    [Senate Prints 106-51]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    106th Congress
     2d Session                 COMMITTEE PRINT                     S. Prt.
                                                                     106-51
    _______________________________________________________________________

         AID TO ``PLAN COLOMBIA'': THE TIME FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IS NOW

                                   __________

                                    A REPORT

                                     TO THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                                       BY

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

                           One Hundred Sixth Congress

                                    May 2000

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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                             COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                               JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

    RICHARD, G. LUGAR, Indiana               JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
    CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                    PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
    GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon                  CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
    ROD GRAMS, Minnesota                     JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
    SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                    RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
    CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming                    PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
    JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri                  BARBARA BOXER, California
    BILL FRIST, Tennessee                    ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
    LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
                           Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
                           Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director

                                     (ii)

                             LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                                  ----------

                                                           May 3, 2000.
    The Honorable Jesse Helms,
    Chairman,
    Committee on Foreign Relations.

        Dear Mr. Chairman:
        On April 19 and 20, I traveled to Colombia to examine
    counter-narcotics programs there. In particular, my objective
    was to discuss the ``Plan Colombia'' proposed by the Colombian
    Government, and the U.S. proposal to assist the plan. While
    there, I met extensively with President Pastrana, Minister of
    Defense Ramirez, the President's Chief of Staff, Jaime Ruiz,
    U.S. Ambassador Curt Kamman, and senior Embassy officials. I
    also met with representatives of Colombian non-governmental
    organizations working on human rights, and representatives of
    the Colombian offices of two U.N. agencies.
        I owe a great debt of gratitude to the Colombian
    Government, particularly President Pastrana, for facilitating
    my visit. President Pastrana graciously hosted me at his
    government guest house in Cartagena. I also owe much to U.S.
    Ambassador Curt Kamman, Political Counselor Leslie Bassett (who
    served as the delegation control officer), and other staff of
    the Embassy who traveled with us to Cartagena.
        I was accompanied and assisted on the trip by Minority
    Counsel Brian McKeon, and Professional Staff Member Marcia Lee.
    They also traveled to Colombia in March for four days, during
    which they conducted numerous meetings and visited forward
    operating locations in southern Colombia. Some portions of this
    report are based on their work in March.
        The delegation was ably assisted throughout the trip by Lt.
    Cdr. Valerie Ulatowski, USN, to whom I am extremely grateful.
        I came away from my visit convinced that the U.S. Congress
    should act quickly to approve President Clinton's request for
    supplemental funding for Colombia. Unless the Congress acts
    quickly to approve funding for this plan, a critical
    opportunity in the fight against narcotics trafficking in
    Colombia may be lost.
        I understand the Committee on Appropriations will soon
    mark-up the Fiscal Year 2001 foreign operations appropriations
    bill, as well as the Colombia supplemental for Fiscal 2000. I
    hope this report will be useful to the Senate during
    consideration of this important issue.
                Sincerely,
                                  Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
                                       Ranking Minority Member.

                                     (iii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

    Letter of Transmittal............................................   III
    Key Findings and Recommendations.................................     1
    Overview: Aid to ``Plan Colombia'' is a Critical Opportunity for
      the United States..............................................     2
    Background on Colombia and Plan Colombia.........................     4
          A. Overview of the situation in Colombia...................     4
          B. U.S.-Colombian relations and the background to Plan
          Colombia...................................................     5
    Narcotics issues.................................................     6
          A. Background on the current narcotics situation...........     6
          B. Key issues in implementation of Plan Colombia...........     8
          C. Colombian Government and Plan Colombia..................    15
    Human Rights issues..............................................    16
    Schedule of meetings.............................................    18

                                    Appendix

    Statements by the President of the United States.................    21
    Table of U.S. Assistance to Colombia, FY 1995-2000...............    24
    Table of Support for Plan Colombia...............................    25
    Excerpt from State Department Report: International Narcotics
      Control Strategy Report, March 2000............................    33
    Table of Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation 1991-1999............    42
    Table of Worldwide Illicit Drug Production 1991-1999.............    43
    Remarks of Andres Pastrana Arango, President of the Republic of
      Colombia, at the American Society of Newspaper Editors.........    44

                                      (v)

                                Map of Colombia

                        KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

                                  ----------

        1. The United States has a rare enforcement opportunity in
    Colombia. Colombia today is the primary source of cocaine and
    heroin sold in the United States. It is the primary source of
    the raw material (coca leaf and opium poppy), the primary site
    of the major laboratories, and the primary site of the leading
    trafficking organizations. Never before in recent history has
    there been such an opportunity to strike at all aspects of the
    drug trade at the source. We also have an important opportunity
    because of the strong commitment of the Government of Colombia
    to fight narcotics trafficking. The United States should seize
    this rare enforcement opportunity by providing assistance to
    Plan Colombia.
        2. The security crisis in southern Colombia warrants
    increased U.S. counter-narcotics assistance. Guerrilla fronts
    have a heavy presence in southern Colombia and have a
    significant role in protecting drug trafficking operations.
    Similarly, right-wing paramilitary organizations are operating
    in portions of southern Colombia. Because of security concerns,
    U.S.-Colombian coca eradication operations were temporarily
    suspended in late March. Increased U.S. assistance to Colombian
    military units which will assist the Colombian National Police
    in counter-narcotics operations is warranted by the serious
    guerrilla and paramilitary threat to the Police.
        3. There are considerable costs associated with Congress'
    delay in approving the Colombia supplemental. Among the costs
    are delayed delivery of the Blackhawk helicopters, delays in
    training of the Colombian counter-narcotics battalions (which
    have already occurred), and reduction in U.S.-Colombian
    eradication operations. The delay also undermines President
    Pastrana's ability to implement Plan Colombia.
        4. The U.S. and Colombian Governments should ensure that
    Plan Colombia focuses on drug trafficking both in the north and
    south of Colombia. Plan Colombia focuses initially on southern
    Colombia, where guerrilla organizations predominate. The plan
    should also focus on coca trafficking in the north of Colombia,
    where paramilitary organizations predominate. This is necessary
    not only to demonstrate that no trafficking organization is
    immune from attack, but also to contain the further spread of
    narcotics trafficking in the north.
        5. The Colombian Government should continue to make strong
    efforts to improve the human rights record of the Colombian
    Armed Forces, and to prosecute all violations of human rights.
    U.S. engagement with Colombia is an important factor in
    continued improvement of the human rights situation in
    Colombia. President Pastrana reiterated his personal
    commitment, and that of the Colombian Government, to improving
    human rights. Congress should consider increasing the amount of
    U.S. assistance proposed for human rights efforts.
        6. Coordination between the Army and the Police needs
    improvement. Important to the success of the military component
    of Plan Colombia will be coordination between the Colombian
    Army and the Colombian National Police. There are indications
    that the Police are unreceptive to working closely with the
    Army. Similarly, the Army counter-narcotics battalion at Tres
    Esquinas has conducted operations unilaterally--without
    including the police in planning or giving them adequate notice
    to participate. The United States must continually emphasize to
    the Colombian Government the importance of improving Army-CNP
    cooperation.
        7. The United States is well-served by the Country Team,
    but more staff are needed. The U.S. Embassy team working on
    Plan Colombia is led by a veteran Ambassador, is highly
    motivated and is working diligently to advance U.S. counter-
    narcotics objectives. Morale appears to be high. But the
    Narcotics Affairs Section is understaffed and needs additional
    personnel, and the Political Section needs additional officers
    to monitor human rights.

     Overview: Aid to ``Plan Colombia'' is a Critical Opportunity for the
                                 United States

        Since February, a request by President Clinton to provide
    nearly $1 billion in supplemental funding in Fiscal 2000 to
    help Colombia and its neighbors fight drug trafficking has been
    pending in Congress. The request was approved by the House of
    Representatives in March, but it has since languished in the
    Senate.
        During the Easter recess, I traveled to Colombia for a
    first-hand look at the situation and to discuss U.S. and
    Colombian counter-narcotics programs with senior Colombian
    Government officials, U.S. Embassy officials, and
    representatives of non-governmental and international
    organizations.
        I spent several hours over the course of two days with
    President Pastrana, who graciously hosted me at the
    presidential guest house in Cartagena. I believe that my
    lengthy meetings with him, mostly in informal settings,
    afforded me the opportunity to take the full measure of the
    man. I am fully convinced of President Pastrana's personal
    commitment to the counter-narcotics effort. I also spent
    several hours with U.S. Ambassador Curt Kamman and his team,
    both in Bogota and in Cartagena. I was deeply impressed by the
    dedication, knowledge and commitment of the senior Embassy
    team.
        I came away from my visit convinced that the U.S. Congress
    should act quickly to approve President Clinton's request for
    supplemental funding for Colombia. Unless the Congress acts
    quickly to approve funding for this plan, a critical
    opportunity in the fight against narcotics trafficking in
    Colombia may be lost. Colombia today is the primary source for
    two leading narcotics sold on the streets of the United States:
    cocaine and heroin. It is the primary source for the raw
    materials (coca leaf and opium poppy), the site of the major
    processing labs, and the site of the major trafficking
    organizations. Never before in recent history has there been
    such an opportunity for the international community to strike
    against the bulk of the narcotics industry at the source.
        Colombia today has a president committed to working closely
    with the United States. He has developed a $7.5 billion dollar
    plan--``Plan Colombia''--to fight traffickers and revive his
    country's economy. President Clinton has proposed that the
    United States provide $1.6 billion to assist Colombia and other
    Andean nations, or about 20 percent of the plan. International
    financial institutions have provided nearly $1 billion. Europe
    and Japan are being asked to contribute as well.
        Every day that the Senate delays imposes a cost on this
    plan and to U.S.-Colombian counter-narcotics efforts.
    Production of the proposed helicopters will be delayed, as will
    training of the necessary pilots. Training of two Colombian
    counter-narcotics battalions has already been delayed. The
    Colombian effort to raise money from Europe is proceeding
    slowly in part because of hesitation in Washington. Most
    important, delay in Washington undermines President Pastrana
    and his ability to implement the plan in Colombia.
        Helping Colombia is squarely in America's national
    interest. It is the source of many of the drugs poisoning our
    people. It is not some far-off land with which the United
    States shares little in common. It is an established democracy
    in America's backyard--just a few hours by air from Miami.
        Colombia is hardly a stranger to the drug war. It has been
    battling this scourge for decades. In the 1980s, its equivalent
    of the Supreme Court was attacked by traffickers. A decade ago,
    its presidential candidates were gunned down. The current
    president, when a candidate for Mayor of Bogota, was kidnapped
    by traffickers. The people of Colombia have demonstrated great
    courage in fighting drug trafficking. Colombia has achieved
    some major successes in this effort--in the 1990s it dismantled
    the major cartels in Medellin and Cali--cartels that a decade
    ago were thought to be invincible. Last October, in a joint
    U.S.-Colombian operation, over 30 major traffickers were
    arrested on the same day.
        America's apparently insatiable demand for narcotics has,
    undeniably, helped fuel the drug trade in Colombia. Colombia
    seeks significant U.S. assistance to help confront this trade--
    and is pledging substantial funds and action by its government.
    Colombia has a highly professional police force dedicated to
    counter-narcotics, and now requests U.S. assistance to train
    and professionalize military units that will be used against
    narcotics traffickers. I believe the United States should
    answer Colombia's call for help.
        There is, to be sure, no guarantee that this plan will work
    in significantly reducing narcotics trafficking. Anybody who
    says they are certain that it will succeed is either lying or
    is a fool. But in my 28 years in the Senate, I have been deeply
    involved in studying and debating narcotics policy. I strongly
    believe that at this moment, with this president in Bogota, we
    have a real opportunity to make a significant difference
    against the drug trade in Colombia. That opportunity could slip
    away unless we seize this rare enforcement moment.

