POW/MIA effort in Cambodia over the 
last two years, noting the rationale for decreased activity as 
being a reflection of political and safety concerns by some, 
not decreased interest. The League expressed optimism that an 
active program would now resume and gratitude that H.E. Chey 
Saphon was still eager to participate, noting his long-standing 
relationships with Vietnamese and Lao historians as especially 
helpful.
    Prime Minister Hun Sen first briefed some present (who did 
not know) on the history of cooperation between the League and 
Cambodia, stating his commitment to continue doing whatever is 
needed to assist and that he considers cooperation on this 
issue as a responsibility. He noted that the Cambodian people 
have suffered and lost so many family members that they 
understand and want to help on a humanitarian basis. He also 
expressed sensitivity to the hardship of uncertainty, 
mentioning that he had written a song about the subject of 
missing loved ones.
    On the subject of trilateral cooperation, the Prime 
Minister stated that after 1970, the border areas were mostly 
under Vietnamese control. He stated that Vietnam also would 
have information on cases in Laos, thus the importance of 
trilateral cooperation, adding that during that time forces 
were traveling back and forth along the border. He noted that 
within the week, he would be meeting with the Vietnamese Prime 
Minister and would use that opportunity, as he had before, to 
personally raise the need for Vietnam's assistance on archival 
records and ask him to urge the Vietnamese people to cooperate.
    In that same context, Prime Minister Hun Sen stated his 
strong support for the Four Party Conference, indicating that 
Cambodia would host the first such meeting, after consulting 
with Vietnam and Laos. He noted that trilateral meetings had 
been held in the past, but not yet the four parties all 
together. The Prime Minister stated his intention to assign his 
son (1999 graduate of West Point Military Academy) to the 
Cambodian POW/MIA Committee. He expressed his hope that his son 
might be able to participate in organizing the Four Party 
Conference during the summer months before returning to New 
York to continue his education, pursuing a graduate degree in 
economics.
    The Prime Minister agreed with the need for getting access 
to former Khmer Rouge officials, noting that some may have 
information and pledged to take advantage of opportunities to 
obtain answers. He indicated that in the case of highly visible 
Khmer Rouge, such as Duch and Ta Mok, their attorneys would 
need to be present for interviews, but expressed hope that the 
humanitarian mission would allow them to be questioned about US 
MIAs. He pledged that they would make every effort to locate 
sources of information and expressed appreciation for the list 
that the League had provided.
    The Prime Minister also stated that LTG Pol Saroeun, head 
of the POW/MIA Committee, having persuaded KR defections from 
Pailin, has responsibility for the mission and the ability to 
get information from the Khmer Rouge immediately as Deputy 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the 
Joint Staff. He added LTG Saroeun also is tasked with reforming 
the Cambodian military forces, can write orders for them, and 
is publicly well known and admired by the Cambodian people.
    Comment: The Prime Minister was cordial, expansive and 
responded positively to all suggestions and requests. The 
importance of gaining Vietnam's cooperation was a theme that 
Prime Minister Hun Sen reinforced in several instances. The 
League responded that he and other Cambodian officials likely 
have unique influence with the Vietnamese leadership that 
neither the League nor the US Government possesses. In dealing 
with Vietnam and Laos, implementation of the commitments of all 
governments involved, including the US, must be closely watched 
to ensure follow-through and to measure results. In Cambodia, 
commitments are honored and implemented unless the US 
Government does not follow through, as has been the case during 
the long delay. Hopefully, that situation is now resolved, 
implementation can and will occur without further impediment, 
and progress will result.
    The same key points were raised with HRH Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh, President of the National Assembly, who also has a 
well-established history of support for the League's efforts. 
In addition to expressing appreciation for his personal support 
and that of the Cambodian government, the League suggested 
introduction of a Joint Resolution of the National Assembly and 
the Senate offering full bipartisan support for obtaining the 
fullest possible accounting for missing US personnel.
    Prince Ranariddh immediately agreed to introduce the 
resolution and was confident that there would be no problem 
with passage in either the National Assembly or the Senate, 
stating his intention to call His Excellency (H.E.) Chea Sim, 