                    Background on Colombia and Plan Colombia

                    a. overview of the situation in colombia

        Colombia is the third most populous country in Latin
    America, with just under 40 million people. It is the second
    oldest democracy in the Western Hemisphere, after the United
    States. Unlike many countries in Latin America, it has rarely
    been subject to military dictatorship. Military rulers have
    governed Colombia for only three brief periods since the
    formation of the republic in the early 19th century; the last
    time was over forty years ago. Today, as democracies across the
    Andes are threatened by renewed rumblings from military
    barracks, or authoritarian tendencies by incumbent leaders,
    Colombia remains squarely and unalterably in the camp of
    democratic nations.
        Although civilian rule has been the norm, it has not spared
    Colombia from instability. Rather, Colombian history has long
    been marked by internal conflict. During the late 1940s and
    1950s, for example, Colombia went through a civil conflict
    referred to as ``La Violencia,'' during which over 200,000
    people were killed. The violence ended when the two major
    parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, agreed on a 16-year
    period of ``National Front'' government during which the two
    parties rotated the presidency and had parity in other elected
    offices.
        It might be said that Colombia is going through a second--
    or perhaps extension of--``La Violencia.'' Colombia today is
    wracked by violence. It faces a three-front war: with drug
    traffickers, with left-wing guerrillas, and with right-wing
    paramilitaries. These fronts are often intertwined; for
    example, guerrillas and paramilitaries both cooperate with drug
    traffickers, and the paramilitaries cooperate with the armed
    forces. None of these groups are monoliths; there are numerous
    drug trafficking organizations, two guerrilla groups, and
    numerous right-wing paramilitary groups. The Colombian
    Government actively fights on two of these fronts: against the
    drug traffickers and the guerrillas, and occasionally fights,
    but occasionally cooperates with, the right-wing
    paramilitaries. At the same time, the government is engaged in
    peace negotiations with both guerrilla groups, and has agreed
    to ``demilitarized zones'' for both of them.
        The violence associated with the civil conflict and drug
    trafficking has been accompanied by an erosion of the rule of
    law. Last year, for example, there were some 25,000 murders in
    Colombia (this far exceeds the murder rate in the United
    States--a country with more than six times the population of
    Colombia--where there were about 17,000 murders in 1998). Of
    these, about 2,000-3,000 were considered to be ``political''
    crimes, that is, crimes related to the civil conflict. The rest
    were common criminal murders. Kidnaping is also widespread:
    there were over 2,500 last year, which is one out of every
    three kidnapings in the world. Justice is often denied. A
    recent judicial report in Colombia found that 63 percent of
    crimes go unreported, and that 40 percent of all reported
    crimes go unpunished. Because of the violence, particularly the
    risk of kidnaping, the State Department currently warns U.S.
    citizens against traveling to Colombia, and states that ``there
    is a greater risk of being kidnaped in Colombia than in any
    other country in the world.''
        Colombia is, as it has long been, the source of up to 75
    percent of the world's processed cocaine (cocaine HCL). It now
    also holds the dubious distinction of being the world's leading
    producer of cocaine base (the intermediate step prior to
    cocaine HCL), as reductions in cultivation in Bolivia and Peru
    have pushed cultivation into Colombia. Colombia is also the
    leading supplier of heroin to the United States.
        Colombia is currently suffering through a recession. Its
    gross domestic product fell by 3.5 percent in 1999, the first
    time the Colombian economy suffered negative growth in three
    decades. Unemployment at the end of 1999 was around 20 percent;
    inflation was over 9 percent. And approximately one million
    people (out of a total population of about 40 million) have
    been internally displaced in the last several years because of
    the civil conflict.

        b. u.s.-colombian relations and the background to plan colombia

        U.S.-Colombian relations have historically been strong.
    Under the previous Colombian president, however, the
    relationship soured because of credible allegations that he
    received financial contributions for his 1994 presidential
    campaign from drug traffickers. This led President Clinton to
    twice ``decertify'' Colombia under the Foreign Assistance Act.
    A general reduction in the level of cooperation between the
    United States and Colombia also resulted.
        The inauguration of President Andres Pastrana in August
    1998 changed the atmosphere in the U.S.-Colombian relationship.
    President Pastrana made restoration of strong relations with
    the United States a high priority, and he has succeeded in that
    objective.
        Undoubtedly, President Pastrana has demonstrated his
    commitment to a key issue for the United States--the fight
    against narcotics trafficking. Among other things, Pastrana has
    released a first-ever national drug strategy, and renewed
    extradition of criminals to the United States, as authorized by
    a December 1997 constitutional amendment. He has also
    formulated a plan to combat drug trafficking and revive the
    economy, which he has called ``Plan Colombia''. Announced in
    September 1999, the plan calls for a $7.5 billion investment
    over three years (2000-2002); of this, the Colombian Government
    would provide $4 billion, and would seek the remaining $3.5
    billion from the international community. As articulated by the
    Colombian Government, Plan Colombia focuses on five areas:

        1. The peace process (i.e., negotiations with the
    guerrillas);
        2. The economy;
        3. The counter-drug strategy;
        4. Reform of the justice system and protection of human
    rights;
        5. Democratization and social development.

        In January 2000, President Clinton announced his proposal
    for U.S. support of Plan Colombia: a two year, $1.6 billion
    contribution. Of this amount, approximately $150 million is the
    base Colombia program for Fiscal 2000 and 2001. The enhanced
    funding would include $954 million in supplemental
    appropriations in Fiscal 2000, and an additional $318 million
    in Fiscal 2001. The supplemental request was approved by the
    House of Representatives on March 30, and is currently pending
    before the Senate.

                                Narcotics Issues

                a. background on the current narcotics situation

    1. Trafficking Organizations
        Organizationally, the drug trade in Colombia is no longer
    dominated by major cartels based in Medellin and Cali, as it
    was a decade ago. Because of law enforcement pressure by the
    U.S. and Colombian Governments in the early and mid-1990s,
    these cartels have been largely dismantled, and their leaders
    killed or imprisoned. The result has been what the Drug
    Enforcement Administration (DEA) aptly terms the
    ``decentralization'' of the trade, with numerous smaller
    trafficking organizations emerging, the rise of independent
    traffickers in Bolivia and Peru producing their own cocaine
    HCL, and changes in the distribution networks such that Mexican
    organizations are not merely middlemen for the Colombians, they
    now have their own distribution networks in the United States.
    2. Production and cultivation
        The organizational changes described above have not
    affected Colombia's role as the source of the large majority of
    processed cocaine, or cocaine HCL (up to 75 percent of the
    world's cocaine HCL comes from Colombia). Because of
    enforcement pressure in Bolivia and Peru, much cultivation has
    shifted to Colombia. As recently as 1995, Colombia only
    produced about 25 percent of the world's cocaine base; it is
    now the world's leading producer, at about 68 percent. Coca
    cultivation is literally exploding in Colombia: in the last
    four years, net coca cultivation has more than doubled in terms
    of area, from 51,000 hectares in 1995 to 122,500 hectares in
    1999. Moreover, a recent U.S. intelligence study determined
    that Colombian leaf produced a higher yield than previously
    thought, and that Colombian labs were more efficient than
    previously thought. Colombia's estimated potential cocaine
    production in 1999 was 520 metric tons; this compares to 70
    metric tons in Bolivia, and 175 metric tons in Peru.
        Much of this new cultivation is in southern Colombia,
    primarily in two departments (or provinces), Putumayo and
    Caqueta. The government does not have much of an institutional
    presence in this region--that is, there are few roads, schools,
    or hospitals--and has not for most of the history of the
    republic. It is remote and much of it is jungle. There is also
    significant cultivation in two northern departments, Norte de
    Santander and Bolivar.
        Nearly half of the coca in the country--about 56,000
    hectares--is cultivated in Putumayo Department. Although I did
    not visit southern Colombia, in March two members of the
    Committee staff visited three forward Army and Police bases in
    Putumayo and Caqueta Departments, and rode on Colombian
    National Police helicopters to witness an eradication operation
    (i.e., fumigation of coca leaves) in Caqueta. They also flew by
    plane over portions of Putumayo Department where significant
    cultivation occurs. In Caqueta, much of the cultivation the
    staff saw was somewhat hidden, at least on the ground, within
    wooded areas. That is, the peasants clear-cut several acres of
    jungle to grow a plot of coca, but attempted to keep the
    presence of the field hidden on the ground (though it obviously
    cannot be hidden from aerial view). In Putumayo, there was no
    such effort to hide the plots of coca: it was out in the open,
    and went on and on for hundreds of acres.
        In addition to coca cultivation, Colombia is now the
    leading source of heroin sold in the United States. Starting
    from almost nothing a decade ago, the opium and heroin trade
    has expanded significantly: by 1993, Colombian heroin accounted
    for 15 percent of the U.S. supply, and by 1998 it accounted for
    65 percent. In 1999, Colombia produced an estimated 8 metric
    tons of heroin, more than Mexico. Though it amounts to only a
    small percentage of the world's heroin supply, Colombian heroin
    dominates the trade in New York and other East Coast cities; it
    is high quality and of high purity, allowing it to be smoked
    rather than injected.
    3. Involvement of guerrillas and paramilitaries in narcotics
            trafficking
        In addition to the drug trafficking organizations, both
    left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries are involved
    in the Colombian drug trade.
        The two major guerrilla groups in Colombia are the
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (commonly referred to by
    its Spanish-language acronym of ``FARC''), and the National
    Liberation Army (or ELN). The FARC is the larger of the two--it
    is believed to have about 10,000-14,000 personnel, and is
    better trained and equipped. It operates primarily in the south
    and eastern lowlands, though it has some urban cells. The ELN
    has about 3,000-6,000 personnel and operates primarily in the
    north and the center of the country.
        It would be ``misleading,'' says an unclassified portion of
    an otherwise classified DEA report, to characterize the FARC or
    ELN as drug cartels per se. Rather, they assist traffickers by
    providing security for drug operations and assisting in
    transportation of narcotics. They also impose taxes, not only
    on the drug trade but all economic activity in areas they
    control. In some areas, they allegedly establish the price paid
    to peasants for coca leaf. Estimates of the profits the
    guerrillas derive from this activity vary significantly, from a
    few hundred million dollars to nearly $2 billion per year (this
    higher end estimate was provided by a Colombian Army official,
    and it appears to be greatly inflated).
        Right-wing paramilitary groups are also involved in the
    drug trade, and some of them are considered to be traffickers.
    The paramilitaries were originally formed in the 1980s as a
    response to guerrilla violence, and several of these were
    originally authorized by the government to protect rural areas.
    These groups are now illegal. The leader of the largest
    umbrella group of paramilitaries is Carlos Castano, the leader
    of the ``Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba
    (ACCU).'' Most paramilitary operations are in the north, though
    they do have a presence in the south. Like the guerrillas, most
    of the paramilitary groups do not appear to be directly
    involved in any significant drug cultivation, but instead levy
    taxes and protect the traffickers. The DEA recently testified,
    however, that Castano's organization, and possibly other
    paramilitary groups, ``appear to be directly involved in
    processing cocaine,'' and that ``at least one of these
    paramilitary groups appears to be involved in exporting cocaine
    from Colombia.''

                b. key issues in implementation of plan colombia

        During my visit, I focused on several key issues related to
    the implementation of Plan Colombia by the Colombian Government
    and the U.S. Government.
    1. The military component of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia--and the
            need for it
        A key component of the U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia
    is military assistance, specifically, the training and
    equipping of three Colombian Army counter-narcotics battalions.
    One battalion of about 950 men was trained last year by U.S.
    forces, and is now in place at the Tres Esquinas base in
    southern Caqueta Department. Together the three battalions will
    form a brigade, just under 3,000 strong.
        The basic argument for training and equipping the Colombian
    Army--rather than the Colombian National Police (CNP), the
    primary counter-narcotics agency in Colombia--is that the CNP
    lacks the muscle to take on the guerrillas and paramilitaries
    that are involved in drug trafficking in southern Colombia. In
    other words, because the guerrillas and paramilitaries often
    protect traffickers and their operations, the police cannot go
    after the traffickers without also risking encounters with
    well-armed irregular forces. And, because the police are
    primarily a law enforcement agency, it lacks the military power
    and training to confront the well-trained and well-equipped
    FARC fronts and paramilitary units.
        It bears emphasis that the United States is hardly
    neglecting the CNP with this plan. It has provided over $775
    million in support for the CNP since the mid-1980s, and the
    Administration proposal provides roughly $100 million in
    additional equipment and training for the CNP.
        The security threat in Colombia warrants increased U.S.
    counter-narcotics assistance. Numerous FARC fronts (the
    estimate of how many is classified), as well as paramilitary
    units operate in the south. Nearly half of the coca leaf grown
    in Colombia is located in Putumayo Department. There is a
    continuous security threat to the current U.S.-Colombian
    eradication operations. In March, the State Department
    temporarily suspended day-time coca spraying operations because
    of the security situation. During the past four years
    (including the first three months of this year), U.S.-CNP spray
    planes in Colombia were hit over 100 times by groundfire,
    including 21 times in the last six months alone. Because of the
    threat from groundfire, two helicopter gunships and a search
    and rescue helicopter continually accompany the spray planes.
        U.S. assistance to the battalions will be in two basic
    forms: training by U.S. military forces, and equipment,
    particularly helicopters. Most of the training will be
    conducted in Colombia by U.S. Special Forces on temporary duty.
    Some of the training, particularly for the brigade headquarters
    staff, will be conducted in the United States. Anywhere from 20
    to 160 U.S. personnel will be involved in training at any one
    time. Some training missions will be conducted at forward
    operating bases in Colombia.
        The training will be just that: training. Pursuant to a
    Department of Defense memorandum issued by Secretary of Defense
    Cohen in October 1998, Defense Department personnel are
    prohibited from accompanying foreign law enforcement and
    military forces on actual counterdrug field operations or
    ``participating in any activity in which counterdrug-related
    hostilities are imminent.'' Moreover, they are prohibited by
    the same directive from accompanying such law enforcement
    forces outside a secure base or area. Secretary Cohen
    reemphasized these points in a memorandum to Joint Chiefs
    Chairman Shelton in March 2000.
        In addition to training the battalions, the United States
    will fill a key shortfall in the Colombian military arsenal:
    tactical mobility. Under the U.S. contribution to the Plan, the
    United States will provide 30 UH-60 helicopters (Blackhawks) to
    the Colombian Army. The Blackhawks will be newly procured from
    the contractor, Sikorsky Helicopters. Delivery of the
    helicopters will be at a rate of two per month, and is
    projected to begin in early 2001. In the interim, 15 additional
    UH-1Ns (Hueys) will be provided to Colombia, which will add to
    the 18 already in country. Up to six of these Hueys, however,
    will likely be diverted from Colombian counter-narcotics
    operations for use in training additional Colombian pilots.
    2. The costs of delaying the supplemental
        There are considerable costs associated with Congress'
    delay in passing the supplemental appropriations that would
    provide nearly $1 billion in assistance for Colombia in Fiscal
    2000.
        First, delay exacerbates the lag time for procurement of
    the Blackhawks, the training of the pilots and the building of
    the infrastructure to house and maintain them. Even if the
    supplemental were enacted today, the first Blackhawks could not
    be delivered until next year due to production schedules.
        Second, the training for the second and third counter-
    narcotics battalions has been delayed because of uncertainties
    about the funding for Colombia. Training of the second
    battalion was scheduled to begin in early April. Because the
    entire training schedule was due to occur in sequence--that is,
    training of the second battalion followed by training of the
    third--the entire training schedule will now likely be pushed
    back.
        Third, because of the delay in the supplemental, the Huey
    helicopters that are currently in Colombia and designated for
    the counter-narcotics battalions are not yet forward deployed--
    for the simple reason that funds are not available, because
    they were to be provided by the United States under the
    supplemental. Consequently, the initial counter-narcotics
    battalion at Tres Esquinas is greatly hampered in its range of
    operation. To date, it has conducted operations only on foot.
        Fourth, the State Department has forward-funded some
    eradication operations in Colombia because it expected the
    supplemental to pass by now. The Department increased the
    operating tempo of eradication, in effect gambling that the
    money from Congress would soon arrive. It was a reasonable
    gamble given the original reception to President Clinton's
    proposal and the recent successes in eradication. But the
    gamble has not worked. The State Department just laid off 40
    contract employees, severely reducing spraying operations in
    Guaviare Department, where there has been significant success
    in spraying in recent years.
        Fifth, the delay in approving the supplemental undermines
    Colombia's efforts to raise funds from Europe and Japan. In
    April, President Pastrana met with British Prime Minister Tony
    Blair, and in March his foreign minister traveled to Tokyo to
    seek help from Japan. This summer, Spain will host a conference
    of donor countries to garner more international support. But,
    in the face of inaction on our part, all those efforts may be a
    waste of time. I do not expect Europe and Japan to contribute
    to Plan Colombia unless the U.S. Congress takes the first step.
        Finally, and most important, we need to move now because we
    have a limited window. President Pastrana is an ally of the
    United States. But he is only going to be president for two and
    one-half more years. The hesitation of the United States has a
    negative psychological effect in Colombia and Pastrana's effort
    to push forward his strategy. Every day we wait to pass the
    spending bill means one less day that Pastrana will have to
    implement Plan Colombia. And every day that we delay, more coca
    seeds are planted, more coca leaf is processed, and more
    cocaine is shipped to this country.
    3. What does the Plan do to counter trafficking by paramilitaries?
        The debate in the U.S. Congress to date has focused in part
    on suggestions that the ``push into southern Colombia'' may be
    a counter-insurgency in disguise--in that the south is also the
    area where the stronger of the two guerrilla groups, the FARC,
    predominates.
        During my visit to Colombia, I impressed upon Colombian and
    U.S. Embassy officials about the importance of taking actions
    against paramilitary trafficking in the north of the country
    simultaneously with the push into the south--not only to
    demonstrate that no trafficking organization is immune from
    attack, but also to contain the further spread of narcotics
    trafficking in the north.
        The push into southern Colombian will in fact engage
    paramilitaries. Although it is not well known in this country,
    hundreds of paramilitaries are struggling with the FARC for
    control of the drug trade in Putumayo province. Operations
    against drug trafficking in Putumayo will not be targeted
    against organizations because of their political views, they
    will be targeted against drug traffickers.
        In addition, the plan contemplates operations against drug
    trafficking elsewhere in the country during the second phase,
    beginning during the second year. Finally, senior Embassy
    personnel indicated that it was an achievable objective to
    undertake operations against coca cultivation in the north of
    the country--where paramilitary organization predominate--
    simultaneous with the ``push into southern Colombia.''
    4. Concerns about coordination between the CNP and the Armed Forces
        The military assistance component of Plan Colombia is
    predicated on the need for the Colombian Army to secure
    portions of southern Colombia so that police operations, and
    ultimately alternative development programs, can occur. The
    Colombian Army counter-narcotics battalions will not operate
    alone, because, as is the case with the U.S. military, there
    are legal restrictions on its ability to conduct law
    enforcement operations. Rather, they must coordinate their
    operations with the CNP, which has the law enforcement
    authority and expertise to make arrests and take down
    laboratories.
        The CNP is formally part of the Ministry of National
    Defense, but, as with any military establishment, there are
    institutional rivalries between the CNP and the other services.
    The rivalry between the CNP and the Army goes back at least
    half a century, when the two services backed different
    political parties during ``La Violencia.''
        The U.S. Government recognizes the importance of improving
    the joint efforts of the two services. During an appearance
    before the Committee on Foreign Relations on February 25, Brian
    Sheridan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, testified that the
    Colombian military needs to ``better coordinate operations
    between the services and with the CNP.'' There are indications
    that the police are unreceptive to working closely with the
    Army. Similarly, the Army counter-narcotics battalion based at
    Tres Esquinas has undertaken several operations on foot
    unilaterally. These were not mere training missions: there was
    a counter-narcotics objective to each operation (typically a
    cocaine laboratory). The Army has failed to properly coordinate
    these operations in advance with the CNP, but instead gave the
    police only a few hours' notice that the operation was
    imminent--leaving the CNP inadequate time to prepare for the
    mission.
        Coordination between the two services will be essential to
    the success of the ``push into southern Colombia.'' The United
    States must make it a high priority to foster and encourage
    coordination between the two services. Embassy officials are
    aware of this objective, and appear to be taking steps to
    promote it. So, too, are Colombian Government officials. I
    spoke at length about this issue with the President and the
    Minister of Defense, and impressed upon them the urgent need to
    improve coordination. The message should be constantly
    emphasized by the United States.
    5. Security at forward operating bases
        In March, the Committee staff took a day-long trip to
    southern Colombia, namely Caqueta and Putumayo Departments.
    They visited the Larandia base in northwest Caqueta, the Army
    base at Tres Esquinas (on the Caqueta-Putumayo border in the
    western portion of Caqueta), and the CNP base at Villa Garzon
    in Putumayo Department.
        Because of time constraints and the Easter holiday period,
    I was unable to visit southern Colombia. I did, however,
    discuss the security issue with the U.S. Ambassador and the
    head of the U.S. Military Group at the Embassy. I impressed
    upon them the need to do everything possible to strengthen
    security at the forward bases.
        The key question for the United States is whether there is
    adequate security at the bases where U.S. trainers will be
    located during the training of the Colombian counter-narcotics
    battalions. It is currently anticipated that some training of
    the counter-narcotics battalions will be held at Larandia and
    Tres Esquinas, which are in southern Colombia in areas where
    FARC fronts operate.
        There is no such thing as perfect security, and it is
    unlikely that Colombian bases will ever meet standards of U.S.
    military bases. But U.S. forces should not be exposed to undue
    risk. Assistant Secretary of Defense Brian Sheridan stated in
    response to a question for the record after a February 2000
    hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations that ``force
    protection measures in place are adequate for the deployment of
    U.S. personnel to train Colombian forces who conduct
    counterdrug operations.'' U.S. personnel in Colombia echoed
    this view, though they underscored that they are continually
    working with the Colombian military to improve security.
    6. Selection and operation of the Blackhawks
        One question before Congress is whether the tactical
    mobility requirement of the Colombian Army can be adequately
    met with a cheaper option than the Blackhawks, namely Hueys.
    The option was rejected by the Administration for three
    reasons: the Blackhawk has a greater range, speed, and can
    carry more troops than the Huey. The following table
    demonstrates the differences:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              UH-60
                                           (Blackhawk)       UH-1N  (Huey)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Maximum range (nautical miles)....               306                230
    Cruising speed (knots)............               150                110
    Troop-carrying capacity...........          11 to 20            8 to 12
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To be sure, the costs of the Blackhawks are substantial: the
    initial investment under the supplemental is $385 million to
    fund the procurement, operations and maintenance, and pilot
    training. There will be associated costs for infrastructure at
    Colombian bases: at least $13 million in Fiscal Years 2000 and
    2001. But the payoff is a far more capable helicopter to
    provide the critical requirement of the Colombian Army. The
    advantage of buying a new helicopter--as opposed to a upgraded,
    but decades-old helicopter--should be self-evident.
        Questions have been raised whether the Colombian military
    can adequately manage sophisticated helicopters such as the
    Blackhawk. The Colombian Army and Air Force, collectively,
    already possess 20 Blackhawk helicopters. The Air Force
    helicopters are operational 80 percent of time, the Army
    helicopters 50 percent. The latter is skewed by the inclusion
    in the calculations of one Blackhawk with 73 bullet holes that
    has been inoperational for 18 months. If this single helicopter
    is not included in the data, the operational rate is 70
    percent. These data compare favorably to the current CNP
    aircraft inventory, which is operational at a 65 percent rate.
    Perhaps more important, the operational rate of the Colombian
    military is comparable to the U.S. military, in which the
    operational rates of the Blackhawk average around 80 percent.
    So this data suggest that the Colombian Armed Forces have
    adequately learned how to operate and maintain the Blackhawks
    in their inventory, though additional pilots, maintenance
    crews, and infrastrucure will be needed for the new
    helicopters.
    7. Alternative development and assistance for the internally displaced
        Two important components of Plan Colombia are providing
    alternative development opportunities to peasants now growing
    coca and poppy, and assisting those that are internally
    displaced by the Plan and Colombia's conflicts.
        The U.S. portion of plan provides for $115 million for
    alternative development efforts in Colombia. This is clearly
    insufficient given the substantial need to persuade thousands
    of small farmers to switch from illegal activities. Colombia
    needs more; it is planning to contribute several hundred
    million dollars of its own funds, and is seeking funds for the
    effort from Europe--which has been asked to provide up to $1
    billion for alternative development--as well as Japan.
        The key issue is one of timing: coordinating alternative
    development programs with enforcement measures, so the peasants
    have real economic alternatives at the moment their livelihood
    (albeit illicit) is being reduced. This has historically been a
    difficult challenge in the Andean region, because development
    programs often take longer to develop than enforcement
    programs. An added difficulty is that the Colombian Government
    agency responsible for alternative development, known as
    ``PLANTE'', is relatively new and is relatively small.
    Similarly, the Agency for International Development mission
    must build its capacity, as its program in Colombia in recent
    years has been negligible. The United Nations Drug Control
    Program (UNDCP), which has been operating in Colombia since
    1985, has extensive experience in the Andes, and should be
    utilized in this effort.
        The Colombian Government plans to begin alternative
    development programs in Putumayo Department on a pilot basis
    (there are already programs underway in opium growing areas).
    Initial programs will be conducted, in coordination with
    eradication operations, in an area along the main highway south
    of the provincial capital. Unlike many areas in the rest of the
    province, the soil there is suitable for agriculture. The
    programs there will be an important test of whether real
    alternatives can work in that region.
        It should be recognized that even the best alternative
    development programs cannot work unless the area is secure. Put
    another way, we cannot expect the Agency for International
    Development and PLANTE to work in areas effectively controlled
    by guerrillas or paramilitaries.
        Plan Colombia also provides for assistance to the
    internally displaced. The battle between Colombia's armed
    actors--the military, the guerillas, and the paramilitaries--
    has had a tremendous impact on the Colombian people.
    Kidnapings, massacres, battles, and threats force tens of
    thousands of Colombian families to flee their homes each year
    and move elsewhere in the country. Squatter settlements of
    displaced people have sprung up around Bogota and other cities.
    These internally displaced persons need food, clothing, shelter
    (temporary and permanent), health care, counseling, job
    training and employment. (In international law, these are not
    ``refugees''; refugees must cross an international border.
    Those displaced by crises, but still within their own borders,
    are referred to as ``internally displaced persons,'' or
    ``IDPs'').
        Estimates of the number of IDPs vary considerably: ranging
    from several hundred thousand to 2 million. The State
    Department estimates that at least 800,000 people, primarily
    women and children, have been displaced since 1996--a level
    similar to those displaced in Kosovo in 1999. The ``Red de
    Solidaridad Social'' (RSS), Colombia's government agency which
    coordinates relief services, numbers the displaced at 400,000.
    The reason for the disparity turns on definitional disputes
    regarding precisely who is displaced. I am not in a position to
    settle this dispute, but it is clear that the government has a
    serious problem on its hands.
        The problem is widespread in the country. According to the
    Colombian Government, the internal displacement problem
    involves 139 of the country's 180 municipalities. Forty-four
    percent of IDP families are headed by a female, 23 percent of
    IDPs are less than seven years old, and nearly 17 percent are
    ethnic minorities. Most are poor families from rural areas with
    an agricultural background.
        The cause of displacement varies. The Council for Human
    Rights and the Displaced, a respected non-governmental
    organization in Colombia, estimates that 45 percent of IDPs are
    displaced by the paramilitaries; 30-32 percent by the
    guerrillas; and 8 percent by the armed forces.
        The push into southern Colombia is expected to displace
    30,000 to 40,000 of the estimated 300,000 residents of the
    Putumayo Department. Many of those expected to be displaced are
    migrant farmers who have moved to the region to grow or pick
    coca. Because the displacements in Putumayo will be the result
    of U.S.-assisted enforcement measures under Plan Colombia, the
    United States will have a special responsibility to assist
    those displaced from that region. The Clinton Administration
    proposal requests $12 million in 2000 and $19 million in 2001
    for resettlement assistance. Given the large number of people
    already displaced and the additional people who will be
    displaced as a result of the ``push into southern Colombia,''
    this amount is probably insufficient, and additional resources
    should be considered during debate on the supplemental or in
    the regular FY 2001 budget.
    8. Embassy staffing requirements for Plan Colombia
        The Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S. Embassy is
    understaffed. In September 1999, with the approval of the
    Ambassador, the Section applied to Washington for 31 new
    positions to help manage the counter-narcotics program, which
    has grown significantly in the past few years--from about $20
    million in Fiscal 1996 to some $235 million in Fiscal 1999--
    without a corresponding increase in staff to manage the
    program. Senior State Department officials have assured the
    Committee that these positions will be approved; to date, 18 of
    them have been. These staff are needed now. It bears emphasis
    that these additional 30 positions were requested before
    submittal of Plan Colombia. The Section estimates that it may
    need up to 20 additional positions in order to support the
    increase of U.S. assistance under Plan Colombia.
        The importance of the State Department providing adequate
    staffing to this mission cannot be overemphasized. If the U.S.
    Government is going to devote substantial resources to fighting
    narcotics in Colombia, it must provide adequate staff to help
    ensure that these resources are spent properly.