President of the Senate. He stated his plan to visit Hanoi the 
next week for meetings with the entire leadership, during which 
he would raise the need for their full cooperation on the cases 
of Americans still unaccounted for in Cambodia.
    Comment: As in the past, His Highness was most cordial and 
responsive. The discussions made clear that Cambodia's 
cooperation on POW/MIAs spans the breadth of all parties in the 
newly formed coalition government, assurance that was welcome 
to the League Delegation, though anticipated.
    H.E. Chea Sim, President of the Senate, was attentive to 
the League's concerns, as in prior meetings. He expressed 
appreciation for the League's recognition of Cambodia's efforts 
to assist and agreed to work with Prince Ranariddh to ensure 
that a Joint Resolution is passed in the Senate. He stated his 
full confidence in LTG Pol Saroeun and Chey Saphon, historian, 
to implement the Four Party Conference, for which he also 
stated full support. (Since returning from the trip, H.E. Chea 
Sim has already sent a letter to the League stating his strong 
support for our ``noble mission'' and readiness of the Royal 
Cambodian Government to cooperate closely, plus ``undertake 
further steps to address the concerns of POW/MIA families.''
    Their Excellencies Sar Kheng and You Hockry, Co-Ministers 
of Interior, were gracious in time and attention during the 
League Delegation's presentation that covered the same key 
points. (The two ministers had met with League Delegations in 
the past.) Minister Sar Kheng stated that Cambodia would 
continue to cooperate fully, that there were no internal 
obstacles since the issue is viewed as humanitarian, and that 
implementation has enabled the two countries to build trust. 
Since the Ministers indicated that they also plan an imminent 
trip to Hanoi, the League Delegation asked them to raise the 
need for Vietnam's cooperation with their counterpart, 
Vietnamese Minister of Public Security Le Minh Huong, a request 
which was met with a positive response.
    The League hosted a working lunch with LTG Pol Saroeun, 
H.E. Sieng Lapresse, Major General Phoung Siphan, BG Kim Chan 
Nee and other members of the Cambodian POW/MIA Committee. 
Senior members of the POW/MIA Committee were present at most of 
the meetings with the Cambodian Ministers; therefore, informal 
discussions over lunch were most helpful. (Since the League 
Delegation returned, LTG Saroeun has already initiated contact 
to propose hosting the first session of the Four Party 
Conference.)
    The final meeting in Cambodia was with H.E. Chey Saphon, 
the designated historian of the Royal Cambodian Government who 
has worked closely with DIA's Stony Beach over the last few 
years. The League Delegation expressed appreciation for his 
personal dedication to obtaining answers for the families and 
for his hospitality in welcoming us to his personal residence. 
The Delegation indicated to Chey Saphon full confidence that 
his assistance is a key element of trilateral and four-party 
cooperation and expressed gratitude for his willingness to 
exert efforts on the difficult task of locating relevant 
archives and sources of information.
    Noting with sadness the loss of his colleague, Lao 
historian Sisana Sisane, the League indicated that such 
longstanding relationships with officials in Vietnam and Laos 
are potentially very useful, but time is short since all are 
aging.
    Mr. Chey Saphon indicated he is eager to continue his work 
with US officials and that he has already begun a renewed 
effort. He stated that he had worked closely with counterpart 
historians in Laos and Vietnam and was impressed with the scope 
of Vietnamese Government archives. He recognized the problem 
with passage of time and the need to move as quickly as 
possible. Referring to the aging of sources, League Adviser 
Richard Childress remarked to Chey Saphon, ``Each time an old 
man dies, a library burns,'' a sentiment with which Chey Saphon 
agreed.
    Assessment: The seriousness of the Royal Cambodian 
Government and its POW/MIA Committee, including H.E. Chey 
Saphon, stands as an example of full cooperation, yet there is 
much more that can be done and, in the League Delegation's 
view, will be pursued by responsible Cambodian officials. Undue 
caution on the US side was equally evident, especially in light 
of the humanitarian nature of the issue as recognized by 
Congress and others. The Delegation believes, however, that 
adjustments are being made to better utilize all assets and 
resources, following establishment of the new Royal Cambodian 
Government. These are welcome changes that will continue to be 
closely watched by the League, and further delays for less than 
valid reasons will be strongly opposed. Now that the political 
situation has stabilized, there should be no further excuses 
for failing to permit qualified US personnel to visit Cambodia 
whenever the need arises.
      