                   C. Colombian Government and Plan Colombia

    1. Securing assistance from other international sources
        Plan Colombia is predicated on international assistance.
    The United States has pledged, but not yet provided, over $1
    billion in new assistance. International financial institutions
    have committed nearly $1 billion. The Colombian Government is
    making serious efforts to raise additional funds from Europe
    and Japan. A donors conference, sponsored by Spain, will be
    convened in Madrid in July for this purpose.
        The Colombian government is working hard to solicit other
    international assistance. The week before my visit, President
    Pastrana traveled to the United Kingdom for meetings with Prime
    Minister Blair and Foreign Secretary Cook. In March, Colombian
    Foreign Minister Fernandez traveled to Tokyo to discuss a
    possible Japanese contribution.
        Should they be provided, contributions from other
    international donors are designed to complement the Colombian
    and U.S. portions of Plan Colombia. Europe is being asked to
    provide up to $1 billion for alternative development. The
    Japanese Government has expressed an interest in helping with
    reforestation and programs for the internally displaced.
        There are reasons to be skeptical that European states will
    provide assistance--Europe has been slow to provide assistance
    for Kosovo reconstruction--but one thing seems clear: neither
    Europe nor Japan is likely to provide assistance unless the
    United States does. In short, the failure of the United States
    to approve the supplemental has delayed commitments by other
    foreign donors.
    2. Peace process
        Another key component of Plan Colombia, from the
    perspective of the Colombian Government, is a peace process
    underway with the two main guerrilla movements. President
    Pastrana was elected in 1998 with a strong mandate to end the
    civil conflicts, and a sizable civic movement called ``No Mas''
    has marched in the streets of Colombian cities in the last two
    years demanding an end to violence.
        The talks with the FARC are further along than the
    negotiations with the ELN. Through negotiations with the FARC,
    last year the government agreed to a demilitarized zone in
    south-central Colombia, in Meta and Caqueta Departments (the
    zone, which is about the size of Switzerland, consists of about
    4 percent of the country's land mass; 100,000 of Colombia's
    roughly 40 million people live there). While the negotiations
    continue, the conflict goes on outside the zone. There has been
    no formal cessation of hostilities, and there are frequent
    military encounters between government forces and the FARC
    around the country.
        There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic that
    President Pastrana will make progress in these negotiations.
    Last winter, FARC leaders went on a three-week tour of European
    capitals. In part, the trip was designed to show FARC leaders,
    many of whom have been living in the jungle for decades, how
    the world has changed. It also exposed them to criticism from
    left-of-center politicians in Europe, who used the opportunity,
    I was told, to press the FARC leadership on its own violations
    of human rights and involvement in drug trafficking. Colombian
    officials believe the European tour will have a positive effect
    in the long run on the FARC position. While I was in the
    country, the FARC announced the formation of new political
    party--perhaps an indication that the guerrillas recognize the
    domestic political need to begin operating within the framework
    of normal politics.
        Just after my visit, the Colombian Government agreed to a
    demilitarized zone with the ELN, though the exact parameters of
    the zone, and the terms and conditions, have not been
    finalized.

                              Human Rights Issues

    1. Background and Colombian Government actions
        The dire human rights situation in Colombia has been well
    documented in the annual State Department human rights report,
    in reports by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
    office in Colombia, and reports by respected non-governmental
    organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
    Watch. I do not attempt to repeat their findings or analysis
    here. It is enough to say that there is a crisis in the
    country: massive human rights violations are committed by the
    guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and to a lesser extent the
    Colombian Armed Forces.
        In recent years, there has been a measurable decline in the
    number of human rights violations directly attributable to the
    military. At the same time, violations by right-wing
    paramilitaries have increased, leading to the widespread belief
    in Colombia that the military collaborates with the
    paramilitaries--and lets them do their dirty work. In February,
    a Human Rights Watch report linked ``half of Colombia's
    eighteen brigade-level army units (excluding military schools)
    to paramilitary activities.'' Their report concludes that
    ``military support for paramilitary activity remains national
    in scope and includes areas where units receiving or scheduled
    to receive U.S. military aid operate.''
        I discussed the human rights situation with the President,
    the Minister of Defense, and the U.S. Ambassador. I impressed
    upon them the importance of human rights issues in the
    Congress, and urged them to keep making efforts to improve the
    record of the Colombian Armed Forces. I emphasized to them the
    need to end impunity in the Armed Forces--that is, to prosecute
    all violators of human rights.
        The Colombian Government, at high levels, concedes that
    there is a human rights problem in the country, and has taken
    certain efforts to address it. These actions by the government
    are commendable, but it must do more. It must continue to make
    human rights a priority. It must continue to send a message
    throughout the armed forces that institutional tolerance of
    paramilitary activity must cease. The actions take to date by
    the Government include:

    Firing of high-level officials: President Pastrana fired four
    Army generals in 1999 for collaboration with or failure to take
    action against paramilitaries. Despite those dismissals, many
    military officials who are under investigation for links to the
    paramilitaries--and some who have been found guilty by the
    civilian courts for violating human rights--continue to serve
    in the military, and some have even been promoted. A number of
    investigators working on cases linking the Army and the
    paramilitaries have been threatened and either forced to resign
    from their posts or to leave the country.
        According to Colombian officials, within the next six
    months, the head of the Armed Forces, General Tapias, will be
    given the authority to dismiss any officer tied to paramilitary
    groups without going through lengthy dismissal proceedings.
    This would give Tapias the same power that enabled General
    Serrano, the head of the Colombian National Police, to purge
    the police of human rights violators. This authority to clean
    house is often credited with professionalizing the police force
    and it is hoped that it will do the same for the military.

    New military penal code: The Colombian Government passed a new
    military penal code in August 1999, but it has yet to be
    implemented. This new code includes protections for soldiers
    who refuse to follow orders which would involve violations of
    human rights. It also creates an independent body, similar to
    the judge advocate general corps in the U.S. military, so that
    unit commanders will no longer be judging their own troops. The
    new code gives civilian courts jurisdiction over all ``crimes
    against humanity'' including genocide, forced disappearance and
    torture. Notably absent from this list of offenses, however, is
    murder.

    Law on forced disappearances: The new military code requires
    that forced disappearances be tried in civilian courts, but the
    law to implement it has been stalled. Though President Pastrana
    initially supported this policy change, in December 1999 he
    vetoed the necessary legislation due to his objections over
    certain provisions in the bill. As a result, forced
    disappearance continues to go unpunished in Colombia: very few
    of the more than 3,000 cases reported to authorities since 1977
    have been resolved. The government has promised that the bill
    will move quickly during the current session of Congress.

    Recent decree on human rights: In March, President Pastrana
    signed a decree to create an inter-agency mechanism designed to
    provide ``early warning'' of potential massacres--so the
    government forces can act to prevent them. This mechanism will
    be coordinated by the Ministers of Defense and Interior, with
    the cooperation of Colombian law enforcement agencies and the
    Prosecutor General. The Minister of Defense will be charged
    with dispatching the military to secure areas where massacres
    are believed to be imminent. It is too soon to say whether this
    mechanism will be effective.
    2. Discussions with human rights and UN representatives
        While in Bogota, I met jointly with three representatives
    of non-governmental organizations working on human rights
    issues, and representatives of two U.N. bodies--the High
    Commissioner for Refugees and the High Commissioner for Human
    Rights.
        All five individuals expressed concern about various
    aspects of Plan Colombia. They emphasized different points:
    that the Colombian Government had not demonstrated enough of a
    commitment to the internally displaced, that increased military
    assistance could lead to increased displacements, that there
    was a great need to reform the military and improve its human
    rights record, that the plan could undermine the peace process,
    and that the plan did not place enough emphasis on alternative
    development.
        I assured the group that the United States was firmly
    committed to human rights, and would continue to press the
    Colombian Government on these issues. I also pointed out,
    however, that the human rights situation in the country was
    unlikely to improve unless the United States was fully engaged
    with Colombia. In other words, U.S. engagement and assistance
    to Colombia would inevitably (because of U.S. emphasis on human
    rights) have a positive effect on human rights in Colombia, and
    the converse--U.S. disengagement--would not be helpful to the
    cause of human rights. One individual present responded by
    saying ``I essentially agree with what you have said.''
    3. Need for additional political officers in the Embassy
        Currently, just one officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota
    is designated to monitor human rights on a full time basis.
    While others in the political section also have responsibility
    for monitoring human rights, I believe more officers may be
    needed to focus exclusively on this matter.
        Under the ``Leahy Amendment'' to the Foreign Operations and
    Defense Appropriations Act, all members of Colombian military
    units receiving U.S. training must be vetted to assure that
    they have not been involved in gross human rights violations.
    Embassy staff must review available records on each and every
    individual to receive U.S. training. This is a painstaking and
    time-consuming task. Moreover, the scope of the human rights
    violations in Colombia requires constant monitoring and
    reporting.

                              Schedule of Meetings

    Wednesday, April 19
    Arrive Bogota; travel to U.S. Embassy

    Meeting with Jaime Ruiz, Chief of Staff to the President

    Meeting with representatives of U.N. offices and non-
                governmental organizations: Michael Hurtado, UNHCR;
                Javier Hernandez, UNHCHR; Marco Romero, CODHES;
                Rev. Fernando Gonzales, CINEP; Andres Sanchez,
                Colombian Commission of Jurists

    Travel to Cartagena aboard presidential aircraft; discussions
                with President Pastrana and U.S. Ambassador aboard
                plane

    Dinner with President Pastrana, Minister of Defense Ramirez,
                U.S. Ambassador, and senior U.S. Embassy staff
    Thursday, April 20
    Breakfast briefing by U.S. Ambassador, Head of Narcotics
                Affairs Section, and Commander of U.S. Military
                Group, U.S. Embassy

    Meeting with Minister of Defense Ramirez; briefing by Rear
                Admiral Cubillos, Commander, Cartagena Naval Base

    Meeting with President Pastrana and U.S. Ambassador

    Dinner with President Pastrana

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

                Statements by the President of the United States

                                THE WHITE HOUSE

    Office of the Press Secretary,
    (Grand Canyon, Arizona),
    For Immediate Release January 11, 2000.

                           STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

        Today I am announcing an urgently needed, two-year funding
    package to assist Colombia in vital counter-drug efforts aimed
    at keeping illegal drugs off our shores. It will also help
    Colombia promote peace and prosperity and deepen its democracy.
    Building on our current efforts, over this year and next our
    resulting support would total over $1.6 billion.
        President Pastrana's inauguration in August 1998 brought to
    Colombia a new spirit of hope--for deeper democracy, for
    broader prosperity, for an end to that country's long civil
    conflict. But, increased drug production and trafficking,
    coupled with a serious economic recession and sustained
    violence, have put that progress in peril.
        President Pastrana has responded with a bold agenda--Plan
    Colombia. It provides a solid, multifaceted strategy that the
    United States should support with substantial assistance. We
    have a compelling national interest in reducing the flow of
    cocaine and heroin to our shores, and in promoting peace,
    democracy and economic growth in Colombia and the region. Given
    the magnitude of the drug trafficking problem and their current
    economic difficulties, neither the Government of Colombia nor
    its neighbors can carry the full burden alone.
        In Fiscal Year 2000, much of our support will be focused on
    a one-time infusion of funds to help boost Colombia's
    interdiction and eradication capabilities, particularly in the
    south.
        The package will also include assistance for economic
    development, protection of human rights, and judicial reform.
        Our bilateral aid to Colombia will be supplemented by
    multilateral agencies. The World Bank and Inter-American
    Development Bank are considering hundreds of millions of
    dollars in loans for Colombia next year. The IMF has already
    pledged a $2.7 billion Extended Fund facility to help jumpstart
    the economy. And we will also continue to encourage our allies
    to assist Colombia.
        The obstacles to a better future for Colombia are
    substantial. We expect it will require years before the full
    benefits of Plan Colombia are felt. But I believe that with our
    support and that of other donors, Plan Colombia can soon
    accelerate Colombia's nascent economic recovery. Over the
    longer haul, we can expect to see. more effective drug
    eradication and increased interdiction of illicit drug
    shipments.
        Strengthening stability and democracy in Colombia, and
    fighting the drug trade there, is in our fundamental national
    interest. So, with President Pastrana and with our Congress, we
    must and we will intensify this vital work.

                                  ----------

                                THE WHITE HOUSE

    Office of the Press Secretary,
    (Grand Canyon, Arizona),
    For Immediate Release January 11, 2000.

                                   FACT SHEET

                          Colombia Assistance Package

        Colombia and its democratically elected government are
    facing an urgent crisis that has narcotics, military and
    economic dimensions. Narco traffickers in Colombia now supply
    about 80 percent of the cocaine used in the United States.
        Colombian President Andres Pastrana, who took office in
    August 1998, has developed a comprehensive, integrated approach
    to addressing Colombia's problems. Plan Colombia would
    strengthen the Colombian economy and democracy, and fight
    narcotics trafficking. The Colombian government estimates that
    Plan Colombia will cost $7.5 billion and is dedicating $4
    billion of its own resources. It has also asked for the
    participation and help of the United States and other nations.
        The United States has a vital interest in the success of
    this plan. For this reason, the President is proposing an
    expanded comprehensive program; as a result, US support over
    this year and next will total more than $1.6 billion.
        The five major components of U.S. assistance are:

       Helping the Colombian Government push into the coca-
            growing regions of southern Colombia, which are now
            dominated by insurgent guerillas. Funds will help train
            special counter-narcotics battalions, purchase 30
            Blackhawk and 33 Huey helicopters, and provide other
            support.

       Upgrading Colombian capability to aggressively
            interdict cocaine and cocaine traffickers. Funds will
            be used for radar, aircraft and airfield upgrades, and
            improved anti-narcotics intelligence gathering.

       Increasing coca crop eradication. The Administration
            will propose $96 million to purchase equipment that
            will enable the Colombian National Police to eradicate
            more coca and poppy fields.

       Promoting alternative crops and jobs. The
            Administration will propose $145 million over the next
            two years to provide economic alternatives for
            Colombian farmers who now grow coca and poppy plants.

       Increasing protection of human rights, expanding the
            rule of law, and promoting the peace process. The
            Administration will propose $93 million for new
            programs that will help the judicial system, and crack
            down on money laundering.

       This initiative will be submitted as part of the
            President's Budget. It will add to our current support
            of more than $150 million each year a $954 million
            emergency supplemental request for FY 2000, as well as
            an increase of in FY 2001 of $318 million.

        The Administration looks forward to working with Congress
    to help Colombia confront it current problems, while reducing
    the supply of drugs coming to the United States--to help both
    their national interest and our own.

        Excerpt from: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
                        Department of State, March 2000

                                    Colombia

                                   I. Summary

        Colombia produces and distributes more cocaine than any
    other country in the world and is also an important supplier of
    heroin. Colombia bolstered its counternarcotics efforts in 1999
    by extraditing a Colombian citizen to the United States on
    narcotics charges for the first time in nine years. The
    Colombian armed forces activated its elite, U.S.-trained, 931-
    man strong counternarcotics battalion. Additionally, the
    Colombian anti-narcotics police (DIRAN) formed an air-mobile
    interdiction unit, which received United States training, to
    conduct operations with the Colombian military.
        After over a year in office, the Pastrana Administration
    remains committed to its peace dialogue with the largest
    insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
    (FARC). The government's talks with the FARC, which earns
    substantial funds from the drug trade, particularly from
    protection and taxation, have shown few gains thus far. Like
    the guerrillas, the paramilitaries are involved in the drug
    trade and are competing for an ever-greater share.
        The combined U.S./GOC aerial eradication program had a
    successful year in 1999. The program sprayed over 42,000
    hectares of coca and more than 8,000 hectares of opium poppy in
    1999.
        The ``Antinarcotics Directorate'' (DIRAN) of the Colombian
    National Police has continued its record of investigations and
    operations against narcotics trafficking. A cooperative effort
    between the Colombian National Police, the Prosecutor General's
    office (Fiscalia) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
    (DEA) led to the arrest of 30 significant Colombian drug
    traffickers in ``Operation Millennium.'' The United States
    requested the extradition of all 30 suspects and awaits the
    GOC's decision on those requests.
        As in 1998, guerrillas protecting the drug trade ratcheted
    up their attacks on Colombian security forces, and hampered
    counternarcotics operations, particularly in the coca growing
    regions of southern and southeastern Colombia. As Colombia
    struggles to climb out of its worst economic crisis since the
    1930s, the GOC is hard pressed to commit the resources
    necessary to combat the powerful combined threat of drug
    traffickers and guerrilla elements involved in the drug trade.
        Colombia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

                             II. Status of Country

        Colombia remains the world's largest cocaine producer: up
    to three-quarters of the world's cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) is
    processed in Colombia from cocaine base imported from Peru and
    Bolivia and, increasingly, from locally grown coca. Coca
    cultivation in Colombia increased by 20 percent in 1999. Most
    of the increase occurred outside of the eradication areas.
    Although opinions differ over statistical baselines, it is
    generally agreed that despite efforts by the Government of
    Colombia to limit increases, cultivation expanded dramatically
    over the past three years. Estimated coca cultivation increased
    36 percent in 1996, 18 percent in 1997 and 28 percent in 1998.
    Colombia is also a significant supplier of heroin to the United
    States, producing, according to U.S. estimates, six metric tons
    (mt) yearly, virtually all of which is destined for the U.S.
    market.