                                


Statement of Spyder Active Sports, Inc., Boulder, Colorado

    Spyder Active Sports, Inc. is a wholesaler of ski clothing. 
We are known within the ski industry to produce high quality 
apparel to meet the rigorous demands of the ski athlete and 
environment.
    Spyder currently sources our cotton t-neck manufacturing in 
Laos. We plan to continue our sourcing at this factory and are 
submitting this statement in support of an extension of 
``normal trade relations'' to the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic (Laos).
      

                                


Statement of US-ASEAN Business Council, Inc.

    The US-ASEAN Business Council is the premier national 
organization in the United States representing private-sector 
interests in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
The Council appreciates this opportunity to express its support 
of the extension of permanent normal trade relations (NTR) to 
the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR).

                      ECONOMIC TRENDS AND OUTLOOK

    In 1986 the Lao PDR adopted the New Economic Mechanism 
(NEM). The NEM was an economic reform package transforming 
economic activity from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy, decentralizing economic decision making, and 
stimulating private sector to take an active role. An economic 
system based on market principle was included in the 1991 Lao 
PDR constitution. Key market liberalization efforts include: 
decontrol of prices and distribution of goods and services, 
elimination of subsidies, establishment of a market determined 
exchange rate, reform of the tax and tariff system, enactment 
of a new Central Bank Law, refinements in money and credit 
management and Foreign Investment Law passage. The government 
has also restructured administrative authority for economic, 
financial and development management--the Ministry of Finance 
manages fiscal affairs, and the Committee for Planning and 
Cooperation manages development.
    The adjustment of the economy over the past ten years of 
the NEM has been helped by the many structural and policy 
changes, which have had a positive overall impact on the 
economy. The government recognizes the need for further 
adjustment for economic growth to take place and further 
market-based activities to develop. The government expressed 
its commitment to further market based development at the 
February 1993 annual ordinary session of the National Assembly. 
The major macroeconomics components of the government's 
strategy are to strive towards a stable macroeconomics 
environment consisting of: stabilizing domestic price and 
exchange rate, reducing the fiscal deficit, increasing and 
mobilizing savings, strengthening financial markets, 
strengthening mother and child health care, reducing government 
involvement in the private sector, undertaking civil service 
reform, and further implementing privatization.
    Over the period 1994 to 1996, Lao GDP economic growth rates 
averaged over 7 percent. Since mid-1996, however, according to 
the 1999 Investment Climate Statement, issued by the United 
States Government, ``the pace of reform has slowed considerably 
since mid-1996,'' and ``Laos's economic performance, aggravated 
by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, has suffered accordingly.'' 
The GDP growth rate fell to 4 percent in 1998. Growth in 1999 
will be dependent on the performance of the agricultural sector 
which employs 85 percent of the work force. Some improvement 
may come from the European Union's decision to grant GSP status 
to Lao garments, but, according to the 1999 Investment Climate 
Statement, ``greater growth in this sector is hampered by the 
absence of normal trade relations with the United States.''

                            US-LAO RELATIONS

    In recent years, the United States and the Lao PDR have 
worked hard to build a mutually beneficial relationship. In 
addition to strong cooperation on POW/MIA issues and anti-drug 
trafficking exercises, the government of Laos and the US 
Government initialed a bilateral investment treaty in 1997. It 
has taken major steps to open the country's economy to foreign 
trade and investment and made the necessary economic changes 
which paved the way for its admission to ASEAN. The Lao PDR 
signed an agreement with the US Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation in March 1996. In 1998 Laos signed an agreement 
with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency that is 
awaiting final ratification by the National Assembly.
    Accordingly, the Lao PDR seeks normal trading relations 
with the United States. Extension of NTR status would enable 
Laos to develop its economy in a better fashion and strengthen 
the liberalization taking place. Moreover, the granting of NTR 
would signal the United States' continuing interest in the 
ASEAN group. ASEAN comprises 500 million people, with a $1 
trillion GDP, two way trade with the US of over $250 billion in 
the year 2000 and designation as the US's third largest 
overseas trading partner.
    Currently, US-Lao trade is a relatively low level, with 
exports to the US in the period Jan-Oct. 1998 at $19 million 
(general customs); $15 million (c.i.f.) for the same period; 
and imports from the US into Laos, $3 million from Jan.-Oct. 
1998 (Source: US Embassy, Vientiane). Granting of NTR status 
would support expansion of such trade and would likely 
encourage others to take a closer look at ASEAN's newest 
member. Since the country is at such a different level of 
economic development from the United States, few US industries 
would be immediately affected by the move. Conversely, as Laos 
becomes more integrated with its regional neighbors, the 
country will provide a strong market for US goods. NTR status 
for Los will likely also contribute to higher standards of 
living for the Lao people. In summary, granting NTR status to 
Laos would result in gains for all countries and people 
concerned.
    The US-ASEAN Business Council fully supports the granting 
of NTR status to the Lao PDR and will continue to work on 
promoting further normalization of commercial relations between 
our two countries.

                                  
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