                   III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999

        Policy Initiatives. In November 1999, Colombia extradited a
    Colombian citizen to the United States for the first time in
    nine years, fulfilling one of the USG's most sought-after, but
    elusive, counternarcotics goals with the GOC. Despite narcotics
    traffickers' attempts to throw up legal roadblocks, and
    bombings possibly linked to the extraditions, the Colombian
    Supreme Court and Pastrana Administration demonstrated their
    willingness to send narcotics traffickers to justice in the
    United States regardless of citizenship.
        In a cooperative anti-narcotics operation with the USG, the
    GOC arrested 30 suspected narcotics traffickers in October 1999
    as a result of ``Operation Millennium.'' This joint operation,
    involved the Colombian National Police, the Colombian
    prosecutor general's office and the DEA. The United States
    requested the extradition of all 30 suspects.
        The GOC succeeded in preserving some, but not all, key
    elements of its ``faceless'' justice system when congress
    approved the new ``specialized'' justice system in June 1999.
    The specialized system no longer protects the identity of
    judges, leading some judges to feel exposed to attempts at
    intimidation. However, the system still protects the identity
    of witnesses and prosecutors in a limited set of crimes such as
    narcotics trafficking, kidnapping and terrorism.
        The asset forfeiture process in Colombia remains stalled.
    Although the GOC has seized millions of dollars worth of
    narcotics trafficker assets, including land, homes, automobiles
    and airplanes, the government has been unable to conclude the
    process and take legal ownership of or auction-off the assets.
        The Colombian Air Force (FAC) is improving its monitoring
    and interdiction abilities. Over the last three years the
    percentage of successful FAC interdiction attempts has
    increased from 25 percent in 1997 to nearly 40 percent in 1999.
    At the same time, the number of suspicious aircraft which radar
    has detected flying to or from Colombia has fallen
    dramatically, from 231 in 1997 to less than 100 in 1999.
        The Colombian National Police successfully implemented a
    civil aviation registration program to curb the use of aircraft
    for drug trafficking. This program inspected 343 aircraft in
    1999, seizing 50 of these for violation of ptotective seals
    that prevent tampering with cargoes.
        In mid-1999, for the first time, the GOC permitted its
    eradication campaign to begin edging into coca-rich Putumayo
    department. The GOC had previously prohibited eradication in
    Putumayo; the mere threat of spraying there in 1996 ignited
    vehement public demonstrations against the government by
    residents of the coca growing areas. The eradication program
    has been careful to enter Putumayo slowly and without fanfare
    to avoid causing a backlash by farmers dependent on the coca
    trade. By November 1999, planes were eradicating fields 20
    miles into the department, allowing them to reach approximately
    30,000 hectares of coca. This has permitted the eradication
    program to enter the fastest growing coca cultivation area in
    the country.
        The eradication program was hindered in 1999 by the
    diversion of escort helicopters for interdiction missions,
    civic unrest in poppy-growing areas that forced the evacuation
    of spray teams, and frequent ground-fire attacks on spray
    planes (resulting, in part, from too few escort aircraft). In
    1999 spray planes suffered 67 hits from ground fire.
    Nonetheless, the program still managed to eradicate more than
    50,000 hectares in 1999.
        The February 1997 shipboarding agreement between the GOC
    and USG streamlined the process for approving the boarding of
    Colombian ships in international waters by U.S. officials and
    has enhanced cooperation with the Colombian Navy. Following
    talks between JIATF-East (USG inter-agency counternarcotics
    task force) and the Colombian Navy, a standing interdiction
    operations plan was signed in September 1999. This plan
    augments the maritime agreement and has led to three U.S.-
    Colombian combined maritime interdiction patrols since May
    1999. The Colombian Navy's counternarcotics efforts however,
    are limited by a lack of adequate resources for patrolling,
    including fuel.
        The USG and GOC have worked to resolve differences
    regarding evidence preparation and delivery in cases where the
    USG is the interdicting authority. In September 1999, U.S. and
    Colombian authorities reached an accommodation concerning the
    evidence required by Colombian prosecutors and other
    evidentiary questions.
        Prison security remains a serious problem in Colombia.
    Overcrowding, lack of administrative acumen and corruption
    among guards plague the system. Almost two percent of inmates
    escape each year. There are 50,000 prisoners in a system with
    capacity for 30,000 and only 1 guard for every 10 prisoners
    (compared with 1 guard for 4 in the U.S.). Violence among
    prisoners is rampant. Due to lax security and permissive
    conditions for prisoners, many convicted traffickers remain
    directly involved in their operations from within prison.
        The Minister of Justice and his director of prisons appear
    committed to reforms. But thus far, the GOC has been more
    inclined to build additional prisons rather than to reform
    prison administration.
        The ``carrot and stick'' approach that couples alternative
    development with aerial eradication is key to Colombia's
    national drug control strategy and to ``Plan Colombia,''
    unveiled by the GOC in September 1999. The National Alternative
    Development Plan (PLANTE) is the agency charged with
    implementing the GOC's alternative development strategy.
    Targeting approximately 35,000 small farmers nationwide, who
    each produce less than three hectares of coca or opium poppy,
    PLANTE focused on linking illicit crop abandonment or
    substitution to markets for the resulting new products or
    services. PLANTE organized strategic alliances with the private
    sector, which provide farmer organizations with risk capital
    and technical assistance in production, product processing and
    marketing.
        As a matter of policy, the GOC does not encourage or
    facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or
    psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the
    laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. The
    Pastrana government has made clear, on many occasions, its
    opposition to official corruption.
        Accomplishments. Law enforcement operations by the
    counternarcotics police and others continue to be the most
    successful element of the GOC counternarcotics program.
    According to the CNP, GOC counternarcotics operations in 1999
    included the seizure of almost 30 metric tons (mt) of cocaine
    HCl and cocaine base; nearly 140 mt of coca leaves; 61 mt of
    marijuana; and 644 kilos of heroin, morphine and opium, the
    destruction of 96 cocaine base labs; 53 cocaine HCl labs and 10
    heroin labs; the capture of over 760 mt of solid precursor
    chemicals and over 890,000 gallons of liquid precursors; the
    seizure of 540 vehicles, 189 boats, 51 aircraft and 422
    weapons; the destruction of 44 clandestine airstrips, and the
    arrest of over 2,200 persons.
        Elite investigative units within the CNP are developing
    long term investigations of trafficker organizations and are
    moving forward on asset forfeiture. The GOC heroin task force
    provided intelligence to effect drug seizures in Colombia and
    assist in U.S.-based investigations. Overall, GOC seizures of
    cocaine and heroin were higher in 1999 than in 1998.
        The level of cooperation between the Colombian military and
    police, and between the services within the military, continued
    to improve in 1999. As in 1998, all of the armed forces
    conducted unilateral and joint counternarcotics operations with
    the police. Cooperation took the form of deployments in areas
    where police face a significant guerrilla threat. The air
    force, army, navy and marines coordinated with the CNP in
    multi-week, joint counternarcotics operations along the Pacific
    coast near the port of Buenaventura. These coordinated forces
    destroyed drug labs, confiscated narcotics and arrested
    individuals involved.
        Furthermore, the Colombian police and army have
    participated in intensive joint training to prepare the army's
    new counternarcotics battalion, which is intended to assist the
    CNP during counternarcotics operations in the coca growing
    regions. The police and army have also agreed to work together
    on tactical operations that involve the new battalion. The co-
    located Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) includes personnel from
    the CNP.
        CNP cooperation, including intelligence sharing with
    international law enforcement entities continued this year. The
    CNP also provided information that led directly to the seizure
    of 30 mt of cocaine HCl outside of Colombian territory in 1999.
        Agreements and Treaties. Colombia ratified the 1988 UN Drug
    Convention in September 1994 and the GOC's National Anti-
    Narcotics Plan of 1998 meets the strategic plan requirements of
    the Convention. Recent reforms have generally brought the
    government into line with the requirements of the Convention.
        In February 1997, the GOC signed a maritime shipboarding
    agreement with the United States. The agreement, which allows
    for faster approval for shipboardings in international waters
    and sets guidelines for improved counternarcotics cooperation
    with the Colombian navy, has been credited with the seizure of
    22 metric tons of cocaine since its signing. In February 1999,
    the Colombian justice system obtained the first convictions of
    individuals prosecuted for seizures related to the maritime
    agreement. However reduced budgets and demands on resources for
    riverine programs south of the Andes limited the navy's
    counternarcotics operations.
        1999 saw substantial improvement in the maritime
    agreement's intelligence and communications exchange process.
    JIATF-East has established direct communication links with
    Colombian navy operations centers in Bogota and Cartagena to
    speed the transfer of tactical interdiction information. The
    navy has also, improved its own ship-to-shore communications.
    Unfortunately, implementation procedures for article 16 of the
    agreement have not been developed. Article 16 permits the
    prosecution of high-seas seizures by U.S. authorities without
    referral to Colombia's legal system and extradition process.
        In September, U.S. and Colombian customs officials signed a
    Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA). The CMAA will
    enhance the countries' ability to share information and
    investigate cases jointly.
        Cultivation and Production. Coca and opium poppy remain the
    principal illicit crops grown in Colombia. In 1998, these crops
    were estimated to be 101,800 hectares and 6,100 hectares
    respectively. In 1999 there were estimated to be 122,500
    hectares of coca and 7,500 hectares of poppy.
        Coca, the predominant illicit crop, is primarily grown in
    two regions on the eastern plains in Guaviare and neighboring
    departments, and along the Ecuadorian and Peruvian borders in
    the departments of Putumayo and Caqueta. Additionally,
    increasing amounts of coca are appearing in the northern
    departments of Bolivar and Norte de Santander. Most opium is
    grown on the eastern slopes of the Central Cordillera Mountains
    in Tolima, Huila and Cauca departments. Limited amounts are
    also found in Norte de Santander, southern Bolivar and
    Antioquia departments.
        Larger and ever more complex cocaine HCl laboratories are
    replacing the less sophisticated labs previously encountered.
    HCl laboratories can be found in all regions of the country,
    but are primarily located in the plains and jungle regions,
    near the coca-growing zones under de facto guerrilla control.
    Numerous laboratories have been identified in extremely remote
    areas that are difficult to reach even by helicopter.
        Most opiate laboratories are small, producing small
    quantities of drugs and using simple equipment and limited
    quantities of precursor chemicals. Colombia accounts for an
    estimated two percent of the world's opium poppy. Nearly all of
    the resulting heroin, however, is destined for the United
    States.
        Marijuana cultivation remained active in 1999, but is not
    believed to have increased significantly. Colombian marijuana
    seizures in the United States are believed to be minimal.
        Drug Flow/Transit. Colombia is the center of the
    international cocaine trade, with drugs flowing out of the
    country at a stable and constant rate. In addition to producing
    large quantities of cocaine base domestically, Colombian
    traffickers import cocaine base, by air and by river, from Peru
    and, to a lesser extent, from Bolivia. The base is converted
    into cocaine HCl at clandestine laboratories in the Colombian
    source zone. Cocaine HCl shipments move out of Colombia
    primarily by commercial maritime vessels (multi-ton loads) and
    general aviation aircraft (400-800 kgs shipments) to Mexico,
    Central America and the Caribbean, typically en route to the
    United States. Cocaine is also concealed in legitimate air and
    sea cargo destined for European ports.
        Recent statistics indicate that approximatels 85 percent of
    the heroin seized by federal authorities in the northeastern
    United States is of Colombian origin. DEA believes that almost
    all of the heroin produced in Colombia goes to the United
    States and is generally smuggled by human couriers on
    commercial airline flights in quantities of one to five
    kilograms.
        Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The National
    Directorate for Narcotics Control administers cost sharing drug
    abuse prevention and education projects with the UNDCP. The
    annual UNDCP budget for Colombia programs is USD five to seven
    million.
        The DNE coordinates GOC demand reduction programs through
    governmental and non-governmental organizations. Demand
    reduction efforts in Colombia faced an uphill battle in 1999 as
    domestic drug consumption continued to rise. Increasing drug
    abuse by Colombians has spurred greater efforts by the DNE to
    publicize the dangers of drug abuse and convince the public
    that local consumption is a problem for Colombia now, not in
    the future. The U.S. Embassy hopes that one result of this
    active media campaign will be that counternarcotics programs in
    general will be more palatable to the Colombian public.
        The priority target group for programs to prevent the use
    of psychoactive substances is male students, ages 12-17, with
    high school level education. New users are located in the
    geographic areas with the highest population densities and
    greater economic development, such as the coffee producing
    region and cities such as Bogota, Medellin and Cali.

                    IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

        Policy Initiatives. The USG continues to place its focus on
    institution building, especially within the law enforcement and
    judicial systems. The counternarcotics legislation passed in
    1997 is an indirect result of advice and studies funded by the
    USG.
        Bilateral Cooperation. Judicial reform in Colombia moves
    forward, albeit at an extremely slow pace. USAID coordinates
    the USG's justice sector reform program in cooperation with the
    Department of Justice (OPDAT and ICITAP). This long-term effort
    is aimed at strengthening the administration of justice in
    Colombia through support and training for judges, prosecutors,
    and investigators. Since 1991, several thousand law enforcement
    officials have received training in basic investigative
    techniques and planning. Recently, OPDAT and ICITAP have
    focused on the development of task force units (teams of
    prosecutors and police) that are charged with investigating
    money laundering, corruption, narcotics and human rights
    violations. Human rights training is an important element of
    the program and has been provided in the United States to some
    program participants. USAID and OPDAT continue to support the
    judicial branch in a challenging effort to establish oral
    trials in a country that has traditionally relied on written
    evidence and the inquisitorial system to resolve cases.
        To reduce the amount of cocaine HCl reaching the U.S., many
    USG programs focus on the Colombian source zone to stop air
    transportation and drug production in this targeted area. This
    focus aims at improving not only bilateral and joint CNP-
    military operations, but multilateral cooperation, as well.
        USG entities, including DEA, FBI, USAID, and training
    elements of the Department of Justice (OPDAT and ICITAP), work
    with GOC law enforcement and judicial entities to increase the
    effectiveness of the Colombian judicial system, developing and
    refining law enforcement capabilities, training host nation
    counterparts, and improving access, fairness and public
    perceptions of the justice system. Thousands of judges,
    prosecutors and investigators have been trained since 1991.
        The U.S. Embassy in Bogota provided the impetus to
    establish a port cargo security program that is now in place at
    all five of Colombia's seaports. The private ports agreed to
    provide $1.5 million per year for the foreseeable future to
    fund 100 specially trained narcotics police who carry out
    inspection and interdiction operations at the ports. This
    private funding complements nominal USG sponsorship. The USG
    monitors performance and provides U.S. Customs Service
    trainers. As a result of this program, the ports have seized
    more than 16 mt of cocaine and 40 mt of marijuana, all at very
    little cost to the USG. Additionally, Colombia is one of seven
    countries participating in the U.S. Customs' Americas Counter
    Smuggling Initiative (ACSI), a program designed to deter
    narcotics smuggling in commercial shipments by enhancing
    private sector security programs at manufacturing and export
    facilities while also seeking to assist law enforcement
    agencies to improve their counternarcotics effectiveness and
    develop private sector partnerships.
        In 1999, the total operating budget for the Narcotics
    Affairs Section (NAS) of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota was $38
    million, with the largest sums going to support CNP air
    operations ($15.3 million) and the crop eradication program
    ($7.7 million). The CNP air wing consists of 47 helicopters and
    20 fixed wing aircraft. The USG-funded private contractor that
    manages the CNP's eradication program operates an additional 12
    helicopters, 9 spray planes, two intelligence-gathering planes
    and several transport planes. In addition to this assistance,
    the USG provided $96 million for the acquisition of six
    BlackHawk helicopters to enhance the CNP's counternarcotics
    capacity. The first three were delivered in November 1999 with
    the remaining three scheduled to arrive in the first quarter of
    2000. The crews and technicians for these new helicopters were
    trained in the United States. The USG is also upgrading the
    CNP's Huey helicopter fleet. The first ten of 25 upgrades were
    performed in 1999 at a cost of $1.4 million each.
        The CNP agreed to an audit of the CNP air services program,
    which receives substantial U.S. assistance. Unfortunately, in
    December 1999, the accounting firm contracted to perform the
    audit backed out, citing security concerns. Nonetheless, the
    CNP's agreement to have the audit performed is a positive step
    and the USG is working to contract another accounting firm for
    the project.
        The GOC also worked with the U.S. Embassy's consular
    section to deny U.S. visas to persons involved or suspected of
    trafficking in drugs or related activities such as money
    laundering.
        In 1999, ICITAP assisted the GOC in developing a unified
    training curriculum for Colombian investigators. In August 1999
    the National Judicial Police Council formally adopted the
    curriculum and made it mandatory for all Colombian
    investigators after January 2000. For the first time, all
    Colombian law enforcement investigators will receive the same
    training.
        The Colombian army's new counternarcotics battalion became
    operational late in 1999. The United States provided training
    and equipment to the 931-man battalion and will assist the GOC
    with the costs of maintaining the elite unit. In 1999, total
    USG assistance relating to the battalion was approximately $7.5
    million. The battalion is expected to commence field operations
    in early 2000.
        The USG also provided 18 UH-1N helicopters to the Colombian
    army to support the new counternarcotics battalion. Helicopter
    operations should begin in early 2000 with full operational
    capability shortly thereafter.
        Using $6 million in supplemental USG funding, the DIRAN,
    with U.S. Embassy assistance, embarked on an ambitious program
    to upgrade security at 16 base sites throughout Colombia.
    Following recommendations by USG security experts, the DIRAN
    enhanced security at all 16 bases. As the program continues,
    the DIRAN will install electronic sensor systems at a number of
    bases.
        In 1999, NAS/INL provided substantial training for CNP
    personnel, including 12 pilots, 37 technicians, 57 ground
    troops and 95 agents of the CNP's new air-mobile unit.
        The Road Ahead. The GOC's ``Plan Colombia'' recognizes the
    interrelated nature of Colombia's counternarcotics efforts and
    its peace process. In 2000, the foremost obstacle to curbing
    narcotics trafficking in Colombia will still be guerrillas who
    depend heavily on the drug trade for their substantial annual
    income. These well-armed rebels violently oppose police
    eradication operations and CNP/military interdiction efforts.
    Some paramilitaries are also involved in the drug trade and
    likewise pose a threat to law enforcement efforts.
        In the year 2000, PLANTE will fund many of these ongoing
    projects from the $15 million alternative development agreement
    signed with the USG in August 1999. Although the number of
    small farmers who have abandoned their illegal trade thus far
    is small, it is hoped that, as PLANTE's market-oriented
    projects take root and spray planes take to the air, an
    increasing number of farmers will see the benefit of getting
    out of coca or poppy cultivation.
        USG programs will continue working with the GOC to solidify
    reforms in the DIRAN and support Colombia's efforts to sustain
    and improve the capability and efficiency of the judicial
    system, which remains one of the weakest links in the
    counternarcotics chain. The USG fully expects that the
    cooperation between U.S. and Colombian law enforcement agencies
    that produced Operation Millennium will continue to show
    results in 2000. The U.S. Embassy is confident that after
    extraditing a Colombian citizen to the United States for the
    first time in 9 years, the GOC will respond favorably on the
    merits to U.S. extradition requests for Colombian nationals and
    others involved in narcotics trafficking. The Colombian
    military's counternarcotics role may broaden in 2000, as its
    first counternarcotics battalion comes on line and as the GOC
    implements plans for additional specialized battalions.
        Resources will be devoted to firming up the Colombian armed
    forces' and police's ability to institutionalize and carry
    forward the training they have received from the United States.
    Priorities will include enhancing the armed forces' capacity to
    conduct field medic training, as well as ground and small units
    training in counternarcotics operations. As Colombia's first
    counternarcotics battalion commences operations, plans continue
    to train and equip additional battalions to strengthen the
    army's counternarcotics capability and expertise.

        Remarks of Andres Pastrana Arango, President of the Republic of
             Colombia, at the American Society of Newspaper Editors

                         WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 12, 2000

        My former colleagues in the media--ladies and gentlemen:
        I am honored to be here today to address the American
    Society of Newspaper Editors at your annual convention. Let me
    thank your president, Christian Anderson, for this generous
    invitation, and all of you for making me feel at home, and for
    easing the anxiety every politician feels standing before a
    large room full of journalists.
        Let me also express my admiration for this society's long
    commitment to upholding the First Amendment, promoting and
    protecting the free flow of information, and nurturing the
    great responsibility that comes with an open and independent
    press. And in this time of unparalleled prosperity and
    leadership for the United States, when our globalizing world
    grows constantly more interconnected, those everywhere who
    believe in freedom are grateful for your work with the Freedom
    Forum, and for your continuing self-examination of how your
    newspapers can better cover the international arena, and bring
    responsible and relevant news to your readers. In the Cold War,
    the United States was deeply concerned with the way it was seen
    by other nations. In the post-Cold War era, other nations are
    concerned about how we are viewed, politically and
    economically, in the United States. We Colombians welcome and
    invite increased interaction with the entire spectrum of your
    media--to exchange ideas, challenge misperceptions, and widen
    understanding.
        The last President of Colombia to speak at your convention
    was Virgilio Barco in 1986. From this platform, President Barco
    made a strong plea for the United States and Latin America to
    do more together in the war on drugs. Here the first steps were
    taken that led to the landmark 1990 drug summit, attended by
    President Bush in Cartagena. The effort marked the beginning of
    the end of the Medellin drug cartel.
        Today, I return here with a similar, urgent call for both
    our nations and the entire international community once again
    to do more in the fight against a new wave of drug trafficking
    and drug violence. I also come here to speak candidly about a
    dangerous problem of misinformation about Colombia. As you know
    better than anyone, in the era of instant information, it can
    be difficult to distinguish impression from truth, and the
    headline of one news cycle from the cycle of history. Today I
    ask you, in a decisive time for my country, to reflect with me
    on the real Colombia . . . our strengths, our problems, our
    resolve, and our prospects.
        In recent months, Colombia has become what truly can be
    called ``a hot topic'' here in the United States. Mike Wallace,
    Dan Rather, Charlie Gibson and Tom Friedman have come to Bogota
    plainly expecting the worst, with a preconceived idea of what
    our country was all about--in a phrase, violence and cocaine.
    Yet they each left with a powerful sense of the character and
    values of the Colombian people, our commitment to peace and
    democracy, and our unbending determination to reforming and
    modernizing our society for the twenty first century.
        What may sometimes be lost in the glare of the media moment
    is the historic truth that Colombia is South America's oldest,
    most resilient democracy, and that we Colombians share your
    long tradition of a free press and open access to information.
    Our newspapers are a powerful, independent influence--something
    we politicians learn again everyday. El Tiempo, the largest
    national daily and one of Latin America's most highly respected
    newspapers, has been at the center of Colombian life for almost
    a century, along with its main competitor, El Espectador. Our
    other major cities--and Colombia has five cities with over one
    million people--each have influential newspapers, and so do
    many smaller communities.
        In reality, it is this regional diversity that defines us
    as a nation. I could also argue that Colombia stands as a
    microcosm for all of Latin America. Consider, just for a
    moment, our geography. Central America ends at our border with
    Panama. From there, to the east, stretch 1000 miles of
    Caribbean coastline, at its center the walled city of
    Cartagena, once the third most powerful city of the Spanish
    Empire, is today a magnet for tourists from around the world.
    To the south, 600 miles along the Pacific Ocean is an area
    still largely undeveloped, with extraordinary potential,
    especially as Asia looks more and more to Latin America. We
    share borders with Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and with Brazil, at
    the very heart and soul of South America, the vast Amazon
    rainforest. Across our entire country, which is the size of
    Texas and California combined, 33 national parks shelter more
    plant and animal species per square mile than anywhere else on
    the planet.
        Yet it is the Andes Mountains, more than anything else,
    that have shaped Colombia as it is today. Most of the Andes,
    like the Rockies or the Alps, are one massive chain, rising
    above a continent. But in Colombia--and only in Colombia--the
    Andes literally branch out into three distinct ranges, with
    altitudes that reach 15,000 feet. Crossing Colombia by car is
    no easy task, and can take many days. The distance traveled in
    a 35 minute flight can take an eight to ten hour drive. No
    wonder Colombia was the first country in all of the Americas
    with a national airline.
        There is an old saying from your old West: ``Give me men
    that match our mountains.'' Colombia has been blessed with a
    people of energy, faith, and enterprise. We have 67 years of
    uninterrupted economic growth, and a pantheon of Colombians who
    have made a difference in the wider world, like Manuel
    Patarroyo, the scientist who has done more than anyone to
    eradicate malaria, or Rodolfo Llinas a worldwide recognized
    neurologist. There is our Nobel Laureate, Gabriel Garcia
    Marquez, whose novel ``One Hundred Years of Solitude'' has sold
    more than 30 million copies in over 40 languages, Fernando
    Botero, whose sculptures have lined Park Avenue and the Champs
    Elysees, Juan Pablo Montoya, our Formula Cart world Champion,
    and Shakira, our amazing Spanish rock superstar.
        I also take pride in reminding people that six out of every
    ten fresh-cut flowers imported to the United States come from
    Colombia, that we are your seventh largest source of crude
    petroleum, and will soon become the world's third largest
    exporter of coal. Such is the Colombia of our history and our
    hopes, a Colombia which today also faces fateful choices.
        The choices, and the crises, are, in my view, often
    misreported and misunderstood. I am regularly surprised and
    sometimes genuinely stunned by what I read in the foreign
    press. When you see your country's name continually misspelled,
    even in the most distinguished newspapers, you naturally worry
    about the rest of the reporting. And even when a wire service
    isn't saying that the United States is being drawn into a
    guerrilla war, some editorial board here is predicting my
    government's imminent collapse. A ripple can too easily be
    mistaken for a wave; the limelight on one event can obscure the
    complicated interplay of underlying events.
        The problem is not one of intentions.I know the need to
    capture and convey drama in a headline or in a news story.
    Still, I ask you to imagine what it is like when El Tiempo or
    our evening TV news reports a standoff between a guerrilla unit
    and an army platoon several miles away from Bogota, and the
    headline in the United States reads: ``Colombia's capital under
    siege.'' For us, every single casualty is cause for national
    concern, but it is not a signal of national collapse.
        To understand modern day Colombia, we must look beyond the
    incidents and see the conditions for what they are--or in this
    case, as they are NOT. For starters, Colombia is not in the
    midst of a civil war, despite what is continually said in the
    international media. Colombians have never referred to this
    conflict as a civil war, for the simple reason that it isn't
    one.
        A civil war occurs in a divided nation, torn apart into
    armed camps of more or less the same size. Ireland. the former
    Yugoslavia and the Congo--these are present day examples of
    civil wars. Colombia's case is dramatically different. There
    are approximately 35,000 well-armed and well-financed
    insurgents, both guerrilla and paramilitary, operating mainly
    in the remote countryside. They have inflicted enormous
    suffering, killing innocent civilians, driving others from
    their homes and villages, and blocking any chance for
    development and progress.
        But the insurgents make up barely one tenth of one percent
    of the total population. Militarily, their tactics are classic
    guerrilla--hit and run, strike and retreat. Every time they
    have faced the Colombian Armed Forces out in the open, they
    have been soundly defeated. And unlike guerrilla movements in
    other places, they have completely failed to convince
    Colombians that they provide a legitimate alternative to our
    tested democracy.
        The guerrilla's roots are in the 1940s and 50s, at the very
    height of the Cold War. In the decades that followed, however,
    their support steadily decreased until today, when the
    guerrillas can claim little more than three- or four-percent
    popular support. Even intellectuals and university students,
    once the bedrock of guerrilla sympathy, have turned against
    them as they wage continuous war on the civilian population.
        The guerillas' loss of support reflects more than the end
    of Cold War confrontation. Colombia today is a much more
    modern, urban and just society than it was a half century ago.
    Ladies and gentlemen, this is not a civil war; and even though
    billions of dollars generated by drug-trafficking sustain the
    violence, the guerillas cannot overthrow our democracy--and no
    one knows this better than they do.
        Yet the talk, so common here in the United States of a
    Colombian government under siege, on the verge of collapse, has
    given rise to another false assumption--namely, that Colombia
    is somehow another Vietnam. A quarter century after the fall of
    Saigon, the shadow of Vietnam understandably continues to shape
    public opinion and influence policy makers.
        But Colombia is no Vietnam, and for many reasons. While
    Vietnam was a divided country and an ideological battlefield--
    its borders imposed by the Geneva Accords of 1954--Colombia is
    a unified nation with a strong national identity, where 95
    percent and more of our citizens believe in democracy, freedom
    of the press, and an open economy. While Vietnam had been a
    colony under foreign domination for over a century, Colombia
    has been a free and independent nation since defeating the
    Spanish empire in 1819. The Vietcong enjoyed significant
    support, while the Colombian insurgents are almost entirely
    without political support or sympathy. Equally important is the
    fact that while Vietnam was a distant Asian country, Colombia
    is an integral part of this hemisphere. Colombia is your
    neighbor, with Bogota roughly the same distance from New York
    as Los Angeles is.
        What must be understood is how drug-trafficking and its
    obscene profits have changed the very nature of our conflict.
    My own opinion--one shared by most Colombians--is that we would
    already be a nation at peace, were it not for the violence and
    corruption fueled by the illegal drug trade. No nation has
    suffered as severely as Colombia from the boom in the demand
    for illegal drugs over the last generation. Rather than fall
    victim to this menace, we have systematically opposed it, taken
    on and destroyed ruthless cartels from Medellin and Cali.
        The cost has been high. Imagine U.S. Supreme Court justices
    murdered in their chambers, or federal judges from Miami, Los
    Angeles or Chicago killed by the scores. Imagine one fifth of
    your FBI and local police forces wounded or killed with their
    wives and children also targeted. Imagine courageous public
    officials--Cabinet Ministers and Mayors, Senators, Governors
    and Presidential candidates--gunned down for giving voice to a
    society that refuses to back down. Imagine being given just ONE
    option, plata o bala--a bribe or a bullet.
        And I ask all of you to imagine newspaper editors,
    publishers and reporters shot in cold blood, their offices
    bombed into rubble, or exiled because they would not be
    intimidated, because they held on to the conviction that was
    worth living for--and all too tragically, all too often worth
    dying for as well.
        Imagine this, my friends, and you get a clear idea of what
    Colombia has endured in this generation. Heroic men and women
    have paid the ultimate price, earning the lasting admiration of
    all Colombians, and we will never forget their sacrifice.
        So we fight on. We push back the forces of violence--and
    then we read that Colombia is on the verge of collapse, of
    becoming a narco-terrorist state. Nothing is further from the
    truth. Indeed, after the break up of the cartels, the nature of
    drug-trafficking has changed dramatically. Unlike the days of
    Pablo Escobar, the drug war has shifted from the cities to the
    Amazon region, particularly the Putumayo. Today, a new breed of
    criminals operates in smaller organizations, underground, with
    closer ties to traffickers in other countries. Indeed, drug
    mafias, too, have become increasingly globalized.
        There is a growing awareness in Colombia, the United
    States, and around the world, that the threat of drug
    trafficking is no longer a national or regional issue. For
    example, the precursor chemicals needed to process cocaine are
    smuggled into Colombia from abroad, while most of the tainted
    profits that drive the drug trade end up invested in financial
    markets abroad. As long as a demand exists, there will be
    suppliers somewhere to meet it. This is why we urgently need
    improvements in education and prevention, as well as more drug
    treatment facilities.
        Colombia's resolve to combat production and distribution
    has not lessened, but intensified. Last October, after months
    of preparation and with the help of your drug enforcement
    agencies, we conducted the most important worldwide drug bust
    in over five years. In Operation Millennium, 30 of the most
    powerful of the new breed of drug traffickers were arrested
    across Colombia and elsewhere. And we have sent those still at
    large the strongest message, in the clearest possible terms:
    Drug-traffickers will never be tolerated in Colombia, and we
    are determined to destroy them and their empires.
        But Colombia cannot and should not continue to bear the
    greatest weight of this global crisis. I have taken the message
    of greater burden sharing in the fight against drugs to the
    international community. President Clinton has committed the
    United States to do more in this crusade. We discussed this at
    our first meeting, in August of 1998, and since then we have
    worked closely to execute a bilateral strategy. Leaders on
    Capitol Hill, Republicans and Democrats alike, have been
    essential in this effort.
        In some quarters, I know there is resistance to U.S.
    assistance for Colombia. The most common argument is that you
    could become, and I quote, ``entangled in a Vietnam-like
    quagmire.'' I would like to make one more point about this--one
    that I cannot emphasize too strongly.
        Implicit in the Vietnam analogy is the belief that the
    United States would end up committing troops to Colombia. But
    that is flat out impossible. Neither your public opinion nor
    ours would support or permit such a move--and neither your
    government nor ours has considered this in even the most
    extreme circumstances. It is simply not on the table, and as
    long as I am President this will not happen. You can quote me
    on that.
        What Colombia has proposed, and your government endorsed,
    is giving us the resources, the hardware and the training
    needed to combat the changing nature of the drug trade. This
    means exposing and penetrating remote jungle areas once beyond
    the sustained reach of our security forces. Earlier on, I spoke
    of our unique geographic make-up and how this has influenced
    our development as a nation. Well, this unique geography also
    plays a critical part in the war against narcotics, where often
    inaccessible areas have become hot beds for cocaine
    production--areas we could not fully control in the past, but
    where our reach is now becoming increasingly stronger.
        Our strategy here is twofold: in the end, we must negotiate
    a meaningful peace agreement with the guerrillas; but from the
    beginning, we must root out the drug-traffickers and the
    violence they cause our society and the damage they do to our
    economy. U.S. assistance is meant to support counter-narcotics
    operations, as well as alternative crop development, economic
    stimulation, and government reform.
        Our strategy is called Plan Colombia, a comprehensive
    blueprint for our future. And while our goal is peace, our
    first order of business has to be the strengthening of our
    institutions, political, judicial and military. No peace
    process can succeed without the institutional strength to
    support it. Above all, our democratic institutions must serve
    the people, and this means guaranteeing their fundamental human
    rights.
        Plan Colombia's cost is estimated at 7.5 billion dollars
    over three years. My government is pledged to providing 4
    billion, while actively seeking additional support from the
    international community. In addition to the Clinton
    Administration's assistance package, we will be meeting with
    European leaders at a conference this July in Spain.
        I have called our efforts ``Diplomacy for Peace''--because
    if we have learned anything from the recent progress in
    Northern Ireland, Central America, and the Middle East, it is
    that the international community must be actively engaged in
    order for peace to prevail.
        A Colombia at peace is in everyone's interest. Not only
    will it bring an end to the violence and human rights
    violations, so those displaced from their homes can return to
    them unafraid. A Colombia at peace also depends on more
    effective counter-narcotics operations, in terms of both
    interdiction and alternative crops for subsistence farmers.
    That means not only less violence on our streets, but less
    drug-trafficking on yours. Every shipment of drugs we stop in
    Colombia is a shipment that doesn't reach American
    neighborhoods, playgrounds, and schools.
        In Colombia, the last year and a half has witnessed
    dramatic steps forward in the name of peace. Never in our
    history has there been such a commitment, from all sectors of
    our society, to bring a lasting end to the violence and an
    honorable end to the insurgency.
        Only days after my election, I flew to the jungle to meet
    with the leaders of FARC, the oldest and largest guerrilla
    group. I was the first President to do so. Since then, we have
    agreed to a twelve point agenda for negotiations. And only last
    month, government and guerrilla delegations traveled in Europe
    together, in order to show the guerrillas, who have lived in
    almost total seclusion for decades, how the world has changed
    and the wide range of new social democratic models.
        More recently, last weekend we started with the public
    hearings procedure, which will give citizens the chance to make
    their contributions to the peace process.
        At the same time, Richard Grasso, Chairman of the New York
    Stock Exchange, Congressman Bill Delahunt of Massachusetts, Jim
    Kimsey, founder of America Online, and Joe Robert are just a
    few of those who have met with the guerrilla leaders, carrying
    a realistic message of progress and development, of the shared
    prosperity that can come with peace. Such exchanges go a long
    way to remove outdated stereotypes and suspicions. They show
    the guerrillas the intentions of the international community,
    the opportunities available to a united, peaceful Colombia, and
    the potent fact that guerrilla warfare has no part in a modern
    nation.
        Perhaps more important have been the strides on the
    domestic front. A little over a year ago, more than 10 million
    Colombians--almost one third of the entire country--marched
    peacefully through our streets, calling for a negotiated end to
    the insurgency. And just as Plan Colombia recognizes the need
    for strong, accountable institutions to sustain any peace
    agreement, we are convinced that only by engaging civil society
    as a whole--labor unions and business executives, teachers and
    health care workers, farmers and truck drivers--only then can
    we meet everyone's legitimate needs.
        Equally important is the economy. Job creation, low
    inflation and interest rates, sustained GDP growth--all of this
    plays a decisive role in strengthening our society. So does
    expanding trade and attracting more foreign investment--another
    way the international community can help. The sheer size of our
    economy--around $86 billion dollars--makes Colombia one of the
    largest and most attractive markets for U.S. trade and
    investment in all the Americas. Bilateral trade with the U.S.
    exceeded $8 billion dollars last year. There are over 120 U.S.
    companies operating successfully in Colombia, most of them for
    many decades. Political strength and economic health are bound
    together. At the end of the day, Colombia cannot be a nation at
    peace if it is not a nation in prosperity.
        Plan Colombia also includes the most ambitious and
    organized strategy of social reform that has ever been proposed
    in the country. The purpose of this reform is to create new and
    better opportunities for progress for the poorest Colombians.
        This component of Plan Colombia includes on the one hand,
    the Social Emergency Fund made up of three basic programs:
    ``Hands to work,'' ``Subsidy for Poor Families,'' and
    ``Training for the Unemployed Youth.'' All of these programs
    geared toward creating a better quality of life for the most
    needy through investment in health, education and job creation.
        On the other hand, we will assign more than $2 billion
    dollars for Alternative Development and Human Rights and
    Humanitarian Aid programs. The first program seeks to go beyond
    crop substitution by promoting a comprehensive regional
    development strategy that will generate legal work alternatives
    for Colombian peasants. In matters of Human Rights and
    Humanitarian Aid, we intend to improve the mechanisms for the
    respect and protection of these rights and the attention of the
    victims of the armed conflict with special emphasis on
    displaced people.
        One the main enemies we face to make Colombia a peaceful
    and prosper nation is corruption. This terrible cancer, on one
    hand, undermines the legitimacy of the Government and, on the
    other, subverts social ethics, creating a vicious cycle of
    mistrust and despair.
        For instance, a large corruption scandal was recently
    uncovered in our Congress, thanks to my government's
    accusations. As a result, a very serious investigation is being
    carried out to uncover those responsible.
        However, the magnitude of this case demands a more profound
    response, one that assures this will never happen again. It is
    necessary to make a radical reform of our political system, and
    especially of the legislative branch.
        For that reason, last week, based on our Constitution and
    our laws, I proposed to the Colombian people a referendum, in
    which they will vote for a change for honesty and transparency
    in the way of doing politics. More than 90% of the Colombian
    people have expressed their support for this initiative, which
    I am sure will serve as the cornerstone of the transformation
    of our democratic system.
        In closing, I would like to extend to all of you, as
    leaders in American journalism, an open invitation to visit
    Colombia. Talking about misperceptions will do little unless
    you are given first-hand access. Our problems are formidable,
    yet our nationwide determination to overcome them is making a
    difference. I want nothing more than to demonstrate that our
    resolve and our progress are much more than words delivered
    from a podium.
        Behind my invitation stands a big, bold and beautiful land.
    It is a land full of people who would welcome you in their
    homes and neighborhoods, villages and schools, their soccer
    fields, offices and places of worship. You will hear stories of
    great success and serious struggle. You will witness sorrow
    mixed with joy. And only then will you understand the real
    Colombia.
        By helping us, I believe that in the truest sense you also
    help your own country. Only provide us with the tools and we
    will do the job. I thank you for the opportunity to speak here
    today, and I hope for a new beginning in the way you see and
    report Colombia.

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